The Encyclopedia of Religion

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Abbreviations and Symbols Used in This Work

abbr. abbreviated; abbreviation
abr. abridged; abridgment
AD *anno Domini*, in the year of the (our) Lord
Afrik. Afrikaans
AH *anno Hegirae*, in the year of the Hijrah
Akk. Akkadian
Ala. Alabama
Alb. Albanian
Am. *Amos*
AM *ante meridiem*, before noon
amend. amended; amendment
annot. annotated; annotation
Ap. *Apocalypse*
Apn. *Apocryphon*
app. appendix
Arab. Arabic
'Arakh. *'Arakhin*
Aram. Aramaic
Ariz. Arizona
Ark. Arkansas
Arm. Armenian
art. article (pl., arts.)
AS Anglo-Saxon
Asm. Mos. *Assumption of Moses*
Assyr. Assyrian
A.S.S.R. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
Av. Avestan
'A.Z. *'Avodah zarah*
b. born
Bab. Babylonian
Ban. Bantu
1 Bar. *1 Baruch*
2 Bar. *2 Baruch*
3 Bar. *3 Baruch*
4 Bar. *4 Baruch*
B.B. *Bava' batra'*
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BC before Christ
BCE before the common era
B.D. Bachelor of Divinity
Beits. *Beitsah*
Bekh. *Bekhorot*
Beng. Bengali
Ber. *Berakhot*
Berb. Berber
Bik. *Bikkurim*
bk. book (pl., bks.)
B.M. *Bava' metsi'a'*
BP before the present
B.Q. *Bava' qamma'*
Brāh. *Brāhmaṇa*
Bret. Breton
B.T. Babylonian Talmud
Bulg. Bulgarian
Burm. Burmese
c. *circa*, about, approximately
Calif. California
Can. Canaanite
Catal. Catalan
CE of the common era
Celt. Celtic
cf. *confer*, compare
Chald. Chaldean
chap. chapter (pl., chaps.)
Chin. Chinese
C.H.M. Community of the Holy Myrrhbearers
1 Chr. *1 Chronicles*
2 Chr. *2 Chronicles*
Ch. Slav. Church Slavic
cm centimeters
col. column (pl., cols.)
Col. *Colossians*
Colo. Colorado
comp. compiler (pl., comps.)
Conn. Connecticut
cont. continued
Copt. Coptic
1 Cor. *1 Corinthians*
2 Cor. *2 Corinthians*
corr. corrected
C.S.P. Congregatio Sancti Pauli, Congregation of Saint Paul (Paulists)
d. died
D Deuteronomic (source of the Pentateuch)
Dan. Danish
D.B. Divinitatis Baccalaureus, Bachelor of Divinity
D.C. District of Columbia
D.D. Divinitatis Doctor, Doctor of Divinity
Del. Delaware
Dem. *Dema'i*
dim. diminutive
diss. dissertation
Dn. *Daniel*
D.Phil. Doctor of Philosophy
Dt. *Deuteronomy*
Du. Dutch
E Elohist (source of the Pentateuch)
Eccl. *Ecclesiastes*
ed. editor (pl., eds.); edition; edited by
'Eduy. *'Eduyyot*
e.g. *exempli gratia*, for example
Egyp. Egyptian
1 En. *1 Enoch*
2 En. *2 Enoch*
3 En. *3 Enoch*
Eng. English
enl. enlarged
Eph. *Ephesians*
'Eruv. *'Eruvin*
1 Esd. *1 Esdras*
2 Esd. *2 Esdras*
3 Esd. *3 Esdras*
4 Esd. *4 Esdras*
esp. especially
Est. Estonian
Est. *Esther*
et al. *et alii*, and others
etc. *et cetera*, and so forth
Eth. Ethiopic
EV English version
Ex. *Exodus*
exp. expanded
Ez. *Ezekiel*
Ezr. *Ezra*
2 Ezr. *2 Ezra*
4 Ezr. *4 Ezra*
f. feminine; and following (pl., ff.)
fasc. fascicle (pl., fascs.)
fig. figure (pl., figs.)
Finn. Finnish
fl. *floruit*, flourished
Fla. Florida
Fr. French
frag. fragment
ft. feet
Ga. Georgia
Gal. *Galatians*
Gaul. Gaulish
Ger. German
Giṭ. *Giṭṭin*
Gn. *Genesis*
Gr. Greek
Ḥag. *Ḥagigah*
Ḥal. *Ḥallah*
Hau. Hausa
Hb. *Habakkuk*
Heb. Hebrew
Heb. *Hebrews*
Hg. *Haggai*
Hitt. Hittite
Hor. *Horayot*
Hos. *Hosea*
Ḥul. *Ḥullin*
Hung. Hungarian
ibid. *ibidem*, in the same place (as the one immediately preceding)
Icel. Icelandic
i.e. *id est*, that is
IE Indo-European
Ill. Illinois
Ind. Indiana
intro. introduction
Ir. Gael. Irish Gaelic
Iran. Iranian
Is. *Isaiah*
Ital. Italian
J Yahvist (source of the Pentateuch)
Jas. *James*
Jav. Javanese
Jb. *Job*
Jdt. *Judith*
Jer. *Jeremiah*
Jgs. *Judges*
Jl. *Joel*
Jn. *John*
1 Jn. *1 John*
2 Jn. *2 John*
3 Jn. *3 John*
Jon. *Jonah*
Jos. *Joshua*
Jpn. Japanese
JPS Jewish Publication Society translation (1985) of the Hebrew Bible
J.T. Jerusalem Talmud
Jub. *Jubilees*
Kans. Kansas
Kel. *Kelim*

Ker. *Keritot*
Ket. *Ketubbot*
1 Kgs. *1 Kings*
2 Kgs. *2 Kings*
Khois. Khoisan
Kil. *Kil'ayim*
km kilometers
Kor. Korean
Ky. Kentucky
l. line (pl., ll.)
La. Louisiana
Lam. *Lamentations*
Lat. Latin
Latv. Latvian
L. en Th. Licencié en Théologie, Licentiate in Theology
L. ès L. Licencié ès Lettres, Licentiate in Literature
Let. Jer. *Letter of Jeremiah*
lit. literally
Lith. Lithuanian
Lk. *Luke*
LL Late Latin
LL.D. Legum Doctor, Doctor of Laws
Lv. *Leviticus*
m meters
m. masculine
M.A. Master of Arts
Ma'as. *Ma'aserot*
Ma'as. Sh. *Ma'aser sheni*
Mak. *Makkot*
Makh. *Makhshirin*
Mal. *Malachi*
Mar. Marathi
Mass. Massachusetts
1 Mc. *1 Maccabees*
2 Mc. *2 Maccabees*
3 Mc. *3 Maccabees*
4 Mc. *4 Maccabees*
Md. Maryland
M.D. Medicinae Doctor, Doctor of Medicine
ME Middle English
Meg. *Megillah*
Me'il. *Me'ilah*
Men. *Menaḥot*
MHG Middle High German
mi. miles
Mi. *Micah*
Mich. Michigan
Mid. *Middot*
Minn. Minnesota
Miq. *Miqva'ot*
MIran. Middle Iranian
Miss. Mississippi
Mk. *Mark*
Mo. Missouri
Mo'ed Q. *Mo'ed qaṭan*
Mont. Montana
MPers. Middle Persian
MS. *manuscriptum*, manuscript (pl., MSS)
Mt. *Matthew*
MT Masoretic text
n. note
Na. *Nahum*
Nah. Nahuatl
Naz. *Nazir*
N.B. *nota bene*, take careful note
N.C. North Carolina
n.d. no date
N.Dak. North Dakota
NEB New English Bible
Nebr. Nebraska
Ned. *Nedarim*
Neg. *Nega'im*
Neh. *Nehemiah*
Nev. Nevada
N.H. New Hampshire
Nid. *Niddah*
N.J. New Jersey
Nm. *Numbers*
N.Mex. New Mexico
no. number (pl., nos.)
Nor. Norwegian
n.p. no place
n.s. new series
N.Y. New York
Ob. *Obadiah*
O.Cist. Ordo Cisterciencium, Order of Cîteaux (Cistercians)
OCS Old Church Slavonic
OE Old English
O.F.M. Ordo Fratrum Minorum, Order of Friars Minor (Franciscans)
OFr. Old French
Ohal. *Ohalot*
OHG Old High German
OIr. Old Irish
OIran. Old Iranian
Okla. Oklahoma
ON Old Norse
O.P. Ordo Praedicatorum, Order of Preachers (Dominicans)
OPers. Old Persian
op. cit. *opere citato*, in the work cited
OPrus. Old Prussian
Oreg. Oregon
'Orl. *'Orlah*
O.S.B. Ordo Sancti Benedicti, Order of Saint Benedict (Benedictines)
p. page (pl., pp.)
P Priestly (source of the Pentateuch)
Pa. Pennsylvania
Pahl. Pahlavi
Par. *Parah*
para. paragraph (pl., paras.)
Pers. Persian
Pes. *Pesaḥim*
Ph.D. Philosophiae Doctor, Doctor of Philosophy
Phil. *Philippians*
Phlm. *Philemon*
Phoen. Phoenician
pl. plural; plate (pl., pls.)
PM *post meridiem*, after noon
Pol. Polish
pop. population
Port. Portuguese
Prv. *Proverbs*
Ps. *Psalms*
Ps. 151 *Psalm 151*
Ps. Sol. *Psalms of Solomon*
pt. part (pl., pts.)
1 Pt. *1 Peter*
2 Pt. *2 Peter*
Pth. Parthian
Q hypothetical source of the synoptic Gospels
Qid. *Qiddushin*
Qin. *Qinnim*
r. reigned; ruled
Rab. *Rabbah*
rev. revised
R. ha-Sh. *Ro'sh ha-shanah*
R.I. Rhode Island
Rom. Romanian
Rom. *Romans*
R.S.C.J. Societas Sacratissimi Cordis Jesu, Religious of the Sacred Heart
RSV Revised Standard Version of the Bible
Ru. *Ruth*
Rus. Russian
Rv. *Revelation*
Rv. Ezr. *Revelation of Ezra*
San. *Sanhedrin*
S.C. South Carolina
Scot. Gael. Scottish Gaelic
S.Dak. South Dakota
sec. section (pl., secs.)
Sem. Semitic
ser. series
sg. singular
Sg. *Song of Songs*
Sg. of 3 *Prayer of Azariah and the Song of the Three Young Men*
Shab. *Shabbat*
Shav. *Shavu'ot*
Sheq. *Sheqalim*
Sib. Or. *Sibylline Oracles*
Sind. Sindhi
Sinh. Sinhala
Sir. *Ben Sira*
S.J. Societas Jesu, Society of Jesus (Jesuits)
Skt. Sanskrit
1 Sm. *1 Samuel*
2 Sm. *2 Samuel*
Sogd. Sogdian
Soṭ *Soṭah*
sp. species (pl., spp.)
Span. Spanish
sq. square
S.S.R. Soviet Socialist Republic
st. stanza (pl., ss.)
S.T.M. Sacrae Theologiae Magister, Master of Sacred Theology
Suk. *Sukkah*
Sum. Sumerian
supp. supplement; supplementary
Sus. *Susanna*
s.v. *sub verbo*, under the word (pl., s.v.v.)
Swed. Swedish
Syr. Syriac
Syr. Men. *Syriac Menander*
Ta'an. *Ta'anit*
Tam. Tamil
Tam. *Tamid*
Tb. *Tobit*
T.D. *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*, edited by Takakusu Junjirō et al. (Tokyo, 1922–1934)
Tem. *Temurah*
Tenn. Tennessee
Ter. *Terumot*
Ṭev. Y. *Ṭevul yom*
Tex. Texas
Th.D. Theologicae Doctor, Doctor of Theology
1 Thes. *1 Thessalonians*
2 Thes. *2 Thessalonians*
Thrac. Thracian
Ti. *Titus*
Tib. Tibetan
1 Tm. *1 Timothy*
2 Tm. *2 Timothy*
T. of 12 *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*
Toh. *Ṭohorot*
Tong. Tongan
trans. translator, translators; translated by; translation
Turk. Turkish
Ukr. Ukrainian
Upan. *Upaniṣad*
U.S. United States
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Uqts. *Uqtsin*
v. verse (pl., vv.)
Va. Virginia
var. variant; variation
Viet. Vietnamese
viz. *videlicet*, namely
vol. volume (pl., vols.)
Vt. Vermont
Wash. Washington
Wel. Welsh
Wis. Wisconsin
Wis. *Wisdom of Solomon*
W.Va. West Virginia
Wyo. Wyoming
Yad. *Yadayim*
Yev. *Yevamot*
Yi. Yiddish
Yor. Yoruba
Zav. *Zavim*
Zec. *Zechariah*
Zep. *Zephaniah*
Zev. *Zevaḥim*

* hypothetical
? uncertain; possibly; perhaps
° degrees
\+ plus
− minus
= equals; is equivalent to
× by; multiplied by
→ yields

M

(CONTINUED)

MOABITE RELIGION. In geographical terms, *Moab* is the name given to that part of the Transjordanian plateau located immediately east of the Dead Sea. The southern boundary of Moabite territory was fixed by the river Zered (modern Wadi al-Hasa), but Moab's northern border was not so stable. In periods of strength, Moabite control extended to the environs of Heshbon (modern Ḥisbān, Jordan), a line running a few miles north of the Dead Sea's northern shore. In times of weakness, Moabite control was reduced to the region between the Zered and the river Arnon (modern Wadi al-Mawjib). Properly speaking, Moab included only the narrow agricultural strip between the western edge of the plateau and the western fringe of the Syrian desert.

In the present article, the term *Moabite* refers to the people who inhabited this tiny kingdom from near the end of the Late Bronze Age until the end of the Iron Age (c. 1300–600 BCE). The Moabites undoubtedly inherited some religious elements from their Bronze Age predecessors, whose religion was probably similar to that practiced by the Canaanites. Like their Judean, Ammonite, and Edomite neighbors, the Moabites lost their autonomy during the Babylonian invasion of the early sixth century BCE. The Moabite kingdom never reappeared, and with the arrival of new religions (Nabatean, Greek, and so on), the religion of the Moabites became extinct.

Sources. When compared with the sources available for the investigation of many ancient Near Eastern religions, the sources for the study of Moabite religion are meager. In general, the relevant data come from two kinds of sources, archaeological and textual. Although the archaeological evidence consists of various types of artifacts, most of this evidence is open to a wide range of interpretation. Even some of the written sources are ambiguous. Few texts deal directly with Moabite religion, and much of the information about it must be inferred from texts written by other peoples.

Without question, the two most important sources are the Mesha Inscription (MI)—inscribed on a memorial stela (the so-called Moabite Stone) circa 830 BCE by King Mesha of Moab to celebrate his victories over Israel—and the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament). While the textual and archaeological sources do not provide enough data for a detailed reconstruction of Moabite religion, a general treatment is possible.

Pantheon. Some scholars assume that the Israelite concept of Yahveh as a national deity was paralleled by the Ammonite, Moabite, and Edomite concepts of Milcom (Molech), Kemosh (Chemosh), and Qaus, respectively. While this comparative approach has merit, each of these ethnic religions is different from the others, and the theology of each religion must be understood in its own terms.

Kemosh. Discussion of the Moabite pantheon must begin with Kemosh, the major god of Moab. Indeed, Kemosh may be viewed as the national god of the Moabites, although it is likely that this people also worshiped other deities throughout their entire history. As important as Kemosh was in Moab, the Moabites were not the only ancient people who honored him.

A god named Kamish appears in tablets listing the deities of Ebla, a Syrian city-state whose royal archives date to circa 2500 BCE. Indeed, Kamish was one of the principal deities at Ebla. Gods with similar names are also known from a tablet found at Ugarit, a North Syrian city that flourished from the fifteenth to thirteenth centuries BCE, and from a Babylonian god-list of the second millennium BCE. The ancient and widespread appearances of these names indicate that Kemosh was part of a broader pantheon with which many Near Eastern peoples were familiar.

Knowledge about the Moabites' understanding of Kemosh's nature and function comes from a variety of sources. The name *Kemosh* appears in the Mesha Inscription twelve times; in most instances, Kemosh is portrayed as the commander of Mesha's war against the Israelites. In the Babylonian god-list mentioned above,

Kemosh is associated with Nergal, a Mesopotamian god of war and death. Some scholars emphasize Kemosh's warlike character by associating him with Ares, the Greek god of war. For example, the warrior depicted on a coin found at Areopolis (modern Rabba, Jordan) has been identified as Kemosh; he has also been equated with the javelin-wielding figure on the Shihan Warrior Stela, dating from the ninth or eighth century BCE, which was found near Jebel Shihan in central Moab. Of course, these claims are highly speculative.

No less speculative is the theory that the Balu' Stela, dating from the twelfth or eleventh century BCE, which was also found in central Moab, portrays a worshiper standing before Kemosh and his consort. Some scholars who support this hypothesis also believe that the presence of a sun disk and crescent moon on the monument may indicate that these two figures represent astral deities. In actuality, there is no artistic portrayal that can be identified with Kemosh with any certainty. That such representations existed is not unlikely, and *Jeremiah* 48:7 may imply the existence of such an image.

Judges 11:24 has been interpreted as equating Kemosh with Milcom, who is usually understood as the chief god of the Ammonites. This interpretation also suggests that *Milcom* was a title for Kemosh ("the king") and that in reality it was Kemosh who was worshiped by both the Moabites and the Ammonites. Alternatively, it is possible that the Hebrew historian made an error or that the reference to the Ammonites is an interpolation.

However his character was understood, there is no question about Kemosh's elevated status in Moabite life. This fact is seen in the frequency with which his name appears as an element in Moabite names (e.g., *Kemosh-nadab*, *Kemosh-yeḥi*, *Kemosh-tsedeq*, *Kemosh-yat*).

Ashtar-Kemosh. An important datum for the study of Moabite religion is the Mesha Inscription's reference to a deity with the compound name *Ashtar-Kemosh*. Such compound names are not unusual in ancient Near Eastern religious texts. Although the exact identity of this deity is uncertain, the explanations fall into two basic categories: (1) *Ashtar-Kemosh* is the name of Kemosh's consort, the goddess who was thought of as his female counterpart (e.g., the goddess Ishtar or Astarte); and (2) *Ashtar-Kemosh* is simply a compound name for Kemosh and points to the identification of Kemosh with Athtar (i.e., Ashtar), the Canaanite god of the morning star. Since the Mesha Inscription contains eleven other references to Kemosh, it seems likely that *Ashtar-Kemosh* is another name for the chief Moabite god. The question remains as to whether Athtar and Kemosh were totally equated or were simply associated by reason of their character or cult.

Other Moabite deities. Additional members of the Moabite pantheon might have included the Babylonian god Nabu, whose name may be reflected in the place-name *Nebo*, and the Canaanite god Baal. While it cannot be determined whether the name *Baal* ("lord") refers to the Canaanite god or to his local manifestation (Kemosh?), the name or title survived in the divine name *Baal-peor* (cf. *Nm.* 25:1–9) and in several Moabite place-names: *Bamoth-baal (Beth-bamoth?)*, *Beth-baal-meon* (cf. *Baal-meon*), and *Beth-baal-peor* (cf. *Beth-peor*).

A number of animal and human figurines dating from the tenth through the eighth century BCE have been found at Moabite sites. Given the cultic use of similar objects in neighboring lands, it is likely that some of these figurines had religious significance, perhaps representing votive offerings, priests or priestesses, and/or gods and goddesses.

Temples and Altars. To give thanks for his victory over Israel, Mesha constructed a high place for Kemosh in Qarhoh (MI, lines 3–4), which was probably a part of Mesha's capital, Dibon (modern Dhiban, Jordan). The last line on a fragmentary inscription found at Dibon can be read *beth Kemosh*, "temple of Kemosh." Taken together, these two references may indicate that there was a temple for Kemosh in Dibon, not just an altar. Indeed, the 1955 excavations at this site revealed the foundations of a building whose size, location, and associated artifacts suggest that it might have been a temple. Among the artifacts recovered near this structure was a fragment of an incense stand. Another inscription dating from the ninth century BCE, found at Kir-hareseth (modern al-Karak, Jordan), implies that there was a sanctuary of Kemosh in Kir-hareseth. (Two additional references to a sanctuary built for Kemosh are found in *1 Kings* 11:7–8 and *2 Kings* 23:13.)

Sacrifices. The Old Testament provides most of the data pertaining to Moabite sacrificial practices. In an effort to rid Moab of the Hebrew intruders, *Numbers* 22:40–23:30 records, King Balak, in the company of the Mesopotamian diviner Balaam, made offerings of oxen, bulls, sheep, and rams; the passage implies that these sacrifices were made to a local manifestation of Baal. Indeed, *Numbers* 25:1–5 describes the sacrifices and orgiastic rites that the Israelites and Moabites performed in honor of Baal of Peor. A more general reference to Moabite sacrificial offerings and the burning of incense is found in *Jeremiah* 48:35.

An extraordinary offering is reported in *2 Kings* 3:27. When besieged in Kir-hareseth by a formidable coali-

tion, King Mesha sacrificed his firstborn son. Believing that Mesha's desperate act would be efficacious, his enemies fled in fear that the local god, probably Kemosh, would support the Moabite cause.

Priests and Prophets. While *Jeremiah* 48:7 refers to the priests of Kemosh, a Moabite priesthood is otherwise unknown. Indeed, the priestly function of offering sacrifices seems to have been performed by the Moabite kings, a practice that was also known among the Canaanites.

The story of Balaam, the foreign seer who was hired by King Balak to pronounce a curse upon the Israelites, indicates that diviners were known and used by the Moabites (cf. *Nm.* 22–24). Indeed, the expression "Kemosh said to me," which appears twice in the Mesha Inscription (lines 14, 32), may point to the presence of oracles or prophets in Mesha's court. Alternatively, this formula may imply that Mesha's kingship entitled him to direct revelation from Kemosh.

Divine Intervention. The Old Testament refers to the Moabites as the "people of Kemosh" (*Nm.* 21:29, *Jer.* 48:46), a designation that was probably used by the Moabites themselves. Both the Old Testament and the Mesha Inscription maintain that a nation's god gives his people their land; both of these sources also claim that the loss of the deity's goodwill can produce catastrophe in human society. Specifically, the Mesha Inscription (line 5) notes that it was Kemosh's anger with his people that caused the Israelite domination over Moab. Although Kemosh's blessings were probably sought in all aspects of life, his intervention in human affairs became most evident in times of war.

Warfare and ḥerem. As was the practice of many ancient peoples, the vengeful war of Mesha was conducted in the name of religion. The enemies of Mesha were identified with the enemies of Kemosh, and, according to the Mesha Inscription, it was the participation of this god in Mesha's campaigns that brought victory. In both general ideology and specific terminology, the inscription's vivid account of a divinely sanctioned war finds close parallels in the Old Testament (e.g., *Jos.* 8:1, *Jgs.* 4:14–15, *1 Sm.* 23:4, *2 Kgs.* 3:18).

Neither the Mesha Inscription nor the Old Testament recounts "holy war" in the proper sense, but both of these sources reflect a belief that battles are often fought under the aegis of the sacred. Accordingly, victory over one's opponents should produce thanksgiving. While it was assumed that Mesha's recapture of Moabite towns pleased Kemosh, the victors' gratitude was most clearly demonstrated in the practice of *ḥerem*, or consecration of the defeated populace to destruction. (The same verbal root, *ḥrm*, meaning "ban" or "destroy utterly," occurs in line 17 of the Mesha Inscription and in numerous Old Testament passages.) As an act of devotion to Ashtar-Kemosh, Mesha took Ataroth and Nebo and slaughtered their Israelite inhabitants (MI, lines 11–12, 14–18). This practice is closely paralleled by accounts in the Old Testament (e.g., *Dt.* 7:2, 20:16–17; *Jos.* 6:17–19, 21; *1 Sm.* 15:3). Fulfillment of the *ḥerem* is also found in Mesha's reference to the presentation of Arel before Kemosh (MI, lines 12–13) and in the execution of Agag (*1 Sm.* 15:13).

Afterlife. Though there is no written evidence that relates to a Moabite concept of the afterlife, the Moabites were obviously concerned about proper burial of the dead. This is illustrated in the well-made and elaborately furnished tombs found at Dibon, tombs that date approximately to the time of Mesha. Since Kemosh was sometimes named in association with gods of death and the underworld, it is possible that the Moabites believed that an individual's existence did not end with death and burial.

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Although it is seriously outdated at a number of points, the most comprehensive study on Moabite history and culture remains A. H. van Zyl's *The Moabites* (Leiden, 1960). Van Zyl's chapter on Moabite religion is a convenient point of departure for anyone investigating this subject. More recent and less speculative is J. R. Bartlett's "The Moabites and Edomites," pages 229–258 in *Peoples of Old Testament Times*, edited by D. J. Wiseman (Oxford, 1973). The detailed footnotes and bibliography that follow this excellent synthesis are quite helpful. A classic treatment of Transjordanian history and archaeology is found in Nelson Glueck's *The Other Side of the Jordon*, rev. ed. (Winona Lake, Ind., 1970). Glueck's pioneering study is supplemented by Rudolph Henry Dornemann's *The Archaeology of the Transjordan in the Bronze and Iron Ages* (Milwaukee, 1983), a massive compilation of archaeological data. This book contains excellent discussions on Iron Age figurines, sculpture, and tomb remains, all of which relate to the study of Moabite religion. A standard translation of the Mesha Inscription is William F. Albright's "The Moabite Stone," pages 320–321 in *Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament*, 3d ed., edited by James B. Pritchard (Princeton, 1969). Important for its comments on the religious significance of this text is Edward Ullendorff's "The Moabite Stone," pages 195–198 in *Documents from Old Testament Times*, translated and edited by D. Winton Thomas (New York, 1961). A valuable study of the Mesha and al-Karak inscriptions is found in volume 1, *Hebrew and Moabite Inscriptions*, of John C. L. Gibson's *Textbook of Syrian Semitic Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1971). This volume includes Gibson's reconstruction of the original texts, introductory material, and technical notes, as well as translations.

GERALD L. MATTINGLY

MODERN ART. To most observers, visual art in the twentieth century has seemed sheltered from the religious confusions and aspirations of its time. Long since liberated from the role of "handmaiden of religion" and liberated in the early twentieth century from its traditional role as a mirror of nature, art has seemed to follow the dual agenda of formal exploration on the one hand and of arousing public controversy through the bold innovations of avant-garde movements on the other. Critics have not failed to notice in the writings, recorded conversations, and works of a number of major artists the signs of religious and philosophical concern, and some have built their critical perspectives around this evidence. As a general rule, however, art criticism and in turn public opinion have proved unable to sustain interest in this aspect of modern art. Yet, as the twentieth century draws to a close, critics, perhaps indirectly influenced by new religious ferment, particularly in the United States, have begun to reassess what can be broadly termed the spiritual concerns of artists whose biographies and catalogs of works were thought to be definitively understood. A tentative revaluation is in progress, based not upon newly discovered documents but upon a new appreciation of certain documents previously inventoried without sufficient sensitivity to the issues raised by them.

It may be useful to begin by making two observations. First, the term *spiritual* is used in this article to characterize the religious and philosophical concerns of artists who often did not or do not espouse a specific religion or institutionalized way of thought. Second, the role of criticism is emphasized because much of twentieth-century art so puzzled the public initially—and indeed has continued to puzzle, decades after its arrival in galleries and museums—that critics have come to play a crucial intermediary role. They have served as a representative public; they have championed artists in the public forum, and they have influenced artists. More than the artists themselves, critics are responsible for the understanding with which the public has received the art of its time.

A sound approach to the spiritual dimensions of twentieth-century art must take into account the artists' stated intentions as recorded in documentary sources. Additionally, through a reasonable and empirically useful theory, it must try to assess the more hidden aspects of art—aspects governed by what some schools of thought call unconscious motivation—since visual art springs from emotional and instinctive sources at least as much as from intellectual premeditation, and the former aspects often go unspoken and even unrecognized by artists and their commentators. Documentary evidence of the artists' concerns and intentions, in association with a theory that addresses the question of unconscious purpose, can therefore provide a well-rounded understanding of the topic under discussion.

The academic discipline of art history has uncovered and published many of the documentary sources required to assess the major artists' spiritual concerns. In the early years of twentieth-century art, between the appearances of Fauvism and Cubism in Paris (1905, 1907) and the formal organization of the Surrealist movement (1924), many leading artists discussed their work in print or cooperated with other artists and critics who did so. The primary documents from this period include the writings of Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944) and his immediate circle, Piet Mondrian (1872–1944), the Cubist group (best represented in print by the critic Guillaume Apollinaire and the artists Jean Metzinger and Albert Gleizes), Henri Matisse (1869–1954), Paul Klee (1879–1940), Marcel Duchamp (1887–1968), Kazimir Malevich (1878–1935), and André Breton (1896–1966). Scarcer in the literary sources but no less important in this period is the recorded conversation of the sculptor Constantin Brancusi (1876–1957). These writings by no means exhaust the repertory that calls for examination, but they do form a circle of ideas and intentions that begins to encompass the topic. "Northern" artists—the Russians Kandinsky and Malevich, the Dutch Mondrian, and so on—have been viewed as more pointedly concerned with religious and philosophical issues, while the artists working in Paris (who counted numerous émigrés among them) have been described as primarily drawn to aesthetic and formal research. But the topic cannot be neatly divided between spiritual search and aesthetic research; texts from both groups bear on both aspects.

Abstraction and Spirituality. The theme of the spiritual first resounds strongly and unmistakably in Kandinsky's book *Über das Geistige in der Kunst* (Munich, 1912; see *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, London, 1914, and many later editions and translations). Working in Munich and its region until the outbreak of World War I, Kandinsky was arguably the first abstract painter and without question the most perspicacious and eloquent defender of abstraction. Resorting to publication both to justify the daring departure that abstraction represented and to speak kindly of other new art that the public had not yet accepted, Kandinsky expressed with unforgettable fervor his generation's disavowal of nineteenth-century culture and its faith in renewal. "Only just now awakening," he writes in *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, "after years of materialism, our soul is infected with the despair born of unbelief, of lack of purpose and aim. The nightmare of materialism, which turned life into an evil, senseless game, is not yet

passed; it still darkens the awakening soul. Only a feeble light glimmers. . . ."

For Kandinsky, that light proceeded not from familiar European religions or philosophies but from Indian thought, primarily as he encountered it in the writings of H. P. Blavatsky (1831–1891), founder of the Theosophical Society. Kandinsky was wary of what he perceived as the excesses of Theosophical thought—its "excessive anticipation of definite answers in lieu of immense question-marks"—but he could affirm that "this movement represents a strong agent in the general atmosphere, presaging deliverance to oppressed and gloomy hearts." Theosophy, as well as the related thought of Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925), which Kandinsky knew primarily through publications, offered assurance of a metaphysical reality, a vocabulary of ideas and words with which to evoke it, and confirmation of Kandinsky's own artistic direction, which led away from the world of natural appearances toward an inner world of the spirit. [*See* Theosophical Society.]

No single phrase can epitomize the riches of Kandinsky's thought and artistic production in this prewar period, but one well-known apostrophe, drawn from his essay in *Der Blaue Reiter* (Munich, 1912; translated by Klaus Lankheit as *The Blaue Reiter Almanac*, New York, 1974), evokes the ardor of his discovery, in concert with others of his generation, that art could reveal the sacred: *"The world sounds. It is a cosmos of spiritually active beings. Even dead matter is living spirit"* (italics in the original). Kandinsky's art of 1910 to 1914 can be characterized as freely painted, complex compositions with swirling color, enigmatic forms, and almost imperceptible vestiges of Christian iconography drawn from the *Book of Revelation* and the image of the equestrian Saint George.

While no critic would dispute the association of spiritual ideas with the work of Kandinsky and his Munich circle, to speak of the spiritual intentions of Parisian Cubism raises a fear that the documentary evidence may be asked to accomplish more than it comfortably allows. Picasso and Georges Braque (1882–1963), originators of the Cubist style, held their silence in the early years, and Picasso throughout his life evinced an earthy disregard for the transcendental. It remains true, however, that the aesthetic system of Cubism, with its quasi-abstract analysis of physical form in terms of ambiguous interlocking planes, was immediately perceived by friendly critics and fellow artists as the discovery of a new "purity." The term *purity*, denoting a turning away from appearances, an austere abandonment of facile beauty in order to uncover the structural underpinnings of reality, has a religious connotation that was not lost on some of the major figures active at the time, although the sensibility is more Platonic and philosophical than Christian and religious. Jean Metzinger wrote of Picasso in 1910: "Rejecting every ornamental, anecdotal or symbolic intention, he achieves a painterly purity hitherto unknown." In 1911, he again wrote: "Today, thanks to a few painters, painting is emerging naked and pure." The critic of genius Guillaume Apollinaire summarized the theme in 1912 and explicitly drew out its religious significance:

> The young painters . . . discard more and more the old art of optical illusion and local proportion, in order to express the grandeur of metaphysical forms. This is why contemporary art, even if it does not directly stem from specific religious beliefs, nonetheless possesses some of the characteristics of great, that is to say, religious art.
>
> (quoted in *Cubism*, ed. Edward F. Fry, London, 1966)

Cubism as perceived by "northern" artists, preeminently Mondrian, became the aesthetic basis for an art of explicit spiritual intentions. Mondrian's bright, rectilinear compositions are now world famous, although in his lifetime they were prized mainly by other artists. Few people even today realize that these compositions manifest a powerfully religious and philosophical temperament, expressed at length in little-known writings dating from 1912 to the mid-1940s. A still more austere purification of the Cubist system, Mondrian's art is intended to be an image of universal law, construed as the endless interplay of opposites in "dynamic equilibrium." Abstraction appeared to Mondrian to offer hope of a modern and yet spiritual art: "In depicting something perceptible to the senses, one makes a human statement because one knows the world through one's own self. If one does not represent things, a place remains for the Divine." Like Kandinsky, Mondrian sensed that his generation of artists was called to model a new world of inner meaning and outward form. "Art," he wrote in 1919, "will become the product of . . . a cultivated externality and of an inwardness deepened and more conscious." Also like Kandinsky, Mondrian drew from Theosophy (he was formally a member of the Theosophical Society) and other contemporary speculative currents.

Primal Currents. There was a strain of what could be called neopaganism, a Mediterranean spiritual ethos, in the complex of spiritual currents that moved artists in the formative years of twentieth-century art. Classicism had been a constant of European art since the Renaissance, but there is a marked difference in sensibility between the gentle, nostalgic late-nineteenth-century canvases of Puvis de Chavannes (1824–1898) and the matutinal vigor of such a work as Henri Matisse's *Joy of Life* (1905–1906), in which naked men and women

rest, dance, embrace, and make music in a forest clearing. Picasso, no less than Matisse, affirmed through decades of work a pagan sensibility that seems to step past the Christian millennia into a renovated world that is not without its gods; they are gods closer to the flesh, Pan rather than Christ. Matisse's famous designs for a chapel at Vence, France, created late in life, gave him a richly exploited opportunity to transfer into a liturgical setting the spiritual fruits of decades of apparently secular work.

Neopaganism paralleled aesthetic and spiritual research that delved still more deeply into the European past and into African and Oceanic cultures perceived as primitive by Europeans. Picasso and Matisse are again associated with this current; it also appeared with striking force in the work of Constantin Brancusi. Some of Brancusi's stone and wood carvings—massive, powerful, "primitive" in style—evoke the monuments of Neolithic culture, that is, the culture of primordial man. In another aspect of his oeuvre, typified by the famous *Bird in Space* series, Brancusi achieved a sculptor's version of the purity valued by the Cubists. Brancusi's words were spare, but when recorded they breathed a Upaniṣadic spirit of simplicity and concentration: "I am no longer of this world, I am far from myself, I am no longer a part of my own person. I am within the essence of things themselves."

The redefinition of the spiritual in twentieth-century art has benefited from the contributions of women artists, who have spoken more through their works than through theoretical writings. The American painter Georgia O'Keeffe (1887–1986) comes at once to mind. From her remarkable public debut in 1916 with semiabstract watercolor landscapes to her developed vocabulary of landscapes, flowers, and compositions with parched bones and other subjects, she has created a body of contemplative work that affirms the human being as a mindful observer and inquirer before the grandeur of nature. Barbara Hepworth (1903–1975), the British sculptor, created abstract works of enduring eloquence. Her *Single Form* (1962–1963) in the courtyard of the United Nations in New York City, captures the essential dignity of the age-old theme of the standing human figure. Through its closed, taut surface contrasting with a single impressive opening, the work seems in its very forms to ask questions relevant to the United Nations: who are we? to what influences, for good or ill, are we open? Few works of twentieth-century sculpture for public places are as effective and appropriate.

Sufficient documentary evidence has been accumulated in the preceding paragraphs to sustain the notion that twentieth-century art set off to be a spiritual art. Why, then, does it seem to most observers to be overwhelmingly secular and aesthetic in intent? In many of its phases, it was of course forthrightly concerned with other matters and did not aspire to be a visible sign of the invisible. Nonetheless, the spirituality that animated its originators seems to have foundered at some point; in W. B. Yeats's phrase, the center did not hold. Three factors can be isolated that figure strongly among the causes of this loss of intent. The political and economic factor is probably strongest: two world wars, the Depression, and the rise of totalitarian regimes that imposed politically useful norms for art denied artists the kind of world in which a spiritual art could flourish. Secondly, the spiritual roots of early twentieth-century art were perhaps not strong enough to nurture an enduring art of spiritual substance. Theosophy and other nontraditional teachings of the period shocked artists into recognitions that Western religion seemed no longer capable of offering, but they were hardly comparable in nurturing power to Christianity in the medieval centuries or to Hinduism, Islam, or Buddhism throughout much of their history. Finally, as noted at the beginning of this article, art criticism has generally remained faithful to secular values; it has shed so little light on the spiritual dimensions of twentieth-century art that even lay observers with explicit religious or philosophical concerns tend to view modern art as spiritually illiterate, however rich in aesthetic content.

Survivals of the Sacred. A highly suggestive theory has been advanced from the field of the history of religions that can help the observer to see an implicit and often hidden continuity between the intentions of the founding artists and the further development of art in our time. Mircea Eliade has proposed that vestiges and transformations of the typical themes of sacred art continue to find their way into visual art. He has pointed out the return to primordial culture in the work of Brancusi; he has convincingly argued that the childlike paintings of Marc Chagall (1887–1985) reflect nostalgia for a return to origins, a longing for paradise. Similarly, in the classic theme of the artist's studio, depicted by many artists of our time, the often shabby reality is transformed into a paradise of order and beauty, in which the artist's nude model is restored as Eve. Although only sketched by Eliade and offered as a suggestive rather than scholarly perspective, this approach to twentieth-century art can yield a rich harvest of observation. Its underlying assumption, distantly related to the notion of archetypes in the psychology of C. G. Jung, is that human nature has its necessities quite apart from the prevailing culture, which may or may not encompass all of these necessities. In a secular and materialistic era, the perennial themes of sacred art will make themselves known, albeit obliquely and even

without benefit of conscious recognition. [*See* Archetypes.]

Looking at contemporary art from this point of view—be it the abstract canvases of Mark Rothko or Robert Motherwell, the sculpture of Isamu Noguchi or Henry Moore, or the work of many other artists—one can find vestiges and transformations of sacred themes not just at the periphery but as central motifs. Intentionally at first and now, as it were, inadvertently and with almost no critical support, twentieth-century art has been truer than suspected to the traditional purpose of art. That purpose, defined in different words over the millennia, is acutely expressed by Piet Mondrian as follows: "Art brings the universal downward . . . while . . . it helps raise the individual toward the universal."

[*For discussion, in wide cultural perspective, of the interrelation of religion and visual art, see* Iconography.]

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Among critics and historians who have contributed to the discussion are Sixten Ringbom, Rose-Carol Washton Long, Robert Rosenblum, Robert P. Welsh, and myself. Mircea Eliade's "Sur la permanence du sacré dans l'art contemporain," *Vingtième siècle* 24 (1964): 3–10, should be read in conjunction with passages on Brancusi in Eliade's published journal, *No Souvenirs*, translated by Fred H. Johnson, Jr. (New York, 1977), and his essay in *Brancusi: Introduction, témoignages*, edited by Ionel Jianou (Paris, 1982).

Roger Lipsey

MODERNISM. [*This entry includes two articles that survey cultural and intellectual developments in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Christianity and Islam. For a broad discussion of modernism as a religious, social, and historical phenomenon, see* Modernity.]

Christian Modernism

The related terms *liberalism* and *modernism*, when occurring in a religious or theological context, are usually no less imprecise than when used with other references. As T. S. Eliot put it: "Liberalism is something which tends to release energy rather than accumulate it, to relax, rather than to fortify. It is a movement not so much defined by its end, as by its starting-point; away from, rather than towards, something definite." Accordingly the content of a set of doctrines or principles described as liberal depends upon that of the "orthodoxy" from which such liberalism diverges, or which it relaxes or qualifies. Much the same applies to *modernism*, which refers not simply to what exists today but to something deemed to be distinctive of today or of the more recent past, and so to be commended as such, in contrast to what represents a settled tradition or a historic inheritance. Defining both terms therefore presents difficulties, and an understanding of what either signifies is best reached by observing how in fact the word has been used, and in particular by recording agreement as to what it at least denotes.

The word *liberalism* was employed early in the nineteenth century to designate "the holding of liberal opinions in politics or theology." Theologically the word did not at first have a favorable connotation. Thus Edward Irving stated in 1826 that whereas "religion is the very name of obligation . . . liberalism is the very name of want of obligation." John Henry Newman went further and spoke in 1841 of "the most serious thinkers among us" as regarding "the spirit of liberalism as characteristic of the destined Antichrist." Liberalism itself he stigmatized in 1864 as "false liberty of thought, or the exercize of thought upon matters in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place." More succinctly, Newman condemned it as "the anti-dogmatic principle."

Gradually, however, this viewpoint changed with the broader adoption by theologians of opinions more or less critical of received dogma or traditional interpretations of scripture. Employment of the word *liberalist* came instead to be a mark of approval, in opposition to attitudes referred to pejoratively as traditionalist, dogmatist, or even obscurantist. Moreover, liberalism was taken to signify a readiness not only to modify or actually negate certain doctrines or beliefs usually associated with received religious teaching but also to propagate views of a more positive nature, such as the necessity for freedom of inquiry and research and the conviction that new knowledge, when soundly based, will not prove subversive of fundamental religious truth but rather be a light by which to clarify and enhance such truth. Hence to be identified as "liberal" was regarded as a compliment by an increasing number of Protestant thinkers and scholars in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

At about the same time the term *modernism* gained currency, especially in Anglican circles, as an alternative, and preferable, designation for such theological liberalism. However, *modernism* has long been accepted in a stricter sense as indicating a type of "progressive" theological opinion to be found in the Roman Catholic church during the pontificates of Leo XIII and Pius X, and many would now consider usage of the word best limited to this latter sense. "Liberal Catholicism" also designates certain tendencies in nineteenth-century Roman Catholicism, notably in France. Its concern, however, was more political and social than theological.

Attitudes which could in some sense be characterized as liberal or modernist have been recurrent throughout the history of Christian thought, but the movements or tendencies which usually carry one of these epithets are of nineteenth- or twentieth-century occurrence, and in the interest of clarity the present article will observe this restriction.

The immediate intellectual background of theological liberalism was the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, with its striving for political, social, and cultural liberty. The criterion of "enlightened" judgment was the use of reason, in which the mysteries of religious faith were prone to seem mere relics of the ignorance and superstition of the past. Deism became the widely prevalent expression of this largely negative standpoint. A new era opened with the later philosophy of the century's greatest thinker, Immanuel Kant, who sought by an analysis of the nature of knowledge itself to offer a rational justification for faith. But the answer he produced in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) was such as to destroy the long-established "natural" theology which most Deist as well as orthodox thinkers regarded as fundamental. In its place he put the witness of the moral consciousness: belief in God was to be seen, philosophically, as a postulate of "practical," or moral, reason. The scientific understanding could not prove the existence of God, but the will, as the faculty of the moral life, required it. Kant's own philosophy of religion—or, more correctly, his philosophy of the Christian religion—was embodied in his suitably entitled *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, one of the main sources from which modern theological liberalism derives. Indeed, Paul Tillich is right in claiming Kant's teaching as "decisive for the theology of the nineteenth century" (*Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology*, London, 1967, p. 64).

The perspective within which Kant views religion appears, on the face of it, narrow. Religion, he maintains, is morality; or at all events morality is of its very substance, albeit construed in terms of divine command. In other words, the religious problem is not a speculative one in which the religious object is validated primarily at the metaphysical level; it is a practical problem, pertaining wholly to man's ethical nature. "The illusion of being able to accomplish anything in the way of justifying ourselves before God through religious acts of worship is *superstition*" (*Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, New York, 1960, p. 162). The reductionism which this implies therefore necessitates a critique of traditional beliefs and institutions in anticipation of a more positive statement of what a genuinely rational Christianity must involve. Such insistence on the need for distinguishing between the essential and the nonessential—reason and conscience providing the criteria—was to become the guiding principle of all forms of liberal Christianity, and especially of German nineteenth-century Protestantism.

Liberal Protestantism. Nevertheless, if liberalism is to attain any sort of useful definition, some discrimination has to be made. "Liberal Protestantism," that is to say, is not simply to be equated with "Protestant liberalism." "A moderately orthodox believer," said the French liberal theologian Jean Réville, "may practise liberalism; he will not thereby become a liberal Protestant" (*Liberal Christianity*, London, 1903, p. 17). Protestant liberalism is in fact no more than the conception of Christianity of those who combine a liberal turn of mind with a broadly Protestant type of religious conviction. Such a position is subject, obviously, to many different sources of influence and offers a wide variety of opinion. Liberal Protestantism, on the other hand, is a designation best applied to the kind of theological thinking which, against a generally Lutheran background, developed in Germany during the nineteenth century under the stimulus first of Friedrich Schleiermacher and then of Albrecht Ritschl. Not that it remained confined to Germany: in France, Auguste Sabatier (1839–1901) and Jean Réville (1854–1908) himself, for example, may fairly be classed as liberal Protestants, as are such men as the Presbyterian William Adams Brown in the United States and the Congregationalists T. R. Glover and C. J. Cadoux in Great Britain. Again, Kantian reverberations are as a rule clearly audible in liberal Protestantism, whereas in Protestant liberalism (at all events, in an English and Anglican setting) the prevailing spirit is more that of the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonists or the latitudinarianism associated with archbishop John Tillotson (1630–1694) than that of Kant or, still less, of Schleiermacher.

Yet to press such distinctions too far would be to obscure the very large amount of common ground which liberals of all shades of opinion occupy in contrast to traditionalist, let alone "fundamentalist," views. Differ-

ences are less of kind than of degree, and they are inevitably marked by national and denominational characteristics. Thus all liberals desire, first, a broad interpretation of dogmatic formularies, where these exist and retain some authority. Second, they are cool toward theological speculation which appears to have no particular ethical relevance. And third, they are especially sensitive to the impact on traditional belief of new knowledge in the sciences, both natural and historical. Indeed, in the more recent phases of liberal religious thought, a determining factor has been the historical criticism of the Bible and the effect which that is bound to have upon the understanding and use of scripture—always for Protestants the ultimate source of Christian doctrine. Hence the varieties of liberalism arise in the main from differing responses on the part of individual religious thinkers to each of these leading considerations.

The starting point for a study of liberal Protestantism is the work of Schleiermacher (1768–1834), "the father of modern theology," as he has fitly been called. Kant, for all his anticipation of subsequent trends of thought, was very much an eighteenth-century figure, in whom the individualist note of ethical rationalism was all-pervasive. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, brought to religious reflection a different spirit. For him religion was primarily a condition of the heart; its essence is feeling *(Gefühl)*. Without a deep emotional impulse it cannot be sustained in its true character and becomes either dogmatism or moralism. Authentic religion is, rather, a "submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over against man," a "sense and taste for the Infinite." In his great work on systematic theology, *The Christian Faith* (1821–1822; 2d ed., 1830), Schleiermacher called religion a "feeling of absolute dependence" or, for the Christian specifically, a feeling of absolute dependence upon "God in Christ." Thus in Schleiermacher's religious philosophy a fundamental principle of liberalism is already evident, namely, the appeal to inward experience, and therewith an element of subjectivism from which the liberal standpoint can never be dissociated. In this, indeed, Schleiermacher had been anticipated by Kant; but whereas for Kant the subjective determinant was moral, for Schleiermacher it could best be described as aesthetic. In the subsequent development of liberal Protestantism, the moral factor was consistently the more potent.

This is especially so in the teaching of Ritschl (1822–1889), the most influential German theologian of his era, who for the greater part of his career held the chair of theology at the University of Göttingen. His main literary work was *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (1870–1874). Ritschl disliked Schleiermacher's emphasis on feeling, and although his own concern was strongly ethical, he believed also that faith must have an objective basis. Such objectivity, however, he found not in metaphysics, Hellenic or Hegelian (for which, as far as theology was concerned, Ritschl had no use), but in history, or rather in the unique historical events of the New Testament. In his younger days he had come under the influence of the eminent Tübingen historian of early Christianity, Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860), whose skeptical conclusions in this field had to a large extent been dictated by his Hegelian presuppositions. But by 1856 Ritschl had repudiated the Tübingen position, although he welcomed historical criticism as such since he believed that recourse to the original salvific events would bypass the metaphysical Christology of Catholic dogma, which to the genuinely religious mind had become an impediment. In short, he saw Christianity as essentially a life devoted to action, both Godward and manward, in which the ethical imperative is supreme. The corollary of this was that religious doctrines are not assertions of fact, in the ordinary meaning of the word, but "value judgments" *(Werturteile)* expressive of man's attitude to the world about him and relating to his moral and spiritual ends. For man's claim to moral freedom and the responsibility which this entails is, in Ritschl's mind, the necessary counterbalance to the determinism of nature as described by modern science, and the primary role of religion is to uphold this claim. To quote Ritschl: "In every religion what is sought, with the help of the supernatural power reverenced by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature" (*Justification and Reconciliation*, Edinburgh, 1874–1900, p. 199).

For Ritschl, the distinctiveness of Christianity lay in the unique clue to an understanding of the divine nature and purposes offered by Jesus, who for the Christian is the sole medium of salvation. And Jesus as the Christ is to be known not through any abstruse theology of his person, but by his work—that is, by his own consciousness of God communicated in turn to us, whereby we experience forgiveness of sin and restoration of the desire and power to do the will of God. The church, to which Ritschl attached high importance, is the only sphere in which justification and reconciliation are experienced. As such, it is the community of the redeemed.

Ritschlianism, however, includes more than the personal teaching of Ritschl himself and comprises the thinking of a number of theologians prominent in German Protestantism down to at least the outbreak of World War I. It also was not without its representatives

in the Anglo-Saxon world. Of the German Ritschlians, the most distinguished were Wilhelm Herrmann (1846–1922), Julius Kaftan (1848–1926), and Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930). Indeed, Herrmann's *The Communion of the Christian with God* (1886) is perhaps the most typical as well as the most sympathetic expression of the Ritschlian viewpoint one could cite. Its author, who was professor of theology at the University of Marburg, was if anything even more anxious than Ritschl to sunder Christian doctrine from all traffic with metaphysical philosophy. For him, as for Ritschl, the heart of the gospel is an ethical ideal, and confessions of theological belief are altogether secondary. The object of a Christian's faith is Jesus as he lived. The more radical side of Ritschlianism is represented by Harnack, for many years professor of church history at the University of Berlin. Here again the bedrock of faith is the historical Jesus. In his well-known *What Is Christianity?* (1900), Harnack sets aside the entire Catholic tradition of dogma, hierarchy, and cult; indeed, under the guiding light of modern criticism, he goes far beyond Reformation Protestantism in negating the past. To discover the *Wesen*, the essence, of the Christian religion, the theologian of today must return not merely to the New Testament—theological distortion had already begun with Paul—but to the teaching of Jesus as preserved in the synoptic Gospels, the heart of which is the principle of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. The "kingdom" which Jesus preached, shorn of its apocalyptic trappings, must therefore be understood in a purely ethical sense. "The individual is called upon to listen to the glad message of mercy and of God's Fatherhood, and to make up his mind whether he will be on God's side as the Eternal's, or on the side of the world and time."

The final phase of liberal Protestantism is really post-Ritschlian and centers upon the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (history of religions school), typified in the work of Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) and Wilhelm Bousset (1865–1920). Troeltsch, at first professor of theology at the University of Heidelberg and afterward professor of the history of philosophy at the University of Berlin, was much influenced by the sociologists Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber. The fact, as Troeltsch saw it, that Christianity, like any other cultural phenomenon, must be understood primarily in relation to its attendant historical conditions inevitably posed the problem of the absoluteness of its claims in respect not only to the world's other religions but to cultural change generally. The proper approach to Christianity appeared to be by way of the history and philosophy of religion; dogmatic theology acquired relevance only within this broader scholarly framework. Not surprisingly, it was an opinion which to the more traditionally minded placed divine revelation at the disposal of a relativistic historicism. This, along with the persistent anthropocentrism of liberal theology, was to lead, by the end of World War I in 1918, to the antiliberalist reaction of Karl Barth, whose *Epistle to the Romans* appeared in the following year, and to the so-called neoorthodox movement generally.

But despite the powerful Barthian influence that lasted for at least four decades into the twentieth century, the liberal aim of communicating the Christian message to modern man in terms of his own modernity was not revoked. This aim is evident enough in the work of two of Barth's most outstanding Protestant contemporaries, Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann, albeit that the associated philosophy here is existentialism rather than post-Hegelian idealism. Moreover, the distinctively humanist tone which since about 1960 has come more or less to pervade virtually all Western theological thinking is clearly continuous with the older liberalizing attitudes.

In the English-speaking world, liberal Protestantism did not form so clearly defined a force as it did in Germany. At any rate it is more difficult to distinguish between liberal Protestants, in Réville's meaning of the term, and theological liberals in a broader sense. But in this broader sense liberalism is multifarious, depending on varying denominational allegiances, although also to a large extent on individual interests and idiosyncrasies. Classification therefore demands much tact.

The antecedents of English liberalism, particularly within the Anglican context, are to be located in eighteenth-century latitudinarianism, in the "noetic" school at Oxford University in the early nineteenth century—whose chief exponents are Richard Whately (1787–1868), Renn Dickson Hampden (1793–1868), and Thomas Arnold (1795–1842)—and in the midcentury "broad church" as represented by H. H. Milman (1791–1868), A. P. Stanley (1815–1881), and Benjamin Jowett (1817–1893), as indeed by all the authors of *Essays and Reviews* (1860), including Jowett. Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–1872), in some ways the most fertile theological mind of his time in England, eschewed the name "broad church," but his teaching, permeated as it was with the influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, had a broadening effect within the Church of England and undoubtedly contributed substantially to the shaping of modern Anglicanism. Maurice himself seems scarcely to have appreciated the unsettling effect on orthodox thinking of the historical criticism of the Bible.

A more self-consciously innovative type of liberalism, however, made its appearance toward the end of the century. It was associated with the names of Percy

Gardner (1846–1937), professor of classicial archaeology at Oxford University; Hastings Rashdall (1858–1924), dean of Carlisle; W. R. Inge (1860–1954), dean of Saint Paul's, London; H. D. A. Major (1871–1961), principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford; and E. W. Barnes (1874–1953), bishop of Birmingham. All of them were connected with the Modern Churchmen's Union, founded in 1898, and with its organ *The Modern Churchman*. But their "modernism"—to use their own preferred designation—had little theological coherence. Such unity as it possessed stemmed chiefly from a marked opposition to the doctrine and practices of the Anglo-Catholic party within the established church. The Union achieved its highest public notice with its Cambridge conference of 1921 on the general theme of "Christ and the Creeds." Rashdall's paper "Christ as the Logos and Son of God" aroused sharp controversy with such statements as the following: "It is impossible to maintain that God is fully incarnate in Christ, and not incarnate at all in any one else." But by the end of the 1930s Anglican modernism was in decline and is now but the merest wraith of its former self. Indeed, the very name has been virtually abandoned.

A liberalism more akin to continental liberal Protestantism was to be found among the English Nonconformists, or "Free Churchmen," rather than among Anglicans. In the main, however, the Free Church theologians, of whom the most distinguished representatives included P. T. Forsyth and A. E. Garvie (the latter a close student of Ritschlianism), were less inclined to doctrinal novelty than were some of their Anglican contemporaries. The Congregationalist R. J. Campbell (1867–1956), author of *The New Theology* (1907), was an exception. So too was T. R. Glover (1869–1943), a Cambridge classical scholar and author of the popular *Jesus of History* (1917), the thesis of which is much the same as that of Harnack's *What Is Christianity?* Another exception was C. J. Cadoux (1883–1947), whose *Catholicism and Christianity* (1928) propounded a radical critique of Catholic orthodoxy from a liberal angle. The Unitarian tradition, maintained with high repute throughout the nineteenth century by James Martineau (1805–1900)—perhaps the greatest Protestant liberal of his era in England—was also represented, if somewhat journalistically, by L. P. Jacks (1860–1955).

In America the liberal movement in religious thought may be said to have begun with William Ellery Channing (1780–1842). Brought up in the strict ways of New England Calvinism, Channing came to be considered a Unitarian. But critical though he was of traditional doctrines, he believed Christ to have been the perfect revelation of God and the living ideal of humanity. Against Calvinism he set a confident faith in man's freedom and inherent capacity for good as a child of God. The leader of the New England Transcendentalist movement, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1888), whom Matthew Arnold, addressing an American audience, described as "your Newman, your man of soul and genius," remains the best-known American religious thinker of the nineteenth century. His religious views are expounded in *Nature* (1836) and the two volumes of *Essays* (1841–1843). The basis of his position was belief in the essential divinity of man; redemption was to be sought in the individual's possession of his own soul by original thought and effort. Jesus, he held, was best honored by following his example. A liberal of more orthodox persuasion was Horace Bushnell (1802–1876), who for much of his career was pastor of the North Church at Hartford, Connecticut. His *Discourse on Christian Nurture* (1847) took a mediating line between the old orthodoxy, with its preoccupation with Original Sin and human depravity, and Enlightenment theories of human perfectibility. In *God in Christ* (1849) he applied the moral criterion to dogma, and he insisted that even in scripture the "soul" must be distinguished from the "body."

Nearer the close of the century European influences—and not least Ritschlianism—are discernible in American theology, notably in the writings of H. C. King (1858–1934), president of Oberlin College, Ohio, and William Adams Brown (1865–1943) of Union Theological Seminary, New York, whose work *The Essence of Christianity* appeared in 1902. Among historical scholars of a liberal bent was A. C. McGiffert (1861–1933), also of Union Theological Seminary, who believed religious certitude to be, in the last resort, independent of historical events. Other prominent liberals of the early twentieth century include the well-known New York preacher Harry Emerson Fosdick; Shailer Mathews, whose book *The Faith of Modernism* (1925) is as forthright a statement of liberal ideals as could be wished; and H. N. Wieman, author of *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth* (1927).

Roman Catholic Modernism. The use of the word *Modernism* in restricted reference (hence the capitalization of its initial letter) to a movement of a theologically "modernizing" or liberalizing character in the Roman Catholic church at the turn of the twentieth century has already been alluded to. But it should at once be said that to describe Roman Catholic Modernism as a movement at all is somewhat misleading, as it had little cohesion, and those to whom the designation "Modernist" has usually been applied do not in any sense constitute a school. As the most famous of them, Alfred Loisy (1857–1940), expressly stated, they were only "a quite limited number of persons" who individ-

ually shared "the desire to adapt the Catholic religion to the intellectual, moral and social needs of the present time." But the exact determination of their overall aim differed from one writer to another, according to his particular interest. Thus the only satisfactory way of studying Modernism is not to attempt to impose upon it a schematization like that of Pius X, by whose encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* it was condemned in 1907, but to examine and assess each author's contribution to the cause as a whole. The countries where Modernist tendencies were most in evidence were France, Italy, and England. Germany, rather surprisingly, was less affected, and in the United States it had no real following at all. [*See also* Vatican Councils, *article on* Vatican I.]

The task which, in one way or another, the Modernists undertook was that of presenting the world of their day with a defense of Catholicism, in both its doctrinal and institutional aspects, which could be accepted as intellectually plausible. In other words, what Protestant liberals had done for the Reformation tradition they would attempt for the post-Tridentine, and their procedure was often no less radical. Thus Loisy, in *The Gospel and the Church* (1902), approached the whole problem of historical Catholicism—its dogmas, its hierarchy, its cult—along evolutionary lines as a natural growth responsive to spiritual and social needs and determined by the continuously changing cultural environment. A direct reply to Harnack's *What Is Christianity?*, Loisy's book denied that the essence of Christianity could be located at any one stage or identified with any single element within its historical life. The entire historical life of Christianity, he maintained, alone provided the data for a true—because empirically grounded—estimate of what the Christian religion is. In this context, Catholicism will be seen to be justified—so Loisy argued—by the sheer fullness and diversity of its content. Similar arguments were used by the Anglo-Irish Jesuit George Tyrrell (1861–1909), notably in his posthumous work *Christianity at the Cross Roads* (1910).

The peculiar difficulty facing the Modernists lay in seeking to validate a form of Christianity which appeared fatally vulnerable to historical criticism. Indeed, they felt that the main pressure upon faith came from precisely this quarter, and the familiar type of Catholic apologetic, tied as it was to biblical fundamentalism, was incapable of meeting it. Moreover, the question of dogma also raised other issues, of a philosophical order. Catholic philosophy, by official direction, meant Thomism, although more often than not Thomism conceived in a narrow, unhistorical, and scholastic form. A more dynamic religious philosophy was wanted, according to Modernists like the French Oratorian Lucien Laberthonnière (1860–1932), a disciple of Maurice Blondel (1861–1949), as well as to the Bergsonian Édouard Le Roy (1870–1954) and to Ernesto Buonaiuti (1881–1946), protagonist of the Italians and author of *The Program of Modernism* (1907). For a more dynamic philosophy they looked not to Kant, as Pius's *Pascendi* had alleged, but rather to the voluntarist tradition of much nineteenth-century French thought and even to American pragmatism. Tyrrell and Laberthonnière both stressed the role of the will in belief and were disposed to understand doctrine in terms of an ethical symbolism. Le Roy's account of dogma (*Dogme et critique*, 1907), in particular, represented it primarily as *une règle de conduite pratique* ("a rule for practical conduct"), without intrinsic speculative content. Thus the doctrine of the divine personality means in effect "Conduct yourself in your relations with God as you would in your relations with a human person." The vindication of dogma, therefore, will rest on its capacity to induce the experience in which it is itself grounded.

However, the Modernist apologetic, whether historical or philosophical, won no approval at Rome, and the movement was summarily suppressed. In 1910 a specifically anti-Modernist oath was imposed on the clergy, or at least those engaged in teaching. The result of the Vatican's action was to retard Catholic biblical scholarship, as well as practically all non-Thomist theological thinking, for many years to come.

Assessment of Liberalism. The strength of liberalism lay in its conviction that the Christian gospel can be offered to modern man without affront to his intelligence. It recognized frankly that Christian belief arose, developed, and was formulated in an era and a culture vastly different from that of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western society, and that both its intellectual presuppositions and the language in which it came to be articulated are inevitably alien and even in large measure unintelligible to this age. Unless therefore one tries to seal oneself off from all contemporary influences, one is bound to reassess the basics of faith in the light of the radically altered ways of thinking which the post-Reformation era has brought about. Especially must Christianity be seen in the perspective of scientific history, even though this may no longer support forms of belief that have persisted over centuries. Indeed, it is difficult to see how on this score the liberal case can be refuted; the facts speak for themselves, and any modernized version of the Christian religion has to take account of them from the outset.

Nevertheless, liberalism has had its critics from at least the beginning of this century, and not merely among the partisans of a crass traditionalism. To many, its immanentist theology greatly overemphasized the continuity between the world and God and between

man and God, at the expense of the received belief, on which the whole scheme of redemption turned, that as between finite and infinite, human and divine, there is a qualitative and not merely a quantitative disparity. (The liberal Christology is usually circumscribed by the humanity of Jesus.) In keeping with this, liberalism seemed to its critics if not altogether to minimize sin and evil, yet to interpret these too easily in terms of ignorance, immaturity, and simple maladjustment, while overlooking the sheer heinousness of sin. In fact, liberalism's view of mankind exhibited an optimism stemming from a combination of Enlightenment notions of human perfectibility and the nineteenth-century ideal of progress. Such optimism is encouraged neither by the traditional Christian doctrine of man's "natural" condition as corrupted by the Fall nor by the cumulative evidence of sin to which man's historical life bears sorry witness. It is also possible to consider as in principle subjective the liberal conception of the church itself: a fellowship of those who share the same or a similar experience, in recognition of which they meet together in worship, hence expressing the social character of religion. Tolerance is applauded because opinions in religious matters inevitably differ. In sum, the values of liberalism, so its critics complain, are essentially those of a bourgeois ethicism having little or nothing of that sense of the eschatological *kairos* ("time") and impending judgment which characterizes the New Testament and persists as a motif in all traditional doctrine.

It was the serious inadequacies of liberalism—as he felt them to be—which led the young Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968), who had been deeply influenced by Kierkegaard, to protest against the anthropocentrism of liberal theologies in the name of the uncompromising theocentrism of the biblical revelation. The starting point of theology, he urged, must not be subjective "religiousness" but rather God's own self-disclosure through his Word: "God is known by God alone" (*Church Dogmatics* 2.1). Thus neither "religious experience" nor speculative natural theology provides any necessary prolegomena to faith. Instead of the Thomist *analogia entis* ("analogy of being"), Barth offered the *analogia fidei* ("analogy of faith"), that is, the insights of faith based on revelation.

The upshot of the Barthian theological revolution was that all forms of liberalism fell more or less into discredit. This "Barthian captivity," as Reinhold Niebuhr called it, of twentieth-century religious thought persisted for some four decades, and only in the years immediately preceding Barth's death in 1968 did its end become manifest. [*See* Neoorthodoxy.] The neoorthodox reaction, although it has not ceased to exert its pull on some minds—conservative evangelicalism unquestionably gained heart from it—now appears to have been less a recovery of the old certainties than a temporary *arrêt* in a process which is actually part of modernity itself. [*See* Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity *and* Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity.] In other words, the theological difficulties which liberalism had sought to resolve remain, inasmuch as orthodoxy, if it is to uphold its claim to intellectual respectability, cannot avoid the challenge of criticism, whether philosophical or historical. A serious fault in Barth himself was his evasiveness on the historical authenticity of Christianity. These unresolved difficulties have no doubt influenced theologians' disposition to reconsider the achievements of liberalism in a more sympathetic light.

[*See also the biographies of the theologians and church leaders mentioned herein.*]

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Riviere's *Le modernisme dans l'église* (Paris, 1929), the work of a relatively "liberal" Roman Catholic, still provides the most comprehensive survey. In *Roman Catholic Modernism* (London, 1970), I have again supplied a longish introduction and a selection of texts, including excerpts from the Vatican documents condemning modernism. Thomas M. Loome's *Liberal Catholicism, Reform Catholicism, Modernism* (Mainz, 1979) is especially valuable for its bibliographical material.

BERNARD M. G. REARDON

Islamic Modernism

As an intellectual trend, Islamic modernism is one response to the Muslim encounter with the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Other such reactions have ranged from the orthodox traditionalism of the Salafīyah to westernizing secularism on the one hand and to revivalism or neofundamentalism on the other. Thus, Islamic modernism should not be equated with all attempts to revive, invigorate, or reform Islam. Further, modernism is not solely an Islamic phenomenon but is known in other religious traditions under similar circumstances. The concern of religious modernists, Muslim or otherwise, is to purify the religious heritage, to reinterpret some of its aspects and to fuse it with modern elements, in order to reinstitute the dignity of that heritage and establish its worth against foreign encroachment. In the case of Islam, modernist thinkers are not enemies of Western culture; indeed they view its science, technology, and institutional forms of organization with great admiration and consider them necessary elements for the development of their countries. What they have opposed is the wholesale and indiscriminate importation of Western ideas, which, in their view, has resulted in the disintegration of the moral fiber of the society and the undermining of its *aṣālah* ("authenticity"). They have emphasized the need for change through reform and adaptation and believe that a *nahḍah* ("renaissance") can only be achieved by turning to Islam.

Islamic modernism is usually associated with the names of the Persian Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–1897) and the Egyptian Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905). Al-Afghānī's primary concern was Muslim awakening and solidarity in the face of Western penetration. For him, the causes of Muslim defeat were internal dissension and disunity. He urged his audiences to forget their sectarian differences and tolerate each other for the good of the Muslim *ummah*. Al-Afghānī asked Muslims to adopt Western science and technology while preserving their own moral and religious values. He was, however, principally a political agitator and revolutionary; his activities took him to Afghanistan, Iran, Egypt, Paris, London, and Istanbul where he eventually died. His disciple and close associate 'Abduh had a far-reaching influence on modern Muslim thought. 'Abduh underlined the congruity between Islam and modernity and emphasized the role of *ijtihād* (exercise of individual judgment) in order to free Islam from rigid interpretations and render it adaptable to the demands of modern society without compromising its fundamental principles. [*See the biographies of al-Afghānī and 'Abduh.*]

Islamic modernism, however, has its roots at an earlier time, in the efforts of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564–1625) and the reformist school of Shāh Walī Allāh (1703–1762), both natives of the Indian subcontinent. In its entirety, the modernist perspective involves a broad range of thinkers and views from different Muslim countries. It includes such people as Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), Ameer Ali (1849–1928), and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) from India and Pakistan; 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Bādīs (1889–1940), 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maghribī (1867–1907), and Abū Shu'ayb al-Dukhālī (1878–1937) from the Maghreb; 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākabī (1854–1902), Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī (1876–1952), Shākib Arslān (1869–1946), and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) from the Fertile Crescent, Muḥammad Farīd Wagdī (1875–1954) and Aḥmad Amīn (1886–1954) from Egypt, and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nā'īnī (1860–1936) from Iran. [*See the biographies of Sirhindī, Walī Allāh, Ahmad Khan, Ameer Ali, Iqbal, and Rashīd Riḍā.*]

Islamic modernism is better understood when placed within its nineteenth-century historical context. These were agonizing times when the political, economic, social, and cultural foundations of Muslim societies were challenged and shaken by Western penetration and domination. The Ottoman empire, the nominal guardian of the Muslim *ummah*, not only was unable to resist the onslaught, but became one of its victims. Western encroachment took the forms of military victories, political and economic domination, and the imposition of Western educational systems and legal codes. Modernism evolved in an attempt to establish the ability of Islam to face the new challenge. In particular, the modernists hoped to refute the argument that Islam was responsible for Muslim defeats and underdevelopment, that it was rigid and incapable of reform, or that as Lord Cromer wrote in *Modern Egypt* (1908), "Islam reformed is Islam no longer."

Thus the goal of Islamic modernism was to make Islam relevant and responsive in the context of modern society. Its message was that Muslims can live, engage, and contribute actively to the modern world while remaining faithful to their religion. Its ultimate objective

was to provide Muslim societies with an indigenous ideology of development, one that was not copied from the West and could become the basis of a rational, modern society. At minimum, modernist thinkers wanted to provide Muslims with criteria by which the process of change resulting from the impact of an alien culture should be controlled and filtered.

Tenets of Modernism. The basic tenets of modernism can be summarized as follows.

1. There is first of all a dire need to purify Islam from the accretions and superstitions introduced by Ṣūfī orders and brotherhoods, as well as from the rigid interpretations inherited from earlier times. The fulfillment of this task requires going back to the original sources of Islam, the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* (traditions of the Prophet), and reinterpreting them. This position the modernists had borrowed from the revivalist movements of the eighteenth century, particularly the Wahhābīyah in Arabia; but their use of the sources was different. While the revivalists took a literal and rigid approach to the text, the modernists' objective was to discover its spirit and to distinguish between the universal rules of Islam and the specific ones that were valid only for a particular period.

2. The modernists questioned the authority of the medieval interpretations of Islam and advocated the exercise of *ijtihād*, which Muhammad Iqbal once described as the principle of movement in Islam. Every Muslim, the modernists argued, has the right and duty to seek to understand the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*. This emphasis on *ijtihād* led the modernists to stress the rational aspects of religion: the role of reason, free thinking, and individual will. Here they invoked the holy word of the Qur'ān in support of their argument: "God alters not what is in a people until they alter what is in themselves" (surah 13:12). In the process, modernist thinkers underlined the importance of *qiyās* (argument by analogy), *istiḥsān* (the principle of desirability), and *al-maṣāliḥ al-mursalah* (general interests of the community).

'Abduh, for instance, emphasized the role of reason in Islam. In his treatise on the unity of God, he referred to it as the power that enables people to distinguish truth from falsehood. Thus, Islamic law must be interpreted by reason. As a *muftī*, he put his ideas into practice and gave a number of important *fatwās* (legal opinions) such as the famous Transvaal *fatwā* allowing Muslims to eat the flesh of animals slaughtered by non-Muslims and others permitting Muslims to wear European dress and deposit money in interest-yielding postal savings banks.

3. The modernist school focused attention on the social and moral aspects of Islam (and the Muslims) rather than on its metaphysical and philosophical ones. Since Islam must be relevant to the needs and problems of ordinary Muslims, it must help them in the conduct of their daily lives, the modernists argued. Believing that the teachings of Islam are the best that humanity knows, they concluded that no worthwhile idea can be in conflict with Islam. Further, they viewed their emphasis on the "this-worldly" aspect of Islam as truly Islamic. The worldly success of Muslims is evidence of God's favor, while failure signifies a break in their relations with God.

Political Aims. The outcome of this stance was an essentially rational and liberal interpretation of Islam covering a broad range of issues, including political organization and sources of legitimacy, legislation, economic life, the status of women, and education.

In the realm of politics, most modernist thinkers advocated constitutional government, elections, and some form of democratic institutions. They opposed despotic rulers and emphasized the importance of *shūrā* ("council"), which they equated with a consultative assembly. All agreed that *istibdād* ("tyranny") runs counter to Islam and had the effect of corrupting the moral fabric of the society. 'Abduh, for example, stressed the civil function of the Muslim caliph (*khalīfah*, lit., the "successor" to the prophet Muḥammad): he is the political head of a political community, not a pope. Although Islamic modernism tended to be more of an intellectual trend than a political movement, there were examples of activism. Some modernist thinkers reconciled Islamic principles with the new forces of anticolonialist nationalism, and in certain cases, as in Algeria, modernist Islam furnished the ideology of national resistance.

In Algeria 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Bādīs, who established the Association of 'Ulamā' (religious scholars) in 1928, demanded that Islamic institutions be given autonomy from French control, that the *ḥubūs* (religious endowment) lands be restored, and that Arabic be made the official language of Algeria. The association established many branches and a network of schools all over Algeria. In these schools Algerian children recited every morning "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, and Algeria is my fatherland." In Tunisia, Fāḍil Ibn 'Āshūr was able to mobilize the students of the Great Mosque of Tunis in silent marches in support of independence. And in Morocco reformist *'ulamā'* defended King Muḥammad V against the pro-French Berber chieftain al-Glāwī.

On relations between Muslims, the modernists asked Muslims to unite and put aside differences among sects and schools. On the issues of social justice and economic equity, the modernist position was more ambivalent and differed greatly from one author to another. One noticable example is the Egyptian Khālid Muḥammad Khālid, who argued in his book *Min hunā nabda'*

(From Here We Start, 1950) that a parliamentary system that did not serve the poor was an empty and meaningless show. In his view the uneven distribution of wealth and authority was the chief enemy of progress.

Another issue that attracted a great deal of attention among the modernists was the status of women. They argued that Islam liberated women and virtually assured them equal rights. In particular the modernists advocated the right of women to education and work. In Egypt, Qāsim Amīn (1865–1908) published a book on the emancipation of women in which he suggested that they should have elementary schooling if they were to play a role in society. In *Al-mar'ah al-jadīdah* (The New Woman), published two years later (1901), he restated the case by invoking the great concepts of the nineteenth century: freedom, progress, and civilization.

From the modernist perspective the primary vehicle for social change was educational reform. They pointed out that the progress of Europe lay in the quality of its educational system. Critizing the traditional Islamic educational system based on the *madrasah*s and *kuttāb*s (religious schools and functionaries), they advocated the introduction of rational and empirical sciences into the curriculum, the popularization of scientific knowledge, and the teaching of foreign languages. Thus, 'Abduh, who closely observed European educational institutions and translated Spencer's *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* into Arabic, worked to improve the curriculum and administration at al-Azhar University in Cairo. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan established the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh to teach modern sciences and founded the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental Conference to promote Western education in Muslim India. Some modernists, however, took a negative view of the influence of foreign schools. Rashīd Riḍā, for instance, considered the graduates of such schools as the peaceful army used by the Westerners for the cultural penetration of Muslim society.

Impact and Limitations. In the early decades of the twentieth century, Islamic modernism attained a great measure of influence in many Muslim countries. It appealed not only to the growing educated groups and the new middle classes who wanted to maintain links with their tradition, but also to the younger *'ulamā'* who saw the futility of the traditional conservative position in the face of an aggressive and dynamic Western culture. But Islamic modernism suffered from a number of limitations that affected its development and impact on society. As a mode of thinking, the essence of Islamic modernism is, Zaki Badawi suggests in *The Reformers of Egypt*, the balancing of two elements: the irreducible and unchanging aspects of Islam and the necessity for change in other aspects in response to modern conditions. The equilibrium between the two elements varied from one thinker to another. For instance, in his attempt to establish complete uniformity between Islam and European naturalism (which considered nature a system of causes and effects that allows no supernatural intervention), Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan redefined the religion in a way unacceptable to many modernist Muslims, including 'Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā, who held that he compromised the authority of revelation and went too far in embracing modern life in the name of Islam. He defended himself by arguing that much of the backwardness of the Muslims was a result of a false supernaturalism and that the author of nature was the author of revelation, so that there could be no possible clash.

The need of the modernists to balance old and new in the midst of a rapidly changing environment made them appear selective and lacking in conceptual cohesion or methodology for the systematic interpretation of Islam. Thus, the impact of their writings had some unexpected results. For instance, their questioning of medieval views and their advocacy of *ijtihād* paved the way for more daring interpretations of Islam. The works of thinkers such as Qāsim Amīn, Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, Aḥmad Amīn, and 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, all from Egypt, were only possible in the wake of the great imam 'Abduh. Thus, the modernist rejection of traditional views about Islam and the questioning of the authority of traditional jurists helped weaken the position of the *'ulamā'* and encouraged secular-oriented intellectuals to carry their arguments to their ultimate conclusions.

In the realm of law, the modernist attempt to relate *sharī'ah* (Islamic law) to modern legal notions reduced the difference between Islamic law and other legal systems, and by accepting the notion of legal change, they encouraged secularization of the system.

A final methodological limitation was the modernists' limited understanding of the Western culture and its dynamics. They were impressed by the science and technology of the West and wanted Muslims to share in it. But as Fazlur Rahman argues persuasively in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, they "did not develop traditional Muslim thought from the inside to supply an adequate basis for the new values and institutions."

Modernists were besieged from almost every corner. The secular elites who assumed power did not allow a role for Islam other than that of legitimizing their own policies. Other ideologies and persuasions, nationalism and socialism in particular, attracted the attention of a great number of the younger generation. New concerns and questions were advanced—social justice in particular—for which the modernists had no adequate answers. On the other side, the traditional *'ulamā'* and

neofundamentalist groups accused the modernists of sacrificing Islamic principles for the sake of accepting Western ideas. They even shed doubt on the modernist fidelity to Islam.

In the midst of their crisis, a number of modernists turned to apologetics. Instead of pressing for change, they attempted to temper the injured pride and unfulfilled expectations of their coreligionists. Their writings about Islamic history represent more of a nostalgic attachment to the past than a coherent set of ideas. In Egypt, for instance, ʿAbduh's thought acquired a more traditional character at the hands of his disciple and biographer Rashīd Riḍā. Muḥammad Farīd Wagdī, another disciple, turned more defensive and apologetic. A third, Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, came closer to secular ideas. In India and Pakistan, the modernism of Ahmed Khan and Ameer Ali was denounced by the uncompromising attacks on men like Abul Kalam Azad.

One familiar line of modern apologetic thinking ferrets out Islamic roots for the new theories in physics, chemistry, and so forth. Another overstates the case of Western indebtedness to Islam. According to this line of thought, Western progress was a result of heavy borrowing from Islamic culture. A third line was espoused by nationalists identifying themselves with leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Ahmad Sekou Touré of Guinea, and Ahmad Sukarno of Indonesia. Since Islamic thinkers provided religious legitimation for the social and economic changes initiated by those leaders, they argue, political ideas and trends such as Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and African socialism were justified in terms of Islam.

History made it more difficult for the modernists. Political events and growing social tensions rendered their argument irrelevant to the immediate needs of the time. In the struggle against Western domination, what was needed was *jihād* (religious war) and not *ijtihād*. The intellectualism of the modernists did not enable them to develop a political movement in a context requiring mass mobilization and solidarity against an external threat. Later, in the 1970s, the failure of developmental efforts by secular or quasi-secular regimes, the intensification of social and economic contradictions, and the increasing gap between classes created an environment conducive to neofundamentalist groups and further weakened the modernists. The birth of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihād in Egypt or Jamāʿat-i Islāmī in Pakistan is a testimony to this development. In an environment characterized by social and political polarization, the modernist liberal and moderate positions seemed out of place.

Thus, in some cases, Islamic modernism ceased to be a progressive force and was bypassed by events. In others, it was overshadowed by stronger forces: secular elites in power or grassroot neofundamentalist groups. Despite these setbacks, the modernist approach seems to be the most capable of providing a synthesis between Islam and the modern world. Its weakening position is a testimony of the state of mind and the crisis situation in the Muslim world.

[*The impact of the modernist movement in individual Muslim countries is discussed in the various regional surveys under* Islam. *Other trends in modern Islam are treated under* Jamāʿat-i Islāmī; Muslim Brotherhood; *and* Wahhābīyah.]

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MODERNITY. Many factors working together have generated interest in modernity and religion. Among these are an increasing consciousness of the many hu-

man societies that now exist, an awareness of previous societies recorded in history, and a recognition of the overwhelming variety of cultures associated with them. The constellation of cultural characteristics associated with the modern period is very different from that normally associated with an isolated tribal culture, a medieval peasant society, or a transitional society of the early modern period. To talk of religion is to identify a particular set of cultural attitudes and activities that point to the deep sources of power in a culture, how humans relate to that power, and the corresponding, codified beliefs and behaviors surrounding it. Each concept is highly complex; to discuss the relationship between them compounds the challenge.

For some time it has been a sophisticated convention to assume that the progressive extension of scientific knowledge sparked the emergence of dynamic Western societies and the extension of their influence. The subsequent triumph of reason and rational behavior over ways of thought and patterns of action associated with traditional cultures was more or less taken for granted. Thus it seemed logical to expect that religious beliefs and behaviors would be forced to the periphery of societies that were becoming modern. By extension it seemed conceivable that religion would disappear altogether. Yet in fact, evidence has suggested that religion, far from disappearing or losing influence, has a prominent place in modern societies. Indeed, religions play many different roles in modern societies, and these societies in turn play back upon religion a wide variety of effects. The term *modernity* refers to the cultural conditions that set the terms for all thought and action in a particular culture. Religious beliefs and behavior cannot be unaffected, even when those who espouse some religion consider themselves untouched by their cultural location. Just as religion remains a cultural reality in modernity, so there can be no escape from modernity, even through a wholehearted appropriation of a comprehensive religious tradition.

Defining Modernity. *Modern*, *modernism*, *modernization*, *modernity*, and related terms, taken alone, qualified, or compounded, are used every day in the popular media as well as in specialized journals and technical exchanges. The ubiquity of these terms is due in part to the shifting sets of meaning they carry. To clarify the current discussion, I propose certain distinctions between these terms.

First, *modern* is a correlative term; it implies what is new as opposed to what is ancient, what is innovative as opposed to what is traditional or handed down. However, what is judged modern at a particular time and place in a culture will not necessarily be defined as such either in the future or in some other context. Students of religion, especially, who by definition are interested in cultural patterns viewed in a long-term framework, must not fail to put in perspective changing perceptions of what is "new" and what is "old." Since a judgment about what is modern is a matter of the perspective of the observer, phenomena that appear similar may in fact vary considerably depending on their context. Thus, "modern architecture" of the mid-twentieth century now has a distinctly dated look. Similarly, nineteenth-century symphonic music must have seemed "modern" to those brought up on the baroque, but outmoded to those brought up on Stravinsky and Hindemith.

Second, the terms *modernism* and *modernization* represent, respectively, cultural and social attitudes or programs dedicated to supporting what is perceived as modern. Modernism entails a kind of explicit and self-conscious commitment to the modern in intellectual and cultural spheres. It involves a commitment to support the tenets of the "new" in the face of critics, opponents, and detractors. In this it parallels the commitment to modernization, a programmatic remaking of the political and economic aspects of society in support of the "new." This distinction implies that it is more appropriate to speak of modernism in nineteenth-century French Roman Catholicism, or in twentieth-century American Protestantism, or even among those who espouse contemporary versions of ancient Indian traditions, than it is to refer to the "modernization" of a religious tradition. Conversely, it is appropriate to refer to the modernization of a factory plant or its organization of production, or of a tax structure. *Modernism* would normally not be a useful designation with respect to such matters—unless we speak about factory architecture in the one case or art objects as shelters under the tax code in the other.

Thus it is inappropriate to refer to the "modernization" of a religion unless we mean as part of a self-conscious, perhaps largely social and political, program. On the other hand, *modernism* in this context implies a commitment (and usually a cultural program in addition) to render religion compatible with more general commitments in other areas. But is modernism divisible? Attitudes toward art, music, drama, religion, and so forth usually hang together and form a powerful set of interactive commitments. Indeed, such a set of cultural ideals may be related to economic and political change as designated by modernization. The conviction that cultural modernism is often associated with programs for social modernization frequently evolves into a more general belief that secularization is relentlessly supplanting the old with the new. In its extreme form this argument concludes that a process of secularization

makes claims upon those involved with it that exhibit a religious character, or that seem like religion in that they are ultimate, unqualified, and beyond review.

Only at this point does the term *modernity* enter our discussion. It explicitly identifies an openness and a commitment to the new as opposed to the old. Our move to the term *modernity* brings us to the consciousness of cultural change. Yet a further move attributes a congruence to the many aspects of a modern culture that makes them appear to be the expression of an entity powerful and coherent in its own right. This third step effectively serves to reify the term *modernity*. To take this step will generally promote confusion in our thinking. It is not helpful to use the term *modernity* as if it referred to a spiritual medium in contemporary life that necessarily rivals religious traditions. It is much more helpful to use it in a prereified or nonreified way as a means of recognizing that cultural change and awareness of that change are pervasive in contemporary societies. What depends upon this distinction between reified and nonreified uses of *modernity*?

One unfortunate consequence of reifying the term *modernity* is that it settles by definition an issue that ought to remain under discussion. To conceive of modernity as a spiritual medium that envelops and interconnects all particular instances of commitment to the modern, whether through modernism or modernization, is to posit an implicitly religious phenomenon, for it assumes that modernity plays the cultural role or roles characteristic of religion. As a consequence, modernity is seen as a rival to traditional or "authentic" religion. An important implication of this view is that religion in a modern society is regarded dichotomously. Either an individual or group is thought to be "for" modernity (and thus against traditional religious commitments) or "for" traditional religion (and thus antipathetic toward modernity in any and all forms). In its most intense version, this dichotomy is characteristic of every period of cultural change known to us and especially of the period we know as the modern one. Under conditions of social and cultural change, and of modernity in particular, one of many responses will be an attempt to reaffirm traditional cultural forms, albeit in highly selective and often strident versions.

Cultural Change and Modernity. It is important to explore, at least briefly, the distinction between cultural change and modernism. Stated exactly, the latter is a special case of the former. Cultural change has been a given in human societies throughout every period of which we have knowledge. There have been some periods of more, and others of less, intensive social and cultural change; but certainly no society we know anything about has been altogether free of cultural change. Records of ancient societies and cultures do not permit refined distinctions, but access to more recent historic examples allows some generalizations. Certainly it is possible to identify characteristic religious responses to periods of intensive cultural change. One is the development of the dichotomous view of the world upon which we have already remarked—"civilized" versus "barbarian," "believers" versus "heretics," and so forth. Another response has been the enhancement of orthodoxy, orthopraxy, or tradition in both ancient and recent examples of interaction between cultures as well as within a single culture. A third is the frequently recurring millenarian or apocalyptic response to cultural change. Here change is experienced as so threatening and intense that it is believed a "big change" will necessarily occur.

Cast in this framework, modernity, too, is a special category of social and cultural change. It is, to be precise, social and cultural change embraced self-consciously in the contemporary world. Some characteristic attitudes toward religion mark modernity, but they tend to be special cases of the more general attitudes toward change and not exclusively related to religion. For example, modernity includes a systematic commitment to rationality, that is, a conviction that logically consistent and universalizable principles ought to be the basis for change. Again, modernity tends to undervalue the role of symbols and the subconscious. A third and related attitude is that human life is highly malleable. This set, and the preceding enumeration, is certainly not a full set and is surely a special case of attitudes to social and cultural change. But it is also a special case, because it is self-conscious, of conceivable responses to that larger and more universal phenomenon of social change. Hostility on the part of religious traditions to the modern, especially when cast as a rejection of modernity, is itself as much a characteristic response to social change as its opposite, the enthusiastic acceptance of change by a confirmed modernist. An explicit and positive attitude toward social change is no more directly related to the experience of change than is a negative response. Both are typical attitudes of individuals and groups throughout history who have been religiously sensitive to social and cultural change.

If modernity is not reified as a spiritual entity, and if modernism is recognized as a special and self-conscious case of positive response to social and cultural changes, our proper subject is how religion appears to respond and vary under the conditions of self-conscious social and cultural change in the contemporary world. If we distinguish the fact of cultural change from a postulated, spiritualized, and thus reified modernity as the controlling commitment, we are then in a position to

review what seems to happen to religion under the conditions of prolonged change—or at least what has happened in social contexts that have been so characterized. Specifically, in an era that is conscious of the new, are there characteristic changes in religion, especially in relationship to the modern?

The Impact of Modernity on Religion. If we take modernity in this descriptive sense, the decisive commitment to modernization socially and to modernism culturally is first to be observed as a coherent process in the United States. It may be thought that revolutionary France in the last decades of the eighteenth century or Japan in the late twentieth century represent more thoroughgoing examples of commitment to the "modern." Certainly, for brief periods other societies may well have manifested an intense and thoroughgoing commitment to change. But over time, at least to date, American society has set about more thoroughly than other societies to overcome traditional ways and self-consciously to replace them with new ones. It is here that the best exhibits are available, and exhibits over time, of the kinds of cultural changes attendant upon the systematic modernization of society. Further, the actual changes we can observe in religion seem to be remarkably heterogeneous, that is, the changes by no means run in one direction only. How can we best summarize what happens to religion under conditions of modernity?

One useful distinction at this point is between responses to modernity that are explicitly keyed to the whole scope of a religious tradition, and those effects that represent the taking on of a coloration from modern society or that are evidence for generalized, nonspecific influence of modernity. It is preferable to consider the latter kind first, since these effects are ubiquitous; this will enable us in turn to review without confusion explicit religious responses to modern life.

Bureaucratization and rationalization. Some of the changes to be observed in religion relating to the modern world clearly derive from the permeation of religious institutions by techniques and procedures developed in other sectors of the society. For example, European-derived (and certainly American-begun) church traditions have adopted much from the business world. These techniques or procedures are inevitably centralizing. This is apparent, for example, in communications: telephone calls have taken the place of pastoral letters, written reports preempt personal visits, revivals and healing services are often televised rather than held locally. Other consequential changes have to do with the liquidity of wealth; even as successful a promoter as the evangelical John Wesley could not have imagined the means available to the contemporary Methodist (or Roman Catholic) church to generate financial resources and shift their allocations throughout a worldwide, well-organized structure. [*See* Bureaucracy.]

Adoption of these kinds of management technique potentially strengthens the hands of central religious leaders. But the same modern society also extends to laity the knowledge and ability to challenge such a transfer of power to central authorities. Countervailing trends, then, are at work, leading both to enhanced localism in the parishes and to the creation of extraecclesial religious organizations. Like centralized religious organizations, the latter make use of techniques widely used in the modern world (media appeals, direct mail campaigns) to raise and dispense funds and to exercise influence. These techniques often are used independently of, if not against, more established ecclesiastical authorities whose power is thus countered.

Other kinds of changes characteristic of the modern world also permeate religious behavior. Many have to do with the high degree of rationality required to function in societies of the scale and complexity characteristic of the contemporary world. One example of this concerns the ordering of time. In the past, traditional religions imposed, or at least sanctioned, a structuring of time to include myriad festivals and feasts. In our society such patterns are in tension with broad social (and especially economic) objectives, so they no longer carry much weight. Thus we can observe certain new constraints or limitations on traditional religion as it impinges on the modern public world. Correspondingly, however, the relevance and influence of religious traditions in the realm of private time and space receive greater emphasis.

These are examples of what we might term the "coloration" through which "new" or modern societies influence all kinds of religious behaviors and beliefs in very basic ways. This "coloration" is thoroughly comparable to the codification of religions in the idioms and through the symbols of particular periods and societies, whether nomadic, pastoral, or urban. The *degree* of penetration by context is different in the contemporary world in some respects, but it is not a different *kind* of penetration. Thus religion is generally affected in the modern era but not solely in terms of conscious response to social and cultural change as represented in modernity.

Religious responses to modernity. There is, however, a contrast between this coloration or permeation of religious traditions and much more explicit religious responses to social change as represented in modern society. Especially as exhibited in American society, these responses may be seen to fall into five categories.

1. One kind of response is the advocacy of new religious ideas or the claim to new insights into ancient religious traditions. This frequently entails embracing the "new" in the name of correctly understanding the old. One dramatic example of this response in North America is the Oneida Community of the nineteenth century. Its founder, John Humphrey Noyes, believed that the spiritual sources for the new modern common life of his community flowed from early Christianity, whose tenets the community claimed to fulfill. Another interesting case is that of Christian Science. Its founder, Mary Baker Eddy, believed that she had correctly interpreted Jesus' teaching, indeed the essential message of early Christianity, which she thought to yield "modern" insights into healing. Many contemporary religiously innovative groups find their sources not so much in Western traditions as in Eastern lore and ritual. (In these cases, too, the connection with healing is often pronounced.)

2. Another response is self-conscious accommodation of religious traditions to modern society, often in very explicit terms. Indeed, here the term *modernist* is frequently used pejoratively with respect to religion. Into this category fall such well-known adaptations as Protestant liberalism (with European as well as New World versions), the Jewish Reform tradition (which of course had its origins in accommodation to modern European culture at the time of the Emancipation), and Roman Catholic Americanism in the late nineteenth century (a largely indigenous movement).

3. A third pattern of response is the determined attempt to preserve the continuing tradition, albeit self-consciously within limits posed by the new framework. In many respects this strategy undergirds various churchly responses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to modern societies, ranging from the proliferation of mainstream Protestant denominations to the careful and restrained Roman Catholic updating of tradition that became highly visible as a result of the Second Vatican Council and to the self-conscious but limited case of the isolated Mercersburg Movement of antebellum nineteenth-century America.

4. A still different pattern, infrequently recognized as equally a response to modernity, is the strident reassertion of a presumed tradition in a condensed, purified, or even reductionist form. The strands of "fundamentalism" in most of the major religious traditions of the globe are to be interpreted in this light. In this perspective, fundamentalisms, as the simultaneous reduction and enhancement of particular traditions, are no less than modernisms determined by the modern culture that they so stridently reject. Here also American society provides the most fully developed instances of fundamentalism, specifically within denominations with a self-consciously British heritage and especially among Presbyterians and Baptists.

5. A final pattern in the religious response to social change in the modern world is the generation of wholly new traditions. This entails celebration of the modern in often bizarre and idiosyncratic ways, although it may also take the form of recovering pagan traditions or exploiting exotic or esoteric beliefs. These new religions are explicit attempts to reject old traditions rather than to accommodate them. But in the larger sense they are also a response to the intense social and cultural changes experienced by people living in the modern era.

This fivefold pattern is, to be sure, an arbitrary division, for the lines between these five types are always shifting. But it serves to point out that the explicit relationships between modern cultures and religions are not single or of one kind only. They vary greatly. Indeed, the relationships are so plural that respective religious movements responding to perceptions of modernity in different ways may in fact be directly opposed to each other. The classical confrontation between liberalism (or modernism) and fundamentalism in American culture is a prime exhibit of this antagonism between essentially related, though very different, responses to a common cultural experience.

Conclusions. Modernity has proven to affect religion in heterogeneous ways, both explicit and implicit. The various explicit religious responses range from a strong and strident reassertion of traditions, frequently on a reduced basis, to outright and uncritical celebration of cultural change. In this the term *modernity* most usefully refers to the kind of intense social, and hence cultural, change that especially characterizes Europe and America, of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but that has extended to other cultural areas a well. This period is not unique, however, for in earlier periods something like the same pattern of a range of religious responses to social change has been evident. Religious life within the Roman empire may be a useful parallel. With respect to the second kind of response—the implicit level of coloration provided by purely technological aspects of contemporary society—it does seem helpful to identify a peculiar cultural configuration exclusively with "modernity." But this coloration extends as much to the activities of critics of the modern as it does to its partisans. Finally, a significant point is that the modern is not to be seen as itself a spiritual medium, that is to say, a unique religious stance.

When taken together, the concepts of modernity and religion identify the broad range of religious responses to intense and self-conscious social change in the contemporary world. What is uniquely modern is not the

particular religious responses to change *per se* but their variety, intensity, and duration in the contemporary world. Crucial is the insight that religion is not so much threatened by modernity as challenged by it. And the challenge involves an inevitable and implicit coloration of virtually all religious behavior as well as a forcing of responses of many kinds, some direct, some indirect, all to some degree explicit, in the realm of religious belief. In these terms, the concepts of modernity and religion encompass a subject as fascinating as it is complex.

[*For related discussion, see* New Religions.]

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JOHN F. WILSON

MOGGALIPUTTATISSA, Buddhist elder and *arahant* leader of the monastic order *(saṃgha)* in India during the reign of Aśoka (274–232 BCE). According to the chronicles of the Theravāda tradition (*Mahāvaṃsa* and *Dīpavaṃsa*), he was the chief Buddhist adviser to Aśoka. After Aśoka became a generous supporter of Buddhism, he asked Moggaliputtatissa whether anyone had ever been a greater kinsman of the Buddha's religion. Moggaliputtatissa responded that a true kinsman of the Buddha must let his son or daughter enter the *saṃgha*. As a result, Aśoka encouraged one of his sons, Mahinda, to become a monk and one of his daughters, Saṃghamittā, to become a nun. Moggaliputtatissa subsequently became Mahinda's teacher in the *saṃgha*.

The primary work of Moggaliputtatissa is reported to have been the purification of the *saṃgha* and the organization of the Third Buddhist Council. Because Aśoka supported the *saṃgha* with lavish patronage, the *saṃgha* became corrupt and filled with undisciplined monks. When Aśoka's ministers, sent to ascertain what was wrong within the *saṃgha*, rashly executed some of the monks, Aśoka feared that the blame for the sin would accrue to him. Moggaliputtatissa, however, reassured Aśoka that he was not to blame for the act. Then, seated beside Aśoka, Moggaliputtatissa questioned all the monks and purged the *saṃgha* of those who did not subscribe to the Vibbhajjavāda interpretation of the teachings. The chronicles relate that he then chose a

thousand *arahants* and held the Third Council, at which the Tipiṭaka was recited and committed to memory in its complete and final form. Moggaliputtatissa himself recited the *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa* at this council.

Moggaliputtatissa also arranged for Buddhist monks to be sent as missionaries to other countries. The most notable of these missionaries was Mahinda, who is credited with the introduction of Buddhism to Sri Lanka.

[*See also the biography of Aśoka.*]

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GEORGE D. BOND

MOGHILA, PETR. *See* Petr Moghila.

MOHENJO-DARO. *See* Indus Valley Religion.

MOHILEVER, SHEMU'EL (1824–1898), a leader of the proto-Zionist movement Ḥibbat Tsiyyon. Born in Lithuania, Mohilever served as rabbi in various communities in Lithuania and Poland. In the 1860s and 1870s, he wrote articles in the religious periodical *Ha-Levanon*, in which he advocated cooperation between the Orthodox and the *maskilim*, the followers of the Jewish Enlightenment. Relations between these two groups were extremely bitter, and Mohilever's attempt to create a bridge between them remained ahead of its time.

Like some of the *maskilim*, Mohilever was attracted to the idea of settlement of Jews in the Land of Israel even before the pogroms of 1881. Following the pogroms and the beginnings of mass emigration, he joined with others in creating the Ḥibbat Tsiyyon movement to divert the emigrants to Palestine. Mohilever was the honorary president of the Kattowitz conference of 1884, and his closing speech became a classic Zionist sermon. Ḥibbat Tsiyyon was torn from the outset by tensions between its religious and secular members, and these ultimately led to a withdrawal of support by many Orthodox Jews who had initially favored the movement. True to his belief in working with the *maskilim*, Mohilever remained in Ḥibbat Tsiyyon. However, in order to further religious interests in the movement, Mohilever suggested establishment of a "spiritual center" *(merkaz ruḥani)* which, following his death in 1898, became the foundation for Mizraḥi, the religious Zionist faction within Theodor Herzl's Zionist movement.

Mohilever worked intensively on developing Jewish colonies in Palestine and influenced Baron Edmond de Rothschild to contribute money toward this end. He also headed a tour of agricultural colonies in 1890. These settlement activities, although small and often failures, laid the groundwork for the later Zionist settlement.

Mohilever joined Herzl's World Zionist Organization when it was founded in 1897, but because of his infirm condition, he played no role in its activities. Nonetheless, he made an important contribution to the later Zionist movement with his insistence on an alliance between religious and secular Jewish nationalism.

[*For further discussion of Ḥibbat Tsiyyon and Mohilever's circle, see* Zionism.]

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DAVID BIALE

MÖHLER, JOHANN ADAM (1796–1838), German Roman Catholic theologian. Möhler was born on 6 May in Igersheim, Germany, near Mergetheim, about fifty miles from Stuttgart. Having determined to become a priest, he entered the seminary at Ellwangen, which seminary was incorporated by the government of Württemberg into the University of Tübingen in 1817. Möhler was ordained in 1819, and after a year in parish work he returned to Tübingen, to continue his studies in classical philology. Because the seminary authorities experienced continuing difficulty finding a suitable instructor in church history, Möhler found himself appointed privatdocent in church history in 1822 and instructed to prepare himself as best he could. He was given leave in 1822–1823 to travel to various German universities, the high point of his trip being brief contacts with Johann August Wilhelm Neander, Philipp Marheineke, and Friedrich Schleiermacher in Berlin. In the summer of 1823, Möhler began to teach church history, patristics, and canon law at Tübingen. He also contributed articles and reviews to the *Tübinger theologische Quartalschrift*, founded in 1819 by his principal mentor, Johann Sebastian Drey.

Möhler's first major work appeared in 1825: *Einheit in der Kirche, oder Das Prinzip des Katholizismus, dargestellt im Geiste der Kirchenväter der drei ersten Jahrhun-*

derte (Unity in the Church, or The Principle of Catholicism, as Presented in the Spirit of the Fathers of the First Three Centuries). Following the path of Drey's interest in, but by no means full acceptance of, the views of Schleiermacher and Schelling, Möhler in effect locates the Romantic concern for the organic unity of man with man and man with God in the writers of the first Christian centuries. This unity is traceable to the working of the inner spirit of the church, although, like Drey, Möhler retains a clear distinction between the divine and the human. (It should be noted that throughout his theological career Möhler tended to a somewhat Jansenistic view of the anticipatory, or initiating, role of divine grace.) Möhler differed with what later in the century would be standard Roman Catholic teaching in his conception of the church: the outward forms of Christianity are simply produced, as needed, by the spirit, with no assurance that the forms thus produced will always be the same. He wrote, for example, that "the Church is the body belonging to the spirit of the faithful, a spirit that forms itself from inward out." This and similar expressions earned Möhler the mistrust of those German Catholics who lived under Prussian rule, frustrating his attempt to move to one of the Prussian universities. Later some Catholic commentators, such as Edmond Vermeil, saw in Möhler a progenitor of modernism. In 1827 Möhler's *Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit* (Athanasius the Great and the Church of His Time) appeared, in which he criticizes Schleiermacher's Sabellianism and his tendency to blur the God-man distinction. In the following year Möhler was made professor ordinarius and doctor of theology.

With Marheineke's *Institutiones symbolicae* as his apparent model, and answering to the renewed German interest in the doctrinal differences arising from the Reformation, Möhler published in 1832 the first of five editions of *Symbolik, oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensätze der Katholiken und Protestanten* (Symbolics, or Presentation of the Dogmatic Differences of Catholics and Protestants). The title refers not to religious symbols but to the Latin *symbolum*, that is, creedal statement. His characterization of Protestant churches drew a number of sharp replies from that quarter, the most significant being the work of his university colleague (on the Protestant theological faculty) Ferdinand Christian Baur, *Der Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus . . . mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Herrn Dr. Möhlers Symbolik*. Besides these two works in their various editions, Möhler and Baur each addressed an additional book-length reply to the other, Möhler's *Neue Untersuchungen* and Baur's *Erwiederung auf . . . Möhlers neueste Polemik*. It would appear that the controversy upset both the peace of the university and Möhler's health, with the result that Möhler moved to Munich, where he began teaching in the university in 1835 and where he died on 12 April 1838. His lectures on church history, patristics, and Paul's *Letter to the Romans* were published posthumously.

Möhler's *Symbolik* is divided into two books. After an introduction, book 1 compares Roman Catholic with Lutheran and Reformed teaching in the areas of original sin, justification, the sacraments and the church, and eschatology. Book 2 takes up "the smaller Protestant sects," namely, those of the radical Reformers, Quakers, Pietists, Methodists, Swedenborgians, Socinians, and Arminians. Möhler's conception of comparative dogmatics goes far beyond merely recording divergent views. It is necessary, he writes, "to decompose a dogma into the elements out of which it has been formed and to reduce it to the ultimate principles whereby its author had been determined." On the other hand, it is also necessary that all "parts of the system be viewed in their relation to the whole, . . . to the fundamental and all-pervading idea." Whereas the spirit of the church led Catholicism, as a collectivity, to produce Catholic dogma, the teachings of the reformers were their individual productions. In Luther's mind and teaching, remarks Möhler, there was only "the inordinate pretension of an individuality which wished to constitute itself the arbitrary centre round which all should gather." In this apotheosis of the human, Schleiermacher is "the only genuine disciple of the Reformers." (Interestingly, Baur basically accepted Möhler's assessment of Protestantism. What he objected to was Möhler's denial of Protestantism's right to doctrinal development.) Paradoxically, the germ of Luther's error lay in his theological anthropology, in his understanding of original sin, wherein the total loss of human freedom leads to the affirmation of universal divine necessitation. Viewed systematically, Protestantism displays the fatal flaw of the disappearance of the merely finite human. By 1832 Möhler had sufficiently mastered church history to recognize and accept fundamental theses of the Council of Trent: synergism in justification and good works, and the positive, outward role of Jesus Christ in the institution of the church and the seven sacraments.

In its immediate effect Möhler's work was a noteworthy contribution to increased self-respect and intellectual respectability among mid-nineteenth-century German Catholics. The long-term effect of Möhler's work arose less from his polemical thrusts than from his essentially Romantic vision of the place of Christ in the church. If the whole life of Jesus Christ is "one mighty action," then "the Church is the living figure of Christ manifesting himself and working through all

ages. . . . He is eternally living in his Church, and in the sacrament of the altar he has manifested this in a sensible manner to creatures endowed with sense." Möhler's interest in the organic nature of reality and in the dignity of the human as a finite symbol of the divine can be traced, for example, in M. J. Scheeben's *The Mysteries of Christianity* (1865) and Henri de Lubac's ecclesiological studies—and ultimately in papal and conciliar documents, namely, Pius XII's *Mediator Dei* and *Mystici corporis* and the Constitution on the Liturgy of Vatican II.

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MOISM is a school of ancient Chinese philosophy founded by Mo Ti (c. 475–395 BCE). An early Chinese source claims that Mo Ti studied among the Confucians. Whether or not this is true, early Moism is best seen as a reaction against the formalism advocated by the Confucians. While Confucianism sought order in the ritual, music, and political organization of the "glorious" days of the Western Chou period (1121–771), Mo Ti explicitly rejected music and elaborate burial rituals as wasteful, finding a precedent for such parsimony in the more distant and supposedly austere Hsia dynasty (traditional dates 2207–1767). Indeed, Mo Ti labeled himself a "lowly man" and probably did not descend from the declining Chou aristocracy. Some modern scholars argue that Mo Ti's philosophy spread among an emerging class of artisans and successful farmers. Certainly the early Moist emphasis upon frugality, utility, and a new social order that eschews inherited privilege would have appealed to such a group.

Mo-tzu. The philosophical content of Moism is best explored through an examination of the text *Mo-tzu,* the only extant work deriving from the Moist school. This text of seventy-one chapters, sixteen now lost, is a repository of the rich and somewhat varied concerns of Moism during the period of its greatest growth and influence, the late Chou dynasty (approximately 400–221). Probably none of the text comes from the hand of Mo Ti himself, and it is unlikely that the work derives from a single time. The authenticity of several chapters has been questioned, but philological investigation leads to the conclusion that virtually all of the text was written in the pre-Han period (before 206 BCE).

The *Mo-tzu* can be easily divided into the following five sections:

1. Epitomes (chapters 1–7)—comparatively short summaries of key Moist doctrines
2. Essays (chapters 8–39, seven chapters lost)—discussions of eleven essential Moist doctrines, each doctrine being the subject of three separate chapters
3. Logic Chapters (chapters 40–45)—systematic presentation of Moist logic
4. Dialogues (chapters 46–50)—descriptions of Mo Ti's wanderings and his dialogues with various contemporaries
5. Defense Chapters (chapters 51–71, nine lost)—technical information on military defense

These sections all contain material of great significance for the study of early China. The Defense Chapters, for example, provide valuable information on early Chinese science and technology, and the Dialogues present noteworthy exchanges between Mo Ti and his contemporaries as well as several useful biographical details about the founder of Moism. However, the Essays and Logic Chapters are central to the study of Moist philosophy and must be discussed at some length.

As the name *Essays* implies, these chapters are systematic discussions of particular Moist doctrines. Stylistically, they mark a critical development in the Chinese philosophical tradition, for they are the earliest

examples of sustained philosophical argument and establish an expository method that leads eventually to the more refined essays of such philosophical texts as the *Hsün-tzu* and the *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu*. The earlier Confucian *Analects (Lun-yü)*, by contrast, contains brief observations or records of short dialogues, nothing remotely comparable to an essay. The Moist essay, as it appears in this section, is highly repetitive and often characterized by a somewhat mechanical question and answer format, a rhetorical style that obviously derives in large measure from oral presentation.

The chapters of the Essays are organized into groups of three. That is, each topic, with one exception, is treated in three chapters. Each of the chapters in these triads repeats much of the material contained in the other two. Indeed, they appear to be three separate redactions of roughly the same material with some additions and deletions being made in each case. Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1911) scholars have suggested that this peculiar arrangement might reflect the redactions of three separate schools of Moism, but it has been difficult to support this thesis by discovering consistent philosophical criteria by which each chapter in a triad can be distinguished.

The eleven topics of the Essays are fundamental principles of Moist philosophy. They are, in order of presentation, "Elevating the Worthy," "Identification with the Superior," "Universal Love," "Against Offensive War," "Economy of Expenditures," "Economy in Burial," "The Will of Heaven," "Elucidating Ghosts," "Against Music," "Against Fate," and "Against the Confucians." Virtually all of these principles are argued on the basis of utilitarianism. For example, to elevate the worthy, rather than fill official positions by virtue of one's nobility of birth, is a more efficient way of running the government. To identify with superiors and comply with their wishes minimizes strife and social disarray. Music is attacked not because it may have a negative moral impact on the listener but simply because musical performances are extravagant and produce no clear social benefit. Even the Moist argument for the existence of ghosts proceeds largely from a utilitarian concern—people simply behave more virtuously when they believe in the possibility of divine retribution. A Moist society, as these principles indicate, would be one of austerity, self-sacrifice, and conformity.

The Logic Chapters contain a highly developed system of formal logic. These chapters are typically dated from a period somewhat later than the Essays and may have been produced by later Moists in a time of intense rivalry between competing schools of thought such as existed from the mid-fourth to the mid-third century BCE. The old authoritarian arguments, which consisted largely of references to the beliefs and policies of ancient sages, had lost force, and there was a tendency at this time in several schools of philosophy to find a new foundation for disputation. As such, the Logic Chapters attempted to place Moist doctrine on a more solid empirical basis. This section of the *Mo-tzu* presents an extraordinary challenge to modern readers. Not only is the material inherently difficult, but the text is exceedingly corrupt. In fact, all attempts to reconstruct and elucidate these chapters are highly problematic. Essentially, the logical system is concerned with names and the relationship of names to objects. The Moist logicians are radically nominalist. An object is named and then all things that are like that object are given the same name. There is no reference to an essence or an idea behind a category of objects. Attention is given what fits or what is admissible with no concern for abstract truth. One portion of the Logic Chapters discusses ethics and attempts to derive Moist behavior strictly from notions of desire and dislike. Despite the supernaturalist content of several of the Essays, later Moism sought support in logic alone for such ethical principles as universal love, pacifism, and austerity.

History of Moism. Moism developed as the traditional aristocratic order declined. Some of its doctrines, such as identifying with the superior and promoting the worthy (others would say "capable"), anticipated the rise of the centralized, bureaucratized state. Indeed, Moism itself, unlike other philosophical schools of the Chou period, was a tightly organized authoritarian movement. Mo-tzu was honored as virtually infallible. A statement in the Logic Chapters proclaims that "even if there were no men at all in the world, what our master Mo-tzu said would still stand." Throughout the late Chou dynasty the Moists were organized under a "supreme commander" *(chu-tzu)* and demonstrated on several occasions a martial willingness to die for their doctrines. The movement was apparently a great success for a time. Meng-tzu (372–289?) obviously saw Moism as a serious threat to Confucianism, noting on one occasion that the followers of Mo Ti "fill the world." Meng-tzu heatedly attacked the Moists, arguing that the doctrine of universal love, which advocated equal love for all, undermined the privileged position of one's own parents and was a doctrine of "beasts."

Although Moism seems to have flourished for a time, it had disappeared with little trace as a movement by the Ch'in dynasty's unification of China in 221 BCE. The reason for this sudden decline has been a subject of considerable speculation. Some have suggested that Moism simply required too much self-sacrifice and had too little regard for normal human psychology to live beyond the initial period of charismatic leaders. Others have ar-

gued that those who opposed offensive war and gave their time and energy to military defense may have been decimated during the intense warfare that accompanied the rise of the Ch'in dynasty. Recently, a sociological explanation of the decline of Moism has been given: the artisan class that may have been the heart of the Moist movement could influence the government of small and unstable states during the late Chou period, but they could no longer exert such influence in a reunified empire.

Whatever the reason for the decline of Moism, it ceased to have significant influence on the Chinese world, and the *Mo-tzu* was largely neglected until the Ch'ing dynasty. The Ch'ing revival of interest in the text was initially motivated not so much by an attraction to Moist philosophy as by the intriguing philological challenges posed by a text that had become rather corrupt through long centuries of neglect. Eventually, however, two groups began to show more than philological interest in the text. The first of these was interested in the similarities between the Moist emphasis on universal love and newly introduced Christian ideas. The second group, which sometimes overlapped with the first, saw Moism as a form of protosocialism. Recent scholarship in the People's Republic of China has been rather sympathetic to Moism. Marxist scholars argue that contrary to Confucianism, Moism opposes the old aristocratic order, anticipates a new political structure, and contains "praiseworthy materialist tendencies."

Although the long-range contributions of Moism to Chinese culture have been minimal, Mo-tzu was the first philosopher to advocate filling political offices on the basis of merit alone—a position that led, perhaps rather indirectly, to the civil service examination system. In addition, Moism's attempt at a formal logic marked a major step forward in the quality of Chinese philosophical discussion, but such interest in formal logic was quickly relegated to the periphery of Chinese intellectual discourse.

[*See also the biography of Mo-tzu.*]

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STEPHEN W. DURRANT

MOKOSH is the life-giving goddess in ancient Slavic mythology, inherited from the pre-Indo-European pantheon and debased during the early Christian era. She is the only female deity mentioned in the Kievan pantheon established by Vladimir I in 980 CE. In northern Russia, she has survived as a house spirit, Mokysha or Mokusha; a tall woman with a large head and long arms, she shears sheep at night and spins flax and wool. Her name is connected with spinning and plaiting (Lithuanian *meksti*, *makstyti*, "to plait," and *mākas*, "shirt"; Russian *meshok*, "sack, bag," *moshna*, "pouch") and with moisture (**mok-* or **mokr-*, "wet, moist"). These associations suggest her ties with the life-giving and life-taking goddess of Old Europe—that is, with Fate, the spinner of the thread of life and the dispenser of the water of life. Menhirs (*kamennye baby*), venerated in some Slavic areas into the twentieth century (and some now called *Maria*), seem to be connected with this ancient goddess, who possessed healing powers. Paralytics, the blind, and the deaf offered flax, wool, and sheep to these stones.

In the Christian era, Mokosh was superseded by Paraskeva-Piatnitsa ("Friday, fifth day") or Lianitsa ("linen washer"). In the Russian Orthodox tradition she is identified as Saint Paraskeviia (from the Greek *paraskevi*, "Friday"). Friday was a day sacred to the goddess and was characterized by taboos on women's work. In Carnival processions, the saint's image was that of a woman adorned with flax, her hair hanging loose and her hands extended. Legends speak of the miraculous powers of healing springs or river sources associated with Paraskeva-Piatnitsa. In the Russian ritual called *mokrida* (from *mokr-*, "wet"), a sacrifice to her consisted of flax, wool, thread, or woven articles such as towels and shirts. Her most important holiday fell on 28 October, a day within the annual period of flax preparation. Women may not work on this day. Disregard of this rule may bring on blindness or some other malady, or may even result in death. Piatnitsa may transform intransigent women into frogs. Posts and shrines in her honor were built at crossroads, and wooden images of her were erected as late as the twentieth century.

In northern Russia, old icons testify to the continuing importance of this pre-Indo-European goddess in Chris-

tian guise. In them, Saint Paraskeviia, who replaced Mokosh, is shown as one of a saintly triad, along with Saint Elijah (Il'ia), who replaced the Indo-European deity Perun, and Saint Blasius (Vlasii), who replaced the Indo-European deity Veles-Volos.

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MARIJA GIMBUTAS

MOKṢA. The term *mokṣa*, a Sanskrit masculine substantive, and its feminine synonym *mukti*, are derived from the linguistic etymon *muc*, meaning "release." Both terms have always been employed in an exclusively religious sense, denoting release from the tedious and painful cycle of transmigration *(saṃsāra)*. Such a notion first appears in Indian thought with the oldest Upaniṣad, as well as in early Buddhism.

The notion of *mokṣa* is found neither in old Vedic literature, nor in the Saṃhitās ("collections"), nor in the Brāhmaṇas, the commentaries referring to sacrificial rites. Indeed, the oldest known Vedic texts are concerned with enjoyment *(bhukti)* of the earthly world, not with release from it. The metaphysical, moral, and soteriological associations of the concept of *mokṣa* are based on a religious sensibility that places absolute priority on the experience of being liberated from those very structures and patterns.

It was not until the sixth century BCE that texts began to give evidence of what would come to be the main concern of Indian religious thought, that is, release from the cycle of rebirth or *saṃsāra*, which is generated by the weight of actions *(karman)* fulfilled during the present life or during previous ones. [*See* Saṃsāra.] Such a preoccupation arose at the same time in Brahmanism and Buddhism, and eventually extended throughout the Indian subcontinent. It lies at the very base not only of the Upaniṣads but of the teachings of the Buddha and of his contemporary, the other great religious reformer, Mahāvīra.

The concept of *mokṣa* becomes more elaborately developed in both the *Mahābhārata* and the *Laws of Manu*. The idea also appears in the early Upaniṣads, but is expressed with the synonymous term *mukti*. When *mokṣa* appears, it is under its compound *vimokṣa*, but with the same meaning. Early Buddhism employes the Pali form *mokkha*.

The *Bhagavadgītā*, which very likely constitutes one of the earlier parts of the *Mahābhārata*, does not yet employ the word *mokṣa*, but the etymon *muc* provides substitutes to specify those who have a mind to gain release (4.4); the one who is released is referred to with the adjective form *mukta* (5.28) and, as in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, which predates the *Gītā* by three centuries, the substantive form appears only as *vimokṣa* (16.5) or *nirvimokṣa*, with the same meaning.

Often, where *mokṣa* might be expected, other words are substituted for it. A word derived from Vedism, *amṛta*, is used to introduce the notion of immortality; in that case, however, it takes on a particular significance, putting the stress on the fact that *mokṣa* results in a privileged position, the major effect of which is to avoid rebirth. The essential point is that *mokṣa* is liberation from the ties of action *(karman)* and from *saṃsāra*, the endless chain with no beginning.

By using a different vocabulary, the later systems derived from Brahmanic thought give a different coloration to their conception of release. For instance, the Yoga system proposes *apavarga*, which emphasizes escape from the cycle of rebirths; the Sāṃkhya chooses the word *kaivalya*, that state of being in which one regains primitive unity. [*See* Sāṃkhya.] However, in spite of a different wording, the aim remains the same, that is, the liberation of the *jīva*, or the individual soul.

In the Vedānta texts of the middle ages, composed by the commentators on the *Brahma Sūtra*, it is the substantive term *mokṣa* that is preferred. The most influential of these commentators are Śaṅkara (eighth century CE), Rāmānuja (c. eleventh to twelfth century), Nimbārka (thirteenth century), Madhva (fourteenth century), and Vallabha (fifteenth century). Following them, modern Indian philosophers of the nineteenth century as well as contemporary thinkers adhered to the same term. [*See the biographies of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, and Vallabha.*]

Mokṣa is a perennial word in the Indian religious vocabulary; the notion it conveys in every case is the assurance that the practitioner is never to come back to this world again. Various ascetic traditions throughout Indian history have taught that the release from the world can actually take place before one's physical death. Such traditions speak then of the *jīvanmukta*, that person who is "released while still alive."

Writings colored by Tantric influences, particularly those connected to the Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra, mention three ways to liberation. The first is based on a full differentiation between the god and his worshiper. The second is based on a theory of union between the two of them: Self and self make one; God and soul are one. The third way to liberation consists of an attempt to reinte-

grate the Supreme Self through complete identification with it. In Tantric Vaiṣṇavism, that expectation is named inmost union, or *sayujya*.

The *Bhagavadgītā* delineates three paths of self-discipline leading to freedom: through action *(karmayoga)*, through knowledge *(jñānayoga)*, and through devotion *(bhaktiyoga)*. In the first, one is deemed bound by each good or evil deed yet can win appropriate reincarnation through actions or deeds. On the face of it, it seems impossible to place *karman* and *mokṣa* together; good deeds may only be valued as preliminary steps to liberation. But we must consider here the particular context of *karman* in its primitive significance as a ritual act, an act specially consecrated. The word *karman* is, of course, basically related to action. However, one will not be tied up by one's actions if one bears in mind the all-important rule not to expect a reward in this world or later on. Only acts with no self-concern may open the kingdom of the *brahman*.

The main characteristic of *jñānayoga* is the cognition that *ātman* and *brahman* are identical. It is cognition or insight that grants man real freedom, for the individual soul is considered free but fails to recognize it.

The *Bhagavadgītā*, together with all of the theistic systems, also espouses a third way to reach emancipation, that is, through *bhakti*, or devotion. Originating in Vaiṣṇavism, *bhakti* spread forth into other religious traditions of India, and became particularly important in Tantric Śaivism.

With regard to cognition or meditation as a path to *mokṣa*, both the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara hold that there is a procedure of mind bound to an intuitive recognition between the *ātman* and the *brahman*, that is, the identity of the self within the Self, or the Primary Energy from whom all energies proceed. Through mere concentration of mind one should seize that identification content as the intuitive recognition of the famous *tat tvam asi:* "that thou art."

In the theistic systems, the meditation process, rather than relying upon abstractions, rests on a personification of the Ultimate. Meditation is achieved by concentrating on the god's performances such as they are reported in the sacred texts. The gods are invoked through prayer formulations known as *mantra*s, which are expected to be impregnated by the very energy of the One invoked. The foundations of a relationship with the Lord are built on love and confidence. In return, the Lord, through his benevolence, grants his worshiper the deliverance others achieve only through the course of multiple lifetimes. Sometimes, *mokṣa* appears as a favor granted by the god, owing nothing at all to human effort. The notion of delivery is conceived of quite differently by theistic and non-theistic systems. If such a quest is evident in the Indian current of thought, it is out of a theistic conception that it acquires its full religious significance.

Indian writings with a political tendency often mention the three traditionally recognized objects (*vargas*) of earthly life: *dharma* (moral duty or law), *kāma* (enjoyment), and *artha* (material wealth). In a combined philosophical and religious context, a fourth object, *mokṣa*, is added. Philosophically, it is recognized as the most important, for it expresses the human being's supreme object, his return to the primary cause, the Ultimate.

In the Upaniṣadic context, *mokṣa* is the cause of little mythological elaboration. It is from traditions where *mokṣa* is won by worshiping a personified god that the myth takes strength in literature as well as in iconography. From the epic poems (i.e., the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*) onward, the notion of liberation is given a mythological context. One of the most striking examples is provided by Kṛṣṇaism. In the separate forms of a child, a warrior, and a lover, the hero Kṛṣṇa is a permanent actor in the quest for salvation of his worshipers.

The Vedānta circles that issued from Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, and later from Vallabha, emphasized the combined worship of Kṛṣṇa and of his favorite shepherdess, Rādhā, for the predominance of love over any other feeling may in itself lead to emancipation. Because every iconic image keeps a fragment of divinity after ritual ceremonies have been practiced, worshiping images is a definite step in adoration; more potent than the rite itself are the images, charged with a salvific power. The Śaiva tradition also recognizes the efficacy of worshiping the images of the god (Śiva) and the goddess (Devī or Kālī or the Great Goddess). [*See* Mūrti.]

When people beg for material valuables, the one "who knows," as it is said in the Upaniṣads, is aware that only through the benevolence of God may he reach the Ultimate, which is the way out of the cycle of rebirths.

[*For further discussion of the three paths of* mokṣa *as delineated in the* Bhagavadgītā *and other texts central to the development of this concept, see* Bhagavadgītā; Karman, *article on* Hindu and Jain Concepts; Jñāna; *and* Bhakti. *For discussion of a term that is linguistically and conceptually related to* mokṣa, *see* Jīvanmukti.]

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A. M. Esnoul

MONASTERY. [*This entry discusses the architecture of Christian monasteries. For discussion of monasteries in Asian religions, see* Temple, *articles on* Buddhist Temple Compounds, Taoist Temple Compounds, *and* Confucian Temple Compounds. *For discussion of similar structures in Islam, see* Khānagāh. *For further discussion of the monastic way of life, see* Religious Communities.]

A monastery is a building or group of buildings arranged for the members of a religious order to live as a community apart from the world in work, study, and prayer dedicated to God. The term *monastery* will be broadly used here to mean not only the houses of monks but also the houses of nuns (convents) and friars (friaries); the term *monk* will be used to mean both male and female residents of monasteries.

The practice of Christian monasticism has its origins in Egypt where, beginning in the late third century, men withdrew to the deserts and mountains to meditate and fast in solitude. Soon these hermits (Lat., *eremites*) formed groups of cells adjacent to a small oratory or church *(laura)*. Pachomius (c. 292–346) was the first to organize hermits into a cenobitic community *(coenobium)*, where each monk lived alone in a room or a cell but joined with the other monks for prayer and meals. Nothing is known about the physical appearance of these monasteries except that the informally disposed buildings were surrounded by a wall, and the monks grouped according to skills or crafts. In Asia Minor, Basil the Great (c. 329–379) added charitable works such as establishing orphanages, hospitals, and workshops to the monks' activities. Some monastic communities included buildings for travelers and pilgrims.

By the fifth century, the cenobitic system had spread throughout the Mediterranean world and north through Europe. The organization of the buildings varied from monastery to monastery, according to what activities were performed and at what times of the day and night. A coherent and logical architectural scheme was worked out only after the monks' day was strictly regulated.

In 529, Benedict of Nursia (c. 480–547) established a community at Monte Cassino, in Italy, where he composed a rule to govern its life. The rule demanded a blend of liturgy, study, meditation, and manual labor under the close direction of an abbot *(abbas)*. While not prescribing the physical features of the monastery, the rule profoundly influenced its design by touching on all aspects of monastic activity, including the monastery's services to society.

The Benedictine Schema. By the late eighth century, Benedict's rule was the accepted code for western European monasteries. The first monastic plan is known as the Plan of Saint Gall—it is extant and now resides in Saint Gall, Switzerland. This plan is a copy from about 820 of a lost scheme for an ideal monastic complex formulated during the reform synods of Aachen in the years 816 and 817. The plan did not designate a specific monastery and was never built as such; rather, it was a statement of policy showing what buildings should make up an ideal monastery and the relationship of these buildings to one another. The Plan of Saint Gall provided a model for later monasteries where the rule of Saint Benedict could be lived in the most rational manner.

Designed to accommodate 110 monks and 150 to 170 serfs and workmen, the Saint Gall plan clearly defines the different activities of the monastic community within separate buildings. Broadly described, these buildings comprise the church; the cloister and its buildings for the monks; the buildings for the sick, the elderly, and the novices; the buildings for the monastery's secular responsibilities; and the domestic buildings serving the community. Each building on the plan is labeled, and these labels are sometimes complemented by a reference to the spiritual significance of the building. The order and logic of the plan both served and reflected the order of the monks' lives as prescribed by Benedict's rule—a perfect life required a perfect monastery.

Components. The monastery, a self-contained and self-sustaining community within the larger community of empire, kingdom, or nation, was enclosed by a high wall with only one means of access. Its physical and spiritual heart was the church. Whereas in the eastern Mediterranean, the centralized, or cross, plan was more popular, in the West, as the Saint Gall plan shows, the basilical plan was preferred. East or West, the church was always the most resplendent building in the monastery, invariably constructed of stone or brick and richly ornamented. The church served the local parish, pilgrims, and guests as well as the monastic community. The lay community and visitors were restricted to the western end of the church, located closest to the monastery's entrance.

The monks, housed in their own group of buildings, were isolated from serfs and workmen and from the secular activities of the monastery. Located alongside the eastern half of the church, the monks' quarters consisted of three ranges of large, often double-storied buildings tightly locked around a square or rectangular courtyard that was the cloister (see figure 1). This cloistral complex was usually sited on the south side of the church in cooler northern climates and on the north side in southern climates; site constraints also influenced its location.

A continuous covered arcade surrounded the open

court and so gave direct access to all the buildings. The walk closest to the church often was used for reading or study and from the fifteenth century contained recesses or carrels to hold the monks' desks. The origin of the cloister as an architectural unit is still unclear, but the square-shaped cloister surrounded by the monks' quarters was an invention of the Carolingian age; its development was dependent on the adoption of the highly controlled and ordered life prescribed by Benedict.

On the eastern side of the cloister, the dormitory was placed at right angles to the church and, joined to it at the transept, provided direct access for the monks during night services. Monks slept communally in the early Benedictine monasteries, although the dormitory often was divided into separate cubicles by wooden partitions. After Pope Martin V conceded single cells to the Benedictines in 1419, the common dormitory became rare. Taking up a greater area than a dormitory, single cells probably led to the two-story cloister composed of cells on all three sides of the upper floor. On the Saint Gall plan, the dormitory was raised above the monks' warming, or day, room. Located near the dormitory was the rere-dorter, or latrine, which was linked by a covered passage to protect the monks in inclement weather.

The refectory was placed at right angles to the dormitory, parallel to the church, with the vestiary, or wardrobe, above. While most refectories were at ground level, some were raised on undercrofts, which were used for food storage. Like the dormitory, the refectory had to be large enough to accommodate all the monks at one time. Monks ate at long tables while listening to scriptural readings given from a pulpit. A fountain or basin for the monks to wash in before eating was located near the refectory, often in the south walk of the cloister. From the twelfth century, the fountain was commonly an independent structure projecting into the cloister opposite the refectory. The kitchen was located near the refectory but usually outside the cloister.

On the west side, for easy access to the outer world, was the cellar, located on the ground floor, with a larder above. Between the cellar and the church, the sole formal exit from the cloistral area was through the monks' parlor, where monks, when permitted, met guests. Except for the time they spent working, the monks spent their entire lives in the cloistral complex. This complex, an architecturally conceived whole, provided a self-contained world for the monks within an already separate world.

From the eleventh century, one other building or room not included on the Saint Gall plan became a standard feature of the cloistral area: the chapter house.



FIGURE 1. *Benedictine Ideal.* Artist's rendering from the plan for the Abbey of Saint Gall, Switzerland; c. 820.

Used for business matters of the monastery and as a burial place for the abbots, the chapter house was located either next to the church or under the dormitory. In England, it was sometimes a separate circular or polygonal building.

The other buildings that made up a typical medieval monastery, as shown on the Saint Gall plan, were sited and grouped according to their function and their relationship with the secular world. Attached to the north side of the church were rooms for the porter and visiting monks. Flanking the apse was the scriptorium, where selected monks copied and illuminated manuscripts, with the library above it. By the twelfth century, the library frequently was located under the dormitory, alongside the chapter house. Also on the north side of the church, but freestanding, were the buildings that served the monastery's obligations of hospitality and education. These included the house and kitchen for visitors of rank; a school for children of the local nobility; and a house and kitchen for the abbot, whose social responsibilities included such secular activities as entertaining guests. The inscription on the Saint Gall plan notes that the ideal abbot's house is constructed of stone; in many monasteries, except for the church, the abbot's house was the most splendid building.

Isolated to the northeast of the church was the infirmary. This infirmary, also used as a nursing home for aged monks, often was designed as a monastery in miniature, with its own refectory, dormitory, bath house, and chapel arranged around a cloister. Completing this unit was the doctor's house, the house for bloodletting, and a medicinal herb garden. Nearby was the cemetery, which in the Saint Gall plan doubled as an orchard. The novitiate, also planned as a monastery in miniature, was to the south of the infirmary.

The L-shaped tract of land on the south and west was occupied by the service buildings. These included chicken and goose houses, a granary, a mortar and mill, workshops, houses for livestock and their keepers, and facilities for visiting pilgrims, paupers, and servants of distinguished guests.

Careful attention was paid to sanitation. In the Saint Gall plan, most of the latrines were placed on the perimeter. Whenever possible, monasteries were located near flowing water, which was channeled both to provide fresh water and to carry away waste. The importance of the water supply and drainage in medieval monasteries is attested to by a plan, drawn up around 1160, for the installation of a new water system at the Canterbury Cathedral monastery.

There is a coherent and logical organizing principle underlying the plan of Saint Gall. The hierarchical division and separation of buildings by function that is integral to the plan is clearly realized in all later monasteries. The plan provided a highly generalized statement adaptable to highly particularized site conditions, needs, and size. The clarity and unity of the plan served the monastery at a symbolic as well as a practical level, reflecting the order of the Benedictine rule and, by extension, the divine order and rule. For many centuries, the scheme of Saint Gall remained the guiding principle for the layout of a monastery, easily adapted to meet the requirements of orders other than the Benedictine.

Other Developments. The monasteries of the Carthusian order are a variation on the carefully conceived scheme of Saint Gall. In 1084, Bruno of Cologne (c. 1030–1101) fused the eremetic life with the cenobitic in one complex at Chartreuse, France, soon called La Grande Chartreuse. It was designed to house twelve monks and a prior, with each living alone in a cell and working alone in the private garden attached to his cell. The only communal activities in these Carthusian monasteries were mass, matins, vespers, and occasional meals. To ensure the monks' solitude, the cells and gardens were arranged around a large cloister and separated from the ancillary activities of the monastery by the church, refectory, chapter house, library, and prior's cell, all of which were organized around a second and smaller cloister. The quarters for the lay brothers *(conversi)*, who ministered to the needs of the monks, and for the guests were arranged around a separate cloister. Because their tasks required more frequent contact with the outside world, lay brothers inhabited either the western range of the cloister or a duplicate cloistral complex to the west. The Certosa di Pavia, the charter house in Pavia, Italy, founded in 1396, is typical of the layout and, like many Carthusian monasteries, housed twice the ideal number of twelve monks (see figure 2). Despite the adoption of single cells and private gardens, there was no substantive alteration in the ideal monastic scheme since there was no fundamental change in the monk's world of prayer, study, and work.

The Cistercians, founded in 1098 by Stephen Harding, dedicated themselves to restoring the original concept of Benedict's rule—self-sustaining communities based on a life of hard manual labor and prayer. They built their first monastery at Cîteaux, France, but it was later, under the leadership of Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), that the order grew rapidly. Uniformity of activities and liturgy within the order resulted in uniformity in plan and design. For example, all the early churches followed the so-called Bernardine plan of a long nave and a rectangular apse in imitation of the church at Clairvaux. The Abbey of Maulbronn, Germany, founded in 1139, exemplifies Cistercian planning as a whole as well as the early design of the church (see

figure 3). Located in secluded valleys, Cistercian monasteries possessed small guest quarters and no outer school. The lay brothers, in the western range of the cloister, were physically separated from the cloister by a walk known as the lane. The monks' refectory was usually at right angles rather than parallel to the church, probably to provide space for the kitchen between the refectory and the quarters of the lay brothers. Extensive and often distant land exploitation required granges consisting of living quarters, a chapel, and barns.

Over the centuries, Benedictine monasteries increasingly were adorned with figural sculpture and painting intended to instruct the faithful in Christian doctrine. For Bernard, this architectural ornament achieved an aesthetic and emotional power inappropriate for monks. Cistercian architecture was without figural sculpture and was minimally embellished, but the unplastered stone buildings achieved an austere monumentality reflective of Cistercian ideals. Cistercian monasteries were structurally innovative and influential in the dissemination of the pointed arch and vault throughout Europe.

The Franciscans (founded by Francis of Assisi, c. 1181–1226), the Dominicans (founded by Dominic of Osma, c. 1170–1221), and the Augustinians (late eleventh century) adapted the Benedictine schema to serve their synthesis of the contemplative life and active ministry. Located in cities and towns, their churches were large and spacious to serve better the new emphasis on preaching. From the 1520s, these three orders played a crucial role in the colonization and conversion of the Americas. In Mexico alone, nearly sixty monasteries were built in the sixteenth century. The early monasteries consisted of a church, often of single nave, and accommodations for the friars grouped around a cloister. For the enormous number of converts, the friars built a large walled courtyard that was attached to a side or corner of the church; this served as a temporary outdoor nave for the huge congregations. A typical courtyard consisted of a vaulted structure with a triple-arched facade to house the Sacrament on the side opposite the entrance and small square structures known as *posas* (Span., *posar*) at the corners. Pauses were made at the *posas* during liturgical processions around the courtyard, and they were used by the friars when teaching separate groups in the corners. The Dominican Monastery of Tepotzlan, Mexico, built in the sixteenth



FIGURE 2. *Ground Plan, Carthusian Monastery.* La Certosa di Pavia, Italy; 1396–1497.

century, shows this ensemble. Both the open court and the *posas* appear to be an original architectural solution, probably invented by the Franciscans, for the particular spatial needs of the early Mexican monasteries. By the mid-sixteenth century, it was normal for these nontraditional open courtyards to be roofed, using traditional European techniques.

As early as the seventh century, and as formalized in the Saint Gall plan, many monasteries served the dual needs of both the monks and the larger community. In England, for example, in ten of the seventeen dioceses, the bishop's residence was in a monastery, and the monastery church also served as the cathedral church. Built within cities, the monks' buildings were set apart by a high wall. The church formed a physical and spiritual link between the conventual buildings and the bishop's palace, court, and administrative buildings outside.

The alliance of secular power with the monastery was demonstrated most influentially in the Escorial palace-monastery in Madrid, built between 1563 and 1584. It was conceived and endowed by Philip II as a retreat for himself and as a mausoleum for his father, Charles V; the monks, in this case of the Hieronymite order, performed daily rituals of commemoration for dead and living royalty. The Escorial was built on a plan of axial symmetry, with the church and crypt at the center and the monastic community housed around five cloisters on the south side of the church and its forecourt. To the north were the palace, a college and seminary, and lodgings for guests. A radical innovation was the king's apartment wrapped around the sanctuary of the church; its location simultaneously stated the power of the monarchy and affirmed monarchal piety. The absolute order of the design of the Escorial, where even the cruciform church echoes the overall grid, reiterates this union of church and monarchy.

The union of religion and state achieved its greatest architectural grandeur in the eighteenth-century Baroque monasteries, especially in central Europe. Adopting a symmetrical and axial plan in emulation of the Escorial, both monastic and secular precincts also were built around their own cloisters. Imperial apartments usually possessed a monumental, ceremonial staircase leading to the imperial hall, a large library to assert the monastery's role as a center of learning, and often a theater. These colossal and ostentatious monastery-palaces had magnificent facades and, sometimes, vast forecourts.

From the beginning, Byzantine and Russian monasteries showed less uniformity of plan than did those in the West. Although the church was normally in the cen-



FIGURE 3. *Ground Plan, Cistercian Monastery.* Abbey of Maulbronn, Germany, founded 1139.

ter of the complex, the support buildings were variously arranged. But in the Baroque period, many newly founded monasteries followed the symmetrically planned and sumptuously appointed models of central Europe.

Modern Times. Following the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and the French Revolution of 1789, many monasteries were dissolved or suppressed, and the buildings were destroyed. A monastic revival in mid-nineteenth-century Europe, coupled with colonization and increased missionary activity, saw the establishment of monasteries in Africa, the United States, and, by the end of the century, Japan. In the twentieth century, and especially after World War II, many monastic communities launched extensive building programs, often selecting internationally renowned architects. Emphasis was on mission and on hospital and educational work, including higher education. Some monasteries extended the concept of hospitality to serve as temporary retreats for the laity. As before, the church acted as the spiritual unifier and the physical separator; the cloistral area was located on the side farthest from the visitor's area, and the school and other buildings were on the other.

Even before the Second Vatican Council of 1965, monastic churches were designed to emphasize the unity of monks and laity. The Benedictine Abbey of Saint John in Collegeville, Minnesota, founded in 1856 and redesigned by Marcel Breuer in 1953, preserves traditional plan organization while epitomizing the new trends. The entire complex of conventional buildings, a seminary, a university, and a high school, center on and revolve around the church. Scholastic zones are grouped to the north and west, and the conventional buildings are to the south. But the bell-shaped church has a centrally located altar, which allows the monks' choir to be visible to the laity, and new materials and structural forms directly express contemporary technology and ideas.

The monastery provides a physical environment to serve the contemplative and active dimensions of the monk's life and has, therefore, a continuity in overall planning concepts and building type irrespective of the circumstances of time and place. At the same time, within the type, monastic architecture shows the persistent experimentation and variation necessary for the particular requirements of the different orders.

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KAREN KINGSLEY

MONASTICISM.

[*This entry consists of three articles dealing with the monastic form of religious life:*

An Overview
Buddhist Monasticism
Christian Monasticism

The first article examines the nature and function of the communal life of monks and nuns in various religious traditions. The companion articles focus on the development of monasticism in Buddhism and Christianity.]

An Overview

The Greek word *monos,* from which *monasticism* and all its cognates derive, means "one, alone." According to this etymology, therefore, the basic monastic person may be a hermit, a wandering ascetic, or simply someone who is not married or a member of a household. However, the term *monastic* normally refers to people living in community and thus embraces the cenobitic as well as the eremitic and peripatetic lifestyles. In Western societies, the definition of *monasticism* has often been restricted to its classic manifestations, especially the Benedictine tradition. By this definition clergy who adopt some aspects of monastic life and rule (canons regular or regular clerks), mendicant orders (Franciscan, Dominican, and like associations), and other religious orders are not properly called "monastic." Furthermore, within the classic definition one might be able to include some kinds of non-Christian monasticism—that is, those with goals and life patterns fairly similar to the Benedictines—but not others.

Nevertheless, many religious traditions feature (with varying degrees of formal institutionalization) a recognizable type of social structure for which *monasticism* is an appropriate name. The Buddhist *saṃgha,* the Christian religious and monastic orders, Jain monasticism, and Hindu *sādhu*s or *saṃnyāsi*ns provide the most

obvious examples. Taoist associations and Muslim Ṣūfī orders share many of the essential features of monasticism, although they also have some atypical aspects. Among primitive peoples something like monasticism exists in the phenomenon of secret societies. Other traditions, for example, Judaism and Protestant Christianity, have little expression of this religious possibility. Even within these religions, however, there have been associations much like monastic communities: among the Essenes, for example, and various sixteenth-century Lutheran groups, through the deaconess movement, to a current interest, most notably in the community at Taize, France.

With all these examples in mind, in the following paragraphs I shall attempt to develop a comprehensive analysis of the monastic phenomenon. In order to avoid the gender specificity of *monk* and *nun*, persons who exhibit and represent the monastic phenomenon will be called "monastics."

Defining Features. First and most prominent of the essential features of monasticism is the monastic's distinctive social status and pattern of social relationships. The monastic person is identified as one whose self-perception and public role include membership in a special religious category of persons, a status which is deliberate and extraordinary. In some cases the monastic lives with other monastics, but in other cases participation in a communal life may only be sporadic. Most monastics are at least theoretically members of a group, but they may not live with that group for most of their monastic existence. The monastic status can involve either a new home or homelessness.

The second defining feature of the monastic situation is a specific program or discipline of life. [*See* Spiritual Discipline.] The most obvious examples of formal regulations for the monastic life are the Vinaya of Buddhism and the Benedictine rule, but even less clearly defined categories set up expectations concerning appropriate behavior and activities for monastics. Monastic life, in contrast to the rest of human life, is entirely oriented toward a personal religious goal. Hence, the monastic adopts special patterns of living in order to achieve that goal.

Monastic status is differentiated from other religious roles, offices, and functions in that it is not primarily based on performing some service to others in the religious tradition or to the larger society but on the more private cultivation of a path of transformation. A minister, priest, shaman, or similar expert in sacred procedures exhibits a kind of religious leadership dependent on a community to which sacred values are transmitted. Certainly these roles can be merged: some religious professionals also live like monastics. Likewise the monastic person or community can take on many and varied tasks of service, only some of which may be obviously connected to the pursuit of the personal religious goal. Nevertheless, the essential element in any monastic situation is the long-term focus of the monastic life: separation from normal human existence in the pursuit of individual aspirations.

Third, monastic status is celebrated and publicized in various ways. A process of initiation marked by ceremony is very important to public perception as well as to monastic self-consciousness. Monastic status is also often indicated by distinctive clothing, modifications of the body (such as tonsure), and symbolic accoutrements (for example, the Buddhist staff and begging bowl). In many traditions the monastic leaves the arena of family, clan, or similar "natural" grouping and lives in a deserted place. The difference between monastics and others can be expressed through such factors as a different daily schedule: many monastic rules call for interrupted sleep or early rising. A specific diet may be prescribed. In all cases the monastic status represents a new or added identity expressed by specific behaviors, signs, and patterns of relationship to others.

Finally, it is important to note the presence of a larger religious tradition and set of institutions within which the monastic phenomenon takes place. We do not call those institutions "monastic" when the religious community in question is the whole legitimate religious tradition. The Shakers, for example, had many of the patterns of monastic life but constituted a whole church in and of themselves. This is the phenomenon that is more often termed a "sect" or "cult." Monasticism, by contrast, exists as an option within a wider grouping or identity; it is a special possibility that not everyone in that religious group adopts or is expected to adopt.

The optional monastic identity may be central or peripheral to the larger tradition. Christianity can exist without monasticism because, in the "secular" priesthood and episcopal office, it has a social structure and forms of leadership independent of monastic patterns. Such patterns are even less central in Islam, where much of the tradition disowns monasticism completely. By contrast, monasticism is central to Buddhism and Jainism; indeed, the monastic is sometimes thought to be the only true representative of these traditions and the lay community no more than a subordinate support group. Jainism and Buddhism began with monasticism, whereas Christianity manifested this pattern clearly only after a few centuries of existence.

The basic, common features of monasticism, therefore, can be reduced to these four: special status; dedication of monastics to the practice of personal religious disciplines; ritual entry and ongoing identification

marked by special appearance; the role of monasticism as an option for some persons within a larger tradition and community. In addition to these features, however, there are many other frequent characteristics of the monastic situation that are not found in all examples.

Frequent Characteristics. Even though the most careful definition of *monasticism* could not include communal life as a necessary factor, there can be no doubt that monastic existence is rarely completely solitary. Even wandering or hermit monks assemble periodically. These assemblies and the buildings constructed for long-term residence constitute the most visible aspects of monasticism and therefore might assume a larger place in one's perception of the phenomenon than they should. Much that is important to monastic life is personal, private, mental, or otherwise difficult for outsiders to gain access to. It is often only in public ceremonies or visible features such as the monastery itself that the outsider observes the monastic phenomenon. However, any adequate comprehension of monasticism requires a knowledge of the lives, conversations, and writings of monastics.

Sometimes monastic status is lifelong; this would seem to be the normal implication of the initiation into a higher realm. In some situations, however, temporary affiliation with a permanent community or temporary communities is a possibility. In Thailand many young men enter the preliminary stages of monastic life with no intention of persevering. A few months of monastic existence is better than none from their point of view. The Hindu phenomenon of the ashram is also deliberately temporary yet has many of the characteristics of a monastic community. The ashram may be thought of as the stage of life through which a pious Hindu man proceeds on his way from being a householder with a family to becoming a *saṃnyāsin*, a wandering, homeless, holy man. The ashram may also be thought of purely in terms of a forest dwelling place of such a man and the community that may gather around him.

Christian religious orders often have some arrangement whereby lay people can become affiliated with the order without becoming full members. The third order of the Franciscan tradition and the Benedictine oblates are two such orders. In some instances a residential oblate may live just like the other members of the community or order. Certain Ṣūfīs live a kind of monastic existence in addition to being married, and several contemporary Christian religious communities are experimenting with such an arrangement.

Another frequent feature of monastic life and a major dynamic in its communal form is the phenomenon of discipleship and obedience. Monastic aspirants gather around a spiritual master, guru, or initiator who becomes their model and guide. The starets in the Russian Orthodox Christian tradition, the shaykh or *murshid* in Sufism, and the Zen Buddhist master are prominent examples. The relationship of master and disciple also can be found in nonmonastic situations. In all examples this type of association is much more intense and personal than that normally experienced between teacher and pupil. The master embodies the lesson and mediates transcendent power; radical obedience is an important discipline in the attainment of the monastic goal. Monastics sometimes validate their doctrine and practice by reference to their masters and their masters' masters, forming lineages back to the founders of their traditions.

Another important aspect of much monasticism, yet one not essential to it, is poverty or simplicity of lifestyle. The constitutive factors of distinction from normal or prevailing forms of life and the adoption of a specific rule and discipline are often expressed in the rejection of comforts or luxuries enjoyed by the rest of society. It is ironic that, despite the attempt to be ascetic or plain, monasteries often become quite wealthy. In order to participate in the holiness of the monastic community, the surrounding community characteristically bestows its valuables on the monastery, hoping to exchange them for the treasures of merit, wisdom, and piety cultivated by the monastics. Also the industry and discipline of monastic work has occasionally produced significant wealth. Such accumulation of wealth, as well as other factors that may lead to a change in the character of a monastic community's life over a period of time, have produced successive reforms within long monastic traditions. Benedictine history is a story of reforms: the first notable one took place under the aegis of Benedict of Aniane about three hundred years after Benedict of Nursia founded the order. This was followed by the reform programs of Cluny, the Cistercians, the Trappists, and so on.

Monastic clothing has had great significance in some traditions. In many cases the origin of such clothing was merely an extension of the emphasis on simplicity—the garments of the poor were adopted. Ṣūfīs are so called because of their affirmation of simple wool *(ṣūf)* in contrast to the silks of the rich. The ocher robe in India and the various colors of the Christian communities have been important means of identification. There has also been a "romance of the cowl." The monastic garment itself has had a fascination and religious significance, for example in the desire to be buried in a cowl through deathbed profession. In Jain monastic practice we find the unusual phenomenon of nakedness as monastic "clothing." The Digamambara Jain monks are thus "sky-clad" as a precaution against harming

even a body louse and as an ascetic discipline, and at the same time to signify their monastic status by departing from the normal way of dressing.

According to one interpretation, monasticism can be understood basically in terms of asceticism; self-denial and the acceptance of pain are the basic reasons for the existence of the institution, from this point of view. Insofar as "asceticism" can refer to any kind of discipline, one cannot argue with this approach. "Asceticism," however, is usually associated with painful and rigorous disciplines, and not all monastic systems prescribe difficult or unusually painful practices. The range is very broad between mild ascetic disciplines and self-denial on a heroic scale, although it is rare that a monastic is not self-conscious about avoiding and rejecting many human potentials and comforts. At the least sleep and eating are usually regulated and reduced. Silence is kept for extended periods. However, ascetic practice is also always a matter of perspective and degree: what seems like suffering to one person might not disturb the comfort of another. If a monastic thinks that suffering must be cultivated in order to achieve a religious goal, many and various techniques may be used. In other situations what might seem like asceticism to the outsider may be understood and experienced more as simplicity and the reorganization of life. [*See* Asceticism.]

Most monastics in the history of world monasticism have been men; indeed, the founders of monastic orders, including the Buddha, have allowed women to be monastics only reluctantly. This probably has been due more to surrounding cultural factors than to anything intrinsic to monasticism. The avoidance of sexual activity and arousal, however, has been an important aspect of much monastic asceticism. Some monks apparently have thought of women primarily as temptresses, and their literature sounds misogynist. The Orthodox Christian monastic center on Mount Athos, in Greece, forbids entrance to women. By contrast, there is greater interest today in mixed communities and in lessening the isolation of monastics from the rest of society.

Monastic Activity. The program, rule, or discipline that is so important in monastic life varies widely between traditions and monasteries. Some monastics spend their time in liturgical activities, others in devotional or yogic exercises, and many in work that does not seem to be religious at all. The monastic performs any task with its religious effects in mind no matter what its other benefits. The basic monastic purpose is to achieve a religious goal, even if the activities performed by monastics may seem somewhat incidental to such a goal. Apparently irrelevant activity often looms large in specific situations and may provide much motivation for the monastic and support from the larger community. The list of monastic disciplines and activities contains none that are absolutely unique to monasticism but many that have been especially prominent and perhaps easier to pursue within a monastic context.

Meditation and prayer, in their various forms, have been the most important activities in most monasteries: meditation may be discursive, ecstatic, yogic; prayer can be spontaneous, formal, communal, solitary. However, all kinds of religious practice are cultivated in monastic situations. Formal liturgical ceremonies (monastic profession or initiation, sacrifices, and sacred dramas) are frequent and conspicuous aspects of monastic life. Monasteries are known for their communal chanting of sacred texts, as certain Ṣūfī orders are known for their dancing rites; other arts are also developed by monastics in the interests of their religious application. Some monastic traditions have been suspicious of particular art forms, associating them with the luxuries of the world or seeing them as distractions; but even simplicity has artistic intention and power. The stark beauty of a Zen garden or a Cistercian church exemplifies a use of the arts in the service of monasticism as much as more ornate and elaborate artistic expressions.

A special kind of meditation or reflection is important to the monastic endeavor in many places and ways. This is the attention given to every detail of life, both physical and mental. Not only are monastics intent on orienting everything in their lives toward the achievement of religious transformation; their heightened consciousness about the motions and thoughts of everyday life becomes itself a transforming mental discipline. They argue that too much human life is lived unconsciously and thus without purpose or organization. By consciously acknowledging and reflecting on such commonplace activities as breathing, walking, or thinking, the monastic gains a new perspective on the human phenomenon. The smallest building blocks of life may be used to evoke ever-deeper awareness and ultimately enlightenment.

The whole of cenobitic monastic life is choreographed by the rules of the order. Times of sleeping, eating, praying, meditating, and working are all prescribed, and these actions are performed by the monastics in unison. The sounds of bells and other signals punctuate the day and coordinate the many lives of the monastics into a single harmonious program. This attempt to blend individual lives into a larger social unity has been influential as a model for utopian theorists and represents to many lay people an attractive aspect of monastic existence. Religious symbols of unity, harmony, and peace are reinforced by the living of the monastic pattern.

It is not difficult to recognize prayer, meditation, and rituals, which are important in any religious situation, as being important as well in the monastic pursuit of religious transformation. However, monastics also do other works that are not so obviously religious. Many monastic rules demand that the monastic perform menial, common chores, not only because work of that sort must be done by someone in any community of human beings but also because of the meaning that is attached to it within the monastic framework: menial labor may give a form to humility, its rhythms may be seen as an aid in meditation, its performance may be an act of service and obedience to the master, and so on. An emphasis on self-sufficiency and isolation has led monastics and monasteries to be pioneers in foreign and remote areas, performing a service in civilizing or proselytizing. Monasteries have also functioned as hotels and hospitals in remote places.

Some monastic work involves intellectual activity. Benedict's rule emphasizes reading *(lectio divina)* as a major component of the monastic life along with prayer and work. The path to perfection or religious transformation is often an intellectual path that requires a new understanding of the self and the world. Reading and study in the monastic context is a means of salvation, a technique for the reconstruction of one's worldview. Also, because the rule, religious texts, and other written guides to meditation, prayer, and discipline must be available to monastics, much of their effort has been put to copying, studying, and teaching these materials. Their educational task starts with that monastic necessity, easily comes to include other religious scholarship, and may extend to more "secular" knowledge as well. Wisdom and religious insight may be cultivated for their role in religious transformation, but here, as elsewhere, there is the potential for great benefit to the rest of society incidental to the main goal. The role of Christian monasteries in preserving classical Greek and Latin writings is a famous example of the intellectual by-products of monasticism. Buddhist *vihāra*s in India and elsewhere have been important centers of learning.

In some situations charitable acts are held to be more important for the monastic than more individual disciplines. A distinction is made within Christian communities between contemplative orders, where activities like those mentioned above predominate, and active orders, where emphasis is placed on work with beneficial effects for others. In the active monastic styles the way to attain deeper or higher religious status is associated with the merit and value of meeting people's needs, in addition to or instead of the cultivation of private pieties. Thus a monastic belonging to an active order may be a teacher, nurse, priest, or support person in some beneficial institution, but with an interest or investment in the work that is beyond that of nonmonastic colleagues. For the monastic such work is part of a discipline or rule, a means toward a religious goal.

The services of monasteries to society as schools, hospitals, and places of hospitality to travelers have been mentioned. Monastics have often provided priestly or pastoral services for their larger communities. Monasteries have also served as orphanages, places of burial, research institutes, and pilgrimage centers. They have provided places of reflection and restoration for individual and communal visits and retreats. It may also be important to people preoccupied with daily, practical concerns that monasteries simply exist; the knowledge that somewhere people are praying and meditating can in itself be beneficial.

Meaning. A number of answers can be given to the question "Why do people become monastics?" Some of these answers might be given by the monastics themselves; others could be provided by students of human behavior attempting to see beneath and beyond the self-consciousness of participants in a social phenomenon. Some of these responses might seem pejorative or critical of the monastic endeavor, while others would be admiring and adulatory. Some answers are psychological and personal, others more social or historical in focus, and most are complex and ambiguous.

Many people have associated the monastic with words like *escape* and *retreat*. This manner of speaking reflects a perception of the monastic world as a realm dominated by an inability or unwillingness to cope with normal life or "the world." This view might lead one to a conception of monastic life as a refuge for the weak or the scrupulous. Insofar as one understands the world and "normal life" to be diabolical or illusory, however, the monastic retreat is the more courageous and realistic option, calling for extraordinary strength and dedication. Monasticism has also been significant as a preserver of culture and civilization in eras when the political structures of the world were weak. Certainly during the disintegration of the Roman empire monasteries provided islands of tranquillity and an opportunity for the pursuit of intellectual activity that was unavailable in the surrounding society.

The adoption of a markedly different way of living cannot but imply some criticism of the alternatives. Thus some observers have emphasized the role of monastic life as a protest against the prevailing patterns of the world or of the religious tradition. Even without a specific aim of reforming or transforming their traditions, monastics have offered an alternative set of ideals to their coreligionists and in so doing have often, perhaps unwittingly, inspired change.

The meaning of monastic life in specifically religious or theological terms goes beyond the analysis presented above. By means of symbols and doctrines the visible rites and practices of monastic life are understood to be much more significant than is apparent to the outside observer. The theme of death, for example, is prominent in various ways. Through profession or initiation the monastic technically attains a status comparable to that of the dead. Indeed, the death and rebirth symbolism in these rites is often quite clear. Through the transformation of joining the monastic community or adopting monastic status, one enters the realm of being of the angels, the ancestors, or those who have achieved enlightenment. Furthermore, it has been noted that Christian monasticism began when martyrdom ceased, indicating that it took over as the arena of ultimate commitment, the new form in which one could die to the world for one's faith. Buddhist monasticism is also a way of death in that the *dharma* provides a program for eliminating all attachment to the world as well as any desire to be reborn.

When ascetic activities are stressed in a monastic life they may be understood as penance and sacrifice to atone for sinfulness. Suffering can be thought beneficial to oneself or to others, the latter leading to the possibility of merit and its transfer in the thought of the monastics or their surrounding community. [*See* Merit.] Ascetic practice may be seen as a means of gaining power, not only over oneself but also over others, even the gods, for example in the ideas associated with *tapas* in Hinduism. [*See* Magico-Religious Powers.]

Monastics as well as scholars have understood monastic life primarily as a pursuit of mystical experience. The *ṭarīqah* in Ṣūfī monasteries can be seen both as a rule and as a method for attaining advanced spiritual life. Many monastics praise and cultivate special states of mind and body, states in which enlightenment, ecstasy, or union with the divine is said to be reached. No matter how advanced the person or the community, however, such states are bound to be rare. Thus, much that is monastic is at best only oriented toward those rare moments, and perhaps quite irrelevant to them. Furthermore, the broad definition and description of monasticism developed in this article includes possibilities for the orientation of monastic existence in other directions. In other words, many monastics may have a conception of the ideal spiritual state that does not center on mystical experiences or realizations, but could instead be focused on charitable, liturgical, or scholarly work to the neglect or exclusion of private mysticism.

One of the criticisms of monasticism has been that it is selfish, that it is in essence a private, individualistic religiosity. That assertion may be true in some instances, but there is much to counter it. Monastic works of charity offer one kind of counterevidence. The social environment of the monastery represents another. Few, if any, monastics have ever been unknown to at least some other people in their environment, and the very fact of their existence has been influential on others. Even if monasticism is centered on the self and its transformation, there has rarely been a monastic for whom the Dominican motto has not been true: "Contemplata aliis tradere" ("To give to others the fruits of contemplation").

Contemporary Monasticism. In recent decades monastics from various religious traditions have become more aware of each other. Toward the end of his life the famous Trappist monk Thomas Merton wrote and spoke of the many similarities among the world's monastic systems. Roman Catholic monasteries in traditionally non-Christian areas have been interested in this consanguinity and have produced some writing on monasticism as an interreligious phenomenon. Since 1960 an organization known as Aide Inter-Monastères has encouraged dialogue between monastics of various religions. Some Christian monastics and monasteries now practice techniques borrowed from Hinduism and Buddhism.

In the United States many experimental as well as traditional new religious communities have been established. A monastic impulse seems to have been a part of the "counterculture" revolution of the sixties and seventies. Monasticism apparently continues to be a persistent and beneficial social and religious structure. In the seriousness with which the monastic reexamines life and its goals, in the rigor with which a discipline of life is pursued, the monastic phenomenon offers an alternative way of life and view of the world to the rest of society.

[*See also* Eremitism *and* Secret Societies.]

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Buddhist Monasticism

Buddhist monasteries are to be found in profusion throughout Asia from Sri Lanka in the south to Japan in the northeast. Although much reduced in India, virtually obliterated in China and Tibet, and wracked by warfare in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Buddhist monasticism is still vital in other Asian cultures and, in recent years, has been transmitted to the West with the establishment of a number of stable Buddhist communities. Outwardly, the forms of monastic life may seem to differ greatly among these various countries and especially between those in which the Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions are dominant. A Zen monastery in Kyoto, with its unpainted wooden buildings, carefully landscaped stone gardens, and black-robed monks, may seem a very different environment from a bustling golden wat with its yellow-robed *phigsus* (monks) in a busy section of Bangkok. And closer observation would reveal many less obvious differences in the details of monastic life and in the monastery's relationship with lay society in these different countries. These differences, however, are not fundamental. They are rather variations on a single tradition of monastic life, regulated by common rules, that can be traced from the very origins of Buddhism in India.

Since the time of the Buddha, the ideal of the monk (Skt., *bhikṣu;* Pali, *bhikkhu*)—whether as yogin, hermit, wanderer, or cenobite—has been central to Buddhist thought and practice. Whereas anyone who expresses trust in the Three Refuges—the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Samgha—is counted a member of the Buddhist community, the ideal Buddhist, in both the Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions, has generally been the monk or nun. Although the Buddha did not deny the possibility of enlightenment to his lay disciples, many of the *sūtra*s teach that it is all but impossible for the householder to attain it. The arduous path to *nirvāṇa* (Pali, *nibbāna*), and to the enlightened state of the *arhat* (Pali, *arahant*) or *bodhisattva*, has traditionally involved leaving home and its attachments, fully embracing the Buddha's teaching, and committing oneself to the vows and discipline of the monastic life. There have at times been reactions against the exclusive monastic ideal. In medieval Japan, for instance, Shinran (1173–1262) and his followers in the True Pure Land school stressed the importance of absolute faith in the compassion of Amitābha and rejected the monastic rules of celibacy and separation from society. In more recent times, lay Buddhist movements have been vigorous. Implicit in these has been the conviction that salvation can be found within the household. On the whole, however, the primacy of the monastic path has been preserved.

The centrality of the *bhikkhu* and of the monastic order, the *saṃgha*, in Buddhism has been reinforced by the fact that the canonical literature—the Sūtras, the Vinaya, and the Abhidharma—was largely developed by monks and devoted to the concerns of monastic life. Thus, while in its most universal sense the term *saṃgha* embraces the whole Buddhist community, laymen (*upāsaka*s) and laywomen (*upāsikā*s) as well as monastics, historically the core of the *saṃgha* has been the Buddhist order comprising monks, nuns (Pali, *bhikkhunī;* Skt., *bhikṣunī*), and the male and female novices known as *sāmaṇera* (Skt., *śrāmaṇera*) and *sāmaṇerī* (Skt., *śrāmaṇerī*), respectively. In general, the laity has supported the order in return for instruction and guidance in the Buddha's teaching and for the performance of religious functions. By making offerings to monks and nuns, the lay Buddhist acquires merit toward his own salvation.

The Origins of Buddhist Monasticism. The basic patterns of Buddhist religious life were instituted by the Buddha himself during the fifty years he spent preaching the Dharma to his growing community of followers. According to the Pali scriptures, the Buddha's decision to renounce his princely life and seek enlightenment was prompted by four signs. Three of these signs involved his recognition of the pains of aging, sickness, and death. The fourth was the sight of a wandering ascetic. Impressed by the man's serenity in the face of sickness and death, the Buddha determined to quit his

palace and seek his own understanding of the problem of suffering. For the remainder of his life, through the phases of asceticism, enlightenment, and the spreading of his teaching, the Buddha lived the life of a mendicant *bhikkhu*. As he wandered through towns and villages along the Ganges, his band of disciples grew in number. At Banaras (modern-day Vārāṇasī), Yasa, the son of a wealthy merchant, became first a lay disciple and then a full-fledged *bhikkhu*. Yasa's family and friends are also said to have joined the order either as lay followers or as monks. The Buddha, too, recognized the creation of an order for nuns, though he did so reluctantly, declaring that it would shorten the duration of his Dharma by five hundred years, and stipulated that the nuns should be subordinate to the order of *bhikkhus*.

The Buddha and his followers were given alms by pious laypeople and also the use of *ārāmas*, or garden retreats. King Bimbisāra of Magadha, for instance, made a gift of the Veluvana, the "Bamboo Grove"; Anāthapiṇḍika, a rich banker of Sāvatthi, built the monastery at Jetavana grove that became a center of the Buddha's teaching activities. As early Pali texts reveal, the pattern of the Buddha's teaching life after his Enlightenment alternated between periods of mendicancy and periods of retreat at one or other of the growing number of *ārāmas* bestowed upon him and his order.

While monasticism quickly became a central institution of Buddhism, it was not initiated by the Buddha, nor did it immediately settle into a cenobitic pattern. The Buddha and his followers were initially only one of many groups of wandering ascetics known as *parivrājaka*, or those who had chosen homelessness. The Buddhist *bhikkhus* differed from other *parivrājaka* groups only in their allegiance to the Buddha and his teaching as their guide. During the Buddha's lifetime, the ideal and practice of the *bhikkhus* probably remained predominantly eremitical and peripatetic as they observed the Buddha's injunction to wander and spread his teaching. Gradually, however, the wandering monks began to settle in more permanent communities. While the mendicant ideal remained very much alive, community practice and organization became increasingly cenobitic.

The impulse toward settled community life was provided by the regular practice of rain retreats. During the three-month summer monsoon season, *bhikkhus* would gather in temporary retreats known as *āvāsas*. As the monks who settled in these small communities developed a collective identity, they found that their needs for shelter and food were readily provided for by local lay donations. Consequently, mendicancy declined and the *āvāsas* grew in scale and developed more permanent characteristics as monasteries (*vihāras*) or cave dwellings (*guhās*). The *vihāras* in particular, many of them large and elaborate complexes, became the great centers of Indian Buddhist monastic life and learning. When the Chinese pilgrims Hsüan-tsang and I-ching visited India in the seventh century CE, they recorded that many smaller monasteries were in ruins but that the great centers of Nālanda, Odantapura, Vikramasilā, and Nāgārjunakonda were still active and impressive centers of monastic life and scholarship. The practice of Indian Buddhist monastic life survived in these centers until the Muslim invasions of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Long before Buddhist monasticism had declined in India, it had taken root throughout Asia. From the time of King Aśoka, Indian Buddhist monks were carrying the message of the Buddha south to Sri Lanka, southeast to Burma, north to Kashmir, and northeast along the silk routes to Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan. The *saṃgha* flourished wherever the Buddha and his Dharma were welcomed. As monasteries were established, the practices of the community life that had taken shape in the *āvāsas* of India were adopted and, in some cases, adapted.

Monastic Life. Life within the Buddhist communities was regulated by a set of rules known as the Vinaya, or rules of discipline. The core of the Vinaya is the group of regulations known as the *pātimokkha* (Skt., *prātimokṣa*), literally a "bond" or "binding together." Although the precise number of rules differs among the various canons—there are 227 in the Pali canon, 250 in the Chinese, and 253 in the Tibetan—the basic corpus is the same for all branches of Buddhism. Since the early stages of development of the *saṃgha*, the Patimokkha has been recited communally at confessional ceremonies, *uposatha* (Skt., *upoṣadha*), that are held fortnightly around the times of the full and new moon. After each proscription was chanted a pause was inserted to allow any transgressor of that particular item to confess his fault. Punishment was prescribed by the Vinaya in accordance with the gravity of the offense. The penalties could range from expiation and public confession for relatively minor transgressions to permanent expulsion from the community for infractions such as theft, fornication, or murder.

Although vegetarianism has been the rule in Buddhist monasteries, the Patimokkha itself does not explicitly forbid the eating of meat. Drinking alcoholic liquor, however, is an offense to be expiated. Prohibitions against going near armies were obviously intended to keep monks from complicity in the taking of human life. Rules that forbade monks to destroy vegetable life, dig

the ground, or irrigate it protected living creatures, but they also effectively prevented monks from engaging in agriculture or slipping back into the role of peasants. The tradition that enjoins monks from engaging in manual labor has been preserved in Theravāda Buddhism and in most Mahāyāna schools, but not in Zen. Chinese Zen masters, perhaps responding instinctively to remarks by Confucian scholars to the effect that Buddhist monks were unproductive parasites, made a positive virtue out of manual labor. The T'ang dynasty monk Pai-chang summed up this attitude in his comment that "a day without work should be a day without food." Zen masters stressed that enlightenment was not only to be found in meditation, prayer, or study; it might be sparked while the individual was working in the simplest of menial tasks.

Entry to the Buddhist monastic order has always been carefully regulated. When the Buddha began teaching, it was possible for him to know each individual who asked to become a follower. Eventually, however, even during his lifetime, there were too many to deal with in this personal way, and thus he gave permission for his leading disciples to grant ordination, as long as at least ten senior monks were present at the ceremony. Before long a two-stage procedure evolved in which young people around the age of fifteen who had the consent of their families were accepted as novices, took the ten basic vows, shaved their heads, and donned yellow robes. After five years of further study and training, they were eligible to take the vows of a fully ordained monk.

Like other monastic traditions, Buddhist monasticism has emphasized personal poverty and subordination within the community. In the early Pali texts *bhikkhu*s were enjoined to make their robes from rags and to sleep under trees. As the *saṃgha* developed, the personal possessions permitted to monks were three robes, a cord girdle, an alms bowl, and a strainer for removing insects from drinking water. In theory at least, all other essential property was held by the community. As Buddhism flourished and patrons lavished gifts of buildings, lands, statues, gold, slaves, and other items on the *saṃgha*, the ideal of poverty was sometimes abandoned by monasteries or by individual monks. From time to time, in all Buddhist countries, reform movements have sprung up within the *saṃgha* urging a return to simplicity and to the strict interpretation of the Vinaya. At times the wealth of Buddhist monasteries even invited secular attack. The great purge of Buddhism in T'ang-dynasty China (845 CE) was triggered in part by allegations of undue luxury on the part of the *saṃgha*, which held extensive tracts of tax-exempt lands and derived additional income from moneylending and commercial enterprises.

In its early organization the *saṃgha* demonstrated community autonomy and democracy. The Buddha declined to designate a single successor as head of the monastic order, leaving unity to be achieved under his Dharma. Communities tended, therefore, to remain largely autonomous; each monastery governed itself through communal assemblies at which all monks had the right to comment on the enforcement of the Vinaya or to express their views on administrative matters affecting the community. Although sectarian hierarchies developed and abbots and officer monks were appointed in many monasteries, the tradition of a monastic council making community decisions persisted.

In Theravāda countries, monastic life is a round of *sūtra* chanting, meditation, study of the Vinaya and Sūtra texts, and alms seeking. Monks rise at 3:00 or 4:00 A.M. They begin the day by prostrating themselves before the Buddha and chanting the Three Refuges and sections from the *sūtra*s. After periods of meditation, study, and confession to a senior monk, they leave the monastery and make their early morning round to receive alms. Breakfast is followed by the morning chanting ceremony and by a period of instruction in the Vinaya. The main meal must be taken by noon. The afternoons are given to rest and reading of scriptures, and the evenings are devoted to confessional ceremonies, chanting, study, and meditation. The day ends at about ten o'clock. Twice each month communal assemblies are held which all monks are expected to attend.

The pattern of life in Japanese Buddhist monasteries is somewhat different. Chanting, *sūtra* reading, and study take up a good part of the day, but alms seeking is a less common activity. One sometimes sees files of young Zen monks walking through the streets inviting alms, but neither they nor their monasteries depend on these offerings. *Takuhatsu*, as it is called, is rather a reminder of the monk's dependence on the generosity of others and an exercise in humility. In Zen monasteries, too, meditation *(zazen)* and interviews with the Zen master *(sanzen)* are the central activities of the monastic day. Once a month, week-long retreats are held. During these sessions meditation continues day and night as the monks throw themselves into an intense struggle for enlightenment.

Buddhist Monasticism in Contemporary Asia. In recent times monks in many Asian countries—Ceylon, Burma, and Vietnam are obvious examples—have become involved in anticolonialist struggles and nationalist movements. In some countries, Thailand and Burma for instance, relations between the ruler or gov-

ernment and the *saṃgha* are still extremely close and the Buddhist order remains a significant force in political and social, as well as religious, life. Communist and revolutionary regimes in China, Tibet, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been less sympathetic to Buddhist monks and monasteries, seeing them as enclaves of the old social order and impediments to full-scale national mobilization. In these countries the *saṃgha* has been obliterated or severely disrupted. In some societies, such as Japan, economic prosperity, a secular orientation, and the rivalry of popular lay Buddhist movements have all contributed to a decline in the number of novices entering the monastic life in most branches of Buddhism. Thus, the future of Buddhist monasticism seems mixed. In some areas where it had flourished until this century it is being eradicated. In other countries it is having difficulty maintaining its appeal as prosperity grows and traditional values shift. In many countries, however, it continues to flourish. Relations with society are harmonious, monasteries perform needed spiritual and educational functions, monks are held in high regard, and young men and women are still willing to enter the monastic life.

[*For further discussion of the Buddhist monastic order, see* Saṃgha; Vinaya; *and* Priesthood, *article on* Buddhist Priesthood.]

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MARTIN COLLCUTT

Christian Monasticism

[*This article discusses the ideals, varieties, and principal exponents of Christian monastic life. For discussion of Christian orders, see* Religious Communities, *article on* Christian Religious Orders. *See* Monastery *for discussion of architectural dimensions of monastic life.*]

Monasticism is the most important legacy of late antiquity to subsequent Christian history. The term *monachos* as a substantive was a Christian creation. In the apocryphal *Gospel of Thomas* (third century AD?), the word is used in the general sense of "a solitary, or single-minded, or celibate person"; by the 320s in Egypt it was already understood to refer to a member of a recognized ascetic group. In the second half of the fourth century, thanks in large part to Athanasius's *Life of Antony* and the writings of Jerome, the word came to be restricted to ascetics who withdrew from the Christian community to do battle with the demons either alone (hermits or anchorites) or in community (cenobites).

Early Monasticism. Among the most difficult problems facing the historian of early Christianity is how and why the distinctive *monachos* arose from the free-form asceticism of pre-Constantinian Christianity, an asceticism whose practitioners were variously described as *remnouth* (Coptic), *iḥîdāyā* (Syriac), *agapetai* or *apotaktitai* (Greek), and *gyrovagi* or *sarabitae* (Latin). Despite the similarities of each form of Christian monasticism to aspects of Judaism and classical religions, the weight of evidence argues that monasticism arose within Christianity independently of such antecedents. In the Gospels Jesus recommended voluntary poverty (*Mt.* 19:21 and parallels) and celibacy (*Mt.* 19:12). Paul also preferred the celibate life (*1 Cor.* 7), and in the *Book of Acts* he portrayed the Jerusalem community as an ideal prayer group where all was held in common (*Acts* 2:42–47, 4:32–35). Old Testament figures, especially Moses and Elijah, encountered God while fasting and praying. Inspired by such texts, ascetical circles stressing poverty, austere practices, and celibacy were well known in early Christianity and were sometimes attacked as heretics with the condemning designation "encratite." These groups were found among the gnostics and were particularly evident in Syria, but they were not restricted to one doctrinal tendency or area.

The great Alexandrian teacher Origen (d. AD 254) was a strong proponent of the life of prayer, celibacy, and austerity. His doctrine of the fall of the soul and its gradual return to God through asceticism and instruc-

tion later proved so useful to Christian monastics that he has been called the "father of monastic theology." There is evidence that during Origen's lifetime female virgins were recognized as a distinct order in the church, and that small groups (sometimes wandering) of ascetic male celibates were not uncommon. Both groups functioned within the urban or village Christian community, as the first use of *monachos* to refer to a specific individual (an Egyptian papyrus from 324) shows.

What made the village ascetic into the anchorite or solitary monk in the proper sense was the act of separation or withdrawal *(anachōrēsis)* from the world and even from the Christian community. This separation, though variously understood, has remained central to Christian monasticism, as Thomas Merton's description of the monk as a "marginal man" implies. Whether or not Antony of Egypt was actually the first to withdraw into the desert, Athanasius's *Life* presents him as such. Born in Egypt about AD 250, Antony was converted to the ascetic life by hearing gospel texts on poverty. He received training in "the road to virtue" from experienced village ascetics, but unlike them, Antony gradually withdrew from society to battle the demons of temptation in the wilderness. About 305, after spending twenty years in isolation, "Antony came forth as though from some shrine, having been led into divine mysteries and inspired by God." The perfected and transformed Antony "persuaded many to take up the solitary life."

During the fourth century Antony was not the only *apa,* or abba (father), who convinced others to take up the new way of life. The *Apophthegmata Patrum* (Sayings of the Fathers), oral materials that began to be collected around 400, portray Antony as one among many famous desert hermits (including some women) who attracted followers. Loose groups of hermits developed at Nitria under Abba Amoun and deeper in the desert at Scete, where Makarios the Great held sway.

About 320, farther south on the Nile, at Tabennesi, the second form of Christian monasticism, the cenobitical, arose. A young ex-soldier named Pachomius, after having been the disciple of an older ascetic, received a command from heaven to build a monastery for the many who would come to him to profit their souls. Pachomius's community flourished, as did the one nearby for women founded by his sister Mary. The growth of the Pachomian houses (there were nine for men and two for women by the time of Pachomius's death in 346) led to the compilation by Pachomius of the first monastic rule, composed for his followers in order to foster the community of Christian love *(koinōnia)* that he saw as the ideal of monasticism.

Harmony between monasticism and the institutional church was the goal of early monastics. Athanasius was a friend of Antony's, and monks soon began to be chosen as bishops. The Pachomian tradition ascribed to its founder the saying: "In our generation in Egypt I see three important things . . . the bishop Athanasius, the athlete of Christ contending for the faith unto death; the holy abba Antony, the perfect model of the anchoritic life; and this Koinonia, which is the model for all those who wish to assemble souls in God" (see the anonymous *First Greek Life* in *Pachomian Koinonia,* vol. 1, Kalamazoo, Mich., 1980, p. 395).

The spread of monasticism throughout the Christian world in the fourth century was not a simple case of diffusion from Egypt. The land of the Nile was the shining example for other areas, but the distinctive forms that monasticism developed in diverse regions indicate that the ascetical tendencies in early Christianity ignited almost spontaneously in several places to create a variety of new forms of life that can be characterized as monastic. Not all these forms were as domesticated as the traditional picture of early Egyptian monasticism suggests (this picture may be a product of tendentious tendencies in our sources); there is much truth in Jean Leclercq's description of the earliest stages as *le monachisme sauvage* ("untamed monasticism").

Palestine was an early center directly influenced by neighboring Egypt. A characteristic of monasticism there was the laura system involving groups of hermits who shared some activities under the command of an abba. The Syriac-speaking world, and farther east the Persian, had been centers of asceticism in both the Christian and Manichaean traditions. Early Syrian monasticism was predominantly anchoritic and was marked by severe and at times bizarre forms of asceticism usually absent in Egypt. The most famous of these was the stylite movement begun in the fifth century, in which noted abbas such as Simeon the Elder lived perched on pillars. Anatolian monasticism was formed by the activities of Basil of Caesarea (d. 379) and his sister Macrina, who founded communities of monks and nuns on the family estate in Pontus. The *Rule of Basil,* which in revised form is still the basic text for Eastern monks, is really two series of spiritual maxims. Basil was resolutely cenobitic, stressing the necessity of living in community because of the weakness of fallen humanity and the demands of charity. His younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa (d. 395), became the first great theologian of monasticism through such treatises as *On Virginity.* Evagrios of Pontus (d. 399), a friend of both who later became a monk at Nitria, was the other major theologian of early monasticism. His Origenist speculative mysticism, although it later came under suspicion and was condemned, was influential in the

East and also in the West, where John Cassian through his foundational writings mediated the developing monastic traditions.

Monasticism moved into the Latin parts of the Roman empire in the 360s. Anti-Arian bishops who had been exiled to the East brought back an appreciation of monastics, and translations of the *Life of Antony* inspired seekers after holiness. The great scholar Jerome (d. 420), who had lived briefly as a hermit near Antioch, formed ascetical groups of aristocratic matrons in Rome in the 380s and publicized the monastic life in his writings, especially in the three half-legendary accounts he wrote of Eastern monastic saints. By the end of the fourth century, monastic communities could be found in Italy, Gaul, Spain, and North Africa.

Early Western monasticism had three main characteristics. First, despite the ideal of flight from the world and the presence of some hermits, the preponderant strain was cenobitical, and most of the communities were found in urban centers or not far distant from them. Second, Western monasticism exercised a strong attraction on wealthy aristocrats, such as the Roman followers of Jerome and Paulinus, a senator from Gaul who gave up his wealth and founded a monastery at Nola, near Naples, in 395. Third, the monastic life in the West was clerical, even episcopal, from the start, in the sense that its founders and supporters were or became bishops who saw cenobitical monasticism as the ideal life for their clergy. Augustine of Hippo was only following lines already laid down by Ambrose of Milan and others when he insisted that his clergy adopt a monastic form of life centered on poverty and celibacy. The *Rule of Augustine*, later so influential on the canonical movement, may go back to this community.

Martin of Tours (d. 397), the archetypal Western monk, illustrates the above characteristics. Martin was an exorcist under Bishop Hilary of Poitiers and lived briefly as a hermit before founding a monastery at Ligugé. When he became bishop of Tours, he continued to live as a monk and founded a house that was the center for the spread of monasticism in Gaul and a training ground for future bishops. Ascetic and wonder-worker, Martin's fame was spread by the *Life* written by the monk Sulpicius Severus.

Meaning of Early Monasticism. The motives that impelled the first monks and nuns to withdraw from society have been much discussed, and many factors, such as the rigidity of late antique society and the tensions of village life, have been advanced to explain their desire to escape. At best, these are only partial explanations. Current research has done much to illuminate the social role of the early monks who served as ideal holy men, that is, as patrons who mediated between the divine and human spheres, as impartial judges of earthly conflicts, and as masters of the demonic forces that contemporary society perceived as so threatening. The ideal monk was presented under many themes and images: the monk as the new martyr; the monk as the one who awaits the return of Christ; the monk as the miracle-worker and recipient of sacred wisdom; the monk as Adam restored from the ravages of sin and in perfect harmony with all creation; the monk as the companion of the angels and equal of the Old Testament prophets; and the monk as the true imitator of Christ.

The essence of monasticism was neither flight from the world nor asceticism. However important these aspects were, they were means to an end—the goal of divinization, or, in the terms of the great monastic theologians, the restoration of the image of God in humanity. The success of monasticism in the history of Christianity hinges on how these deliberately marginal men and women succeeded in becoming universal models of transformed humanity.

Paradoxes have marked the history of Christian monasticism from the start. "A monk is a man who is separated from all and who is in harmony with all," as Evagrios said *(On Prayer)*. Monasticism involves the paradox of how flight from the world rapidly led to felt responsibility for society, as well as the paradox of how a charismatic and anti-intellectual phenomenon grew to be a central institution for the preservation and transformation of the social and intellectual values of the late antique world. The tension between the radical aspects of monasticism and its frequently conservative role in society has been significant throughout its history.

Eastern Christian Monasticism. In the East after the fourth century, monasticism, both male and female, exercised a crucial and at times dominant role in the church's life. The abbot Shenoute of Atripe (d. 450?) gave cenobitical monasticism in Egypt its definitive form, although a more severe one than that of Pachomius. Palestine, Sinai, and Syria all continued to have monastic centers, even after the Arab conquest in the seventh century; but the communities of Anatolia, and especially Constantinople, exercised the most powerful role in the devotional and doctrinal life of Greek Christianity from the fifth century onward. Basil's writings served as a general base, but each monastic house possessed its own typicon, a document that legislated the community's life and practices.

The part played by the monks in the controversies over Christology, especially in the Iconoclastic Controversy (c. 725–842), was of great weight; the monasteries were also important centers of charitable works of many kinds. Byzantine monasticism never saw the de-

velopment of the various orders that characterized the West, but the single monastic "order" of the East had its own diversity and development in which urban monasticism remained important and in which there were movements of renewal analogous to the Western reforms. Perhaps the most important of these movements was connected with Theodore, the abbot of the monastery of Studios (d. 826) in Constantinople. A vigorous opponent of iconoclasm, Theodore's renewal of the Basilian ideal influenced the monastic communities founded on Mount Athos toward the end of the tenth century. At the same time that Athos was becoming a center of cenobitism, Symeon the New Theologian (d. 1022), the greatest mystic of Byzantine Christianity, fostered a return to rigorous monasticism in Constantinople. Symeon's twenty-sixth *Discourse* gives a good picture of the daily life of the Eastern monk in this period.

Important monastic foundations continued to be made in the later centuries of Byzantium, especially in Greece, and the monks still played a vital role in the life of the empire. In the hesychast controversy of the early fourteenth century, the monks of Athos rallied behind Gregory Palamas (d. 1359) to defend the orthodoxy of the "prayer of quiet, or of the heart," that is, the rhythmic repetition of the name of Jesus as a means to attain the vision of divine light in this life. The growth of the hesychast movement and "idiorhythmic" monasticism, in which small groups of monks lived an independent life within the monastery, were signs of a new vitality of the eremetical ideal in late Byzantine monasticism. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 severely affected the monasteries; but many centers, including Athos, have had an active life to the present day.

Monasticism spread into Slavic lands in the tenth century, and monks played a significant role in the christianization of eastern Europe. In the eleventh century, Anthony of Kiev and Theodosius founded the Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, the first center of Russian monasticism, but the early Russian monks were subsequently decimated by the Mongol invasions. The fourteenth century saw a revival of the eremetical life (frequently lived in sketes, or small communities), as well as the foundation by Sergii of Radonezh (d. 1392) of Holy Trinity in what is now Zagorsk (near Moscow), an influential monastic house in the Studite tradition. In the late fifteenth century, a debate of considerable importance for Eastern spirituality and monasticism erupted between Nil Sorskii (d. 1508), a hesychast and proponent of monastic poverty and the "sketic" life, and Joseph of Volokolamsk (d. 1515), who successfully promoted a cenobitic ideal of wealthy and politically active monasteries dedicated to the traditional liturgy.

The sixteenth through eighteenth centuries were a time of troubles for Russian monks, especially under Catherine the Great, who secularized most of the wealthy houses; but the nineteenth century has been described as a golden age, both of monasticism and of the mysticism closely allied with it. Based on the work of Paisii Velichkovskii (d. 1794), who translated the *Philokalia*, a collection of Greek texts on prayer, into Slavic, there was a great revival of hesychast, as well as of traditional cenobitical, monasticism. The figure of the starets, the monastic spiritual guide, dominated the age, as embodied in Serafim of Sarov (d. 1833) and the monks of the monastery of Optino. In 1914, there were over eight hundred monasteries for men and women in Russia. The vast majority were disbanded by the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Western Christian Monasticism. The history of monasticism in Western Christianity is long and complex; only some main lines can be given here. The fifth and sixth centuries saw the proliferation of cenobitical monks and nuns in the collapsing Western Empire and the multiplication of monastic rules. Monasticism spread to Ireland, where in the sixth century a powerful native monasticism became the dominant form of ecclesiastical organization in this pastoral and tribal society. Irish monasticism had a dedication to *xeniteia*, the ideal of exile as a special form of asceticism, and wandering Irish monks like Columba (d. 597) in Scotland and Columbanus (d. 615) on the continent did much for the christianization of the barbarian kingdoms. Columbanus wrote an influential, if harsh, rule which was also important in the spread of the "double monasteries" (houses for both men and women under one head, frequently an abbess).

The most famous of all monastic lawgivers was Benedict of Nursia (d. 550?), who first lived as a hermit at Subiaco before founding a community at Monte Cassino. The rule that Benedict wrote for this community is dependent on earlier legislation (notably the *Rule of the Master*), but it breathes an originality and a sense of order and spirit of moderation that have made it one of the most influential documents in the history of Christianity. Benedict's stress upon humility and obedience as the fundamental asceticism of the monk, as well as his insistence upon a careful novitiate (period of initiation), a vow of stability to one house, and the Christ-like authority of the abbot were crucial factors in the spread and success of his rule.

Benedict's balanced life of prayer and manual labor concentrated on liturgical worship, but also had a role for the more intellectual *lectio divina*, a meditative reading of sacred texts, especially scripture. Other contemporary monks, such as the Roman aristocrat Cassiodorus (d. 580?), gave greater stress to the role of learn-

ing in the monastic life than did Benedict, and these monks helped forge the alliance between learning and monasticism that has marked Western history. The sixth century also saw the appearance of Gregory I (d. 604), the first monk to become pope, a tireless administrator and spiritual author of genius, who sought to utilize monks as bureaucrats, missionaries, and models for Christian perfection.

In the period of the "mixed rule" which lasted until the ninth century, individual monasteries could and did follow a variety or combination of many rules. Despite this diversity, monasteries grew and flourished under the patronage of the Frankish, Visigothic, and Anglo-Saxon kings. The monasteries were almost the sole "civilized" institutions left in Western Europe, and the well-known educational and missionary activities of the monks and nuns were only a portion of the wide range of services they contributed to a fragmented society. The wealth of the monasteries and their close involvement with lay patronage, however, were factors in the decline of religious observance. Monastic abuses led to frequent reforming movements, usually promoted as a "return to origins." The first great reform movement was connected with Benedict of Aniane (d. 821), whose systematization of Benedict's *Rule* as the basic text for all Western monks was approved at the Synod of Aachen (817). The collapse of the Carolingian empire and the confusions of early feudalism led to severe disruptions in Western monasticism, which were countered by a series of tenth-century reforms spearheaded by the Burgundian monastery of Cluny. Cluny, which became the center of a large system of monasteries, did not simply represent a return to the original Benedictine model. The wealth of the Cluniac houses, their involvement with church and feudal society (despite the freedom from local control that was so important to Cluny and many of its dependent houses), and Cluny's concentration on liturgy as the essential work of the monk, marked an important change from the simplicity of the original Benedictine ideal.

The same eleventh and twelfth centuries that witnessed the triumph of Cluny and other great centers of traditional Benedictine reform (e.g., Gorze, Hirsau, and Bec) also experienced a revival of eremetical traditions in Western monasticism. First in Italy and then in France, charismatic holy men turned their backs on traditional monasticism to live as ascetic hermits and wandering preachers of repentence. The most noted of these monastic saints, Romuald (d. 1027), John Gualbert (d. 1073), and Bruno (d. 1101), eventually became founders of new communities that sought to combine traditional Benedictinism with aspects of a more austere eremetical life (their communities still exist today as the Camaldolese, Vallombrosan, and Carthusian orders).

The Cistercian order, the most famous of the new orders, however, was more cenobitical in orientation, though it, too, was touched with the thirst for primitive austerity. In 1098 Robert of Molesmes and a group of monks initiated a new foundation at Cîteaux in Burgundy. The New Monastery did not begin to flourish until 1112, when a young nobleman named Bernard and a group of his friends and relatives entered it, but the new constitutional structure that made Cîteaux the first centrally organized monastic order already seems to have been formed before his advent.

In the twelfth century the Cistercian reform spread like wildfire and proved as attractive to women as it did to men. The Cistercians aimed to return to the letter (or at least the "spirit of the letter") of Benedict's rule. Manual labor for the choir monks was reintroduced; severe simplicity in all things became the norm; and freedom from feudal economic ties was encouraged. The Cistercians were innovators in their use of conversi (lay brothers), and in the flexible institutional model they created to foster regular observance. Above all, Cistercian stress on a community of *caritas*, or Christian love, provided the matrix for a flowering of speculative mystical theology in the writings of Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153) and many of his contemporaries.

The twelfth century in the West was an age of the triumph of monasticism and also of the closely allied canons regular (priests living in community according to a rule). It was also an era of crisis and challenge. Towns and cities were growing in importance; urban schools broke the educational monopoly of the monks; and soon new orders (especially the thirteenth-century mendicants) were created to meet needs that monasticism had not been designed to answer. Monasticism was to continue to play a role in Western Christianity, but it was never again to be so central as it had been in the centuries between the deaths of Benedict and Bernard.

Reform movements produced small new monastic orders in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as the Cistercians (gray monks) and traditional Benedictines (black monks) became less innovative and influential than they had been. The most important development in late medieval monasticism came in the fifteenth century with the grouping of Benedictine houses into congregations to facilitate the work of reform (e.g., the Bursfeld Congregation in Germany, and the Congregation of San Giustina in Padua). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that abuses were widespread, most notably

the commendatory system in which nonresident abbots (frequently not even monks) controlled the finances of monasteries to the detriment of their religious observances. The Carthusians alone can be said to have flourished in this period.

The difficulties of late medieval monasticism help explain the strong attack on monks and nuns by Martin Luther and other reformers. The suppression of monasteries by secular princes and the confiscation of their wealth characterized the spread of the Reformation. In Roman Catholic western Europe the Council of Trent (1545–1563) reaffirmed the value of reform and systematization, which reached its peak in seventeenth-century France with the formation of new congregations of the traditional groups of monks and nuns, among them the very rigorous Trappist reform of the Cistercians. With some notable exceptions (e.g., the pious and learned Maurist congregation of Benedictines), the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a time of torpor and decline for Western monasticism, and the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment had, if anything, less appreciation for monks and nuns than did the sixteenth-century reformers. This opposition bore fruit during the time of the French Revolution and under Napoleon, when monastic houses en masse were closed down and destroyed through much of Catholic Europe. By 1810 monasticism had almost disappeared (only about forty of well over a thousand monasteries survived).

The nineteenth- and twentieth-century revival and spread of Western monasticism is perhaps the most extraordinary rebirth in monastic history. Traditional Benedictinism, with its devotion to liturgy and study, was revived through the activities of Prosper-Louis-Pascal Guéranger (d. 1875) at Solesmes, through the formation of the Congregation of the Primitive Observance of Subiaco, and through the work of the abbey of Beuron in Germany. The Benedictines returned to England and spread to the United States, where houses were founded at Saint Vincent in Pennsylvania (1846) and Saint Meinrad in Indiana (1855). Some of the new monasteries and congregations, following the model of the early medieval monastics, undertook missionary as well as parochial and educational work, so that Western monasticism began to spread outside Europe and North America for the first time. In 1893 Pope Leo XIII initiated steps toward greater centralization of the Benedictines under an abbot general, an experiment not without problems given the Benedictine history of tension between autonomy and centralization. During the nineteenth century, the Cistercians also revived through the activities of Abbot Lestrange (d. 1827) and others. By the end of the century, the Cistercians' two major divisions, the Common Observance and the Strict Observance (Trappist), were flourishing and they, too, had spread to the New World. The smaller groups, like the Carthusians and Camaldolese, also experienced growth.

Despite the crises of two world wars, the Western monastic orders in general continued their growth and expansion during the twentieth century down to the time of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). Monastic authors such as Thomas Merton (d. 1969) and Jean Leclercq (b. 1911) have acquired international reputations. Following the council there has been internal debate over the forms and ideals of monasticism and some decline in the numbers of monks and nuns, but this ferment must be measured against the return to the original sources and values of Christian monasticism and an unprecedented ecumenical encounter between Western and Eastern and Christian and non-Christian monastics. New forms of Western monasticism continue to find a presence in the developing nations, and Christian monasticism in general seems as lively as it has been since its origins in the fourth century.

[*See also the biographies of monastic leaders, particularly those mentioned herein: Athanasius, Augustine of Hippo, Basil of Caesarea, Benedict of Nursia, Bernard of Clairvaux, Cassian, Evagrios of Pontus, Gregory I, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Palamas, Jerome, Joseph of Volokolamsk, Makarios of Egypt, Merton, Origen, Pachomius, the apostle Paul, Serafim of Sarov, Sergii of Radonezh, Sorskii, Symeon the New Theologian, and Theodore of Studios.*]

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Fourth Lateran Council, 940–1216, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1963), a book with a broader scope than the title implies. Of particular note among Knowles's many other works of value on monasticism is *From Pachomius to Ignatius: A Study in the Constitutional History of the Religious Orders* (Oxford, 1966).

No single book better captures the spirit of traditional Western monasticism than Jean Leclercq's *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God* (New York, 1961), and Leclercq's multitude of books and papers on all aspects of monasticism constitute an unrivaled resource, both for the scholar and the general reader.

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BERNARD MCGINN

MONEY. In examining the significance of money in the history of religions, one must begin by making a distinction between the commercial use of money in societies that have developed a market economy and the uses of money in societies with nonmarket economies. In the former, money is used primarily as a medium of exchange and standard of value in the marketplace, and its value lies in its abstractness, in its ability to mediate the exchange of goods between all persons who desire to engage in exchange, regardless of their social status and regardless of the nature of the goods involved. In this context money plays a major role in the economy, and the economic sphere is relatively independent of the social and religious spheres. When money is used in the context of a nonmarket economy, on the other hand, its use is more intimately connected with social and religious institutions. Whereas in a market economy money is used primarily for the commercial exchange of essential goods, in nonmarket economies such exchanges are often accomplished through nonmonetary means (such as barter or redistribution by a political authority), and money is reserved for a more exclusive set of exchanges that are at once social and religious in significance. This article will accordingly focus on the social and religious significance of money in communities with nonmarket economies.

Marcel Mauss (1914) was one of the first scholars to call attention to the religious significance of money in so-called primitive and archaic societies. In 1914 Mauss noted the use of objects like shells and precious metals as means of exchange and payment by peoples who were without a system of coinage. Drawing on evidence from Africa, Oceania, and North America, he insisted, against the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, that such objects are rightly described as money, but he added that they are to be distinguished from modern money in being used only in specific social contexts and in being endowed with numinous or sacred value over and above their economic worth.

One of the most famous examples of such money is provided by the *kula* ring of the Trobriand Islanders, studied by Malinowski and discussed as well by Mauss. The *kula* ring is a complex system of exchange by which armbands and necklaces made of shells, collectively called *vaygu'a*, are traded around a large ring of islands just east of New Guinea. The armbands and necklaces, items of high value but of little practical use (they are seldom used even as ornaments), are traded in opposite directions around the circle by various sets of trading partners who make periodic voyages between their respective islands. The complex system of gifts and countergifts that develops is closely connected with the social order. The higher a person's social status, the more trading partners he is liable to have, and the more generous he may be expected to be in gift giving. Not only is status an important factor in the giver, but the *vaygu'a* themselves develop a kind of status. The more a particular necklace or armband is traded, the more valuable it becomes, receiving a name and personal history and taking on a certain numinous quality. This trade in *vaygu'a* forms the heart of a more extensive trade between the islands that includes trade in ordinary commodities as well as in the valuable shell ornaments. Furthermore, the *vaygu'a* themselves can be given a definite price, in terms of baskets of yams, and in some specific circumstances can serve as a means of payment for services. Mauss argued that they could therefore be considered as a form of money, although clearly not the impersonal medium of exchange we normally intended by that word. The *kula* ring thus provides a good example of money in a nonmarket economy, where it is an integral part of the economic system and yet still has a definite social and magico-religious value.

The use of shells as money goes far beyond the Trobriand Islands. The commonest form of shell money is the cowrie shell, which is found in China, India, the Near East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. This small, attractive shell is well suited to serve as money because of its portability, countability, and immunity to counterfeiting. However, the use of the cowrie as money was originally motivated by more than its practicality. Mircea Eliade (1969) has pointed out the rich symbolism of shells in general, and the cowrie is no exception. It has been used widely as a talisman and is commonly viewed as a symbol of fertility, while among certain Indian tribes of North America it was treated as

a sacred object. Like gold and jade, both rich in symbolism, cowries were also quite commonly buried with the dead. In China, cowries were placed in the mouth of the dead person, perhaps as a kind of passage money, similar to the obol for Charon in ancient Greece. The association of cowries with gold is evidenced by the fact that cowries actually made of gold have been found in Egypt and Cyprus. The popularity of the cowrie as a form of money is thus also due to its intrinsic symbolic properties.

Another widespread form of money is the glass bead. These seem to have been particularly common in Africa, where they were believed to grow naturally in the ground and thus to partake of the sacrality of the earth. Like the cowrie, they provided a convenient form of currency that was also endowed with numinous and magical properties. They were used not only as money but also in various rituals. Among some African peoples they were ground up, mixed with water, and rubbed on children to aid their growth. Again like the cowrie, they are often found in graves.

Not only were many types of primitive or archaic money endowed with an intrinsic numinous quality; some were also used as the specified means of payment for various religious services. This is seen clearly in ancient India, where the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* enjoins that the payment *(dakṣiṇā)* of the priests officiating at a sacrifice be made in gold, cattle, clothing, or horses. With the possible exception of clothing, all these objects are laden with religious symbolic significance. Their value was at least partly intrinsic, and it was this intrinsic worth and not their raw economic value that made them fit for the remuneration of priests. Their economic value was located within a broader context of social and religious value.

A particularly interesting case of an exclusively religious use of money is the Chinese custom of making offerings of paper money to gods, ghosts, and ancestors. Four centuries before paper money began to be used for commercial exchange in China, it was already being used as a sacrificial offering. The money itself consisted of pieces of paper in varying sizes and colors, decorated with designs, depictions of gods, or Chinese characters. A small piece of tin foil was sometimes attached to the center of the paper in order to represent silver or, when dabbed with yellow tint, gold. Obviously this paper money had little real economic value, but this was in fact intentional, since it was believed that what was a mere imitation in this world would become, when transformed by the sacrificial fire, a genuine treasure in heaven. There it would be added to the Celestial Treasury for the benefit of the person making the offering. This paper money is still in use in Taiwan, where four principal types are found: "gold" paper money, offered to the gods; "silver" money, offered to ghosts and ancestors; "treasure money" for repaying the "debt of life"; and "money for the resolving of crisis," used primarily in rites of exorcism.

It goes without saying that gold and silver have been favorite forms of money from earliest times. Long before they came to be used for commercial exchange, however, they were used for gift exchange and as a standard of value among various political, social, and religious elites. Exchanges of articles made of these precious metals were a primary means of asserting and maintaining one's status. The cups, tripods, bowls, and arms exchanged among the ruling elite of Homeric society, for instance, were often made of precious metals and were endowed with the numinous quality that is associated with these metals more generally. A king's treasury could express not only his political sovereignty and personal wealth but also an intrinsic sacred power that could come to the aid of his kingdom in times of crisis. [*See also* Gold and Silver.]

The close association of gold and silver with royalty, on the one hand, and with religious values, on the other, did not cease when these metals eventually began to be used in the manufacture of coins. Although it has been customary in textbooks on economics to attribute the introduction of coinage or "real" money to a merchant class seeking to overcome an awkward system of barter, this hypothetical reconstruction contains little historical truth. In fact, as illustrated above, the use of money cannot be equated with the use of currency in a market. Furthermore, the transition from a nonmarket to a market economy is a gradual one that is not identical with the introduction of coinage. According to Édouard Will (1954), who builds upon the earlier work of Bernhard Laum (1924), the introduction of coinage in ancient Greece must be understood in the context of the social and legal reforms of the time of Solon (638–559 BCE). Far from being intended to facilitate trade (which was in fact not a Greek but a Phoenician concern), coinage was introduced by the state in order to provide a new standard for an older system of exchange that had become decadent and unjust, and to provide a standard means for payments made to the state such as taxes, fines, port fees, and the like. The introduction of coinage was thus the initiative of the same group with which gold and silver were already associated, namely, the royalty.

The religious significance of the earliest coins must be seen in this larger political context. Although it was argued in the nineteenth century, in particular by Thomas Burgon and Ernst Curtius, that early Greek coinage had a direct religious origin, it seems more likely today that

the numerous religious symbols found on these coins are to be understood both as symbols of the issuing city-state and as symbols of the divine sanction behind a specific issuing body and hence behind the value of its coinage as well. This is not to deny that religious representations have been favorite themes on coins throughout history; but these representations are to be understood as expressing the religious values of the issuing body and not necessarily as implying an intrinsic value in the material coin itself.

With the introduction of coinage, therefore, a gradual movement began away from the more archaic pattern of attributing sacral value directly to the material objects used as money and toward the highly abstract forms of money used today, which are valued purely on the basis of their usefulness as indirect media of exchange in commercial markets.

With the introduction of fully monetized market economies, one begins to encounter a reversal in religious attitudes toward money. Whereas the earliest forms of money had a positive numinous quality for many archaic peoples, the disruptive effects that moneys and markets can have on the social structure of previously nonmarket societies can lead to negative evaluations of money as an evil. This can be seen clearly in the medieval West, where the introduction of markets and the increased use of money from the eleventh century onward led to a variety of religious protests. Money was increasingly represented as demonic. Feelings of awe before the numinous qualities of gold and silver were transformed into feelings of disgust for gold and silver coins, which were increasingly compared to excrement. By the end of the thirteenth century, depictions of apes defecating coins begin to appear in the margins of manuscripts. One also finds a picture of the head of a monster vomiting gold coins into a golden bowl. In less extreme forms this religious suspicion of the role of money in a market economy has persisted into the modern era.

[*For discussion of the historical relations between religious traditions and economic practices, see* Economics and Religion; *see also* Wealth.]

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DAVID CARPENTER

MONGKUT (1804–1868), Thai Buddhist reformer and later king of Thailand. A son of the second king of the Cakkrī dynasty (1782–), Mongkut was heir apparent to the throne. However, when his father (later known as Rama II) died before Mongkut had reached his twentieth birthday, his claims were passed over in favor of those of his uncle (Rama III). Having entered the Buddhist monastic order for a temporary stay only two weeks prior to his father's death, he decided to remain a monk. Mongkut's monastic career did not end until more than a quarter of a century later when, following his uncle's death in 1851, he was chosen to succeed to the throne. At that point he left the order, became king (Rama IV), and began a reign that continued until his death.

Mongkut began his monastic career at Wat Samorai, a forest monastery near Bangkok that was renowned for its emphasis on ascetic practice and meditation. After a year of apprenticeship there he became increasingly dissatisfied because no adequate intellectual grounding or justification was being provided for the practices in which he was engaged. For this reason he left to become associated with a monastery in Bangkok, Wat Mahāthāt, which emphasized the study of the sacred texts written in the Pali language. There he quickly demonstrated his intellectual ability, becoming a leading expert in Pali studies.

Despite his increasing erudition, however, Mongkut remained skeptical about the authenticity of the tradition in which he was participating. At a certain moment during his stay at Wat Mahāthāt he reached a point of spiritual crisis (so the story goes) and vowed that if his doubts were not resolved within the week he would give up the struggle and leave the order. Before Mongkut's self-imposed time limit had expired, the answer that he was seeking came to him during an encounter with a Mon monk. (The Mon were an ethnic group with a long and venerable history in both Thailand and Burma.) This teacher was able to convince Mongkut that the Theravāda tradition as preserved and practiced by the Mons was the authentic tradition, the one remaining truly faithful to the teachings of the Buddha and to the testimony of the Pali scriptures (the Tipiṭaka). The obvious correlary was that the Thai version of the Theravāda tradition was inauthentic, misguided, and in need of reform.

Soon after his encounter with the Mon monk, Mongkut returned to Wat Samorai, where he launched his reform movement. Having initiated his own program of Pali studies at this forest monastery, he soon "discovered" that the boundary stones that established and set off the sacred precincts *(sīmā)* were not in accord with the requirements set forth in the Vinaya (the portion of the Pali Tipiṭaka that deals with the behavior of monks and the proper ordering of monastic life). Thus, he concluded, the ordinations that had taken place at this monastery, which for many years had been an ordination center for the Thai *sangha* as a whole, were invalid. In order to rectify the situation Mongkut arranged for the proper consecration of the sacred precincts at the Wat, and for his own reordination by monks who had been ordained in the Mon tradition. Through these formal ecclesiastical acts Mongkut made an irrevocable break with the traditionally oriented community of Thai monks (the Mahanikai; Pali, Mahānikāya) and established a new, reformist Thai lineage that later came to be known as the Thammayut (Dhammayuttika) Nikāya.

During Mongkut's remaining years in the order, he gradually built the new lineage into a small but distinctive and distinguished community. This community came to include within its ranks a number of serious and intellectually creative young monks, most of them from high-ranking families in the kingdom. It gained the support of many laymen and laywomen, including prestigious and influential members of the nobility. It also gained widespread popular recognition through an active program of teaching, not only in the capital city but also in the countryside.

Like many reformers who have emerged in traditions that have preserved sacred scriptures from the distant past, Mongkut appealed to the authority of those scriptures in order to purge supposed accretions that had, from his perspective, come to compromise the purity of the original tradition. He also combined his emphasis on scripturalist reform with an openness to the new modes of scientific rationality (and the accompanying rejection of inherited "superstitions") that were then being introduced from the West. The effect of these reforms on religious practice was the adherence, by the monks, to more canonical forms of monastic discipline and ritual. Doctrinally, the reforms resulted in a new modernist form of Buddhist teaching that emphasized the humanity of the Buddha and highlighted the ethical and humanitarian aspects of his message.

When, at the age of forty-seven, Mongkut left the order and became king, he assumed the traditional royal responsibility for the support of the *sangha* as a whole. In this new role he provided patronage and protection for the older and much larger Mahanikai lineage, but he clearly favored the reform-minded Thammayut lineage that he himself had founded.

By the time of Mongkut's death in 1868 the reform movement that he had originated was well established. During his long career as a monk he had provided the intellectual and organizational leadership that had enabled the new Thammayut lineage to become a coherent community with its own distinctive emphases and goals. Subsequently, during his seventeen years as king, he fostered both the religious and intellectual atmosphere and the institutional ecclesiastical adjustments that enabled the new movement to consolidate its position and extend its influence. In so doing, Mongkut has contributed, more than any other individual of his era, to the establishment of the gradual but pervasive process of modernist reform that characterized the development of Thai Buddhism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

[*See also* Theravāda *and* Buddhism, *article on* Buddhism in Southeast Asia.]

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MONGOL RELIGIONS. If stereotypical reports from early times are taken into account, the religious forms of the Mongols have been influenced by the religions professed by all ethnic groups who have lived in what later was to become Mongolian territory prior to the emergence of the Mongols. The oldest of these religious forms was shamanism, which was the religion of the Liao empire of the Kitan (907–1125) and their usurping successors, the Jurchen (1115–1234). There have been accounts of Buddhist influences in the steppes since the Chinese Han period (206 BCE–220 CE), while Iranian influences are attested among the Turkic peoples of the region. Nestorian Christianity is reported as early as the twelfth century among the Turkic neighbors and later compatriots of the Mongols, the Kereit, Naiman, and Önggüt. This nourished contemporary Western beliefs that located the realm of the fabulous Prester John in their territory. Later conversions of Mongols by Catholics even led to the foundation of a bishopric in Khanbaliq (Peking), but this development was short-lived. Renewed Christian missionary attempts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have again failed to leave recognizable traces in Mongol popular religions.

In addition to the influences of Nestorianism, Manichaeism, with its dualistic ideas of light and darkness and good and evil, also played a role in the religious history of the region. It had strong footholds in the oasis towns of the Uighurs, which were incorporated into the Mongol empire under Chinggis Khan (1162–1227). The Zoroastrian deity Ahura Mazdā was an Iranian import who in Mongol popular religion became Khormusta Tengri, with a retinue of thirty-three heavenly beings *(tengri)*. All these professions have been of temporary influence, however, while shamanism has remained the perennial dominant religious practice of the Mongols.

In contrast to the abundance of studies on the shamanism of the Siberian ethnic groups and of the Buriats, shamanism in Mongolia has not yet received the scientific treatment needed to form a well-founded opinion of this religious manifestation. Following the trends of research on Siberian shamanism, the emphasis of investigation has been placed on such external paraphernalia as drums, ceremonial dresses, and idols. But unlike the Yakut and Buriat shaman songs, both of which show important Mongolian components, only a very small number of invocations from Mongolia proper have been published; an even smaller number of these incantations have been translated. Recently published materials, however, show shamanism still in existence in the northwestern parts of the Mongolian People's Republic and in eastern Mongolia. A number of invocations gathered in 1982 in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia and among the Daghurs of northwestern Manchuria also testify to the continued existence of shamanism. Some studies on these forms of shamanism have been published.

Mongol shamanism developed into its current state in various phases. In the original phase, fear of natural powers that were thought to be caused by evil forces led to the worship of the spirits of ancestors. One of the few remaining chronicles about the origin of shamanism, a text from the Chahar region, states that the living "made offerings of one wooden bowl of tea, one wooden bowl of water, and one bowl of milk brandy on the first, seventh, and ninth days of each new moon; saluted; and worshiped," attempting thereby to obtain the protection of the ancestral spirits. Through these actions one would combine forces with the masters of places and the waters, thus becoming powerful enough to fight the detrimental forces. The shamans (male, *böge;* female, *idughan/udaghan*), however, by their worship and incantations became the mediators and the means of communication with the forces to which all life was exposed. In addition to the spirits of ancestors, the spirits of unfortunate people who had not found a natural end, having been killed by accident, murder, or suicide, were thought of as possessing particular powers. They were added to the group of helpful powers that were manifest in the venerated idols called *ongons*. Because personal *ongons* were transferred into a greater unit through the merger of smaller ethnic groups or through marriage, the number of *ongons* of the individual shaman increased. (A shaman who marries obtains the *ongons* of his wife's clan.) The more *ongons* a shaman possesses, the greater is his power. This explains the diversity of incantations and the varying names of the invoked spirits and *ongons*. The functions of shamanism, as explained by the shamans themselves, are to invoke the *ongons*, to shamanize with their help, to intercede on behalf of ill persons, to exorcize evil and the powers creating calamities and illness, to expel these into effigies that are then destroyed, and to pronounce charms and prognostications by scapulimancy and other divinatory methods.

Shamanism thus appears to have developed out of the needs of a primitive economic society for the preservation and protection of the means of subsistence (health, fire, food, game, and livestock, as well as human labor, i.e., children), all of which were obtained through the help of the ancestors. People seek shamanic assistance for immediate concerns; there is no belief in its efficacy for retaliation or reward in another world or in a future life. Shamanism, lacking any moral incentive, is a mat-

ter of this world, using combinations of natural means to achieve supernatural results. The culmination of all shamanic practice is the ecstasy the shaman experiences when the protective spirit enters his body. The shaman then acts in the spirit's power and speaks in its voice. The ecstatic state is achieved in part by self-hypnosis, and in part by constant turning around in circles, inhaling burning juniper, and gulping large doses of alcohol; no other use of drugs and stimulants is traceable among Mongol shamans. In this state the shaman travels into another world, searching for the soul of the ill person, fighting with evil powers for it, and trying to win back the victim's health. The fate of the person in whose behalf the shaman acts is uttered by the protective genius through the mouth of the shaman.

The shaman's drum serves as the vehicle of this spiritual journey, having the function of a horse or a boat. Some Mongol shamans explain the streamers on their vestments as feathers enabling them to fly on the spiritual journey. Others call these streamers snakes. To transport themselves to the spirit world, certain shamans from Inner Mongolian tribes use wooden or iron staffs, each crowned with a horsehead and terminated with a carved hoof, and adorned with rattling iron rings and little stirrups. Beating the drum and shouting and singing loudly with the assistance of helpers is part of the shaman's ritual; these actions are intended to frighten and scare away the evil spirits and demons. Such an aim is already attested for the Kitan shamans of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Once exorcised, the evil originators of the illness are banished into effigies that are burned or buried.

To become a shaman a person must have the calling. The mental instability, resulting in a long period of initiatory illness, that is often reported for the Siberian and northern Eurasian shamans is rarely mentioned in Mongolia. Such a nervous and feeble condition would not accord with the historical fact that until the time of Chinggis Khan, the shaman *(böge/bägi)* often was the head of the clan and therefore was not only its spiritual leader but also its political and military leader. Mongol shamans seem to be perfectly healthy individuals. The prospective shaman is singled out by an old shaman who becomes his teacher *(bagši)*. From the *bagši* the student learns the names of all the ancestral spirits, which eventually are all bequeathed to him. The young shaman thus becomes a link in an age-old chain of religious and ethnic tradition. The continued existence and activity of the *bagši* is still being reported. One famous *bagši* died as recently as 1970 in the Bulghan district of northern Mongolia; in 1983 the incantations of a sixty-one-year-old *bagši* and his pupil *(šabi böge)* were recorded in eastern Mongolia. The costumes of Mongol shamans furthermore lack any of the female symbols and emblems reportedly common among Siberian and Central Asian shamans.

In the thirteenth century Mongol shamanism was influenced by administrative measures when the first Mongol emperor in China, Khubilai Khan (r. 1260–1294), established by imperial decree the office of the state shamans. These shamans were responsible for offerings in memory of Chinggis Khan and his house as well as for the worship of fire. According to the *Yüan shih*, the official Chinese history of the Yüan dynasty, these shamans pronounced their prayers and invocations in the Mongolian language. Judged by the evident longevity of the Mongolian oral tradition and its extraordinary reliability, it seems certain that some of the prayers still used today at the so-called Eight White Yurts, the center of worship of the deified Chinggis Khan in the Ordos territory, contain remnants of these early shamanic prayers and supplications. Tradition has outlived the destructive influences of the fratricidal warfare of the Mongols in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as well as more recent attempts at annihilation. The faithful handing down of the clan-bound names of the ancestral spirits from one generation of shamans to the next is proof of the age of the many different extant samples of shaman invocations and poetry. The Yüan government's early administrative measures regulating religious affairs may also account for a certain conformity of expression in the shamanic supplications. The mention in invocations of Chinggis Khan's son, Čagadai, and Čangqulang, one of Čagadai's spouses, testifies to the continued inclusion of historical personages of the Mongol imperial line in the realm of the powerful ancestral spirits and *ongons*. The same holds true for the mention of members of the Mongol imperial family among the persons lauded in the fire prayers for having brought the flame to life by striking sparks from flint and steel.

The ephemeral contacts of Buddhism with the ruling strata of the Mongol nobility during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and later did not lead to any decisive intrusion of Buddhist notions into the religious conceptions of the bulk of the Mongol populations. Shamanism remained dominant. Only when Buddhist missionary work began among the Mongols in the sixteenth century did shamanism come under heavy attacks. Biographies of Buddhist missionaries such as Neyiči Toyin (1557–1653), who converted the eastern Mongol tribes; the lamas who were active in the southern part of Mongolia ruled by Altan Khan of the Tümet (1507–1583); and the western Mongol Zaya Paṇḍita (1599–1622), who

spread Lamaism among the northwestern Mongol groups, show clearly the methods of conversion. All of these missionaries had recourse to the persecution of shamanism and the shamans and to the sequestration and destruction of their idols, vestments, and paraphernalia, using ruthless force, persuasion, and bribes. The conversion aimed particularly at prohibiting bloody offerings of animals and the worship of the *ongot*, the collective term for *ongon* figurines. Princes and overlords sustained the missionaries by donating horses and cows to converts while burning the confiscated shamanic idols in iconoclastic purges. Thousands of the idols were destroyed in this period, and the shamans had to renounce their profession and faith. Many fled during the sixteenth century into more remote regions, even as far as the territory inhabited by the Buriats.

Considered by both the Lamaist clergy and most princes to be a meritorious deed that would further the spread of Buddhism, such persecution has been repeated again and again up to the beginning of the twentieth century. Cases of rounding up, mistreating, and burning shamans were reported among the eastern Khalkha Mongols in the nineteenth century and in the remote northwest of Mongolia in 1904. Yet shamanism and related forms of popular religious worship have not been totally subdued. Forced during the periods of worst suppression into some camouflaged forms, it found a new, more syncretic expression by adding and adapting objects and forms of Buddhist veneration. The old, true forms of "black" and "white" shamanism were supplemented by a third, "yellow" shamanism or semishamanism that included praying to Buddhist and shamanic numinous representations. In addition to the traditional objects of veneration (the *ongons*; the sun and moon; Köke Möngke Tengri, the "eternal blue sky"; Khormusta and his thirty-three *tengri;* and the lords of the places, mountains, and waters), a new pantheon was worshiped.

While shamanism calls itself a "faith without scriptures," there exist a great number of written prayers and invocations for this other group of venerated numinous images. Most of these are directed toward obtaining help, blessings, and consecration through the instrument of incense offerings *(sang)*. The structure of the *sang* follows the pattern of Buddhist incense offerings, but, shrouded in some Buddhist phrases and verses, contains ancient pre-Buddhist conceptions. This development was due to the necessity of creating a prayer that would appear to be a genuine work of Buddhist liturgy, a practice engaged in by both famous Buddhist ritualists and stout shamanic believers. The former intended to use these new scriptures to expel shamanic ideas completely, while the latter hoped to preserve essential parts of the old belief under the veneer of the new Buddhist religion. The Buriat scholar Dorzi Banzarov, the first to study the popular religion of the Mongols, described this practice: "The Lamas collected prayers which survived on the lips of the people, added to them new ones more in conformity with the new religion, and again distributed them among the people" (Banzarov, 1897, p. 2). In the sixteenth century a process thus began that resulted in the creation of numerous prayers and hymns of semi-Buddhist character, which became an inexhaustible mine of information concerning the conceptions of old Mongol religion. The Hungarian scholar Alice Śarközi has aptly stated the importance of these texts for the history of religions: "Every new text, or even new variants of already known texts can enlarge our knowledge of popular native beliefs and can shed a light on details which up to now have not been quite intelligible" (Śarközi, 1984). Analysis of such materials has yielded insights into the rather complex figure of a fire goddess who developed out of one of the oldest rituals into the worship of mountains and heights *(obogha)* and into the existence of a triad or pentad of gods of fate, headed by Möngke Tengri and Atagha Tengri, all considered to be "a late hypostasis of Eternal Heaven," as Sergei Iu. Nekliudov phrased it (Nekliudov, 1982, p. 500).

These divine representations, as well as those of Chinggis Khan and Geser Khan, the hero of a widely known epic, present an iconography related to the Tibetan "enemy gods" *(gra lha)*, wearing the armor of Central Asian warriors of the first millennium CE and mounted on horses of varying color. All of these equestrian deities have protective functions. In addition to Köke Möngke Tengri, Čaghan Ebügen ("white old man") is venerated as the personified creative power, the lord of all earth and water, protector of animals and guarantor of longevity. He is certainly one of the oldest deities of the Mongol pantheon. Prayers to him refer to a legendary meeting between the White Old Man and the Buddha in which the Buddha confirmed him in his functions, testifying to this deity's pre-Buddhist origins. All requests addressed to these numinous representations of the popular religion are requisite to the nomadic/seminomadic pastoral way of life and its additional economics. The prayers ask for the same things as the shamanic invocations do: health; fertility and children; multiplication of livestock; protection against evil, dangers, war, and robbers; prevention of droughts, inundations, and blizzards; and safe roads, journeys, and caravan travel. In regions of additional or expanding agriculture, requests for augmentation and protection of crops are added, but the formulas of the prayer remain the same.

In more recent times the healing activities of the shamans have been more and more predominant, the shaman personnel being divided into real shamans *(böge/udaghan)* and non-shamanic healers and singers. The method of healing employed tends toward a kind of group therapeutic treatment of psychic illness *(andai)*, which consists of shamans, helpers, and a crowd of laymen singing and arguing with the patient as a means of restoring him to his normal psychic state. In eastern Mongolia this singing therapy has been practiced since at least the mid-nineteenth century.

[*See also* Buddhism, *article on* Buddhism in Mongolia; Shamanism, *article on* Siberian and Inner Asian Shamanism; Tengri; Ongon; Geser; Erlik; Ülgen; *and the biography of Chinggis Khan.*]

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WALTHER HEISSIG

MONISM is a term applied to a group of thinkers or to philosophical systems that emphasize the oneness or unity of reality. Thinkers ordinarily regarded as monists do not themselves use this label, and do not refer to an agreed-upon monistic model. Unlike philosophical systems such as Platonism or Taoism, however, examples of monism cannot be identified by means of an accepted source or criterion. Moreover, in contrast to philosophical schools of thought such as pragmatism or existentialism, monism lacks an identifiable point of origin and a historical framework. In this respect, monism is a conceptual label, like idealism, realism, or determinism. It might be more appropriate to use only the adjectival form: thus, rather than regard a philosophical system as an example of monism, we should understand that, in a variety of ways, philosophical and religious systems are more or less monistic. In view of the arguable character of monism, perhaps the most useful task of the present essay would be to establish one or more definite examples of a monistic system and to abstract from such examples the specific features that render them monistic.

Philosophies frequently regarded as monistic are found in both Asian and Western traditions and are rather evenly distributed among ancient, modern, and contemporary systems. Many philosophical systems ordinarily regarded as monistic are influenced by mystical experience. Even though there are monistic systems that are not mystical, as well as mystical systems that are nonmonistic, there is a close affinity between monistic and mystical systems of thought. Most of the systems referred to in this article exhibit a mystical as much as a monistic emphasis. The decided influence of mysticism on monistic systems, as well as the considerable frequency with which mystical experience is expressed in a monistic system, would seem to be due to the unitive quality of the mystical experience itself. The great mystics, especially those of the Indian and Christian traditions, emphasize that their blissful experience of oneness with or in the divine renders all particulars insignificant, and in some cases, relatively unreal and illusory. This tendency of monistic thinking to favor unity and oneness at the expense of the particular has confined monism per se to a minority position in philosophy and religion, both Asian and Western. Even in India, ordinarily regarded as uniformly monistic in philosophic and religious outlook, the monistic system of Śaṅkara (traditional dates 788–820) is but one of several competing interpretations of the Hindu scriptures. Similarly, in the Western tradition, philosophical thinkers such as Plotinus (204–270) and Spinoza (1632–1677), and others who espouse an unabashed monism, have proven unable to gain a dominant position in the tradition. Despite significant differences, Śaṅkara, Plotinus, and Spinoza individually and collectively show the essential strength as well as the typical weaknesses of monism as a philosophical position.

Asian Traditions. Perhaps of all claimants to the label "monist," the paradigmatic system is that of the ninth-century mystic philosopher Śaṅkara, who stands in the Indian tradition as the foremost interpreter of the ancient scriptures and the creator of an original philosophy of *brahman*, the Absolute, "one without a second." Śaṅkara's *advaita* (nondual) system is one of several alternatives within Vedānta, the religious-philosophical tradition consisting in systematic exposition and speculation based on the Vedas (c. 800–400 BCE) and the Upaniṣads (c. 800–400 BCE), mystical and quasi-philosophical texts in the Sanskrit of the *ṛṣis* (seers) of ancient India.

The dialectic between Śaṅkara and his competitors, both Vedāntins and proponents of other Indian philosophical schools, has helped to establish Śaṅkara's system as a model of monistic thinking. Because his sources are evident, because his arguments on behalf of an absolute oneness of reality are systematic, ingenious, and influential, and because his interpreters and opponents have shown his position to be committed to an unambiguous epistemological and metaphysical monism, Śaṅkara serves, in Wittgenstein's terminology, as a "home base" for the "family resemblances" that monistic systems would seem to share. Whatever else monistic systems have in common, they all seem committed to a conception of reality that resembles Śaṅkara's idea of *brahman* in its oneness and in its contrast to the unreal or less real particulars of the spatial and temporal world, all of which are, according to Śaṅkara, ordinarily and erroneously experienced as separate from *brahman*.

Of the thirteen Upaniṣads that have survived and have been commented upon by sages such as Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, some tend toward theism, but most contain passages that have placed a definite monistic stamp on the Indian philosophical tradition. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya* Upaniṣads offer some of the strongest texts for the monistic position:

> Brahman indeed was this in the beginning. It knew itself only as "I am Brahman." Therefore it became all. Whoever among the gods became awakened to this, he, indeed, became that. . . . Whoever knows thus, "I am Brahman," becomes this all. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.4.10)

> Verily, this whole world is Brahman, from which he comes forth, without which he will be dissolved and in which he breathes. (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 14.1.1)

According to Śaṅkara, the concept of *brahman* in the Upaniṣads teaches that all particulars of the spatial or temporal world—all objects, thoughts, spirits, and gods (since gods are temporal, they are less than *brahman*)—are real only with respect to, only by virtue of being one with, *brahman*. Particulars that appear real to the observer independent of *brahman* do so because of an all-pervasive ignorance *(avidyā)*. Although the universal self and God (in whatever form, by whatever name) is *brahman*, the ignorant perceiver, or believer, habitually regards these and lesser entities, or appearances, as independent realities.

Śaṅkara follows the Upaniṣads in distinguishing two aspects of *brahman*, namely, *nirguṇa* (indeterminate) and *saguṇa* (determinate), and identifies Īśvara (God) as the personification of *saguṇa brahman*. In itself, *(nirguṇa) brahman* is beyond qualities—not only beyond description, but beyond any specificity, including the temporal nature of God. *Saguṇa brahman*, which includes everything that is not *brahman* per se—from the most ephemeral entity or musing to the most perfect concept of God—issues from *brahman*, has its reality by virtue of *brahman*, and in the end is gathered into *brahman*. Or rather, *saguṇa brahman* in all of its multiplicity is finally—or once again—realized as the one indivisible *(nirguṇa) brahman*, which it never ceased to be even though it most assuredly appeared to be separate from *(nirguṇa) brahman*. That is, *saguṇa brahman* appeared real as *saguṇa* (having qualities, particularized, pluralized) even while its true identity as *nirguṇa brahman* ("one without a second") was hidden not only from human consciousness but, presumably, even from higher beings and perhaps from God as well. Obviously, the terrible burden (or flaw) of a system that is so strongly on the side of oneness is to establish a degree of reality for particulars, which range from fleeting moments to God the creator of the universe.

The most effective alternative interpretation to Śaṅkara was provided by the South Indian philosopher-saint Rāmānuja (c. 1017–1137), who argued that the level below *brahman* must also be counted as real. Rāmānuja's position is within Vedānta, but it is closer to traditional theism as developed in the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions. Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṅkara's advaitist (nondual) conception of *brahman*, however, does not lead him to deny either the *nirguṇa brahman* or Śaṅkara's contention that the reality of *saguṇa brahman* is entirely dependent on *nirguṇa brahman*. In this respect, Rāmānuja's position is closer to that of a theist who affirms, in addition to a God involved in the world, a conception of God or godhead that is beyond and ultimately unaffected by the temporal experiences of God and humanity.

The twentieth-century philosopher-statesman Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) tried to combine the merits of Śaṅkara's absolute nondualism and Rāmānuja's qualified nondualism by attempting to reconcile, in a polar relationship, the two natures of *brahman*—ab-

solutely one and beyond, on the one side, and pluralistic and particular on the other. It must be admitted that Radhakrishnan's view is very close to that of Śaṅkara except that he forcefully affirms the reality of the world. As he notes in his semiautiobiographical essay *The Religion of the Spirit and the World's Need: Fragments of a Confession* (1952), his intent is to "save the world and give it a real meaning"; it is *brahman* that gives the world its true meaning, but only if *brahman* is understood in a positive relation to the world.

Radhakrishnan's metaphysics shows the influence of both Plotinus's description of the One/Intellect *(nous)*/ Soul/World and Whitehead's conception of the divine in process:

> [The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*] affirms that Brahmaṇ on which all else depends, to which all existences aspire, Brahman which is sufficient to itself, aspiring to no other, without any need, is the source of all other beings, the intellectual principle, the perceiving mind, life and body. It is the principle which unifies the world of the physicist, the biologist, the psychologist, the logician, the moralist and the artist.
>
> (Radhakrishnan, 1953, p. 59)

> We have (1) the Absolute, (2) God as Creative power, (3) God immanent in this world. These are not to be regarded as separate entities. They are arranged in this order because there is a logical priority. The Absolute must be there with all its possibilities before the Divine Creativity can choose one. The divine choice must be there before there can be the Divine immanent in this world. This is a logical succession and not a temporal one. The world-spirit must be there before there can be the world. We thus get the four poises or statuses of reality, (1) the Absolute, Brahman, (2) the Creative Spirit, Iśvara, (3) the World-Spirit, Hiranya-garbha, and (4) the World. This is the way in which the Hindu thinkers interpret the integral nature of the Supreme Reality. (ibid., p. 65)

In his attempt to articulate the integral nature of the Supreme Reality, Radhakrishnan argues that *brahman* includes Īśvara, and Īśvara is the concrete manifestation of *brahman:* "There is nothing else than the Absolute which is the presupposition of all else. The central mystery is that of Being itself. We should not think that emphasis on Being overlooks the fact of Becoming" (intro. *The Brahma Sutra,* New York, 1960, p. 119). This fact of becoming is none other than *saguṇa brahman* or Īśvara: "The Absolute is a living reality with a creative urge. When this aspect is stressed, the Absolute becomes a Personal God, Īśvara" (ibid., p. 126). Īśvara is not something other than or in addition to *brahman;* Īśvara is *brahman* itself: "The creative thought 'let me be many' belongs to Brahman. It is not simply imagined in him. The energy that manifests itself in Brahman is one with and different from Brahman" (ibid., p. 142).

Despite Radhakrishnan's determination to reconcile Śaṅkara's conception of the *brahman* with the reality and value of the world, he nevertheless admits, with the Upanisads and Śaṅkara, that the absolute oneness of *(nirguṇa) brahman* is unaffected by God and creation:

> So far as the Absolute is concerned, the creation of the world makes no difference to it. It cannot add anything to or take anything from the Absolute. All the sources of its being are found within itself. The world of change does not disturb the perfection of the Absolute.
>
> (Radhakrishnan, in Muirhead, 1958, p. 502)

It is possible to find in some of the Buddhist schools metaphysical and epistemological teachings that seem to be examples of monism, though if one keeps in mind the aim of all Buddhist teaching—to attain enlightenment, *nirvāṇa* (eternal peace), or Buddhahood—such teachings will be seen to be only incidentally and superficially monistic. The concept of *śūnya* or *śūnyatā* as developed by Nāgārjuna (second or third century BCE) offers a vivid example of the way in which Buddhist teaching can be, though perhaps should not be, interpreted monistically. Zen Buddhism (or, in Chinese, Ch'an Buddhism) offers a second, equally ambiguous example of apparent monism. In both cases, as in the Buddhist tradition generally—to the extent that any generalization can be made accurately for the full variety of Buddhist teachings—the monism affirmed is intended primarily as a mere philosophical or conceptual stage on the way to an enlightenment experience concerning which no statements can be stable or adequate. According to Nāgārjuna, absolute reality can be positively experienced but only negatively expressed: "There is no death, no birth, no destruction, no persistence, no oneness, no manyness, no coming, no departing" (*Madhyamakakārikā* 1).

D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966), the prolific interpreter of Mahāyāna Buddhism and exponent of Zen Buddhism in the West, offers a more explicit account of the paradoxical character of the extent to which Zen may—and may not—be regarded as monistic:

> We may say that Christianity is monotheistic, and the Vedānta [the dominant school of Indian philosophy, based on the Upaniṣads] pantheistic; but we cannot make a similar assertion about Zen. Zen is neither monotheistic nor pantheistic; Zen defies all such designations. Hence there is no object upon which to fix the thought. Zen is a wafting cloud in the sky. No screw fastens it, no string holds it; it moves as it lists. *No amount of meditation will keep Zen in one place.* Meditation is not Zen. Neither pantheism nor monotheism provides Zen with its subjects of concentration. . . . Zen wants to have one's mind free and unobstructed; even the idea of oneness or allness is a stumbling block and a stran-

> gling snare which threatens the original freedom of the spirit. (Suzuki, 1974, p. 40)

The Mādhyamika (Middle Way) of Nāgārjuna and Zen Buddhism share with monistic philosophies a systematic and highly effective assault on the apparent self-sufficiency and presumed reality of all particulars, but as expressions of Buddhist spiritual wisdom, they move beyond the monistic consequence of this assault to the silence of enlightenment.

In the Chinese tradition, particularly in the writings of Lao-tzu (traditionally, sixth century BCE?) and Chuang-tzu (latter fourth to early third century BCE), the illusive but uniquely formative concept of the Tao performs a function similar to the concept of *śūnyatā* in Mādhyamika Buddhism. According to the *Tao-te ching (The Way and Its Power)*, the poetic-philosophical text attributed to Lao-tzu but in actuality compiled by his followers in approximately the early fourth century BCE, the Tao is the unity and the creative principle underlying all particulars. In contrast to an absolute monism such as defended by Śaṅkara, the Taoism of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu does not threaten, and in fact celebrates, the reality and value of particulars. Space and time, persons and nature, life and death, and all shades of being and becoming arise in and return to the Tao. But the Tao is not a principle or concept to be thought; it is a mysterious, ineffable reality to be experienced—and to the extent experienced, expressed only indirectly and inadequately. The Tao cannot be grasped or defined, but it can be received and hinted at by artful, seemingly effortless, action. The Tao is above concepts, above either being or nonbeing, and yet it runs through all realities named by concepts. It is the One behind the many—but not the One that can be named, thought, or delineated. Like the butterfly, which ceases to be itself when caught and mounted, human attempts to catch the Tao can catch expressions of the Tao, but not the Tao itself.

Western Tradition. There are perhaps a dozen thinkers spread throughout the history of Western thought who would likely be included in any survey of monistic systems. Among the ancient Greeks, probable candidates include Parmenides for his enigmatic but highly influential definition of reality as One. If monism were to be regarded as a theory of one kind of reality (as distinct from the more usual conception of monism as defining reality as singular), Democritus would be included for his definition of reality as consisting in atoms. Plotinus, the Neoplatonic mystic of the third century, articulated a philosophy of the One that stands as an obvious model of monistic thinking in the history of Western philosophy. The Christian period is steadfastly theistic—that is, maintaining a real separation between creator and creation—with the notable exceptions of the ninth-century Irish theologian John Scottus Eriugena and the fourteenth-century Rhineland mystic Meister Eckhart.

In Judaic and Muslim thought, orthodox theism and its attendant resistance to monism proved effective except for Ibn 'Arabī, the thirteenth-century Spanish Ṣūfī Muslim, who taught that God, or reality, is absolutely singular, and that the human soul is indistinguishable from God. It is important for anyone unfamiliar with Islamic thought to understand that the Muslim thinkers of the Middle Ages were using the same philosophical sources—primarily Plato and the Neoplatonists—as were medieval Jewish and Christian thinkers. Obviously, thinkers in each of these three religious and cultural traditions also drew from—and in turn influenced—their respective religious traditions. In the case of Ibn 'Arabī, his Muslim experience took the form of mysticism known as Ṣūfism. As R. C. Zaehner notes: "The introduction of Neoplatonic ideas into Sufism from philosophy was, of course, made much of by Ibn al 'Arabī who systematized them into something very like Śaṅkara's version of the Vedānta" (*Hindu and Muslim Mysticism*, New York, 1969, p. 174). Although Ibn 'Arabī's system is generally regarded as heretical by orthodox Muslims, his writings—perhaps because of his vast erudition and manifest saintliness—were influential on subsequent Muslim and Christian thinkers. [*See* Images, *article on* The Imaginal.]

In the modern period the two most important monistic philosophers have been the seventeenth-century Sefardic Jew Barukh Spinoza, who defines reality as one substance, calling it either God or Nature, and the nineteenth-century German idealist G. W. F. Hegel, whose concept of the Absolute continues to hold its place in the modern West as the dominant monistic philosophical system. Within the present century there are at least four philosophers, all American or British, who have extended the Hegelian, or absolute idealist, variety of monistic philosophy: Josiah Royce and F. H. Bradley, who wrote at the turn of the century, and W. T. Stace and J. N. Findlay, both Hegel scholars and metaphysicians who wrote at midcentury.

Virtually all of these philosophers, religious thinkers, and mystics, as well as others who could be added to the list, can be understood as a variation or subset of one of the following five influential figures: Plotinus, Eriugena, Eckhart, Spinoza, and Hegel.

Plotinus (c. 205–270), the last great thinker of antiquity, combined a profound knowledge of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics with an equally profound mystical experience of absolute oneness. Although Plotinus thought

that he was faithfully interpreting the philosophy of Plato, he is rightly credited with founding a new school of philosophy, that is, Neoplatonism. Moreover, although Plotinus's writings, and therefore the tenets of Neoplatonism of which he was the first and greatest exponent, were neither influenced by Christian teachings nor read by medieval Christian theologians, nevertheless they exercised a significant influence on Christian thinking indirectly through Augustine (354–430) and Dionysius the Areopagite (fl. c. 500). By the time Plotinus's *Enneads* were rediscovered by Marsilio Ficino, the fifteenth-century head of the Platonic Academy of Florence, Meister Eckhart (1260–1327?) had articulated a novel monistic system, fashioned equally by Neoplatonism and by his spiritual life and thought as a German Dominican monk. The Neoplatonic—or Plotinian—cast of Eckhart's mystical monism accounts for its distinctiveness and for his difficulties with defenders of orthodox Christian theism. A close look at Plotinus's idea of the One will show both its affinities and its ultimate incompatibility with Christian doctrine; not surprisingly, Eckhart's use of Neoplatonic monism led his writings to be censored as heretical.

Plotinus's concept of the One is comparable to, and in part derived from, the absolute One of Parmenides, the Good of Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's First Cause, and the immanent God of the Stoics. In affirming the absoluteness and transcendence of the One, however, Plotinus is speaking from a compelling mystical experience of Unity. Throughout the *Enneads*, which Plotinus's student Porphyry arranged in six sets of nine treatises each (Gr., *ennea*, "nine"), all of his references to the One, particularly those in the final tractate (6.9), "On the Good, or the One," emphasize that the One cannot be described or characterized, but can only be pointed to as the ineffable source and goal of mystical experience. In terms comparable to the Upaniṣadic concept of *brahman*—though with a greater affirmation of the value and beauty of the individual soul and the physical world—Plotinus conceives of the One as the absolute unity and harmony underlying all particularity and all polarities. The One is the source of the other two principles, or levels, of reality, both of which exist within the One and share completely in its divinity. But the One is not less absolute for their existence. Since the second and third principles, Mind or Intellect *(nous)* and Soul, are also real (though not absolute in their own right), it is not easy, as Plotinus admits, to state in what the One, or the Unity, consists. Unity can be experienced, but not described. Plotinus tells us:

> We are in search of unity; we are to come to know the principle of all, the Good and First; therefore we may not stand away from the realm of Firsts and lie prostrate among the lasts: we must strike for those Firsts, rising from things of sense which are the lasts. Cleared of all evil in our intention towards The Good, we must ascend to the Principle within ourselves; from many, we must become one; only so do we attain to knowledge of that which is Principle and Unity. . . .
>
> The Unity, then, is not Intellectual-Principle but something higher still: Intellectual-Principle is still a being but that First is no being but precedent to all Being: it cannot be a being, for a being has what we may call the shape of its reality but The Unity is without shape, even shape Intellectual. (*Enneads* 6.9.3)

In this tractate, Plotinus continues with a series of negative definitions: the One is not merely the Good, nor merely Mind, nor Soul, but is the indivisible source and perfect goal of all of these limited realities. While all characterizations of the One must be negative, experience of the One cannot but be overwhelmingly positive. This experience is more than an intuition or a vision; it is "a unity apprehended":

> The man formed by this mingling with the Supreme must—if he only remember—carry its image impressed upon him: he is become the Unity, nothing within him or without inducing any diversity; no movement now, no passion, no outlooking desire, once this ascent is achieved; reasoning is in abeyance and all Intellection and even, to dare the word, the very self: caught away, filled with God, he has in perfect stillness attained isolation; all the being calmed, he turns neither to this side nor to that, not even inwards to himself; utterly resting he has become very rest. (ibid., 6.9.11)

As this passage shows, it is difficult to separate the mystical from the philosophical assertions in Plotinus's philosophy, and in this respect, although he was not a Christian, Plotinus stands at the head of a line of Christian mystical philosopher-theologians for whom the concept of God, or the Absolute, is equally the object of mystical experience and philosophical reflection. [*See* Neoplatonism.]

In his work *On the Division of Nature*, for example, the Irish theologian John Scottus Eriugena (810–877) affirmed and extended several Plotinian tenets: the absolute ineffability of God—a concept expressed in Christian theological language almost identical to descriptions of the One of Plotinus; a dual process of emanation from, and return to, the One of lower stages of reality—stages that also resemble those articulated in the *Enneads*. At the same time, Eriugena also used Christian ideas as developed by Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory of Nyssa, both of whose works he translated from Greek to Latin. For Eriugena as for Plotinus, God or the One is not only beyond human

thought, but equally beyond his own thought: God is incomprehensible even to himself because in his oneness he does not think at all. In fact, the reason for creation, which is accomplished through his ideas (*nous* in Plotinus's system, the divine attributes in Eriugena's), is to manifest the otherwise absolute and eternally hidden nature of God. Thus, the God of Eriugena is virtually identical to the One of Plotinus in that he (or it, in view of its absolute and transpersonal nature) is the source of being and knowledge but absolutely transcends both.

Meister Eckhart (1260–1327?) drew from Eriugena, and through him from Plotinus and early Neoplatonic Christian thinkers. He developed a concept of the Absolute, or God, that he called godhead, from the two points of view developed by Plotinus and Eriugena and comparable to the unqualified *(nirguṇa)* and qualified *(saguṇa)* dual conception of *brahman* in Advaita Vedānta. According to Eckhart, God is Being per se, or all that is, but is also inexplicably above and beyond Being, totally other and absolutely one. Existence or Being can be seen from two points of view, as the mysterious source of being and as being (or creation) itself, but ultimately there is only one existence. This affirmation of absolute unity of being, on the one hand, and on the other, the idea that all beings, including the human soul, are none other than God or Being from the perspective of creation, shows why Eckhart's teaching was regarded as too monist not to be at odds with orthodox Christianity. Eckhart's conception of the unity of God follows Eriugena's negative characterization of God and resembles Nāgārjuna's conception of the ultimate as *śūnyatā*, emptiness or nonbeing. Clearly, there is a point in the monist position at which the absolute fullness and the absolute emptiness of being appear to be indistinguishable—they are equally true and equally inadequate ways of expressing the absolute otherness of the One, the ultimate ineffable source of all particularity.

The same need to see the Absolute from two perspectives—as it is in itself and as it is from the perspective of creation—recurs in the metaphysical system of Barukh Spinoza (1632–1677), according to which the Absolute is referred to as Substance, God, or Nature. These three terms are declared to be perfectly synonymous, infinite, and absolutely necessary: "God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists" (Proposition 11). God (or Substance or Nature) manifests itself through an infinity of attributes, two of which, thought and extension (or ideas and bodies), are intelligible to man and constitutive of his experience. These two attributes, which are capable of infinite combinations, are related to each other (in contradistinction to Descartes's dualism of mind and body) through their common source in the one divine Substance. Spinoza's solution to the Cartesian dualism, however, generates the same problem that attends all monistic systems—the difficulty in establishing the reality of particulars, which Spinoza refers to as modes, within the one indivisible Substance. Although Spinoza may be thought to have generated his metaphysics from a religious or mystical impulse, his conception of the divine as impersonal and absolutely necessary was clearly not influenced (except perhaps negatively) by either Jewish or Christian theological orthodoxy.

In conceiving of the world as God's manifestation of himself within his inviolable unity, Spinoza is in general agreement with other absolute monists like Advaita Vedānta (of the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara), Plotinus, Eriugena, and Eckhart, but he is unique in attributing absolute determinism to the divine substance. On this point Spinoza is rigorously consistent even if his terminology gives the impression of inconsistency or paradox: he refers to the necessity of the divine Substance as both freedom and determinism because God is free to do what is required by his nature. God is free because of what he is—or because of the necessity which is the essential character of his existence. Since only God must be, and must be what He is, only God is free. Further, all of God's attributes and modes are what they are necessarily as part of God's essence. Without violating its unity and necessity, one can conceive of God, or Nature in polar terms, as the creator, or *natura naturans* ("Nature naturing"), and as creation, *natura naturata* ("Nature natured"), which consists in the infinite combinations of attributes and modes of the one divine Substance, God, or Nature. Within this Substance, all things that exist do so, and do so in the way that they do, because they are not other than God, and God's nature is absolutely necessary.

In the conclusion of *Ethics* Spinoza asserts that this Substance—which, it must be remembered, is the one and only reality regardless of how plural and diverse it appears to a human perspective—can be known by the third or highest form of knowledge, the intellectual love of God. This love, which is knowledge of a particular in relation to its divine cause (or divine nature), is in effect a direct knowledge of God, or Nature, in its infinity, eternality, and necessity. In this discussion of the intellectual love of God, which occurs in part 5 of *Ethics*, "Of Human Freedom," Spinoza's monistic conception of Substance (God or Nature) reveals a reverence and a personal experiential depth that would appear to be mystical even if not religious in the usual sense. While the overall force of *Ethics* would seem to represent an

atheistic monism that allows no room for the God of Western religion, the profoundly mystical love of divine necessity, which is the goal and perhaps the source of Spinoza's entire system, would seem to justify Novalis's often-quoted reference to him as "a God-intoxicated man." W. T. Stace holds to both of these interpretations and suggests that Spinoza "exhibited in himself the living paradox of being a God-intoxicated atheist" (*Mysticism and Philosophy*, p. 217).

In that his philosophy of the absolute Spirit is the result of philosophical reflection rather than the product of his own mystical experience, G. W. F. Hegel is closer to Spinoza than to Plotinus or Eckhart. Hegel would also seem to resemble Spinoza in that his philosophy of the Absolute is an expression, however partial and indirect, of the experience and understanding of absolute Unity for which the great mystics, of both Asia and the West, are the primary source. In explaining the relation between mysticism and philosophy in Hegel, Frederick Copleston wisely remarks that Hegel was not a mystic and did not look to mysticism to solve the problems of philosophy, but rather "he saw in mysticism the intuitive grasp of a truth which it was the business of philosophy to understand and exhibit in a systematic manner" (*Religion and the One*, p. 135).

While Hegel's conception of the Absolute combines elements of many predecessors, including Plotinus, Eriugena, Eckhart, and Spinoza, in his original synthesis he introduces novel conceptions so as to create a uniquely profound and modern monistic philosophy. In terms similar to the conception of God in Eriugena or Eckhart, Hegel conceives of the absolute Spirit as revealing itself through spatial and temporal creation. For Hegel, however, the Absolute is neither empty nor so totally transcendent as to be characterized as nonbeing. Rather, the absolute Spirit of Hegel more closely resembles Spinoza's conception of Substance in that it is intelligible to human consciousness. In fact, it is through human rationality that the Absolute has its being: the Absolute exists through its self-knowing, which is none other than its being known through speculative philosophy. In this respect, Hegel's conception of absolute Spirit may be said to exhibit a radical temporality characteristic of process philosophy and other modern philosophical systems influenced by the theory of evolution. Spirit itself evolves through human consciousness, without which it cannot be said to be intelligible—or real, which comes to the same, according to Hegel's identification of the rational and the real.

Is Hegel's system, then, monistic? In what does his principle of unity, or oneness, consist? Since Hegel's system precludes univocal summations, two responses may fittingly be offered: in that the absolute Idea is single, rational, and the sole reality, Hegel's system clearly resembles monistic systems such as those of Plotinus, Eriugena, Eckhart, and Spinoza; since, however, the absolute Idea cannot be thought to exist in its own right as a full or finished reality separable from the process of human consciousness by which it knows itself, there is a sense in which the One in question, the absolute Idea, is equally plural and temporal. Absolute Spirit is there in the beginning, and without it, there would be no beginning—but it is equally the case that it comes to be, or comes into being, by being thought—as all human reflection is advancing, or making real, the actual content of the divine Idea. In Hegel's view, his *Phenomenology of Spirit* was itself a significant contribution toward the self-realization of absolute Spirit.

Delineating the relationship between these two perspectives—absolute Spirit as the one source of all and as the temporal-spatial process—required thousands of torturous pages by Hegel and continues to produce countless volumes of interpretation by his followers and critics. While it might be possible to solve the problem of the one and the many in contemporary terms without recourse to Hegel, most of the important work on this problem in the present century is demonstrably traceable to one or another interpretation of the Hegelian system. The most promising effort would seem to be that of J. N. Findlay, whose Gifford Lectures, *The Discipline of the Cave* and *The Transcendence of the Cave*, given from 1964 to 1966, represent a reformulation, by phenomenological and dialectical methods, of problems first set forth by Plotinus and Hegel.

Conclusion. A survey of monistic systems ranges from the uncompromising Advaita ("nondual") Vedānta of Śaṅkara to those thinkers, such as Radhakrishnan and Hegel, who have attempted to affirm the unity or oneness of reality without jeopardizing the reality or value of the many. In this regard, Radhakrishnan's response to, and restatement of, Śaṅkara's conception of *brahman* "so as to save the world and give it a real meaning" would seem to be a telling critique of the absolute monist position: the stronger the affirmation of oneness, the more difficult it is to affirm particulars in their own right. Within the context of absolute unity, all particulars are relegated to a quasi reality. If all is *brahman*—or Being, or the Absolute, or the One by any other name—then sticks and stones, civilizations and planets, ideas and gods must all share, and perhaps lose, their distinctive reality within the all-inclusive (or all-consuming) reality of the One.

Given the extent to which a monistic system jeopardizes the reality of the ordinary world, it is perhaps not surprising that it typically has drawn its inspiration from, and in turn lends its formulations to, mystical ex-

perience. The three most formidable monistic systems—those of Śaṅkara, Plotinus, and Spinoza—are all dependent on mystical awareness, however rational may be their respective processes of articulation. In view of the monistic tendency to devalue the full range of particulars, it is understandable that throughout the history of Western thought, monism has been countered not only by orthodox theologies (of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) but equally by dominant philosophies. In Asia, and particularly in India, monism may appear to have enjoyed greater success historically, but most Asian thought systems—for example, Confucianism in China, theism and Yoga in India, and various forms of Buddhism throughout Asia—have not been monistic. Further, the remarkable influence of Advaita Vedānta in India may be due as much to its apparent mystical source and hermeneutical power as to its philosophical argumentation. The monist affirmation of the One (in whatever terminology) may well be truer than the myriad religious and philosophical positions that hold to the reality of the many, but while the vast majority of religious thinkers and philosophers fall short of mystical insight, it seems probable that in the future of philosophy and religion monism will continue to be a strongly opposed minority position.

[*For a view contrasting with that of monism, see* Dualism. *Related ideas are surveyed in* Pantheism and Panentheism, *and issues raised by thoughts about the relationship between the divine and the cosmos are discussed further in* Transcendence and Immanence. *See also the biographies of the thinkers mentioned herein.*]

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MONKEYS. The monkey is an archetypal image of the instinctual personality and the baser human propensities as well as of celestial blessings. In the ancient Mediterranean world and in the East, simians have generally symbolized sagacity and good fortune; and in the West, depravity and sin. As personifications of unconscious activity, monkeys may signify danger and degradation or an unexpected boon.

Among the Egyptian gods worshiped in the dynastic period, many of whose attributes are believed to have survived from prehistoric times, is Thoth, god of wisdom, whose emblem is a cynocephalus, a dog-headed ape or baboon. Originally held in high regard for their cunning, monkeys came to symbolize intelligence, magical powers, and ultimately wisdom. In statues, on tombs, and in countless editions of the *Book of Going Forth by Day*, a cynocephalus is depicted in the act of supplying words of wisdom to Thoth, who in turn transmits them to Osiris, god of the dead. It is in the aspect of friend of the dead that the dog-headed ape is represented in the Papyrus of Ani, seated on top of the standard of a balance as the heart of the deceased is weighed against the feather of truth. The Egyptians also believed that apes were transformed openers of the portals of heaven. As a symbol of wisdom in Greece, the monkey was associated with Hermes, god of magicians and thaumaturges, a figure that evolved into Hermes Trismegistos.

The most widespread and enduring cult of the monkey developed in India, where it figures prominently in religion and myth. Among the animals personifying gods or heroic, godlike beings with magical powers, the monkey god Hanuman, son of Vāyu the wind god and the monkey nymph Añjanā, is the most popular. Worshiped at the famous monkey temple at Vārāṇasī, Hanuman is also a village deity, a divine agent invoked as a protector against whirlwinds and as a fertility god. As a sun hero in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Hanuman comes to Rāma's aid in his battle to recover the abducted Sītā, for which help he is granted eternal life. The solar nature of the mythical monkey is repeatedly manifested in the poem, as he travels through the air, enters into darkness, and emerges from it.

The primarily Buddhist and Islamic religions of Java and Sumatra were permeated with the figure of the monkey god. A relief on the lintels of Banteay Srei, a Cambodian temple of the late tenth and fourteenth centuries, depicts the monkey king Sugrīva aided by his captain Hanuman in battle with his rival. Whenever a hamlet was founded in western Bengal, the villagers' first duty was to erect an image of Hanuman, protector of crops and cattle and virile consort of the Earth Mother.

The ambivalent symbolism of the monkey is best exemplified in Chinese thought, where it represents both good and evil. On the one hand, monkeys connote the carnal instincts, duplicity, trickery, mimicry, transformations, mischievousness, ugliness, and conceit; on the other, they are associated with protectiveness, sorcery, thaumaturgy, and the powers of bestowing good fortune, health, and success. In Taoism, monkeys symbolize thoughts that on the meditation path must be shut off through the practice of "the binding of the monkeys." A popular representation of monkeys is in the configuration of the Three Mystic Monkeys, who in turn seal their lips, ears, and eyes against speaking, hearing, or seeing evil.

In Judeo-Christian and Islamic symbology, monkeys are unambiguously sinister. According to the Talmud, to dream of one is an ill omen, and in rabbinic lore, one of the three classes of men who built the Tower of Babel was transformed into monkeys. In Christianity, the monkey represents only the iniquitous aspects of human nature: luxury, lust, levity, unseemliness, greed, vanity, malice, cunning, idolatry, a slothful soul, and perversion of God's word. Satan was described as the *simia dei* in the Middle Ages, and the Devil is often depicted as a monkey in Christian art, with an apple in its mouth, as an emblem of the Fall, and its body in chains, signifying sin conquered by virtue. Monkeys have invariably been a malevolent sign for Muslims, and in one Islamic tale the Jews of Elath are turned into apes as punishment for fishing on the Sabbath.

Monkeys are totem animals in many traditional cultures. It is forbidden to eat or harm them in Togo; they are sacred to the Bakatta; their teeth are worn as breast ornaments by the Boróro to gain strength. Certain peoples venerate monkeys as the abode of the human soul, and one East Indian clan regards them as ancestors.

In many parts of the world monkeys are benevolent creatures, often symbolizing fertility or other good fortune. Magical ceremonies are performed in Java in which cures for sterility are invoked by making offerings to the king of monkeys. In Mesoamerican hieroglyphic writings, the monkey is represented as a symbol of sexual intercourse. It is also associated with the benevolent deity Chac, and Maya inscriptions represent the god of the North Star with a monkey head. In a Maya creation myth, the only creatures to survive the gods' destruction of their creation are the monkeys. In

some Mesoamerican and South American tribal cultures, the apparatus of medicine men includes a talisman of dried monkey tails as a protection against evil.

Monkeys have figured prominently in folk tales and legends of the East, of Africa and Oceania, and of Europe, where they largely derive from the abundant fable literature of the Middle Ages.

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ANN DUNNIGAN

MONKS. *See* Monasticism *and* Religious Communities.

MONOLATRY. *See* Henotheism *and* Monotheism.

MONOPHYSITISM, meaning "one nature" and referring to the person of Jesus Christ, is the name given to the rift that gradually developed in Eastern Christendom after the Council of Chalcedon in 451. While the definition agreed upon at the council laid down that Christ should be acknowledged "in two natures," human and divine, the properties of each nature retaining their identity, the Monophysites held that after the incarnation the two natures became one, so that all the thoughts and acts of the Savior were those of a single unitary being, God in Christ.

The germ of monophysitism may be found in the *logos-sarx* (Word-flesh) theology of the Alexandrian church. The question of how Christ's personality should be acknowledged could not be avoided, however, once the Creed of Nicaea (325) confessed that he was "of one substance with the Father." If this was so, how was Christ to be considered of one substance with man? Fifty years later, the answer was given uncompromisingly by Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea in Syria, a friend of Athanasius and an Alexandrian-trained theologian. Scripture, he maintained, emphasized that Christ was "one." In *De fide et incarnatione* he wrote, "There is no distinction in Holy Scripture between the Word and His flesh; He is one energy, one person, one *hypostasis* [individuality], at once wholly God and wholly man." This exactly summed up what was to become the Monophysite position: Christ was "out of two natures," one.

Apollinaris's opinions aroused the opposition of the Cappadocian fathers and were condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 381, but his works circulated widely under the names of orthodox personalities, and as such they influenced profoundly the theology of Cyril of Alexandria (412–444). Cyril, however, was willing to admit at least the mystical reality of the two natures after the incarnation. His successor as patriarch of Alexandria, Dioscorus (444–451), less subtle and more impetuously ambitious for his see, made an uncompromising one-nature Christology the basis of his theology, and enunciated it in his vindication of the archimandrite Eutyches at the Second Council of Ephesus in August 449 (the "Robber Council"). The Council of Chalcedon reversed this situation, and Dioscorus himself was condemned (though for indiscipline rather than for heresy) and exiled. However, a large proportion of Eastern Christians, especially in Egypt, showed that they supported the one-nature Christology and rejected Chalcedon.

Dioscorus died in exile at Gangra in Paphlagonia in 454. Three years later his supplanter, the former archpriest Proterius, who had been consecrated by Egyptian bishops at Chalcedon, was lynched. Another former presbyter of Cyril, Timothy Ailuros (d. 477), was consecrated bishop by the anti-Chalcedonians. Although Timothy was also exiled, until 482 the Church of Alexandria was divided between an anti-Chalcedon majority and a Chalcedonian minority.

Schism, in the sense of establishing a rival church with its own hierarchy, was far from the minds of Timothy and his supporters. They were entirely loyal to the empire politically, but they aimed at persuading the emperor and his advisers to abandon the *Tome* of Leo and the Council of Chalcedon in favor of their one-nature interpretation of the theology of Cyril. Timothy opposed Eutyches' belief that Christ's human nature was not the same as that of ordinary man. In 475 the anti-Chalcedonians came near to success when the usurper Basiliscus, who had forced the legitimate emperor Zeno (474–491) into exile, issued an edict declaring his adherence to the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople and *both* councils of Ephesus, and declaring as anathema the *Tome* of Leo and "all that was said and done at Chalcedon in innovation of the holy symbol of Nicaea."

In 476 Basiliscus fell, largely because of the support

given to Zeno by the patriarch of Constantinople, Acacius, who was determined to protect the prerogatives of his see against possible renewal of threats from Alexandria. On 28 July 482, in an attempt to reunite the church in Egypt and reconcile it to communion with Constantinople, Zeno issued a circular letter, known as the *Henotikon*, to the "bishops, monks, and laity of Alexandria, Egypt, and Cyrenaica." This letter, drafted on Acacius's advice, reaffirmed the creedal statements of Nicaea, Constantinople, and the first council at Ephesus (431), condemned Nestorius and Eutyches, accepted the Twelve Anathemas of Cyril (which tended toward one-nature Christology), and proclaimed that Jesus Christ, consubstantial with both God and man, and "incarnate from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and *Theotokos* is one and not two." Anyone who thought differently was anathema. The *Henotikon* avoided denouncing Chalcedon as such, which would have removed from Constantinople its legal superiority, grounded in Canon 28 of that council, over the other sees in the East; but the letter went just far enough to secure the uneasy agreement of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The popes, however, refused to accept the *Henotikon* and denounced the restoration of communion between Acacius and Peter Mongus, patriarch of Alexandria (482–490), as "double-dealing."

The Acacian Schism lasted from 484 to 519. During this time Monophysite opinions hardened in Egypt and Syria, while the emperor Anastasius (491–518) personally favored them. The Monophysites found a spokesman in Severus, a monk from a noble ecclesiastical family in Pisidia who in November 512 was promoted to be patriarch of Antioch. During his six years of rule he evolved a theology based almost entirely on Cyril's teachings. Severus's christological beliefs, expressed repeatedly in tracts and a massive correspondence (of which four thousand letters and fragments have survived), might be summed up as follows: "The Fathers have taught us that God, the Word, the Unique One begotten by his Father without beginning, eternally, impassably, and incorporeally, did in the last times for our salvation take flesh of the Holy Spirit and of the holy *Theotokos* and ever-virgin Mary, flesh consubstantial with us, animated by an intelligent and reasoning soul." Christ was both God and man, of one single nature; the ideas of Eutyches and Dioscorus, and the *Tome* of Leo and the definition of Chalcedon, were alike repudiated. In the last years of Anastasius's reign, the empire was moving rapidly toward monophysitism. Communion between the four Eastern patriarchates was maintained, at the expense of communion with Rome.

The death of Anastasius in July and the succession of the Latin-speaking and pro-Chalcedonian Justin I (518–527) brought about an immediate change. Communion between Rome and Constantinople was restored in 519. Severus was exiled, along with his chief supporter, Philoxenus, bishop of Hierapolis (Mabbug) in Mesopotamia, and some fifty-five other bishops. Gradually it became clear that if the Monophysite congregations were to survive, a hierarchy would have to be created to administer sacraments to them. Severus, in exile in Alexandria, reluctantly assented to the ordination of presbyters and deacons in 529/30. Great numbers of volunteers came forward. The schism between the Monophysites and Byzantine orthodoxy may be said to date from that moment.

During the reign of Justinian (527–565), the Monophysite movement assumed the form it was to retain through the centuries. In 532 the emperor tried to settle the controversy through a conference aimed at agreeing upon a statement of doctrine based on the Theopaschite interpretation of Christology, that is, that "one of the Trinity suffered in the flesh and was God." Although this came near to the Monophysite position, the emperor's insistence on the canonical status of Chalcedon wrecked the possibility of agreement. Between that time and the death of Theodora in 548, however, the Monophysites had a firm ally in the empress. At the end of 534, Severus was invited to the capital by the emperor, and the following year Theodora secured the election of a new Monophysite patriarch of Alexandria, Theodosius (535–566), and a pro-Monophysite patriarch of Constantinople, Anthimus, bishop of Trebizend (535–536). This was too much for the emperor, the pope, and the Chalcedonians. Anthimus was replaced, and Severus was condemned by a powerful synod held at Constantinople on 10 June 536; the condemnation was confirmed by edict on 6 August.

Severus died at Alexandria in February 538. By that time, Justinian, urged on by the papacy, had restored the Chalcedonian line of patriarchs in Alexandria, a factor that more than any other associated the Monophysite patriarch with the Coptic Christians as a national representative of the Egyptians. Though their patriarch, Theodosius, was ordered to Constantinople at the end of 537, the Monophysites, thanks to Theodora, were not without means of reply. A mission under the presbyter Julian was fitted out by the empress and arrived in the kingdom of Nobatia (Nubia) to convert the royal court to Monophysite Christianity. Even more effective was the series of missions carried out by Jacob Baradai (Būrd'ānā), who had been consecrated bishop of Edessa by Patriarch Theodosius. Between 542 and his death in 578 he crossed and recrossed the whole area between the Bosporus and the Persian frontier, establishing congregations and a Monophysite hierarchy to govern

them. The eventual tally of twenty-seven metropolitans and one hundred thousand clergy all over the eastern part of the Roman empire given by Baradai's contemporary John of Ephesus (d. 585) may be exaggerated, but clearly Baradai's missions established the Monophysite church on a permanent footing. Not for nothing did the Syrian Monophysites take the name Jacobites, which they have retained to this day.

On the emperor's side, the Fifth General Council held at Constantinople during 553 may be reckoned as another effort to placate the Monophysites, through its condemnation of the Three Chapters (treatises criticizing Cyril's theology by the Antiochene theologians Theodore of Mopsuestia and Ibas of Edessa). In 573 Justin II (565–578) issued a second *Henotikon*, which again stressed the oneness of Christ, without, however, repudiating Chalcedon. Under Heraclius (610–641), what proved to be the final, though at first the most promising, effort to find a settlement failed. Intrinsically the Monophysites could accept the formula proposed to them by the emperor: that there was one will and one energizing activity in Christ, even if two natures were confessed. For three years following the restoration of the True Cross in Jerusalem in 630, it looked as though this compromise doctrine, known as monoenergism, was providing common ground between Monophysites and Chalcedonians. But once more, suspicion of any formulas that left a shred of authority to Chalcedon, Egyptian distrust of Cyrus "the Caucasian," the emperor's nominee as patriarch of Alexandria, and cleverly orchestrated opposition to monoenergism by Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem (634–638), brought the plan to nought. When, within a few years, Egypt, Palestine, and Syria were lost to the Arabs, the Monophysites saw the hand of God in their success against the Byzantines.

By this time, monophysitism was a missionary faith that had assumed many forms. On the one hand, it rejected outright any idea that the flesh of Christ was liable to suffering—preached by the followers of Julian of Halicarnassus (fl. 520–530)—that is, acceptance of the views of Eutyches; on the other, it accepted the theology of Cyril of Alexandria combined with rejection of the Council of Chalcedon as incompatible with it—represented by the Armenian and Ethiopian churches. The Coptic church and what is known of the Nubian church followed Severus of Antioch more closely and seemed to have been more hostile to Chalcedon and the two-nature Christology enunciated in the *Tome* of Leo. The Syrian church looked back to its great protagonist, Jacob Baradai. Rejection of Chalcedon, on the one hand, and of the two-nature Christology held in the West and by the Nestorians, on the other, has formed the common ground between various national and regional churches known to other traditions as the Monophysite churches. Reluctantly, these have remained separate from the Eastern Orthodox churches and from the West to form one of the four main divisions of Christianity that have survived to our day. [*See* Eastern Christianity *for further discussion of these churches, known collectively as the Oriental Orthodox churches. See also* Councils, *article on* Christian Councils.]

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MONOTHEISM. Derived from the Greek *mono* ("single") and *theos* ("God"), the term *monotheism* refers to the religious experience and the philosophical percep-

tion that emphasize God as one, perfect, immutable, creator of the world from nothing, distinct from the world, all-powerfully involved in the world, personal, and worthy of being worshiped by all creatures. Some forms of monotheism, however, differ about the notions of God as distinct from the world and as personal.

The term *monotheism* has generally been used theologically rather than for philosophical or cross-cultural descriptions of religion. Philosophers have used the term *theism* with the same meaning as *monotheism*, and cross-cultural descriptions find categories like *monotheism* and *polytheism* to be inappropriate in describing some religious traditions. The term *monotheism* presupposes the idea of *theos*—a divine being with mind and will, fully personal, conceivable in images drawn from human life, and approachable through prayer. In this respect monotheism differs from deism and from the various forms of monism. It also presupposes the unity of the divine and raises one *theos* exclusively to absolute supremacy and power, producing and governing everything according to the divine will. In this respect monotheism differs from those views that accept a plurality of divine beings. In the strict sense, *monotheism* best describes the idea of God in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and in the philosophical systems based on these traditions. But we can extend the term to include conceptions of deity in certain other traditions such as Zoroastrianism, Sikhism, and some forms of Hinduism and Buddhism, even though these traditions include somewhat different conceptions, such as the existence of evil forces alongside God, the nonpersonal nature of God, God's complete immanence in the world, or the fundamental unreality of the world. In this article, the basic requirement for a religious tradition to be considered monotheistic is that it emphasize both *theos* and *monos*.

Monotheism in Religious History. Whereas monotheism is most often associated with the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religions and philosophies, tendencies contributing toward a monotheistic outlook have long been present in human religious history. Monotheism is like a river with many springs and many tributaries. The course of the river is difficult to map, for monotheistic beliefs are often put forward in protest against other beliefs and practices.

Obscure as they are, springs of monotheism can be discerned at the very earliest levels of known human cultural life, in the primordial high god of the archaic hunters. The theory of *Urmonotheismus* ("original monotheism") as put forth by Wilhelm Schmidt and others held that a primordial monotheism was the earliest form of human perception of deity, and that the plurality of gods and spirits found in most primal religions was a degeneration from this original perception. While that theory cannot be substantiated in the history of religions, research in recent years has made it clear that a great many primal or archaic peoples have conceptions of a high god who is creator of the world, has supreme authority over other gods and spirits, and presides over human morality. Some of the most archaic peoples, such as certain groups in Africa, Australian Aborigines, and the nomadic hunters of Tierra del Fuego, have definite conceptions of a supreme god associated with the sky who is changeless, invisible, and all-powerful and who gives morality. The supreme high god characteristically is a remote god (*deus otiosus*), too distant, all-powerful, good, and just to need worship or to be intimately involved in ordinary existence; there are lesser gods and spirits who play a much more active role in the lives of the people.

The streams of the monotheistic vision run dimly through the fertile valleys of archaic agricultural religions with their pluralistic experience of the forces of nature centered on Mother Earth. Here the high god tends to become head of the divine pantheon; pushed into the background by earth gods of fecundity, the high god could hardly be the focus of a unifying perception of deity. But a few high gods developed with supreme sovereignty and autonomy, as sources of fecundating power and guarantors of the order and norms of the world and of human society. For example, Zeus and Jupiter were ruling high gods fashioned in accord with the Greek and Roman notions of norm and law. In India, Varuṇa was sovereign guardian of *ṛta*, cosmic order, a role taken over later by the great gods Viṣṇu and Śiva. Yahveh, the high god of the ancient Hebrews, showed himself as all-powerful creator, absolute sovereign, and author of all norms and laws by which the earth functions. Belief in these high gods did not necessarily exclude lesser divine forces, but it did provide the opportunity for reflections on the unity of divine reality, as we see in the following examples from ancient Greece, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

Greek religion. Among Greek thinkers, ideas of a unitary divine reality were expressed as a means of showing the order and reasonableness of the world. Already in pre-Socratic times, it seems, philosophers like Xenophanes depicted the spiritual unity of the whole world in the notion of the All-One, uncreated, unchangeable, and immanent in all things. Plato stressed the unity of the Good and identified God with that: God must be perfectly good, changeless, and the maker of the best possible world. Aristotle also made the idea of goodness central to his concept of God, the causal principle of all. The unicity of the supreme First Mover follows from the unity of the physical world: God is one, eternal, and im-

mutable. God is defined as pure mind *(nous)*, who always thinks one and the same subject, namely himself—and thus this view is not really theism. Later in the Hellenistic religions, the sense of God's unicity was expressed by raising one god or goddess to supremacy, encompassing all others. For example, Apuleius described Isis as the one Great Mother of all, by whatever name she may be called in different areas (*Metamorphoses* 11).

Hinduism. Hinduism is characterized by monistic (*advaita*, or nondualistic) thought, which merges the divine reality with the world in a unity called *brahman*. Here the unifying principle is strong, but the theistic quality of the unified divine reality is of lesser importance. There have always been theistic tendencies in Hinduism, but these have been associated with a variety of divine beings. Yet intense concerns of *bhakti* (devotion to a god) have sometimes led Hindus to raise up one god as supreme ruler, or to see the various gods as manifestations of one God. "They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, and Agni . . . ; but the real is one, although the sages give different names" (*Ṛgveda* 1.169). Among Vaiṣṇavas, Viṣṇu tends to become all, and the same is true of Śiva among Śaivas. Kṛṣṇa, *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, can be put forth as the supreme God behind all names: "Many are the paths people follow, but they all in the end come to me" (*Bhagavadgītā* 4.11). Thus Hinduism does recognize the oneness of the divine, and it includes theistic forms of worship, even worship of one God exclusively, without denying the reality of other gods.

Buddhism. Buddhism, like Hinduism, is essentially a monism which has only an inferior role for those born at the level of gods, trapped as they are like all living beings in the cycles of rebirth. But in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the idea has arisen that beings who have realized their Buddhahood (that is, Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*) can function similarly to gods in theistic religions. Generally Mahāyāna Buddhism holds to the multiplicity of these powerful beings, but in certain schools one such Buddha becomes supreme and is worshiped exclusively. Such is the case with Amitābha (Jpn., Amida) Buddha in Pure Land Buddhism, a soteriological monolatry offering the one hope of salvation for this degenerate age. Esoteric Buddhism has developed a unified cosmotheism, according to which the whole universe is the body of Mahāvairocana, the Great Sun Buddha, with all Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*—and thus all reality—united in this supreme Buddha-reality.

Egyptian religion. One of the earliest forms of exclusive monotheism apparently developed in ancient Egypt. Within the elaborate and complicated polytheism of Egyptian religion there had long been rationalistic tendencies toward seeing various gods as different forms of one particular God, with an emphasis on the supremacy of the Sun God, who tended to absorb other gods. Around 1375 BCE Pharoah Amunhotep IV repudiated the authority of the old gods and their priests and devoted himself exclusively to Aton, the god appearing as the sun disk. He proclaimed himself the son of Aton, taking the name *Akhenaton* ("devoted to Aton"), and he imposed this worship on others. By royal decree Aton became the only God who exists, king not only of Egypt but of the whole world, embodying in his character and essence all the attributes of the other gods. Akhenaton even had the names of the other gods effaced from inscriptions and replaced with the name of Aton. Akhenaton's monotheism was related to protest against abuses in the cults of the gods, but it does not appear to have led to new ethical standards. Within twenty-five years Akhenaton was gone, and his successors restored the old cults.

Zoroastrianism. Growing from the ancient Indo-Iranian polytheistic religion, Zoroastrianism unified all divine reality in the high god Ahura Mazdā. Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), who lived sometime between 1700 and 1500 BCE, was a priest who turned against some of the traditional cultic rituals and proclaimed the overthrow of polytheism. In his teaching, Ahura Mazdā (Pahl., Ōhrmazd) is the one God who, to implement his will in the world, associates with himself the six Amesha Spentas ("holy immortals"), spirits or angels that represent moral attitudes and principles. Ahura Mazdā, the Wise Lord, is good, just, and moral; he creates only good things and gives only blessings to his worshipers. The one God is sovereign over history, working out the plan he has for the world. Humans are to assist God through upright deeds, and there will be a final judgment in which every soul will be judged to see if it is worthy of entering Paradise. Conflict is accounted for as the hostility of two primordial spirits: Spenta Mainyu, the good spirit, and Angra Mainyu (Pahl., Ahriman), the evil spirit. Ahura Mazdā apparently fathered these two spirits; the struggle between them has been going on since the beginning of time, when they chose between good and evil. It appears, then, that Ahura Mazdā cannot be called omnipotent, for the realm of evil is beyond his control; in that sense it may be said that this is not a complete monotheism. Yet there is no doubt that Zoroastrianism considers the realm of Ahura Mazdā to be ultimately victorious. Further, in this eschatological religion the conflict between good and evil is understood not so much metaphysically as ethically, involving the free choice of humans either for the rule of the Wise Lord or for that of Angra Mainyu. It is true that later Zoroastrianism brought some of the other gods back into the picture again. But in the teaching of Zarathush-

tra in the *Gāthās* is found a unique monotheism with an ethico-dualistic accent.

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The three religions that are generally held to be the full expressions of monotheism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, also arose against the background of the polytheism of the ancient Near East. These three religions are closely related in that they grew from the Semitic cultural background and the foundations of the religion of ancient Israel.

Although it was the fountainhead of this type of monotheism, the religion of ancient Israel was not actually monotheistic in early times. Stories of the patriarch Abraham show that he worshiped the Canaanite high god El in a variety of forms in addition to the god of the clan, and when the people of Israel entered into a covenant with the high god Yahveh they did not exclude the existence of other gods. One might call early Israelite religion henotheistic or monolatrous in the sense that exclusive loyalty was to be given to Yahveh, but Yahveh's power was limited because other nations had their own gods. Some Israelites lived with a polytheistic vision, giving loyalty to Yahveh as the god of the covenant but also worshiping Baal and the other gods of fecundity as they settled in Canaan and became agriculturalists. But the covenant relationship with Yahveh contained the seeds of monotheism; the Israelites experienced Yahveh as personal, showing himself in historical events and demanding exclusive loyalty and ethical behavior according to the covenant law. Prophets arose who challenged the polytheistic notion that various gods controlled the functions of nature. Elijah and Hosea, for example, held that it is only Yahveh who makes his power felt in all areas of existence, as the creator of all and the one God who sends corn at the harvest and wine at the vintage. Just as polytheistic ideas were overcome, the prophets also struggled to overcome the limitations of a henotheistic view of God. At one time it was accepted that one could not worship Yahveh outside the land of Israel. But Amos insisted that the one God, Yahveh, had not only brought Israel out of Egypt, but had also brought the Philistines from Caphtor and the Arameans from Kir (*Amos* 9:7). And Second Isaiah, the prophet of the Babylonian exile, went so far as to describe Cyrus II, the mighty king of the Medes and Persians, as "the anointed one of Yahveh" whom Yahveh had taken by the hand (*Is.* 45:1). In the vision of these prophets, Yahveh is no tribal god sharing power with other nations' gods; rather, he is the universal creator of all and the director of the history of all peoples according to his holy design.

Jews, Christians, and Muslims drew on the fundamental monotheistic vision of ancient Israel, each group filling out the picture of God with colorings and shapes drawn from its own particular culture. The dimensions of the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim type of monotheism will be discussed at more length below.

Sikhism. One more expression of monotheism should be mentioned in this religio-historical survey: Sikhism. Starting with Gurū Nānak (1469–1539 CE), an Indian type of monotheism developed that synthesizes the mystical monotheism found in Hinduism and the ethical, personal monotheism brought into India by Islam. In Gurū Nānak's teaching, there is only one God, who is immortal, unborn, self-existent, creator of all the universe, omniscient, formless, just, and loving. God is both transcendent as pure potentiality and immanent as world-embodiment. Thus God is contained in everything. God is personal but is beyond complete knowledge, to be worshiped mainly in rituals of repeating his name. Revelation comes through *gurūs* who speak the divine word. Humans attain heaven or hell at the end of a lifetime, although they are involved in many rounds of births and deaths. Final salvation for humans is *nirvāṇa*, absorption into God's being like water blending with water.

Summing up this cross-cultural religio-historical survey, it is clear that monotheism has arisen in a number of ways. In some areas it came through rationalization, seeing the logic of unified divine power. In other traditions, mystical experience of everything as one and unified with the divine gave rise to monotheistic expressions. In still other traditions, historical experiences of one powerful, personal God led toward formulations of monotheistic belief.

Monotheism in Contrast to Nonmonotheistic Views. Monotheism often arises in antagonism to other views of divine reality. One of the most obvious contexts against which monotheism defines itself is a plurality of divine beings or forces, which is commonly called polytheism. Central to polytheism is the notion of *theoi*, personal divine beings within nature and society. These gods have personal wills, control specific spheres, and interact with one another to make up a functioning organism. The functioning of nature is seen as the operation of a plurality of divine wills, and this plurality and conflict are extended to human life and society. Typically there is a head of the pantheon, but this high god is limited in power and authority and often is thought of as old or impotent.

Monotheism distinguishes itself from the various forms of polytheism in that the whole realm of divine power is unified, with no conflicting wills or limitations. God has unlimited authority and power but still is *theos*, possessing personal will and relationship to the world. The plural forces are seen as qualities and attri-

butes of God or as subservient beings of the created world. In the monotheistic view, God transcends the world of nature and human society; the world is not the locus of divine power, for God is the universal creator of everything out of nothing (*ex nihilo*). Humans find value and integration of meaning by realizing their common creaturehood and serving this one universal God. Revelation from God is the source of unified, universal meaning.

Related to polytheism is what F. Max Müller called henotheism and what others have called monolatry: worshiping one god at a time or raising up one most powerful God as the only one to be worshiped. [*See* Henotheism.] The other gods, while real, are downgraded before this supreme God. Monolatry means one God is worshiped as supreme, though the lesser gods of other peoples are recognized. Henotheism (kathenotheism) would be the view that different gods can be worshiped as the supreme God one at a time without implying that the other gods do not exist.

In contrast to monolatry and henotheism, monotheism universalizes the power and authority of the one God exclusively, for even sharing power with lesser gods would be a limitation that cannot apply. Monotheism is intrinsically universal, transcending tribal or nationalistic limitations; the one God has authority and power over all peoples, friends and enemies alike. And monotheism refuses the henotheistic idea that one god can be worshiped as supreme at one time and another at another time, although it does allow for the experience of various aspects of the one God at different times.

A form of thought close to monotheism but still related to polytheism and henotheism is theistic dualism. [*See* Dualism.] Typically, this experience of the divine reality separates out the hurtful or evil elements and associates these with another divine power, thus setting up a divine struggle with echoes in human life. One unified supreme God is posited as the good divine force, and the source of evil can be thought of as many beings or as one evil being.

Strictly speaking, monotheism does not allow the one God to be limited even by the causes of destruction and evil; these causes cannot be divine forces outside the will of the one God. Ultimately the one God must be the source of all reality and all events, including those that humans experience as evil and destructive. Some forms of monotheistic thought do allow for evil beings as creatures of God, permitted to cause destruction and evil for various purposes within the overall authority of the one God. But these demons, devils, and satans are only part of the panorama of human existence, and they cannot limit or act against God's power, authority, and will.

Monism (nondualism) in the history of religions refers to a broad category of thought and experience in which the divine reality is unified and no ontological separation exists between the divine and the world itself (monism), or the divine is the "soul" of the world (nondualism). [*See* Monism.] All reality, including humans, share in the divine nature. Monism and nondualism tend to be nontheistic, for qualities of personal will and otherness from the world do not fit this perception of the divine. The world is not what it appears to be in the multiplicity of our perceptions. Rather, either the world is in essence one divine reality, or it is fundamentally an illusion, or it consists of forms and expressions that emanate from the one divine source. Further, monism and nondualism tend to be nonhistorical, in the sense that a cyclical rhythm of time expresses the experience of the one divine reality. The religious path is one of mystical discipline and meditation, bringing progressively higher stages of knowledge and ultimate liberation in union with the one divine reality. Of course, provision is made for theistic practices at the lower levels of spiritual perfection.

Monotheism distinguishes itself from the various forms of monism and nondualism by positing a definite separation between the one divine reality and the world which God brought into existence. In this sense there is a dualistic emphasis in monotheism, for there are two distinct realms of reality, the divine and the created world. Only God is eternal and transcendent; he created the world out of nothing *(ex nihilo)*. At the same time, most forms of monotheism hold God not only as transcendent but also as immanent in the world: God's presence, power, and operation are immediately present in human experience. [*See* Transcendence and Immanence.] The world is a creature, real and good as part of God's design. Revelation from God is important as guidance; prophetic and devotional emphases predominate over the mystical and meditative ones. God is a personal *theos* who confronts one in historical existence as an Other, to whom one relates through obedience and service. And God works in the history of the world, directing events toward an eschaton in which there will be evaluation and judgment. History has a beginning and an end, and God transcends it all.

Dimensions of Monotheistic Belief and Practice. In setting up a typology of monotheism to show the ideal types toward which the various monotheistic religious traditions point, it is important to realize that even within one tradition there will be different experiences and philosophies of monotheism. Thus, while a tradition may be dominated by a certain type, its particular coloration may be affected by hues drawn from other types. Further, monotheistic thought focuses especially

on the theoretical or verbal dimension of religious experience. When we move to the practical and the social spheres we encounter a variety of phenomena which at times may not be distinctively monotheistic. Worship, law, customs, and social forms may show striking parallels in different religions without regard to the theoretical stance on monotheism, polytheism, or monism. For example, visual images of the divine reality are used in Christianity as well as in Hinduism, but not in Islam or Judaism—and also not in polytheistic Shintō. Some Muslim mosques are as bare and simple as Buddhist meditation centers, while some Christian churches gleam with golden brocade, candles, images, and saints that rival Hindu or Taoist temples. Orders of priests, monks, and nuns bring some Christian groups close to Buddhism, while the rabbi and imam of Jews and Muslims resemble more the learned teacher of a Hindu ashram. The veneration of saints in some sectors of Islam and Christianity appears similar to the veneration of spiritual beings in traditional African religions, but other sectors of Islam and Christianity strongly reject these practices. Thus care needs to be taken in setting up a monotheistic typology, so that religious traditions are not fitted in too tightly, doing damage to the integrity and richness of the particular religion.

The following typology of dominant emphases in the monotheistic religions includes elements from some religious traditions that may not be fully monotheistic, yet they all put forth the two essential ingredients of monotheism: *monos* and *theos*.

Monarchic monotheism. Monarchic monotheism, the belief in one God who rules over many gods, is close to polytheism and grows out of a cosmic religious context. One high God rises to supreme authority and unlimited power, forcing the other powers to total submission. Akhenaton's monotheistic movement in ancient Egypt was of this type; and Yahvism in early Israel displays this form, with Yahveh pictured as "a great king above all the gods" (*Ps.* 95:3). The attitude which subjugates other religions and imposes a monolithic system on all may be a result of this type of monotheism.

A subtype of monarchic monotheism would be dualistic monotheism: one God opposed against evil forces. In this view there is one ruler God, all-good and all-just, who tends to become distant, watching over the struggle within existence in which evil divine forces play a part. The distinctive quality of this type of monotheism is that it takes evil away from the being of the one God, accounting for it through demons or devils. Zoroastrianism is a classic example of dualistic monotheism: although the one God, Ahura Mazdā, is supreme, the evil spirit Angra Mainyu struggles throughout the history of the world, to be overcome only at the end. Popular forms of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have sometimes approached this type of dualistic monotheism with ideas of Satan or the devil defying God's will, although generally these religions see the evil one as a creature permitted by the one God to perform evil within creation. The struggle between God and evil forces can be seen as a cosmic struggle, as in the Hindu Purāṇas, in which demonic powers arise anew in each new age and Viṣṇu incarnates himself in an *avatāra* to do battle and realign the cosmic order. Some traditions in Judaism and Christianity describe God's struggle with Satan or the Antichrist as taking place on a transhistorical, cosmic plane. More commonly, however, dualistic monotheism has strong ties to the historical plane of human existence and provides an ethical dimension for human involvement in God's struggle against evil.

Emanational mystical monotheism. We can divide emanational mystical monotheism into two subtypes: the worship of one God through many gods, or the worship of one God as the world soul. The first subtype, congenial especially to a monistic context, recognizes many gods but sees them as emanations of the one divine source, which is conceived of in theistic terms. Some ancient Greeks rationalized the plurality of the gods in relation to a particular supreme high god in this way. Hindu theistic cults sometimes offer this explanation of the relation of the many gods to the one great god worshiped in that cult. Viṣṇu, for example, can also be worshiped in many *avatāra*s and with many different names. Another example would be Esoteric Buddhism, in which all Buddhas and *bodhisattva*s can be seen as emanations of the Great Sun Buddha, Mahāvairocana.

Another type of monotheism related to the monistic worldview is the mystical view of the one God as the world soul. This type of monotheism holds that there is one personal *theos* who is not sharply separate from the world but rather is the creative divine force in everything. Again, the great theistic cults of Hinduism and Buddhism often show this type. For example, Rāmānuja's "Qualified Nondualism" holds Viṣṇu to be the absolute, supreme God to whom the worshiper relates in *bhakti* as qualitatively different from the worshiper himself; yet Viṣṇu and the worshiper are united as soul and body are united. In the theistic Kṛṣṇa cults, Kṛṣṇa as the supreme personality of God can be experienced as different from the world, yet in the highest mystical experiences these differences fade away and Kṛṣṇa becomes all, as expressed in Arjuna's vision (*Bhagavadgītā*, chap. 11). Sikhism is a monotheism that emphasizes God as absolute creator, self-sufficient and unchanging; yet God is embodied in the world, and the believer who finally reaches *nirvāṇa* becomes absorbed

in God. Sikh monotheism, like Hindu monotheistic forms, tends to be nonhistorical, looking on existence as a countless series of cycles until finally the separation is overcome and the worshiper achieves complete union with the one God. Certain mystical movements within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have also approached this type of monotheism without displaying the ahistorical feature. For example, the "panentheism" ("everything is in God") of Ṣūfī mystics like Ibn al-'Arabī (1165–1240 CE) or of medieval German Jewish mystics tended to see the whole universe as an emanation of God's own being, a reflection of the divine, while maintaining a view of God as distinct from the world.

Historical ethical monotheism. Historical ethical monotheism, the belief in one God guiding the historical design, characteristically describes God as personal, having a will for the historical design of the world, guiding all events as the creator, separate from the world yet immanently involved in human history as the God whose law governs all, who gives value to all and holds all accountable at the end of history, and who reveals himself through pivotal prophets, events, and scriptures. Humans are expected to follow God's design by establishing goodness and justice in human society. God makes total demands, controls political history, is intolerant of other gods or other ultimate commitments, and is to be worshiped by all exclusively.

Zoroastrianism contains most of these monotheistic features, although it makes the dualism of good and evil central to the conception of the divine and thereby assigns some limits to the power of God. Sikhism also contains many of the features of ethical monotheism, but it gives central place to a cyclical view of existence and the goal of mystical absorption into God.

The family of religions made up of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam most fully expresses this type of monotheism and places it at the center of religious thought and practice. Each of these three traditions also adds its particular hue to the universal monotheistic vision. Judaism places a strong emphasis on the personal character of God, encountered in an "I–Thou" relationship and providing an ethical design for life as spelled out in the Torah and Talmud. The universal character of the one God is seen as turned toward humankind, especially in the very specific form of the covenant relationship with the Jews as "chosen people." The particular nature of this covenant and its demands does not negate God's universality, in the Jewish view. God's design for the world is to be fulfilled especially through the covenant with the Jews and thus a great responsibility is placed on them. Further, all non-Jews who fulfill in their lives the basic human principles known as the "seven commandments of the sons of Noah" will have a share in the life of the world to come. Thus the religion of Judaism expresses a universal monotheism that focuses on God's particular relationship to humans through the covenant with the Jews.

Christians have modulated historical ethical monotheism into concrete, existential terms by emphasizing the personal character of the one God revealed in human history. Resisting tendencies of *tritheism*, Christian tradition has worked out a *triunity* that makes God concretely immanent in this world as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Central to this vision is the incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ, a historical particularization of the universal God that provides a pivot for all of human history and points to the fulfillment of God's whole design in the eschaton. Christians insist that their Christology is monotheistic; Christ is one substance *(homoousios)* with God the Father. Jews and Muslims, of course, find this doctrine of the incarnation of God in Christ to be out of line with their understanding of monotheism.

Muslims have made the unity *(tawḥīd)* of God the central statement of their confession of faith: "There is no god but God." Islam puts forth a very radical monotheism in insisting on the utter transcendence and sovereignty of God, all-powerful in every aspect of the universe, to be likened to nothing. The greatest sin is *shirk*, associating anything else with God. The universal God is particularized in Islam by making the Qur'ān the concrete revelation by which God relates to all humans and gives them guidance. While the final revelation came through the prophet Muḥammad, it is intended for all humans in all ages as their guide to the ethical life and to the blessings that God intends for faithful creatures.

Current Reflections on Monotheism. Monotheism is the long-established religious tradition in the cultures informed by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, but still a considerable amount of searching and rethinking goes on. Philosophers and theologians continue to draw out the implications of the monotheistic vision for thought and society. For example, an influential work by H. Richard Niebuhr, *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture* (New York, 1960), argues that modern society tends toward henotheism, making one particular society into the center of value and the object of loyalty; in contrast, radical monotheism has as its reference the One, beyond all the many, from whom all reality receives its value. Contemporary Jewish and Muslim writers have also stressed radical monotheism as a critique of the polytheistic or henotheistic tendencies of modern society.

Modern thinkers have also been wrestling with some of the central characteristics of traditional monotheism

that seem to be problematic. Difficulties revolve around God's personality, God's immutability, and his strict separation from the world; the theocratic overtones of monotheism, its patriarchal associations and seeming suppression of human freedom; and the rejection of mystical spiritism found in monotheism. Without surveying all the recent critiques and reinterpretations of the doctrine of God among philosophers and theologians, several lines of thought directly related to monotheism may be mentioned here. For example, feeling that the traditional view of God as personal tends to make him another being in additional to those we know in the world, John Macquarrie and Paul Tillich speak of the divine reality as "Being" or the "Ground of Being," avoiding pantheism but holding God to be not one being but the *source* of all being.

The movement known as process philosophy or theology has attempted to move to a *via media* between an untenable unipolar theism in which God is immutable and completely separate from the world, and an equally untenable pantheism. Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne maintain that God includes and penetrates the world, while still being distinct from the being of the world. This bipolar view sees God as infinite personal existence and thus independent of the actual world in his abstract identity but including the actual world in his concrete existence. God is the source of love and the cause of nature's order and has an overall design for the world. Since God is personal, change and growth take place in God as well as in the world.

Critiques of traditional monotheism have also come from analyses of the type of ideology and society associated with monotheism. In 1935 Erik Peterson, in an essay called "Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem," described monotheism as a political ideology linked with the notion of divine kingship and leading to totalitarianism, and this line of criticism has recently been renewed. Disillusioned by the effects of secularism, thinkers of the "New Right" in France, such as Alain de Benoist and Manuel de Diéguez, blame monotheistic ideology for suppressing human freedom and forcing people to adopt atheism as the only alternative. They seek a neopagan resurgence as a new location of the sacred in the plurality and freedom of human life rather than in the monolithic totalitarian rule of monotheism. David Miller likewise has suggested that monotheism can no longer sustain and provide creativity for modern culture, calling for a return to the creative sources of polytheism. And feminist thinkers have criticized monotheism as a model of the highest form of patriarchal power and authority; in monotheism, God is imaged as male, omnipotent with unilateral power and authority over the world, separate and autonomous, exclusive, and opposed to everything related to change, sensuality, nature, feeling, and femininity.

There have, of course, been many responses to these critiques. For example, theologians have attempted to be more careful in the use of conventional dualisms like monotheism-polytheism, personal-impersonal, and transcendent-immanent, recognizing that religious traditions, including those labeled monotheistic, are complex and embody elements from both sides of these conceptual dualities. New defenses of monotheism are being proposed. For example, Bernard-Henri Lévy turns to the Jewish tradition to show that monotheism actually has a liberating function, safeguarding against totalitarianism and all the idols of nature, ideology, and the state. Some Christian theologians, like Jürgen Moltmann, recognizing the problems with a monarchical, patriarchal monotheism, stress God's liberating relation to humans by reemphasizing the trinitarian conception—though such emphasis widens the gulf between Christian thought and that of Judaism and Islam.

This ongoing discussion makes it clear that monotheistic thought, while often challenged by and in tension with alternate and modified religious understandings, is still central to most of the Western world and will continue to be a dominant mode of experiencing and expressing the divine reality.

[*See also* Theism *and* Deism.]

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MONSTERS. Strictly speaking, a monster is a mythical being and may be human or animal or a combination of both; it may be huge, misshapen, or grotesque, malevolent, savage, or terrifying. Such creatures have been a feature of popular lore and religious cult in all parts of the world from earliest times. The term is applied also to human "freaks," or "monstrous births," that is, persons with more or less than the normal number of limbs or organs, Siamese twins, hermaphrodites, and even albinos.

In popular legend, monsters are commonly portrayed as both stupid and gluttonous. What they have in brawn, they lack in brain, and when they devour their victims, it is not because they are innately hostile to the human race but because they possess insatiable appetites. It is often their obtuseness and greed that prove their undoing.

One kind of mythical monster is the dragon, the embodiment of primordial chaos, who is believed to have been subdued in battle by a leading god before the world order could be established. [*See* Dragons.] The Sumerians of Mesopotamia spoke of such a combat between the monster Azag ("demon") and the god Ninurta; the Babylonians, of the defeat of the rebellious Tiamat by their supreme god Marduk; the Hittites, of the defeat of a sea serpent named Illuyankas by the combined efforts of the goddess Inaras and a mortal hero; the Hebrews, of Yahveh's rout of Leviathan; the Hindus, of Indra's subjugation of Vṛtra; the Iranians, of the dispatch of the serpentine Azhi Dahaka; and the Greeks, of the triumph of Zeus over the contumacious Typhon.

The primordial monster appears not only in myth but also in ritual. It is a widespread custom to inaugurate a new year or season by staging a mimetic combat between two antagonists who represent respectively the old year and the new, winter and summer, drought and rainfall, and the like—a combat that survives, albeit in distorted form, in the English Mummers' Play and similar seasonal performances elsewhere. What thus inaugurates each separate year or season is thought to have inaugurated the entire procession of years and seasons in any given era and to be destined to happen again before a further era can begin. The defeat of the monster is therefore retrojected into cosmogony and projected into eschatology: Leviathan, Vṛtra, Azhi Dahaka, and Fenrisúlfr of Norse mythology, for instance, are said to be imprisoned but not slain and will eventually burst their bonds and have to be subdued again.

In several myths, the monster personifies the swollen rivers or winter squalls that threaten to inundate the earth unless properly channeled. In Chinese folklore, the subjugation of raging streams is called "caging the dragon." Conversely, however, the monster sometimes personifies a malevolent power who impounds the subterranean waters that have to be released in order to prevent drought.

Adverse natural phenomena are also personified as monsters, though it is sometimes difficult to determine whether these represent the phenomena themselves or

the demonic powers that are believed to cause them. One such monster is the gigantic North American deity called the Thunderbird, the flapping of whose wings is believed to cause storms. The ancient Sumerians spoke likewise of a gigantic bird named Heavy Wind (Im Dugud) who caused storms; the Teutons spoke of Hraesvelgr. Analogous figures appear in the folklore of such diverse peoples as the Chinese, the Burmese, and several American Indian tribes.

Hurricanes are often attributed to the rampages of monsters. In the Mesopotamian creation epic *Enuma elish*, the rebellious Tiamat is accompanied into battle by a cohort of gruesome monsters that includes Stormwind, Cyclone, and the like. The Seneca Indians saw in hurricanes the activity of a monstrous bear named Ya-o-gah. According to some scholars, the English word for this phenomenon derives ultimately from *Hurucán*, the name of a monstrous wind god of the Quiché Indians of Central America.

Equally widespread is the belief that eclipses are caused by a monster's swallowing and then disgorging the sun or moon. The Hindus spoke of a dragon called Svarbhanu; analogous figures appear almost universally. In the language of the Turkic-speaking Chuvash and of Estonian folklore, a verbal form translated into English as "eaten" is used to describe an eclipse. Drums and gongs are beaten, bells rung, and trumpets blown in many parts of the world to scare away the dire adversary. A variant of this notion asserts that the sun is pursued nightly by a voracious monster—in ancient Egypt by the serpent Apopis and in Norse mythology by the wolf Skoll.

Another natural phenomenon personified as a monster is the whirlpool, which is said by some scholars to be the original referent of the word *gargoyle* (from the Latin *gurges*). In Arabic a waterspout is popularly termed *tinnīn* ("dragon"); in the Old Testament the sea monster Leviathan is sometimes referred to by the term *tannin*. So, too, Edmund Spenser describes a whirlpool as a whale.

Not only natural phenomena but also human situations and infirmities are personified as monsters or are attributed to their activities. In Babylonian magical incantations, epilepsy and palsy are represented as a demonic monster with a bird's head and human hands and feet, and impotence as one with a lion's mouth, a dragon's teeth, and an eagle's talons. In Jewish folklore, noontime sunstroke and dizziness are attributed to an ogre who has the head of a calf with a revolving horn in the center, one eye in its breast, and a body covered with scales, hair, and eyes.

Sexual dreams are commonly represented in popular lore as due to the assaults of monsters who consort with sleeping men and women. Those that assail men are known as succubi; however monstrous their activities, they are usually portrayed not as grotesque harridans but as voluptuous sylphs or *femmes fatales*. Those that assail women are known as incubi. Belief in such creatures was widespread especially in the Middle Ages and was held even by such noted churchmen as Augustine. They were thought to be the demon lovers of witches, and intercourse with them was said to produce "monstrous births," deformed persons, hermaphrodites, and sometimes albinos. Indeed, according to many medieval commentators the "sons of God," who are said in the *Book of Genesis* (6:1–4) to have consorted with mortal women and thus engendered a race of giants, were in fact incubi.

Fairly universal is the belief in a monstrous beldam who seizes and strangles newborn babes and kills their mothers or drains the mothers' milk. In ancient Mesopotamia, she was known as Lamashtu and was portrayed with a lion's head, a woman's body, and bird's feet. She held serpents in both hands and suckled a black hound and a pig at her breasts. The Hittites knew her as Wesurya ("strangler"); known among the Greeks as Gello, Lamia, or Strix, she could take the form of a screech owl or bat. The Arabs saw her as a goggle-eyed hag whose one foot was that of an ass and the other that of an ostrich. In German folklore, she is a sharp-nosed, scrawny harridan. Superstitious Jews identify her with Lilith, the legendary first wife of Adam, who was expelled childless from Eden for her rebellious behavior and who is therefore envious of all new mothers. In many parts of the world plaques and amulets are hung up to ward her off.

Not only diseases and human infirmities but also death and the netherworld are portrayed as monsters. In several passages of the Old Testament (*Is.* 5:14, *Hb.* 2:5, *Prv.* 1:12) hell is depicted as a being with jaws agape, a portrayal frequent in medieval art, for example, in the east window of York Minster. Supay, the Peruvian deity of the nether regions, is similarly characterized.

There are also animal monsters, creatures that combine the parts of several different beasts or of beasts and human beings. Not all of them are regarded as harmful; some, despite their grotesque forms, represent beneficent spirits or deities. Many of these monsters acquired acceptance through descriptions of them in medieval and later bestiaries, which in turn derive largely from a book about animals known as the *Physiologus*, compiled (probably in Greek) between the third and fifth centuries CE by an unidentified writer and subsequently translated into many European and Oriental languages. Under the hands of Christian redactors, sym-

bolic and allegorical meanings were given to the fabulous beasts, and they were thus incorporated into heraldry (e.g., the lion and the unicorn of British heraldry). Prominent among such creatures are the unicorn, the phoenix, the griffin, and the manticore.

The unicorn is first mentioned by the Greek writer Ctesias (third century BCE) as native to India and akin to the rhinoceros. It was later portrayed in art and literature as a white horse with a single horn protruding from the middle of its forehead. It is identified by some early translators of the Old Testament with the *re'em*, a beast mentioned in several passages, and on the basis of this identification it became prominent in Christian symbolism. The *re'em*, however, is said explicitly to have more than one horn (*Dt.* 33:17, *Ps.* 22:21) probably it is the now extinct aurochs. Legend asserted that the unicorn could be caught only if it leapt into the lap of a virgin sent into the woods to entice it.

The phoenix, a red bird variously identified as an egret or flamingo, is said to be native to Arabia. It was believed to live for five hundred years and then to burn itself in its nest. Out of the ashes arose a new phoenix. Modern scholars believe that this is simply a Greek transmogrification of the Egyptian mythical *bennu* bird, who represented the resurgent sun and rose daily from a flaming tree at Heliopolis.

The griffin is a creature with a lion's head and the wings of an eagle who, in Greek mythology, guarded the gold in the north. It is probably to be identified (even in name) with the biblical *cherub* (Babylonian *karūbu*), who was not an angel, as is commonly supposed, but a monster who guarded the entrance of ancient Mesopotamian palaces and who is also related to the legendary dragon who guards the pot of gold.

The manticore is a hybrid monster described in the bestiaries as possessing a lion's face, a man's body, and a tail with a serpent's head and a scorpion's sting. It has gleaming eyes and can leap prodigious lengths. It is said to be native to the Far East but may in fact derive from the fabulous Indian monster *makara*.

In general, harmful demons are often portrayed as monstrous beasts. A representative example is the Russian Zmei Gorynych, a snake that typifies all evil and is prone to run off with mortal girls.

One example of a beneficent animal monster is the Iranian Senmurv, part dog, part bird, and sometimes part reptile, who gave mankind seeds scattered from a tree in which it lived. Another is the Chinese Ch'i-lin, a spirit of good luck who has a deer's body, a bushy tail, cloven hoofs, and horns.

Besides these individual theriomorphic monsters there are also classes of such beings, for example, centaurs, Gorgons, and harpies. Centaurs are most commonly described in Greek literature and portrayed in Greek art as half human and half horse. It should be observed, however, that this is but one variety of them, for their human parts are said to be combined alternatively with those of asses and other beasts. It has therefore been suggested by some modern scholars that centaurs are really the mythical counterpart of the bands of wild men who are said to rampage in animal pelts and perform ritual dances at certain seasons in Balkan countries and who find their congeners in the hobby-horse performers of English folk custom. The Gorgons are, in Greek mythology, three horrendous sisters whose glance petrifies the beholder. Their hair consists of serpents, and they possess golden wings, brazen claws, and huge teeth. One of them, Medusa, is mortal. Harpies ("snatchers") are filthy winged monsters, part woman and part bird, who defile whatever they encounter and who, according to Hesiod, also carry off newborn babies. In the latter capacity, they have their counterpart in Canaanite lore. Hesiod calls two of them by the names *Aello* ("stormwind") and *Ocypete* ("swift flier"). These names are included to this day in the Jewish amuletic plaques mentioned above as a device for averting the child-stealing beldam.

Human "monsters" or freaks are popularly attributed to the union of mortal women (especially witches) with incubi, or demons. Included among them are misshapen children and adults, androgynes, and persons with extra limbs and organs. An outstanding example is the Pig-faced Lady, Tanakin Skinner, who appeared in London in the early seventeenth century. An otherwise gracious person, she was said to have the head of a sow and to eat from a trough. Her grotesque form was attributed to divine vengeance on her mother, who had refused alms to a poor woman begging for the sustenance of her child. Another example is the Elephant Man, the subject of a well-known play by Bernard Pomerance. Albinos too fall into this class, although the popular attitude toward them is ambivalent. In Senegal, for instance, they are regarded as ominous; in Gabon they are killed at birth, whereas in New Guinea they are deemed holy.

Remote, "outlandish" peoples are often depicted as monsters in traveler's yarns, medieval romances, and the writings of various ancient authors. Herodotus (485?–425 BCE) and Pliny the Elder (23–79 BCE), for example, mention a legendary people of the far North named the Arimaspeans, who have no heads but have eyes in their stomachs. Japanese legend tells of Jon-li, a remote island inhabited by people whose bodies are half human and half dog. Marco Polo says that the inhabitants of the Andaman Islands are dog-headed, and other writers similarly describe the Karen of Burma. The Jewish traveler Binyamin of Tudela (twelfth cen-

tury) reports that men who live in the Turkish steppes have no noses, although this may refer to flat-nosed Mongolians. In the same vein, Jean Struys (1650) asserts that tailed men are to be found on the southern side of Formosa, and a similar statement is made by later writers about an allegedly cannibal race called the Nuam-ni'aros who lived between the Gulf of Benin and Ethiopia. Jews during the Middle Ages were also commonly accused of cannibalism.

Some monsters are not objects of actual belief but are deliberately invented to scare unruly children. The outstanding monster of this type is the Greek figure Mormo ("bogey"), also called Mormolukeion ("bogeywolf"), who survived in British nurseries as late as the nineteenth century. Similar creatures are the beldam Bebau in central France and the *windigo* of the Ojibwa Indians of North America.

The conquest of a draconic monster who ravages a country or holds a princess or other fair maiden captive is a standard motif in heroic legend. One is the Chimera, a fire-breathing monster, part lion, part dragon, and part goat, who ravaged Lycia and the neighboring lands but was slain by the hero Bellerophon mounted on the winged horse Pegasus. Typhon, a hundred-headed, fiery being, challenged the sovereignty of Zeus but was destroyed by a thunderbolt and buried under Mount Etna. The Minotaur, half bull and half man, was kept in a labyrinth by King Minos of Crete to devour the youths and maidens demanded of Athens as periodic tribute. He was eventually defeated by the hero Theseus with the aid of the princess Ariadne. (The exaction of periodic tribute by water spirits as the price of averting inundation is a not uncommon theme in world folklore.) The Hydra was a hundred-headed monster of the Peloponnese who was slain by Herakles as one of his twelve labors. Whenever one head was severed two grew in its place, but the hero eventually scorched the growth with a firebrand. Geryon was a monster with three heads or three bodies whose herds near Gades (Cadiz) Herakles carried off as his tenth labor, slaying their guardians, the giant Eurytion and the two-headed hound Orthros, as well as the Geryon itself. Fenrisúlfr (Fenriswolf) was the monstrous offspring of Loki in Norse mythology. The gods eventually bound him with a fetter made by dwarfs from the sound of a cat's footfall, the breath of a fish, and the spittle of a bird, and then imprisoned him in the depths of the earth. He will break forth, however, at the final twilight of the gods (Ragnarǫk) and slay Óðinn (Odin), only to be himself slain by Óðinn's son Víðarr. Battles against monstrous dragons are familiar also from the legends of Perseus, Beowulf, Saint George, and many other heroes.

From time to time—especially in the present century—reports have circulated of gigantic prehistoric monsters sighted in various parts of the world. These are commonly termed "monsters," but that designation is misleading, for a monster is essentially abnormal, whereas these creatures are supposedly surviving specimens of mammoths, mastodons, and the like. To this class belongs especially the celebrated Loch Ness monster of Scotland, said to have been seen sporadically throughout the ages, but a subject of public interest only since 1933. It is reputed to have been seen since then by no fewer than four thousand witnesses, and several scientific expeditions have attempted to photograph and identify it. A group of sonar and photographic images obtained in 1973 by the Academy of Applied Science has, for some, lent credence to its existence. It is usually described as being dark gray or brownish black in color, about fifteen to twenty feet long, with a thin neck, small head, long tail, four paddles or fins, and several humps. Another such alleged prehistoric monster is the Yeti, or Abominable Snowman, said to have been sighted or to have left gigantic footprints in remote areas of the Himalayas. He is described as resembling an ape, standing nearly six feet tall, shaggy in appearance, with huge teeth in a large mouth, and a head tapering to a point. However, native Sherpas declare that he is far smaller and has red or black tufts of hair and the face of a monkey. He has no tail and apparently walks on two legs.

Cousin to the Yeti is Sasquatch, or Bigfoot, a hypothetical species of primates said, since 1840, to have been sighted in the mountains of the Pacific Northwest. This creature is reported to be between seven and nine feet in height and to weigh from six hundred to nine hundred pounds. He is not ferocious. He looks like a furry ape, walks upright, and leaves footprints sixteen inches long and six inches wide. Sasquatch plays a role in the folklore of the Northwest Coast Indians and in turn has a cousin in the Mono Grande of the Andes. It has been suggested that the Abominable Snowman, Sasquatch, and Mono Grande may be surviving specimens of a prehistoric ape-man known as *Gigantopithecus*, fossils of which have been discovered in China and other parts of Asia.

Monsters and ogres survive also in popular lore in such figures as Frankenstein's monster, King Kong, and the like—staples of horror movies, television, and comic strips. An interesting development in this respect is the circulation of stories about visitors from outer space allegedly seen emerging from flying saucers. Significantly, many of these stories come from rapporteurs of Irish descent, and the creatures are described as having a form closely resembling that of the leprechauns of Irish folklore.

Finally, it may be observed that monsters also appear as figures of political propaganda. An outstanding instance is the protrayal of the Japanese in World War II as "monkeys"—a tendentious revival of the old practice (mentioned above) of so characterizing remote, unfamiliar peoples. Similarly, barbaric historical personages are commonly designated "monsters," for example, Attila and, in our own day, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Mengele. In such characterizations, the essential nature of a monster is effectively expressed; huge, savage, and hostile, he is the direct opposite of the diminutive dwarf, elf, or gremlin, who, albeit mischievous, is essentially benevolent.

[*For a discussion of mythical beings of mixed (human and animal) form, see* Therianthropism.]

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THEODOR H. GASTER

MONTAGU, LILY (1873–1963), founder of the Liberal Jewish movement in England. Born in London on 22 December 1873, Lily H. Montagu was the sixth child of Ellen Cohen Montagu and Samuel Montagu. Her father was a wealthy banker and leading member of the Orthodox Anglo-Jewish community. Convinced that Orthodoxy offered her, and other women, little room for religious self-expression, she found in the works of Claude Montefiore a vision of Judaism that mirrored her own understanding of true religion as personal in nature, universal in outlook, and best revealed through daily conduct.

In the January 1899 issue of the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, Montagu published "The Spiritual Possibilities of Judaism Today," an essay in which she asked all religiously committed Jews to help her form an association aimed at strengthening the religious life of the Anglo-Jewish community through the propagation of Liberal Jewish teachings. Membership would not necessarily demonstrate allegiance to what Montefiore identified as Liberal Judaism but simply would demonstrate the recognition of its ability to awaken within many Jews a sense of spirituality and personal responsibility to God. The Jewish Religious Union (JRU), established by Lily Montagu in February 1902, instituted Sabbath afternoon worship services conducted along Liberal Jewish lines and propaganda meetings, led by Montagu, to clarify and spread its teachings. Though Montefiore agreed to serve as the group's official leader, Montagu assumed responsibility for its major activities and daily affairs.

By 1909, acknowledging the failure of its initial, all-inclusive vision, the union declared itself to be a movement specifically committed to the advancement of Liberal Judaism. During the next few decades, Lily Montagu helped form Liberal Jewish synagogues throughout Great Britain, frequently serving as their chairman or president, and became lay minister of the West Central Liberal Jewish Congregation in 1928, a position to which she was formally inducted in November, 1944. Following Montefiore's death, in 1938, she assumed the presidency of the JRU, later renamed the Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues. Having conceived of the idea for an international JRU as early as 1925, Montagu also helped found and eventually became president of the World Union for Progressive Judaism.

Montagu was the author of eleven books, including *Thoughts On Judaism*, a theological treatise published in 1902, and her autobiography, *The Faith of a Jewish Woman*, published in 1943.

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Little has been written either on the history of the Liberal Jewish movement in England or on Lily Montagu herself. The only critical study of Montagu's life and thought published to date is my book *Lily Montagu and the Advancement of Liberal Judaism: From Vision to Vocation* (Lewiston, N.Y., 1983). A second volume, *Lily Montagu: Sermons, Addresses, Letters and Prayers*, edited and with introductions by me (Lewiston, N.Y., 1985), includes a fully annotated selection of her unpublished writings. Finally, for a more detailed account of Montagu's contribution to the development of Liberal Judaism, see my essay "The Origins of Liberal Judaism in England: The Contribution of Lily H. Montagu," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 55 (1984): 309–322.

ELLEN M. UMANSKY

MONTANISM. Although there are various reports (e.g., Hippolytus, *Refutatio* 8.19.1; Eusebius, *Church History* 6.20.3) that the leaders of Montanism composed many writings, none of these has come down to us. As a result, special importance attaches to the approximately twenty-five surviving fragments of their prophecies and oracles (see new edition in *Kirchengeschichtliche Entwürfe*, 1960) and a few inscriptions, as well as to the writings from Tertullian's Montanist period, although the latter reflect essentially the later development of Montanism. Even the writings of the adversaries of Montanism have disappeared and are known to us only from citations by the fathers of the church. Especially important are Eusebius's account in his *Church History* and the *Panarion* of Epiphanius of Salamis, both of which are based on numerous sources. By contrast, what we know of Montanism from Jerome and Augustine has significantly less value as a source.

According to the sources, Montanism arose in Asia Minor in AD 156/7 and was centered there, at least in its first period. Its founder was Montanus, but he was evidently accompanied from an early date by prophetesses, among whom Priscilla (or Prisca) and especially Maximilla were particularly important. After they had first attracted attention by speaking in tongues, Montanus and his associates made use of intelligible oracles and prophecies to proclaim the final revelation and the will of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit was calling for an intensified expectation of the end, since the Parousia (the second coming of Christ) was imminent. The thousand-year reign would descend to earth at Pepuza (and Tymion?) in Phrygia, and the faithful were to travel there in order to share in it as soon as it appeared. They were to prepare themselves by intensified asceticism.

Glossolalia and the claim of a communication of the Spirit were at this time just as suspect to the official church in Asia Minor as was the expectation of an imminent end. The bishops endeavored in vain through exorcisms to resist the "new prophecy," as the apparently tightly organized movement was called, and they tried to coordinate their activity against the "Cataphrygians" (so called after their place of origin) at the first provincial synods. Despite these efforts, Montanism spread far beyond Asia Minor. Only with great difficulty was its recognition by the bishop of Rome prevented, and approximately in the year 207 in North Africa it made a convert of Tertullian, who became a passionate proselytizer for Montanism.

The fight against the movement was difficult because early Montanism was orthodox in its doctrine and exemplary in its ethics. Its characteristic traits—a heightened expectation of an imminent Parousia and a resultant intense asceticism (to the point of seeking martyrdom)—were basic elements of early Christianity, as were speaking in tongues and the claim to immediate revelation from the Holy Spirit. Montanus claimed that in him the Paraclete had made his appearance. After all, the coming of the Spirit was expressly announced in the *Gospel of John*. In addition, millenarianism found justification in the *Revelation to John* and was especially widespread in Asia Minor, and this even in the subsequent period. The *Revelation to John* and the *Gospel of John* were evidently among the spiritual sources from which Montanism was derived.

By the second half of the second century the official church and its theology had moved beyond the expectation of an imminent Parousia and had made room for the idea of postponement of the end. The *Second Letter of Peter* and the *Shepherd of Hermas* are clear proof of this. In the community at large, however, the expectation of an imminent end was still alive, at least in a latent form, and was given new life by Montanism. It was this expectation that made it possible for the movement to spread so quickly and so widely. The church's opposition to Montanism began to be effective only when the predicted return of the Lord did not occur and the prophetic energies of the movement fell off. Maximilla's oracle, "After me there will be no further prophet but only the end" (Epiphanius, *Panarion* 48.12.4), gave the church a weapon that became all the more effective as time passed after the death of Maximilla and neither the predicted end nor even the disturbances and wars preceding the end came to pass. During the second half of the second century, Montanism underwent the same kind of development that official Christianity had experienced: there was a withering of the prophetic element, cessation of glossolalia, and a decline in ethical standards.

It was the ethical rigorism of Montanism that converted Tertullian. When he became a Montanist in about 207, he evidently had been in conflict with the official church, which in his opinion was too lax, for some time. The gift of prophecy was still alive in Montanism at that time, as was eschatological expectation, though this was no longer as intense as in the beginning. The gift of tongues had disappeared, and the Lord's thousand-year reign was expected to come no longer in Asia Minor but in Jerusalem.

It is not possible to say for certain to what extent Montanism had spread in the West and how long it persisted there. Modern writers often rely too much on the lists of heresies, in which Montanism soon acquired its fixed place, as proof that the movement actually existed in a given area. Although Augustine wrote of "Tertullianists" in Africa, it is uncertain to what extent they are to be identified with Montanism. On the other

hand, in the East the laws against heretics give the impression down to the beginning of the fifth century that Montanism was still a living reality there.

The attempt (by Wilhelm E. Schepelern and, later, B. W. Goree, Jr., for example) to explain Montanism in terms of the paganism of Asia Minor and especially the cult of Cybele is not a promising one in view of the state of the sources. What these writers view as a tradition peculiar to Asia Minor (e.g., emphasis on ecstasy, the special place of women, intense asceticism) was in fact the common possession of early Christianity.

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KURT ALAND

Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

MONTANUS, second-century Christian schismatic. For information on the life of Montanus we are dependent on statements made by the Christian controversialists of the time, as transmitted by the fathers of the church. Only a few utterances of Montanus himself have come down to us: "I am the Father and I am the Son and I am the Paraclete," as in the *Dialogue between a Montanist and an Orthodox Christian* (J. Ficker, 1905, pp. 447ff.) and according to Didymus of Alexandria (*De Trinitate* 3.41) and Epiphanius (*Panarion* 48.11.1). "The Paraclete" is sometimes replaced by "the Spirit" or "the Holy Spirit" or some expanded form of this. Man is like a lyre, and Montanus is described as the plectrum that sweeps across the strings. Extraordinary promises are made to the faithful, but no concrete indications are given of Montanus's teaching or ethical demands in any of the extant sources concerning him.

Montanus reportedly first attracted notice in the time of the proconsulate of Gratus (Quadratus?), in Ardabau (on the Phrygian border of Mysia), as promulgator of the "new prophecy." When combined with data provided by Eusebius and Epiphanius of Salamis, this information suggests the date 156/157 as the approximate beginning of this movement. Montanus is also reported to have been a recent convert to Christianity (in Eusebius's *Church History* 5.16.17) and to have previously been a priest of Apollo (this designation appears in the *Dialogue*) or, more generally, a priest of idols (in the *Dialogue* and in Didymus's *De Trinitate* 3.41). Jerome speaks of him (*Letters* 41, to Marcella) as *abscisum et semivirum* (castrated and half a man), that is, a priest of Cybele. Montanus is reported to have hanged himself (*Church History* 5.16.13). Since the same story is told of Maximilla, the prophetess and close associate of Montanus, the report is evidently a piece of antiheretical polemic, passed on by an anonymous writer simply as a rumor (cited in *Church History* 5.16.15). We cannot say for certain whether the report is true that Montanus was originally a pagan priest, but the contradictory claims suggest that early Christian polemics played a role in the report, especially since there is no reference to this pagan background of Montanus among the writings of the anti-Montanists of the second century.

Augustine (*De haeresibus liber* 26) reports that Montanus celebrated the Lord's Supper with bread that had been prepared using the blood of a one-year-old infant. The blood had been extracted by means of countless tiny punctures. The same story is told by numerous church fathers (Epiphanius, Filastrius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Jerome), but it represents nothing more than the acceptance into antiheretical Christian polemics of the pagan legend of the orthodox Christian Lord's Supper as involving the ritualistic sacrifice of an infant. This story was told at the end of the second century (cf. Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 9.5). Because they did not recognize this, some scholars saw the story as reflecting the influence of an orgiastic culture in Asia Minor and considered it as justification for looking into the matter further. Montanus's contemporary adversaries knew nothing about the story, or they gladly would have used it in arguments against him. Also, Eusebius, who summarizes virtually everything of the anti-Montanist writings, would undoubtedly have passed the story on.

There was nothing about Montanism that could not have been found, at least in the form of tendencies, in the early Christian church. Montanism was a movement of renewal that sought to revive, in the second half of the second century, certain elements of worship, doctrine, and ethics that had gradually died out in the church at large during the first half of the century. Montanism itself eventually underwent the same kind of development that official Christianity had experienced (cessation of glossolalia, withering of the prophetic element, nonfulfillment of the expectation of the second coming of Christ, decline in ethical standards), so that in the third century Montanism's internal energies were

gradually exhausted and nothing was left but a sect that, from the fourth century on, was exposed to ecclesiastical and civil persecution and was doomed to extinction.

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Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

MOODY, DWIGHT L. (1837–1899), American revivalist preacher. Dwight Lyman Moody was born in Northfield, Massachusetts. Like many Americans of his era, he left home as a teenager for the city—first Boston, then Chicago. In each city he quickly established a reputation as an aggressive boot and shoe salesman, but in Chicago he soon turned his organizational talents to religious endeavors, especially those of the local YMCA. During the nearly two decades he lived in Chicago, Moody moved from volunteer to full-time religious work, developed his techniques as an urban evangelist, and began to establish a national reputation as a leader in church circles. After several tentative, exploratory trips overseas, Moody in 1873 launched a career in England as a full-time revivalist. Within two years he had established himself as a highly effective revivalist, able to stir religious feelings in large numbers of people during lengthy revival "campaigns" conducted in the principal cities of England and Scotland.

Moody parlayed his fame overseas into even greater public acclaim in the United States. Beginning in 1875 he conducted a series of lengthy revivals, carefully planned and orchestrated, in most major American cities. True religious sentiment and feeling were to be found in these revivals, even though Moody's activism, efficient organization, and rough-hewn appearance seemed also to exemplify the emerging materialism of industrial America.

By 1880 Moody had established a permanent residence at his birthplace, Northfield, Massachusetts. This act, combined with the evangelist's continuing round of annual urban revivals, exemplified the tension many late nineteenth-century Americans felt in living between the two worlds of small-town origins and big city realities. Moody broadened his concerns beyond mass revivalism in the 1880s. Shifting part of his energy and interest into education, he founded Mount Hermon and Northfield academies in his hometown, and the Moody Bible Institute, for training urban evangelists, in Chicago.

In the last years of Moody's life, growing divisions between liberals and conservatives in American Protestantism somewhat undermined his leadership. His personal integrity and his irenic temperament, however, made it possible for him to bridge the gap between these divergent groups, and only after his death in 1899 did tensions grow so great that open conflict erupted.

In numerous ways Moody epitomized popular American Protestantism in the second half of the nineteenth century. His family life and personal values reflected evangelical Protestant ideals of personal piety and morality. In the public realm, also, Moody embodied key characteristics of the evangelical world. He had transformed that world by adapting the revival tradition to the new urban, industrial context of late nineteenth-century America. His public activities in his later years also offer fascinating glimpses of the breakup of the cultural synthesis evangelism had provided in the nineteenth century. To the end of his life, Moody remained one of the best representatives and reflectors of popular Protestant culture and practice in the United States.

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JAMES F. FINDLAY

MOON. To observers on earth, the moon appears to be the most changeable of celestial phenomena. In earlier times the appearance of the new crescent was often greeted with joy as a return of the moon from the dead; the full moon was considered an occasion for celebration, the waning a time of anxiety, and the eclipse a cause for dread. In religion and mythology the moon plays a variety of roles. It is personified as a male or female divinity, or, like the sun, thought to be an object thrown up into the sky by some supernatural being. It may be thought of as kindly or malicious, male or fe-

male, pursued or pursuer, a god of destruction or of birth and growth.

An early recognition of a connection with menstruation gave rise to the conception of the moon as the guardian of the female cycle and of birth or, alternatively, as a male god who monthly defiles women. In connection with dew, rain, or tides, the moon may promote the growth of vegetation or bring disastrous floods.

The moon has been a measure of time from early times, especially for hunting societies. In tropical climates, where the sun is cruel, the moon is considered beneficent, especially by nomads and caravan drivers. As a male god the moon appears as the Strong Bull of Heaven who cares for his cows, the stars; or as the sacrificed god, the son or lover of the mother goddess.

As a goddess, the moon brings cures and eases childbirth or, on the other hand, helps to rot corpses and receives the dead. The waxing and waning of the moon led to the idea that it dies and is reborn, and thus the moon became a part of funeral ceremonies and rites of resurrection. The discovery that the moon is the closest celestial body to the earth led to the idea that the moon was the "abode of souls," a way station to immortality.

The phases of the moon seem to echo the life cycles of women and therefore connect the moon with the Triple Goddess who presided over birth, initiation, and death. The Moon became part of a triad with Hekate, goddess of the underworld, and with Artemis, the divine huntress, whose hounds were the stars. Sometimes even the Egyptian goddess Isis joined the grouping. In this connection the qualities of the moon are fertility, moisture, change, darkness, and magic. In the ancient Chinese division of the universe into *yang* (hot, dry, strong, male) and *yin* (cool, moist, weak, female) the moon is considered *yin*.

Usually the waxing moon is a fortunate omen and waning moon a dangerous one. In the Andaman Islands the waxing moon is male and the waning moon female. The dark of the moon is the time for gathering herbs to be used in spells and curses. The new or full moon is the time for white magic. In some systems, however, the moon rushes to conjunction with the sun to be refreshed by his light.

In poetry, the dying god, who is related to the divine powers of the plant world, is often compared to the moon. Intoxicating liquors used in many religious ceremonies are said to drip forth from the moon. As spider, spinner, and weaver, the moon is likened to the three Fates, who spin and weave man's destiny.

The moon is often paired with the sun, as either father, son, wife, sister, or daughter. Sometimes the moon and sun are twins, and the weaker one, usually the moon, is doomed to live in the underworld, while the other rides on high. Frequently both are thought of as boats riding through the ether as on the ocean. Often, the sun rides in a chariot pulled by four white horses. The moon is pulled by two white horses, or by a bull, a stag, or a cock.

The moon's animal is often the bull, because of the crescent shape formed by its horns, or the hare, because of its fertility or because the "man in the moon" is thought to resemble a hare. The bear is also associated with the moon, because its hibernation and waking are like death and resurrection; the snail, because it retreats and reappears; or the frog, because it is an aquatic creature.

The Moon as a Measure of Time. Aside from night and day, the moon is the most obvious natural measure of time. The Indo-European root is the same for the *moon*, *month*, and *measure*. There exist what may be notations of the moon's phases in Paleolithic caves in Spain from 7000 BCE. Stonehenge in Great Britain (c. 3000 BCE) may have been used to measure the movements of the moon as well as those of the sun. There are still primitive peoples who use only the moon to measure time. Before the arrival of Europeans, American Indians counted the lunations as "war month," "month of flowers," and so forth. The dark of the moon was the "naked time"; its first appearance, the "coming to life."

Agricultural people, however, needed to have their times of planting and reaping coincide with the seasons—that is, with the sun. Thus began the long effort to correlate twelve lunations (too few) or thirteen lunations (too many) with the solar year. Accounts from republican Rome show the problems associated with this effort. We are told that from earliest times a *pontifex minor* would watch for the new moon from the Capitoline Hill, and when it was sighted, call out to Juno, the queen of the gods. The first of the month was called the calends from the verb "to call out." Juno is in this way identified with the new moon, as her husband, Jupiter, is with the ides, or full moon. The priest then announced the series of festivals for the coming month and whether the nones (the half-moon) would fall on the fifth or the seventh. The festivals, sponsored by the state, were instituted as a means of keeping the agricultural, military, and civil activities in order. It was necessary for all farmers to come into the city to learn on what days they could not work but must keep festival. On calendars that have come down to us, festival days are marked *nefas*, meaning that no work could be done; 109 out of the 355 days of the year were designated *nefas*.

The priesthoods, like the early magistracies, were in the hands of the patricians. The inconvenience of not

knowing the feast days was one of the problems that led to the "struggle of the orders." Eventually the *fasti* (calendars) were published, in 304 BCE. The year began in March, and any time that had to be intercalated to bring the months into line with the seasons was added in February, after the Terminalia (a festival of boundaries and the year's end, celebrated on 23 February).

Until the end of the republic the work of intercalation was the duty of the pontifices, who were often inefficient or corrupt. For instance, the date of court cases could be shifted by altering the intercalations. By the end of the republic, the whole calendar was out of harmony with both the sun and the moon. Cicero, writing to his friend Atticus, says he is not sure whether or not there will be an intercalation. There was a clause in contracts that read "si intercalat" ("in case of an intercalation").

Julius Caesar, aided by his Egyptian astronomer, made a clean sweep of the quasi-lunar calendar, extended the year 45 BCE from 355 to 445 days, and started anew on 1 January 45 BCE, with a cycle of 365 days, adding another day on the fourth year, after the Terminalia. This, with a few adjustments, is the solar calendar under which we live.

The ancient Greeks sent out criers to announce the sighting of the new moon. At some unknown point in history, the Greeks had limited the length of the year to twelve lunations of "full" or "hollow" months (comprised of thirty and twenty-nine days respectively), with an intercalary month every two years. We learn from Geminus that "they sought for a period which should, as to years agree with the Sun, as to months, with the Moon." The first period they constructed was an eight-year cycle called the *octaeteris*.

A nineteen-year cycle was suggested by the astronomer Meton in 432 BCE but was apparently not accepted by the cities, which went their own way, creating their own calendars and even inventing their own names for the months. In *The Clouds* of Aristophanes the Moon complains, "You subvert the calendar and fail to observe her days. When the sacred days are unobserved, the gods go hungry, and it is the Moon they threaten." In this confusion, many citizens returned to direct personal observation of the rising moon. Beginning in the second century BCE, two sets of dates were recorded, "according to the state and according to the deity [Selene]."

In Mesopotamia the month began with the sighting of the new moon. A letter to the Assyrian king Esarhaddon (r. 680–669 BCE) states, "On the thirtieth I saw the moon. It was in a high position. The king should wait for the report from the city of Assur and then may determine the first day of the month." There are indications that in some cities months alternated between thirty and twenty-nine days in a nineteen-year cycle with regular intercalations. By the time of the Seleucids (third century BCE), it was possible to calculate the appearance of the new moon and to predict eclipses.

In India, religious festivals are still regulated by the lunar calendar, as are such domestic events as marriages. The moon festivals—two days for the new moon, one for the full moon—are considered important, even by Buddhists. The present names of the months are derived from the *nakshatras* ("lunar mansions"), twenty-seven or twenty-eight conspicuous stars along the ecliptic through which the moon passes.

The early Hebrews celebrated the new moon with a feast, which was a family gathering at which animals were sacrificed. The months were identified by the agricultural activity taking place at the time. The beginning of the month, after being attested to by observers, was announced to various communities by fire signals at first, and later by messengers. Since messengers could not always reach the outlying groups in a day, festivals often went on for two days. Since Passover, celebrated at the full moon, was originally a feast of the first fruits, it had to occur after the reaping of the grain. Thus it became necessary to add another month after Adar (approximately March). After the exile the calendar followed the Babylonian system, using Babylonian names for the months, counting the days from the evening, and intercalating an extra month on a regular basis. After the third century there was increasing dependence on calculation of the beginning of the month, though some sects from time to time insisted on reverting to direct observation.

The lunar year to which Muslims adhere was not established until 631 CE, when Muḥammad made his last pilgrimage to Mecca. There he proclaimed that the year should consist of twelve lunar months and that intercalation should be forbidden. As Arabs before that time had probably had a combination lunar and solar calendar, it is likely that Muḥammad intended to discourage old pagan festivals. His system won acceptance by the Arabs, who since ancient times held the moon in special reverence. The festivals now run through the whole year and come back to the same solar season in about thirty-three years. The new month begins when two trustworthy Muslims notify the authorities that they have observed the new moon from a mountaintop or from an open field. The crescent motif (the *hilal*) has been much used throughout the centuries in Islamic art and in the last two hundred years has appeared on the standard of Islam.

Early Christians attached importance to celebrating Easter at the time of the Jewish Passover but agreed

that Easter should fall on a Sunday. In the third century Christians began to frame lunar calculations for themselves. The Easter controversy raged in the early church and still exists between the Western and Eastern churches. The final conditions arrived at in the West are that Easter must be kept on the Sunday after the paschal moon (the calendar moon whose fourteenth day falls on or after the vernal equinox), reckoned from the day of the new moon inclusive.

The Moon as Deity. Only once, so far as is known, did the moon as divinity command political power and an influential priesthood, but it did so for about three thousand years, through changes of race, language, and regime. The place was the area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, known as Mesopotamia ("between the rivers"), and the cult spread or grew independently in Syria, Palestine, Arabia, and Anatolia.

In the southern part of the Land between the Rivers there appeared around 5000 BCE the first urban civilization—a group of cities in which trade, division of labor, metalworking, organized religion, and writing were developed by a people whom history knows as Sumerians. Each of the cities was under the protection of a high god and in the beginning was probably ruled by the priesthood of the god. By the time the first records appear, these gods are all related. An is the creator–sky god. His son, Enlil, the Air, carries on most of the business of controlling the other gods and resides in the holy city of Nippur. The first son of Enlil is Nanna, the Moon, patron of the important city of Ur. His wife is Ningal, daughter of the Lady of the Reeds, a moisture goddess from the marshes. The children of Enlil and Ningal are Utu, the Sun, and Inanna, warrior goddess of love and the Evening Star. The trio of Moon, Sun, and Evening Star are often found together on royal stelae down through Babylonian times.

The Semitic-speaking peoples who succeeded the Sumerians—Akkadians, Assyrians, and Babylonians—took over most of their inventions and adopted the Sumerian pantheon, giving the gods Semitic names. Nanna became Sin; Utu, Shamash; and Inanna, Ishtar.

C. Leonard Woolley, excavating at Ur in 1922–1934, found the famous royal tombs, containing the bodies of mass suicides, royal ladies (who Woolley surmised might have been priestesses of the Moon), and a harp with a bull's head and a lapis lazuli beard, the Strong Bull of Nanna. He also describes the ziggurat of Ur, dedicated to the Moon, the best preserved of its kind in the Near East. At the top of the ziggurat, a high staged tower terraced with trees, was a shrine where the god rested, gave dream oracles, or took part in a sacred marriage. This last is suggested by a hymn in which Ningal addresses Nanna, "In your house on high I will come to you, Nanna. In your perfumed cedar mountain, in your mansion of Ur, I will come to live."

At the base of the ziggurat was a large temple, the real home of the god, where he was fed and clothed daily. Probably the people saw the god only when he was paraded at each phase of the moon—on the first, seventh, and fifteenth days of the month. The temple was a huge complex of storehouses, kitchens, and rooms for priests and slaves. It was a landowner and received rent in kind, which was used for sacrifices and for feeding the enormous staff. Slaves were employed in smelting, weaving, and preparing goods for sale. The high priestess of Nanna was traditionally a king's daughter.

A text describes how Nanna made a pilgrimage to visit his father Enlil at the holy city of Nippur, taking agricultural products and receiving in return Enlil's blessing. Enlil confirmed his son in power as Nanna, the king of Ur. It is likely that the king acted out the life of the god. During the dark days of the moon, called the "days of lying down," the queen conducted the rituals.

The temple complex at Ur was destroyed and reconstructed many times over the centuries, by Assyrians, Babylonians, even by alien Kassites, and finally by Cyrus, the Persian invader. The complex was rebuilt not to conciliate the people but to preserve good relations with the god.

The Assyrians, who took over from the Sumerians the worship of the moon under the name of Sin, built another moon city, Haran, on the Euphrates. The Assyrian kings came to Haran to "take the hand" of Sin after they had been confirmed by their own god, Ashur. In the sanctuary at Haran was a dream oracle, where Esarhaddon (r. 680–669 BCE) was told to proceed to the conquest of Egypt, which he did. Moon worship continued at Haran well into Islamic times when it was the center for a planet-worshiping people called the Sabaeans. The emperor Julian worshiped the moon at the temple in Haran in 365 CE.

In the early sixth century BCE, Babylon was the area's greatest city. Its founder, Nebuchadrezzar, set about rebuilding Ur. His successor, Nabonidus, was an antiquarian and a devoted worshiper of the moon. His mother (or grandmother) had been governor of Haran, and he was perhaps partly of West Semitic origin. In records of Ur, Nabonidus found the inscription of Ur-Namma, founder of the third dynasty of Ur (2100 BCE), whom he called "a king before me." Upon the ancient foundation he rebuilt the ziggurat "as in old times." He also rebuilt the temple at Haran and one in the Arabian city of Tema, where he remained for eleven years. Many critics in Babylon claimed he was putting his god Sin above Marduk.

The name of the moon in Canaan was Yarih. A Ca-

naanite text tells of his wedding to Nikkal (related to Ningal, wife of the Sumerian moon god): "I shall make her field into vineyards, the field of their love an orchard" (Samuel Noah Kramer, *Ugaritic Manual,* 1955, no. 77). There is no doubt that the golden calf worshiped in *Genesis* was a figure of the moon and that Mount Sinai was his home.

Throughout Anatolia there are depictions of and inscriptions to the Anatolian moon god, called Men, from the Indo-European root for *moon* and *measure.* He was known as Menotyrannus ("lord of the moon"), Men Ouranios ("lord of the sky"), or Katachonios ("lord of the underworld"), suggesting that he was a god of death and rebirth. We cannot be sure whether he arrived along the trade routes from the Near East or was an indigenous deity. Later Men became confused with the "dying and rising god" Attis, the castrated follower, son, or lover of the Great Mother of Phrygia, Cybele, as well as with Dionysos and Sabazios of Thrace, two other dying and rising gods.

The Moon in Mythology. In ancient India, Soma was the deification of a sacred plant that, when pressed, strained, and mixed with milk and barley, became an intoxicating drink for men and gods. The whole ninth book of the *Ṛgveda* is devoted to the praise of the yellow drink, which it identifies with the yellow moon. There is a marriage hymn in which the god Soma is married to the Sun, Sūrya, and has his head in the laps of the Nakṣatras ("lunar mansions"). Soma is celestial and bright, dispelling darkness and dwelling in the waters. In a later hymn, Soma is said to have married all twenty-seven Nakṣatras, daughters of the creator god, but he prefers one, Rohiṇī (possibly identified with the evening star). The other wives complain to their father, who afflicts the moon with a wasting sickness, causing his waning and disappearance. The Moon promises to reform and then grows back again, but always he relapses. In this problem the Moon is aided by Śiva, like Soma an ancient god of change, fertility, and destruction. Śiva wears the Moon's crest on his head; Soma is known as the "crest of Śiva." In a wheeled chariot drawn by a horse or an antelope, Soma leaves the sky to visit the earth at the new moon to revitalize plants and animals. *Soma* as an intoxicating drink has been compared to the wine of the Greek Dionysos, which the playwright Euripides described as "a drink that is poured out, a god for a god."

In Iran there is also a ritual of the sacred drink, there called *haoma*, which is not identified with the moon. In one hymn, the Moon is one of a triad of divinities, the lowest one being the sacred ox, who is sacrificed. The seed of the ox enters the Moon, where it is purified and divides into all the species of plants and animals. Iranians dedicated the right eye of every sacrificed animal to the Moon. They believed that when all things were put in motion by Angra Mainyu, or Evil, the Moon created time, which will run until Angra Mainyu is overthrown.

The ancient Greeks had only one myth concerning the moon, there called Selene, "the bright one." It is the story of how she fell in love with Endymion, a prince of Elis, while he was sleeping on Mount Latmos in Asia Minor. She begged Zeus to give Endymion eternal sleep so that she could visit him every night. In this way she managed to have fifty children by him, the number of the lunations between Olympic games, or equal to one-half of the eight-year cycle. Though there are almost no rituals associated with the moon in Greece, there are traces of moon worship from earlier times and in outlying regions. The Endymion myth connects Asia Minor with western Greece. According to Plato, mothers and nurses in ancient times taught children to bow down to the new moon. Torchlight parades for Selene are mentioned. A dream oracle in the Peloponnese, frequented by ephors from Sparta, was dedicated to Helios (the Sun) and to Pasiphae (the name, meaning "shining on all," is an epithet of the Moon). There was a queen named Pasiphae in Crete, where there are many traces of bull worship. In the myth, this Pasiphae fell in love with a white bull and from their union produced the Minotaur, who was half man and half bull. Another bull brought Europa (whose name, meaning "broad-faced," is another epithet for the Moon) from Phoenicia to Crete.

In Baltic mythology the sun is feminine and the moon masculine. The Balts say that the Sun was once married to the Moon, but he left her for the Morning Star. This so enraged the storm god, the most important Baltic god, that he beat the Moon with his sword, thus reducing the latter's size. The Sun and Moon have many children, the stars, but the Morning Star is a product of a union of the Sun with the storm god himself. The Moon, in shame and anger, avoids his wife, and they never appear together.

In Japan, the Sun, the most important divinity, is feminine; the Moon, her brother, plays only a minor role. Once the Sun ordered the Moon to go down to earth to find out what the goddess of food was doing. When the Moon arrived on earth, the goddess of food, meaning to please him, turned her face toward the land and from her mouth poured out boiled rice; toward the sea, all kinds of fish; and toward the mountains, all kinds of game. The Moon, instead of being pleased, was so enraged that she had offered him things from her mouth that he killed her. Out of her corpse were born the horse, the cow, and the silkworm. Back in Heaven

the Sun, angry with her brother for what he had done, said, "I'll see you no more," and so they never meet.

Another myth of plant discovery is told by the Machiganga of Peru. It relates that the Moon gave mortals cultivated plants, giving instructions about them to a mortal girl whom he eventually married. He caused his wife to be fertilized by a fish, and she produced four sons: the daytime Sun, the planet Venus, the Sun Under the Earth (i.e., the sun at night), and the nocturnal Sun, invisible to all but shedding its light on the stars. This fourth child was so hot that he scorched his mother's womb, and she died. The Moon's mother-in-law reproached him, saying that there was nothing left for him to do but to eat the corpse. His wife, disgusted with life on earth, had left her body there and taken her soul to the underworld. The Moon was distressed but obeyed his mother-in-law. Thus the Moon became an eater of corpses and decided to move far away from the earth.

All types of creation myths explain the origin of the moon, usually together with the sun. The cosmic egg motif occurs in the Finnish epic *Kalevala:* the egg falls from heaven onto the knee of the creator goddess as she floats in the cosmic waters, and from it emerge all the aspects of the universe. The sun was made out of the yellow of the egg and the moon out of the white. In Greenland, the Sun and Moon are a mortal pair, sister and brother. In a house with no light they lay together. When the sister discovered that she had committed incest, she tore off her breasts and threw them at her brother; the holes they left became sunspots. Then she flew away and he after her, both carrying torches. The sister's torch burned brighter so she became the sun, and her brother, the moon.

To the type of myth in which the world is created out of the body of a primal being belongs the Huron story of Ataentsic. She was a creation mother goddess who was thrown down from heaven through the hole in the sky she had made by tearing up the world tree. Landing on earth, she gave birth to twins, one good and one evil. The evil son killed her, but the good one made the sun from her face and the moon from her breasts.

In the Aztec pantheon, Huitzilopochtli is a warrior god, culture hero, and the sun. When Mother Earth became pregnant with him (her last child), her other children, the stars, were angry and pursued her to kill her. But one, called Golden Bells, ran ahead to warn her mother. The sun god sprang fully armed from the womb and beheaded Golden Bells. Learning that she had meant well, in compensation he put her head in the sky as the moon, but he chased the other stars away, as the sun does at rising.

The Greek Hesiod (seventh century BCE) describes all creation as the result of sexual union. From the original parents, Earth and Sky, were born twelve Titans, who paired off and produced most of the natural objects as well as the gods. One pair, Theia and Hyperion, become the parents of the Sun (Helios), the Moon (Selene), and the Dawn (Eos). Another pair of Titans became the grandparents of Hekate, goddess of the underworld, and of Artemis, the huntress. Hekate and Artemis later became identified with the moon. In the Homeric *Hymn to the Moon* (sixth century BCE), the Moon has a daughter, Pandia, by Zeus. There was a festival at Athens called the Pandia where round moon cakes were sold and eaten.

In one of the emergence myths characteristic of the southwestern United States, the Pueblo tell how mortals came up in several stages to the surface of the earth. Finding it in darkness, they tossed into the sky the moon and sun, which they had brought with them. A variant of the emergence myth is found in Oceania, in which mankind or the gods are originally enclosed in a shell that they have to pry open. In a Micronesian story, the creator god, Ancient Spider, encased in such a shell, found two snails; after he opened the shell he used the smaller for the moon and the larger for the sun.

In Queensland, the Sun is a woman made by the Moon; although she has two legs, she has a number of arms, which can be seen as the sun's rays. Among the Aranda (Arunta) of Australia, a man of the Opossum totem carried the Moon around with him in a shield, keeping it hidden in a cleft of the rocks all day. One day a man of another totem saw the Moon shining and ran away with it. The Opossum man, unable to catch the thief, called out to the Moon to rise into the sky and shed light on everyone. This it did, and it has remained in the sky ever since.

According to the Pima Indians of North America, the Sun and Moon are parents of Coyote, the famous trickster figure in mythology. In another story, it is Coyote who invents the Sun and Moon. Some Altaic-speaking peoples of Siberia believe that in the beginning there was no sun or moon, but people themselves flew around in the air and gave out light. A high god sent a spirit to help them. Stirring the primeval waters, he found two mirrors, which he set up in the sky as the sun and the moon. Mirrors are often used in rituals by Siberian shamans, and in their out-of-body travels they frequently reach the moon.

The Moon and Death. Because of its monthly disappearance and return, the moon is often connected with the idea of mortal death and rebirth. In the Caroline Islands it is believed that in the beginning men rose from the dead, as did the moon. Every month they fell into a deep sleep when the moon became dark and awoke when the moon returned. An evil spirit disap-

proved of this and arranged for men to stay dead. In New Zealand, in a similar story, it is the culture hero Māui who wished men to live forever, but the moon said, "No, let them die and become like the soil."

In western Ceram, an island westward of New Guinea, a divine maiden was desired in marriage by the sun god. When her parents, disapproving, put a dead pig in her marriage bed as a substitute for her (perhaps a vestige of a changeover from human to animal sacrifice), the Sun caused her to sink into the ground. The girl called out to her parents, "Slaughter a pig and make a feast. In three days, look into the sky where I will be shining like a light." Thus the feast of the dead was instituted, and mortals for the first time saw the moon rising.

To the Siberian Inuit (Eskimo), death is conceived as loss of one's soul, which travels up to the moon and finally to the sun. This upward flight of the soul through the planets and stars is a widespread motif, found earliest among the Sumerians. It turns up again in Plato's *Republic* and in Cicero's *Somnium scipionis*, where the younger Scipio Africanus dreams he visits his grandfather in the heavens and looks down on all the celestial spheres. Below the moon, his grandfather tells him, all is chaos, but up here all is pure and serene.

The fullest account of the moon as the "abode of souls" is found in the essay *De facie lunae* by Plutarch (second century CE). Pythagorean philosophers had already taught that the Elysian Fields, the Greek isles of the dead, were situated on the sun and moon. In his essay Plutarch describes mortals as consisting of three parts: body, soul, and reason. In death the body is dissolved by Demeter, who stands for Mother Earth. The soul, together with reason, floats upward and, if pure, reaches the moon. If corrupt, it must wander between the earth and the moon until it is purified. The moon is ruled by Persephone, the Greek queen of the underworld, now transferred to the upper spheres. The souls who remain on the moon become beneficent spirits who return to earth to give oracles and help mortals in other ways. Gradually they are dissolved into pure reason and reach the sun.

In one of the earliest Indian Upaniṣads we are told that there are two roads open to souls after death: the road of flame and the road of smoke. The road of flame leads to the sun and the gods; the road of smoke to the moon, the ancestors, and reincarnation.

In the teaching of Mani, founder of the Manichaeans, the souls of those who have learned the truth during their lives are taken up to the wheel of the sun, where they are purified and passed on to the moon, here described as the superior station. Both of the luminaries are pictured as boats sailing to and fro in the upper atmosphere. When the moon becomes full of souls, it ferries them toward the East to the "aeons of light," who place them in the "pillar of glory," their final resting place. Then the moon, greatly reduced in size, returns for another load of souls.

The Moon and the Occult. Witches' meetings are held at the full moon, but the dark of the moon is the time for black sorcery. A practice known as "drawing down the moon" is pictured on Greek vases. In the *Voyage of the Argo* (Apollonius Rhodius, third century BCE), Medea, the priestess of Hekate, is gathering herbs when the Moon addresses her, saying "How often have you disorbed me, making the nights moonless so you might practice your incantations." In this case the Moon would seem to be guiltless in the magic rites.

The lucky rabbit's foot must be taken in the dark of the moon, perhaps because the hare is one of the Moon's animals and she might protect it. According to Aelianos, a Greek writer of the third century CE, the moon causes epilepsy, which may be cured by a special kind of peony that, like the mandrake root, cannot be seen by day but must be gathered at night by tying to it a dog who pulls up the root and then dies (*On Animals* 24). This plant also cures afflictions of the eyes "in which moisture congeals and robs the eyes of their sight." Spells to reunite lovers are especially effective when cast by moonlight. In Theocritus (third century BCE) a lovesick girl calls on the moon for help in her enchantment. The Roman poet Catullus (first century BCE), in his hymn to Diana, calls her Trivia, Lady of the Crossroads (i.e., Hekate), and the "moon with counterfeit light." In the Middle Ages Diana was considered the ruler of witches, together with the "horned god." Pope John XII (tenth century) accused witches of "riding with Diana."

In dream divination, according to Artemidorus (*Interpretation of Dreams*, second century CE), "Intercourse with the Moon is entirely auspicious for shipmasters, pilots, merchants, astronomers, vagabonds and people fond of travelling. But for others it means dropsy . . . . Selene the Moon represents both the wife and mother of the dreamer. She also represents prosperity, business ventures and navigation."

Thoth, the Egyptian god of measure and writing, was appointed by the sun god Re to take his place in the underworld as the moon. Thoth is also the god of magic and spells, like the Greek Hermes. In the Hellenistic period, the two were combined as authors of a series of magico-mystical writings under the name of Hermes Trismegistos.

In the astrology that took form in Alexandria around the second century BCE as a combination of Near Eastern star lore and Greek mathematics, the moon, "when at its northern or southern limits helps in the direction

of greater versatility, resourcefulness and capacity for change; in its rising, toward greater natural endowments, firmness and frankness; in its waning, towards dullness, less fixity of purpose and less renown" (Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, second century CE).

In modern astrology, the moon "stands for the feminine, indrawn, receptive, and imaginative side. It tends toward carefulness, prudence, timidity, shyness, and the secluded life, though the lunar person is shrewd and practical in business" (Charles E. Carter, *Principles of Astrology*, London, 1969, p. 50).

The Moon in Folklore. Almost universal are cautions and devices to take advantage of the beneficent (and to avoid the unlucky) aspects of the moon, as well as theories to explain the moon spots. It has seemed an obvious ritual to farmers all over the world to plant during the waxing moon and reap during the waning moon, and this is still done in many parts of the United States. In pre-revolutionary France the law required trees to be felled during the waxing moon so that their wood would be drier. Hair, on the other hand, should be cut at the waning moon to make it thick. In England, shingles laid during the waning moon tend to swell. All over Europe, money, especially silver, the moon's metal, is exposed to the waxing moon or turned over in the pocket to make it grow. In Uganda, potters wait for the waxing moon before firing their pots. Warts are everywhere believed to grow as the moon waxes and to decrease at the wane.

Some Muslims in India practice a ritual called "drinking the moon." They fill a silver basin with water, let it reflect the light of the full moon, and drink it at a gulp as a remedy for palpitations and nervous disorders. Mothers in many places present their babies to the full moon so they will grow. In New Guinea, men on a hunting expedition leave their women at home to sing to the new moon for the success of the hunt. Natives of Greenland believe that women can become pregnant from sleeping in the light of the full moon. To prevent this, women wipe their abdomens with spittle. Weddings are variously believed to be lucky if held at the full moon or at the dark of the moon. The latter is explained by Plutarch *(De facie lunae)*, who claimed that the moon rushed to conjunction with the sun so that she might be refreshed by his light.

There are innumerable explanations for the spots that the West calls the "Man in the Moon." Some South American Indians believe they are ashes or menstrual blood smeared on the (male) Moon when he raped his sister the Sun. The Ona of South America say they are the results of a beating the (female) Moon received when the Sun discovered that she had disclosed her initiation rites. The same spots are often described as a hare, a frog, a snail, or some other animal or as some mortal lured up to the moon. In Scandinavian mythology they are a boy and girl carrying water, supposed to be the prototypes of Jack and Jill. The Shawnee Indians see in the spots their creator goddess bending over a cooking pot. Among the Malay, they are an old man making a fishing line under a banyan tree. At the other end of the line is a rat, who is eating the line as fast as the man can make it. When the old man is finished, he will use the line to catch everything on the earth and reel it up to the moon.

There is widespread belief that the light of the full moon turns humans who are so disposed into werewolves and causes lunacy if one sleeps in its beams. Very common in Europe and America is the idea that, during the night of the full moon, more crimes are committed, more children are born, and more patients committed to mental hospitals than at other times.

[*See also* Feminine Sacrality.]

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JEAN RHYS BRAM

MOORE, GEORGE FOOT (1851–1931), American historian of religions and scholar of Hebrew scriptures and Judaism of the common era. Born of Scotch-Irish ancestry in West Chester, Pennsylvania, Moore received his B.A. degree from Yale University (1872) and his B.D. degree from Union Theological Seminary, New York (1877). Following ordination as a Presbyterian clergyman (1883), he served a five-year pastorate in Zanesville, Ohio. Moore's academic career began with his appointment as professor of Hebrew language and literature at Andover Theological Seminary (1883). Moore became professor of theology at Harvard University (1902) and later professor of the history of religions there (1904), a position in which he remained until his retirement in 1928.

All of his works evidence diligent scholarship and masterful competence. Two are monumental: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era, the Age of Tannaim* (1927–1930) and *History of Religions* (1913–1919). The excellence of Moore's work in his specialty of Hebraic and Judaic studies had been established with the publication of such early works as *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Judges* (1895) and *The Literature of the Old Testament* (1913); his preeminence was assured with the publication of his definitive work on Judaism. Moore is unique among Christian scholars in addressing attention to the history of Judaism during the first centuries of the common era; his exhaustive and discerning account remains definitive. Moore's two-volume *History of Religions* filled the need for a new handbook on the history of religions with the unity and continuity that single authorship could provide. In this work, Moore limits his treatment to the religions of the "civilized" peoples, omitting any discussion of "primitive" (i.e., tribal) religions. Moore's treatment of the various religions manifests an impressive capacity to master the best current scholarship. Two uncritical assumptions underlie his work, neither of which was uncommon in his day: an evolutionary theory concerning the development of religion and a basic methodological distinction between the religions of "civilized peoples" and "other" (i.e., "primitive" or tribal) religions.

His contributions as a historian of religions were marked by two notable qualities. First, he demonstrated the possibility of pursuing work in the history of religions in a manner that was characterized by openness to the richness of diverse religious traditions (among the "civilized" peoples) on the one hand and by disciplined scholarship on the other. Second, it was singularly important to the study of religion in North America that, even though most work in comparative religion and the history of religions had tended to focus attention on religious traditions other than Judaism and Christianity, his *History of Religions* extended equivalence of treatment and analytical criticism to these "higher" religions.

Moore made frequent contributions to scholarly journals, writing almost forty articles for the *Encyclopedia Biblica* (1899–1903) alone, among the most notable of which are his essays "Historical Literature" and "Sacrifice." He was instrumental in the establishment of the *Harvard Theological Review*, contributed to it often, and twice was its editor (1908–1914 and 1921–1931). Moore held presidencies in such notable professional societies as the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (of which he was a fellow), the American Oriental Society, the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, and the Massachusetts Historical Society.

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A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Judges. New York, 1895. This important volume of the International Critical Commentary series established Moore's reputation as a careful and diligent scholar of the Old Testament.

The Literature of the Old Testament. New York, 1913. This modest volume in the Home University Library series presents in lucid and concise form both a discourse on the sources, formation, and structure of the Pentateuch and a discussion of every book of the Old Testament, informed by the most careful scholarship of the period and intended for the general reader.

History of Religions. 2 vols. New York, 1913–1919. Volume 1 discusses the religions of China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, India, ancient Greece, ancient Rome, and Persia, while volume 2 discusses Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Moore's succinct survey of major religious traditions is informed by his mastery of the most competent scholarship

in each field and by his special competence in Christianity and Judaism. The approach is characterized more by an interest in the history and thought of each tradition than by a consideration of their sociological and anthropological aspects. It is regrettable that Moore used the then-prevalent misnomer *Mohammedanism* to refer to Islam, even though he recognized it to be erroneous. A remarkable accomplishment in its time, the work has enduring value.

The Birth and Growth of Religions. New York, 1923. This publication of the Morse Lectures of 1922 presents Moore's theory that religion is grounded in the universal impulse for self-preservation and is developed in evolutionary fashion, ultimately manifesting an aspiration for self-realization.

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F. Stanley Lusby

MORALITY AND RELIGION. In the minds of many people, the terms *morality* and *religion* signal two related but distinct ideas. Morality is thought to pertain to the conduct of human affairs and relations between persons, while religion primarily involves the relationship between human beings and a transcendent reality. In fact, this distinction between religion and morality is a relatively modern one. Although tension between religion and morality is already evident in the writings of Plato and other Greek philosophers, the popular modern conception that religion and morality are separate phenomena is probably traceable to the Enlightenment. At that time, a number of thinkers, reflecting Europe's weariness with centuries of religious strife, sought to elaborate ethical theories based on reason or on widely shared human sentiments. In so doing they established the assumption that the norms governing conduct, morality, and ethics (that is, the effort to reason about or justify these norms) were separable from matters of religious belief.

This same cultural context also gave rise to a number of efforts to explain the relationship between morality and religion. Since it was now possible to conceive ways of thinking and acting morally that were not dependent upon religious revelation, it became natural to ask why these two phenomena have usually been so closely linked in human history. Answers to this question were diverse, but they might be broadly divided between those that were friendly to religion and those that were hostile. Kant's thinking epitomized the views of those who believed that religion and morality are mutually necessary: although he was willing to criticize religious excesses and fanaticism, he was convinced that belief in a God who rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked was necessary to ensure full moral commitment.

In the hands of thinkers less friendly to religion, this claim—that religion involves the assumption of a morally governed world—became the simpler assertion that religion represents the effort to buttress morality by adding to its ordinary social sanctions a concocted series of supernaturally mediated rewards and punishments. This was not a new idea. It had already been stated in antiquity by some Greek, Roman, and Chinese philosophers. Although compatible with a respect for religious belief, it generally laid the foundation for a series of stinging critiques of traditional religion. Since morality could be understood in human or rational terms, it seemed to follow that the use of religious sanctions to support moral conduct was appropriate only where primitive, gullible, or morally weak persons were involved. By this reasoning, religion was at best useful during an early stage of human cultural evolution where it provided the "matrix" for moral concepts; in time, it was bound to be replaced by more rational modes of thought.

Some thinkers doubted the usefulness of religion in any context. A social critic like Marx, for example, viewed religion as the effort to support the moral norms and codes of privileged strata and ruling groups, while also masking worldly wrongs with the false allure of otherworldly rewards. Marx did not usually justify this view and his opposition to religion in moral terms. Indeed, he was equally critical of the moral systems and moral philosophies of his day, believing that they, too, were deeply involved with and compromised by the social and material conditions of the era. Yet, in many ways his attitude toward religion is similar to that of the critical Enlightenment philosophers: religion is to be rejected because it is ultimately opposed to the development of full human freedom and moral responsibility.

Decades later, Freud makes this point even more explicitly in *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), arguing that religion must be put aside because it undermines moral responsibility and encourages fanaticism. Individuals or groups whose only reason for being moral is fear of supernatural punishments cannot be counted upon to respect other persons once these fears lose their hold, as they inevitably must before the advance of reason. Fur-

thermore, religious promises of forgiveness of sin and absolution are an encouragement to morally irresponsible behavior. For a mature and morally healthy world to emerge, Freud concluded, men and women of good will must meet together on the common ground of reason and atheism.

Not surprisingly, criticisms of this sort engendered a reaction. Often accepting the claim that religion and morality were only problematically linked, thinkers more sympathetic to religion like Friedrich Schleiermacher or Rudolf Otto sought to develop an abiding place for religion independent of its moral significance. Schleiermacher found this in the emotional state of "God-consciousness," while Otto found it in an essentially nonmoral sense of awe before the mysterious and transcendent. This reaction probably reached its zenith in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard, particularly in *Fear and Trembling* (1843). Although Kierkegaard was fully appreciative of the value of morality, he believed that religious faith ultimately transcended ordinary human moral considerations. In the story of God's command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, Kierkegaard discerned a "teleological suspension of the ethical," according to which morality was essentially subordinated to religious concerns. "Duty," he concluded, "is precisely the will of God." [*See the biographies of Marx, Freud, Schleiermacher, Otto, and Kierkegaard.*]

Theoretical Assumptions of Western Ethical Theory

To an outside observer, these debates among Western philosophers and theologians concerning the relationship between religion and morality may seem culture-bound. The emergence of ethics as a separate field of inquiry, the effort to distinguish morality from religion, and the countervailing effort to reassert a place for religion in human life all arise from a very particular cultural and social context. Nevertheless, the fact that systematic thinking about ethics emerged in the West, and that it generated a series of divergent explorations of the relationship between religion and morality, does not mean that this thinking or aspects of these views have no validity across cultural lines. The physical sciences, too, have been most fully developed in the Western context, but the value of their findings, and even of their different hypotheses, is not limited to this setting. In trying to understand the relationship between religion and morality, therefore, it may be useful to employ concepts and approaches developed over the past centuries by Western philosophers, theologians, and social scientists. If one keeps in mind that concepts or ideas developed in a Western context are at best tentative efforts to penetrate complex realities and that they may not be wholly applicable to moral and religious traditions elsewhere, this approach can provide an interpretive guide through diverse religious and moral traditions.

Definitions of Religion and Morality. Surveying the modern body of thinking about religion and morality, one can identify a number of distinctive ideas. Foremost among these is an idea already mentioned: that morality and religion, however intertwined, are at least conceptually distinct phenomena. Religion involves beliefs, attitudes, and practices that relate human beings to supernatural agencies or sacred realities. It addresses what has been called the problem of interpretability, which includes such persistent questions as the ultimate nature and purpose of the natural world and the meaning of death and suffering. In contrast, morality has usually been thought of as a way of regulating the conduct of individuals in communities. It represents a response to the problem of cooperation among competing persons or groups and aims at settling disputes that may arise in social contexts. Force also represents a method of adjudicating conflict, but morality differs from force by appealing to principles or rules of conduct that are regarded as legitimate, that is, as having a justification potentially acceptable to each member of the community. The complex interrelationship between religion and morality is illustrated by the fact that moral legitimation may sometimes involve appeal to shared beliefs involving the supernatural or the sacred. But this is not a necessary aspect of moral justification, which can appeal to reason or to considerations of human welfare.

The Superiority and Logical Independence of Moral Norms. Philosophical analysis has also led to a series of more specific ideas about morality and ethics. For example, moral norms are regarded as among the most authoritative guides to conduct. This means that the dictates of morality are superior to and take precedence over self-oriented, or "prudential," considerations. The fact that something is morally wrong is thus held to be a sufficient grounds for refraining from doing it. Moral philosophers have disagreed over the questions of whether self-interest may play any role in moral decision and whether moral rules may ever be qualified or suspended to protect oneself or those one personally cares for. They have also disagreed over the larger question of whether these rules are absolute or permit exceptions. But that the dictates of morality have considerable authoritativeness and superiority is widely acknowledged.

A tradition of philosophical analysis, beginning with Plato's dialogue *Euthyphro* and culminating in the writings of Kant, has also insisted on the logical indepen-

dence of moral norms and their conceptual priority over religious and other requirements. According to this line of thinking, human reason and conscience must be the final arbiter of right and wrong. Even religious norms and divine commands must be tested by the "autonomous" individual conscience. Recent discussions by philosophers and theologians have softened the contours of this view. Early rationalist claims that, to be acceptable, every religious command or requirement must conform to existing moral beliefs have been replaced by a recognition that religious teachings, in a dialogue with reasoned morality, can instruct and inform conscience. But the point made by Plato centuries ago, that human reason is the final forum of judgment, is still widely accepted, since to subordinate reason to other considerations is to renounce the very possibility of rational discourse and justification.

The Universality of Moral Norms. The writings of Western moral philosophers also reveal broad lines of agreement about the nature and content of morality. By and large, for example, these thinkers have not been impressed by the position known as "ethical relativism," which holds that basic moral principles or modes of reasoning differ substantially from culture to culture. While ethicists do acknowledge the truth of "cultural relativism," the view that accepted or prohibited modes of conduct vary among cultures, they have pointed out that this does not necessarily mean that fundamental principles are dissimilar. Different technical and social situations can cause common basic principles to yield different results in specific circumstances. For example, a general principle of respect for parents may produce a stringent ban on parricide in a technically advanced civilization but may lead to a custom of abandoning infirm or very elderly parents in hunter-gatherer cultures where there is no provision for sustaining the disabled and where dependency is regarded by all as shameful.

In contrast to the position of ethical relativism, most Western philosophers have subscribed to the essential universality of moral principles. This understanding, in fact, has several important meanings. First, it implies the descriptive point just made: at their most basic level, very similar basic moral rules and principles are understood and respected by human beings everywhere. Second, it implies the normative claim that not only is this so but that it ought to be so. There is a universal standard of morality to which all persons are accountable. This standard is sensitive enough to the reality of specific circumstances to justify broad tolerance of differing social practices, but even so there are limits. Thus, where a strict ethical relativist might conclude that "right" and "wrong" are definable only by the norms of a particular culture, nonrelativists have pointed out that certain cultural practices are so heinous that they cannot be judged morally acceptable without violating human beings' deepest moral self-understanding. For example, the fact that some societies have practiced genocide against minorities in their midst cannot be thought of as making this conduct right. Some things are wrong no matter how widely they are accepted in particular societies. Finally, morality has been regarded as universal in the sense that its rules and protection extend to all who are human. Precisely because it is a reasoned method of settling social disputes and, hence, superior to force or coercion, moral discourse remains the preferred method of relating to all who are capable of this method of social adjudication. G. J. Warnock has expressed the logic behind this view:

> If conduct is to be seen as regulated only *within* groups, we have still the possibility of unrestricted hostility and conflict *between* groups—which is liable, indeed, to be effectively ferocious and damaging in proportion as relations between individuals within each group are effectively ordered toward harmonious co-operative action. Thus, just as one may think that a Hobbesian recipe for 'peace' could securely achieve its end only if all Hobbesian individuals were engrossed within a single irresistible Leviathan, there is reason to think that the principles of morality must, if the object of morality is not to be frustrated, give consideration to *any* human, of whatever special group or none he may in fact be a member.
> (Warnock, 1971, p. 150)

Warnock and other philosophers who share this view would of course concede that it has more often been honored in the breach than in practice, but we shall soon see that the theoretical assumption that morality embraces the entire human community has special importance for the understanding of religious ethics.

The Moral Rules. Moral philosophers also display wide agreement on the most fundamental rules of morality. These include rules prohibiting persons from killing other persons, from inflicting injury on them, or from depriving them of freedom and opportunity. Other rules prohibit deception or the breaking of promises. All these rules presume that the recipient of the action in question has not voluntarily consented to it. Thus, a surgeon is not regarded as wronging a patient by cutting into his flesh, nor is a stage actor regarded as practicing immoral deception. In addition, these rules are clearly held to apply only where the persons affected by one's choice have not acted immorally in a way that necessitates breaking a rule with respect to them. While killing others or depriving them of their freedom is ordinarily viewed as wrong, for example, it may be justified when individuals threaten harm to others, as in criminal conduct or aggressive war.

These rules for personal conduct constitute only the minimum requirement for moral conduct. They are largely negative in character, prohibiting certain forms of behavior but not requiring positive efforts on others' behalf. In addition to this, however, ethicists recognize supererogatory actions, performance of which is an occasion for moral praise but omission of which does not ordinarily merit condemnation or blame. These actions include forms of mutual aid, generosity, and self-sacrifice. Along with respect for the basic rules, attention to these supererogatory requirements is ordinarily held to enter into the character ideals or standards of virtue that form part of a full system of ethics. Such ideals are separate from, but conceptually dependent upon, the understanding of right acts, since virtuous individuals are those who can be counted upon habitually to do what is right. Kant's famous statement that the only thing that can be called "good without qualification" is the morally good will is not meant to identify the norm of right or wrong conduct (for that, Kant believed, the test of the categorical imperative is required); rather, it is directed to the assessment of individual moral worth. In this connection, it is important to note that the intention of the agent plays a major role in evaluating conduct in terms of such character ideals. Since it is pointless to hold individuals morally responsible for the unforeseeable or uncontrollable consequences of their actions, the moral worth of persons is usually assessed in terms of what they intended to do, although morally acceptable intentions are ordinarily held to encompass reasonable prevision for consequences.

While moral theorists are widely agreed on at least the basic principles governing individual conduct and defining individual virtue, there is far less agreement on the norms or principles that ought to guide the conduct of social and economic institutions. At least for the context of industrialized societies, various competing theories have been advanced to justify everything from laissez-faire through welfare state societies to fully socialist and egalitarian systems. This is no place to settle a debate that continues to be one of the most heated in contemporary moral literature. It is important to note, however, that the very basic condition that moral principles be potentially acceptable to all persons tends to support views acknowledging a significant degree of social responsibility toward those who, through no fault of their own, are seriously disadvantaged. Thus, even thinkers who minimize society's responsibility for social justice tend to endorse efforts to ensure equal opportunity and hardship relief.

The "Moral Point of View." Behind these specific rules, many philosophers have also discerned a way of reasoning that is basic to moral judgment. This involves, first of all, an element of imaginative empathy for the other persons affected by one's choices and a willingness to consider the impact of one's conduct on their welfare. In addition, it calls for a willingness to reason about moral choices in an impartial way, as though the agent were only one interest among all of those affected by a choice. This perspective of impartiality is sometimes called "the moral point of view." Various moral theories have tried to integrate this way of thinking into decision procedures for moral choice. Views that derive moral decisions from the presumed judgments of an ideal sympathetic spectator and those that see such choices as arising from the decisions of self-interested but impartial contractors are examples.

Why Should One Be Moral? Delineation and justification of the moral rules have been the principal focuses of most moral theory. Yet, beyond specific normative issues, a series of persisting questions has stood at the far side of ethical discussion and has been dealt with increasingly by ethicists, as the nature and content of the moral reasoning process have become better understood. One of the most important of these questions is why one should be moral. Because this question can easily be misunderstood, its full significance and the difficulty of answering it may not be appreciated. If it is asked in the sense of why people in general should think and act morally, why morality itself should exist, then, to answer the question, it is necessary only to point to the general usefulness of morality as a method of settling social disputes. In this sense morality is in everyone's interests. Again, if one who has adopted the moral viewpoint of impartiality and empathy for others asks why he or she should obey the moral rules, then it is necessary only to point out that impartial persons would certainly advocate obeying the rules they would choose. But if this question is asked in its sharpest sense of why one should adopt the moral point of view in the first place, it becomes exceedingly difficult to answer. This is especially true whenever acting morally occasions serious loss for the individual agent.

Some philosophers have tried to answer this question in terms of the demonstrable long-term interest and welfare of the moral agent: they have argued that it is, by and large, advantageous to be a morally upright person and disadvantageous to be an immoral one. They point to the social and psychic costs that openly immoral conduct or covert and hypocritical behavior can entail. But others have rejected this approach either on the grounds that it is often not correct (immoral people sometimes do very well) or because it introduces essentially nonmoral motives into one's reasons for being moral. Some who argue this way have contended that no self-interested reasons should be given for being

moral—that one's decisions to be moral must rest on a respect for moral reasoning requiring no further justification. For these thinkers the voice of duty, in the words of George Eliot, is "peremptory and absolute." Still others, rejecting both the appeal to personal advantage and the claim that no further justification need be given, have stressed the importance of various metaphysical or religious views in grounding, explaining, and justifying commitment to the moral life. These thinkers have argued that without at least some metaphysical or religious basis moral striving makes no sense. This basis may range from the minimal belief that morality is not pointless or futile, that one's efforts do make a difference, to the stronger belief that, however much it may appear true that good people suffer for their commitments, moral acts and dispositions are, in the ultimate scheme of things, acknowledged and rewarded.

It is noteworthy that discussion of the question "Why should one be moral?" returns ethics to basic matters of religious belief. Hence, the separation of ethical theory from theology and philosophy of religion, which ethical theorists effected during the modern period, has to some extent been reconsidered. It is interesting that this development was anticipated strongly in the work of Kant. To be sure, Kant is well known for his emphasis on the rational accessibility of moral norms and for his insistence that moral commitment must be autonomous, in the sense that it must be based on respect for the dictates of reason and conscience rather than on norms imposed from without and enforced by external rewards or punishments. Nevertheless, Kant's later writings, especially the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), were focused largely on questions concerning the philosophy of religion. In these writings, Kant developed the position that, to make sense, moral striving requires belief in a morally intentioned governor of the universe (this was Kant's "moral proof" of the existence of God), and he began to explore the relationship between ethics and themes in biblical theology. Foremost among these were the issues of sin, repentance, and the possibility of moral righteousness. Kant's discussions here are dense, but it can be said that, in perceiving the need to ground moral commitment in voluntarily assumed religious beliefs, Kant also recognized the difficulty of providing any clear and incontestable rational justification for being moral. Thus his work highlighted the difficulty of sustaining moral commitment and opened up, as never before, the prospect of rational persons' defecting from morality. Discussing this problem under the rubric of the "radical evil" of the human heart, Kant introduced themes that were later developed by Christian theologians like Kierkegaard, Barth, and Niebuhr. [*See* Neoorthodoxy.]

Moral Theory and Religious Traditions

This body of reasoned reflection on basic issues in morality and ethics provides a useful background for exploring the variety of concrete traditions of religious ethics. Regarded superficially, these traditions display a bewildering variety of teachings and beliefs, making difficult any general conclusions about the relationship between religion and the moral life. But when they are assessed against the framework of concepts just presented, religious traditions display some common patterns. Moreover, identifying these common patterns also helps highlight some of the important differences between traditions. In approaching these concrete traditions with the framework of ethical assumptions as a guide, one should keep in mind one other important consideration: religious traditions are not static entities that display finished form at any moment in time; rather, like most human creations, they develop in the course of history. In his book *Beyond Belief* (1970), the sociologist Robert Bellah has suggested that religious evolution, like the evolution of other complex systems, often involves movement from simplicity to greater differentiation of structure (pp. 20–50). In terms of moral ideas, this suggests a development of greater sensitivity to the full gamut of specific issues and questions identified by systematic ethical theory. We shall see that questions or distinctions barely occurring to thinkers or writers within a tradition during its earliest phases emerge as important issues later in the tradition's life. In addition to looking at traditions synchronically in terms of their structure at any given moment, therefore, we must also look at them diachronically over the course of their development.

The Superiority of Moral Norms and Independence of Moral Reasoning. As we look at the variety of religio-ethical traditions, it is striking that a sense of the distinction between religious, ethical, and even legal norms is often not present, and that when it is, it is often a late development. Furthermore, because the very distinctions are lacking, traditions do not always assert the superiority of moral norms over specifically ritual or religious requirements. This does not mean that these ideas are not present; often they are implicit and can be discerned only by a careful examination of how conflicts between norms are handled.

As I have already observed, most historical traditions tend to see the normative structures bearing on human life as an integrated whole, wherein moral requirements are fused with religious, ritual, and legal norms.

In this respect it is often strained to speak of Jewish, Hindu, or Islamic "ethics." In Judaism, for example, the sacred norms for human life constitute *halakhah*. Incompletely understood as "law," *halakhah* is more properly thought of as sacred teaching or guidance, although it is also "law" in the sense that many of its specific requirements were upheld by public sanctions and punishments, when Jews were politically able to govern themselves. In all, *halakhah* discusses 613 specific commandments or normative prescriptions identified by commentators in scripture, including the Ten Commandments. While this body of norms does contain many requirements that are recognizably "moral," these are not clearly distinguished from what we would identify as ritual or religious norms. At a fairly late date in the development of the tradition, commentators would puzzle over why specific ritual commandments (for example, the requirement that only the ashes of a red heifer be used in a specific ritual of expiation) had been placed on a par with obviously important moral norms. But the early tradition tends not to make distinctions of this sort, and even later commentators who were rooted in this tradition agreed that all the norms of *halakhah* were equally sacred and equally incumbent upon the pious Jew. What is true for Judaism in this case, however, may also be said for *sharī'ah* in the Muslim tradition or *dharma* in the Hindu and Buddhist traditions. In each case we have a legal-moral-religious teaching containing the totality of enjoined actions in an undifferentiated unity.

Neither can it be said that many traditions display ethical theorizing in the contemporary sense of an effort to work out and to justify moral norms in rational terms. Commentators on early Christian ethics have noted the striking difference between the tone of early Christian ethical writing and that of the surrounding Greco-Roman world. Whereas Greek and Roman thinkers were concerned with such questions as what constitutes "the good" for man and what patterns of conduct are most conducive to individual and communal well-being, Christian writers commonly established rules for conduct by citing biblical commandments, or by holding up as models for behavior exemplary persons in scripture. Throughout, it is the hope for God's approval (or the avoidance of his wrath) that is pointed to as the principal reason for living a Christian life. As is also true for Judaism and Islam, not human reason but God's will remains the source and sanction for moral conduct.

It is true that in our era each of the biblically based traditions has developed bodies of systematic ethical reflection, and it is also possible today to find treatises on Buddhist, Hindu, or Jain ethics. Yet the separation of moral reasoning from other dimensions of the religious life is largely alien to all these traditions. In Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the appearance of ethical theorizing initially represents a response to the authority of Greek and Roman philosophy. Thus, some of the earliest thinking about the relationship between religious and rational norms in these traditions—as for instance Sa'adyah Gaon's *Book of Beliefs and Opinions* (933 CE) and Thomas Aquinas's discussion of the forms of the law in his *Summa theologiae* (2.1.90–97)—emerges during the medieval period, when classical philosophy was rediscovered. Similarly, modern efforts to develop statements of Jewish, Christian, or Islamic ethics are very much a response to initiatives in philosophical ethical theory. The authority of Western thought has had a corresponding effect in stimulating thinkers in African and Asian religious traditions to develop systematic approaches to ethics. But in all these cases, writers are usually compelled to begin their discussions with the observation that the moral teachings of their tradition are inseparable from its theological, metaphysical, or ritual dimensions.

Are we to conclude, then, that the separation of ethics from these other aspects of religion is only a Western phenomenon, and one largely traceable to the classical philosophers of Greece and Rome? It is true that systematic, rational thinking about morality—ethics in the modern sense—does emerge primarily in the Greco-Roman world, although one might also speak of ancient Chinese ethics in this sense. Interestingly, in both these cases it was partly the breakdown of an older religious ideal that prompted rational reflection on the human good (a theme we shall return to later). But while ethical theorizing per se may be culturally localized, a sense of the independence, special significance, and even superiority of moral norms with respect to other normative requirements is present throughout many of these diverse traditions.

Criticism of purely ritual efforts to please God, for example, is one of the hallmarks of the Hebrew prophetic tradition. *Amos* 5:21ff. gives classic expression to the theme: "I hate, I despise your feasts, and take no delight in your solemn assemblies. . . . But let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream." In less impassioned but equally serious tones, Confucius would criticize members of the Chinese elite who believed that Heaven was satisfied with outward displays of piety and ritual in lieu of sincere efforts at righteousness and benevolence: "A man who is not good, what can he have to do with ritual? A man who is not good, what can he have to do with mu-

sic?" (*Analects* 3.3). Neither the prophets nor Confucius, of course, would eliminate ritual from the life they believed human beings were called to live. For both traditions of thought, a fulfilled human existence was a moral and religious whole. But their opposition to efforts to reduce morality to one lesser aspect of the religious life evidences their sensitivity to the importance and relative priority of the moral norms.

This point could be further illustrated within a number of diverse traditions, but it becomes even clearer when we survey the historical development of religious thought. Not only do traditions tend to highlight moral requirements as they develop over time, but major religious controversies and schisms giving rise to new religious traditions usually effect dramatic ethicization of aspects of the older traditions, thus indicating how important the issue is for diverse religious communities. Many examples from the history of religions could be given: early Christianity's prophetic denunciation of Jewish religious observance and its replacement of the many ritual requirements of Jewish law with a simplified set of primarily moral norms; Protestantism's revolt against Catholic sacramentalism and against the idea that God's favor could be won by religious observance devoid of moral or religious sincerity; Buddhism's deliberate rejection of the heavily ritualized Indian caste order, and its replacement of that order with an ethicized hierarchy based on moral and spiritual attainment; and Taoism's repudiation of alleged Confucian formalism in the name of a simplified religious and moral ideal of spontaneous selflessness.

To be sure, each of these important moments of religious change involves more than moral reform (nor are the allegations of the "reformist" tradition always correct). But it is noteworthy that in each of these cultural contexts the effort to highlight and assert the priority of the moral norms is of such urgency that it could well be an important contributing factor to major religious change. It is also noteworthy that in these quite different contexts change is always unidirectional; religions do not efface the distinction between religious and moral norms as they develop, nor do they subordinate moral requirements over time. On the contrary, just as a theoretical appreciation of the importance of moral norms would suggest, traditions move toward greater clarity about the distinctiveness and relative superiority of moral requirements.

One final matter deserves attention: the claim that the basic derivation of norms in some traditions is religious, not moral. The supreme guide to conduct in these traditions, it is said, is God's command, and because this command is not always moral, these traditions are fundamentally opposed to any idea of the distinctiveness or superiority of moral norms. This viewpoint is associated with forms of divine command ethics in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Many believe it finds its strongest biblical support in God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac (*Gn.* 22:1–19).

In fact, the issue of divine command ethics is a complicated one. Theoretical defenses of this position (as voiced by al-Ghazālī in Islam and by William of Ockham, Duns Scotus, and Kierkegaard in Christianity) usually arise in contexts where the very authority of the tradition is under attack by rationalist critics. These defenses may seek less to represent the tradition in its integrity, therefore, than to place it beyond assault. Examined with less apologetic interests in mind, the traditions themselves do not necessarily support the religiously authoritarian reading they are given. While biblically based traditions trace their norms to God's will, this will is usually viewed in such ethicized terms as to render it unthinkable that God could ever require anything fundamentally wicked or immoral.

The Abraham-Isaac story in *Genesis* 22 is no exception to this rule. Readings based on this passage alone (such as Kierkegaard's) tend to omit the fact that, several chapters earlier, in *Genesis* 18:23–33, Abraham has questioned God concerning the possible destruction of innocent persons along with the wicked in Sodom and Gomorrah, asking boldly, "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Abraham's willingness to question God in moral terms and God's willingness to enter into dialogue with Abraham do not support an understanding of the divine character as arbitrary or nonmoral. In many ways, the episode in *Genesis* 22 reinforces this impression: though a supreme demand is made, the sacrifice itself is not required. The God of the Hebrew scriptures, unlike deities worshiped by idolators, does not demand the slaughter of children. Indeed, this was precisely the lesson drawn by most later Jewish, Christian, and Muslim commentators. In this single text, therefore, we see both sides of the biblical tradition: its emphasis on obedience to God's will and its essential faith that this will is trustworthy and righteous. Taken together, these ideas do not suggest a religious attitude that would subordinate morality, but one that discovers moral intentionality at the tradition's highest level of authority.

Universality and the Moral Rules. We have seen that the term *universality* has several distinct meanings when used in reference to moral rules. It signifies the fact that at least the basic rules of morality are the same across cultures. It also signifies that these rules are to be regarded as applying across cultural lines pre-

sumably to every human being. All who are human are members of the moral community and bear the rights and responsibilities of this status. A survey of different historical traditions bears out the presence of these ideas, although historical development and other considerations sometimes render matters complex.

Common moral principles. One of the most striking impressions produced by comparative study of religious ethics is the similarity in basic moral codes and teachings. The Ten Commandments of Hebrew faith, the teachings of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount and of Paul in his epistles, the requirements of *sādhāraṇa*, or universal *dharma*, in Hinduism (*Laws of Manu*, 10.63), Buddhism's Five Precepts, and Islam's decalogue in the Qur'ān (17:22–39) constitute a very common set of normative requirements. These prohibit killing; injury, deception, or the violation of solemn oaths. C. S. Lewis has called basic moral rules like these "the ultimate platitudes of practical reason," and their presence and givenness in such diverse traditions supports his characterization.

Also remarkably similar are norms bearing on social and institutional life, especially economic relations. While none of these traditions condemns private property (though common possession is sometimes viewed as appropriate for the religious elite, or is thought to have prevailed during a utopian era at the beginning of time), all are solicitous of the needs of the disadvantaged or powerless and, in different ways, all encourage active assistance to the poor. Judaism and Islam institutionalize this ethic through rules requiring tithing and charitable donation (indeed, *zakāt*, almsgiving, is one of Islam's Five Pillars of Faith). Christianity accomplishes the same end by encouraging extreme sensitivity to the plight of the weak or needy. Despite their other differences, Confucianism and Taoism share the Chinese conviction that the mark of just rule is a prosperous and happy peasantry. Both laud generosity by the rich and powerful, and both vigorously condemn economic oppression and rapaciousness. The caste system of Hinduism, though opposed to any notions of social equality, aims at ensuring a livelihood and a share in the social product for all members of the community. This was accomplished by means of the *jajmani* patronage system, involving the exchange among castes of services and goods at socially established and protected rates. Finally, while charitable giving in Buddhism goes largely to the monastic community and is directed toward spiritual attainment and not toward economic need, this community itself often has been a refuge for the poor and for orphans and widows. Furthermore, Buddhism espouses a vigorous ideal of shared prosperity in its conception of the duties of the righteous monarch *(cakravartin)*.

Similar assessments of individual moral worth. Beyond these common moral principles, interesting normative similarities may also be identified with respect to the role played by individual decision and intention in the evaluation of moral worth. We have seen that while intention does not figure into the rightness or wrongness of a particular act, it is a crucial consideration in estimating the merit or blame of the moral agent. This aspect of moral reasoning, as well as the centrality of the individual agent as moral subject, is apparently well appreciated by the major traditions under discussion, although again some historical perspective is needed. Very often during their earliest periods, traditions evidence an objective assessment of moral culpability: individuals may suffer social or religious penalties for wrongs accidentally committed. Similarly, the earliest strata of some traditions at times display notions of collective guilt whereby all members of a community are regarded as meriting punishment for the wrongdoing of a few.

Characteristically, however, these less differentiated ideas give way over time to greater precision in the assessment or apportionment of blame. In the Hebrew faith, Ezekiel's rejection of collective punishment (*Ez.* 18:1ff.) represents a watershed in the development of biblical ethics (similar changes in attitude can be discerned in *Deuteronomy* 24:16 and *2 Kings* 14:6). This process of differentiation becomes particularly apparent during moments of radical religious change. None of the "daughter traditions"—neither Buddhism, Christianity, nor Islam—defends the idea of corporate punishment, whereas all put much stress on intention in assessing individuals' deeds. Jesus' criticism of religious and moral hypocrisy may not be fair to the Jewish tradition from which he sprang, but it is fully consistent with the spirit of greater interiority in the assessment of worth that marks the development of biblical faith. Much the same might be said of the Buddhist remolding of the doctrine of *karman* to the effect that karmic consequences are seen to derive from the willing of the agent rather than from the outward deed. The importance of intention *(nīyah)* in validating religious and moral observance in Islam and of the kindred concept of *kavvanah* in rabbinic Judaism exemplifies this same process of increasing precision in the assessment of individual worth.

Differences between traditions. Despite all these remarkable similarities, there are also important differences among the codes and teachings of these traditions. Thus, the permitted range of sexual conduct

differs from tradition to tradition, with the concept of sexual chastity apparently not ruling out polygamy in some cases (ancient Israelite religion, Islam, Confucianism) but requiring monogamy and even recommending celibacy in others (monastic Christianity and Buddhism). Wrongful killing, too, is variously defined. For Jews and Muslims, killing is permissible if done in self-defense or to punish wrongdoers whose conduct is believed to threaten the community. The New Testament, however, suggests a stance in which even self-defensive killing of other human beings is prohibited. Buddhism and Jainism take this position one step further by discouraging the killing not only of human beings but of all sentient creatures.

Differences of this sort represent an important object of study. Why is it that traditions whose moral attitudes and teachings are in some ways similar tend to differ in other respects? But the significance of these differences for our basic understanding of the relationship between religion and morality should not be exaggerated. For one thing, these differences are manifested against a background of basic similarities in moral teaching. It is sometimes assumed, because religious traditions hold widely different religious beliefs, that their ethics must correspondingly differ; what is remarkable, however, is that these great differences in beliefs apparently do not affect adherence to at least the fundamental moral rules. Furthermore, where moral differences do occur, they do so within the permitted range of moral disagreement. For example, even though Western religious moralists have vested sexual conduct with great importance (often intolerantly imposing their norms on other cultures), there are many different ways in which societies can organize sexual conduct so as to fulfill the more basic moral objective of protecting human beings from injury. In some circumstances the welfare of women and children might seem best accomplished by polygamous relations; in others, monogamy might be desirable. Changing circumstances within a single tradition can even recommend a movement from one pattern to the next, as has been the case for Judaism and, to a lesser extent, Islam. That traditions would differ over a difficult moral issue like this is almost predictable. What would be surprising, and what would throw open to question any claim that religions are basically respectful of the moral rules, would be teachings that permit rape or other violently abusive sexual acts. But no major historical tradition tolerates anything of the kind.

Some differences in these teachings are also traceable to differing moral ideals or standards of supererogation. We have seen that, above and beyond the basic moral rules (which are largely negative and prohibitory), there are a variety of positive encouragements to generosity, sharing, and self-sacrifice. Since views of what is "above and beyond the call of duty" normally differ even within cultures and between individuals, it is not surprising that differences among religious traditions should be marked. Indeed, some of the disagreements with respect to sexual conduct and killing just mentioned are also differences of this sort. New Testament Christianity, for example, would interpret self-sacrifice to imply celibacy, disregard for material wealth, and abstention from physical self-defense. Buddhists and Jains adopt very similar norms (possibly less for reasons of self-sacrifice or altruism than as part of a vision of spiritual self-cultivation), whereas Judaism and Islam tend to associate self-sacrifice with unstinting obedience to every provision of their respective religious laws. This may require extreme efforts at charity and the willingness to accept martyrdom in the name of the faith, though neither tradition advocates poverty, celibacy, or the renunciation of self-defense. As important as they may be for the study of comparative religious ethics, however, these differences with respect to supererogatory ideals are matters about which reasonable and morally well-intentioned persons can disagree, and they do not affect the traditions' agreement about the basic moral rules.

"Omnipartiality." Probably nothing makes this agreement clearer than the ways in which diverse religious traditions communicate to their adherents the perspective I have called "the moral point of view." We have seen that this requires imaginative empathy for others, an ability to put oneself in their shoes, and the willingness to make moral decisions from a standpoint of objectivity and impartiality. The element of reciprocity here is aptly expressed by the Golden Rule of Christianity (*Mt.* 7:12). While Christians are justly proud of the moral wisdom represented by this simple decision procedure, the Golden Rule is by no means limited to Christianity. Jesus' teaching is initially drawn from Hebrew scriptures (*Lv.* 19:18). Within rabbinic Judaism a negative form of the Golden Rule ("Do not do unto others. . . .") is presented by the sage Hillel as a virtual synopsis of the law. In the *Analects* (12.2), Confucius utters this same negative form of the Golden Rule, and variants of both the negative and positive forms are to be found in Buddhism's *Dhammapada* (10.129–130). Parallels like these led early missionaries and scholars to speculate on the possibility of historical borrowing or even parallel divine revelation in the East and the West. But this similarity of moral perspective does not have to be attributed to anything more than the essential and universal logic of the moral reasoning process.

While the Golden Rule is an impressive intuitive

guide to responsible moral decision, its focus is too narrow. In making moral choices, we must consider not only the immediate neighbor but all other persons affected by our conduct or choice. Hence the requirements of universality, objectivity, and impartiality in moral reasoning. In fact, the term *impartiality*, though widely used in moral theory today, is inappropriate, because it suggests detachment and distance in reasoning when what is really required is genuine empathetic concern for all those affected by our decisions. In this respect either *omnipartiality* or *omnicompassion* would be a better term.

When we examine the very highest reaches of religious thought, we are struck by the ways in which adoption of this perspective is encouraged. In the Western traditions believers are called upon to imitate God while trying to develop their own moral and religious lives. The various metaphors for God that express the traits to which believers should aspire convey this moral point of view: God is the creator and king of all the world, the righteous ruler in whom there is neither partiality nor injustice. He is also a parent who loves his creatures with tender mercy and concern. Modeling their behavior on God's, Jews, Christians, and Muslims are thus called to distance themselves from selfish interests and to adopt an omnipartial point of view. Some Asian religions share this teaching. Adherents of the *bhakti* (devotional) tradition of Hinduism find a model in the god (often embodied in the figure of Kṛṣṇa) whose love transcends social distinctions of caste, wealth, or gender. In the ancient Chinese and Confucian traditions, Shang-ti ("lord on high") and T'ien ("heaven") represent the standard of impartial justice. Knowing no favorites, Heaven judges by merit alone and casts out the unworthy.

Mystical traditions, which often place less emphasis on obedience to God and more on the adherent's experience of a transcendent reality, arrive at this standpoint in a different way. Characteristically, once a person has joined with or is in contact with transcendent reality (whether as *brahman*, *nirvāṇa*, or the Tao), the ego assumes reduced importance. No longer clinging to the self, one participates sympathetically in all of reality. In Mahāyāna Buddhism this experience eventuates in compassion *(karuṇā)* for all sentient beings and the desire to help extricate them from suffering. The Taoist adept, in achieving mystical insight into the Way, participates in its spontaneity, generosity, and support of all living creatures.

It may be objected that the picture of universal compassion presented here is one-sided: that while the historical religions sometimes counsel universality of perspective, they have also been seedbeds of intolerance, persecution, and cruelty, and that under the guise of religious devotion, all sorts of nationalisms and even tribalisms have flourished. Certainly these things are true. But once again, historical perspective is in order. One of the salient features of all traditional cultures is their tendency to view themselves as human, while outsiders, often all those beyond the narrowest boundaries of a local community, are looked upon as enemies, barbarians, or less than fully human. Frequently this assessment has a real basis in self-perpetuating conditions of conflict and vendetta that render every outsider untrustworthy and dangerous. To some extent, we see this mentality in the early strata of many of the literate traditions, although even there universalist elements are discernible. For example, *Genesis* contains many passages in which Yahveh is depicted as little more than a tribal deity who fights without quarter on behalf of his people, whereas other passages display remarkable universality of perspective. Sometimes the two impulses are joined. A poignant example occurs in *Genesis* 21 when the working of the divine plan on behalf of Isaac's lineage leads Abraham to expel Hagar and her son Ishmael into the desert. In a moving passage, Yahveh personally intervenes to save the lives of the abandoned pair. Though his first loyalties may be to Israel, the chosen instrument of his purpose in history, Yahveh reveals himself as a God whose compassion and concern transcend national lines.

As traditions develop, one finds an almost invariant movement from relative particularity to greater universalism. Examples include the lofty visions of prophetic faith, where Israel's chosenness comes to be viewed in terms of a mission of universal instruction and redemption; the emergence of *bhakti*, the devotional strain, in later Hinduism, with its perception of the sanctity of all human beings; and the development of various forms of messianism in Mahāyāna Buddhism, placing salvation within the reach of all and rendering every person potentially an enlightened being, or *bodhisattva*. If such development can be found within the traditions, it once again shows itself most dramatically at moments of decisive religious change. Christianity's abandonment of Jewish religious law, for example, opened its community, "the new Israel," to a membership drawn from the entire ancient world. Paul's statement in *Galatians* 3:28 that in Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek . . . slave nor free . . . male nor female" fully expresses Christianity's universalizing impulse. Similarly, Buddhism, by rejecting Hindu notions of caste, severed the geographical ties to India that had characterized Hinduism and, as a result, Buddhism became a world religion. By expanding the possibility of salvation beyond the narrow community of mendicants, religious developments in

later Mahāyāna Buddhism merely accentuated a tendency implicit in Buddhism from the outset.

But probably no tradition better illustrates this tendency to universalism coupled with the possibility of intolerance than Islam. Over the centuries, Muslims' willingness to use the sword in defense of their faith has earned Islam a reputation, especially among Christians, as a paradigm of religious intolerance and persecution. In fact, Islam's record in this regard is much more complex than its foes admit. Not only is the idea of holy struggle *(jihād)* a less bellicose and more defensive concept in the classic Muslim sources than it is often thought to be, but in many ways Islam's record of religious toleration is enviable. And even if some Muslims have promoted their faith through violence, it must be remembered that, in its essence, this faith has the most universalistic aspirations. The object of Islam is precisely to bring all human beings, whatever their race or nationality, into submission to God's will. Islam would create one human community in which all share obedience to a high moral and religious standard and in which all merit the protection embodied by that standard. The fact that some Muslims have at times been prone to excess in promoting this objective may be thought of as an unfortunate consequence of the breadth of their moral and religious vision. This vision is representative of the tendency of other major world religions to fulfill the promise of universality implicit in the moral point of view.

Why Should One Be Moral? Religions are not just bodies of teaching about right and wrong; they are total ways of life. As a result, it is not surprising that they provide answers, whether explicit or implicit, to some of the more urgent "transnormative" questions of morality, among them the questions of why one should be a moral person and how one can attain a morally estimable character. In many ways, these questions are central in religious teaching. While standards of right or wrong conduct are readily elaborated by traditions, efforts to secure full adherence to these standards are a major preoccupation.

Retribution. Religious traditions commonly provide answers to the question "Why should I be moral?" by affirming the existence of an order in which moral retribution (reward and punishment) is assured. Those raised in the West are familiar with some of the standard forms of this belief: God is consummately righteous; he is the omniscient judge of human acts and intentions; he upholds the moral law by punishing the wicked and rewarding the righteous; and, in some cases, he metes out reward and punishment directly in the course of a person's life. But since there is an apparent discrepancy between moral conduct and one's worldly fate—too often the good suffer and the wicked prosper—divine retribution is usually consigned to an eschatological realm, whether a personal afterlife, a period of judgment at the end of history (the kingdom of God), or some combination of these two.

Although this retributive scheme prevails in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, it is not the only one that religions (including these same Western traditions) have elaborated. The idea of eschatological retribution is absent from many nonliterate traditions, and even in biblical faith it is a relatively late development. More common is a perception of death as departure to a state where the discarnate soul suffers neither punishment nor reward. The principal expectation for virtuous conduct, therefore, lies in the hope of worldly prosperity, numerous progeny, good health, and long life, so as to "come in sturdy old age to the grave," as the *Book of Job* (5:26) says. It may be that more explicitly eschatological thinking arises, as it did in Hebrew faith, only after massive and repeated frustration of these expectations and, even then, only within a context of historical expectation and sustained reflection and writing about this experience.

Neither is the apportionment of reward and punishment always accomplished by a supreme, morally intentioned deity. In some traditions the sincerity of oath takers is tested by requiring them to undergo a quasi-magical ordeal such as ingesting a poison that is expected to prove fatal only if they are guilty of deception. (An instance of such an ordeal is found in *Numbers* 5:11ff., where an accused adulteress is required to vindicate herself by consuming a draft of "bitter waters.")

In many of the nonliterate traditions of Africa and in some Native American religions, lesser supernatural agents such as witches and sorcerers also play a role—indeed, a complex one—in upholding the moral order. These agents are often "negative exemplars," embodying attitudes of selfishness and resentment that are the opposite of the open and generous attitudes expected of a good member of the community. Since witches and sorcerers can themselves expect to be punished for their behavior, the lesson to all is clear: avoid becoming persons of this sort. But the presence of these malign agents also reinforces the moral conduct of others. Anyone who neglects hospitality obligations and treats a stranger unkindly, or who deals unfairly with one of his several wives, or who fails to be generous to others while himself experiencing prosperity may easily fall prey to the destructive powers of a witch. Indeed, since witches and sorcerers are masters of deception, combining outward benevolence with inward wrath (and so,

once again, are consummate examples of how *not* to be), it is possible that, if mistreated, one's nearest kin or neighbors may become a threat.

Among the traditions of India, moral reward and punishment are also the province of religious thought, but (at least in the post-Vedic period) they are accomplished by means very different from those in the West. In Indian thought the operative mode is the impersonal, natural-moral law of *karman:* the certainty of moral punishment or reward in combination with a belief in metempsychosis or the transmigration of the individual soul. In the world of *karman*, each act and each volition entails consequences for the welfare of the agent. In a sense, it is misleading to label these consequences rewards or punishments, since they do not result from the action of any judge but are part of the natural law of occurrences in the world. As such, these consequences may be experienced within the lifetime of an individual. More commonly they take many successive lifetimes to work their effect as one's *karman* "ripens." When morally caused suffering does occur, it is often suited to the crime. One who habitually lies, for example, may become the victim of slander in some future life; one who drinks to excess may be reborn insane. Just because it is an impersonal, natural law, *karman* is inescapable. As the *Dhammapada* (9.127) says, "Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if one enters into the clefts of the mountains" can one be freed from the consequences of evil deeds.

Belief in *karman* is so widely shared among the Indian traditions—Jainism, Hinduism, and Buddhism—that it may be called the principal dogma of Indian religious belief. For these traditions, to reject *karman* is to put oneself outside the religious pale. Indeed, the one intellectual tradition of ancient India that did just this, the Cārvāka or materialist school, lives on, like the Sophists of ancient Greece, only as an object of ridicule by the other traditions. It is further testimony to the centrality of this belief in Indian religion that Buddhism, whose doctrine of *anattā* ("nonself") opens to question who or what agent could be the inheritor of continuing karmic forces, nevertheless continues strongly to affirm the reality and significance of this natural-moral law.

One of the future tasks of comparative religious ethics is to better understand why retributive doctrines evolve and take the different forms that they do. It is also important to understand why, in some cases, religious doctrines of retribution lose their power or vanish altogether. To a large extent, but probably for different reasons, this occurred in ancient Greece and China.

In the case of Greek religion, confidence in a reliable religious-moral order may have been eroded, in an increasingly complex society, by repeated frustration of moral expectations. Furthermore, the traditional religion was based on a panoply of deities whose moral integrity and power had been open to question from an early date. The result was a withering of religious confidence and its replacement with an effort to ground moral obedience in an understanding of the relationship between virtue and personal welfare *(eudaimonia).* Thus the rational discipline of ethics, as found in the writings of the great classical philosophers, arose amid the crisis of a religious-moral culture.

In China an opposite series of events seems to have led to the same result. From an early date, Chinese religious thinkers correctly linked human well-being, in the form of a stable, secure, and prosperous society, to moral conduct on the part of rulers. Misrule, it was believed, would manifest itself in popular unrest, rebellion, and susceptibility to invasion. "Heaven sees and hears as our people see and hear" (*Book of Documents* 3.74) was the teaching of the various Chinese traditions. It may be that, in time, this direct, demonstrable, innerworldly link between virtue and welfare largely obviated the need for an impassioned affirmation of religious retribution (at least among the intellectuals who were shaping the tradition). In the Chinese experience, in a very direct and material way, virtue may have reasonably been thought to bring its reward. This was not always to remain true, of course, and at a later date Buddhist eschatology filled a void left by the earlier tradition.

In these respects, the course of Greek and Chinese religious thought contrasts markedly with that of ancient Israel, where an emphasis on religious retribution was magnified by successive and intense experiences of both failure and vindication of moral expectations. This leads one to conjecture that strong schemes of religious retribution are most likely to flourish where confidence in moral retribution is neither too secure nor too imperiled.

The uncertain link between moral conduct and moral reward has a further very important consequence for religious thought: it contributes to the development of sustained reflection on the problem of human sin and wrongdoing. Earlier, I noted how difficult it is to provide answers to the question "Why should one be moral?" If moral or immoral conduct were always followed by its appropriate reward or punishment, not only would this question be easy to answer but individuals would have little temptation to pursue selfish goals. The fact, however, that this is not the case, and that moral commitment may have to rest on uncertain

religious beliefs or on metaphysical beliefs, leads to the recurrent possibility of moral weakness and moral failure.

Redemption. It is important to note that strong affirmation by religious traditions of the existence of a morally retributive order, while it relieves this problem in some ways (by reinforcing confidence in retribution), accentuates it in others. It does so first of all because, in a world assumed to be governed by moral considerations, ordinary forms of suffering (sickness, famine, or premature death) are naturally attributed to moral and religious failures on the part of the individual or community. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find a concern with the expiation of sin present in many nonliterate traditions, and even the earliest documents of the literate traditions (such as the cultic ordinances in *Leviticus*, the *Ṛgveda*, or the Chinese *Book of Rites*) emphasize these matters. But as traditions develop, a further problem emerges that often leads into the most subtle and paradoxical reaches of religious thought. Earlier I noted that moral reasoning, though it may lead to a recognition of the need for some confidence in moral retribution, is nevertheless opposed to basing moral commitment on crass considerations of personal benefit or gain. Indeed, not only are individuals who calculate their commitments in this way morally unreliable (since expediential considerations can easily lead them to be immoral), but they do not attain to the highest standard of moral virtue, in which a spontaneous and pure love of righteousness is the principal motivating ground of conduct.

But since religions inevitably hold out the promise of reward, how are they, at the same time, to lead their adherents into such an elevated level of moral attainment? Or, as the outward behavior of adherents becomes more refined, how are religions to prevent egoism from corrupting the inner core of intention? To answer these questions fully would require an extensive exploration of various traditions' conceptions of sin and redemption. We can, however, identify a very common direction taken by religious thought at this point. Simply stated, in coming to terms with this problem, traditions tend to qualify and soften their own insistence on moral retribution. The world may be a moral order, but ultimate redemption does not necessarily rest on the moral performance or accomplishments of the individual agent. The effect of this teaching is twofold: it relieves the inevitable self-condemnation of the morally conscientious yet knowingly frail person, but at the same time it eliminates any vestiges of cloying self-regard that might corrupt the moral life and make it an instrument of pride and self-assertion.

Traditions effect this qualification of the retributive scheme differently. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam emphasize God's grace and the recurrent possibility of repentance. Pauline Christianity takes this teaching to the extreme conclusion that salvation comes not by works of the moral and religious law, but through God's free, unnecessitated love. Similar conceptions are found in the devotional *(bhakti)* tradition of Hindu thought, but in the Indian-derived traditions the retributive order is more commonly qualified differently: ultimate redemption requires one to attain the consciousness that full liberation *(mokṣa, nirvāṇa)* is open only to those who transcend attachment to *saṃsāra*, the karmic realm of merit and demerit.

On the surface, all these teachings appear to undermine the significance of morality and moral striving—indeed, of the very retributive order these faiths have affirmed—and it is true that, at one time or another, teachings such as these have been taken to antinomian conclusions. But religious thinkers or traditions advancing such "transmoral" ideas often seem to have the opposite intent: namely, to free conscientious and morally committed individuals from the last vestiges of self-regard in order to make possible a spontaneous, joyful, and sincere moral life. Thus Paul, after stating his doctrine of justification through grace in *Romans* 5 and posing the rhetorical question "Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?" (6:1), replies "By no means!" To draw an antinomian or immoralist lesson from this teaching, in Paul's view, would miss the point that it both presupposes and aims at devoted moral commitment.

Hindus and Buddhists are equally vehement in rejecting the idea that, according to their teachings, the religiously liberated person acts immorally. Liberation may take one beyond the moral order of *dharma*, but it is by no means the same thing as *adharma*, or lawlessness. On the contrary, attaining liberation requires a disciplined, righteous life as preparation; for most Hindu and Buddhist thinkers, furthermore, it issues in the most consummately moral existence. Precisely because the liberated person has put all vestiges of egoism behind, he has attained a state of mind where, without regard for personal benefit, he acts out of a free compassion for other beings. This is exactly the state achieved by Arjuna in the *Bhagavadgītā*. Perplexed over the terrible implications for himself and his kinsman if he performs his warrior's duty, Arjuna is unable to act until, in a series of religious encounters, he learns from Kṛṣṇa-Viṣṇu that one's true self is not stained by moral good or evil. This instruction frees him to do his duty and thereby help sustain the cosmic-moral order. Far

from being antinomian or immoral, therefore, this teaching of "detached action" *(niskama karman)*, as Max Weber observed, is one of the loftiest achievements of Indian moral and religious thought.

Conclusion

As far back as the historical record allows us to see, religion and morality have been intertwined. This collaboration has not always been fruitful. Such Western critics as Marx and Freud regarded the link between religion and morality as unfortunate. Among other things, they criticized it for producing immoral teachings (whether in the economic or sexual realms) and dubious or morally questionable eschatological schemes, for basing morality on fear of punishment, and for using doctrines of forgiveness for manipulative or immoral purposes. All these criticisms were valid, not just for Western religion in this late period but for all traditions at one moment or another in their history. Religions engage some of the most fundamental and most difficult questions of the moral life, and it is no wonder that their failure to deal adequately with these questions can have the most serious consequences. In the effort to transcend narrow tribalism, for example, a religion can contribute to the reinsertion of tribal attitudes at an ever higher and more dangerous level.

Nevertheless, this critical word is not all that can be said. Religions, whether nonliterate or literate, characteristically emerge and develop in a process of intense dialogue with the requirements of the moral life. They elaborate codes of conduct, procedures for reasoning morally, and standards of virtue. To support commitment to the moral life, they help configure the world as a moral order. Finally, they are prepared to qualify or refine this order so as to permit anyone to attain the highest level of moral excellence. In all these ways, religious traditions have contributed to human moral development and self-understanding. Religion is not reducible to morality, as some nineteenth-century thinkers argued, because religions address a variety of human interests and concerns. Aesthetic propensities, historical or scientific curiosity, speculative and ritual tendencies—all find expression in religious faith. But no one can deny that moral concerns in their fullest sense have been a central aspect of religious life.

[*For discussion of the foundations for and the development of ethical thought within specific religious traditions, see* Buddhist Ethics; Chinese Philosophy; Christian Ethics; Confucian Thought, *article on* Foundations of the Tradition; Enlightenment, The; Halakhah; Islamic Law; Israelite Law; *and* Law and Religion, *articles on South Asia, East Asia, and the West. For detailed treatment of related topics, see* Dharma; Evil; Good, The; Karman; Nonviolence; Relativism; *and* Suffering.]

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Unfortunately, while there are a number of good specific discussions of Christian, Jewish, Hindu, or Buddhist ethics, relatively little work has been done on the comparative analysis of religious traditions in a way comprising not just their specific normative teachings but also their doctrines of retribution and their fundamental ways of relating ethics to other features of the religious life. Two classic discussions in this area are Edward A. Westermarck's *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 2 vols., 2d ed. (London, 1924), and his *Christianity and Morals* (1939; reprint, Freeport, N.Y., 1969). These works provide a wealth of information about the moral and religious beliefs of preliterate and literate cultures, though the moral perspective is colored by Westermarck's moral relativism. Even more systematic comparative discussion of specific traditions can be found in Max Weber's pioneering studies of 1915–1919: *Ancient Judaism* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), and *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*

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RONALD M. GREEN

MORAL THEOLOGY. *See* Christian Ethics.

MORAVIANS. The Moravian church, as the Unitas Fratrum (Unity of Brethren) is popularly known, is a Protestant denomination with roots in the fifteenth-century Hussite reformation and the eighteenth-century German Pietist movement. By the late nineteenth century, these influences had coalesced to give the denomination its contemporary form and character.

The Unity of Brethren was founded in March 1457 in Kunwald, Bohemia as the Jednota Bratrská ("Society of Brethren"), but the issues behind this event stretch back more than a century. From the mid-fourteenth century there had been growing demands for reform within the Roman Catholic church of Bohemia and neighboring Moravia. The reform movement was centered in the capital city of Prague and the newly established Charles University (1348). Persistent Waldensian influences as well as newer Wyclifite influences from England were evident in this movement.

The calls for reform finally found their most eloquent voice in Jan Hus, priest, university professor, and popular preacher. Although attracted to the doctrines of Wyclif, Hus claimed to advocate independently a return to apostolic simplicity in the church, and he vigorously attacked the lax morality of the clergy. As Hus's popularity increased, so did controversy about his ideas and his difficulties with the hierarchy. He was excommunicated by Pope John XXIII in 1411 but eventually appealed his case to the Council of Constance then in session. After his trial, deemed irregular by later historians, he was burned at the stake on 6 July 1415 as a heretic.

Hus's death served to arouse his followers in Bohemia. His ideas soon became entwined with a developing Bohemian nationalism, and Hus himself became something of a folk hero. When civil war erupted, a series of unsuccessful crusades were launched, with the blessings of the papacy, in an attempt to subdue the heretics. Among the most ardent Bohemians, highly respected for their military zeal, were a group of radical religious and political reformers headquartered in the town of Tabor. Although they were destroyed as a separate party by the late 1430s, many of their religious ideas lingered on in the population. Bohemia's political situation would remain unstable for a century after Hus's death until 1526, when the crown was acquired by the Habsburg Ferdinand I.

Upheavals occurred also in the religious life of the Bohemians and Moravians as several groups claiming the heritage of Hus emerged alongside the Roman Catholic church. One such group, the Utraquists, represented a conservative attempt at reformation, finally insisting only on the right of all believers to receive the bread and wine at Communion and continuing to hope for a reunion with a purified Roman Catholic church. It was the Utraquist archbishop-elect Jan z Rokycan (c. 1390–1471) whose preaching inspired one of the founders of the Brethren, his nephew Gregory (d. 1474), to pursue more vigorously the goal of reformation. Jan z Rokycan also introduced Gregory to the writings of the radical reformer Petr Chelčický (c. 1380–c. 1460).

Within ten years of the founding of their society, the Brethren felt the need to establish their own clerical orders to insure the efficaciousness of their ministry. They chose deacons, presbyters, and bishops from among their membership. One of the candidates was a former Roman Catholic priest, and some Waldensians may have participated in the establishment of the new orders. Modern historians see in these events an attempt by the Brethren to reconstitute the style of ministry of the New Testament church. Any attempt by the Brethren to claim apostolic succession as traditionally understood must be laid to a faulty reading of Waldensian history on their part. The orders established in 1467 have been carried on into the contemporary Moravian church.

The first decades of the Brethren organization were marked by sectarian characteristics including pacifism, rejection of oaths, communal organization, use of the titles "Brother" and "Sister" for all members, suspicion of advanced education, reluctance to admit members of the nobility to membership, and a preference for rural living. This trend was reversed under the leadership of Bishop Luke of Prague (c. 1460–1528), who succeeded in 1494 in having the works of Chelčický and Gregory reduced to nondogmatic status. The group gave up much of their exclusiveness and moved into the mainstream of society, though not without the defection of a conservative minority. The majority, although retaining a strict church discipline, grew rapidly. It has been estimated that by the 1520s there were from 150,000 to 200,000 members located in 400 congregations in Bohemia and Moravia.

Under the leadership of such bishops as Jan Augusta (1500–1572) and Jan Blahoslav (1523–1571), the Brethren maintained generally friendly contacts with Luther

(who wrote favorably about them) and later with leaders of the Reformed churches. Although ecumenical in spirit and experiencing strong influences from first Lutheran and later Reformed theology, the Brethren maintained their own course. They structured their church with dioceses headed by bishops, abandoned clerical celibacy, and eventually accepted a general Reformed understanding of the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist.

In worship, while ritual was simplified, the church year was retained and lay involvement encouraged through the publication of hymnals and the Czech-language Kralitz Bible (1579–1593) in six volumes with commentary. The church sponsored schools and encouraged the training of clergy in foreign universities.

Since their legal status was often in doubt, the Brethren endured periodic persecutions by the Utraquists and the Roman Catholics. But they continued to maintain their vitality and established congregations in Poland, which later merged with the Reformed church.

The involvement in political affairs of members who were of the nobility helped to bring about disastrous consequences for the Brethren in the opening phase of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). With the defeat of the Protestant forces at the Battle of the White Mountain (1620), suppression of Protestantism in Bohemia and Moravia began. The events of this era are highlighted in the career of Bishop Johannes Amos Comenius (1592–1670), the renowned educational theorist. He spent much of his life in exile developing his reforms of education and despite several personal tragedies never lost his belief in the power of the educated mind to serve God's purposes for humanity.

The traditions of the Brethren survived in Bohemia and Moravia through secret meetings and the laxity of government officials in enforcing conformity. Sporadic contacts with Lutherans in border areas also helped to sustain morale.

A group of these secret Brethren were led in 1722 to the German estate of Count Nicolaus Zinzendorf (1700–1760) by the lay evangelist Christian David (1690–1751). There they established the village of Herrnhut. A creative theologian and gifted leader, Zinzendorf became the driving force behind the merger of the Brethren's traditions with the emphases of the Pietist movement. [*See* Pietism.]

After initial difficulties, the growing community experienced a series of unifying experiences in the summer of 1727, culminating in a service of Holy Communion on 13 August. The fellowship now developed the unique characteristics that would mark its second phase. The residents were organized into residential groups based on age, sex, and marital status ("the choirs"). The intent was to foster spiritual experience appropriate to one's stage in life and to utilize the resources of a concentrated labor force. From Zinzendorf's Christocentric emphasis flowed a rich liturgical life with stress upon the Advent–Christmas and Holy Week–Easter cycles. The Moravian understanding of the joyous nature of the relationship between the believer and the Savior enabled them to develop education and the arts in his praise, sponsoring schools and producing musicians and artists of note. The Brethren's clerical orders were continued through new ordinations by the two remaining bishops in exile. Since the church developed a conferential form of government, however, the bishops became primarily spiritual leaders.

Worship was characterized by a simplified liturgical ritual that observed the festivals of the Christian calendar with particular attention to the Advent–Christmas and Holy Week–Easter cycles. Unique features included the singing of many hymns, with the minister clad in a surplice for the celebration of the sacraments of baptism and Holy Communion. The Lovefeast, patterned after the agape meals of the early Christians, developed as a significant service. In it participants were served a simple meal as an expression of their fellowship with one another.

Under the leadership of Zinzendorf and his *de facto* successor Bishop Augustus Gottlieb Spangenberg (1703–1792), Herrnhut became the model for some twenty similar communities established in Europe, England, and the eastern United States. These self-sufficient "settlement congregations" were to serve as the home base for two types of outreach developed by the Brethren.

Beginning in 1727 the Moravians sent forth members to serve in their "diaspora" through establishing Pietist renewal societies within existing state churches. This practice is supported by European Moravians today. In 1732, after Zinzendorf's presentation of the plight of the West Indian slaves to the community, the Brethren Leonard Dober (1706–1766) and David Nitschmann (1696–1772) went to Saint Thomas. By 1760 the Moravians had sent out 226 missionaries to the non-European world. This effort introduced into Protestantism the idea that missionary outreach is the responsibility of the whole church, brought the Moravians into significant ecumenical contacts, such as that with John Wesley (1703–1791) in Georgia and England, and helped shape the contemporary Moravian church.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the settlement congregations were given up as no longer viable and the towns opened to all who wished to settle in them. German and Scandinavian immigration to North America in the last century brought new Moravian congregations into

being in the eastern and midwestern United States and western Canada. The end of World War II found Herrnhut and the older settlements in East Germany and, through the movement of refugees, a stronger Moravian presence in western Europe. Immigration continues to affect the Moravian church through the recent movements of Surinamese members to the Netherlands and Caribbean-area members to cities in England and North America.

The Moravians have also experienced constitutional changes as they have moved beyond their European origins. The British and American areas of the church gained independence from the German in the mid-nineteenth century, but the foreign missions continued under control of an international board that met in Germany until the end of World War I. Responsibility for the work was then divided among the European, British, and American areas of the church. A major constitutional change in 1957 resulted in the creation of the present seventeen autonomous provinces located in Europe, England, North America, Central America, and Africa, and the undertaking of educational work in India and Israel. The provinces constitute the "Moravian Unity" and send delegates to periodic meetings of the "Unity Synod." The late twentieth century has witnessed the rapid growth of the church in Africa and Central America. In America, the Moravian church did not experience significant growth until after the mid-nineteenth century. Earlier attempts at "diaspora"-style outreach had proved unsuited to America, since there was no religious establishment within which to work. Groups gathered by "diaspora" workers simply became congregations of other denominations. The retention of the exclusive settlement congregations until the 1840s also retarded outreach.

The church has continued to honor many of its traditions of worship and practice. While eschewing a formal dogmatic theological tradition of its own, it affirms the historic creeds of the Christian faith, continues to emphasize the believer's relationship with Christ, and to encourage fellowship among its members. Both men and women are ordained as pastors. The church's historical ecumenical stance is reflected in its participation as a founding member of the World Council of Churches and in the activities of the various provinces in regional councils of churches. Total membership recorded in December 1982 was 457,523.

[*See also the biographies of Comenius, Hus, and Zinzendorf.*]

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DAVID A. SCHATTSCHNEIDER

MORDVIN RELIGION. *See* Mari and Mordvin Religion.

MORMONISM. The religious movement popularly known as Mormonism encompasses several denominations and sects, the largest of which is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints with headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah. The second-largest organization, with headquarters in Independence, Missouri, is the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Perhaps the smallest of numerous Mormon splinter groups is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Burlington, Wisconsin, with about two hundred members. All of these churches trace their origins to founder Joseph Smith, Jr.

Mormonism had its beginnings in western New York in the 1820s, a time when the fires of the Second Great Awakening were sweeping across that "burned-over district" and America's most important nineteenth-century waterway, the Erie Canal, was being completed there. Such a mingling of spiritual and physical developments was a perfect expression of the symbiosis between evangelical religion and an emerging industrial order that radically transformed American society, leaving many Americans bewildered and confused. Among those passed by in the rush for progress was the family of Joseph and Lucy Mack Smith, who had left New England with their children in 1816 in search of better economic opportunities in western New York. They settled in the village of Palmyra, directly on the canal route. Though skeptical of the religious enthusiasms of the revivalists, the Smiths were persuaded of the need for religious af-

filiation. However, they found it difficult to make a choice among competing denominations. Their third eldest son, Joseph Jr., was particularly confused in his search for the one true church. According to a later, official church account, it was in the spring of 1820 that the boy, aged fourteen, retired to a grove on his father's farm, where he prayed for divine guidance. In a vision he beheld God the Father and Jesus Christ and was told to join none of the existing denominations, for they were "all wrong." [*See the biography of Smith.*]

As young Joseph matured, he had a number of subsequent visions and revelations that convinced him that God had chosen him as his instrument to restore the true church of Christ which, through the course of history, had been corrupted by fallible and evil men. In preparation for this restoration, he was directed by an angel to unearth a set of golden records from a hill near his parents' farm. He then translated these records with divine aid and published them in 1830 as the *Book of Mormon*, a sacred history of three groups of pre-Columbian migrants to America, including the ancestors of the American Indians. According to the *Book of Mormon*, Christ had visited the inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere after his crucifixion, taught the gospel, and instituted a church "to the convincing of the Jew and Gentile that Jesus is the Christ, the Eternal God, manifesting himself to all nations." Although accepted as scripture by believing Mormons and popularly called the Mormon bible by nonbelievers, Smith regarded the *Book of Mormon* as a supplement rather than a substitute for the Bible.

Smith also believed that no scripture, ancient or modern, was sufficient for the restoration of the gospel. More than anything else, mankind needed divine authority to act in the name of God, an authority that had vanished after a great falling away in the early days of Christianity. This authority was restored in the spring and summer of 1829, when the powers of the priesthood of the early church—which included the authority to baptize and the gift of the Holy Ghost—were conferred upon Smith and his associate Oliver Cowdery by John the Baptist and the apostles Peter, James, and John. Smith now felt authorized to restore the church of Christ, which he officially organized under the laws of the state of New York on 6 April 1830, shortly after publication of the *Book of Mormon*. In 1838, the name was changed to Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

Although the new religion initially met with skepticism and persecution, it succeeded in attracting a substantial following among restorationists who saw in Mormonism the fulfillment of the awaited return of the true church of Christ, led by a divinely ordained priesthood. Perhaps the most prominent and influential of these converts was Sidney Rigdon, erstwhile associate of Alexander Campbell. Rigdon brought virtually his entire Ohio congregation over to the new religion, thus inducing Smith and most of his New York followers to establish a Mormon settlement in 1831 in Kirtland, Ohio. It was there that Smith greatly amplified and broadened his theological and organizational principles in a series of revelations first published in 1833 as the *Book of Commandments* and later enlarged into the canonical *Doctrine and Covenants*. The Saints were enjoined to gather in communities as God's chosen people under an egalitarian economic order called the Law of Consecration and Stewardship and to build a temple that was, literally and symbolically, the sacred center of the community. Jesus, Moses, Elias, and Elijah then appeared to Smith and Cowdery in the temple in 1836. These revelations initiated a patriarchal order that harkened back to Old Testament traditions and established the nucleus of a kingdom of God in which the temporal and the sacred became indistinguishable.

These innovations—radical departures from traditional Protestantism—while attracting many new converts, strained the loyalty of some early Saints and also began to arouse the hostility of non-Mormons. When the Saints were forced to leave Kirtland in 1838, it was largely the result of internal conflict; however, as early as 1833, a Mormon settlement in Jackson County, Missouri, had to be abandoned because of persecution. When the Mormons were completely driven out of Missouri in 1839, it was primarily because of opposition to their kingdom. Internal conflict also intensified as Smith continued to move beyond his early restorationist impulse in favor of a kingdom of God that achieved its fullest expression in Nauvoo. Nauvoo, a settlement founded in 1839 for refugees from Missouri, had become Illinois's largest city, with a population of about eleven thousand by 1844. It was a city under the full religious, social, economic, and political control of the Mormon kingdom. Much of this development was the result of the spectacular success of missionaries in Great Britain who, beginning in 1837, sent a steady stream of converts to the American settlements.

The success of Nauvoo may well have led Smith to overreach himself. He assumed the leadership of the Mormon militia and announced his candidacy for the presidency of the United States. Smith ostensibly made this gesture in order to avoid having to make an inexpedient choice between the two major political parties, but he was also imbued with the millennial belief that if God wished him to become president and establish Mormon dominion over the United States, no one could hinder him. The temple in the center of Nauvoo was much more Hebraic in design and ritual (with Masonic

borrowings) than the one in Kirtland, which resembled a New England meeting house. Innovative doctrines and ordinances such as baptism for the dead and, especially, plural marriage for time and eternity—with Smith and his closest associates secretly taking numerous wives—offended the religious sensibilities of many Saints who believed they had joined a more traditional, more Protestant kind of Mormonism. Similarly, controversial doctrines such as belief in the preexistence of man, metaphysical materialism with its attendant denial of the belief in creation *ex nihilo*, eternal progression, a plurality of gods, and man's capacity to achieve divinity through obedience to the principles of Mormonism, outraged not only nonbelievers but tested the faith of some of the more traditionally oriented Latter-day Saints. A group of alarmed anti-Mormons effectively capitalized on internal dissent and formed a mob that killed Smith and his brother Hyrum on 27 June 1844.

History has shown the killers of the Mormon prophet wrong in thinking that they had delivered a mortal blow to Mormonism. Although it was Smith's energy and genius that started the new religion and kept it going in the face of nearly insurmountable external and internal opposition, a number of able leaders had been attracted to Mormonism. They helped ensure its survival after Smith's death. As early as 1834, Smith had organized some of his most loyal lieutenants into a council of twelve apostles in restorationist emulation of the primitive church. In 1840, Brigham Young became president of this powerful and prestigious group. It was in this capacity that he was sustained as leader by those Mormons who had unquestioningly accepted Smith's Nauvoo innovations. Most of those devotees followed Young to the Rocky Mountains, while most of the more traditional Saints, who rejected plural marriage and kingdom building, remained in the Midwest. [*See the biography of Young.*] In 1860, Smith's son Joseph became president of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, which established its headquarters in Independence, Missouri.

Young's advance pioneering party arrived in the valley of the Great Salt Lake in July 1847 and immediately began to survey a site for a city, with a temple at the center. Aided by a steady stream of immigrants, Young built an inland empire including Utah and parts of Idaho, Wyoming, Arizona, and Nevada that boasted a population of over one hundred thousand by the time of his death in 1877. A practical leader not given to visions and revelations, he insisted throughout his life that he was implementing the plans that Smith had been unable to realize fully in Nauvoo. Plural marriage, practiced secretly in Nauvoo, was publicly announced to the world from Salt Lake City in 1852; most of the church leaders took numerous wives to set an example for their somewhat reluctant followers, and by the 1860s more than 30 percent of the Mormon population was living in polygamous households. Temporal government was placed in the hands of ecclesiastical leaders under the auspices of a political kingdom of God whose theocratic model was ancient Israel. An ambitious attempt to establish a Mormon State of Deseret failed, but home rule for the Mormons was only partly thwarted because the federal government, under the Compromise of 1850, created Utah Territory with Young as governor.

In 1857, however, President James Buchanan felt compelled to act on reports by territorial officials who had accused Young and his followers of disloyalty to the United States and of immoral polygamous liaisons. The president sent an expeditionary force of the United States army to Utah to prove to a reform-minded North that the Democrats were at least against one of the "twin relics of barbarism" (meaning slavery and polygamy), whose elimination had been the rallying cry of the Republican party platform in 1856. "Buchanan's blunder," however, did not gain him any political advantage and ended in a negotiated settlement, with Young remaining as de facto governor of Utah. Nevertheless, the handwriting was on the wall for Young's Mormon kingdom; further government attacks on polygamy and the political kingdom were delayed only by the Civil War. Beginning in the 1870s, the United States Congress exerted increasing pressure on the Mormons, who, in 1890, were forced to relinquish polygamy and the political kingdom as the price of their religion's survival. Mormon president Wilford Woodruff's manifesto disavowing any further sanctioning of plural marriages by the church symbolized the passing of an era and the beginning of the reconciliation of Mormonism with the world.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Mormonism had been an antimodern, antipluralist religious movement in a modernizing, pluralistic world. The latter was represented perhaps most significantly by the symbiosis between evangelical religion, entrepreneurial capitalism, and political pluralism. Religion, like politics, had become a commodity in the free market place of ideas and beliefs. Democrats and Whigs might disagree about means, but not about ends. The same was true of Protestant religious denominations, who agreed that ultimately they would all arrive at the same truth, if by different routes. This was a world alien to Smith and most of those who became Mormons. Smith's original quest, which had sent him to pray in his father's grove, was for the one true church. Because truth, ultimately, could not be divided, "correct principles" also

applied to economics, society, and government—principles that were incompatible with an emerging, competitive, capitalist American society. Here, then, was a fundamental source of conflict between the Saints and their adversaries, in which the former were sustained by their millennial expectations of the near advent of their Savior and the eventual triumph of the kingdom of God over its enemies.

When the Saints voted on 6 October 1890 to accept Woodruff's manifesto, they probably did not perceive the full significance of their decision. Yet this event was a watershed in Mormon history as the Saints then had to jettison some of their most distinctive institutions and beliefs: economic communitarianism, plural marriage, and the political kingdom. Mormons now followed their erstwhile evangelical adversaries into the pluralistic American cultural mainstream, joining what historian Martin Marty has called "a nation of behavers." In search of new boundaries and symbols of identification, the Mormons, much like the evangelicals, adopted strict codes of behavior: abstinence from alcohol, tobacco, tea and coffee; acceptance of regulated dress norms; adherence to a strict code of sexual morality. These codes reflect the very values that had aided nineteenth-century evangelicals in their adaptation to an emerging capitalist industrial order requiring work discipline that was effectively sustained by internalized behavioral norms.

Mormons found these values equally congenial in their own adaptation to a competitive, individualistic social and economic order, and they prepared the rising generation to meet this change not only through the family but also through a growing number of church auxiliaries: primary associations for the very young, young men's and women's organizations, Sunday schools, priesthood quorums, and women's auxiliaries. Such institutions were all designed to keep Mormons active in their church from the cradle to the grave, while at the same time allowing them to become productive members of the larger American society. Religious commitment thus became a springboard for social and economic success in the world, which was further facilitated by the Mormons' increasing commitment to education; nearly thirty thousand Latter-day Saints attended Brigham Young University by 1984, and many thousands more were studying at secular universities throughout the United States and the Western world. Mormons serve in prominent positions in the federal government, in the military, in major business corporations, and in major universities.

Many of these Mormons are third- to fifth-generation Latter-day Saints who have a strong cultural identification with their religion that is enhanced by closely knit family ties. The strong Mormon emphasis on family solidarity finds theological and institutional expression in the belief in the eternal nature of the family when family ties have been solemnized within the sacred precincts of the temple. Temple ordinances, conducted not only for the living but also vicariously for the dead, are intended to bind families, and ultimately the entire human race, through sacred covenants.

Only those Mormons who observe their religion's strict rules of conduct are allowed to enter the temple and participate in these ordinances and rituals. Temples, then, are not ordinary church buildings but regarded as very special edifices and found only in major population centers. Meetinghouses, on the other hand, are functional buildings where congregations of several hundred members hold simple worship services as well as social and athletic events. Often two congregations share one building.

Mormonism continues to appeal to many socially and culturally disoriented members of society. They are attracted by a lay church that offers active participation to all of its members and provides an instant, socially cohesive group whose authoritarian male leaders set boundaries while providing recognition for behavior that conforms to group standards. Many converts are especially drawn to the Mormon family ideal.

The rapid growth of Mormonism in recent years has created some friction between new converts and multigenerational Mormons who find the fundamentalist values of the newcomers less than congenial. Even greater potential for conflict looms as Mormon missionaries—who serve the church at their own expense for two years—are increasingly successful in attracting converts in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Dominated by a culturally conservative hierarchy drawn almost exclusively from the Mormon core region in the intermountain West, Mormons have shown some inflexibility in adapting their religion to cultural needs in other parts of the world. Prophet-President Spencer W. Kimball's 1978 revelation extending the lay priesthood to all Mormon males, irrespective of race or color (blacks had been denied the priesthood prior to that date), was a clear recognition of the need for major change. However, Mormon leaders continue to resist changes in the role of women, who are admonished to remain at home to raise children while partaking of the priesthood only through the male heads of families. (By contrast, the Reorganized Church, which had never withheld the priesthood from blacks, recently announced that women were eligible for ordination to the priesthood.) If their past history is a reliable guide to the future, however, the Mormon hierarchy in Utah will not allow its conservatism to hinder the progress of the Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, whose membership by 1986 had reached nearly six million worldwide.

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KLAUS J. HANSEN

MORRISON, ROBERT (1782–1834), first Protestant missionary to China. Morrison was born in Morpeth, Northumberland, England, on 15 January 1782 of humble Scottish parentage. At an early age he became an apprentice to his father in making wooden boot trees. During these years he joined the Church of Scotland (1798) and soon began studying Latin, Hebrew, and theology. In 1802 he entered the Congregational Theological College at Hoxton (now Highbury College). His Christian upbringing and studies inclined him toward missionary service and in 1804 he offered himself to the London Missionary Society, which, though not yet ten years old, was beginning to prepare workers for China. Morrison spent the next two years at the Missionary College at Gosport. While there he began an intensive study of the Chinese language using a Chinese tutor and a Catholic translation of part of the New Testament into Chinese kept in the British Museum.

Shortly after his ordination on 8 January 1807, Morrison began making final arrangements for his departure for China on 31 January. Because the British East India Company (BEIC) was hesitant to promote Protestant missions to China at that time, Morrison could only gain passage to New York. After receiving a personal written recommendation from James Madison, the American secretary of state, to the American consul in China, he set sail from New York and arrived in Canton on 7 September 1807.

Upon arrival, Morrison found the English-Chinese political situation tenuous. The propagation of Christianity was prohibited by the reigning Ch'ing dynasty. The Missionary Society knew this and had instructed Morrison not to preach openly but rather to concentrate on learning Chinese and to make the necessary preparations for publishing religious literature that would be used for long-range evangelism. Morrison stayed in various Western trade houses in Canton, where he assumed Chinese dress and dietary customs while studying the language with two Roman Catholic Chinese. Pressure from the government, however, eventually forced him to seek refuge in Portuguese Macao, where he stayed for one year with an English family, marrying their oldest daughter in 1809. During that same year he became employed by the BEIC as an interpreter. Having thus been able to acquire permanent residency, Morrison began to turn his efforts to ways in which to propagate the gospel. Realizing that under the current circumstances literature was virtually the only open avenue, he focused his attention on the printed word. The BEIC provided invaluable assistance at this point by allowing Morrison to use their press. His works were prolific and diverse: in 1810, his translation of *Acts* became the first portion of scripture translated into Chinese by a Protestant missionary; *Luke* (1812); the New Testament (1814); a Chinese grammar (1815); *A View of China for Philological Purposes* (1817); the entire Bible (written in 1818, published by 1823, 21 vols.); his magnum opus, a Chinese-English dictionary (3 vols., 1815, 1822, 1823); and catechisms (1812) as well as portions of *The Book of Common Prayer* (1833).

Morrison's wife died in China in 1822. Robert Morrison returned to England in 1824 and became a well-received lecturer able to generate interest for Chinese missions. Shortly before returning to China in 1826, Morrison married Eliza Armstrong.

Morrison witnessed his first Chinese baptism on 16 July 1814. After twenty-five years, his Society co-workers and he had baptized only ten individuals. Yet, in spite of difficulties that he encountered in his work, Morrison succeeded in laying down a foundation for others who were to follow. William Milne (1774–1822) came with his wife to assist Morrison in 1813 and was instrumental in helping translate and publish the Chinese Bible. Later, building upon Milne's school for Chinese established in Malacca (1816), Morrison

founded the Anglo-Chinese College (1818). The purpose of this institution, besides providing a context for evangelism, was to establish reciprocal cultivation and respect of Chinese and European culture, language, and literature.

For his efforts, Robert Morrison was awarded an honorary degree from the University of Glasgow (1817); he became a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1824. After his death in Canton on 1 August 1834, his eldest son, John Robert Morrison (1814–1843), succeeded his father as Chinese secretary and interpreter for the British authorities in Canton.

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PAUL V. MARTINSON

MORTIFICATION. The term *mortification* derives from the church Latin *mortificare* ("to put to death"), a term that appears several times in the Latin New Testament. In the *Letter to the Romans,* Paul counseled the early Christians, "if you live according to the flesh you will die, but if by the Spirit you put to death [*mortificetis*] the deeds of the body you will live" (8:13). In the *Letter to the Colossians* the Christian is exhorted: "Put to death [*mortificate*] what is earthly in you: fornication, impurity, passion, evil desire, and covetousness, which is idolatry" (3:5). This "mortification of the flesh" was intimately connected with the "mortification" of Jesus Christ, that is to say, with his crucifixion. According to Paul, Christians carry this death *(mortificatio)* of Jesus in their bodies so that the life of Jesus might also be manifest in them (2 *Cor.* 4:10). All who belong to Christ have "crucified" the flesh with its passions (*Gal.* 5:24). The Christian notion of mortification thus derives from this originally Pauline ideal of participation in the passion of Christ through the putting to death of the inordinate desires of the flesh. This ideal was exemplified by the early martyrs, and when the persecutions eventually came to an end mortification began to function as a sort of self-imposed martyrdom. Thus the adoption of practices of mortification made it possible for future generations of Christians, living in more or less settled times, to recapture some of the self-sacrificing intensity of the early church.

In the general history of religions the term *mortification,* despite its specifically Christian origins, may be extended by way of analogy to refer to a wide variety of practices that aim at the religious transformation of the individual through specific forms of bodily discipline, often entailing a degree of actual physical pain or suffering. Mortification is to be distinct from asceticism in that it is one of the latter's possible components. The term *asceticism* usually refers to a general regimen or way of life that may or may not include specific forms of mortification. Indeed, if mortification is understood as involving the deliberate infliction of actual physical suffering, then it may be altogether absent from some forms of ascetic life, such as that practiced in Buddhism.

For the sake of the following exposition I will distinguish two general types of mortification: the ascetic type, which is more or less integrated into a general form of religious life (and may include, for example, the wearing of rough or inadequate clothing), and the initiatory type, which is occasioned by specific ritual initiations and is more likely to involve the temporary infliction of pain.

Ascetic Mortification. In Christianity, mortification usually has been an element in a more general practice of the ascetic life. Among its most extreme forms are self-flagellation and the wearing of a hair shirt. Flagellation is intended to reproduce the scourging of Christ, while the hair shirt, an ancient penitential symbol, can function as a kind of continuous flagellation. The semantic history of the hair shirt is informative. Originally it was simply a garment made of very rough cloth. In the *Book of Daniel* (9:3) the wearing of rough cloth garments is associated with fasting and with strewing ashes on one's head in order to entreat God. In the *Gospel of Matthew* (11:23), such garments are associated with strewing ashes on the head as a sign of conversion. In primitive Christianity they were the dress required of catechumens; from the fourth century on they were adopted by monks as a means of mortification. In the

sixteenth century the name *hair shirt* was given to what was really a scourge worn as a belt against the naked flesh, the rope made more painful by being knotted or by the addition of metal nails. This type of hair shirt was first used by certain mendicant orders and became a form of private mortification.

These and other less extreme forms of mortification, such as fasting, could be used as means of individual penance for particular sins or as a more general form of asceticism associated in particular with the monastic orders. In both cases mortification was ideally intended to have a transformative effect, aiding in the transition from a life devoted to the gratification of the desires of the body to a higher, sanctified life in the spirit.

The forms of mortification that one finds in various Hindu religious traditions also aim at a radical transformation of the practitioner, but there is a marked difference in the attitude taken to the suffering that this entails. Whereas in the Christian tradition, the suffering is connected with the sufferings of Christ as an *imitatio Christi*, in Hinduism the suffering lacks this positive aspect and is used negatively as an inducement to rise above the human condition. The practices of Yoga, for instance, aim primarily at the suppression of suffering or at the cultivation of an attitude of complete indifference to it. In itself the suffering involved in mortification has no positive religious significance. The ideal is to reach a state of detachment that is in many respects similar to the Stoic ideal of *apatheia* and is thus quite different from the intense involvement implied in the notion of the *imitatio Christi*.

Buddhism is quite similar in this regard, although the Buddhist ideal of the Middle Way served to moderate some of the more extreme forms of mortification found among the ascetics of the Buddha's day. The Buddha's own engagement in mortification led him to death's door before he renounced such extreme practices. To the extent that the idea of mortification implies immoderation it cannot be accepted as a Buddhist ideal. Nevertheless, Buddhist ascetic practices may still be regarded as forms of mortification to the extent that they aim at the cessation of *saṃsāra*, the cycle of life.

Initiatory Mortification. In a wide variety of archaic religious traditions mortification occurs in the context of initiation rituals. In some of these cases, practices of mortification seem intended symbolically to assimilate the initiate into a deathlike condition that is to precede an initiatory rebirth. Such practices thus place the initiate temporarily outside of the normal human order. The practices include a number of temporary dietary restrictions, ranging from fasting to complete abstinence, and various forms of imposed deprivations, such as deprivation of water and of sleep. This may also be the motivation behind several practices designed to test the initiate's endurance of extremes of heat and cold.

The keeping of watches and vigils is widespread. Such practices have been attested to among the Andaman Islanders and peoples of New Guinea (the Siana), Africa (the Venda), and South America (the Ocaina). Deprivation of sleep, food, and drink seem to be ways of symbolizing death: the dead do not eat, drink, or sleep.

Other forms of mortification associated with initiation rituals are more difficult to interpret. A number of practices of a punitive character, such as flogging, for one reason or another form an integral part of the initiation process. Some involve torture, such as the practice of biting the initiate's head through to the bone (Australia) or that of hanging the initiate from a rope that passes through a hole made between the muscle and the shoulder bone (as among some Plains and Northwest Coast tribal groups of North America).

Ritual forms of abuse are usually interpreted as endurance tests, an interpretation at times suggested by the requirement that the painful ordeal be undergone without complaint lest the rite be invalidated. But there are also cases in which the initiate is not forbidden to cry out, and even cases in which a cry of pain must be heard by those who are present. If, when faced with such cases, we refuse to characterize such ritual abuses as purposeful (for example, as tests of endurance), all that remains is to characterize them as expressions of violence. Violence may serve to separate the initiate from his earlier natural state (the infantile) and to introduce him to the social status of an adult. It is violence of this sort that the smith, a common initiator among many African peoples, exerts upon the natural elements in order to transform them into the tools of culture, through a kind of symbolic mortification. Violence may have a similar purpose in rituals of initiation. In the ritual hanging mentioned above, for instance, the initiate is made to spin around as he hangs until he faints. This loss of consciousness, which is precisely the attainment of a state similar to death, may well be the final goal of this rather grim form of mortification.

In general, however, violence is of secondary importance; it is not strictly required in order to act out an initiatory death. In some cases symbolic death may be achieved merely by conducting funeral rites over the initiate or over something that represents him. The initiate may be mourned, spoken of as deceased, subjected to a fake interment, or in other ways treated like a corpse.

Initiatory forms of mortification that involve the creation of a symbolic state of death may also be detected

in baptismal rites that call for the complete immersion of the initiate. The passage from impurity to purity implies not only a rebirth but also a death of the old condition. Immersion in water may signify a mortification through a reimmersion in the primordial waters of chaos prior to rebirth. From this perspective, one can say with Mircea Eliade (1958) that the same logic has produced both baptismal rites and myths of inundation, both involving initiatory forms of mortification endowed with cosmic significance.

Mortification of the King. There is a cosmic dimension as well in the "mortification of the king," a rite of periodic cosmic renewal. In Babylonia, this annual ritual consisted merely of stripping the king of his regal insignia, slapping his face, and pulling his ears. However, as James G. Frazer argued in *The Golden Bough*, this seemingly harmless "mortification" may be merely a survival of an earlier practice in which the king was actually put to death.

The practice of the mortification of the king recalls the passion of Christ, who was crucified with the title *Rex Judeorum:* Christ "mortified" as a worldly king so that he could rise again as the heavenly king. The death of Christ also marks the end of a cycle and the initiation of a new order. It is in this death that the Christian participates, both through the initiation of baptism and through the practice of mortification. The initiatory type of mortification, though not prominent, is nevertheless discernible in Christianity in a somewhat attenuated form. This is but one indication that the types of ascetic and initiatory mortification that I have presented here need not be viewed as mutually exclusive.

As a final note, it is interesting that the expression "mortification of the king" *(mortificatio regis)* appears in the literature of alchemy as one of the most frequent symbols of the disintegration of matter. Interpreted spiritually, this *mortification regis* is a part of what Renaissance alchemists called the "saving Christian mystery." Meditation on the *mortificatio regis*, therefore, was comparable to meditation on the *mistero doloroso* of the passion of Christ in the Catholic practice of the recitation of the rosary.

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DARIO SABBATUCCI

Translated from Italian by J. C. Binzen

MOSES (c. thirteenth century BCE, but date uncertain), or, in Hebrew, Mosheh; leader of the Hebrews in the Exodus from Egypt and giver of the Law at Sinai. Tradition regards Moses as the founder of Israel's religion—the mediator of its covenant with God (Yahveh) and its cultic institutions.

Historicity of Moses. Any discussion about the historicity of Moses is entirely dependent upon an evaluation of the biblical account of his life and activity. There are no extant records from Egypt that make any reference to him or to the Exodus. Yet most scholars believe that a person named Moses existed and had a connection with the events of the Exodus and the wilderness journey as described in the four biblical books from *Exodus* to *Deuteronomy*. But there is little agreement about how much can be known about Moses or what role he played in the events, since the biblical accounts have been modified and embellished, and Moses' place in some of the traditions may be secondary.

The one point that seems to argue for regarding Moses as historical is his Egyptian name. An explanation of the name *Moses* that few would dispute is that it derives from the Egyptian verb *msy* ("to give birth"), a very common element in Egyptian names. This verb is usually combined with the name of a god (e.g., *Re*, as in *Re-messes*, i.e., *Ramses*), and the shortened form, *Moses*, is in the nature of a nickname. But whether in the long or short form, the name is common in Egypt from the mid-second millennium onward. None of the persons in Egyptian historical records bearing the name Moses can justifiably be identified with the biblical Moses, and to do so is quite arbitrary. The only argument for historicity to be derived from Moses' Egyptian name is its appropriateness to the background of Israel's sojourn in Egypt. Other examples of Egyptian names occur among the Israelites, particularly within the ranks of the priests and Levites. Such names may have survived in Canaan at sanctuaries and urban centers from the time of Egyptian control of the region in the Late Bronze Age.

A name by itself, however appropriate to the time and events described, does not make a historical personality. The various elements of the Exodus story do not

correspond with known Egyptian history, and historians have usually set about reconstructing the events to make a better fit between the Bible and contemporary records. For instance, the presence of numerous Asiatic slaves in Egypt during the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties (1550–1200 BCE) was not the result of an enslavement, out of fear and hatred, of a specific people already resident in Egypt, as pictured in *Exodus*. Slaves were brought into Egypt in large numbers as prisoners of war from many different peoples and social classes and were dispersed throughout Egypt to serve in many different capacities. Many Asiatics became free persons within Egyptian society and were found at various levels of rank and status. The nineteenth dynasty in particular was one of great assimilation of Asiatic religion and culture in Egypt. Furthermore, while bedouin were allowed certain grazing rights in the eastern Delta, there is no suggestion that they were enslaved or made to do menial labor. Nothing in the Egyptian records suggests any acts of genocide or any distinct group of state slaves resident in the eastern Delta.

None of the pharaohs in *Exodus* is named, but the reference in *Exodus* 1:11 to the Israelites' building the store cities of Pithom and Ramses is enough evidence for many to date the events to the nineteenth dynasty. Yet Pithom (Tell el-Maskhuta), in the Wadi Tumilat, was not built until the end of the seventh century BCE, and the reference to Ramses and the "land of Ramses" hardly suggests the royal residence. The name *Goshen*, as the region where the Israelites were said to reside, is known only from the latest geographic texts. The few specific names and details, therefore, do not point to a particular period of Egyptian history, and scholars differ on the dating and background of the Exodus precisely because so many details must be radically redrawn to make any connection possible. The quest for the historical Moses is a futile exercise. He now belongs only to legend.

Literary Tradition. The traditions about Moses are contained in the Peutateuch from *Exodus* to *Deuteronomy*, and all other biblical references to Moses are probably dependent upon these. The view of most critical scholars for the past century has been that the Pentateuch's presentation of Moses is not the result of a single author but the combination of at least four sources, known as the Yahvist (J), the Elohist (E), Deuteronomy (D), and the Priestly writer (P), and composed in that order. The existence of E as a separate work from J has long been disputed; at best it is very fragmentary. It is best to treat J and E as a single corpus, JE, as will be done below. The usual dating for these sources places them in a range from the tenth to the fifth century BCE, although there is a strong tendency, which I support, to view D (from the seventh century) as the earliest work, JE (from the sixth century) as exilic, and P (from the fifth century) as postexilic. This would account for the fact that so little is made of the Moses tradition outside of the Pentateuch.

Whether one adopts the older scheme or the later date for the Pentateuchal sources, a long period of time separates any historical figure from the written presentation of Moses in the Bible. To bridge this gap one is faced with evaluating the diversity of traditions within the Moses legend and with tracing their history of transmission prior to their use by the later authors, as well as with considering the shape and color the authors themselves gave to the Moses tradition as a reflection of their own times and concerns. The history of the preliterary tradition has occupied a lot of attention but with few convincing results because it is so difficult to control any reconstruction of the various stages of oral tradition. We are therefore left with an examination of the traditions about Moses in their present literary forms within the larger context of the Hebrew scriptures.

Moses as deliverer from Egypt. The general background for the deliverance of the people through Moses is the theme of the oppression and enslavement in Egypt. This theme of Israel's oppression is often mentioned elsewhere in the Hebrew scriptures as the condition of the people from which God "redeemed" them, often without any reference to Moses (note, e.g., *Ez.* 20). The Pentateuch continues to stress God as deliverer but now makes Moses the human agent.

Within the tradition of enslavement the JE writer introduces a special theme of attempted genocide (*Ex.* 1:8–22), which provides the context for the story of Moses' birth and his rescue from the Nile by the Egyptian princess (*Ex.* 2:1–10). But once this story is told, the theme of genocide disappears, and the issue becomes again that of enslavement and hard labor. The story of Moses as a threatened child rescued from the basket of reeds and reared under the very nose of Pharaoh to become the deliverer of his people corresponds to a very common folkloric motif of antiquity. Similar stories were told about Sargon of Akkad and Cyrus the Persian. However, Moses' initial attempt at deliverance (*Ex.* 2:11–15), whereby he kills an Egyptian for beating a Hebrew, is antiheroic because it ends in failure and leads only to his flight to the land of Midian, where he becomes a shepherd (*Ex.* 2:16–22, 3:1). This prepares the way for the author (JE) to present Moses as a most unheroic leader, totally dependent on the divine word from Yahveh for each action he takes.

The story of Moses' experience of the burning bush theophany at Sinai/Horeb, in the land of Midian (*Ex.* 3–4), has all the marks of a new beginning. It resembles that of the prophetic-call narratives in which the prophet experiences a theophany and then is given his commission (*Is.* 6, *Ez.* 1–3). Moses' protest is similar to that of Jeremiah in his call (*Jer.* 1:6–10), but the author in *Exodus* develops it into an elaborate motif. At the same time Moses' call bears some resemblance to the commissioning of a military leader whose task it is to deliver his people from oppression (*Jgs.* 6, *1 Sm.* 9). But Moses is not given the task of being a military leader, nor are the signs he receives meant to give him confidence of victory. The primary concern in the dialogue between Moses and Yahveh is in Moses' role as a spokesman whom the people will believe and who can speak on behalf of the people to the foreign ruler. The author (JE) has drawn upon both the tradition of classical prophecy and the literary history of Gideon and Saul to fashion his rather composite presentation of Moses' call and commission as Israel's deliverer.

The plague stories (*Ex.* 7:14–11:10) carry out the image of Moses as deliverer through the prophetic word of judgment and salvation. But they also add the element of the prophet as a wonder-worker similar to Elijah and Elisha. Yet in the plagues tradition the wonders are all carefully circumscribed by divine commands so that Moses and Aaron—aside from a slight gesture—are almost completely passive and unconnected to them (see also *Ps.* 78:43–51, 105:26–36). The notion of the man of God as miracle worker has been largely absorbed by the view of the prophet as messenger and spokesman. The P writer, however, introduces the notion of a contest between Aaron and the magicians of Egypt (7:8–12). The plague stories as a whole are intended to emphasize the greatness and power of Yahveh and add very little to the Moses tradition.

The climax of Israel's deliverance is at the Red Sea (*Ex.* 13:17–14:31), and here again Moses' role is to announce judgment on the Egyptians and salvation for Israel. In the JE account Moses and Israel do nothing but witness the divine rescue, while in the P version Moses, at God's command, splits the sea with his rod to create a path for the Israelites and, again at divine command, makes the sea come back upon their pursuers. The effect is that the people fear Yahveh and believe in him and in his servant Moses. It is remarkable that except for one late addition to *Deuteronomy* (11:4) there are no references to the Red Sea event in this source even though the Exodus is mentioned many times. This suggests that the Red Sea episode is really secondary to the Exodus tradition. In its present form it constitutes a transition to the wilderness themes and to Moses' direct leadership of his people.

Moses as leader. Apart from an initial contact with Israel's elders in Egypt, which did not turn out very well (*Ex.* 5), Moses' direct leadership of the people begins only when they depart from Egypt. As their leader he is the one to whom the people complain about their hardships in the wilderness. But it is always God who meets their needs, with manna from heaven, or quails, or water from a rock. In the case of the people's complaints or rebellions, sometimes directed at Moses (and Aaron), God answers with judgment, and Moses must act as intercessor to mitigate the severity of the punishment. In all of this Moses is primarily a spiritual leader, a kind of prophetic mediator between the people and God with no other form of authority or legitimation.

Moses is also the supreme judge and head of the administrative functions of the wilderness community. In these capacities the tradition tells of two occasions in which Moses sets up civil institutions, one a system of courts for the purpose of sharing the judicial responsibility of the people (*Ex.* 18, *Dt.* 1:9–18) and the other a council of seventy elders for a sharing of the governance (*Nm.* 11:16–30). But these stories merely represent etiologies of later Israelite institutions. Moses' authority is his endowment of the prophetic spirit and the means by which God speaks and directs the people in every decision.

On a few occasions the Israelites are involved in military encounters, but Moses' role in these is very limited. In their fight against the Amalekites (*Ex.* 17:8–16) Joshua is the military captain, while Moses raises his hands as if to receive divine aid. When Moses sends spies to survey the land of Canaan, it is Joshua and Caleb who play the major role in support of a military campaign and against the negative report of the other spies. When the people finally attempt a southern assault, Moses does not go with them, and they are defeated. In the campaign against the Midianites (*Nm.* 31 [P]) it is Phinehas the priest who takes charge of the army while Moses remains in the camp. In the campaign against Sihon and Og (*Nm.* 21:21–35, *Dt.* 2:24–3:11) Moses appears to lead the forces in the D account, but in JE he recedes into the background. Moses is not a military hero in these traditions.

Moses as lawgiver. The theme of Moses as lawgiver is more closely associated with the theophany at Sinai/Horeb (*Ex.* 19–20, *Dt.* 4–5), and with the prolonged stay at the mountain of God, during which the Law was given to Israel through Moses. Many scholars have argued that the giving of the Law at Sinai originated as a separate tradition. In many respects it represents a de-

tour on the way from Egypt to Canaan and is parallel to another law-giving tradition, which is reflected in *Exodus* 15:25–26. But the matter is hotly debated and still unresolved.

Within the corpus of laws in the Pentateuch there is great variation of type and function reflecting different social settings and historical perspectives. Some of these laws represent the casuistic style of civil law used in the settled life of Israelite society in the land of Canaan. Others are apodictic commands that express universal principles of ethics and religion. There are also laws regarding cultic observances and regulations. Each category of law contains examples of parallel versions among the various Pentateuchal sources, and the law codes of the various sources can be correlated with certain periods of Israelite history. Thus the comparative study of the laws of the Pentateuch has become an important aspect of the study of Israel's social and religious history far removed from the wilderness period, which is their present narrative setting. [*See* Israelite Law.]

Nevertheless Moses has often been viewed as the author of the Ten Commandments. But the two forms, in *Deuteronomy* 5 and *Exodus* 20, are in the sources D and P respectively, and their language is so characteristic of D that there seems little reason to believe that they are any older than the seventh century BCE. Even in these two sources the "ten words" are said to have been given to the people directly without the mediation of Moses and only later written by the finger of God upon the two tables of stone. Furthermore, the JE corpus does not regard the Ten Commandments as a distinct series and has quite a different set of laws and instructions written on the two tables of stone (*Ex.* 34).

The JE corpus of laws in *Exodus* 20:22–23:33, usually designated as the Book of the Covenant (24:7), is a mixture of all types of law, religious and civil regulations, absolute principles of religion and ethics, and paraenesis. These are all given through Moses at one time on Sinai and constitute the basis of the covenant between the people and their God (*Ex.* 24:3–8). Portions of the civil laws are generally regarded as quite old in origin and perhaps taken over from the earlier Canaanite society, but this corpus of laws in its present form derives from the exilic period. The Deuteronomic code (*Dt.* 12–26) is the body of instructions given to Moses *after* the Ten Commandments were proclaimed. The D code was delivered to the people in written form in the land of Moab as preparation for their entry into the promised land. In actual fact the code represents a cultic reform movement of purification and centralization of worship in the time of Josiah (c. 625 BCE). The Priestly code is primarily concerned with setting out an elaborate program of cultic regulations to form the basis for the cult of the Second Temple during the restoration. Its view of Judean society is strongly theocratic, with the high priest as the real head of state—hence the elevation of Aaron alongside of Moses. The P writer has much of this code revealed to Moses at Sinai (*Ex.* 25–31, 35–40; *Lv.*; *Nm.* 1–10), but some instructions are given during the remaining part of the wilderness journey. In P, Moses' role as the revealer and instructor in divine law is the most dominant.

For all the biblical writers the wilderness period was the constitutional age, the time of Israel's beginning. Whatever was most fundamental to Israelite society was deemed to have arisen in this period. And Moses as the leader, the prophet, the founder, was regarded as the one through whom all this came about. Modern historical criticism, however, has made the Moses tradition problematic by identifying its anachronisms and by dating its materials to later ages. While some scholars have tried to find some elements of the tradition, particularly within the Decalogue, that may go back to Moses, there are others who dispute that any of the laws and customs of the Pentateuch derive from Moses or the wilderness period.

Moses as the Founder of Israelite Religion. Many scholars believe that Moses is the founder of Israel's religion, at least in the form of a worship of Yahveh alone and, ultimately, in the form of monotheism. This position is based upon a number of arguments. First, the P source explicitly states (*Ex.* 6:2–3) that the name of Yahveh was not known before the time of Moses and that the forefathers worshiped God as El Shaddai. In *Genesis* there are also frequent references to forms of El worship among the patriarchs. Yet the JE corpus clearly regards the patriarchs as worshipers of Yahveh and the El epithets as merely titles for Yahveh. It is the P writer who has created a periodization of revelation out of the El references. The use of *El* as a designation for Yahveh becomes particularly frequent in the exilic period (see *Is.* 40–55) and says nothing about early Israelite forms of worship.

Second, in the call narrative of *Exodus* 3:13 Moses inquires about God's name and is given an answer that seeks to explain the name *Yahveh* (actually YHVH in the unvocalized Hebrew text) in terms of its supposed etymology from the verb *hyh* ("to be"). This could be interpreted as signifying that Moses introduced a new understanding of the name and character of Yahveh and Yahveh's relations with his people. Yet this piece of dialogue is unrelated to anything else that follows in the tradition and has the character of theological speculation and interests in the author's own time. It tells us nothing about Moses.

Third, the first and second commandments of the Decalogue emphasize the exclusive worship of Yahveh and an imageless cult. Those who attribute the Decalogue to Moses also use it as a basis for their view that Moses was the founder of monotheism. But it is unlikely that these laws predate the seventh century BCE. Archaeological evidence confirms the fact that as late as the eighth century BCE Yahveh was regarded by some Israelites as having a divine consort. At Kuntillat 'Ajrud, a Judean sanctuary in eastern Sinai, two inscriptions were found containing blessings "by Yahveh and his Asherah" (a female deity). One of these inscriptions was accompanied by a drawing of a seated female deity alongside two male divinities(?). At Khirbet el Qôm in western Judah a similar inscription referring to Yahveh and his consort Asherah was also found. The first commandment of the Decalogue may be understood as a direct protest against such a consort being placed or named "beside" Yahveh.

Fourth, there are those who would see in the Sinai covenant Moses' achievement in creating a unique politico-religious union centered upon commitment to Yahveh and a new social order among his fellow Israelites. These scholars point to the Hittite suzerainty treaty model of the Late Bronze Age, which emphasizes absolute loyalty to the great king based upon past favors and complete obedience to a series of stipulations regulating relations between king and vassal as well as between vassal states. The force of the argument lies in the attempt to establish parallels between this model and the giving of the law and covenant ratification at Sinai in *Exodus* 19–24, as well as in the fact that the time of Moses and the time of the Hittite empire are relatively close. The theory, however, has come under criticism because the parallels are too forced to be convincing, the treaty form is not so restricted in time, and the greatest correspondences to such a treaty-covenant form is to be found in *Deuteronomy*—very likely written shortly after Judah had experienced such vassalage to Assyria. In fact, it has been strongly argued that the notion of such a Sinai/Horeb covenant between Yahveh and his people is no older than D and cannot be traced back to Moses.

While the critical scholar may doubt that a historical figure, Moses, living in the thirteenth century BCE was the founder of Israelite religion in anything like the form reflected in the Pentateuch, the tradition itself has clearly regarded him as such, and thus he remained in all the subsequent developments of that tradition in later times.

Moses in Postbiblical Judaism. The great diversity within Jewish piety and religion in the centuries that followed the Hebrew scriptures does not allow for a simple statement about the development of the Moses tradition in this period. Nor is it possible to do justice to all the sources or varying viewpoints. Yet a few common features are shared by most of them and may be listed as follows. (1) The Law of Moses, the Torah, becomes understood as the whole of the Pentateuch and not just the laws within it. This means that God revealed to Moses past history as well as future events, in addition to law. (2) The legend of Moses, especially details about his birth and youth, was greatly expanded. (3) Moses is consistently viewed as the greatest prophet of Israel, although the understanding of this "office" and the nature of the revelation he received were not always the same. (4) Moses is the great intercessor and defender on Israel's behalf and the one responsible for mitigating God's punishment for the people's sins. Let us now consider some of the special developments of the Moses tradition.

Moses in Hellenistic Judaism. One of the characteristics of Hellenistic Judaism in the period from 200 BCE to 100 CE was its strong apologetic character. A number of pagan writings represented Judaism and its history in a bad light and included Moses in this vilification. In order to counteract this, Jewish writers presented their history in a way that would have special appeal for gentile audiences and win support for their religion and way of life. Thus Moses was portrayed as a great culture hero and inventor of the arts of civilization, including writing, philosophy, statesmanship, and religion. Moses' early life was modeled after the Hellenistic biography of the divine man, with prophecies about his birth and greatness, accounts of his beauty and royal upbringing, and his great military exploits on behalf of the pharoah. In all these embellishments of the tradition the authors were responding to criticisms of Moses.

Josephus Flavius, the Jewish historian writing at the end of the first century CE, stands in this stream of Hellenistic historiography. Moses is both the Hellenistic "divine man" and the Hebrew "man of God." As lawgiver he is presented in Greek terms as legislator and founder of the ideal constitution—a theocracy (*Jewish Antiquities* 2.6–24, 3.180, 4.13, 150, 156; *Against Apion* 2.75, 145, 154ff.). At the same time Moses is the greatest of the prophets as the "apostle" of God and interpreter of the words of God (*Antiquities* 4.165, 329; 3.85–87).

Philo Judaeus of Alexandria, who also lived in the first century CE, stands in the tradition of Judeo-Greek philosophy and mystical religion. He identifies Moses as the ideal king of Hellenistic ideology and combines in this role most of Moses' task (*Life of Moses* 1). Moses, with his special qualities as divine man, his royal upbringing, and his life as a shepherd, is prepared to be-

come the king of Israel in the wilderness period. To his role as king is related his function as legislator, since the king is the embodiment of law (2.8ff.). The priesthood is also part of the royal office, and Moses is priest, according to Philo, in his establishment of the cult and in his role as intercessor (2.66ff.). Moses is also *the* prophet for Philo but in the special sense of the ecstatic who gains direct intuition of the truth through the mystical experience (2.187ff.). The theophany of Sinai was such an experience for Moses whereby he ascended to heaven itself and became a divine king through divinization. In some of Philo's writings he describes Moses as a hierophant, and the Torah is interpreted as a guide into the mysteries of God (*On the Decalogue* 18; *Allegorical Interpretation* 3.173).

The apocalyptic tradition. In two apocalyptic works, the *Assumption of Moses* and *Jubilees*, Moses receives special and secret knowledge about both past and future as well as the unseen worlds of heaven and hell (*Jub.* 1.26; *Asm. Mos.* 1.16–18). The apocalyptic literature reveals this information with special emphasis on the events of the end of time. Great emphasis is also placed upon Moses as intercessor, but this is not restricted to the wilderness period. Since Moses' death is understood as an assumption into heaven, his role as defender of Israel continues throughout Israel's history up to the Last Judgment (*Jub.* 1.18–21; *Asm. Mos.* 11.17).

The Essenes living at Qumran on the shores of the Dead Sea in the first centuries BCE and CE were a community dedicated to living by the Torah. They regarded themselves as the true Israel, who withdrew to the desert "to prepare the way of the Lord" for the last days (*1 Qumran Scrolls* 8.14f.). The biblical wilderness period was a model for their own experience, and a study of the Law was intended to yield an eschatological revelation for their own times. Moses was the great prophet whose words were the primary revelation for this apocalyptic community (*1 QS* 1.3, 8.15; *Code of Damascus* 5.21).

Rabbinic view of Moses. The rabbinic tradition represents a vast array of sources from the second century to the Middle Ages, containing a wide spectrum of belief and opinion. At the same time it fell heir to many of those traditions and impulses in the Moses tradition that we have already noted above.

In the legal tradition *(halakhah)* Moses represents the great "teacher" by which Israel was instructed in the Torah. This includes not only the laws of the Pentateuch but all the subsequent oral Torah, which was handed down from Moses to Joshua and in succession to the rabbis. All students of the law were really disciples of Moses.

The homiletic tradition *(aggadah)* brought to the fore those other aspects of the Moses tradition that were a part of Jewish piety. It continued to embellish the biography of Moses as the "man of God," but more central is his role as the servant of God. As such he was God's agent for bringing about the rescue from Egypt, for mediating the covenant and the laws to Israel at Sinai, and for leading the Israelites to the Promised Land. The role of servant emphasized Moses' function as intercessor for his people and as one who suffered and died on their behalf. Through his death in the wilderness instead of in Canaan Moses was identified with the sinful generation of the wilderness and thus ensured its salvation in the resurrection.

Moses was the supreme prophet as revealer of the words of God and the one to inaugurate the succession of prophets. The traditions about Moses as king and priest were viewed in a more limited fashion, for while he may have been king during the wilderness period and priest in the dedication of the Tabernacle rites, he was not able to pass on this succession to his heirs, and it remained for David as king and Aaron as high priest to found these lines of succession.

There is also a tradition within the *aggadah* about Moses' heavenly ascent at Sinai that elaborates on his vision of God and his struggles with the angels to acquire the Torah for Israel. These stories have much in common with the ascension materials called *heikhalot*, which Gershom Scholem has seen as reflecting ecstatic mystical experiences. There was a certain reticence expressed by some rabbis toward this form of piety and the rather speculative character of its traditions.

Moses in the New Testament. The New Testament accepts Moses as the author of the Pentateuch (*Mt.* 8:4, *Mk.* 7:10, *Jn.* 1:17), but the real significance of the Pentateuch is as a prophecy that discloses the origins of Christianity (*Lk.* 24:25–27). Yet the whole of the institutional and ritual forms of Judaism as well as the Pharisaic-rabbinic tradition is associated with Moses, so that Moses reflects the ambivalent feelings of Christianity's continuity and discontinuity with Judaism.

In the Gospels, elements in the life of Jesus are parallel to those in the expanded legend of Moses. The infancy narrative in *Matthew* (chap. 2), with its predictions and warnings to king and father, its slaughter of the innocents, its recognition of Jesus' royalty, and the flight into exile until the king's death, is modeled on the Moses biographies. The scene on the mount of transfiguration where Jesus appears with Moses and Elijah has many allusions to the Sinai theophany (*Mt.* 17:1–8, *Mk.* 9:2–8, *Lk.* 9:28–36); Jesus' feeding of the five thousand (*Mt.* 14:13–21, *Mk.* 6:32–44, *Lk.* 9:10–17, *Jn.* 6:1–14) is directly associated in John's gospel with Moses giving the manna in the wilderness (6:25–34); and his forty days of fasting in the wilderness parallel Moses' fast at

Sinai (*Mt.* 4:1–2, *Lk.* 4:1–3; cf. *Dt.* 9:9). The story of Jesus' ascension in *Luke* and *Acts* has similarities to the traditions of Moses' assumption (*Lk.* 24:51, *Acts* 1:9–11).

The ministry of Jesus is also compared with that of Moses. In Matthew's gospel, Jesus' teachings are given a setting—that of the Sermon on the Mount—that is parallel to the receiving of the law at Sinai. In *Luke,* Jesus as prophet is a second Moses who has come to redeem his people. In *John,* the comparison with Moses is especially pronounced: "The law came through Moses but grace and truth came through Jesus Christ" (1:17). John's message to Jewish believers is that Jesus is superior to Moses and supplants him so that one must make a choice between Moses and Jesus.

The apostle Paul, using the methods of Hellenistic Jewish exegesis, interprets the time of Moseṣ typologically as a reference to Christianity (*1 Cor.* 10:1–11). But for Paul generally Moses represents a religion of the law, to which he compares his religion of grace.

The *Letter to the Hebrews* draws parallels between Jesus and Moses in order to demonstrate that Jesus is superior. Moses as the servant of God is inferior to Jesus, who is the son of God. Moses instituted the earthly sanctuary, which is only a copy and a shadow of the heavenly, and in this earthly sanctuary the Levitical priesthood ministers according to the law. But Jesus is the eternal high priest who ministers in the heavenly sanctuary by interceding for the faithful (*Heb.* 8:1–6). In the same way Moses is the author of the old covenant, but this was only a preparation for and a foreshadowing of the new covenant through Jesus (*Heb.* 8:7–10:18).

Moses in Islam. Moses is highly regarded in Islam as the great prophet who foretold the coming of Muḥammad, his successor. Details about Moses' life from the *aggadah* are to be found in the Qur'ān, but there are additional details with parallels from folklore as well as borrowed from other biblical stories and applied to Moses (see especially surah 28:4–43; also 7:104–158, 20:10–98, 26:11–69). Apart from explicit references there is much in the life of Muḥammad that is implicitly reminiscent of the Moses tradition. This is particularly true of the notions about a dictated revelation received through angels and the experience of an ascent to heaven, in Muḥammad's case, from Jerusalem.

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MOSES BEN MAIMON. *See* Maimonides, Moses.

MOSES BEN NAḤMAN. *See* Nahmanides, Moses.

MOSQUE. [*This entry consists of two articles:* History and Tradition *and* Architectural Aspects. *The first article surveys the religious and political functions of the mosque as the center of Muslim community worship. The second presents a historical view of the geographical types and structural and decorative features of mosques.*]

History and Tradition

Essentially, the mosque is a center of community worship where Muslims perform ritual prayers and where historically they have also gathered for political, social, and cultural functions.

Name. The word *mosque*, anglicized from the French *mosquée*, comes through the Spanish *mezquita* from the Arabic *masjid*, meaning "a place where one prostrates oneself [in front of God]." The term *masjid* (same in Persian, Urdu, and Turkish) was already found in Aramaic, where it was used in reference to Nabatean and Abyssinian sacred places; it was also a common word in pre-Islamic Arabia.

The *masjid* is frequently mentioned in the Qur'ān (principally 2:144, 9:17–18, 9:107–108, 22:40, 62:1, 72:17); there it is applied generally to sanctuaries where God is worshiped but does not refer to a specifically new kind of Muslim building. Whenever a precisely Muslim identification was needed, the term was used in a compound construct, as in *masjid al-ḥarām* in Mecca or *masjid al-aqṣā* in Jerusalem. A celebrated *ḥadīth* ("tradition") indicates that a *masjid* exists wherever one prays and thus makes the existence of a Muslim building unnecessary. However, all Muslims are obliged to perform prayers collectively once a week on Fridays at noon, when they also swear allegiance to the Prophet's successor. The great mosque in which the community *(jamā'ah)* of worshipers attended the Friday *(jum'ah)* service took the name *masjid al-jamā'ah*, or *masjid al-jum'ah*, or *masjid al-jāmi'* ("place of assembly"), usually called simply *al-jāmi'*. Subsequently, the word *jāmi'* has been reserved for large congregational mosques where the Friday *khuṭbah* ("sermon") is delivered, whereas the word *masjid* refers to small private mosques of daily prayer (with the exception of the mosques of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, which have kept their traditional Qur'anic names of *masjid*s). This distinction is still clearly observed in Turkey where the respective terms are correctly used.

Definition. The function of the mosque is perhaps best summarized by the thirteenth-century jurist Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328), who describes it as a "place of gathering where prayer was celebrated and where public affairs were conducted." In simple terms, the mosque is a building large enough to contain the community of the believers, laid out with a covered space for prayer and an open space for gatherings, and oriented toward Mecca. The structure, in spite of chronological developments and stylistic and regional variations, has remained unchanged in its essentials. All mosques are built on an axis oriented in the direction of Mecca, the focus of prayer established in the Qur'ān (2:139). They all have a prayer hall parallel to the wall of the *qiblah* (the direction of Mecca) where Muslim men, on an egalitarian basis, rich or poor, noble or humble, stand in rows to perform their prayers behind the imam. Women, who are expected to say prayers at home, may join in certain mosques but are expected to use a separate place specially screened off for them. Otherwise, Muslim men from all four Sunnī legal schools (Shāfi'ī, Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī) go to the same mosque. Shī'ī Muslims, on the other hand, pray in mosques of their own.

The building proper has few characteristic symbols that identify it with the requirements of the faith: on the outside, a fountain for ablutions is provided so the Muslims can pray in ritual cleanliness, and a minaret serves to call the believers for prayer, while inside, a small, empty niche *(miḥrāb)* in the center of the *qiblah* wall indicates the direction of prayer, and in communal Friday mosques (*jāmi'*s) a pulpit *(minbar)* is placed to the right of the *miḥrāb* for the prayer leader *(khaṭīb)* to deliver his sermon. Other optional features are an enclosed area for the ruler *(maqṣūrah)*, the respondent's platform *(dikkah)*, and a cantor's lectern *(kursī)*.

It must be stressed that the mosque is not an exclusively religious space. Rather, like the Greek agora or the Roman forum, the court of the mosque has also been the favored place of public assembly, where the Friday *khuṭbah* has always addressed issues of politics, war, religion, and so forth, the community has acclaimed caliphs and governors, judges have held court, the treasury has been kept, and teaching has taken place. Unlike a church, it does not accommodate services related to marriages and births, nor does Islam provide for confession and confirmation.

Officials. Historically, mosques have been maintained through endowed properties *(waqf*, pl. *awqāf)* administered by a warden *(nāẓir)* who also oversees the management of the mosque's finances and the appointment of its staff. Since Islam has no clergy and no liturgy, mosque officials are few in number and their functions are simple and clear.

1. The imam, or prayer leader, is the most important appointee. In the early days the ruler himself filled this role; he was leader *(imām)* of the government, of war, and of the common *ṣalāt* ("ritual prayer"). Under the Abbasids, when the caliph no longer conducted prayers on a regular basis, a paid imam was appointed. While any prominent or learned Muslim can have the honor of leading prayers, each mosque specifically appoints a man well versed in theological matters to act as its imam. He is in charge of the religious activities of the mosque, and it is his duty to conduct prayers five times a day in front of the *miḥrāb*. The office is not a profession, for an imam usually has another occupation, such as judge, schoolteacher, or shopkeeper, and the title remains with the job rather than the person.

2. The *khaṭīb*, or preacher of the Friday sermon, is also a religious appointee. The office, like that of the imam, evolved when the Abbasid caliph no longer deliv-

ered *khuṭbah*s on Fridays. A man learned in religious matters was appointed to represent the ruler. *Qāḍī*s ("judges") have been frequently chosen as *khaṭīb*s, and the office is usually hereditary. In large mosques, a number of *khaṭīb*s are appointed to relieve one another, while in smaller mosques the offices of *khaṭīb* and imam can be combined. Besides the *khaṭīb*, the *wāʿiẓ* and the *qāṣṣ* act as edifying preachers without set forms.

3. The muezzin *(muʾadhdhin)* announces to the faithful the five daily prayers and the Friday noon service. According to tradition, the *adhān* ("announcement") was instituted in the first year of the Muslim era, and Bilāl, the Prophet's freed Abyssinian servant (known for his sweet voice), was the first muezzin to convoke the believers to prayer. Originally called out from the top of the mosque, the *adhān* quickly acquired a formal locale in the *maʾdhanah* (minaret). Until the twentieth century, the muezzin climbed to the top of the minaret five times a day to issue the call to prayer, but with the introduction of electrical loudspeakers and recorded *adhān*s, the highly developed art of the muezzin is no longer a prerequisite. The muezzins, whose office has sometimes been hereditary, are organized under chiefs *(ruʾasāʾ)* who are next to the imam in importance. At times they also perform the role of *muwaqqit*, the astronomer who ascertains the *qiblah*.

Institutions. In early times, mosque construction was viewed as an obligation of the ruler, but with the spread of Islam, governors assumed that role in the provinces and were followed by private individuals. Once the building of mosques came to be regarded as a religious and social obligation—one *ḥadīth* reported that the Prophet said, "For him who builds a mosque, God will build a home in Paradise"—and as a reflection of prestige, their number increased dramatically. Chronicles and travelers report, for instance, 3,000 mosques for tenth-century Baghdad, 300 for tenth-century Palermo, 241 for twelfth-century Damascus, and 12,000 for fourteenth-century Alexandria.

In addition to its religious and political functions, the mosque had always served as a center of administrative, legal, and educational activity. While the actual work of government was transferred early on from the mosque to a special *dīwān* ("office") or *majlis* ("council"), matters of public finance continued to be transacted at the mosque, and the community treasury *(bayt al-māl)* was kept there. Similarly, in the time of the Prophet, legal questions were settled in the mosque; as early as 644/5 the *qāḍī* of Fusṭāṭ held his sessions in the mosque, and in tenth-century Damascus the vice-*qāḍī* occupied a special *riwāq* ("aisle") in the court of the Umayyad mosque. When the judges officially moved to law courts, the mosque remained the center of legal studies. Finally, the mosque has served as the most continuous center of education in Islam, with study circles *(ḥalaqāt)* traditionally gathering around the teachers in the courtyard and at the base of columns. Some mosques, such as that of al-Manṣūr in Baghdad or those in Isfahan, Mashhad, Qom, Damascus, and Cairo, became centers of learning for students from all over the world. Teaching in mosques continued even after the proliferation of *madrasah*s where permanent, state-approved, and state-financed teaching took place. In modern times, the political, administrative, social, and educational functions of the community mosque have been taken over by specialized institutions.

[*See also* Worship and Cultic Life, *article on* Muslim Worship; Ṣalāt; Ḥaram and Ḥawṭah; *and* Madrasah.]

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Architectural Aspects

The mosque is a place of communal prayer and the principal type of Muslim religious building. The English term *mosque* derives from the Arabic *masjid*, meaning simply the "place where one prostrates oneself [before God]." It came only slowly to signify a specific building type and can refer to either a simple oratory *(masjid)*, the congregational or Friday mosque (Arab., *masjid al-jāmiʿ*; Pers., *masjid-i jumʿah*; Turk., *ulu cami*), or an outdoor prayer area for larger assemblies *(muṣallā)*.

Liturgical Elements. The obligation to perform prayers is of seminal importance for the form of the mosque. The ritualized prayer *(ṣalāt)*, a sequence of standing, kneeling, and prostrating postures, is repeated five times daily and performed facing the spiritual center of the Muslim world, the Kaʿbah in Mecca. This orientation, the *qiblah*, is the central organizing feature of the mosque. The singular importance of the *qiblah* was evi-

denced in the practice of Muḥammad's armies when out in the field. At the hour of prayer a long line at right angles to the direction of Mecca was drawn in the sand, and ranks of soldiers lined up behind it to pray. As the first row of worshipers enjoyed greater proximity to Mecca, the source of blessing, the tendency was for the line to be broadly drawn. In the mosque likewise, the sanctuary was wide and shallow, in contrast to the narrow and deep configuration of the Christian church. The *qiblah* wall, the broad one turned toward Mecca, marked by an elaborate niche *(miḥrāb)* in its center, is the architectural culmination and focus of the entire mosque.

Prayer also requires an open, ritually purified floor area. Thus the simplest places of prayer (*muṣallās*), used for large outdoor gatherings, are merely open areas with an indicated *qiblah* line or wall. Worshipers bring their own mats or prayer rugs to maintain ritual cleanliness and to define their individual space. For the same reason mosque interiors are generally carpeted and require baring the feet to avoid ritual defilement. To keep interior space open toward the *qiblah* wall, multiple-columned or "hypostyle" halls were the earliest and still prominent solution (see figure 1). Such halls can easily be expanded with additional rows of columns to accommodate a growing population. The hypostyle hall also reflects the equality of supplicants in prayer; lacking a priesthood, the mosques long maintained a communal rather than a hieratic organization. As the diversity of congregations grew, interiors were often elaborated with specially configured rows of pillars or ancillary *miḥrāb* niches spatially distinguishing areas for the different groups and quarters of the town.

Though prayer is often performed in isolation, the celebration of the *ummah*, or polity, is a concept basic to the mosque. Since Islam does not distinguish between spiritual and temporal power, the congregational or Friday mosque was generally (until the nineteenth century and the institution of colonial civil governments) the center for secular as well as religious practice. At the Friday noon prayer, the main weekly service, the entire adult community assembles at the congregational mosque for the reading of the sermon *(khuṭbah)*, a compilation of financial and political news. The congregational mosque often forms the core of a major urban center, a complex that can include markets, caravanseries, a government administration center, public baths, saints' shrines, and schools.

The small local or community mosques, simple oratories for daily prayer and without the more complex furnishings of the congregational mosque, are identified with the patrons, prominent families, charitable foundations, or communities. In an urban framework the local mosque establishes the identity of neighborhood quarters. Permission to build such a mosque constitutes official recognition of a community or group. While the congregational mosque and the simpler oratory mosque were originally two discrete types, the distinction is often lost today.



FIGURE 1. *Great Mosque.* Cordova, Spain. Artist's rendering of interior, showing hypostyle, or multicolumned, hall. Floor plan shows successive additions made from the eighth to the eleventh century.

One final requirement for the performance of prayer is sequestration from the profane world. The words of God as spoken in the Qur'ān are the subject of prayer and revelation. The mosque concretizes this contemplative arena in a building most often lacking exterior embellishment or elaborate facades. The architectural fo-

cus is rather on the secluded realm of the courtyard and the sanctuary. Furthermore, Muslims very early on rejected the depiction of animate objects or human figures in religious environments as degrading to the transcendental state of prayer. The subject of the ornamentation is thus the word itself. Domes, portals, and *miḥrāb*s are lavishly embellished with Qur'anic passages in stylized calligraphy. [*See* Calligraphy, *article on* Islamic Calligraphy, *and* Iconography, *article on* Islamic Iconography.]

The earliest building used for prayer and an important symbolic and functional precedent for the organization of the mosque was the prophet Muḥammad's house in Medina (dating from the Hijrah or Emigration of 622) where his followers gathered for discussion and prayer. A rudimentary courtyard house, enclosed by a high wall with a shaded porch supported by palm trunks along one wall, it became the basis for the early hypostyle mosques of the seventh century. With its square courtyard *(ṣaḥn)* and covered sanctuary facing Mecca, the hypostyle plan established two basic features: the division of the mosque into court and sanctuary, and the intersection of the *qiblah* wall with the direction of Mecca. Functionally, it exemplified the dual role of Muḥammad's house, and subsequently the mosque, as both an oratory for prayer and a social and political center for the community.

Architectural Elements and Furnishings. With the accession of the Umayyad caliphate (661–750) and the expansion of the empire west into Syria, Palestine, Iraq, North Africa, and Spain, the influence of Hellenism and the development of a formalized liturgy resulted in a more elaborate assembly of parts. Primary among these, the *miḥrāb*, a niche evoking the symbolic presence of the Prophet, marks the direction of Mecca in the *qiblah* wall and is the symbolic culmination of the mosque. The *miḥrāb* is typically of an arched apsidal shape, lavishly ornamented and flanked by colonnettes. It may be surmounted by a window to show its directional position or fronted by a dome.

The *minbar*, a stepped pulpit that is as much a symbol of authority as an object for acoustical elevation, is located to the right of the *miḥrāb* (see figure 2). The top step of the *minbar* is reserved for the Prophet; the imam, or prayer leader, stands on the second step and uses the top one as a seat. After reading the *khuṭbah*, the imam descends the pulpit to lead the prayer standing before the *miḥrāb* as member of the assembly, a demonstration of his double role as both lawgiver and religious leader. *Minbar*s are usually of wood and encrusted with nacre and ivory, though marble is also used.

The dome is of minor liturgical significance but is, along with the *miḥrāb*, the object of the most lavish architectural embellishment. Domes are often placed adjacent to the *qiblah* wall, emphasizing it from the exterior and washing it with light inside. At Kairouan a dome is used over a central raised nave. Placed at right angles to the *qiblah* wall, this combination of dome, nave, and *miḥrāb* stresses the *qiblah* and creates a major cross-axis with the *qiblah* wall. In Turkey the dome was expanded in volume to cover the entire sanctuary area around the *qiblah*. Functionally, the use of the dome ensured the visibility of the imam by lighting the entire sanctuary area or highlighting him against darker surroundings.

The minaret *(manārah)* evolved from the need for the call to prayer. In contrast to the Jewish use of the *shofar* (ram's horn) or the Christian use of wooden clappers, in Islam a specially delegated muezzin *(mu'adhdhan)* gives the call to prayer *(adhān)*. In Damascus, an early Muslim conquest, the old church tower was adapted to raise



FIGURE 2. *Great Mosque.* Kairoun, Tunisia; rebuilt 836. The *miḥrāb*, a niche in the *qiblah* wall, marks the direction of Mecca and evokes the presence of the Prophet. The *minbar*, a stepped pulpit, symbolizes authority.



FIGURE 3. *Mosque of al-Ḥākim.* Cairo, Egypt; 990–1013. Minarets serve as platforms for the call to prayer.

the call above the rooftops, a practice subsequently spurring the design of specially built towers. With the addition of a platform or a peripheral balcony the muezzin could broadcast the *adhān* to all corners of the city. Lighter and more slender than church towers encumbered with heavy bells, minarets took a variety of forms, from the square fortresslike towers of North Africa (see figure 3) to the slender spires of Ottoman Turkey (see figure 4).

The fountain for ablutions is commonly located in the center of the courtyard. Tradition requires that the worshiper use running water and wash hands, feet, and face. An elevated step or stool may be provided to remove the cleansed supplicant from the impure floor or courtyard pavement. An additional marble jar may be found inside the mosque, a provision for the elderly who cannot be safely exposed to inclement weather. At the entrance to the mosque a low screen demarcates the boundary between ritually pure and impure areas.

The *dikkah*, somewhat analogous to the church choir, is a raised platform holding a group of respondents *(muballighūn)* who echo the imam's prayers and postures, transmitting the liturgy to those unable to see or hear the imam himself. In widespread use by the eighth century, the *dikkah* was invented as a means of communicating the prayers among increasingly large congregations. It usually straddles the *qiblah* axis in the middle of the mosque, though it may sit off-axis so the officiant can be seen more readily. With the installation of electronic amplification systems, it has largely fallen into disuse.

A final piece of mosque furniture, the *kursī*, is a lectern for the recitation of the Qur'ān. Usually made of wood and placed next to the *dikkah*, the *kursī* is lavishly ornamented and holds a platform for the Qur'ān reciter *(qārī)* to kneel while facing the *qiblah*. Sometimes it has a V-shaped slot to hold the very large Qur'āns that are often used.

Historical Development. The hypostyle mosque had a pervasive influence over the first six Muslim centuries (seventh to twelfth centuries CE), spreading throughout the Middle East and the southern Mediterranean. The shaded porticoes, interior courtyards, and vast columned or arcuated halls were well suited to the native building practices, climatic conditions, and Hellenistic architectural heritage of the region. To the east a second major mosque tradition arose from indigenous Iranian building and coalesced during the Seljuk dynasty (1038–1194). Like the hypostyle mosque, the *īwān* plan derived from a courtyard house plan, one so culturally predominant in Iran that it was applied interchangeably to house, *madrasah*, and caravansary. The major focus and organizing feature of the plan is the central courtyard, which is faced with four vaulted, open porches (*īwān*s), one in the center of each side, and each encompassed by a giant portal (*pishtaq*), providing functional, shaded outdoor areas and monumental entryways (see figure 5). Generally, the *īwān* leading to the



FIGURE 4. *Süleyman Mosque.* Istanbul, Turkey; 1551–1558. The central dome, buttressed by semidomes, is punctuated by slender minarets.

sanctuary precedes a domed bay directly fronting the *miḥrāb*. Subsidiary rooms and spaces open off of an arcade surrounding the courtyard. This *īwān* plan yielded a distinctive mosque type featuring large domed spaces, slender round minarets, elaborate decorative brickwork, and polychromed mosaic ornamentation. The *īwān* mosque flourished in Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia through the seventeenth century.

Throughout the history of Islam the basic features of the mosque have been repeatedly reinterpreted and adapted to a wide range of geographical, cultural, and historical contexts. Egyptian mosques with richly decorated street facades took on a strong public presence beginning already in the Fatimid era (969–1171). The *īwān* mosque and Seljuk influence penetrated Egypt under the rule of Salāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin) and his Ayyubid dynasty (1171–1250). Under the patronage of the Mamluk sultans (1250–1517), elaborate mosque complexes with monumental portals and towering domes and minarets delineated in carved and polychrome masonry marked the power, prestige, and material wealth of the rulers and their entourage.

When the Seljuks conquered India in the twelfth century, *īwān* mosques were transformed by a highly sophisticated Hindu building tradition of trabeated stone construction and elaborate inlay and ornamental stone carving into a host of regional developments. In the Indo-Islamic style of the Mughal period (1526–1858), the Hindu influence emerged in a courtyard that was frequently the primary spatial element and a sanctuary reduced to an elaborated pavilion or arcade wall. The giant *īwān* of the sanctuary, the portals, and the arcades were articulated with ogee arches, onion domes, and polychromed masonry bearing the ornamental lineage of both traditions.

In Turkey the Ottomans (1281–1922) made a major contribution with the centralized mosque, dominated both inside and outside by a massive dome. The earlier Seljuk rulers had brought the *īwān* plan to the cold climate of the Anatolian highlands, where the courtyard was soon engulfed by a pillared hall, a skylit dome over the ablution fountain, and a second dome over the *miḥrāb* bay. Under the Ottomans the *īwān* plan was monumentalized and merged with the Byzantine centralized basilica plan. The courtyard and sanctuary each assumed a square configuration, the courtyard open to the sky and surrounded by domed porches, the sanctuary sheltered beneath a single circular dome buttressed by semidomes (see figure 4). This ascending mountain of domes flanked by two or four needlelike minarets introduced a monumentality into the urban landscape that was alien to the hypostyle mosque.

In sub-Saharan Africa Islam arrived by way of the caravan routes around the year 1000. Along its path a synthesis of Muslim and African architectural concepts evolved. The Sudanic mosques merge indigenous mud architecture with the hypostyle mosque of North Africa in a range of ethnic variations. The Djenné Mosque has been rebuilt repeatedly in its history, most recently in 1909. Engulfing the hypostyle interior the pinnacled and buttressed facade integrates three square, symmetrically ordered minarets reflecting the indigenous monumental design. Projecting wooden dentils serve both as scaffolding for repairs to the adobe surface and as an ornamental motif. Male and female fertility symbols that ornament the towers and buttresses and the twin *miḥrāb*s and *minbar*s are also a reflection of traditional religious beliefs.

The mosques of Southeast Asia and China were largely incorporated into existing building traditions. In China mosque design was influenced by Central Asian precedents but became increasingly sinicized through the centuries. With the first Muslim communities during the T'ang dynasty (618–907), the Central Asian masonry techniques employing domes, vaults, and arches was uniformly adopted. But already by the



FIGURE 5. *Mosque Complex of Jamāl al-Dīn.* Anaw, Turkmen S.S.R.; 1452–1456. Artist's reconstruction of the monumental entrance facade of the mosque complex with vaulted porch *(īwān)* and twin minarets. The mosque complex was destroyed by earthquake in 1948.

Laio dynasty (907–1125), the indigenous character of Chinese design asserted itself on both a national and a regional level. In the Niu-chieh Mosque in Peking (962), the prayer hall and ancillary pavilions sit within the confines of a traditional series of axial courtyards and gateways, while the wooden pavilions themselves feature elaborate bracket systems and tiled roofs with the characteristic upward-sloping corners.

In its long history the mosque has been subject to an ever-changing series of contingencies. Like Islam itself, the vitality of the mosque tradition must be seen as tied to its syncretic potential. While its contemplative and liturgical functions have barely altered through time, its specific political and social roles have varied widely according to the historical and cultural context. So, too, have climatic and technical exigencies continuously reshaped and delimited its exterior form. The aesthetic component, coordinating and unifying these diverse elements, has given expression to the particular significance of the mosque in space and time. Today the evolution of the mosque continues as the techniques of modern technology and contemporary society interact with ancient traditions of Islam.

[*See also* Ṣalāt *and* Worship and Cultic Life, *article on* Muslim Worship.]

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SUSAN HENDERSON

MOTHER GODDESS. *See* Goddess Worship.

MOTOORI NORINAGA (1730–1801), regarded as the preeminent scholar of the Kokugaku ("national learning") school of premodern Japan. Born Ozu Yoshisada to a merchant-class family in Matsuzaka, Norinaga became interested in literature as a young man. Following the death of his brother-in-law in 1751, Norinaga's mother skillfully juggled the family finances in order to send her son to the capital, Kyoto, to continue his education. In 1752 he became the student of Hori Keizan, a Confucian scholar, with whom he studied Chinese literature. That same year he also discovered a book on Japanese poetry written by the Shingon monk Keichū, the first Kokugaku scholar *(kokugakusha)*. This experience moved Norinaga to undertake the study of the earliest Japanese documents, an occupation that he complemented with the study of practical medicine. As a result of his reading, which inculcated in him a growing awareness of, and sensitivity to, Japan's long cultural and religious history, he abandoned the name Ozu in favor of his family's ancestral name, Motoori. Later, he took Norinaga as his personal name.

Norinaga returned to Matsuzaka in 1757 and began to practice internal medicine, but his main interest continued to center on "ancient learning" *(kogaku)*, the literary and historical heritage of the early Japanese state. His early works include *Ashiwake obune* (A Small Boat on a Reedy River), which discusses the nature of *waka* poetry; *Shibun yōryō* (The Essence of *Genji*), an analysis of the *Genji monogatari* (Tale of Genji); and *Isonokami sasamegoto* (Whisperings of Isonokami), in which he developed the celebrated concept of *mono no aware*. This term, which literally means the sentiments or affections felt immediately after experiencing something, Norinaga considered to be the integrating concept of the *Genji monogatari*. Using this notion, he attempted to free the analysis of literature from the moralism of contemporary criticism. His emphasis on human experience for its own sake was fundamental to his existential outlook on life; it was from this standpoint that he would later explore his own cultural identity within the Shintō tradition.

Norinaga's major work, the *Kojikiden* (Commentary on the *Kojiki*), was begun in 1763, soon after Norinaga's first and only meeting with Kamo no Mabuchi (1697–1769), a disciple of Kada Azumamaro (1668–1736) and a major figure in the Kokugaku movement. Their meeting took place as Mabuchi was passing through Matsuzaka on a pilgrimage to the Grand Shrine at Ise. Prior to this, Norinaga had already begun to read the works of Mabuchi, intending to study the *Kojiki* with him sometime in the future. After their fortuitous meeting, Mabuchi accepted Norinaga as his student; through a

lively correspondence that continued until Mabuchi's death, Norinaga gradually laid claim to the intellectual successorship of the Kokugaku movement. Some thirty-five years elapsed between the time Norinaga began work on the *Kojikiden* and its completion in 1798. During that time he produced a number of other important works. These include the most representative of his treatises on Shintō, *Naobi no mitama* (The Spirit of Naobi; 1771); *Hihon tamakushige* (Special Edition of *The Spirit Box;* 1787), a discussion of Japanese politics presented to the Kii (one of three collateral Tokugawa families); and *Uiyamabumi* (Introductory Remarks for Scholastic Beginners; 1798), which marked the end of his scholarly career. In that year he began to draw a pension from the daimyo of Kii in response to an earlier request.

In the year preceding his death Norinaga wrote *Shokki rekichō Shōshikai* (Commentaries on Imperial Edicts in the *Shoku Nihongi*) and his will, which described in detail the procedures to be followed at his funeral. He also purchased land at the top of Mount Yamamuro to be used for his burial plot. Many have interpreted these actions as a rejection of Buddhism and an affirmation of his conviction that his spirit would remain on this earth forever.

In his many works Norinaga combined philological acumen with a keen sense of the primacy of the ancient texts of Japan, providing a basis on which scholars of his generation could forge a new appreciation of Shintō myth. He regarded Shintō as the way of the *kami* (which he defined as anything possessing awe-inspiring or superior power) and thus essentially the way of the emperor, the direct descendant of the deity Amaterasu. According to Norinaga, it is not our fate after death that should be our concern but rather a spontaneous and natural appreciation of life itself. In this life-affirming ethic he advocated a joyous reliance on the will of the *kami*, and maintained that each person was possessed of an innate sense of moral rectitude that renders man-made ethical systems unnecessary. For Norinaga, these attitudes were the very essence of the received traditions of antiquity. He himself eschewed the word *kokugaku*, holding that "learning" could not but refer to the study of the ancient texts and traditions of Japan.

[*See also* Kokugaku.]

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UEDA KENJI

MO-TZU (470?–390? BCE), philosopher and founder of a religion in ancient China. His given name was Ti; *Mo-tzu* is the complimentary reference, meaning "Master Mo" or "Teacher Mo" in popular usage.

Born shortly after Confucius's death, Mo-tzu was a contemporary of Socrates. At first a follower of Confucianism, he felt dissatisfied with its code of ritual and music, and he began instead to propound his own teaching. For nearly two centuries, Moism and Confucianism were known as the eminent schools of the land.

The time in which Mo-tzu flourished is known in Chinese history as the age of Warring States (403–221 BCE). The feudalistic hierarchy instituted at the beginning of the Chou dynasty (1122 BCE) had collapsed, and incessant intrigue and violence among the feudal states brought on widespread chaos and confusion. The common challenge confronting all thinkers of the day was how to bring order out of chaos, how to establish a harmonious human society. Believing himself to possess a teaching that would rectify the ills of his age, Mo-tzu served for a short time as a minor official. He spent a great deal of time as an itinerant scholar, visiting one feudal lord after another in the hope of finding a sympathetic patron so that his teaching could be put into practice. Failing to find such a prince, Mo-tzu instead devoted himself to a life of private scholarship and instruction. His personal life was simple and austere, bordering on asceticism.

Mo-tzu's teaching is known principally from the book entitled *Mo-tzu*, which has fortunately come down to us. It evidently represents the collected works of the Moist school, with the corpus of Mo-tzu's teaching constituting the body of the volume.

The central idea in the *Mo-tzu* is the doctrine of universal love. Convinced that the cause of disorder in the empire lay in the want of mutual love, Mo-tzu declared, "If everyone in the world will practice universal love: states not attacking one another, houses not attacking one another; . . . if all this comes to pass, order will prevail in the world." One of his critics remarked, "Universal love may be a good thing, but can it be of any use?" Mo-tzu responded, "If it were not useful, then I myself would disapprove of it. But how can there be anything that is good but not useful?" The identification of the good with the useful (i.e., good for something) is at variance with the traditional Confucian insistence that the good stands above the dictates of utility.

In defending the doctrine of universal love, Mo-tzu referred to men's predilections and preferences on the one hand and the sanction of Heaven on the other. Given the choice between a man committed to universality and one committed to partiality, anyone would naturally prefer the former as a master, a friend, or a person to whom one would entrust the care of one's parents, wife, and children. At the same time, Heaven provides divine sanction for the practice of universal love among men. When a disciple asked, "How do we know Heaven loves all men?" Mo-tzu replied, "Because Heaven teaches them all, claims them all, and accepts sacrifice from them all."

Mo-tzu's stand on religion makes him unique among Chinese philosophers. While the general tendency was to regard Heaven as a moral principle or as a natural force, Mo-tzu described Heaven as a living god. Heaven has a will, and the will of Heaven is to be obeyed and accepted as the unifying standard of human thought and action. "What is the will of Heaven that is to be obeyed? It is to love all people in the world universally."

Mo-tzu was at the same time a man of ideas and a man of action. A corollary tenet of universal love is condemnation of offensive war. It is recorded that to prevent a large state from making a predatory attack on a smaller one, Mo-tzu walked ten days and ten nights, tearing off pieces of his garment to wrap up his sore feet.

Inspired by his example of self-sacrifice, Mo-tzu's followers organized themselves after his death into a religious order led by a succession of Elder Masters, with a sizable congregation of devotees. At one time, it was said, as many as 170 followers were ready to give up their lives at the command of the Elder Master. But the Moist religion was short-lived and by the third century BCE had passed into oblivion.

The most famous among Mo-tzu's critics was Meng-tzu (Mencius; 372?–289?), the second sage of Confucianism. Meng-tzu said, "Mo advocates universal love, which fails to recognize one's special relation to one's father. To fail to recognize one's special relation to one's father . . . is to act like a beast." As if in anticipation of Meng-tzu's criticism, Mo-tzu asked, "How would a son wish others to behave toward his parents? Clearly, he would wish others to love his parents. So his duty likewise is to love others' parents." Universal love is thus a way of conduct that assures the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Another well-known critical remark is that of the Confucian thinker Hsün-tzu (306?–212?). Referring to Mo-tzu's advocacy of an economy so strict it would eliminate music as a wasteful luxury, Hsün-tzu said, "Mo-tzu was blinded by utility and did not know refinement."

[*See also* Moism.]

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Y. P. Mei

MOUNTAINS have an important place in the symbolic geography of religious traditions the world over, although the ways in which mountains are significant have differed. Some have been seen as cosmic mountains, central to an entire worldview; others have been distinguished as places of revelation and vision, as divine dwelling places, or even as geographical manifestations of the divine.

Attitudes toward mountains in general have varied widely. Chinese poets such as Hsieh Ling-yün (fourth to fifth century CE) and Han-shan (eighth to ninth century CE) were attracted by mountains through a sense that these peaks piled one upon the other led not only to the clouds, but to heaven. And yet in the West, the image of jutting mountain peaks touching the clouds has not always had a positive symbolic valence. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, Luther and others held the view that mountains appeared in an otherwise pleasingly symmetrical world only after the flood, which scarred the surface of the earth with "warts and pockmarks" and signaled the fall and decay of nature. Mountains were, in the view of the sixteenth-century English writer Edward Burnet, the ruins of the postdiluvial world, a sign of chaos and fractured creation. However, in the late seventeenth century with the "aesthetics of the infinite" came a new appreciation of the splendor and height of mountains as stretching the imagination toward God. One writer of the time described his response to the Alps as "a delightful Horrour, a terrible Joy, and at the same time, that I was infinitely pleas'd, I trembled" (quoted in Nicolson, 1959, p. 277).

The Cosmic Mountain as Sacred Center. As the center of the world, linking heaven and earth and anchoring the cardinal directions, the mountain often functions as an *axis mundi*—the centerpost of the world; it is a cosmic mountain, central to the order and stability of

the cosmos. [*See* Center of the World.] One of the most important such mountains is Mount Meru, or Sumeru, the mythical mountain that has "centered" the world of the majority of Asians—Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain. According to Hindu cosmology, four lotus-petal continents spread out from Mount Meru at the center and beyond them the seven ring-shaped seas and ring-shaped continents of the wider universe. Mount Meru rises heavenward as the seed cup of the world lotus. As an *axis mundi*, this mountain, rooted deep in the netherworld, rises high through the realms of heaven, where it spreads out to accommodate the cities of all the gods. Interestingly, Meru does not form a peak, for the geographical texts of the Purāṇas agree that Meru is wider at top than at bottom, true to both its seed-cup prototype and the polytheistic consciousness that accommodates many gods at the top. Meru has four sides of different colors (*varṇas*) and is flanked by four directional mountains. Above Meru stands the polestar, and daily the sun drives his chariot around the mountain. The heavenly Ganges in its descent to earth first touches the top of Meru and then divides into four rivers that run in the four cardinal directions to water the earth.

As the center of the world-circle, or *maṇḍala*, Mount Meru is symbolically repeated in many Hindu temples that take the mountain as an architectural prototype. The *sikhara* (spire or peak) of the temple rises high above the cavelike womb-chamber of the sanctum and is capped with the cogged, ring-shaped *āmalaka*, the sun itself, a symbol of the heavens. The mountain is also repeated in the architecture of the Buddhist stupa, the reliquary dome with gateways in the four directions and a multileveled mast at the top marking the *bhūmis* ("worlds") that lead to heaven. The mountain symbolism is most elaborately seen in the stupa of Borobudur in Java, which is actually built over a small hill. [*See* Stupa Worship.] There one sequentially circumambulates the nine *bhūmis* of the cosmos to reach the top. In China and Japan, the vertical dimension of the stupa became attenuated in the structure of the pagoda and came to predominate over the dome-shaped tumulus of the reliquary. Even so, the pagodas of the Far East preserve the basic mountain symbolism of the stupa. In Southeast Asia, one of the many duplicates of Meru is Mount Gunung Agung, the great volcanic mountain that is at the center of the island of Bali. Throughout Bali, individual temples repeat the mountain symbolism and are called *merus*. Their nine roof-layers again signify the vertical dimensions of the cosmic mountain linking heaven and earth. [*See also* Cosmology, *articles on* Hindu and Jain Cosmologies *and* Buddhist Cosmology.]

Like Meru, other mountains have been seen as cosmic centers. Mount Hara Berezaiti has a central place in the ancient cosmology of the Zoroastrian tradition. According to the *Zamyad Yasht*, it was the earth's first mountain, and its roots the source of the other mountains of Iran. Like other cosmic centers, it is the pivot around which the sun and the stars revolve, and like many other sacred mountains, it is also considered to be the source of heavenly waters. In Japan, the great volcanic peaks, among which Fuji is the most famous, have been thought to link earth and heaven. In Morocco, the great Atlas range in the territory of the Berbers is sometimes called the "pillar of heaven." Mountains that center and stand at the quarters of a fourfold cosmos are numerous, as can be seen in the quadrant mountains of China and in the "Encircled Mountain" of the Navajo, around which stand four peaks, each identified with a direction and a color.

Mountains not considered "centers" in any cosmology still share this image of stability and permanence, of both height and unshakable depth. The *Book of Psalms* speaks of the "foundations" of the mountains and hills. Among the Yoruba, myths stress the durability of the hills and, therefore, their ability to protect. The Yoruba say "Ota oki iku," meaning "The rock never dies." In East Africa, one might receive the blessing "Endure, like Kibo." Kibo is the peak of Mount Kilimanjaro and marks, for the Chagga people, the direction of all that is powerful and honorable.

In a similar vein, there are many traditions of the mountain that stood firm during a great flood. Mount Ararat in Turkey is known as the mountain where Noah found land and the ark came to rest. Among the Native American peoples of the Pacific Northwest, Mount Rainier was a pillar of stability during the flood. Peruvian myths from the Sierran highlands claim the same for several of the high peaks of the Andes.

The mountain as nature's great link between heaven and earth has also been widely symbolized architecturally, as in the case of Meru. In ancient Mesopotamia, the seven-storied ziggurat, with its high temple at the top and its low temple at the bottom, allows for the descent of the the devine. The pyramids of Mesoamerican civilization, such as the ruins at Teotihuacán, are clearly aligned to stand at the center of ceremonial avenues. The Pyramid of the Moon at Teotihuacán is further aligned with Mount Cerro Gordo, which it duplicates. [*See also* Pyramids *and* Temples, *article on* Mesoamerican Temples.]

Mountains of Revelation and Vision. There are many mountains that may not have a central role in cosmology but that are, nonetheless, places of powerful contact between the divine and the human. For example, on top

of Adam's Peak, or Śrī Pada ("auspicious foot"), in Sri Lanka is a large indentation said to be a footprint. According to Buddhists, it is the footprint of the Buddha himself, matched by a similar imprint at Phra Sat in Thailand. For Hindus, it is the imprint of Śiva; for Muslims, that of Adam; for Christians, that of the apostle Thomas. In any case, the belief that the peak was once trod by one larger than life is held by the people of all four traditions who climb to the top on pilgrimage.

In the Islamic tradition, it was on Mount Hira on the outskirts of Mecca that Muḥammad heard the revealed word of the Qur'ān. At nearby Mount Arafat, the entire assembly of pilgrims stands from noon to sunset on the ninth day of the *ḥajj* pilgrimage. This collective act of standing, before God and around Arafat, is considered by many to be the most powerful moment of the *ḥajj*.

Mount Sinai, where Moses encountered Yahveh face to face, is one of the most striking examples of the mountain of revelation. There Yahveh appeared to the Hebrews as a storm, with fire and lightning, or as a cloud that covered the peak. And there Yahveh also appeared directly, when Moses and the elders ascended the mountain and "saw the God of Israel" (*Ex.* 24:10). In the Elohist and Deuteronomic traditions, Yahveh appeared on Mount Horeb. There Moses enountered Yahveh in the burning bush. And there Elijah stood before the Lord, who, after the rock-breaking wind, the fire, and the earthquake, spoke to him as "a still small voice" (*1 Kgs.* 19:11–12). And Jesus was transfigured upon a high mountain, sometimes said to be Mount Hermon, and appeared to Peter, John, and James with a glowing countenance, in dazzling raiment, and flanked by Moses and Elijah (*Mt.* 17:1–8; *Mk.* 9:2–8; *Lk.* 9:28–36).

The mountaintop is a revelatory landscape, its height offering both the vision of heaven and a broad perspective on earth. Mountain ascent is associated with vision and the acquisition of power, as is clear in the vision quest of many of the Native American traditions and in the ascents of the *yamabushi*, the mountain ascetics of Japan. In both cases, transformation, including spiritual insight, is part of the mountain experience. For the pilgrim who is not an adept, a shaman, or an initiate, the mountaintop still affords ecstatic vision. In the words of the great Chinese mountain poet Han-Shan, "High, high from the summit of the peak, / Whatever way I look, no limit in sight" (*Cold Mountain*, trans. Burton Watson, New York, 1970, p. 46).

The Dwelling Place of the Divine. For the Hebrews, God's "dwelling place" was surely not Sinai, the place of revelation, but Mount Zion, the sturdy, rocky mount of Jerusalem. Zion, neither lofty nor dramatic, was the firm foundation of Jerusalem, the "City on a hill." Here God was said to dwell in the midst of the people. The awesome mountaintop, where God appears in fire and lightning, is replaced with the security and protection of a fortress mountain.

The hills of Canaan were the high places of powerful local *baalim*, and Mount Zaphon was the abode of the great Baal Hadad. In the *Ras Shamra* Ugaritic texts, Baal describes his dwelling place "in the midst of my mountain, the godly Zaphon, in the holy place, the mountain of my heritage, in the chosen spot, the hill of victory" (Clifford, 1972, p. 138). Many of Zaphon's traditions have likely become attached to Zion.

Perhaps the earliest evidence for mountaintop sanctuaries is in the Middle Minoan period (2100–1900 BCE) on Crete, where peak and cave sanctuaries such as those at Mount Juktas, Mount Dikte, and Mount Ida have been found, along with evidence of votive offerings to the goddess. In the Greek mythological tradition, Olympus is the dwelling place of the gods, especially of Zeus, whose cult was widely associated with mountaintops. Hermes, Apollo, Artemis, and Pan had mountain sanctuaries as well.

The hilltop and mountain shrines of both local and widely known gods are also important in the sacred geography of India. Śiva is called Girīśa, the "lord of the mountains." He dwells upon Mount Kailasa in the Himalayas and has mountain shrines all over India, such as Śrī Śaila in Andhra Pradesh and Kedāra in the Himalayas. Śiva's consort, Pārvatī, is the daughter of the mountain *(parvat)*, and she too dwells on mountaintops in countless local forms—as Vindhyavāsinī in central North India or as Ambikā at Girnār in Gujarat. Similarly, in South India, Skanda has hilltop shrines at Palṇi and Tirutaṇi, Ayyappan dwells on Mount Śabari in Kerala, and Śri Veṅkateśvara dwells on the Seven Hills of Tirupati.

In China, there are four mountains that came to be associated with the four directions and four prominent *bodhisattvas*. Most famous among them is the northern peak, Wu-t'ai Shan, associated with Mañjuśrī, the *bodhisattva* of wisdom. When the Japanese monk Ennin visited Mount Wu-t'ai in the ninth century CE, it was a bustling center of monastic learning and of lay pilgrimage. The others are Mount Chiu-hua in the south, Mount O-mei in the west, and the hilly island of P'u-t'o Shan off the Chekiang coast in the east. According to popular tradition, the *bodhisattvas* associated with these mountains were to be seen not merely in the temples but would take human form and appear as a beggar or an elderly monk to pilgrims along the way.

In addition to this group of four Buddhist mountains there are the five mountains of the Taoist tradition, again situated at the four compass points, with a center

mountain shrine at Sung Shan in Honan Province. T'ai Shan in Shantung Province is perhaps the most famous of the five, with seven thousand stone stairs leading to the top where, next to the Taoist temple, a stone monument stands uninscribed but for the word *ti* ("god"). The poet who was supposed to honor the mountain on this tablet was silenced by its splendor.

Mountains Charged with Divine Power. Japanese traditions recognize many mountain divinities—the *yama no kami*. In a sense, they dwell upon the mountain, but it might be more correct to say that the *yama no kami* are not really distinct from the mountain itself. In the Shintō traditions of Japan the separation of nature from spirit would be artificial. In the spring, the *yama no kami* descend from the mountains and become *ta no kami*, *kami* of the paddy fields, where they remain for the seasons of planting, growth, and harvest, returning to the mountain in the autumn. Even as the *kami* change locus, they remain part of the nature they inhabit.

In the Heian period, with increasing Shintō-Buddhist syncretism, the mountain *kami* came to be seen as forms of Amida Buddha and the various *bodhisattva*s, and the Shugendō tradition of mountain ascetism began. Among Japan's important mountain sanctuaries are Mount Haguro, Mount Gassan, Mount Yoshino, Mount Omine, and the Kumano mountains, identified with the Pure Land of Amida Buddha. Religious associations called *kō* organize locally or regionally for the ascent of particular mountains, taking the name of the mountain itself (Fujikō, Kumanokō, etc.).

Many Native American traditions share this sense of the inseparability of mountain and spirit power. The peoples of the Pacific Northwest, for instance, often begin their tales with "Long ago, when the mountains were people. . . ." The mountains, such as Tacoma, now known as Rainier, are the mighty ancestors of the past. Farther south, the divine personification of mountains can be seen in Popocatépetl and his spouse Iztaccíhuatl in Mexico or in Chimborazo and his spouse Tungurahua in Ecuador. The Zinacantecos of Chiapas still honor the tutelary ancestors, the Fathers and the Mothers, in shrines at both the foot and summit of their sacred hills. Among the Inca, the localization of power is called *huaca*, and is often manifest in stones or on mountains, such as the great Mount Huanacauri above Cuzco.

The mountain *is* the temple. Mount Cuchama in southern California, known as the Place of Creation, was one of the four exalted high places of the native peoples. For worship and initiation, it had no temple, for it was itself nature's own temple. India has many such striking examples of divine mountains, among which is Aruṇācala (Dawn Mountain) in the Tamil lands of South India. This holy hill is said to be the incandescent hierophany of Śiva and is reverently circumambulated as a temple would be.

Life and Death. As givers of life, mountains are the source of rivers and, thus, the source of fertility. This is made explicit in the relation of the mountain and rice-field *kami* in Japan. On the south side of Mount Atlas in Morocco, fruits are said to grow spontaneously. And on the mythical Mount Meru the divine trees are said to yield fruits as big as elephants, which burst into streams of nectar when they fall and water the earth with divine waters. As the prophet Amos said of the Land of Israel, "The mountains shall drip sweet wine, and all the hills will flow with it" (*Am.* 9:13).

Mountains are the source not only of nourishing waters but also of rains and lightning. Storm gods are often associated with mountains: Zeus, Rudra/Śiva, Baal Hadad of Ugarit, Catiquilla of the Inca, and many more.

Mountains, the source of the waters of life, are also seen as the abode of the dead or the path to heaven for the dead. Among the Shoshoni of the Wyoming, for instance, the Teton Mountains were seen primarily as the dangerous place of the dead. The Comanche and Arapaho, who practiced hill burial, held similar beliefs. The Japanese elegy literature makes many references to the mountain resting place of the souls of the dead. A coffin is called a "mountain box," choosing a burial site is called "choosing the mountain," and the funeral procession chants "We go to the mountain!" Throughout the Buddhist world, the stupa, which originally is said to have housed the relics of the Buddha, has become on a miniature scale the symbolic form in which the ashes of the dead are housed. [*See also* Iconography, *article on* Buddhist Iconography, *and* Temple, *article on* Buddhist Temple Compounds.]

The Persistence of the Mountain. Through the ages many sacred mountains have accumulated many-layered traditions of myth and pilgrimage. Moriah, the mount of the Temple in Jerusalem, is a good example. First, it was an early Canaanite high place, a threshing floor and sanctuary for harvest offerings. According to tradition, it was there that Abraham came to sacrifice Isaac. And it was there that Solomon built the great Temple, and Nehemiah rebuilt it after the Babylonian exile. And much later, according to Islamic tradition, it was there that Muḥammad began his ascent from earth to heaven on his mystical "night journey" to the throne of God.

In Mexico, Tepeyac, the hill of the Aztec goddess Tonantzin, became the very place of the apparition of Our Lady of Guadalupe when the Catholic tradition was lay-

ered upon indigenous traditions. Similarly, the great mountain-shaped pyramid of Quetzalcoatl at Cholula became, in the age following the conquest, the site of Our Lady of Remedios. In Japan, Mount Koua and Mount Hiei, both charged with the power of their particular *kami*, became in Buddhist times the respective centers of the Shingon and the Tendai traditions. In countless such cases, the mountain persists as a sacred center, while myths and traditions change.

[*See also* Architecture *and* Geography.]

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DIANA L. ECK

MUDRĀ. The basic meanings of the Sanskrit word *mudrā* include "stamp," "mark," and "seal" (or the imprint left by a seal). It is largely in this latter sense that the term is used in Esoteric Buddhism; there the *mudrā* acts as a magical seal that guarantees the efficacy of the magico-religious act. Since the seal in Esoteric Buddhism is made with various gestures of the hands, the term *mudrā* has also come to mean the manner of holding the fingers to act as seals or guarantees for the *mantras*, or magic sounds, that they accompany. *Mantras* play an important role in interiorizing certain cosmic forces. The use of the hands for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficacy of a *mantra* doubtless came to Buddhism from the wellsprings of Indian religious practice. Certainly, hand signs were, and still are, commonly used in Indian dancing, where their presence plays a highly important expository role. Thus symbolic hand gestures fall into two main types: those used by the officiant in Esoteric ceremonies and those that appear in the iconography of Esoteric Buddhist sculpture and pictorial art. Gestures of the first type are multitudinous and mobile, while those of the second type are relatively restricted and, by the very nature of sculpture or painting, immobile.

Buddhist Mudrās. The great number of ceremonial *mudrās* performed by the Esoteric officiant requires an arduous period of training on the part of the neophyte. The imparting of these *mudrās* is usually accomplished by an Esoteric master, thus reflecting Indian origins, for in India the master-student relationship has always been important. Since *mudrās* are meant to act as seals that guarantee the veracity of magic words (*mantras*), it is indispensable that they be impeccably formed and that they correspond to the words they are meant to accompany. *Mudrās* made incorrectly to "seal" or guarantee a *mantra* do not achieve their intended effect and in fact invalidate the magical act. [*See* Mantra.]

Despite the importance traditionally accorded the direct transmission of these hand seals by a master to a student, in the course of time they became so complicated that illustrated collections were compiled for the

edification of the student. But it must be remembered that such compendia that reproduce the forms of hand gestures are strictly without meaning unless form and use are precisely understood and precisely executed by the practitioner. *Mudrās* in fact constitute one of the "mysteries" of Esoteric Buddhism to which, in principle, only the adept is privy. To use them indiscriminately, without knowledge of their sense or power, is to tinker irresponsibly with the manipulation of the cosmic forces to which they are a key.

Mudrās of the second type, those that appear in Buddhist Esoteric sculpture and painting and that are of necessity motionless, essentially serve as markers that identify a frequently nonspecific statue or image. Similarly, in Christian iconography Christ may be identified in his role as preacher or benedictor by the position of his hands.

Widely used in the Japanese Esoteric Buddhist sects of Shingon and Tendai today, the most common Japanese names for *mudrā* are *shu-in* ("hand sign"), *mitsu-in* ("esoteric sign"), or simply *in* ("sign"), although other terms exist. In Buddhist Esoteric art roughly seven of the many hand signs are regularly used. (See figure 1.)

1. The Gesture of Fearlessness (Jpn., *semui-in;* Skt., *abhayamudrā*) shows the right hand held up, palm facing outward. This gesture, used widely in the Near East, is also present in Christian iconography, where it designates Christ as all-powerful monarch and creator. It early became a symbol for lawgiving, and the Buddha who makes this gesture is identified with the double role of lawgiver and protector. In Buddhist legend the gesture is associated with the story of the malevolent cousin of the Buddha, Devadatta, who attempted to cause the Buddha's death by having him trampled by a maddened elephant. Buddhist iconography shows the Buddha calming the enraged animal by raising his hand in this gesture of fearlessness. By extension, the Buddha grants fearlessness to all those who take refuge in the Dharma. When the hand is held so that the fingers point downward, the gesture is that of Grant Bestowing (Jpn., *segan-in*) and symbolizes the Buddha's benevolence.

2. The Gesture of Appeasement or Argumentation (Jpn., *an'i-in;* Skt., *vitarkamudrā*) is a gesture of calming, of bringing the peace of the Word (sacred power). The right hand is raised, palm outward, with the tips of the thumb and index finger (but also sometimes the middle or ring finger) touching. This is a widespread

FIGURE 1. *Seven Common Buddhist Mudrās*


Gesture of Fearlessness
Gesture of Appeasement (Argumentation)
Gesture of Worship
Earth-Touching Gesture
Gesture of Concentration
Gesture of Turning the Wheel of the Law
Gesture of the Wisdom Fist

gesture connected with the Word, and is to be found all around the Mediterranean Basin and throughout the Near East and Far East. It is symbolic of the Buddha teaching the Law, a role represented by the wheel in aniconic representations.

3. The Gesture of Worship (Jpn., *kongō-gasshō;* Skt., *añjalimudrā*) is made by joining the two hands palm to palm in a gesture of respectful worship or adoration. It is never made by a Buddha figure, but appears in representations of *bodhisattva*s and lesser personages.

4. The Earth-Touching Gesture (Jpn., *sokuchi-in;* Skt., *bhūmisparśamudrā*) is always made by the right hand (which indicates the earth), while the left hand lies in the lap. Contrary to most other gestures, which often are made by several types of divinities, the Earth-Touching gesture is used only by the historical Buddha, Śākyamuni. It recalls the incident in Buddhist legend when the historical Buddha, after overcoming the demon hosts of Māra (the Tempter) just prior to his Enlightenment, touched the earth, thereby calling upon it to witness to the religious merit he had amassed throughout his long career as a *bodhisattva*.

5. The Gesture of Concentration (Jpn., *jō-in;* Skt., *dhyānamudrā*), of which numerous variants exist, is made in a general way by placing the hands in the lap, one on the other, though the fingers may be disposed differently in variant forms of this *mudrā*. This widely represented gesture shows the ubiquitous importance of meditation and concentration techniques in Buddhism. The model for concentrated meditation remains the historical Buddha who, after meditation, became awakened to, or conscious of, the realities of existence: all-encompassing suffering is caused by desire, which can be slacked only by following the discipline laid down by the Buddha. Deities other than the historical Buddha, however, frequently made this gesture.

6. The Gesture of Turning the Wheel of the Law (Jpn., *tembōrin-in;* Skt., *dharmacakramudrā*) is made most frequently by juxtaposing two "wheels of the Law" as they are formed in the *an'i-in*. Thus this gesture is associated with the Word and with the promulgation of the Buddhist Law. Some versions of this gesture have so deviated from the circle of the wheel that their signification is not at once apparent. The *tembōrin-in* is regularly made by the Buddha in his role as propagator and disseminator of the Law.

7. The Gesture of the Wisdom Fist (Jpn., *chi ken-in;* Skt., *jñānamudrā*) is restricted to Esoteric Buddhism, where it has profound significance. The upstanding left index finger is inserted into the right Diamond Fist, in which the right thumb is enclosed by the fingers of the right hand. This gesture represents the wisdom of the great Esoteric Buddha Dainichi (Skt., Vairocana) as the central divinity of the Diamond World, in which role the gesture confirms him. This same divinity in the Womb World makes the Gesture of Concentration. Thus two different aspects of the same deity are emphasized.

Hindu Mudrās. In Hinduism, the term *mudrā* applies to one of the component parts of body positions represented in ritual dancing, in occult symbolism, and in sculpture. *Mudrās* formed with one hand are known as "unconnected" *(asaṃyukta);* those formed with two hands are "connected" *(saṃyukta)*.

The origins of such gestures may go back to the mnemonic techniques *(sāmahasta)* used by Vedic reciters. These techniques are meant to aid the officiant in remembering accent and stress in the sacred texts. In *sāmahasta* the thumb counts off the phalanges of the fingers that represent notes, timing, and accompanying actions. They also provide cues for remembering the order of the ceremonial. *Mudrās* serve as well to evoke an idea in the mind and symbolize certain powers or deities. Such ritual gestures may have contributed to the development of *mudrās* as used in the dance.

Hand gestures in Hinduism have traditional, pictorial meanings that may be extremely complex. The *hasta-mudrās* of classical dance have about five hundred basic meanings, although they involve, beside the fingers and palms, the wrist, elbow, and shoulder. Obviously, it is impossible for any one observer to know all the *mudrās*. The performer follows a sequence familiar to the spectator, and the gestures become meaningful when a specific "phrase" is suggested and can be understood in the context of the whole dance. There are some thirty-two major hand positions, twelve hand movements, and twenty-four combined hand positions, with a plethora of minor variations—tradition posits over eighty-eight million—of which eight or nine hundred are described in technical manuals. Gestures denote a variety of subjects: gods, demons, emperors, gardens, flowers (there are over sixty lotus positions), and so forth. All single-hand positions in dance, ritual, and sculpture are based on the open palm, the hollowed palm, the hand with fingertips together, and the closed fist.

One such gesture, typically linked to many variations, is the *patākā* ("flag"). The *patākā* is formed with the palm held upright and open, facing the spectator, fingertips closed and pointing upward. The thumb is slightly bent inward and touches the lower side of the index finger. In dance it symbolizes a flower, a child, a forest, night, and many other subjects.

When the ring finger is bent forward it is called the *tripatākā* and symbolizes coitus. But when the *tripatākā* shows the tips of the thumb and ring finger touching, it is called the *vajrapatākā* and symbolizes a thunderbolt, an arrow, a tree.

When the ring finger and the little finger are bent, the gesture is called the *ardhapatākā* and stands for a dagger, harm, a temple tower, a river bank. And when the slightly hollowed palm is turned upward (sometimes with the thumb outstretched at right angles to the palm), the gesture is known as the *ardhacandra* and signifies a spear, a prayer, a greeting, the half-moon, a battle-ax.

When the forefinger and the ring finger are bent, the position is known as that of the "parrot beak" *(śukatuṇḍa)* and stands for shooting an arrow, dismissal, mystery, ferocity. If the little finger is bent, the gesture is called *triśula* and symbolizes three objects together, a leaf, or the desire for sexual union. When the index finger is bent, the gesture is called *arāla* and stands for a bird, blame, drinking poison.

The flag gesture hanging down loosely at right angles to the wrist is called *lola* ("restless"), and if this gesture is shown with the arm extended to the front or side it becomes the "elephant" *(gaja)* position. When the right hand is raised as to strike, it becomes the *chapetādana* ("slap giving") and signifies anger or strife. With the hand pointing down, palms toward the spectator, fingers stretched and sloping downward as in offering a gift, the gesture is known as *varada* and symbolizes the bestowing of gifts. It is frequently present on sculpted seated figures, but in that case the fingers do not touch the ground.

The *patākā* held upright and rigid, like the sign for "Halt," is known as the *abhayamudrā* ("hand sign of fearlessness") and signifies protection or the bestowal of benediction. These last two forms of the *patākā* gesture are also common in Buddhist sculpture.

[*For further discussion of the role of* mudrā *in Tantric Buddhism, see* Buddhism, Schools of, *article on* Esoteric Buddhism. *For a cross-cultural overview of hand gestures and symbols, see* Hands.]

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E. Dale Saunders

MUḤAMMAD (c. 570–632 CE), the Prophet or (as Muslims usually call him) the Messenger of God, from whose activity the religion of Islam developed.

Life and Career

Muḥammad was a political as well as a religious leader, and it is convenient to look first at the external and political aspects of his career before considering the religious aspect in more detail; the latter, of course, cannot be completely excluded at any point.

Background and Early Life. Muḥammad was born in Mecca, allegedly in "the year of the elephant," that is, the year in which the territory of Mecca was invaded by an Abyssinian expedition from the Yemen which included a fighting elephant. This is thought to have been 570 CE or a little later. He was the only child of his parents, since his father, 'Abd Allāh of the clan of Hāshim, had died in Medina on a trading journey. His mother was Āminah of the clan of Zuhrah. He was entrusted for a time to a wet nurse belonging to a desert tribe; this was apparently a common practice to counter the bad effects of the climate of Mecca. Apart from this, his mother and her family looked after him until her death when he was six. His paternal grandfather, 'Abdal-Muṭṭalib, then took charge of him but died two years later, and then his father's brother Abū Ṭālib became his guardian. There are reports of various miraculous events occurring during his childhood and youth—for example, two angels are said to have washed his heart in snow and taken from it a black clot—but such stories appear to be pious inventions. There may also be some

exaggeration of 'Abdal-Muṭṭalib's importance in the affairs of Mecca; though certainly important, he was by no means the leading man there.

Mecca lies among barren rocky hills, and no agriculture is possible. The dominant group in Mecca was the Arab tribe of Quraysh, which was subdivided into clans. The chief asset of the town was a sacred building, the Ka'bah, which was a center of pilgrimage. Because the area around the Ka'bah was a sanctuary, and certain months were also held sacred, with blood feuds in abeyance, many nomadic Arabs came to Mecca for the annual pilgrimage and fairs. In this way it became an important trading center as well, and trade was the primary source of livelihood for its inhabitants. In the later sixth century the merchants of Mecca appear to have gained control of most of the trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. This was possibly because the route by the Euphrates and Iraq had been closed by the continuous warfare between the superpowers of the day, the Byzantine and Persian (Sasanid) empires. As a result Mecca was now very prosperous, but prosperity had led to social malaise through the breakdown of traditional morality, which was a morality suited to desert conditions rather than to the world of commerce.

According to Arab custom as it was at the time, Muḥammad, because he was a minor, inherited nothing from either his father or his grandfather. This meant that he had no capital with which to engage in trading on his own account, although he accompanied his uncle Abū Ṭālib on trading journeys to Syria. When he was twenty-five, a wealthy widow, Khadījah, enlisted him as her steward on such a venture to Syria and, when he acquitted himself satisfactorily, made him an offer of marriage, which he accepted. Though she is said to have been about forty, she bore him two sons (who died as infants) and four daughters: Zaynab, Ruqayyah, Umm Kulthūm, and Fāṭimah. After his marriage Muḥammad seems to have occupied himself with trading in a relatively small way until he received the call to be the Messenger of God.

First Preaching of Islam. It was presumably the frustrations he faced in the years before his marriage that made Muḥammad especially sensitive to the malaise in the community of Mecca. He had skill in handling people and great intellectual gifts, and yet he was unable to use these qualities in trading because of his lack of capital. He is said to have spent a month each year in a cave near Mecca meditating on spiritual matters, including conditions in Mecca itself. About the year 610 he had some strange experiences, described more fully below, and as a result of these he became convinced that he had been called to be the "Messenger of God" *(rasūl Allāh)* who would bear messages or revelations from God to the people of Mecca. He was also convinced that these messages, which he "found in his heart," came from God and were not the product of his own thinking. After his death the messages were collected to form the book still in our hands, the Qur'ān.

The messages which were earliest, so far as we can tell, spoke of God's power and his goodness to human beings, called on them to acknowledge their dependence on God and to be generous with their wealth, and warned them that all would appear before God on the Day of Judgment and be assigned to Paradise or Hell according to whether their deeds were good or bad. These messages were clearly relevant to the situation in Mecca. The great merchants thought they could control everything because of their wealth and expertise and that they could flout traditional nomadic moral standards with impunity, especially in such matters as the use of their wealth. It was therefore salutary for them to be told that, ultimately, events were controlled by God and that there was a future life in which their prospects would depend on their conduct in this present life. Thus there was a sense in which the revealed messages were directed against the powerful merchants who were the effective rulers of Mecca.

At first Muḥammad communicated the messages only to his own household and a few close friends, but gradually an increasing number of people accepted the messages as true. A wealthy young man called al-Arqam offered his house as a meeting place, and the believers gathered there daily. Then, about three years after receiving the call to be Messenger of God, Muḥammad began to preach publicly. By this time he had at least fifty followers (whose names have been preserved), and enough was generally known about the content of the messages for bitter opposition to have been aroused among the wealthy merchants. One of the interesting facts about those who became Muslims while Muḥammad was still at Mecca is that they were mostly young men. They even included sons and younger brothers of some of the most influential merchants of the town. There were also older men from the less influential clans, as well as Arabs from outside Mecca and men from the Byzantine empire. Those in the latter groups, some of whom were moderately wealthy, were attached for protection—a formal guarantee of security for one's life and property as a *jār*, or neighbor—to one of the clans of Mecca, but the clans were not always ready to make their protection effective. From these facts it is clear that Muḥammad's movement was not plebeian or proletarian in character.

Rejection at Mecca. A number of events are recorded in the period between the beginning of the public preaching about 613 and the Emigration, or Hijrah, from Mecca to Medina in 622, but the precise dating is uncertain. The earliest of these events may have been that known as the incident of the "satanic verses," which is recounted by early commentators on the Qur'ān as an illustration of surah 22:51. The story is that, while Muḥammad was wondering how the leading merchants could be induced to accept the Qur'anic messages, he received a fresh revelation (surah 53, *The Star*), of which a section permitted treating three pagan goddesses as having the power to intercede with God on behalf of their worshipers. The goddesses were al-Lāt, al-'Uzzā, and Manāt, and all had shrines within a day or two's journey from Mecca. When Muḥammad proclaimed this revelation in the presence of the leading men, they joined him at the end in prostrating themselves in worship. Later, however, the angel Gabriel came to Muḥammad and made him realize that the verses permitting the goddesses' intercession were not a genuine revelation but had been "put upon his tongue" by Satan, and the true continuation of the surah was then revealed to him. This "abrogation" or cancellation of the satanic verses increased the opposition to Muḥammad and his followers. Some Muslims today reject this whole story, but it is difficult to see how any Muslim could have invented it, or how a non-Muslim could have persuaded distinguished Muslim scholars to accept it.

About the same time as this incident, or a little earlier, Muḥammad encouraged a number of his followers to go to Abyssinia, where they were hospitably received by the Christian emperor, the negus *(najāshī)*. Allegedly they went to avoid persecution in Mecca, but the reasons are more complex, since some of them remained there for years after they could have rejoined Muḥammad at Medina. There were trading relations between Mecca and Abyssinia, and the merchants opposed to Muḥammad sent a deputation requesting the negus to make the emigrants return, but this he refused to do. It is difficult to reconcile all the accounts, but some of the Muslims who went to Abyssinia certainly returned to Mecca while Muḥammad was still there.

Muḥammad and his followers deeply resented the treatment they received at the hands of their opponents in Mecca, perhaps chiefly because in the end this made it impossible for Muḥammad to continue preaching and gaining disciples there. In themselves many of the measures were not serious, although slaves and those without clan protection could suffer bodily harm. Muḥammad himself experienced verbal taunts and petty insults. Other believers experienced various forms of family pressure. Most effective, however, was the economic pressure which the wealthiest men, acting together, could exert on others.

In Arabia at this time the maintenance of public order depended on the clan or family exacting vengeance for any injury done to one of its members, according to the principle of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." This meant that if opponents attacked a Muslim not of their own clan, there would be reprisals. That Muḥammad was able to go on preaching in Mecca as long as he did was due to the fact that his own clan of Hāshim continued, as custom and honor required, to protect him, although most of them did not accept what he preached. Attempts were made to persuade the clan either to stop the preaching or to refuse further protection, but Abū Ṭālib, as clan chief, would do neither. In consequence, about 616, most of the clans of Quraysh joined together to boycott Hāshim by refusing trade dealings and intermarriage. Although the boycott is said to have lasted for over two years, there is no record of Hāshim's having suffered unduly. The reason for the end of the boycott was probably that some of the clans participating found that it was harming their own interests.

Shortly after the end of the boycott, probably in 619, Abū Ṭālib died, followed a little later by Khadījah. Abū Ṭālib was succeeded as chief of the clan by his brother Abū Lahab, who was probably not much older than Muḥammad, since at one point he had agreed to marry two of his sons to two of Muḥammad's daughters. He had, however, entered into business relations with some of the leading merchants opposed to Muḥammad and had broken off the proposed marriages with Muḥammad's daughters, and then he even joined in his own clan's boycott of Hāshim. It would have been dishonorable for him to refuse outright to protect Muḥammad, but he soon found an excuse for doing so, in that Muḥammad had spoken disrespectfully of the former chief of the clan, 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib, by alleging that he was in Hell. The sources are rather silent about Abū Lahab's subsequent actions; Muḥammad then went to the neighboring town of Ṭā'if, but he was unsuccessful in gaining support and was roughly treated. Before returning to Mecca he had to ask the chief of another clan for protection and doubtless had to agree not to preach.

Emigration from Mecca to Medina. Muḥammad next approached one or two nomadic tribes while they were attending fairs at Mecca, but nothing came of this. Then at the annual pilgrimage of the year 620, he met six men from Medina who were interested in what he had to say. At the pilgrimage of 621, five of these came back,

along with seven others, representing most of the clans of Medina, and they promised to accept Muḥammad as Messenger of God and to refrain from sins. In the following year a stronger party of seventy-three men and two women came from Medina, met Muḥammad secretly at Aqaba, and to the earlier promise added an undertaking to fight on behalf of God and his Messenger. This is known as the Second Pledge of Aqaba or the Pledge of War (July 622). After this about seventy of Muḥammad's followers began to immigrate to Medina in small groups, and they were not opposed by the people of Mecca.

At length only Muḥammad himself, his chief adviser Abū Bakr, his cousin 'Alī (the son of Abū Ṭālib), and some of their families remained in Mecca. Muḥammad's life was in some danger. There was a plot to kill him in Mecca in a way that would have made retaliation impossible. Apparently, too, while on the journey between Mecca and Medina, he had protection from neither city. He and Abū Bakr therefore set out secretly, eluded pursuit from Mecca by various ruses, and reached Medina safely on 24 September 622. This is the Hijrah, or Emigration of the Prophet and the believers; the word connotes a breaking of relationships, not "flight" (as it was formerly translated). The Islamic era commences with the beginning of the Arabian year in which the Hijrah occurred, namely, 16 July 622; it is indicated by the letters AH *(anno Hegirae)*.

Medina, about 250 miles north of Mecca, was an oasis in which dates and cereals were grown. The inhabitants included various groups of Jews and Arabs. The groups who were called Jewish had intermarried to a considerable extent with Arabs and had adopted Arab customs, while still following Jewish religious practices. It was probably they who had developed agriculture in the oasis, and for a time they had been politically dominant. One or two weak Arab groups were still in alliance with them as inferiors. Later Arab settlers, however, had achieved political control, and Jewish groups were now subordinate to them, though still holding some of the best lands. For over half a century before Muḥammad's arrival there had from time to time been bitter fighting in Medina between various groups, and this had increased in intensity and in numbers involved until, in the Battle of Bu'āth about four years before the Hijrah, nearly all the inhabitants of the oasis, including the Jews, had participated. Fighting had ceased because of exhaustion, but peace had not been formally reestablished. It seems likely, then, that one of the reasons why many people wanted Muḥammad to come to Medina was the hope that he would be able to maintain peace between the rival factions.

These factions were roughly, but not exactly, identical with the two Arab tribes of the Aws and the Khazraj, and Jews were also involved on both sides. A document has been preserved, usually known as the Constitution of Medina, which records the agreement between Muḥammad and the people of Medina. It is now generally held that the document as we have it is a conflation of several others, but it presumably reflects the basic agreement which made the Hijrah possible. Formally it establishes an alliance between eight Arab clans from Medina and the "clan" of Emigrants from Mecca, while a number of Jewish groups are mentioned as dependents of Arab clans. The document describes itself as "a writing from Muḥammad the Prophet between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib and those who follow them, are attached to them, and fight along with them." (Yathrib was an older name for Medina.) Strictly speaking, Muḥammad was only one clan chief among nine, but he was recognized as Prophet, and all the primary parties to the agreement were Muslims; it was also stated that disputes were to be referred to him. Thus he was far from being the absolute ruler of Medina, but gradually, as he got the better of his opponents in Mecca and elsewhere, and as many Arab tribes joined his confederacy and became Muslims, he came to have almost unquestioned control of the affairs of Medina.

Struggle with the Pagan Quraysh of Mecca. In the early biographies of Muḥammad, the decade from the Hijrah until his death in 632 is characterized by accounts of a series of "expeditions" *(maghāzī)* by the Muslims, about ninety in all. In some of these only a handful of men, or even just one, might have been involved on the Muslim side, while the last expedition, led personally by Muḥammad, involved an army of thirty thousand. The aims of the expeditions were very varied, such as gaining booty, punishing those who had raided Medina, dispersing a concentration of hostile forces, reconnoitering routes for later expansion, and so on. Since the main enemies were the Quraysh of Mecca, the expeditions which led to battle with them receive most attention in the sources.

When Muḥammad arranged the Hijrah of his followers to Medina, he presumably did not intend them to make their living by farming or by depending on the hospitality of the Muslims of Medina. Trade was a possibility but would have led, sooner or later, to conflict with the Quraysh. It is likely, then, that Muḥammad realized all along that he would have to fight Quraysh. Certainly in his first fifteen months at Medina he sent out, or personally led, several expeditions of between twenty and two hundred men with the aim of intercepting and plundering caravans on the route between Mecca and Syria. All failed in this primary aim, appar-

ently because the plans for the expeditions were being communicated to the intended victims. Eventually a small expedition was sent out with sealed instructions which were not to be opened until the men were two days east of Medina. This made surprise possible. They moved south, near Mecca, seized a small caravan and captured two of its four guards, then returned safely to Medina. This action was calculated to provoke Quraysh, and much more was to follow. Emboldened by the first success, Muḥammad led a force of over three hundred Muslims to intercept a much larger caravan returning from Syria. The caravan managed to evade the Muslims, but a supporting army from Mecca of about nine hundred men made contact with them at a place called Badr, and a battle became inevitable. The outcome was a complete victory for the Muslims. Only fourteen of them were lost, but some fifty of the enemy were killed, including several of the leading men, and nearly seventy taken prisoner. This victory seemed to Muḥammad and the Muslims to be God's vindication of his prophethood. The year was AH 2/624 CE.

When the remaining leaders in Mecca had recovered from the shock of the disaster, they realized they must exert themselves to the utmost to destroy Muḥammad's power. About a year after the Battle of Badr they marched on Medina with three thousand men. Against his better judgment Muḥammad was persuaded to station his forces, who numbered only about one thousand, on the hill of Uḥud in the north of the oasis. The Muslims routed the enemy infantry but then suffered severe casualties from a cavalry attack. In military terms the battle was a draw, since the invaders were too battered to take advantage of their cavalry success and withdrew immediately. The ordinary Muslims, however, felt it more as a defeat, partly because they had lost seventy-five men, nearly three times as many as their opponents, but even more because after Badr they had thought that God was fighting for them, and now it looked as if this were not so. Before long, however, Muḥammad was able to restore the confidence of his followers.

During the next two years Muḥammad's strength increased, though he had some ups and downs. Meanwhile in Mecca wealth and diplomacy were being used to form a grand alliance, including nomadic tribes. Eventually, in 5/627, about ten thousand men marched on Medina, but Muḥammad had prepared for invasion by digging a ditch *(khandaq)* to protect the main settlements. The device was successful, efforts to cross the ditch were repulsed, and after about a fortnight the grand alliance broke up and abandoned the siege. This supreme effort to dislodge Muḥammad ended in fiasco.

It seems virtually certain that by this time Muḥammad had evolved a long-term strategy, looking to a time when most Arabs would have become Muslims. The alliance of clans in Medina had already swollen into a wider confederacy with the accession of several nomadic tribes. Those who joined the confederacy had to accept Islam and refrain from fighting other members. A feature of desert life in Arabia, however, had been the razzia or raiding expedition *(ghazw)* for some purpose such as seizing a hostile tribe's camels—the practice from which Muḥammad's expeditions had developed. If tribes in the confederacy were not to raid other tribes, into what direction were their energies to be channeled? And, if more and more tribes joined the confederacy, what then? Muḥammad seems to have realized, first, that the energies of the nomads must be directed outward to Syria and Iraq and, second, that the organizing skills of the merchants of Mecca would be essential in the vast enterprises such thoughts suggested. That he had some such strategy is borne out by the size and number of the expeditions he sent along the route northward to Syria and by the fact that he tried to win over the Meccans, not to inflict a decisive defeat on them.

About a year after the "siege" of Medina Muḥammad had a dream, as a result of which he led a party of fifteen hundred men to Mecca with the aim of performing the lesser pilgrimage *('umrah)*. The Meccans refused to allow them to enter the sacred territory, but eventually, after some perilous confrontations, both sides accepted the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyah. The two parties were to refrain from hostilities for ten years, and the Muslims were to be allowed to perform a pilgrimage in the following year. The pilgrimage was duly made without incident, but about nine months later apparent breaches of the treaty by allies of the Meccans gave Muḥammad a justification for marching on Mecca with ten thousand men. Only one or two pagans who had personal reasons to fear reprisals took to flight, and Muḥammad was able to enter the town without encountering serious resistance. A general amnesty was proclaimed, although some persons guilty of criminal or treasonable acts were excluded. Most of the chief merchants of Mecca were ready to serve under Muḥammad. There was no pressure on them to become Muslims, but a few did so immediately, and the others followed in the course of time.

Muḥammad had been in Mecca only a fortnight or so when word was received of a great concentration of tribesmen to the east, apparently threatening Mecca as much as the Muslims. Accompanied by two thousand men from Mecca, Muḥammad led his army of Muslims against them. Battle was joined at Ḥunayn, and for a time the enemy had the best of it, but the bravery of

Muḥammad himself and some close followers helped to turn the tide, and in the end, they achieved complete victory. Again the defeated enemy was treated with magnanimity.

There was now no Arab leader capable of raising a force which could meet Muḥammad in battle. During the remaining two and a half years of his life many, probably the majority, of the nomadic tribes throughout Arabia entered into his confederacy and accepted Islam. This was now a vast political unit, and much of Muḥammad's time was devoted to ordering its affairs. About nine months after his occupation of Mecca, he led a great expedition of thirty thousand men on a three-month journey to Tabūk on the road to Syria, doubtless with future expansion in mind. During this expedition treaties were made with small Jewish and Christian groups on the Gulf of Aqaba which became a model for the "protected minorities" of non-Muslims within later Islamic states. Such groups retained their religion and had internal autonomy in return for a payment of tribute to the head of the Islamic state.

In the year 10/632 Muḥammad led in person the greater pilgrimage to Mecca, the *ḥajj*, but was seen to be in poor health when he returned to Medina. About two months later he became too ill to conduct the daily prayers, and he died on 13 Rabī' al-Awwal 11, 8 June 632. He had made no arrangements for the succession but had appointed Abū-Bakr to lead the prayers in his stead. 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, later to lead the community himself, was able to persuade the Muslims then in Medina to accept Abū Bakr as head of state with the title of caliph (*khalīfah*, "successor, deputy") of the Messenger of God.

Relationships with Jews and Christians. When Muḥammad made the Hijrah to Medina he hoped that the Jews there would accept him as a prophet, since he had been told that the messages or revelations he was receiving were identical in content with those of the biblical prophets. One or two Jews did so accept him and became Muslims, but the majority not merely rejected his claim but used their knowledge of the Bible to make it seem false. For the first year and a half at Medina, he tried to reconcile the Jews to his new religion. While still at Mecca he had adopted Jerusalem as his *qiblah*, the direction to be faced in prayer, and he had encouraged the Muslims to observe the fast of the Jewish Day of Atonement. By the month before the Battle of Badr, however, it was clear to him that the Jews were not to be reconciled, and a series of changes took place which constitute "the break with the Jews." Instead of facing Jerusalem in prayer, the Muslims were to take Mecca as their *qiblah*. The fast of the Day of Atonement was replaced by the fast of the month of Ramaḍān, though perhaps not until the following year. At the same time Muḥammad was coming to rely more on an anti-Jewish party in Medina. Above all, however, the Qur'ān put forward an intellectual response to the Jewish criticisms of Islam. Islam was asserted to be the true religion of Abraham, from which Jews and Christians had deviated. It was pointed out that Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian (which is true) but a *ḥanīf*, which the Qur'ān takes to be one who believes in God without being attached to either Judaism or Christianity.

This ideological "break with the Jews" was followed over the next four years by physical attacks. After the victory of Badr, the Jewish clan of Qaynuqā', who were goldsmiths and armorers and had a market, were attacked on a trivial excuse and forced to leave Medina for Syria. Fifteen months later similar treatment was meted out to the clan of al-Naḍīr, who were agriculturists, and they went to the Jewish settlement at Khaybar, seventy miles to the north. A third clan was attacked after the failure of the "siege" of Medina by the grand alliance. This clan, Qurayẓah, had been intriguing with the besiegers, probably planning some act of treachery. They were forced to surrender unconditionally, and then one of the leading Muslims of Medina, who had been in alliance with the clan, decreed that all the males should be executed and the women and children sold as slaves. After this there remained in Medina only a few small groups of Jews, now thoroughly chastened and very dependent on their Arab allies. Finally, soon after the expedition which led to the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyah, Muḥammad led the same force against the Jews of Khaybar, who had been trying to bribe Arab nomads to join them in attacking the Muslims. When the Jews surrendered, they were left cultivating the lands but had to hand over to the Muslims half the produce of dates. Some smaller Jewish colonies also submitted to the Muslims on similar terms.

There were few Christians in either Mecca or Medina, although Waraqah, Khadījah's cousin, is said to have been a Christian and to have had a good knowledge of the Bible. After the welcome given to the Muslims who immigrated to Abyssinia, Christians in general were accounted friends (as is shown by surah 5:82). In the last years of Muḥammad's life, however, the Muslims had to fight against hostile Christian tribes along the route to Syria, and attitudes changed. Some of the Qur'anic arguments against Jews were also used against Christians, and there were also arguments against specifically Christian doctrines. The Qur'ān asserted that it was impossible for God to have a son and attacked the doctrine of the Trinity, interpreted as a doctrine of

three gods (4:171 and elsewhere). The apparent denial of the crucifixion of Jesus (4:157) was not aimed against the Christians but against the Jews.

Political and Social Achievement. Since the religion of Islam arose out of the social malaise at Mecca, it was necessarily concerned with the alleviation of this malaise. There were various underlying causes for the situation, such as the transition from nomadic life to urban, the transition (encouraged by trading activity) from communalism to individualism, and the transition from matrilineal kinship to patrilineal. The insistence of the Qur'ān that God would make judgment on the Last Day provided a sanction for an individualistic morality where communal sanctions had broken down. The elaborate rules for inheritance in the Qur'ān (4:11–18 and elsewhere) are aimed at preventing powerful individuals from seizing more than a fair share of communal property. To maintain security of life and property the communal system of the blood feud was retained, but Muslims were exhorted to accept a blood-wite (of camels or money) instead of a life and were forbidden to exact more in revenge than the equivalent of the injury (4:92).

The most interesting reforms are in the sphere of marriage and the family. The previous situation was complex and has not been sufficiently studied by scholars with the relevant anthropological skills. A likely hypothesis, however, is that a formerly widespread matriliny was being replaced by patriliny, which fits in better with an individualistic outlook. As practiced in Arabia, matriliny did not imply matriarchy, for the head of a matrilineal household was the uterine brother of the senior woman. Under this system, since physical paternity was not important, loose forms of polyandric marriage were permitted, some little different from prostitution. The basic reform of the Qur'ān was to restrict a woman to one "husband" at a time, so that physical paternity would be certain (2:228, 2:234). The Qur'ān encouraged Muslims to have up to four wives at once (4:3), not as a restriction on a supposedly unlimited polygamy but to prevent women from relapsing into some of the former polyandric practices. Muḥammad himself is said to have had fourteen wives or concubines, of whom nine survived him, but for each of his marriages there was a social or political reason; thus he bound his two chief lieutenants, Abū Bakr and 'Umar, more closely to him by marrying their daughters, 'Ā'ishah and Ḥafṣah. By arranging for his wives to have separate apartments within his house, Muḥammad helped to make virilocal marriage the norm, as against uxorilocal marriage in matrilineal society.

Among minor social reforms were the prohibition of wine and of usury. What exactly was prohibited as "usury" *(ribā)* is not clear, but it was certainly not an obstacle to the development of trade by Muslims. In this century some Muslims have emphasized these points, not for social reasons but in order to show that they have an Islamic identity distinct from that of Westerners.

In the sphere of politics, Muḥammad established a state which proved capable of developing into a great empire. At the time of his death the state was basically a confederacy of tribes according to traditional Arab principles, except that all the main participants were Muslims. Non-Muslim groups could be attached to the confederacy as "protected minorities." This structure was adequate to bring about the unification of the Arabs and to channel their energies into an expansionist drive.

During his lifetime Muḥammad thus laid the foundations for a stable social and political order. Circumstances favored him in many ways, but he could not have achieved what he did without his personal qualities, his far-seeing wisdom as a statesman, his skill as an administrator, and his tact in handling individuals.

Prophethood

In Qur'anic usage there is little difference between the terms *nabī* ("prophet") and *rasūl* ("messenger, apostle"), and they will here be treated as equivalents. Some Muslim scholars have held that, while all prophets received messages from God, a messenger had in addition a mission to a particular community, but this cannot be fully justified from the Qur'ān.

The Call to Be a Prophet. The experiences which led Muḥammad to believe that he was called to be a messenger of God or prophet began with two visions which are briefly described in the Qur'ān (53:1–18). In the first, he saw a mighty being on the horizon, who then came nearer; in the second, he saw the same being in mysterious circumstances. At first he appears to have thought that this being was God, but later he concluded it must have been the angel Gabriel. The early biographers of Muḥammad present accounts of how the angel Gabriel appeared to him and said, "You are the Messenger of God," and then continued, "Recite in the name of your Lord . . ." (the beginning of surah 96, said to be the first revealed). Other accounts make the first revelation "Rise and warn . . ." (74:1–7). Both versions may well be only the conjectures of later scholars.

Later Muslim scholars also made a list of the "manners of revelation" *(kayfīyāt al-waḥy)*. In the first vision something was revealed to Muḥammad, but we are not told what it was, and the combination of a vision with a revelation seems to have been exceptional. One verse

(42:51) seems to mention several "manners": "It was not given to any person that God should speak to him, except by revelation [*waḥy*] or from behind a veil, or should send a messenger to reveal what he will by his permission." The distinction between these "manners" is by no means clear, but the third is generally taken to be the usual one. This is supported by the statement that Gabriel "caused it to come down on your heart by God's permission" (2:97; also 26:193f.). Still further "manners" are described in the *ḥadīth*, but these seem to have happened only occasionally. It is fairly certain that normally Muḥammad neither had a vision nor heard voices, but simply "found the words in his heart." These messages he remembered and then recited to his followers, who also memorized them, and then sometimes wrote them down. Most of the revelations were short passages. Muḥammad himself seems to have begun to join them together into surahs, but the final "collection" of the Qur'ān was not made until about twenty years after his death.

The Qur'ān regards Muḥammad as coming in a long series of prophets, including in particular Moses and Jesus, from whom Judaism and Christianity took their origin. All the prophets were commissioned by God and received revelations from him. Many verses imply that Muḥammad was a prophet to the Arabs, but there are also suggestions that his mission was universal, such as the title "Mercy to the Worlds" (21:107). Another title applied to Muḥammad, "Seal of the Prophets" (*khātam al-nabīyīn;* 33:40), which Muslims today interpret as "the last of the prophets," probably meant to its first hearers only "the one who confirms previous prophets."

The Nature of Revelation. Traditional Islamic doctrine regards the words of the Qur'ān as the actual speech of God, for which Muḥammad was only a passive channel of transmission. He himself believed that he could distinguish such revelations from his own thinking, and in this his sincerity must be accepted. The insistence of Muslim scholars that Muḥammad's personality contributed nothing to the Qur'ān does not entirely rule out the possibility that the messages came somehow or other from Muḥammad's unconscious. All these issues raise theological questions which have not yet been adequately discussed.

Two points may be noted, however. First, even from a traditional Islamic point of view, the Qur'ān is "an Arabic Qur'ān" (12:2 and elsewhere). This means not merely that it is in the Arabic language but that it speaks in terms of the social and intellectual culture of the Arabs of the time, with references to Arabic practices such as *ijārah*, the granting of "neighborly protection" (23:88), which are unintelligible to Westerners without much explanation. Its references to Christianity and Judaism, too, are not to these religions as they are historically observed, but as they were supposed to be by the Arabs to whom the Qur'ān was addressed; for example, Christians in general have never believed in three gods (as is suggested in 5:73), but some Christian Arabs may possibly have done so, or may have been thought to believe this by pagan neighbors. This gives a reasonable explanation of what Western Christian readers see as "mistakes" in the Qur'ān, without denying its character as revelation. Second, when the positive religious content of the Qur'ān is appreciated, it is difficult to deny that it comes from an experience of a kind similar to that of the prophets of the Old Testament.

Throughout the centuries Christians have mostly denied the prophethood of Muḥammad. They have usually accepted Muslims as believers in God and have sometimes spoken of Islam as a Christian heresy, but they have found little of positive value in Qur'anic teachings. For Eastern Christians, the Muslims were a dangerous enemy. For Western Christians, Islam, when they first met it in Spain in the eighth century, was not merely a dangerous enemy but also a culturally superior society. An unfavorable verdict on Muḥammad was thus almost essential as an aspect of Christian apologetics. A contributing factor to this verdict was a simplistic attitude to religious language, taking assertions at face value and failing to realize their symbolic character. As dialogue develops between Muslims and Christians the old attitudes are slowly disappearing.

The Prophet as Political and Religious Leader. It does not belong to the conception of messenger as such that he should also be political leader of his community. In the earlier passages of the Qur'ān Muḥammad is spoken of as a "warner" *(nadhīr, mudhakkir)*, whose function it was to "warn" his fellows that they would all have to appear before God to be judged on the Last Day. When Muḥammad went to Medina, it was not part of the formal agreement that he was to be head of state; he was only one clan head out of nine. There was always, however, a readiness among the Arabs, even among his opponents at Mecca, to regard someone capable of receiving messages from God as being the person best able to guide the affairs of his community wisely. Muḥammad's political power grew as he came to be respected more by the people of Medina; and the success of most of his expeditions contributed to that growth of respect. In his later years, too, many nomads who came to settle in Medina were attached to the "clan" of Emigrants, so that it became relatively more powerful. If at the end of his life Muḥammad was ruling a large part of Arabia, that did not follow automatically from his being a prophet, but was due to his personal qualities. It is also

to be noted that it was not his practice to seek revelations in order to solve political problems.

What has not been so clearly recognized is that much of the establishment of Islam as a religion is due to him personally, even in the Islamic view that he contributed nothing to the Qur'ān. Although some justification can be found in the Qur'ān for the religious institutions of Islam (such as the profession of faith, the five daily prayers, the fast, and the pilgrimage), they are by no means clearly defined there; they derive their precise shape from the practice of Muḥammad and the early Muslims, and this was in part recognized by the later use of the *ḥadīth* to justify these institutions.

Role in the Later Islamic Community

Although Muḥammad himself always insisted that he was an ordinary human being to whom God had chosen to reveal messages for his people, it was almost inevitable that after his death some of his followers would try to make out that he was more than this.

Muḥammad as Exemplar. A feature of Islamic religion is its possession of a kind of secondary scripture known as *ḥadīth* or, in older works, "traditions." These are anecdotes about something Muḥammad said or did, and they became of great importance as one of the "roots" on which are based the detailed prescriptions of the *sharī'ah*, or revealed law. Muslim scholars developed criteria for distinguishing "sound" *ḥadīth* from others, but some Western scholars in the late nineteenth century came to hold the criteria inadequate and to regard most *ḥadīth* as unhistorical. Recent opinion is inclined to see more *ḥadīth* as sound, and also recognizes that the *ḥadīth*, whether "true" or not, were a powerful formative influence in Islamic society. Scholars made many collections of "sound" *ḥadīth*, and six of these came to have a kind of canonical status among Sunnī Muslims; the earliest of the six were those of al-Bukhārī (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875).

The jurist al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820), who was mainly responsible for establishing the discipline of "roots of law" or principles of jurisprudence *(uṣūl al-fiqh)*, also helped to give *ḥadīth* their quasi-scriptural status. He quoted Qur'anic verses which speak of God giving to Muḥammad "the book and the wisdom" (e.g., 2:251) and argued that, while the book was the Qur'ān, the sayings and doings recorded in the *ḥadīth* were expressions of this God-given wisdom. The use of *ḥadīth* in jurisprudence was the chief reason for collecting them, but these also served to make Muḥammad an exemplar and model for his community in other ways, for example, in liturgical practice and in the nonlegal aspects of morality.

Although *ḥadīth* are anecdotes about Muḥammad, it should be noted that at an early date the study of *ḥadīth* became distinct from the study of Muḥammad's biography, the *sīrah*. It is not merely Western biographers of Muḥammad who find that the *ḥadīth* offer little information relevant to their purposes. Muslim biographers also found this and found, too, that they had to use different scholarly methods from those of the *ḥadīth* scholars. Of the canonical collections, only that of al-Bukhārī has a chapter on the "expeditions" of Muḥammad; the later collectors realized that, although such a chapter contained anecdotes about Muḥammad, these were of no value for legal and liturgical purposes.

In addition to regarding most *ḥadīth* as unhistorical and rejecting Muḥammad's prophethood, Western scholars have criticized his moral character and have accused him of such vices as dishonesty, cruelty, and lechery. Some of the evidence has been twisted and exaggerated by Christians. Apart from that, it is necessary to look at the standards by which Muḥammad is to be judged. How is one to decide, for example, whether Islamic polygamy is superior or inferior to the ineffective monogamy now practiced in the West? What can be said is that by the standards of his own time and culture Muḥammad was a good and upright man. If he is to be taken as an exemplar for all humanity, however, then Muslims have to make a better case for this than they have so far done.

Muḥammad as More than a Prophet. Islam originated in regions where there were strong Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian traditions, and where traces of older beliefs still survived in popular thought and practice. It was therefore inevitable that some of those who had held these older beliefs before becoming Muslims should soon attach earlier ideas about religious leaders to Muḥammad.

Some of the early developments within Islam came about as a result of the criticism, mainly from Christians, that Muḥammad could not be a prophet since no miracles were worked through him. Muslim scholars began to search the Qur'ān and the anecdotes about Muḥammad to find incidents capable of being treated as miraculous, and many were found, even miracles of healing, such as the tending of a wounded eye so that the individual later declared that this eye was better than the other. Stories like this could obviously grow in the telling. Muḥammad's birth and childhood gave further opportunities for introducing miraculous elements, an example of which was given above. The most spectacular of the miracles was the Mi'rāj, Muḥammad's night journey to the seven heavens. This is based on the verse "Praise be to him who brought his servant by night from the Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque . . . that he might show him of his signs" (17:1). Presumably this referred to a dream, but piety transformed

it into a miraculous physical journey on the winged horse Burāq, first from Mecca to the Farthest (al-Aqṣā) Mosque in Jerusalem, and then to the seventh heaven, and accounts of what he saw on the way could be elaborated almost indefinitely. That this night journey and ascension were a reality was accepted by Muslims, though there were heated discussions of whether he had seen God. Another verse which was elaborated into a miracle is "The hour drew near and the moon was split" (54:1). This was traditionally one of the signs of the Last Day, but the people of Mecca were said to have seen the moon in two parts, one on each side of a local mountain.

While these miracles might fill popular imagination, the theologians tended to say that the one "evidentiary miracle" *(muʿjizah)* was the Qur'ān itself, because of the inimitability of its style and contents. The theologians also held that Muḥammad, like other prophets, was preserved from sins, though they disputed the precise nature of his infallibility *('iṣmah)*. It also came to be an article of belief that on the Last Day Muḥammad would have God's permission to make intercession on behalf of the sinners of his community; though intercession is mentioned several times in the Qur'ān, it is not specifically stated that it is permitted to Muḥammad.

Most of what has been mentioned so far was accepted by Sunnī Muslims. Among the Shī'ah and the Ṣūfīs, however, there were some who went much further. Muḥammad was identified with the Perfect Man of late Greek speculation, in whom God's consciousness became manifest to itself, and who then became the instrument or agent of creation. This image was associated in turn with the "light of Muḥammad" *(nūr Muḥammad)*. A different line of thought led to the somewhat similar conception of the *ḥaqīqah muḥammadīyah* ("reality of Muḥammad"), which is something like the Active Intellect of Neoplatonism. Thus in various ways some of Muḥammad's followers raised him above the sphere of humanity into that of preexistence and identification with the Logos, or Word of God. For the great majority of Muslims, of course, such speculations are anathema.

[*See also* Ḥadīth; Islamic Law, *article on* Sharī'ah; Mi'rāj; Qur'ān; *and the biographies of the principal figures mentioned herein.*]

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Tor Andrae also published an impressive study of Muslim beliefs about Muḥammad entitled *Die person Muhammeds in lehre und glauben seiner gemeinde* (Uppsala, 1918). Annemarie Schimmel takes up the same topic in *And Muhammad Is His Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), first published as *Und Muhammad ist Sein Prophet* (Düsseldorf, 1981); she has a wealth of examples from poetry, prose, and art.

Biographies of the Prophet by Muslims in the last century or so have been mainly apologetic. Pride of place must be given to the work of Syed Ameer Ali (1849–1928), who in 1873 published a life of the Prophet defending him against views expressed in books he read while a student in London. Throughout his life he kept expanding this work, which became very popular, eventually giving it the title *The Spirit of Islam* (1890), 2d ed. (1922; reprint, London, 1974). In it he attempted to show that Muḥammad in particular and Islam in general exemplified all the virtues of nineteenth-century European liberalism. Something similar was attempted by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (1888–1956) in his Arabic life of Muḥammad, *Ḥayāt Muḥammad* (1935; reprint, Cairo, 1960), but he was primarily a believer in science and reason. The most scholarly work by a Muslim is *Le prophète de l'Islam*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1959), by Muhammad Hamidullah; in this he adopts modern historical methodology, though in a very conservative fashion, and places emphasis on Muḥammad as a religious leader. In *Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources* (New York, 1983), Martin Lings gives in very readable English a harmonious narrative of the events of the Prophet's life, smoothing over discordances and omitting matters which Muslims find difficult to interpret, such as the incident of the "satanic verses."

W. MONTGOMERY WATT

MUḤAMMAD AḤMAD (AH 1260–1302/1844–1885 CE), Sudanese preacher and mystic who claimed to be the Mahdi of Islam. Muḥammad Aḥmad ibn 'Abd Allāh

was born at Labab Island on the Nile in Dongola province of a Nubian family claiming descent from the Prophet and was brought up at Karari, just north of Omdurman. He received a traditional Islamic education and at age seventeen became apprenticed to Muḥammad Sharīf Nūr al-Dā'im, a shaykh of the Sammānīyah Ṣūfī order. He spent seven years serving and imbibing mystical wisdom from his master who then authorized him to teach the doctrines of the order and to initiate others.

In 1870 he took up residence on Aba Island on the White Nile just north of Kosti, along with his three brothers, who were engaged in the family trade of boat building. Once settled there his growing reputation as a Ṣūfī teacher and ascetic began to gain him a considerable following among the local peoples. His teacher, Muḥammad Sharīf, also established himself nearby in 1288/1872, but before long the two men fell out, perhaps because of the elder man's jealousy at this pupil's acclaim. Muḥammad Sharīf announced Muḥammad Aḥmad's expulsion from the Sammānīyah order, whereupon the latter declared his allegiance to a rival shaykh of the order and denounced his former shaykh as a man who flouted the *sharī'ah*.

In 1878 his new shaykh, al-Qurashī wad al-Zayn, died, and Muḥammad Aḥmad was immediately recognized as his successor. Shortly afterward he received a visit from the man who was to be his political successor, the *khalīfah* 'Abd Allāh ('Abdullāhi) ibn Muḥammad Ādam. 'Abd Allāh's attachment to Muḥammad Aḥmad, however, was more than that of a Ṣūfī disciple to his master. He recognized him as the expected Mahdi, the final regenerator of Islam who, it was believed, would appear shortly before the end time to usher in a period of justice and equity and unite the whole world under the banner of Islam.

Up to this point there is no indication that Muḥammad Aḥmad had considered the possibility that he might be the Mahdi, though he must have been aware of the widespread belief in the Sudan and West Africa that the Mahdi would appear in the thirteenth century of the Hijrah (1785–1882 CE). Even now he hesitated, but following a series of visions he became convinced in 1881 that God had designated him as the Mahdi. For three months his Mahdihood was a secret, revealed at first only to trusted disciples and then, on a visit to al-Ubayyiḍ (El Obeid) in Kordofan, to religious scholars and finally, to the common people. Finally, on 29 June 1881 his public manifestation *(ẓuhūr)* as the expected Mahdi took place on Aba Island, and he called upon his adherents to rally to him.

Events now moved rapidly. In keeping with the Prophet's practice to muster his followers and distinguish the true believers, he undertook an "emigration" *(hijrah)* from Aba Island to Jabal Qadīr in the Nuba Mountains of southern Kordofan, naming those who rallied to him the "helpers" *(al-anṣār)* after the Prophet's allies in Medina. While encamped at Jabal Qadīr, his supporters won two resounding victories against forces sent by the Turco-Egyptian government of the Sudan, gaining for the Mahdi enormous prestige and a considerable quantity of arms and other booty. The Mahdi now turned his attention to central Kordofan, where he had been warmly received before his manifestation and where there was already a body of believers in his mission. An initial attack by Mahdist forces on al-Ubayyiḍ in September 1882 was repulsed by government troops with heavy losses, but a siege resulted in the town's fall to the Mahdi early in 1883.

The universal implications of the Mahdi's mission were now made plain. A vision assured him that he would eventually offer prayer in Cairo, Mecca, Jerusalem, and Kufa. The first step was to strike at the heart of the Turco-Egyptian administration, Khartoum, and this city was duly occupied after considerable bloodshed in January 1885.

Following this triumph the Mahdi established his headquarters in nearby Omdurman, but he was destined to survive for only six months, dying, it is generally believed, from typhus. The Islamic state he was in the process of establishing, however, lasted for a further fourteen years until the forces of the Anglo-Egyptian "reconquest" mowed down the *khalīfah* 'Abd Allāh in 1899.

The mission of the Mahdi, however, had not been to establish a lasting political structure. His claim to Mahdihood implied that the apocalypse was at hand, and he constantly exhorted his followers to reject the world and its deceits and to prepare for the life to come. As a divinely appointed leader he claimed a status only a little short of that of a prophet. While preaching strict adherence to the Qur'ān and the prophetic *sunnah*, he placed himself above the interpretations of the *madhhab*s, the Islamic law schools, and issued authoritative pronouncements on ritual, social, and economic matters through a series of written proclamations *(manshūrāt)* and oral rulings issued in public gatherings *(majālis;* sg., *majlis)*. Though a Ṣūfī and shaykh of a suborder, he ordained that belief in his mission overrode all other loyalties and that his prayer manual, the *Rātib*, superseded the litanies of the orders. Mystical ideas, however, pervaded all his thinking. His mission was announced in visions in which the Prophet invested him as Mahdi in the presence of al-Khiḍr, the legendary immortal "man of God," and other "saints" *(awliyā')*. He was told by the Prophet that he had been created from

the light of the core of his heart, an allusion to the preexistent light before creation that God made incarnate in Adam and other prophets and, finally, in Muḥammad and his descendants.

Although his claims to be the Mahdi must be judged to have been unsubstantiated, many Sudanese remained loyal to Muḥammad Aḥmad's memory. His posthumous son, Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, was won over by the British administration and was able to benefit from popular pro-Mahdist sentiment (especially among the Baqqārah) to establish grass-roots support for a national political party. The Ummah party, which he founded in 1945, played the dominant role in Sudanese politics in both the first republic (1956–1958) and the second (1964–1969). The Mahdi's great-grandson, Sayyid al-Ṣādiq, a Western-educated Islamic modernist, remains an influential thinker and a key political personality.

[*See also* Messianism, *article on* Islamic Messianism.]

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JOHN O. HUNWICK

MUḤAMMAD ʿALĪ LĀHŌRĪ. *See* Lāhōrī, Muḥammad ʿAlī.

MUISCA RELIGION. Located high on the Colombian plateau, the territory of the Muisca people extended a scarce 300 kilometers long by 125 kilometers wide. To history, the Muisca have become known as the Chibcha, a name derived from Chibchacum, one of their major deities (Von Hagen, 1974, p. 78). Their state comprised two principal kingdoms that, for four generations of rulers preceding the Spanish conquest of this area in 1537, were ruled by two hereditary monarchs, the Zipa from Bacata in the south and the Zaque from Hunsa in the north. Independent allied territories bordered the northern region. The city of Sugamuxi, which was governed by an elected *cacique* ("leader") was an important religious center (Falchetti and Plazas de Nieto, 1973, pp. 39–45).

Unlike the theocratic empires of Mexico and Peru, the fledgling Muisca state had no stone pyramids, temples, or sculpture. In common with the religions of other American theocracies, however, that of the Muisca placed special emphasis on the adoration of the sun. In Muisca cosmology, the supreme deity, Chiminigagua, was equated with light. Myth recounts how, in the beginning, darkness and silence reigned over a sterile world. Light existed only as the omniscient Chiminigagua within an impenetrable shell of clay. On the occasion of the first dawn, the god broke the shell and illuminated with beauty all that had previously been chaos. He then dispatched two ravens to the ends of the earth. As the birds flew, bright light emanated from their beaks, revealing all the creations of the omnipotent god: the sun, the moon, the vivid birds that animate the sky, and the animals and plants of the earth (Pérez de Barradas, 1950–1951, vol. 2, p. 372; Samper, in Camargo Pérez, 1937, p. 186).

Complementing this dawn-creation myth is the legend of Bachue, fecund mother and matrilineal deity. One spring morning, the sun's rays, like a luminescent emerald, projected sparkling colors over the bleak moor. Warm breezes cleared the early mists as brightly hued birds skimmed over Lake Iguaque. With the gentle murmur of waves, Bachue and her three-year-old son appeared from the waters. Bachue raised her son to maturity, at which point they married. With each pregnancy the prolific Bachue gave birth to five or six children and peopled the entire Muisca realm. With her consort, Bachue instructed the Muisca in the moral precepts of society. Finally, after many years, the couple returned to Iguaque, where they changed into snakes and disappeared into the depths of the lake. Thus Chiminigagua is the energizing power of the universe and Bachue is the progenetor of the Muisca people (Arango Cano, 1970, pp. 29–40).

Bochica, the envoy of Chiminigagua, was a protective deity who saved the Muisca from a disastrous flood inflicted by the irate god Chibchacum (Triana, 1970, p. 82). From a rainbow Bochica hurled a golden staff that dispersed the menacing storm clouds and shattered the mountain below, allowing the flood waters to escape into the Tequendama Falls. For the cruelty he inflicted on the Muisca, Chibchacum was condemned for eternity to carry the earth on his shoulders; as he shifts the

weight from one shoulder to another, earth tremors are felt (Arango Cano, 1970, pp. 65–72). The conflict between the two deities is thought to symbolize the rivalry between the chiefs, whose patron was Bochica, and the merchant class, which was protected by Chibchacum (Pérez de Barradas, 1950–1951, vol. 2, p. 401).

Muisca gods were worshiped at the streams, lakes, waterfalls, and mountains of the territory. Rocks bearing the footprints of Bochica were venerated, and many cliff and rock surfaces were carved or painted with sacred designs (Pérez de Barradas, 1950–1951, vol. 2, pp. 340–354). The holiest shrine was the Temple of the Sun, a circular building with cane walls that were whitened with mud daub and floors covered with fine esparto mats. On platforms against the walls lay the mummies of illustrious ancestors. In tribute to their forefathers, the faithful brought to the temple offerings of emeralds and gold that were placed in hollow wood or ceramic sculptures. The gold or *tumbaga* (an alloy of gold and copper) objects, known as *tunja*s, were anthropomorphic or zoomorphic, in the form of snakes, lizards, birds, monkeys, or felines. Kneeling reverently in the temple with arms held high, the supplicant chanted hymns to the omnipotent spirit of the Sun (Camargo Pérez, 1937, pp. 53–59; Samper, in Camargo Pérez, 1937, p. 190).

Birds were sacrificed in the temple in great numbers. Especially valued were macaws and parrots that were taught to speak; after the sacrifice their heads were preserved. Human sacrifice took place prior to departure for war, and head trophies were taken from the enemy to adorn the temples. During the construction of a temple, posts were driven into the ground through the bodies of living slaves. In honor of the Sun, young boys known as *moxa*s were procured from alien territories and reared in the temples as priests. Believed capable of conversing with the Sun in song, these youths were considered sacred, and their movements were circumscribed by strict taboo. Sexually innocent, they were sacrificed in early puberty. To the chanting of hymns, the heart and viscera of a *moxa* were removed, his head severed, and his blood sprinkled on the temple posts. To placate the Sun in times of drought, a youth would be sacrificed before sunrise on a mountain peak, the east-facing rocks anointed with blood, and the body exposed on the mountain to be devoured by the Sun (Kroeber, 1946, p. 907).

Another important ceremonial offering took place at the Lake of Guatavita in commemoration of a legendary princess. Long ago, a ruler, upon discovering his wife's adulterous liaison with a young warrior, tortured and impaled the man and forced his wife to eat the heart and genitals of her lover. Griefstricken, the princess fled, seeking refuge with the guardian spirits of the sacred lake. Full of remorse, the ruler sent priests to reclaim his wife, but they found her in an enchanted palace protected by a great snake. In memory of his abused wife, the ruler promised to give bountiful gifts; thus, on nights of full moon, the princess appears above the waters of the lake to remind people of their obligation and to bring prosperity to the Muisca.

At the investiture of a ruler, offerings were made to obtain the benevolence of the lake's tutelary spirits. Before sunrise, to the sound of flutes and drums, the ruler, carried on the shoulders of painted warriors, approached the Lake of Guatavita. Boarding a raft, he shed his cloak and stood naked, his body anointed with fragrant resin and coated with gold dust. Accompanied by nobles and priests, the raft proceeded to the center of the lake, as worshipers along the banks intoned sacred hymns. When the first rays broke across the horizon, the gilded monarch, resplendent in the Sun's divine light, emitted a joyful cry that was echoed by his reverent subjects. Placing in the waters offerings of gold and emeralds, the ruler finally immersed himself in the lake to wash away the precious gold particles. And on his triumphant return to shore he was received with acclaim and celebration (Arango Cano, 1970, pp. 101–119).

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PITA KELEKNA

MULLĀ ṢADRĀ (AH 979/80–1050, 1571/2–1641 CE), popular name of Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī; Persian philosopher, theologian, and mystic. As his name indicates, Muḥammad, titled Ṣadr al-Dīn ("breastplate [defender] of the faith") was born in Shiraz; his father, Ibrāhīm ibn Yaḥyā, is said to have been a governor of the province of Fārs.

Life. Little is known of the details of Mullā Ṣadrā's life. He came at a young age to Isfahan, which was the Safavid capital and the center of a flourishing school of philosophy established by Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631), Mullā Ṣadrā's mentor and a philosophic thinker of fairly high caliber. Ṣadrā also studied theology with Bahā' al-Dīn al-'Āmilī (d. 1621), a theologian, mathematician, and architect whose treatises on mathematics and science were taught at al-Azhar University in Cairo. His third teacher, Mīr Findiriskī (who died the same year as Mullā Ṣadrā), is believed to have taught Ṣadrā the Peripatetic philosophy of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna).

Sometime in his youth, most likely during his middle twenties, Mullā Ṣadrā left Isfahan under persecution from certain traditionalist circles who, probably among other things, accused him of pantheism; he was also impelled by a strong inner need to base his thought on a more solid footing than the superficial method of debates and "verbal quibbles," as he calls them. He settled in the village of Kahak in the mountains near Qom (an important center of religious learning in Iran), where he led a solitary life, devoting himself to deep contemplation of the basic problems of truth and life, particularly of human destiny. This was accompanied by strenuous religious exercises as a means of spiritual catharsis, as he avers, and as preparation for the reception of truth. It is not certain how long he stayed in Kahak: reports vary from seven to fifteen years, but the latter figure appears to be more accurate within the periodization of his life suggested below. In any event, Ṣadrā informs us that during this stay, as he resigned himself to God and passively submitted to truth, his mind was "flooded with invasions of intuitive truth." This infused new life into him; he had gone into seclusion troubled and brokenhearted, but he came out of it with a new philosophical discovery, a discovery that was to serve him as the master principle for the solution of all philosophical problems, from the theory of movement, through epistemology, to the nature of the self and God. This was the principle of the reality of existence and the fictitiousness of essences. To expound this principle he wrote various works, including his *magnum opus, Al-asfār al-arba'ah* (The Four Journeys).

After his stay in Kahak, Ṣadrā returned to his native town, Shiraz, where it is said a mosque school was built for him by Allāhwirdī Khan under orders from Shah 'Abbās II. This was the "Khan School" mentioned by the seventeenth-century traveler Thomas Herbert as the most prominent school in Iran; it offered courses in philosophy, astrology (that is, astronomy: astrology is prohibited in orthodox Islam), physics, chemistry, and mathematics. The building, though badly in need of restoration, still stands today. Here Ṣadrā wrote practically all of his works and trained scholars, the most famous of whom were Mullā Fayḍ Kāshānī and 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī. He is said to have died in Basra on a return from his seventh pilgrimage to Mecca; he was buried there. If reports are to be believed, he made several pilgrimages to Mecca on foot. Such a journey is not uncommon among Muslims, but in the case of a busy intellectual leader it would have been an almost incredible feat.

The life of Ṣadrā thus falls into three broad periods. The first covers his childhood and his period of study in Shiraz and Isfahan—up to his early or middle twenties; the second is the period of his self-imposed exile in the village of Kahak, which, if it spanned fifteen years, would bring him to the age of almost forty, and the last period covers the last thirty lunar years of his life, which would give him a total of seventy lunar or sixty-eight solar years.

Thought. Mullā Ṣadrā tells us that in his early youth he held to the primary reality of essences and considered existence to be a "secondary attribute" contributed by the mind to external reality. This doctrine of "essentialism" arose with Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl, "the Martyr" (d. 1191), who criticized the view of Ibn Sīnā that existence is a "real" attribute of existents. Suhrawardī held that in reality there are only essences, and that existence is a most general attribute contributed only by the mind and with no counterpart in the external world. This doctrine became very popular after Suhrawardī and gave rise to the doctrine of the "unity of being" *(waḥdat al-wujūd)*, according to which all beings share existence equally but differ in their essences, a doctrine often linked with pantheism since it asserts the unity of the existence of God with all beings. At some point during his period of seclusion, however, Ṣadrā abandoned this view in favor of the idea of the primary or sole reality of existence, which he then used as his master principle in all fields of philosophic inquiry.

The doctrine of the sole reality of existence implies (1) that essences are not real but are produced only in the mind by the impact of outside reality upon it and (2) that existence is in eternal progressive motion, which at each point assumes all previous grades of movement and transcends them. Let us now consider the fuller impact of each of these propositions. First, existence is "something whose nature it is to be in the external world," while mind is the natural home of essences. The moment we conceptualize existence, therefore, it becomes an essence and falsifies real existence; thus, existence cannot be known through conceptual reason but only through direct intuition, just as we know ourselves. As Ṣadrā puts it, "That which is directly experi-

enced is existence, but that which is understood by the mind are essences." Even so, however, the concept of existence differs from all other concepts or essences, in that it alone presupposes real existence. Essences are dysfunctional to existence: the more something has of existence, the less it has of essence. God, the most perfect being, is therefore pure and absolute existence without any essence, although this fact does not, in Ṣadrā's view, negate God's attributes, because each of them, as an infinite and concrete entity, is identical with God's existence and is only conceptually distinguishable from the others, while essences are closed and mutually exclusive. Existence alone is all-inclusive; from it, the mind somehow partitions and carves essences for certain practical purposes, but the continuum of reality is falsified in the process.

Second, this continuum of reality is the continuum of eternal progressive motion, which is unidirectional and irreversible. This movement, which Ṣadrā calls "substantive movement," occurs in the very substance of everything and not just in its accidents or extrinsic attributes, such as color, shape, locus, and so on. This latter kind of movement is reversible in quality and quantity—hot can become cold or vice versa—but such extrinsic motion is dependent upon an inner, intrinsic one that is irreversible. This intrinsic or substantive motion is so imperceptible that we become aware of it only after a great deal of cumulative change has occurred and a critical point is reached. In view of his doctrine of "substantive motion," Ṣadrā, of course, denies that real motion has any enduring substratum. But contrary to the theologians *(mutakallimūn),* who believe in atomism, he spends a good deal of effort to prove continuity, without which the whole idea of process would become impossible, and he would end up denying the very motion that he wants to establish. He therefore concludes by asserting that while the idea of a fixed and enduring substratum is real with regard to accidental movements, it is fictional with regard to substantive movement, which is itself a veritable unity wherein the potential and the actual or the "active" and the "passive" principles are one and the same. In a self-actualizing process, any dualism between that which produces change and that which is receptive of change vanishes.

In the entire field of reality, it is only existence that is characterized by substantive change. Existence alone is therefore "systematically ambiguous" *(mutashakkik)* because it is "that which, by virtue of sameness, creates difference"; other phenomena, like extrinsic motion and time, are so only because they are contingent upon this substantive change. This substantive movement of the world process always proceeds from the general to the specific, from the genus to the differentia, from the abstract to the concrete, and every subsequent development contains the prior developments and transcends them. Ṣadrā also describes the process as movement from mutually exclusive to mutually inclusive parts of being, or from the "composite" to the "simple" being. He thus enunciates the principle: "The truly simple *is* all reality." A consequence of this principle is that what appears contradictory at a lower level of being appears as a synthetic unity at a higher level, since mutually exclusive factors progressively become mutually inclusive.

Whereas God is absolute existence, the perpetually and progressively moving grades of existence are the "modes" of existence; these modes, in proportion to the measure of existence they realize, are organized according to the principle of "more or less," or *ad priorem et posteriorem,* a principle that Ṣadrā borrowed from Suhrawardī. But while for Suhrawardī the principle of "more or less" applies to essences, according to Ṣadrā it applies to existence alone, and that is, as we have seen, the "systematic ambiguity" *(tashkīk)* of existence. On the basis of this *tashkīk* of existence, moreover, Ṣadrā asserts that although in this life all humans partake of one species, thanks to the progressive motion from abstract to concrete in the evolutionary process, in future life every human will become a species unto himself. Strictly speaking, on this principle, every form or mode of being has an irreducible reality of its own, which cannot be dissolved without residue: each being, Ṣadrā tirelessly repeats, exists in its own right as a unique and unanalyzable particular *(fard).* Yet so strong is the pull of the pantheistic-monistic worldview of his earlier days that Ṣadrā emphatically tells us that only God is real and truly existent; every other being is only a chimera, a pseudo-being beside God. Here lies the most basic tension in Ṣadrā's thought, one which he never seems able to overcome; it is the tension between his philosophical and his religious motivations. Thus, while he tells us that the question "why does the world move?" is a meaningless one, like the question, "why does fire burn?"—for the only answer is "because this is its very nature"—in the same breath, he insists that it is God who creates change at every moment in the world process, that nothing other than him has any reality whatever, and that all contingent beings are not just things related to him, but mere relations, a hardly intelligible proposition.

Nonetheless, Ṣadrā applies his fundamental theory of existence and its evolution to various traditional problems of philosophy with an amazing degree of consistency and success. Thus, in his theory of knowledge he argues strongly against the Peripatetic view that knowl-

edge comes about by way of gradual abstraction of the object of knowledge from matter and its relationships until pure intellective knowlege is attained. If this is the case, then our intellective knowledge of an animal, for example, since it is abstracted from the matter of the animal, must falsify the object of knowledge, because the real animal has matter, and "concepts in the mind would become like engravings on the wall." Knowledge, in fact, since it is at a higher plane of being than material things, is more concrete, simple, and inclusive, until, at the highest level, the full knowledge-being equation is reached as in God.

In his eschatology, Ṣadrā rejects the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, giving as one reason, among others, that when a soul has developed in a body it cannot regress and start from scratch, which it would have to do if it joined a newborn body. Applying his doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of existence to the problem of will, Ṣadrā asserts that will (like knowledge and other intrinsic attributes) is commensurate with a particular form of existence. Fire, for example, has a certain tendency (like other natural objects) but no will; humans have a will with choice between alternatives. They have to choose because they are a mixture of power and powerlessness, knowledge and ignorance; their "free will" means that they have choice, but also that this choice has determinants. Philosophers who hanker after an "absolutely free will" for humans are running after a mirage. God has a free will without choice since, in his case, there is no question of alternatives to choose from; nevertheless, he does not work under constraint. Thus, an individual can say, "'If I will, I will write; otherwise not," and God can say, "If I will, I will create; otherwise not," even if God must always create, given his nature; but fire cannot say, "If I will, I will burn; otherwise not." These differences are due to the nature of existence in each case.

Works. The editor of *Al-asfār al-arba'ah* (Tehran, 1958) puts the number of Ṣadrā's works at thirty-two or thirty-three; S. H. Nasr, in his study *Mullā Ṣadrā and His Transcendent Philosophy*, mentions forty-six, although he includes a number of items entitled "Answers to Questions." Although Ṣadrā wrote works of religion as well as philosophy, the latter are by far the more important, since the former are products of the application of his philosophical hermeneutics to religious tenets. His writings can also be divided into original works and commentaries; the commentaries on Ibn Sī-nā's *Metaphysics* and Suhrawardī's *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* are very important and certainly more influential even than most of Ṣadrā's smaller original pieces. His most important and comprehensive work is undoubtedly *Al-asfār al-arba'ah*. The first part deals with ontology, discussing questions of existence, essence, and movement. The second, apparently addressing the categories of substance and accidents, deals with his natural philosophy. The third "journey" is devoted to a discussion of God's being and attributes, while the last deals with humanity and its destiny, which is the final purpose of the entire work. Two other important late works are *Al-mabda' wa-al-ma'ād* (The Origin and the Return, that is, of all being from and to God) and *Al-shawāhid al-rubūbīyah* (Divine Witnesses), held to be his last work; these are both in the nature of summaries of the *Asfār*.

Despite his fame, Ṣadrā had little influence in his own lifetime. As mentioned earlier, two of his pupils gained prominence. It appears that since he had synthesized several schools of Islamic thought and also wrote commentaries on some of their prominent texts, his works gradually became a focal point of philosophic studies in Iran and subsequently in the Indian subcontinent, where Sadrā's commentary on Ibn Sīnā's *Metaphysics* was taught and where numerous manuscripts of his works still exist uncataloged.

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The latest edition of the *Asfār* (Tehran, 1960–) so far includes three "journeys" in nine volumes; the publication of the second "journey," which exists only in the 1865 Tehran lithograph edition, is still awaited. The first great commentator on the *Asfār* was 'Alī Nūrī (d. 1831), followed by a series of other commentators, the most able and prominent of whom was Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1871). A list of important commentaries (which have never been published independently of the text) is given in the publisher's introduction to the recent edition of the *Asfār* mentioned above. Ṣadrā has had many "debunkers" as well, particularly Abū al-Ḥasan Jalwah (d. 1894), who claimed that Ṣadrā "stole" practically all of his characteristic ideas without naming his sources, a claim that of course cannot be taken seriously. For the past few decades, Iran has witnessed reinvigorated interest in Ṣadrā. The celebration of his four hundredth anniversary in 1961 occasioned the publication of some valuable information about him and his writings, along with editions of some of his previously unpublished works.

In the West, the first book on Ṣadrā's thought, *Das philosophische System von Schirāzi* (Strassburg, 1913), was published by Max Horten. This was followed by Henry Corbin's translation of *Al-mashā'ir* as *Le livre des pénétrations métaphysique* (Tehran, 1964). I have published a detailed critical analysis of Ṣadrā's philosophy based primarily on the *Asfār* entitled *The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā* (Albany, N.Y., 1975). Seyyed Hossein Nasr's *Mullā Ṣadrā and His Transcendent Philosophy* (Tehran, 1978) contains useful information on the life and works of Ṣadrā. James Winston Morris has published an annotated English translation of Ṣadrā's treatise *Al-ḥikmah al-'arshīyah* entitled *The Wisdom of the Throne* (Princeton, 1981), with a lengthy

introduction from an esoteric angle. For general bibliography, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr's work cited above.

FAZLUR RAHMAN

MÜLLER, F. MAX (1823–1900), German-born historian of religions, scholar of the comparative study of religions, and professor at Oxford University. Friedrich Max Müller was the son of Wilhelm Müller, a famous German poet celebrated for his philhellenic lyrics.

Max Müller devoted his life to the study of classical Indian religious documents, the comparative study of religious history and myth, and the publication of the religious history of the world. After studying philosophy, linguistics, and languages (especially Sanskrit) at the universities of Leipzig, Berlin, and Paris—which studies led to his translations into German of the Indian fables of the *Hitopadeśa* (1844; Eng. trans., 1866) and Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* (1847)—he went to London, where he devoted himself to the publication in English of the *Ṛgveda*. In 1848, he moved to Oxford, where he remained until the end of his life.

At Oxford, Müller completed his edition of the *Ṛgveda* (published as *Rig-Veda Samhitâ*, 6 vols., 1849–1873); during his first twenty years there, he taught European languages and literatures. He was disappointed in his hope of being appointed to the chair of Sanskrit in 1860. In 1868, he received the professorship in comparative philology. Henceforth he began to work on a broad, comparative basis rather than on a purely philological one. After his retirement in 1875, Müller devoted himself to questions concerning the history and scientific study of religions.

The scope of Müller's works is broad. Besides writing on German classics and poetry, on the comparative study of languages and the "science of thought" (i.e., the study of thought in the light of the history of language), and on Indian linguistics and literature, Müller researched the field of Indian religion and philosophy. He edited and translated both Hindu and Buddhist scriptures like the aforementioned *Ṛgveda*, the Upaniṣads, the *Dhammapada*, the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, and so on. The fruits of his studies on the Indian traditions include such works as *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as Illustrated by the Religions of India* (1878), *India, What Can It Teach Us?* (1883), *Râmakrishna, His Life and Sayings* (1898), and *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (1899).

Müller was especially concerned with the publication of an edition of translations of the major religious documents of Asia, his monumental series "Sacred Books of the East," which he edited in fifty volumes (1879–1894). The series "Sacred Books of the Buddhists" began publication under Müller's editorship in 1895.

Müller's major works on the comparative study of religion and mythology include "Comparative Mythology" in *Oxford Essays* (1856), *Chips from a German Workshop*, 4 vols. (1867–1875), *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (1873), the above-mentioned work *The Origin and Growth of Religion* (1878), *Natural Religion* (1889), *Physical Religion* (1891), *Anthropological Religion* (1892), *Theosophy or Psychological Religion* (1893), and *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, 2 vols. (1897). In addition, his *Biographical Essays* (1884) are to be mentioned, as is his posthumously published *My Autobiography*, edited by W. G. Max Müller (1901). These are only his major works; all in all, he wrote and edited more than one hundred books.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, debates between Müller and other scholars, notably E. B. Tylor and Andrew Lang, about the origin of religion were among the most important academic controversies of the day. Tylor proposed that religion had its origin in various psychological factors, such as dreams, ecstasies, and so forth; Lang, on the other hand, argued that the idea of a supreme being could be placed historically among the earliest conceptions of humanity, and therefore that no discussion of an antecedent "cause" of religion was meaningful. [*See the biographies of Lang and Tylor.*]

According to Müller, however, religion and mythology began with the human perception of overpowering natural phenomena. The "nature mythology" school that Müller founded, which included English classicist George W. Fox and English Semitist Robert Brown among its adherents, argued that myth is an imagistic expression of the experience of the infinite provoked by nature. Most important to Müller were the myths that he believed to be inspired by the power of the sun: his "solar mythology" argued that the principal gods and heroes of the Indo-European peoples were, at root, solar metaphors.

Müller believed that this transformation, from a direct perception of the sun's power to a metaphorical representation of this power in myth, illustrated a "disease of language"; that is, the original, natural objects of awe and reverence were gradually obscured behind a tissue of linguistic usage, and ultimately severed from direct perception by the action of metaphor. The gods, Müller believed, were originally only names for natural phenomena, names that in the course of time were falsely interpreted, personified, and deified.

Müller's enormous literary output was closely connected with his broad, comparative approach. He in-

sisted that the major holy books of religious history, as well as texts on the mythologies of nations, should be available to scholars and that the new science of religion, which he was helping to found, should be based on the study of sources. Although his comparative works were criticized in some academic quarters as too sweepingly general or too devoted to philosophical or linguistic presuppositions (such as the idea that religions, like languages, could be classed in families), his fame in England was great at the height of his creativity. He was interested not only in scholarly work but also in the political and cultural questions of his day, and he sought and won contacts with politicians and rulers. For him, scholarship was to serve the understanding between peoples. In this respect, his work facilitated an understanding of the Indian traditions in the Western world. It is therefore understandable that Müller has received special recognition in India.

Müller can be regarded as one of the founding fathers of the "science of religion," as he translated the German *Religionswissenschaft*. His emphasis on the legitimacy and necessity of a historically based comparative study of religions (sometimes referred to by him as "comparative theology" on analogy with "comparative philology") has gained general recognition.

Certain philosophical presuppositions held by Müller (based mainly on German Idealism), such as the idea that religion discloses itself when its origins are studied, and certain of his private theological convictions, are bound to his personality and time. This includes his Kantian leanings, as reflected in the introduction to his English translation of Kant's *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1881), where he extolled religion as a "capacity to perceive the infinite," as well as ideas taken up from Friedrich Schleiermacher and Arthur Schopenhauer. Müller's far-reaching aim of formulating a "theoretic theology" to supersede the comparative study of religions and to explain the conditions under which religion is possible (once the data of world religions have been collected, classified, and analyzed) goes beyond the present-day scope of the history of religions.

Müller was personally guided in his academic work by the conviction that traces of divine wisdom and love could be discovered in the history of humanity. The critical, scientific study of ancient documents should be accompanied, he thought, by a reverence for the eternal value of religion, in whatever form it may present itself. While the historical study discloses the historicity of all forms of religion, Müller was convinced that a comparative study would disclose that no religion is entirely devoid of truth. The eternal truths he refers to repeatedly are a belief in God, the immortality of the soul, and a future retribution. In opposition to his Christian critics, Müller emphasized that the study of the religions of the world would serve for a better appreciation of the Christian faith.

[*See also* Study of Religion, *article on* History of Study, *and* Indo-European Religions, *article on* History of Study.]

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HANS J. KLIMKEIT

MÜLLER, KARL O. (1797–1840), German classical historian and mythologist. Karl Otfried Müller was educated at Breslau and at Berlin under the classical philologist August Böckh. In 1819 he was appointed adjunct professor of ancient art and literature at Göttingen and taught there until 1839, when he left Germany to study and travel. He died of fever in Athens the next year.

Müller may be claimed as the most balanced and versatile classical historian of his time, especially in the area of Greek religion and myth. None before him had portrayed this ancient religion and mythology within such a broad and unfolding historical context. Müller's innovation, as Henri Pinard de la Boullaye said, was "not a thesis but a method." Müller related cult and myth, for example, to such complex matters as the shift from agriculture to war and hunting, the founding of cities and colonization, the movement of tribes, and the way differences in locale and climate affect ritual and belief. His many-sided approach gave scholarly rigor to Johann von Herder's emphasis, a generation earlier, on seeing national culture as an organic whole, developing from its own historical roots, language, customs, and

geography. Müller thus opposed the Romantic view, common in his time, of Greek religion as patently derived from India and the East, usually by way of migrating priests. He treated Greek civilization in its own terms and applied any useful method: philology, the history of religions, aesthetics, cartography, archaeology. By this variety of means, he clarified what might be called the historical topography of Greek cults and myths as they arose, flourished, and spread. He traced the way this changed over time, and he tried to assign causes, explaining, for example, how a single deity (such as Demeter) was replaced by the Homeric pantheon, how earlier cults remained visible in later and different forms, why the role of local sanctuaries changed, and why mystery religions emerged.

Müller postulated that cult originates in symbol, which is both a transcending and a material representation; myth comes afterward, as an explanation of the cult. He treated myth mainly as a historical document, a clue that the Greeks themselves gave to the meaning of existing customs, beliefs, and important events. He took myth to be a most reliable guide, however, and he was convinced that the folk mind speaking in myth does not falsify or even invent. (Here he reflected the influence of his friends the famous German folklorists Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm.) The most exalted role Müller allowed myth was that of giving an ideal representation to otherwise realistic matters.

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BURTON FELDMAN

MULUNGU is the high god of several Bantu-speaking peoples of East Africa, where he is also known as Muungu, Mungu, Murungu, and Mvungu. Mulungu is recognized as the supreme deity by the Yao and Zimba of Malawi and Mozambique, the Kamba of Kenya, and the Gogo of Tanzania. However, he is widely recognized among the central and eastern Bantu-speaking peoples, and the name *Mungu* is commonly used to refer to God by Swahili-speaking peoples of eastern and central Africa. Mulungu is synonymous with Ngai, particularly for those peoples who live near the Kikuyu and Maasai.

Mulungu is a high god, but, as is typical of so many African religions, prayers are rarely directed to him and he has no formal cult. He is said to dwell in the sky and is associated with celestial phenomena such as rain, thunder (said to be his voice), and drought (said to be a sign of his displeasure). Mulungu is invoked most often in the prayers for rain, and at such times offerings may be made to him as well as to the other spirits.

Mulungu's relationship to lesser deities is complex and even contradictory. Some writers, such as Hetherwick, perceive him as an aggregate of the spirits of the dead, even though prayers were directed to him through the intercession of the souls of the deceased elders. Similarly, he is thought to be an aggregate of all the lesser deities. Nonetheless, the accounts show that Bantu-speaking peoples also see Mulungu as a supreme deity superior to, and different from, the souls of the dead and the lesser deities. For instance, among the Kamba prayers are most often directed to the *aimu*, lesser spirits dwelling on the earth, rather than to Mulungu; this is not because Mulungu is powerless or uncaring but because he is benevolent toward mankind. The *aimu* spirits are morally ambiguous, and sacrifices must be made to them regularly to ensure their benevolence.

Mulungu is also intimately related to mythic history, particularly to the creation, the origins of death, the separation of heaven and earth, and the origin of man. One myth of the Yao relates that in the beginning there was only Mulungu and the animals. The chameleon was fishing one day and found in his net the first pair of human beings. At Mulungu's command the chameleon raised the people and taught them many things. Among these things was the ability to create fire, but in the beginning they could not control it, and a fire raged across the earth and drove Mulungu away into the heavens.

Thus Mulungu is related to the time of origin, but in day-to-day human activity he is now considered fairly remote. However, the Kamba believe that Mulungu can, and does, intervene in human affairs when the moral order of society is threatened or violated.

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JAMES S. THAYER

MÜNTZER, THOMAS (1488?–1525), also known as Münzer; radical Protestant reformer involved in the German Peasants' War of 1524–1525. Little is known about Müntzer's early life. His name first appears in the 1506 matriculation records of the University of Leipzig, which required entering students to be at least seventeen years old. Attempts to demonstrate that Müntzer was born earlier than 1488—perhaps as early as 1468—on the basis of records reporting his membership in a religious order have been successfully refuted by Walter Elliger in his detailed biography, *Thomas Müntzer* (Göttingen, 1975, pp. 10–11). Born of a well-to-do family in the Saxon town of Stolberg, Müntzer attended the universities of Leipzig (1506–1512) and Frankfurt an der Oder (1512–1516), where he received the master of arts degree. He was ordained, perhaps in 1513.

Increasingly curious about the relationship of faith to history, Müntzer learned Hebrew and Greek. He studied Eusebius's *Church History*, Augustine, Jerome, the apocalyptic speculations of the Italian Cistercian abbot Joachim of Fiore, the German mystics (especially Johannes Tauler), the records of the reform councils of Constance (1414–1418) and Basel (1431–1449), and canon law. Between 1516 and 1520, Müntzer was an itinerant priest and scholar, for a brief period taking the positions of provost and father confessor in the convents of Frose and Beuditz. In 1518, he traveled to Wittenberg, where he may have met Luther, then north to Jüterbog, where he became known as "emulator of Martin." In 1520, on Luther's recommendation, he became pastor of Zwickau, the "pearl of Saxony."

Zwickau had become the center of the silver trade, with a large influx of tradesmen hoping to make a fortune. There Müntzer began a reform program to eliminate socioeconomic differences between the rich and the poor. He organized meetings of small groups of common people, mostly weavers who had lost their jobs in the wake of the silver boom. Nicholas Storch, the leader of the unemployed weavers and a member of a radical Christian group known as the Zwickau Prophets, persuaded Müntzer that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the end of the world was near. The city council soon accused the Zwickau Prophets and their pastor, Müntzer, of fomenting rebellion. Müntzer tried to enlist the support of Luther who, however, did not respond.

In 1521, the Zwickau council dismissed Müntzer from the pastorate of Saint Catharine's Church. Müntzer went to Prague, hoping for the support of the Hussites, who were well-known enemies of the Roman papacy. There he posted a handwritten declaration (later known as the Prague Manifesto) on the doors of various churches. Written in German, Latin, and Czech, this manifesto attacked the status quo and announced the beginning of a final reformation leading to a "renewed apostolic church" in which only the Holy Spirit would reign. Müntzer called on the people of Prague to support him in communicating the new "living word" and to oppose anyone defending the status quo. The Prague authorities first placed Müntzer under house arrest and then banned him from Prague.

Once again Müntzer took to the road, traveling through Saxony with brief stops in Erfurt, Halle, and Nordhausen; by 1523 he was penniless and nearly starved. However, he was convinced that his personal suffering was but a prelude to the final tribulations of the world. He met and married the apostate nun Ottilie of Gersen in 1523, the same year he received a call to the pastorate in Allstedt, a small town in electoral Saxony. In 1524, the Müntzers became parents of a son.

In Allstedt, Müntzer implemented his new vision of church and world. First, he reformed congregational life by creating a German church order, a German Evangelical mass, and the German Order of Allstedt, this last to help "poor and collapsing Christendom." He wrote Luther, his Stolberg friends, and Karlstadt that he had become the advocate of the Holy Spirit, who would radically change Germany and the world. In addition, Müntzer wrote several revolutionary tracts. Published in 1524, the tracts *Concerning the Invented Faith*, *Protestation*, *A Clear Disclosure of the False Faith of an Unfaithful World*, and *A Highly Necessary Defense and Answer against the Soft-Living Flesh of Wittenberg* (all written in German) declared that the "elect of God" must experience the "bitter Christ" in the "depth of the soul" in order to be purified for the final battle between good and evil, the final struggle between the status quo and new life in the Holy Spirit. Müntzer now called himself the "new Daniel," the leader of a "league of the elect" who would smash the opponents of the Holy Spirit. Those who refused to accept the Holy Spirit in their souls, Müntzer proclaimed repeatedly, would have to be forced to do so, if necessary by the sword. No "ungodly" could be tolerated among the "elect."

When Müntzer led a small band of "elect" in destroying a small Catholic chapel outside Allstedt, Saxon au-

thorities became alarmed. Having been warned by Luther against the "restless spirit of Allstedt," representatives of the Saxon court met with Müntzer in Allstedt, where he preached a radical sermon to them. They then summoned him to Weimar and ordered him to stop his agitations. When the authorities confiscated copies of his treatises, Müntzer was convinced that the time had come to oppose the status quo with force. But, in a letter of 5 September 1524, the Anabaptist reformer Conrad Grebel warned Müntzer against the use of violence.

Müntzer never received the letter because he had left Allstedt vainly seeking support in Switzerland, especially in Basel. He then joined bands of rebellious peasants in Mühlhausen. He and the radical priest Henry Pfaiffer tried once again to create a model of reform, but the Mühlhausen authorities banned both of them. By the spring of 1525, Müntzer had joined the rebelling peasants in Thuringia and had become their chaplain. In May of 1525, the peasants were cruelly defeated at Frankenhausen, and Müntzer, who had fled before the massacre, was captured, tortured, and beheaded. Luther approved of Müntzer's execution, calling it a "just and terrible judgment of God."

Müntzer was the first Protestant theocrat who advocated a Christian crusade to liberate the world from sin, death, and evil. He was a spiritualist who could no longer endure the compromise between internal spiritual experience and living in an imperfect external world; a truly apocalyptic thinker, he tried to transform theological ideas into revolutionary action. Reformers like Luther and Calvin made him the symbol of villainy, and Anabaptists and other radical reformers refused to support him. Ironically, he would become a hero in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to Marxists and other communist groups who advocated revolution, although of course without Müntzer's theological foundation.

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ERIC W. GRITSCH

MURAMURA DARANA. Among the many *muramura* (sacred, or Dreaming, mythic beings) who traveled the country in the vicinity of lakes Eyre, Hope, and Gregory in northeastern South Australia, the *muramura* Darana was highly regarded as a rainmaker. Although his main sphere of influence was the Dieri-language area, his name and his mythic activities were known to members of contiguous language groups, such as the Ngamini, Tirari, Wongganguru, and Yandruwunda. Samuel Gason (in Woods, 1879, p. 267) considered all the *muramura* to be gods or divine beings. Darana was certainly a deity of considerable importance. He was not, however, a supreme being.

The Lutheran mission established stations at Killalpaninna and Kopperamana on Cooper's Creek in 1860. By the end of the century, Otto Siebert (1910) and J. G. Reuther (1981) were recording myths that include references to Darana. Theodor Vogelsang (1942, p. 149), who was born in the area in 1878, asserted that Darana "was the most powerful *muramura* of them all." Darana emerged from the earth at a place named Kandrimoku, a lake east of Killalpaninna; he had power over the wind, could cause droughts, and could attract rain, especially in the Lake Hope area.

The following myth about the adventures of Darana is a summary of the version reported by A. W. Howitt (1904, pp. 798–800):

> No rain had fallen for a considerable time in the Lake Eyre region. However, Darana was able to produce it by singing, repeatedly, songs of his rain-cycle. The rain he caused was so intense and so sustained that all the lakes and creeks were flooded, and their waters spread across the land. They reached Darana's knees, then his hips and, ultimately, his neck. Taking his *kandri* (a rounded boomerang pointed at

each end), he waded through the swirling flood waters toward the north, where at a particular place he plunged it into the ground. Immediately, the rain ceased. Gradually the country dried, and plants and trees grew prolifically. As a result, *muluru* (caterpillars or witchetty grubs) settled there in great numbers. Through his songs, Darana brought these grubs together, collected and dried them, and packed them into string bags which he hung on trees. Then he prepared to leave that place, to visit another *muramura* who had invited him to share in a feast of *paua* (grass-seed "bread"). He was accompanied by his followers. Among them were a number of persons who had been so weakened by the drought preceding the rain that they could only crawl along on their knees and elbows. They left behind them two youths: the Dara-ulu, sons of Darana.

The Dara-ulu saw the bags of dried grubs. In the absence of the others, they amused themselves by throwing boomerangs at them. One of the Dara-ulu hit one of the bags, making a great hole. Grub dust poured out in clouds, spreading across the countryside, darkening the sun. However, through the haze, the other bags shone brightly and could be seen in the distance by the traveling *muramura*. At once they returned. Those who had recovered from the drought ran on the surface of the ground, and others went underneath the ground. Arriving back, they strangled the Dara-ulu. The youths were immediately restored to life by Darana. But through common consent, the two were finally strangled and their bodies "rolled up" to form two egg-shaped objects which represented their "hearts" (the *dara*) and were consequently regarded as secret-sacred.

This is only one of the myth segments that refers to the adventures of Darana. For instance, the place Mandikilla-widmani received its name from the actions taken by Darana in stopping the flood: in this case, "he put the waters into the ground." He is also associated with the *muramura* Wuriliwulu (Bat), who was the patron of the grubs. Darana met Wuriliwulu at Wogadani-muramura, close to the head of a creek near Lake Hope. At Lake Killalpaninna, Darana met a female *muramura* and was responsible for shaping a hill there as well as part of the lake; he also met the *muramura* Gadi-margara (a mythic crocodile-shaped creature). Gadi-margara was living in a hole under a eucalyptus tree near where Cooper's Creek enters the lake. There are many examples of this kind, which demonstrate that Darana mythology reflected local topography and was linked to the land and the natural environment (see Berndt, 1953, pp. 193–194).

In the version presented here, the supernatural power of Darana is emphasized. The myth deals with a highly religious matter. It contrasts a time of plenty with a time of hunger. Symbolically, the abundance of *muluru* and their dried state represent rain and drought, respectively: excessive rain leading to flood, dust from the dried *muluru* leading to drought and extinction. These contrasts spell out the unpredictability of nature unless it is controlled ritually—in this case, by or through Darana.

The transformation of the Dara-ulu, Darana's sons, into two secret-sacred objects resulted from a sacrilegious act on their part—namely, destroying one of the dried-grub bags, which, because they had been prepared specially by Darana for a sacred purpose, were taboo. The act was deemed sufficient to bring disaster to the Dieri people through drought; that potential, and also real, situation was underlined by the presence of Darana's weakened followers.

Howitt (1904) and Vogelsang (1942) each state that the two "hearts" *(dara)* were believed to possess great power. To scratch one would cause "perpetual hunger"; if they were broken, the sky would redden and the mythic dust from the dried *muluru* would cover the earth. On the other hand, there is the power of ritual—the power, in this case, of the deity Darana. The two hearts of the Dara-ulu, if appropriately treated (by anointing them with fat and singing the relevant songs in particular circumstances), can bring rain—but, ideally, they will bring rain within reasonable limits, because flood can be just as disastrous as drought.

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RONALD M. BERNDT

MURO KYŪSŌ (1658–1734), Japanese scholar of Neo-Confucianism in the mid-Tokugawa period (1603–1868). Kyūsō, the son of a physician, was born in Yanaka, Musashino Province (in the modern Tokyo area). After studying at the school of Kinoshita Jun'an in Kyoto, he took up a career of scholarship and official service that culminated in his appointment as Confucian adviser to the eighth Tokugawa shogun, Yoshimune.

Kyūsō asserted that he had opposed the scholarly tradition established by Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), founder of the school of Ancient Rhetoric (Kobunjigaku). Kyūsō emphasized the practice of good, and declared that a true scholar did not copy the teachings of others but propounded his own philosophy. He dissociated himself from those scholars he believed were preoccupied only with problems of theoretical epistemology. A pragmatist, Kyūsō criticized the doctrine of the Wang Yang-ming school of Confucianism and the mysticism of Buddhism.

Among his written works, *Sundai zatsuwa* (Essays Written at Sundai) is well known. Written in 1732 and consisting of five volumes entitled *Humanity*, *Justice*, *Courtesy*, *Wisdom*, and *Faith*, the work resembles in style the famed *Tsurezuregusa* of Yoshida Kenkō (1283–1350).

It was Kyūsō's thesis that the truth *(ri)* of nature or the universe would be realized only through exchange and practice between human beings. The core or essence of nature was always stable, he wrote, and spirit *(ki)* was equal to that essence—in contrast with truth *(ri)*—that was materially based. Kyūsō criticized idealism and the concomitant doctrine of intuition as understood by the Yang-ming (Yōmei) school of Neo-Confucianism. Although he utilized the term *intuition*, Kyūsō tended to regard it not as reflexive self-understanding, a religious goal in and of itself, but rather as a mere instrument by which to plumb a truth that is both universal and objective. Contrary to Neo-Confucianism, Kyūsō believed that truth was not separate from the material spirit. He did not regard it as material but rather as something that was in "collision" with spirit.

A pantheist, Kyūsō considered nature sacred. He explained that the forces of nature and the *kami* were in collision as the negative and positive forces of *yin* and *yang*. The natural and eternal activity of the negative and positive forces resulted in the combining of the five elements that compose the universe and in the various forms and changing seasons of nature. This activity, Kyūsō held, paralleled the development of all natural phenomena and therefore correlated with the laws of the universe. *Kami*, or sacredness, would be sensed by man through observation of the marvelous action of the universe, and in this way faithfulness would result. Therefore it was necessary to study in depth the laws of the phenomena of nature.

Kyūsō struck out at the religious groups enjoying popularity in Japan at that time. Believing that Buddhism was detrimental to society and the family and that Buddhist monks were sowers of the seeds of deception, Kyūsō advocated the rejection of the "useless ghost." He denied that Buddhism had exerted a useful influence on Japanese culture and civilization. Not limiting his attacks to Buddhism, he denounced Shintō as well, ridiculing the theory of an unbroken line of Japanese emperors from the beginning of time. Christianity he likened to Buddhism and Shintō, and foreign missionaries to spies in sacerdotal robes. As a result, Kyūsō supported the violent suppression of Christianity that was then taking place in Japan.

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HAGA NOBORU

Translated from Japanese by Irene M. Kunii

MŪRTI. According to many Hindu religious traditions, *mūrti* is a god's form, its infinite metaphysical reality manifested visibly. Aside from a limited class of objects called *svayambhū* (self-created or natural), *mūrti*s are mainly anthropomorphic figures or symbols. They are the ritually consecrated cult images at the center of *pūjā* (worship), which is the dominant form of Hindu religious practice.

In Vedic sacrifice the deity is unseen, being represented only by the chanted *mantra*s of the priests as they move among the abstract geometric forms of the altars that represent the cosmos. The deity's form first emerges in the practice of the orthodox tradition with the later, theistic Upaniṣads, where a vision of the *mūrti* of the personalized deity is summoned through meditation. In the epics, image worship is mentioned and ac-

cepted, but it is given only marginal and fleeting notice, while major interest is centered upon the fire sacrifice. Only with the emergence of sectarian Agamic and Purāṇic literature, from the fourth century CE on, did the notion of *mūrti* and its use in *pūjā* become systematically formulated. There, for the first time, the claim is made that worship of *mūrti* succeeds or even supplants the sacrifice.

Paralleling this textual record are inscriptions and fragmentary temple and image remains from as early as the second century BCE. Very few images of orthodox Purāṇic deities have survived from before the third century CE, however, and not until the fifth and sixth centuries were *mūrti*s and the temples that house them committed to the permanence of stone throughout the subcontinent. Nearly all earlier images, and most later ones, were made of perishable materials, and so lost.

An image is a *mūrti*, not by virtue of looking like the deity it represents, but because it conforms to prescribed measurements and symbolic conventions and is accorded orthodox consecration *(pratiṣṭhā)* and authentic devotion, by those whose activities create it, the initiated artist *(sthapati)*, priest *(ācārya)*, and devotee *(bhakta)*. This process is expounded in two sets of authoritative texts. Requirements as to materials, measurements, proportion, decoration, and symbolism according to which the *mūrti* is shaped are provided in technical manuals known as the Śilpaśāstras. Explanation of the metaphysical significance of each stage of manufacture and the prescription of specific *mantra*s to sanctify the process and lodge the power of the deity in the image are found in the Āgamas and Tantras, liturgical handbooks. The process is modeled on the instructions found in the Brāhmaṇas for building fire altars.

Mūrti worship also, partially patterned after the fire sacrifice, takes place in the complementary contexts of household and public altars. Images of *iṣṭadevatā* and *kuladevatā*, family deities who are treated as honored guests, are found in a discrete location in every household. The *mūrti*s of public cults are established in palatial temples, where they are served by an attached priesthood and may be visited by their devotees. As material extensions of the *mūrti* and descendants of the sacrificial altar, such temples are created in accordance with the same technical and liturgical prescriptions as the *mūrti*s themselves.

[*See also* Iconography, *article on* Hindu Iconography, *and* Temple, *article on* Hindu Temples.]

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MURUKAṆ, the Tamil name for the Hindu deity also known by such names as Skanda Kumāra, Subrahmaṇyam, or Kārttikeya. The name is sometimes transcribed as Murugan. While Murukaṇ is the most popular god in present-day Tamil India, he has been worshiped in a variety of forms from at least the third or second century BCE. In his earliest South Indian form, Murukaṇ was described in classical (or Caṅkam) literature as a god of hill and hunt, who was worshiped by hill people, the *kuriñci*s, as a possessor of young damsels and avenger of *anaṅku* and *cūr*, malevolent spirits of the hills.

In North India, Skanda was depicted in epic mythology as the son of Rudra-Śiva or Agni, and as a warrior deity patronized by such dynasties as the Śakas, Ikṣvakus, and Guptas. By the eighth century CE, and throughout the medieval period, these earlier attributes of the god seem to have merged, as subsequent literature, iconography, and temple architecture attest to Murukaṇ's worship in South India as a high god and the son of Śiva.

Murukaṇ was especially extolled by such medieval Tamil *bhakti* (devotional) poets as Aruṇakirinatha of the fifteenth century and Kacciyapaciva of the seventeenth. Late in the nineteenth century, worship of Murukaṇ was given new impetus by a Tamil renaissance, during and after which temples to Murukaṇ were renovated, pilgrimages to these centers increased, and the god came to be viewed as the quintessential Tamil deity.

The basic myth of Skanda-Murukaṇ's life and exploits is found in the *Mahābhārata* (3.223–232; 9.46–47; 13.130–133). It is repeated in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (1.36–37), and further embellished in a wide range of Sanskrit and Tamil literature, especially in Kālidāsa's (fourth century CE?) *Kumārasambhava* and the *Skanda Purāṇa*.

According to Kālidāsa's version of the myth of Skanda's birth, the deity is born of Śiva's semen when the latter marries Pārvatī following an extensive period of meditation and austerities *(tapas)* on Mount Himavat. Later accounts, as in the *Skanda Purāṇa*, say Skanda is born of sparks emanating from Śiva's brow. According to the *Mahābhārata*, Skanda is born of Agni's love-play with Svāhā while she is impersonating the wives of six *ṛṣi*s. Once born, Skanda is suckled by the six Kṛttikā (Pleiades) maidens and engages in a variety of childhood exploits, including the defeat of Indra, the humiliation of Brahmā, and the instruction of Śiva as to the meaning of the sacred syllable *oṃ*. On the sixth day of his life, he is made general of the divine army and conquers the *asura*s headed by Tāraka (or, in South Indian accounts, Surapadma). After the battle, according to the epic myths, he is given in marriage to Devasenā (literally, "army of the gods"); in southern versions, Murukaṉ woos Vaḷḷi, a hunter damsel who becomes the god's second consort.

Murukaṉ is the most widely worshiped god among Tamil Hindus today, and three of the six most popular pilgrimage centers in Tamil Nadu are temples consecrated to him. One of these, Palani, is the second largest pilgrimage complex in South India. Six major festivals celebrating events in the god's life attract millions of worshipers, from the festivals of Skanda-Ṣaṣṭi in October–November to Vaikāci Vicākam in May–June. The cultus incorporates a whole spectrum of rituals, from classical fire sacrifices and Tantric invocations as prescribed in the Śaiva Āgamas to folk forms of possession and dancing with the *kāvaṭi*, or peacock arch. In addition, the god is popularly perceived to be the inspirational source of Tamil literature, vanquisher of cosmic and personal malaise, and the embodiment of Śaiva thought and religion.

[*See also* Tamil Religions.]

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MUSAR MOVEMENT. The Musar movement for individual self-examination and ethical renewal spread among mid-nineteenth-century Lithuanian Jewry after its founding by Yisra'el Salanter (1810–1883). So called from the Hebrew term *musar* ("ethics, instruction"), the Musar movement can be viewed as one of the first attempts in eastern Europe to organize traditionalist circles within Jewish society in modern forms, although its long-term legacy and influence remained limited to the Lithuanian *yeshivot*.

The Musar ideology was formed during the young Yisra'el Salanter's fifteen-year sojourn in Salant during the 1820s and 1830s. There, in addition to achieving mastery of Talmud in the standard manner, Salanter came under the influence of the saintly reclusive figure Yosef Zundel of Salant. Zundel devoted his attention to the ethical aspects of Jewish law, which in his view had been neglected. He believed that in order to overcome the temptations of evil, special actions were necessary beyond a theoretical knowledge of one's legal obligations. To this end Zundel developed a system of regular self-analysis and study of ethical texts, and he introduced such innovations as the repetition of Talmudic statements on ethical issues as a way to induce the proper mood for soul-searching. Yisra'el Salanter built upon the system of his master, but unlike Zundel he attempted to present the Musar doctrine to the community at large within an organizational framework.

In Vilna in the mid-1840s, Salanter made his first efforts to establish a mass Musar movement. Departing from the standard practice for heads of *yeshivot*, he presented a series of public talks addressed not only to scholars but also to artisans and most particularly to affluent educated businessmen. Salanter called for the inclusion of ethical works in the curriculum of Torah study that is incumbent upon every Jew. Such study, besides making the individual aware of the ethical responsibilities stipulated by Jewish law, would also help him recognize and struggle with his unconscious impulses and bring them under control. For this purpose, Salanter set up a *musar-shṭibl* (Yi., "place of instruction") where, through the combined practice of meditation and the somber repetition of moral texts, an appropriately ecstatic-fearful mood could be created for the encounter with elemental passions and drives. During this Vilna period, Salanter arranged for the reprinting of classic ethical texts and attracted the first of his key disciples.

By all indications, Salanter intended the Musar movement to answer the threat to traditional Jewry posed by the Haskalah, the movement for Jewish Enlightenment, one of whose major centers was in Vilna. Believing that existing institutions could not meet this danger, Salanter instead tried to bolster the religious loyalties of the individual Jew. His emphasis on ethical behavior indicates that Salanter shared many of the Haskalah's criticisms of the social and economic ills of Jewish society, but unlike proponents of Haskalah he did not prescribe a thorough educational and economic

reform of Jewry as the proper solution for these problems. In Salanter's view, a revival of the standards for social and economic relations demanded by Jewish law would redress the imbalances in Jewish society.

In 1849, rather than accept a teaching position offered him in a government-sponsored rabbinical seminary in Vilna, Yisra'el Salanter transferred his base of operations to Kovno (modern-day Kaunas). He succeeded in establishing *musar-shṭiblekh* there and in several other towns. Yet the immense personal prestige that Salanter enjoyed in his lifetime was not reflected in a corresponding success for his planned mass movement. By the 1850s *musar-shṭiblekh* existed in only five communities, with an estimated following in the hundreds. More lasting achievements of the Kovno period include the model of a Musar *yeshivah*, where self-examination and the study of ethical tracts formed regular parts of the curriculum, and where responsibility for the students' spiritual development was assigned to a *mashgiaḥ* ("supervisor"), who functioned alongside the normal teaching staff. Salanter's disciples from this period spread this model to most of the major Lithuanian *yeshivot*, among whose students the movement found its greatest success. Salanter's letters to his disciples, later collected and published, laid down the basic ideological direction of the Musar phenomenon.

Despite Salanter's unassailable personal moral and scholarly credentials, his innovations aroused no little criticism in rabbinical circles. Some claimed that the stress on ethics undermined the centrality of Torah study, while others worried that the elitist spirit of the Musar groups carried a potential for sectarianism. This polemic over the Musar movement continued into the twentieth century.

After 1857, when Yisra'el Salanter moved to Germany, although he maintained his personal influence over his students, the practical work of spreading the movement's teachings was carried on by the disciples. Through their efforts Musar became the dominant mode in the Lithuanian *yeshivot*, despite occasional strong resistance on the part of more traditional *yeshivah* leaders. Among the major successors of Yisra'el Salanter were Simḥa Zisl Broyda of Kelem (1824–1898), who in the schools under his supervision tried to develop a systematic educational method based on Musar principles; Yitsḥaq Blazer (1837–1907), former rabbi of Saint Petersburg and interpreter and publisher of Salanter's teachings, who served as head of the Kovno *kollel* (an advanced *yeshivah* providing stipends for married students); Eli'ezer Gordon (1840–1910), rabbi of Telz and head of its noted *yeshivah;* Note Hirsh (Natan Tsevi) Finkel (1849–1927), known as the Old Man of Slobodka, spiritual director of the central Musar *yeshivah* in Slobodka. Each of these figures put his personal stamp on the basic Musar doctrine and thus helped to evolve variations of its teachings on the nature of man, the nature of evil, and the ways to struggle with evil. All of the Musar *yeshivot*, however, featured daily Musar studies (often at twilight) and the role of the *mashgiaḥ*, whose responsibilities included regular talks to the student body as well as individual guidance. Most extreme among the Musar schools was that directed by Yosef Yosl Hurwitz, the Novaradok (Nowogródek) school, where students were required to pursue intense Musar study and to perform unusual (i.e., socially unacceptable) actions in public as a way of subduing the lower instincts.

The expansion of the Musar *yeshivot* continued in the period following World War I, but was cut off by the Nazi Holocaust. The Slobodka and Novaradok Musar approaches live on, however, in *yeshivot* set up in Israel and the United States.

[*See also* Jewish Thought and Philosophy, *article on* Ethical Literature; Yeshivah; *and the biography of Salanter.*]

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MUSES. Near the highest peak of snowy Olympus, the nine Muses—Clio, Euterpe, Thalia, Melpomene, Terpsichore, Erato, Polyhymnia, Ourania, and Calliope, daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne (Memory)—were born to be, in Hesiod's words, "the forgetting of misfor-

tunes and respite from sorrow" (*Theogony* 55). Like-minded virgins, free from grief, their only concern is song. Always accompanied by the Graces and Desire, they dance in chorus on delicate feet on the mountaintops, bathe in springs with violet glints, and make their way to the radiant abodes of Zeus, which laugh under the spell of their sweet voices (*Theogony* 1ff.).

What the Muses sing is *mnēmosunē*—memory of what is, what was, and what will be. And for the Greeks, memory is truth. The subject of their song is the kingdom of Zeus the father, he who subdued the Titans, who restored his brothers' power and imposed a harsh fate on their father Kronos, and who bestowed honors on all the gods. The Muses sing the victory of the cosmos, of harmony over chaos, and their sweet accents make Zeus's enemies tremble in the depths of the earth (*Theogony* 68ff.; Pindar, *Pythia* 1.13). They also sing the miserable fate of mortals, who live in bewilderment, unable to find a cure for death or a remedy for old age (Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* 190ff.).

With Apollo, the Muses select and inspire the men they cherish. These are the lyre players and singers, and they, too, are able to make sorrow and grief disappear from mortal hearts with the sweet strains that flow from their lips. Thus when poets sing to Apollo and the Muses at the beginning of their songs, they put themselves under divine protection and make an offering at the same time. Invoking the Muses is the price the poet pays in order for his song to be called veracious and in order that he may breathe the imperishable memory and knowledge that the Muses alone bestow. Those who disdain this inspiration and pride themselves on being capable of creating and fashioning their songs without the Muses are punished; they are made to sing untruths and soon become mute, like the poet Thamyris (*Iliad* 2.594ff.).

Each of the nine Muses presides over one of the arts. According to one scheme, Clio is linked with history, Euterpe with music, Thalia with comedy, Melpomene with tragedy, Terpsichore with dance, Erato with elegy, Polyhymnia with lyric poetry, Ourania with astronomy, and Calliope with eloquence. Only Calliope, first among the Muses, has a role in the courts of kings (*Theogony* 80ff.); it is she who gives them wisdom and mellow voices. If the political initiation resembles poetic initiation, the music that Calliope teaches kings can in no case be confused with that of the poet. The Muse inspires kings with the knowledge of the kingdom of Zeus, so that the divine cosmos may be re-created among men.

The spirit that emanates from the Muses is the springlike freshness that allows mortals to derive some fortune from divine nature and to forget death. That may be why the Muses warn poets that they know how to sing untruth just as well as truth.

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Translated from French by Alice Otis

MUSIC. [*This entry comprises eleven articles: an overview that explores definitions, components, and rituals of, and myths about, music, and ten articles on music and religion in particular cultures:*

Music and Religion
Music and Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa
Music and Religion in Australia and Oceania
Music and Religion in the Americas
Music and Religion in the Middle East
Music and Religion in India
Music and Religion in Southeast Asia
Music and Religion in China, Korea, and Tibet
Music and Religion in Japan
Music and Religion in Greece, Rome, and Byzantium
Religious Music in the West

For discussion of related performance phenomena, see Dance *and* Drama.]

Music and Religion

Music and religion are closely linked in relationships as complex, diverse, and difficult to define as either term in itself. Religious believers have heard music as the voices of gods and the cacophony of devils, praised it as the purest form of spirituality, and condemned it as the ultimate in sensual depravity; with equal enthusiasm they have promoted its use in worship and sought to eradicate it from both religious and secular life. Seldom a neutral phenomenon, music has a high positive or negative value that reflects its near-universal importance in the religious sphere. This importance—perhaps difficult to appreciate for post-industrial-revolution Westerners accustomed to reducing music to the secondary realms of "art," "entertainment," and occasional "religious" music isolated behind sanctuary walls—has nonetheless been pervasive.

Religious "texts" have been sung, not written, throughout most of human history; and religious behavior has found musical articulation in almost every reli-

gious tradition. Navajo priests are "singers"; the primary carriers of Sinhala traditional religion are drummers and dancers; and the shamans of northern Eurasia and Inner Asia use music as their principal medium of contact with the spirit world. Through the centuries, priests, monks, and other specialists have sung the Christian masses, Buddhist *pūjās*, Islamic calls to prayer, Hindu sacrifices, and other ceremonies that form the basis of organized religious observances in the world's major religions.

The values, uses, and forms of religious music are as diverse and culture-specific as the religious traditions in which they are found. Christian liturgical music is generally as characteristically "European" as Hindu devotional music is "Indian"; both use sounds, forms, and instruments from their respective cultures and have contributed greatly to the overall musical life of their own regions. Yet music, like religion, can transcend cultural limits; the religious musical systems of Ethiopia and Tibet, for example, differ almost as greatly from the secular musics of their own respective cultures as the musics of foreign countries.

Religious musical systems may also extend across cultural boundaries. Islam, for example, has forged musical links across vast regions of Asia and Africa; and North American traditions such as the Ghost Dance and the peyote cult have created musical bridges between very diverse ethnic groups. Other well-known intercultural religious musical traditions include Jewish, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and West African/Latin American possession music. Additional cases may include (1) the drumming and singing of Asian shamans, perhaps constituting a related tradition stretching from Scandinavia to the Himalayas, and possibly even extending into the Americas; (2) the epic songs, based on improvisatory recombinations of traditional song segments, of Central Asia and eastern Europe; (3) the bronze gong ensembles, associated with cosmological and calendrical symbolism and functions, of Southeast Asia; (4) perhaps the ancient sacrificial chants, linked to modal systems built on tetrachords, of Indo-European peoples extending from India to Greece; and (5) conceivably an even wider connection between Chinese, Indian, and Greek conceptions of music as an embodiment of universal cosmological and mathematical laws.

Yet, second only to its universal occurrence, diversity is the most characteristic feature of religious music, even in the great intercultural religious traditions. Christian music, for example, includes not only Gregorian plainsong, Palestrina masses, Protestant hymns, and Bach oratorios but also the resonant basses of the Russian Orthodox choir, the ornate melodies of Greek Orthodox chant, and the percussion-accompanied dances of Ethiopian Coptic worship; in the postcolonial era, it encompasses West African rhythms, and metallic sonorities of the Javanese *gamelan* orchestra, and the driving beat and electronic tones of the rock band as well. Hindu music aimed at helping to achieve the meditative state of *samādhi* can employ the very non-Indian sounds of Indonesian bronze instruments. Musical diversity in its religious and cultural contexts will be treated in other articles; here, I shall discuss some panreligious and pancultural issues.

Definitions and Concepts. Given the close links between musical and religious concepts, a nonsectarian definition of music may be impossible. For example, one common definition of music as "humanly patterned sound" conflicts with widely held religious beliefs that music is not humanly, but rather, divinely patterned. To members of traditions holding that music or, at least, religious music originates with the gods or with devils, the assertion of the human origin of music must seem the ultimate in Western materialistic dogmatism, however scientifically neutral it may seem to the outsider.

Even definitions as simple as the dictionary staple "art of sounds" carry ethnocentric and sectarian implications. In many religious contexts, music is less an expressive "art" than a technology applied to produce practical results, from the storage and retrieval of information contained in religious narratives and teachings memorized in song to the attraction of animals in hunting, increase of harvests, curing of diseases, communication with the divine, supplication, and control of the various levels of psychocosmic experience. While aesthetic beauty may or may not be integral to such technologies, individual self-expression plays little part in them and may be detrimental to their intended results.

The concept of music as an "art" carries overtones of a late European ideology based on the sanctity of self-expression and individualism, ultimately rooted in Greek and Judeo-Christian notions of ego, self, and soul. For some traditions, music is antithetical to the very notion of an individual self or soul. One group of Buddhist texts takes music as the archetypal embodiment of impermanence and conditioned causality, dependent on external sources and conditions, in order to show that there can be no such thing as an individual self. By contrast, modern Western scholars tend to view music, at least in its ideally purest forms, as fundamentally independent of external causes and conditions; they draw a sharp line between "extramusical" elements such as symbolism, function, purpose, and so forth, and "the music itself," which is supposed to consist of pure arrangements of tones. This concept of music seems to reflect European post-Renaissance religious

concepts of an autonomous and inviolable soul wholly contained in the body of the individual. Perhaps it also reflects postfeudal economic concepts of individual entrepreneurial freedom, just as the Buddhist concept of an impermanent music resulting from temporary combinations of causes and conditions reflects basic Buddhist religious beliefs.

Even sound may not play a decisive role in religious concepts of music, at least not in any technical sense. When fundamentalist Muslims ban recordings of Western popular music and fundamentalist Christians burn them, they are not necessarily reacting to the melodic or chordal structures that constitute the essence of music for the technically oriented outsider. The "music of the spheres" extolled by early Christian writers was not sound in the sense of physical waves propagated in a gaseous medium; and, in Tibetan Buddhist thought, music consists of both the "actually present music" produced by sound-making voices and instruments and the "mentally produced music" perceived and imagined by each listener, with different results according to individual differences in experience, skill, and imagination. Religious traditions have by and large no more conceived music to consist of sounds and the "extramusical" than they have considered persons to be made up of the physical body and the "extrapersonal." Hence, even the most basic technical definition of music will ignore or deny essential aspects of music as conceived by many religions, while labels such as "symbolism" applied to nonacoustic aspects may appear misguided or even hostile from a believer's perspective.

The very attempt to define music neutrally and openmindedly might be objectionable from some religious viewpoints. For certain Christians, some kinds of secular music and the musics of other religions are the works of the devil and should not be mentioned without condemnation; on the other hand, for the Mahāyāna Buddhist author Sa-skya Paṇḍita, all music deserves praise because it relieves human suffering. Some Muslims would object to a discussion of Qur'anic vocalizations and other songs under the same heading and would assign negative connotations to music in general; but some Ṣūfī writers discuss music only in terms of highest praise for its capacity to lead to spiritual fulfillment, and they would consider a neutral approach as evidence of a lack of real understanding or appreciation of music's most important meanings and values.

Many religions and cultures do not have a concept corresponding to "music" or "religious music." For Islam, *al-mūsīqī* ("music") is, in principle, what the West might consider secular music, controversial for its potential to mislead believers into sensual distractions; melodic vocalizations of the Qur'ān and certain religious poetry are not "music," however musical they may seem on technical and aesthetic grounds. To avoid violating the integrity of a tradition by imposing a dissonant external viewpoint, it might help to consider all such cases of performances that sound musical to the outsider, but are not music to the insider, as "paramusical."

Cultures as diverse as those of Ethiopia (Shelemay, 1982) and modern Tibet have distinct terms and concepts for religious and secular music, with no common category of "music" to unite them. The music of the Chinese *ch'in* (a type of zither), on the other hand, is clearly conceived as music and has strong roots in Confucian and Taoist concepts and practices; but it certainly is not "religious" in the same sense as the singing of monks in Buddhist or Taoist temples. And, although the point lends itself all too easily to distortion and romanticism, it is a well-known fact that in many small-scale kinship-based societies of hunters, nomads, and subsistence farmers, where formal role distinctions are much less prominent than in bureaucratized state civilizations, it is often as difficult to draw a clear line between "sacred" and "secular" musics as it is between religion and everyday life. Are Pygmy honey-gathering songs part of a traditional ritual, a comic entertainment, a social regulatory system designed to ensure and enhance egalitarian universal participation in community life, or an aesthetically exquisite polyphonic art? The question, if not meaningless, is at least inelegant.

Musics, like religions, are most meaningfully defined in their own terms. Along with aspects of musical sounds and their structural relationships, religious definitions frequently take into consideration such factors as cosmological and mathematical laws, divine origin or inspiration, psychological and emotional effects, social and ethical implications, relations or contrasts between religious and secular musics, and a wide range of other elements.

Since the selection of factors varies widely from one religious tradition to another, as does the relative importance assigned to any particular element, an approach that attempted to define all religious musics "in their own terms" would result in a collection of mutually unintelligible approaches to what must on some level be a cosmically, divinely, or humanly universal topic. For want of a better solution, we must discuss music and religion in the terms most widely shared by the full range of musical and religious traditions; and these, in the first place, require attention to the technical elements of music and of the paramusical phenomena found in religious contexts.

Technical Features. Music has its technical basis in human voices and/or musical instruments that produce

sounds with patterned acoustical characteristics. Religious traditions often stress a distinction between vocal and instrumental music and frequently assign higher value to vocal music. This is usually because of its capacity to communicate meanings through the words of song texts, because the human body seems more a part of divine creation than instruments created by human artifice, or because of negative associations of instruments and their music. In some traditions, such as the Mennonite churches and Theravāda Buddhist monasteries, vocal music is performed *a cappella*, without instrumental accompaniment. No cases are known in which vocal music is rejected entirely in favor of instrumental music; but there are significant examples (such as the Siberian shaman's drum) where instruments and their music equal or overshadow vocal music in religious importance.

Patterned human vocalizations take two forms: speech, emphasizing contrastive distinctions between units (phonemes, syllables, words) with distinct meanings, and singing, emphasizing prolonged continuity of sounds with controlled pitch (frequency of vibration). Singing without words produces a melody, a patterned sequence of tones; with words sung to the melody, one has a song. A song may be sung on a single, steady pitch level (monotone); or its melody may rise and fall to any number of higher and lower pitches, the total of which, arranged in ascending or descending order, are its scale; or it may consist of continuous, gradually shifting tone contours without distinctly separate high or low levels. Sets of musical scales may be conceived as modes that incorporate standard melodic patterns, ethical and cosmological implications, and other nonacoustic features.

Religious traditions may place greater value and emphasis on either words or melody; and vocal styles may range from formally simple, with few up-and-down melodic movements to avoid distortion of the words of the texts, to more elaborate, with complex melismatic movements to enhance musical beauty. It was once widely believed that such differences represented an evolutionary sequence from "primitive" chant to musical art; but, as Edith Gerson-Kiwi (1961) has convincingly argued, melodic simplicity may be a deliberately developed stylistic alternative to elaborate secular styles in complex cultures. Varying textual/musical emphasis may reflect varying mythic/ritual applications, stressing either the informational content of religious narratives or the aesthetic beauty or power of a religious offering. Contrasting textual/musical emphases may also reflect differences in communicating with human believers in an intelligible language, or with spirits or gods, who may prefer the special mode of musical communication.

Melodies may be performed as a solo by a single singer or instrument player, in unison by a chorus of singers, or accompanied by other singers or instruments playing independent, distinct musical parts. They may be arranged so as to occur simultaneously with other melodies (polyphony), with a steady-pitch monotone (drone), or with conventionally arranged sequences (harmony) of other pitches or simultaneous-pitch clusters (chords). The most musically complex of these features may occur in the smallest local religions of the sociopolitically and technologically simplest cultures. Generally, such traditions tend toward maximum religious and musical participation by the whole group, while the "great" religions of urban civilizations tend toward complex patterns of religious and musical specialization. However, the existence of religious and musical specialists such as the shaman in small cultures, of complex divisions of musical function in the group performances of hunter-gatherers such as the Pygmies and San, and of movements toward community religious and musical participation such as the growth of the Lutheran chorale and Buddhist monastic chant in urban civilizations in Europe and India, show that even the most general rules may find exceptions in religious and musical traditions.

Rhythms are the product of patterned accents and "long" and "short" durations of sounds. Their patterns may be varying groups of irregular or equal-length beats (abstract or actually played accent/time units) and pulses (shortest units actually played); or patterns may recur in cycles of the same number of beats played again and again. Rhythms and cycles may be classified as appropriate to specific gods and ritual activities, and some traditions (such as Tantric Buddhism) use mathematical beat groups extending into the hundreds to musically embody cosmological and other religious concepts. Rhythms often form a link between music, words, and dance. In songs with prose texts, musical rhythms are often free, varying along with long-short syllable and sentence patterns; while songs with poetic texts often reflect the meter of poetic stanzas, with the same number of syllables and beats recurring in successive lines. However, musical settings may also utilize different rhythmic patterns from the texts set to them. Dance rhythms provide cues of accent and patterning to coincide with movements of the body; they range in style from syncopated (favoring sounds that fall between and overlap beats) and very fast styles associated with some Afro-American possession religions to the asymmetrical, extremely slow rhythms used in Tibetan Buddhist dances.

Musical instruments are scientifically classed into four groups according to the means used to produce sound: idiophones (bells, gongs, etc.), which produce

sound by means of a solid vibrating body; membranophones (drums, etc.), which utilize a stretched membrane; chordophones (lutes, harps, etc.), which use strings; and aerophones (flutes, trumpets, etc.), in which vibrating air produces the sound. Instruments of all these classes are widely used in religious music, although one class or another is looked on with special favor or disfavor by various religious traditions. Instruments are often played in groups or ensembles. These are sometimes called "bands" or "orchestras," with the latter term technically implying greater size and more variety of instrument types; but the terms are often used simply to connote a lesser or greater degree of respect on the writer's part.

Some Western writings on religion and music, particularly works by early scholars and missionaries, contain misnomers that convey false technical implications. Most common is the term *primitive,* which implies both "early" and "simple"; in fact, historical evolutionary chronologies of musical types are speculative and controversial, and the term has been indiscriminately applied solely on racial grounds to musics comparable in complexity and sophistication to the music of any known civilization. Words such as *noise, din,* and *cacophony* often simply indicate lack of understanding or sympathy.

Instruments are frequently misnamed; for example, *flageolet,* the name of a flute, is widely applied to oboes and trumpets; *tambourine,* a frame drum with jingles, is used for every kind of drum; and *guitar* and *harp,* applied to almost any chordophone. A more ambiguous usage is *chant,* a term that should carry technical implications of free rhythm, limited pitch range, and a relatively simple melodic style. In fact, the term is widely used as a simple synonym for "religious vocalization" or "religious song," even in cases of melodically and rhythmically very complex music; hence, it may impart the misleading impression that a music is of inferior aesthetic quality simply by virtue of its being religious.

Origins, Myths, and Symbolism. The close relationship of music and religion may imply, as some myths and legends claim, a common or related origin. From the eighteenth to the early twentieth century, evolution-oriented scholars debated theories of musical origins in the sounds of birds and animals, emotional cries of grief at funerals, language intonations, stylized recitations of religious texts, and animistic awe of "voices" heard in natural objects such as shells and bamboo tubes, and so forth. All such theories proving no less speculative and resistant to objective investigation than the traditional myths they were meant to replace, the issue gradually lost scientific interest, and it is now all but ignored in musical research. But, as if in discouragement at having failed to construct their own myth of musical origins, scholars also made little effort to explore the origin question in its traditional context of religious mythology; and today we still find ourselves in the "surprising" position of finding, as did Alan P. Merriam (1964, p. 74), "that there seem to be almost no available accounts of beliefs concerning the ultimate origin of music."

Accessible information, while insufficient to allow for generalization or systematic analysis, is abundant enough to show that music is as diverse in myths of origin as in any other of its aspects. Music may be thought to originate in a primordial divine power, as in the *nāda-brahman* "God-as-sound" of Hinduism, or in the efforts and discoveries of such human originators as Jubal and his father Lamech, briefly mentioned in Jewish and Islamic traditions (see *Gn.* 4:21), or Fu-Hsi and Huang-ti, in Chinese legend the discoverers of music and its mathematical-cosmological basis. Music may also play a cosmogonic role in the origin or maintenance of the world, as in the drum-playing and cosmic dance of the Hindu god Śiva Nāṭarāja or in widespread stories of gods who "sing" their creations and creatures into existence.

The creation of individual pieces of music and musical instruments may involve contact with the divine. In the vision quest of the Plains Indians, individuals would go out alone into the wilderness to fast and seek divine messages revealed in songs, which they would then bring back to enhance the religious and musical life of the community. The Asian shaman's quest for a drum may take him to the center of the world and the beginning of time, just as the Australian Aborigine's dreaming of songs may provide a link to the primordial Dreaming. Musical creation may even move in the opposite direction, from the human world to the divine, as in the case of the Tibetan composer Mi-la-ras-pa (1040–1123), whose songs are said to have been "imported" to heaven by the Mkha'-'gro-ma goddesses who, like their counterparts in many other religions, fill the Tibetan Buddhist heavens with their music.

The idea that music originally belonged to "other" places, times, persons, or beings is found in many myths, sometimes with connotations of conflict and conquest, as in the South American and Melanesian legends of male theft of sacred flutes from the women who originally possessed them. However, the discovery or creation of music is more often a joyful or ecstatic experience, as in the many vocal and instrumental pieces and religious dances of Tantric Buddhism experienced in dreams and meditations as celestial performances and then recomposed by the meditator for performance in the human world. Handel's often-quoted account of seeing God and the angels while composing the "Hallelujah" chorus—to say nothing of the religious experi-

ences the chorus continues to evoke for many of its performers—may indicate the viability of such concepts even in cultures that favor ideas of human composition of music over divine creation and that tend to conceptualize musical "inspiration" in more secular terms.

Specific beliefs in music coming to us from other realms and beings may be a special case of a more general belief in the otherness, the special or extraordinary nature, of music in human experience. Such beliefs are seldom rooted in simple perceptions of music as strange and alien but rather seem based on recognition of the beauty and power of music. Thus, even when some traditions condemn music, they are condemning aspects of it that other traditions find worthy of praise: music exerts a strong appeal on humans, spirits, or gods; it stimulates sensual, bodily, and mental involvement, and so on. Does the power of music come from physical sensations of breath, motion, and vibration, from cognitions of proportion and symmetry as unexpected and serendipitous in the auditory realm as geometric arrays in nature, from socially and culturally conditioned associations? Is there one explanation, or are there separate causes for different kinds of musics and experiences? Whatever the answer, music enhances, intensifies, and—in ways that may elude precise analysis and control but which are nevertheless apparent both to participants and observers—transforms almost any experience into something felt not only as different but also as somehow better. In this transformative power, music resembles religion itself; and when the energies of music and religion are focused on the same object in an isofunctional adaptation of both toward a common meaning and goal, intensification reaches a peak greater perhaps than either might achieve by itself. Thus, the "otherness" of music and the "other" levels of reality and beings encountered in religion merge into a heightened synthesis of religious-musical experience. The possibility of such a synthesis may help to explain the aspect of music in religion that we usually call symbolism.

Symbolism is a problematic concept for both religion and music. Like the gods and spirits who remain invisible to an outside observer or to a camera, music's religious meanings and functional effects that elude capture by microphones and tape recorders may strike the uninitiated outsider as pure symbolism and yet be at least as real as its physical sounds to the aware and sensitive insider. For the Aztec, songs were flowers, birds, pictures, and the spirits of dead warriors called back to earth (Bierhorst, 1985); we ourselves would probably find it easier to agree that a song "is" a picture than that a song *is*, rather than *symbolizes*, a spirit. And if we adopt the kind of viewpoint that reduces the symbolic relationship between symbol and meaning to questions of physical-intangible and real-unreal, thus disposing of the spirits, we still have not decided whether songs are the symbols of flowers or vice versa. One senses that either choice is equally arbitrary; but if both are admissible as the real basis of the symbol, then why not the spirits as well?

Even if we take musical symbolism as a comparative and technical question of meanings attributed to sounds and forms, there are further questions of how so abstract and nondiscursive a medium can symbolize effectively, other than by purely arbitrary association, in the absence of explicit content that would lend itself to unambiguous communication. Some hear the diabolical in sounds that others find sacred; cross-cultural searches for even the most general agreement on music's cognitive or emotional significance have been unrewarding. There even seems to be a contradiction in the attempt to encode or decipher symbolic meanings in music: its aesthetic power seems to rely on the manipulation of abstract forms, however defined by a given culture and style, to the extent that subjecting form to an externally imposed system of meanings and functions might imply conflicts of purpose and musically inferior results.

Yet, if a symbol is that which stands for and reveals something other than itself, then music throughout the world has been accepted as successfully symbolizing the "other" of religion. Part of its success must derive from its generally perceived qualities of otherness and extraordinariness, and perhaps even from the very abstractness that frees it from associations too narrow to be associated with religious goals and meanings. But symbolic effectiveness must also rely on more specific associations than arbitrary applications to meanings or goals, which, even though they may be isofunctionally linked to the goals of religious practice, may still appear extrinsic to the music. If such associations do not arise from explicit musical content, then they must result from specific forms that accord with other meaningful forms in the religious sphere. Isoformalism of shared musical and religious forms, then, may combine with isofunctional applications to produce music that effectively symbolizes a religious object, and moreover without compromising the aesthetic integrity or viability of music as a medium of structured forms. Taking religious inspiration as the primary element in the process, this synthesis would occur when the form of a religious experience, action, image, or statement stimulated the creation of a corresponding musical form appropriate to and effective in the context of the musical system of its particular culture or religious tradition.

When religious and musical forms and purposes thus

coincide, we have the kind of congruence that allows religious meaning to pervade every aspect of music from its assumed origin to the forms of individual instruments, songs, and pieces, and at every level of meaning from the most central to the most peripheral, from the most general to the most specific. The synthesis may be so complete as to leave no certainty whether either component, religion or music, takes precedence over the other; and it certainly allows for influence in both directions. There are, for example, not only myths of music, but also musics of myths; and the influence of music on mythology is almost certainly more pervasive and more important than the influence of mythology on music.

Contrary to a famous assertion by Lévi-Strauss, Wagner was far from the first, even in the Judeo-Christian tradition, to structurally "analyze" myths through music, for there are European precedents for the musical structuring of mythic narratives and themes going back to the Middle Ages, and far older examples from other parts of the world. These range in complexity from dramatizations as musically elaborate as Bach's or Wagner's (for example, the many performance genres of the Hindu epics *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* in South and Southeast Asia), to the almost universal forms of mythic vocalization that utilize a simple binary contrast of sung myth/unsung ordinary discourse, or melodic and rhythmic highlighting of important words and passages to create a musically enhanced structure for a mythic narrative. For most religions throughout history, myths have been embodied not in written literature but in musical performance; and such performances provide one of the most characteristic bridges between religious belief and action, between myth and ritual.

Time, Space, and Ritual. Music is widely used as a demarcator of ritual time and space. In traditional settings all over the world, one may enter a community just before or during a ritual performance and be drawn toward the center of religious activity by musical sounds that grow progressively stronger as one moves toward the center. At the ceremonial site, music may emanate from the exact center of action; or musicians may be placed at the borders of the ritual site, creating a boundary zone of maximum sensual stimulation through which one passes to enter the ritual area itself. In either case, the ceremonial space is pervaded by musical sounds that, more than any other element, fill the entire sacred area with a tangible energy and evidence that a special situation has been created.

Sometimes architectural or geographic isolation is used to confine the sound to the ritual space, and the music becomes an intimate or secret experience restricted to ritual participants and unheard by the general public. In other contexts, musical contrasts may mark the boundaries of sacred spaces by reserving different styles or sounds for sacred centers and profane peripheries: for example, Christian churches with bells that ring on the outside and organ music on the inside, or Theravāda Buddhist monastic ordinations with royal processional instruments outside the temple and choral chanting inside.

Unlike works of visual art, which exist in their entirety and all their details at any given moment, music unfolds through time. Thus, it creates a temporal framework that may be synchronized with ritual time in various ways. At the simplest level, the beginning and ending of a musical performance may coincide with the beginning and end of a ritual performance. Music may begin before a ritual and end after it, enclosing the performance in a temporal bracket or frame; or music may be performed selectively at temporal high points in ritual activity, highlighting significant periods of religious action.

But music also structures the experience of time in more complex ways. The tempo of the sounds that constitute the "events" of a musical performance may be considerably faster or slower than the pace of everyday experience, and they may combine in unusual temporal patterns. Music uses formal devices such as cyclicity, repetition, contrast, variation, and development of one pattern of organization into another. Any or all of these devices may be used to create perceptual impressions of the extension or compression of a moment of experience to a longer or shorter time than normal, the return of a previous moment, or the building of intensity toward a climax and emergence of a new structural and experiential framework.

For both time and space, the structuring effect of music and other performance media may thus function in quite distinct ways. The most obvious way is by contrastive marking of boundaries between music-filled sacred space/time and profane space/time without music. The musical preludes and postludes performed before and after Christian services, or the conch-shell trumpet notes sounded before and after many South Asian rituals, often from a temple door or gateway, exemplify the boundary-marking aspect of music used to highlight ritual activity by creating a sonic frame around it in time and space.

A different mode of organization is used when the spatial and temporal centers, rather than the boundaries, of ritual activity are brought into concentrated focus by music. This phenomenon occurs at a conceptual or "symbolic" level when music is perceived as a spatiotemporal *axis mundi*, a channel of communication with spiritual realms and primordial eras. For example,

singing the "drum lineage" songs of the Tibetan Bon religion evokes a link with the beginning of time and the center of the world.

More concretely, the central spatiotemporal foci of ritual actions in the physical world may be highlighted by musical intensification, while movement toward or away from the center is marked by gradually changing intensity rather than a sharp boundary. For example, the religious and musical focus of a Sinhala Kohombā Kankāriya ritual is in the drumming, singing, and dancing of the priests themselves; their sound is heard with decreasing intensity as one moves outward through the concentric rows of the audience in the open-walled ritual enclosure, through the streets of the village, and on out through the fields of the surrounding district, which may be the ultimate space consecrated by their performance.

In such cases, the consecrated space is defined by its relation to the ritual action at its center, rather than by a boundary at its edge; and the gradually diminishing intensities of musical sounds emanating from the center serve well to embody this central-focal mode of spatial demarcation. A similar mode of temporal demarcation seems to occur in, for example, the Shona Bira ritual described by Berliner (1978, chap. 8), in which the *mbira* musicians begin their performance with unobtrusive, unelaborate playing and gradually build to a peak of musical and religious interaction with the audience. Both musical intensity of creative improvisation and religious experiences of spirit possession occur within this focal period, and both gradually fade away to more ordinary levels as the ritual draws to an end. In such modes of application, music ceases to be a simple boundary marker, enhancer, or accompaniment to ritual action and religious experience: musical and ritual structure and content begin to take on more vital and significant relationships.

The most basic and widespread musical and ritual time-structuring device is repetition, often carried to such lengths as to perplex or bore the outside observer. It may be that repetition and redundancy serve to impart sensations of continuity, stability, and security, that they aid concentration and provide safeguards against distraction, or that they simply allow continuation of a "state of music" to enhance a ritual performance. Whatever the cause, the use of repetition is surely wide enough to show the importance of this little-understood formal device. However, except in unusual cases such as South Asian *mantra*, Japanese Nembutsu chanting, and some kinds of instrumental accompaniments to rituals, which may involve very prolonged repetitions, musical repetition is almost always found in conjunction with variation, and each depends on the other.

For example, we might consider three possible musical settings for the beginning of the Christian Mass, "Kyrie eleison / Christe eleison / Kyrie eleison." (1) The same melody, musical form, and so forth, is repeated in all three phrases. This would appear to minimize the effect of the textual variation "Kyrie . . . / Christe . . . / Kyrie" and create a musical analogue of the textual continuity provided by the triple repetition of "eleison," reinforcing the conceptual unity of the plea for mercy expressed in all three phrases. (2) Each phrase is set to a different melody or form. Here, the formal analogue is with the variation of initial words, rather than continuity and repetition, and the cognitive effect might be a heightened awareness that each phrase represents a new act of asking mercy, even though there is textual repetition in the first and third phrases. (3) The beginning and ending "Kyrie . . ." phrases are set to the same or a similar melody or form, with the intervening "Christe . . ." set to a different one.

Here, the use of musical variation and repetition corresponds exactly with the variation and repetition of "Kyrie . . . / Christe . . . / Kyrie"; continuity and conceptual unity are given cyclic expression in the identity of the beginning and ending phrases, while the middle phrase receives the special treatment of being given its own individual musical setting. Both repetition and variation in this context acquire a different significance than in (1), with its triple repetition, or (2), with its ongoing changes. The individualized setting in the second phrase is likely to be experienced by performers and observers alike as a special or climactic moment between the pattern established in the first phrase and repeated at the end; and a participant might experience it as a special enhancement of asking mercy in the name of Christ, without special attention to the role played by musical forms. But the formal differences remain: (1) with its repetition and sense of continuity and prolongation of a moment and action already begun, (2) with its emphasis on change and newness, and (3) with its variation-repetition structure and sense of return to a previous moment when the text and music of the first phrase are repeated at the end.

Similar cases can be found in many religious traditions; for example, in the various settings of the Buddhist Triple Refuge, with its three-phrase invocation of Buddha, Dharma (teaching), and Saṃgha (religious community). The actual use of musical structuring through repetition and variation is frequently much more complex, and each tradition tends to develop its own characteristic styles. For example, many Christian

Mass settings use extensive repetitions of text phrases such as "Kyrie eleison" with increasingly different variations of the melody, developing it into new forms, and building to climaxes of musical intensity. Buddhist settings of the Triple Refuge, on the other hand, tend to use melodic variation in more restrained ways, and concentrate instead on text/music repetitions that build to mathematical or exponential permutations such as triple repetitions of a three-phrase structure, resulting in a 3^2 formal structure, and perhaps a sense of transcending cyclic repetition to reach a more abstractly perfect state. However such structures may be felt or interpreted in their own traditions, it is clear that they make equally sophisticated but formally quite different use of such features as continuity, change, and development of basic elements into more complex forms. And since each in its own context is only a small part of a much longer ritual performance, opportunities for complex structuring of musical time are obviously great.

Yet, however natural the concept "musical time" may appear to us, we must treat the issue with caution. Westerners may not be the only ones to conceive of music and its structures in temporal terms. For example, the Javanese prince Mangkunegara VII (1957) and others see the *wayang kulit* (shadow play) in such terms. For them, this all-night performance, with its chronological ordering of musical modes and its complex alterations of repeating sections and new developments, encapsulates the experience of progress through a prolonged state of *samādhi* meditation and through life from birth to spiritual fulfillment. And Judith Becker (1979, 1981), in a series of provocative articles, suggests that Javanese music embodies local and Hindu-Buddhist time concepts from cyclicity to the coincidence of differently ordered calendars.

Alan P. Merriam (1981) has warned that we may be imposing our own prejudices on African music by discussing it in terms of a "musical time" for which African languages have no corresponding terms. Nevertheless, we find areas in Africa with both musical coincidence of different-length beat cycles and calendrical coincidence of different-length week cycles, and the parallel seems too exact and complex to be unrelated. Perhaps one solution would be, in studying a culture, to adopt a comparative perspective that takes musical time as one of the fundamental modes of human time perception and organization, whether or not the culture calls it by a term that also applies to calendrical or experiential time, just as we continue to identify and study "music" and "religion" in cultures that have no equivalent terms. Since each culture and religion has its own concept of time, some such artificially neutral viewpoint may be necessary to think clearly about questions of musical and ritual durations and structures, questions that transcend both cultural and religious boundaries.

[*Related entries include* Chanting; Percussion and Noise; *and* Drums.]

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There is no integrated study of this subject on a worldwide scale. Older studies tended either toward ethnographic-scrapbook approaches, indiscriminately assembling all kinds of traveler's remarks on music hastily encountered and little understood, or to evolutionist approaches meant to "explain" the superiority of European religion and music. The articles on music in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hastings, vol. 9 (Edinburgh, 1917), exemplify both approaches. More recent research has favored field studies of single communities or ethnic groups. Although such studies have resulted in intensive exposure and considerably more extensive and accurate firsthand information, they have also produced works that frequently tend to one-sided emphasis of either religious or musical factors with inadequate attention to their mutual relationships. Readers who want to learn more about the religious music of a given tradition should consult not only the bibliographies of the articles on music that follow but also the general articles on the same religious traditions elsewhere in the encyclopedia.

The most extensive collection of studies of religious music by individual authors writing on different areas and religions is the *Encyclopédie des musiques sacrées*, edited by Jacques Porte (Paris, 1968), and, in English, articles listed under the names of individual religions and countries in the *New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 20 vols., edited by Stanley Sadie (London, 1980). Other collections of recent studies are found in two special "Sacred Music" issues of the journal *World of Music* (Berlin; vol. 24, no. 3, 1982, and vol. 26, no. 3, 1984), and in *Sacred Sound: Music in Religious Thought and Practice*, edited by Joyce Irwin (Decatur, Ga., 1984). Standard works on the theory and method of research on world musics, including religious music, include Bruno Nettl's *The Study of Ethnomusicology* (Urbana, 1983), in which see especially chapters 11, 12, and 15, and Alan P. Merriam's *The Anthropology of Music* (Evanston, Ill., 1964), in which see chapters 4, 11, and 12. The most comprehensive cross-cultural theoretical approach to a single aspect of religious music is Gilbert Rouget's *Music and Trance: A Theory of the Relations between Music and Possession* (Chicago, 1985). Less helpful applications of cross-cultural theory are found in works such as *Man, Magic and Musical Occasions* by Charles L. Boilès (Columbus, Ohio, 1978), which subsumes all kinds of religious practices under "magic," or Arnold Perris's *Music as Propaganda* (Westport, Conn., 1985), which evaluates the musics of other religions by European Christian standards.

A number of studies of religious music in specific traditions make effective use of anthropological approaches to religion, particularly those approaches that focus on language and sym-

bolism. Classic anthropological studies include works by David P. McAllester on the Navajo, *Enemy Way Music* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), and on the peyote cult, *Peyote Music* (New York, 1949). A broad-based anthropological approach is used in *Horses, Musicians, and Gods: The Hausa Cult of Spirit Possession* by Fremont E. Besmer (South Hadley, Mass., 1983), while a focus on symbolism marks Steven Feld's work on the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea, *Sound and Sentiment* (Philadelphia, 1982). Works in the emerging category of "performance studies" place less emphasis on technical description and analysis of music but give it an important place in a multidimensional exploration of the multimedia world of cultural and religious performances; examples include Bruce Kapferer's study of Sinhala lowland possession cults, *A Celebration of Demons* (Bloomington, Ind., 1983), and Ellen B. Basso's study on the Kalapalo Indians of Brazil, *A Musical View of the Universe* (Philadelphia, 1985). These newer studies often show a sophisticated approach to the sung and narrated "texts" of oral traditions that may eventually enable more meaningful comparisons with traditionally text-oriented studies of the literate religions of Asia and the Mediterranean.

Studies of musical and ritual time include Judith Becker's "Time and Tune in Java," in *The Imagination of Reality*, edited by Aram A. Yengoyan and A. L. Becker (Norwood, N.J., 1979), pp. 197–210, and "Hindu-Buddhist Time in Javanese Gamelan Music," in *The Study of Time*, edited by J. T. Fraser et al., vol. 4 (New York, 1981); Alan P. Merriam's "African Musical Rhythm and Concepts of Time-Reckoning," in *Music East and West*, edited by Thomas Noblitt (New York, 1981), pp. 123–141; and Lawrence E. Sullivan's "Sacred Music and Sacred Time," *World of Music* 26, no. 3 (1984): 33–52. Other works cited in this article include Paul Berliner's *The Soul of Mbira* (Berkeley, 1978); John Bierhorst's *Cantares Mexicanos: Songs of the Aztecs* (Stanford, Calif., 1985); Edith Gerson-Kiwi's "Religious Chant: A Pan-Asiatic Conception of Music," *Journal of the International Folk Music Council* 13 (1961): 64–67, which has an overstated but important thesis; Prince Mangkunegara VII's *On the Wayang Kulit (Purwa) and Its Symbolic and Mystic Elements* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957); and Kay Kaufman Shelemay's "Zēmā: A Concept of Sacred Music in Ethiopia," *World of Music* 24, no. 3 (1982): 52–67.

TER ELLINGSON

Music and Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa

The most compelling reason for music making in Africa derives from religious experience, for it is generally believed that the spiritual world is responsive to music and deeply affected by it. Acting through human mediums, the gods are known to object to the singing of particular songs and to express dissatisfaction when performances are slipshod or lacking in animation. Now and then they also bring new songs or themes of songs to their worshipers. Hence worship always finds its most intense expression in music making, which can go on for hours or days during major religious festivals, for performing sacred music in this manner gives not only aesthetic satisfaction but also the assurance of continuous contact with the spiritual world. Accordingly, those who worship particular gods often describe themselves in songs as the "children" of those gods and may distinguish themselves from other members of the community, among other ways, by their repertoire of songs, instruments, and dances.

Ancestral spirits, as well as gods, generate repertoires of songs and instrumental forms. The scale and intensity of expressions related to ancestral spirits, however, varies considerably in relation to the perspective from which they are viewed. While some societies emphasize the spiritual and behavioral aspects of ancestors in the performance of rain rites, curative rites, initiation and other rites of passage and special rites for the dead, others focus on the philosophical aspects of the concept of the ancestor. Celebrations of life or the triumph of life over death indicated by the continuing presence of the dead is given scope in special festivals involving displays of ancestral masks and dramatic enactments accompanied by music and dance. Some centralized traditional states employ music and ritual for political ends.

Organization of Sacred Music. Because the spiritual world is believed to be sensitive to music, performances of sacred music are usually controlled. Accordingly there are occasions during which (1) little or no music is performed (such as personal ritual and worship); (2) music other than the sacred music of the gods is performed (such as events during which social rather than religious values are emphasized); (3) both sacred and nonsacred music may be performed (for example, the funeral of a priest or priest-medium or religious festivals that incorporate the singing of songs of insult sanctioned by the gods for the release of tension in society); and (4) sacred music is performed (such as fixed days of worship, festivals, and other special occasions on which dramatic enactments, including trance and spirit possession, take place). The repertoire of sacred music used on ritual occasions usually includes either songs and instrumental pieces or sound events that function as codes or signals for indicating divine presence or for inviting undivided attention.

As in many cultures of the world, African songs provide avenues for making references to the sources of religious experience and to the values that hold a community of worshipers together. Marion Kilson shows in her study of Ga songs and symbols (1971) that a homogeneous body of sacred songs may include references to the supreme being, individual lesser gods and their interrelations, creatures and objects of nature connected

with the religious experience, the seasons, ritual symbols, interpersonal relations, and events in the life of the community of worshipers. Africans sing about their gods and their own social history in their sacred songs because their gods accompany them during their migrations as well as in their encounters with other societies.

Sacred song repertoires usually include items that fulfill special functions related to the details of worship or a ritual occasion. Some songs are sung for the opening and closing of worship while others accompany, precede, or follow particular rites or provide the link between different phases of a ritual occasion. Getting in and out of trance or remaining in a state of trance can be aided by particular songs, while changes in the mood of worship can be effected not only through the content of songs but also through variations in form and singing style, including the occasional use of spoken verse; changes from speechlike chants in free rhythm or recitative style to songs in strict rhythm; and differentiations between simple litany types of songs and songs that utilize more complex forms or occasionally songs in strophic form.

Group singing is invariably led by cantors, who may not necessarily be priests or priest-mediums. Special chants performed as solos that require mastery of particular vocal techniques and repertoire may be performed by specialists in the religious community. In some societies the songs of public worship are performed by a select group of singers well versed in the tradition and not by the entire congregation.

Sacred songs may be sung unaccompanied (especially when they are in free rhythm) or they may be accompanied by handclapping, bells, rattles, friction sticks, or by more complex percussion on drums or tuned idiophones (*mbira* and xylophones). Chordophones such as lutes, harp-lutes, and arched harps are also used in religious contexts in some societies.

In general, instruments that can play complex melodic and rhythmic patterns are treated not only as accompanying instruments but also as instruments that can stand on their own in ensembles. They may be assigned their own limited repertoire of pieces that are specific not only in their basic materials but also in style and tempo, so that they can be correlated with various songs, movement, and dance. During performances it is the instrumental ensemble that provides the required energy levels for movement expression and more especially for trance and spirit possession.

Because of the different roles performed by vocal and instrumental pieces and the dance, it is customary to combine all three in a full performance. Where this is done, all that a priest-medium who wants to perform a particular dance while in trance needs to do is start a song in the set for the particular dance. The instrumentalists will switch automatically to the rhythms he needs. The singers will similarly take up the song he started and continue with others in the same set.

A number of conventions are used to distinguish the sacred from the secular. For example, a simple ritual act of dedication or the use of external symbols of sacralization, such as marks of white clay, special drapes, pendants, or symbolic carvings, might distinguish sacred instruments from their secular counterparts. There are a few instances where the distinction is made in the form, structure, and tuning of instruments. For example, among the Lobrifor of Ghana, there is a xylophone used in sacred rituals that has fourteen bars, like other xylophones; however, only twelve bars are played, and a tetratonic tuning is used instead of the usual pentatonic. Similarly the *mbira dzavadzimu*, a tuned idiophone (*sansa*, or hand piano) of the Shona of Zimbabwe, used for playing music connected with ancestral rituals, is distinguished from those tuned idiophones played for entertainment, such as the *mbira dzavandau* and the *karimba*. It has twenty-two keys that are generally wider and thicker than those of other instruments and a keyboard with three manuals.

The organization of sound events that function as signals or codes follows similar conventions. Instead of the clapperless bells used in musical ensembles, clapper bells may be used in ritual contexts. Instead of a regular flute made of bamboo, a flute made out of the tip of an animal horn may be used. Instead of an instrument, voice masks and whistling may be used to indicate the presence of particular gods or spirits. Ankle buzzers and similar devices normally used in the context of the dance may be worn by a novice, a ritual expert, or a medium when he is in ritual contact with his god so that anyone approaching him might take a different route.

Similar functions may be performed by instruments set aside for this purpose. Thus the bull-roarer (or thunder stick) is used in some societies to represent the voice of the ancestor (for example, among the Dogon of Mali) or the voice of a god (such as Oro of the Yoruba of Nigeria). The major god of the Poro initiation society of the Senufo is represented not only by the sound of an eland's horn incorporated into an aerophone ensemble but also by the bull-roarer. Here and there one finds sacred drums that function in the same manner, drums such as the *digoma* of the Lovedu of the Transvaal, beaten twice a year in a ritual addressed to the ancestors; the drums of the Lozi of Zambia associated with chiefship; and the *bagyendanwa* drum in the Ankole region of Uganda.

Coded sounds are not always played as independent

sound events. They can also be incorporated into regular pieces. For example, where the gods are worshiped collectively, the entrance and exit of each god can be indicated aurally through changes in rhythm or instrumentation or by a song functioning as a code.

Impact of Religion on Musical Life. Because music makers, artists, and craftsmen are also carriers of the religious beliefs of their societies, religious concepts and practices extend to artistic behavior in the public domain. A music club or association that performs recreational music may begin with libation, a song of invocation, or an instrumental prelude from the sacred repertoire in order to ensure that nothing goes wrong in the course of the performance. Some societies ban all musical performances for a few days after rites performed at the beginning of the planting season or before the annual harvest festival, while others prohibit the performance of certain musical types outside prescribed contexts. The making of instruments such as xylophones and drums begins and ends with rituals irrespective of the contexts in which they will be used. In some societies the rituals continue at various stages in the process of manufacture and on each occasion on which the finished product is used. There are also instances where musicians seek ritual protection not only for their instruments but also for themselves and their art. Belief in ancestors also sometimes plays a role in the recruitment and training of musical specialists, such as the royal musicians *(ingombe)* of the Bemba of Zambia and the royal drummers and fiddlers of the Dagomba of Ghana.

Because sacred music is held in high esteem, the borrowing and adaptation of instruments or musical items of particular aesthetic or verbal interest occurs now and then in the music performed in the public domain. While in the past this was done with discretion, social change now seems to have opened the door to conscious exploitation of the aesthetic potential of sacred music, both in traditional music practice and in the new forms of African popular and art music. The reverse process, whereby traditional sacred music is influenced by secular music, does not seem to be common, although a few notable examples can be cited. The emergence of centralized states in Ghana in the pre-European period, which developed royal court music of a complex order, seems to have encouraged the incorporation of the talking drum *(atumpan)*, an instrument of kingly command, and the royal heavy drum *(bommaa)* into the ensemble of gods regarded as state gods.

Similarly, the advent of new cults that worship in the traditional manner has led to the development of new repertoires of traditional sacred music that utilize the recitative song style of traditional hunters' associations. These songs are used partly because of their affective character and partly because the gods of the new associations are regarded as "hunter gods" who specialize in the neutralization of evil forces such as witchcraft and sorcery.

Introduced Religions. Although indigenous religions have continued to maintain the vigor and vitality of their beliefs and expressive forms, both Islam and Christianity are also well established in many parts of Africa in spite of the alien modes of worship they brought with them.

Islam. Because Islamic religion does not view the sensuous qualities of music with favor and therefore tends to discriminate between what is admissible in religious life and what is not, the connection between music and Islamic religious observances in Africa has been marginal, in contrast to traditional African religions in which music is integral to worship and ritual observance. Apart from the call to prayer and the Qur'anic recitations that are at the core of Islamic worship and that have been maintained in sub-Saharan Africa, it is religious events in the life of Islamic communities that provide outlets for music. The type of music used in these contexts depends on the community, in particular whether it is an Arab or Afro-Arab community, an African community ruled by an Islamic aristocracy, or an African community with Islamic leaders and a traditional aristocracy.

In all three types of communities the Qur'ān is chanted in the original Arabic during worship and on other occasions, while nonliturgical music may be in the local language and idiom. Friday services are observed, while the Prophet's birthday and his ascent to heaven or particular episodes in his life are commemorated in the form of festivals at which music in the local idiom may be performed. The end of Ramaḍān, the period of daytime fasting, is marked by feasts and music, while the routine pilgrimage to Mecca also provides a pretext for music making for the pilgrims, both on the occasion of their departure and on their return.

There is a general tendency in Islamic communities for a simple musical event that satisfies the Islamic ideal to grow into a more elaborate and sometimes inadmissible form, a process that leads to its secularization as entertainment music. The Yoruba Islamic musical types *apala*, *waka*, and *sakara*, for example, which started as modest forms of pilgrimage music, have become part of the general entertainment repertoire. Similarly among the Dagomba of Ghana *damba* music and dance performed at the *damba* festival, which celebrates the birth of the Prophet, is now performed in

other contexts by *lunsi* drummers. Sectarianism and syncretic tendencies have similarly encouraged the use of African musical resources at *dhikr* gatherings as well as modifications in liturgical practice that allow for the development of a corpus of songs based on local models.

Christianity. A different picture presents itself when one turns to Christianity in Africa, for it has been less compromising than Islam as far as the use of local musical resources is concerned. Like traditional African religion, Christianity regards music as an integral rather than a marginal aspect of worship. Accordingly they share a similar approach to the organization of the content of sacred songs.

However, the values that guide the selection and use of music and musical instruments in Christian worship as well as performance organization and musical behavior are very different from those of traditional African worship. Until recently, African modes of expression and behavior seemed to the leaders of the Christian church not only unsuitable for Christian worship, but also not conducive to the restrained Christian life expected of converts. African drumming and dancing and the exuberance of African celebrations such as festivals and rituals of the life cycle were not tolerated. The problem that Christianity in Africa has had to face, therefore, is how to integrate Christian worship with indigenous cultures and preserve at the same time the basic Christian beliefs, values, and norms of behavior that characterize the religion. Although the Ethiopian church could have been used as a model of integration, it was ignored for quite a long time because it did not conform to the norms and values of the Western church.

The most obvious practical step toward "indigenization" of music widely adopted in the nineteenth century was the translation of hymns in European languages into African languages. It was not generally realized, however, that "indigenization," in a fuller sense, would have also meant setting the translated texts of hymns to tunes that reflect African rhythmic and melodic characteristics or that follow the intonational contour and rhythm of texts, since many African languages are "tone" languages (that is, languages in which tones or pitches distinguish meaning or tend to be fixed for particular words, phrases, and sentences). The retention of the Western tunes invariably led to the distortion of the words, a situation that has not been fully remedied in many parts of Africa.

A few missionaries and African church leaders who became aware of this problem tried to provide other solutions. The Livingstonia Mission in Malawi, for example, encouraged local Ngoni people to adapt their traditional songs for church use, and also arranged for traditional instruments such as bells, drums, and horns to be used for calling worshipers to church. Elsewhere songs in the traditional style emerged (such as the Fanti lyrics of the Methodist Church of Ghana) that could be sung as spirituals or anthems.

The search for solutions to this problem, and to the whole question of Christianity in relation to African cultures, continued in the early decades of the twentieth century with the formation of the International Missionary Council. A more liberal attitude toward African cultures as well as to the indigenization of Christian liturgies and music emerged. This has encouraged not only African contributions to Western hymnody in African languages but also the development of new forms of syncretic church music that combine African and Western resources. Songs and anthems as well as a number of new settings of the Mass that use drums and other traditional African instruments as accompaniment have become fashionable in Roman Catholic churches. The All African Conference of Churches (AACC) and local church music associations are also giving encouragement to the creation and dissemination of new African hymns.

Separatist or independent churches have also grappled with the problem. Beginning with hymns in translation and original compositions in the same style, leaders of these churches give scope to songs in the style of traditional African music as well as songs based on the style of marching songs and African popular music. Both African drums and Western band instruments not generally used in ecumenical churches are utilized by independent churches, since physical movement and expressions of ecstasy are encouraged. [*See* African Religions, *article on* Modern Movements.]

As might be expected, there is a close relationship between trends in African church music and trends in contemporary African secular music, for many contemporary composers of art music are also composers of church music and of music for educational institutions formerly run largely by churches. Church choirs and singing bands as well as school choral groups are the main performers of African choral music in the art music tradition, while the repertoires of the few independent choral societies often include new African church music. Because of the large number of independent churches that have sprung up, composers of African popular music now include religious themes and tunes sung by such churches in their repertoire of dance music, a practice that enables their songs to be performed not only in independent churches but also in ballrooms, cafes, night clubs, and on social occasions.

[*See also* Drama, *article on* African Religious Drama; Percussion and Noise; Drums; *and* Bull-Roarers.]

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Music and Religion in Australia and Oceania

For the purposes of this essay, religious music is broadly defined as that used in formalized contact or attempts to establish contact with the supernatural.

Australia. Throughout Aboriginal Australia, ritual with its attendant singing focuses on fertility and all of the life crises except birth. The relatively rapid population reduction or assimilation to European life of the Aboriginal peoples of Tasmania in the southeastern regions of the continent have eliminated virtually all music in these areas. However, where tradition is still followed, music is the most rigidly organized element of ritual, encapsulating in song texts the precedents for much social life and material culture.

With minor variations the Aboriginal peoples of central Australia are characterized by a homogeneity of cultures, languages, and singing styles. Religion, in the sense of man's relationship with the supernatural, is expressed in virtually all categories of song. Ultimately all types of song are traced back to superhuman activity. Ancestors from the mythical past, known popularly as the Dreaming, are believed responsible for the creation of the physical world as it now exists and for establishing behavioral precedents. Their deeds are preserved in series of up to several hundred songs: each song is of around thirty seconds duration and is sung in unison by groups of men or women. The texts of these songs contain sequences of key words that are mnemonics for myth episodes. Individual melodies are associated with particular ancestors, and adherence to the correct sequence of songs is rigidly observed. Through singing, and even more through dancing, participants ritually become their own ancestors and ensure the maintenance of food sources, health, and social order. Myths are the religious property of those of direct though distant descent from the Dreaming ancestors; through a chain of reasoning, present-day land ownership is traceable to the ownership of song series celebrating the ancestors' travels and deeds. Singing is the agent that activates the superhuman forces. Instruments (boomerangs, for example, and paired or single sticks) are confined to accompaniment. Religious ritual is male-dominated, although there are women's rites that include singing for the maintenance of health and to complement men's activities in maintaining spiritual links to sites or tracts of land. Both men and women sing "love magic" songs, reliving the sexual exploits of specific Dreaming ancestors to sustain or increase their own attractiveness. Where the geographical travels of such ancestors were extended, the myth and its attendant songs detailing those travels are shared by the successive Aboriginal groups through whose traditional country the ancestors passed. Common elements in the myth, the song series, and the geographical landscape are recognized; despite differences in location and in the ownership of the myth itself, the melody of the songs may be retained throughout a shared series.

Religious activity for all adults centers on male initiation, in the course of which novices are circumcised and later subincised. Each stage of initiation, indeed each individual action, is founded on a precedent from the Dreaming, and referred to in and accompanied by song. Additions to local repertoires are obtained by the spirit of a shaman, which travels far off while its owner lies asleep, discovers and captures a complete song series from a distant land, and transmits that knowledge back to the sleeper, who teaches it upon awaking.

A distinctive feature of northern Australian Aboriginal religion is the "increase" cult (e.g., the Kunapipi, Maddaiin, and Djanggawul complexes), which in various forms permeates the area. In rituals belonging to these complexes, songs relate, and thereby reanimate, the journeys and actions of mythic ancestors who created plant and animal life; material representations figure prominently. Songs are sung for the benefit of many by a few people, selected for their clan or moietal rela-

tionship to the relevant myth. Mortuary ritual songs, another important category, direct the deceased's spirit back to the world of the dead, or control and propitiate its dangerous features.

Whether performed as dance accompaniment or by themselves, most categories of northern Aboriginal song are sung by a pair of singers accompanying themselves with short sticks, and also accompanied by a *didjeridu* (drone pipe) player. The singing is polyphonic, high-pitched, loud, and nasal. Vocal rhythms are individualistic and often complex. The word content may vary in successive performances. *Didjeridu* accompaniment tends to occur only in the central part of each song.

Polynesia. Despite a numerous and hierarchical pantheon, religious music in western Polynesia is limited mostly to prayers sung by individuals to family or district gods for personal protection from injury in war, for success in certain sports, for the healing of specific illnesses, and for rain. It appears that in Uvéa and Tonga first-fruits rites may have included songs to greater deities. Only in Samoa are certain medicinal incantations still sung, using melodic stereotypes found also in secular songs; elsewhere they are intoned.

Settled later than western Polynesia, the islands of eastern Polynesia are characterized by more extensive and elaborate religious rites. Religious music in this region formerly centered on cult worship led by priests trained in song and dance. Although most cults were location-specific, members of the Tahitian *arioi* cult (who were believed to be the god's favorites) traveled widely, performing song, dance, and pantomime under the tutelage of their deity. In both Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands other performers sought to entertain and arouse the gods. Aided by erotic dancing, their songs worked to stimulate the divine *mana* (supernatural power) on whose procreative activities the fecundity of humans, the earth, and the sea depended. In the Marquesas, songs consecrated children, new houses, and canoes to particular deities, or sought to rouse fury and power in warriors and war gods alike. While learning the creation and other lengthy songs, singers were isolated in a special house. Practitioners of the Hawaiian hula dance underwent similarly rigorous training in song and dance, during which period they sang songs praising their tutelary god; in recognition of the sacred nature of that dance category, prayer and sacrifice preceded formal hula performances. Religious activities centered on temples, where professional dancers and singers, together with priests, propitiated and entertained the deities. New Zealand Maori religious practice incorporated invocations and incantations for a wide variety of occasions, including birth, death, marriage, burial, purification of the body following contamination, voyaging, haircutting, and the consecration of most large-scale work projects. In the Marquesas, the Tuamotu archipelago, and the Hawaiian Islands, large skin drums were reserved for religious ceremonies. In most areas musical instruments provided signals or accompanied song and dance at religious ceremonies.

Throughout the region songs relating creation myths, genealogies, and prophecies, as well as protective, productive, and curative incantations were sung either in unison or solo, with a relatively small pitch range and emphasis on word content. The fate-compelling power of the sung word ensured close attention to textual accuracy. The efficacy of this religious music depended on the potency of the names and words used, the *mana* of the rite and of the character and correct mode of utterance. Particularly in the rituals of the New Zealand Maori, sustained phrases or overlapping breath-breaks enabled the continual sound flow necessary for the desired outcome of the song. Any break in the flow constituted an omen of the failure of the desired outcome, or invited disaster. A religious festival would be abandoned should an error occur during a sung prayer.

Micronesia. Preliminary results from the few published studies of Micronesian religion indicate that religious activities incorporating song (with or without dancing) tend to focus on village or matriclan efforts to seek the maintenance of personal health, food productivity, and travelers' safety. In the Micronesian pantheon there is no recognized paramount individual. Most domestic group activities have a patron god with limited geographical authority. Shamans use songs to establish contact with such beings to obtain advice and admonition; through incantations a mantle of divine protection is laid over hazardous occupations. Humanly or divinely composed songs and dances led by a priest at a shrine seek to entertain a village or district god who demonstrates his or her pleasure through the medium of the priest. On Ifalik Island the women rehearse and sing invocations to a local god to ward off disease, and men perform polyphonic songs to accompany dancing intended to please the deity.

Island Melanesia. Although religious activity within island Melanesia is both frequent and diverse, audible communication with or from the supernatural realm tends to be spoken rather than sung. Religion and magic, here and in Papua New Guinea, are not sharply differentiated. It is a widespread belief that the ghost of a local person influences local affairs, causing or curing sickness, prophesying, and controlling the weather and the crops. As part of ancestor worship in the Solomon Islands, New Britain, and the Duke of York Islands, a funeral feast together with song and dance ensures that the ghost of a recently deceased person will leave the

region and reside permanently in the afterworld. The skull or other bones of the deceased may be displayed during the dancing so that the spirit can witness the ritual farewell and depart promptly.

In New Caledonia elderly relatives of the deceased sing in imitation of the voice of the spirits of the dead while their living descendants dance. In Vanuatu conchs and bull-roarers are sounded to expel ghosts after a funeral; conchs are similarly used in Fiji. In the regions where male initiation is important, boys often are told initially that the mysterious sounds produced by conch shells and flutes are the voices of spirits; later, they are shown the instruments.

Papua New Guinea. A prime focus of religious music in Papua New Guinea and the islands to the immediate east is the widespread practice of male initiation. Across broad geographical belts within these regions musical instruments used in initiation or other ceremonies are believed to be the voices of spirits by those not socialized into manhood or secret cults. Slit drums and bull-roarers figure prominently in this respect in New Britain and New Ireland. Slit drums and paired flutes are predominant in the central Highlands, Papua Gulf, and Huon Gulf areas. These end-blown or side-blown flutes of unequal size, which represent male and female identities, have no finger holes and produce fundamental and selected harmonic pitches only in so-called fanfare melodies. Together the two instruments provide a single interlocking melody. Bird symbolism for the flutes and their repertoires is widespread. Information from Irian Jaya is limited but indicates the presence in the north of flutes and bull-roarers, usually played together, while skin drums and shell trumpets are used in the central region; bull-roarers are reported from Milne Bay to the south. Bull-roarers and flutes most commonly represent the voices of the dead in initiation ceremonies, in garden fertility rites, and in summoning spirits. The emphasis is on sound quality rather than on purely musical elements. [*See* Bull-Roarers.]

Mythology frequently assigns the invention or discovery of musical instruments to women, who later yielded them to men; men subsequently monopolized them and continue to keep them secret by stealth and deception, evidently as a means of male self-enhancement. The structure of the male initiation rituals suggests the processes of menstruation, impregnation, gestation, and parturition, as men attempt to obtain for themselves through ritual the female life-imparting capabilities denied to them in reality, or they may reflect and validate sex-role social structures. Songs tend to accompany each stage of initiation. These may also be learned from spirit ancestors who appear in bird or human form or, conversely, may be sung in seances in efforts to contact the supernatural world. Through first-fruits rites (which include song, dance, and instrumental performances) the spirits' contribution to garden fertility is symbolically recognized. Songs may also be sung by a diviner to rescue a patient's soul from a malevolent witch. Together with ritual, song provides a tangible link with the invisible and is able to assuage the overarching powers controlling the natural world.

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RICHARD M. MOYLE

Music and Religion in the Americas

The record of human occupancy in both North America and South America begins with the hunting cultures of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand years ago. Evidences of agriculture and village life in Mesoamerica and South America are dated as early as 5000–3000 BCE, and with the invention of pottery the record of musical instruments begins. Instruments made of clay—whistles, panpipes, rattles, ocarinas and other flutes, and even trumpets and drums—are imperishable; they may be broken, but the fragments never decay and so the instruments may be reconstructed. Bone, antler, stone, and shell are other durable materials from which musical instruments were made.

We can infer from archaeological and ethnological evidence that the function of this rich inventory was largely religious and that much of the instrumentarium

accompanied song. From the time of the earliest written historical record (the fifteenth century) it has come to be known, with increasing certainty, that the predominant native music in the entire hemisphere was vocal. Solo and ensemble instrumental playing developed widely in Mesoamerica and South America but hardly at all in North America.

South America. The early immigrants to the south, who spoke many different languages, developed an enormous variety of cultures over the millennia of their occupancy. Certain motifs seem to characterize the religious thought of the native peoples of South America and Mesoamerica: feline deities and a profound duality that includes paired male and female cosmic forces such as earth and sky or sun and moon. Hero twins, day and night creatures, and the contest between good and evil appear in the mythology and religious thought of both isolated tribal groups and the high civilizations of Mesoamerica and the Andes. Paired drums, horns, flutes, and other instruments often styled "male" and "female" carry this concept of duality into the realm of music. Other widespread cultural elements are puberty ceremonies with chanting to the accompaniment of rattles, and curing rituals in which supernatural powers are invoked in song with the percussive accompaniment of drums, rasps, rattles, or stamping tubes.

Scholarship on the native peoples of Mesoamerica and South America has until recently focused primarily on the civilizations of the Maya, Aztec, and Inca. As the result of field studies, some sense of the religious and musical life of the smaller and more isolated cultures has now begun to emerge. This research may also give a hint about the nature of urban cultures in their earlier stages. We learn that a complex priesthood is not essential to the development of a sophisticated view of the universe. The elaborate mathematical/astronomical/religious discoveries and speculations of the Maya in their temple cities may be matched by the psychological insights in the myth and religion of the Witoto deep in the jungles of Brazil. To convey a sense of the continuities and developments on this continent, I shall give brief sketches of the religion and music of a tribal group, the urban cultures that developed before the Spanish conquest, and the acculturative changes that took place after the European invasion.

The Tucano of the northwest border area of Brazil resemble, culturally, many of the other forest tribes that occupy the millions of square miles of river and jungle elsewhere in South America. They live by hunting, fishing, and agriculture; manioc, their staple, is a major food source and is fermented to make *chicha* beer. The Tucanos' mastery of chemistry is impressive: they can remove the prussic acid from manioc by a complex process; they hunt and make war with poison darts; and they make use of a wide range of narcotics, which they chew, drink, or inhale.

Tucano religious life emphasizes communication with ancestral spirits through music and dance to ensure human vitality and growth. Certain musical instruments are the properties of deities, such as Jaguar, Serpent, Fish, Butterfly, and Owl, and the fifteen-foot paired trumpets of wound bark used in their most important ceremonies are themselves deities. Called Grandmother and Grandfather, these deities were the first ancestors to die; they taught the people how to weep and how to make masks of bark cloth.

The Tucano's most important ceremony is the mourning ritual for an outstanding member of the *maloca*, the big communal house where extended families of more than a hundred persons may live. Immediately after death the body is buried under the floor of the *maloca* to the accompaniment of wailing, mourning songs, and the staccato chanting of the elders who recount incidents in the life of the deceased. A year later, visitors from many other *malocas* come, by invitation, to perform the characteristic songs and dances of the various deities. The masked participants, who together represent every aspect of the cosmos, act out their roles for three days and nights. The great trumpets are brought by canoe, and their deep notes sound in concert with the singing, flutes, panpipes, bells, clay jaguar horns, turtle-shell friction blocks, and snail-shell trumpets. Great amounts of food and stimulants are consumed, and with the growing relaxation and intimacy the people are united both with each other and with their ancestors. Still another year later, a final day of songs and dances concludes with the burning of the masks and bark trumpets; that night there is more drinking, dancing, and music, and at dawn the departing spirit is honored with a farewell before it goes on to the home of the ancestors. The singing provides a low, melodic background for the repetitive formulas of the various pipes, whistles, and trumpets.

Eyewitness accounts of the performance of Aztec music have come down to us from sixteenth-century Spanish chroniclers. Even the famed Aztec calendar had a role in musical life, as it fixed the times for festivals. Every twenty days specific gods governing the seasons, agriculture, and war were venerated in a principal festival. Victories in war, the installation of new members of the nobility, marriages, and the commemoration of great moments in past history and the lives of deceased leaders were also celebrated.

Choirs of highly trained singers, often including the sons of the nobility, were maintained under the leader-

ship of music masters in temples, courts, and private homes of the well-to-do. For private family rituals, singers with deep bass voices were highly regarded. The indispensable accompanying instruments were a pair of drums, the *huehuetl* and the *teponaztl;* these former deities had been banished from heaven for their sympathy to humankind. The *huehuetl* is an upright barrel drum in various sizes up to several feet high. It was played with the hands: the deerskin drumhead produced two notes a fifth apart. The *teponaztl* is a horizontal slit drum with two lamellae that produce two different notes. It was played with rubber-tipped sticks.

The shrilling of whistles announced the beginning of a performance under the direction of two music masters. The drums then began a soft introduction after which the chorus would begin slowly, in a low key. The songs were in rhymed couplets; in the pause following the end of a song the *huehuetl* was tuned to a higher pitch, then the next song would begin, faster and higher. Other instruments joined in: whistles, flutes, trumpets, flageolets. The performers wore brilliant mantles and carried flowers and fans of feathers and gold. For certain performances they were crowned or masked to represent deities. At times the whole audience would join in the dancing; some four hundred or even a thousand or more of them would perform movements said to be graceful and precisely in time with the music. Bernardino de Sahagún recorded that the correct performance of sacred material was so important that singers, dancers, or even song masters responsible for mistakes could suffer capital punishment.

Although the high culture of the Maya had passed away before the arrival of the conquistadores, their musical instruments were analogous to those of the Aztec. Murals and bas-reliefs on their deserted temple walls portray scenes similar to those described above.

The Inca of Andean South America had a highly regulated civilization with an even richer metallurgy than that of the Aztec and without the Aztec practice of human sacrifice. An extraordinary development of panpipes, coiled clay trumpets with shell or metal bells, end-notched flutes, and zoomorphic whistles sets their instrumentarium somewhat apart from that of other peoples of Mesoamerica. They also had schools for music training and observed calendrical festivals. In three principal celebrations of thanksgiving and purification they sang fables of their past, invoked local deities, and honored the sun, the ancestor of their divine rulers. There was music to revive the dying moon at the time of an eclipse.

Mourners went in procession to localities that had been frequented by their deceased; they played drums and flutes and sang sad songs that recounted the life of the departed. Among the skulls, shells, and horns that served as resonators for trumpets the giant conch was particularly prized. The first European ship to sail in Peruvian waters (in 1526) intercepted an oceangoing raft loaded with fabrics, gold, silver, and jewels, all to be exchanged for conch shells from the Caribbean.

A major goal during the colonial period was conversion of the Indians to Christianity, and early on excellent choirs were singing masses and other liturgical music. Of the more than two hundred books published in Mexico in the sixteenth century, thirteen dealt with sacred music. So great was the native enthusiasm for church music that in the 1560s royal and ecclesiastical decrees set limits to the number of musicians in the churches lest too many natives be withdrawn from the work force.

In the rural areas the music of the folk religions mixed indigenous instrumentation and musical ideas with European elements. Today a wide variety of native instruments, such as panpipes and notched flutes in the Andes, and flutes, drums, and whistles in Mexico, are played along with violins, harps, and other European instruments.

In the revolutionary era a new interest in indigenous music developed as twentieth-century composers sought to create national styles. However, the widespread use of native instruments and melodies in modern Latin America has been largely confined to popular music and art music.

North America. Certain elements of the high civilizations to the south made their way to North America. Temple villages developed throughout the vast Mississippi drainage, and as far back as two thousand years ago pyramidal and zoomorphic mounds, vast in extent, bespoke obedience of large populations to powerful rulers or priesthoods. But the great inventory of musical instruments is missing from the archaeological record, and the accounts by Spanish and French explorers and conquerors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tell us little about the music here or elsewhere on the northern continent. The account that follows refers to present-day practice, some aspects of which may have had their beginnings many generations ago.

Over the whole area the native music is almost exclusively vocal, usually with the percussive accompaniment of drums, rattles, or both. The only traditional melody instruments are flutes and flageolets used for courtship and a few small fiddles that provide social music in two or three tribes. Nevertheless, the drums and rattles are myriad in form and number. Many are used for a particular ceremony in only one tribe and have deep symbolic meaning. An Iroquois rattle made from a snapping turtle *(Chelydra serpentina)* is used only

in the midwinter False Face ceremony; no other tribe makes that particular kind of rattle. Water drums made on a clay pot, a wooden barrel, or an iron or aluminum pot are also specific in form and use. In addition, various kinds of whistles and bull-roarers (a flat stick whirled at the end of a thong) represent voices of deities or mythical creatures and signal important ritual moments.

Religious observances among the Indians of North America range from purely private ceremonies inherited, or obtained in dreams, to complex performances supervised by religious societies or priesthoods. The religious function of ceremonies varies according to tribe and geographic region. Among Eastern Woodlands Indians the focus is on thanksgiving; the Athapaskan of the Southwest emphasize curing; the agrarian tribes of the southwestern Pueblo seek rain and a good harvest. Hunting cultures, such as the Inuit (Eskimo) of the Arctic and the Indians of the Northeast Woodlands and central Plains, practiced ritual to ensure a plentiful supply of game. The music ranges from brief songs to long chants composed of many song series that require a number of days and nights for their performance. The songs may have texts that are entirely in vocables (untranslatable syllables), or they may include a few lines of meaningful text, or they may have many lines of cosmic poetry relating the story of creation.

Some of the better-known large ceremonies of the North American tribes are the *kachina* dances of the Pueblo peoples of the Southwest, the healing chants of the Navajo, the Midewiwin of the Chippewa and other tribes of the Great Lakes region, the Sun Dance of the Plains tribes, the potlatch of the Northwest Coast tribes, and the midwinter feast of the dead of the Iroquois in the Northeast.

The *kachina*s are ancestral deities who spend half the year in the sacred mountains or a sacred lake and the other half in the villages of their descendants. At the autumn homecoming ceremony, masked dancers represent the deities, and for the next six months they appear in a round of ceremonies designed to bring rain and a good harvest. Priestly societies are responsible for the ceremonies and the public dances associated with them. The melodies of *kachina* songs are some of the longest and most complex to be found in native North American music. There are occasional breaks in rhythm and many verses concerning clouds, rain, and the fruits of the fields. The dancers sing in deep powerful voices to the accompaniment of a large barrel drum.

The Navajo healing chants exemplify their belief that the voice is wind, the greatest cosmic force, made articulate. Deities of mountains, sky, earth, and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are invoked to bring harmony and restorative power to a sick person. The deities are also made manifest in the famous Navajo sandpaintings and, in some ceremonies, in the persons of masked dancers or actors. The music contrasts markedly with that of the Pueblo Indians. The melodies are relatively short and repetitive; the texts may comprise as many as fifteen or twenty verses. The ceremonial practitioner, who learned the songs in a long apprenticeship, leads the participating friends and relatives of the sick person. The tone is high and nasal, and the melodies have wide leaps in the choruses and a narrow range in the verses.

The Midewiwin is healing in emphasis, and it also serves as a teaching and grading society in supernatural knowledge and power. As the members advance to higher levels of training, their ability to heal and their repertory of songs increase. There are many of these songs to be learned, but they are short; often they are made up of downward transpositions of only one or two musical phrases. The texts are cryptic references to the various deities that bring power to the ceremony: "In form like a spirit / It appears." The Chippewa sing in a robust emphatic voice much like that in European folksinging, but in the Midewiwin an exaggerated vibrato is a part of the vocal style.

The isolation of North American Indians on their reservations did much to preserve the traditional cultures; recent decades, however, have brought increasing influences from outside that have touched every aspect of their lives, including religious music. In the late nineteenth century, as armed resistance proved inadequate against whites, nativistic religions spread from tribe to tribe. For example, the Ghost Dance religion looked to a second coming of Christ and a return of indigenous powers to help the Indians. It featured group dancing and plaintive songs with the paired phrases of the Plateau region where the religious movement originated. The peyote religion (Native American Church) has a large pantribal membership today. The nightlong ceremony includes extended prayers to native and Christian deities for health and the solution of personal problems. The songs, which come in sets of four, are sung to the loud, rapid beating of a water drum made on a metal pot. The songs, performed with a rapt, inward quality, also address Christian or native deities or describe visions induced by the intense feeling of the ceremony and the sacramental ingestion of the hallucinogenic peyote plant *(Lophophora williamsii)*.

As Christianity has spread among the North American Indians a hymnody of a unique sort has been added to the traditional music. Standard hymns, often with Indian texts, are sung with much feeling in a slow, dragging meter. Some of the Southeast Woodlands tribes,

such as the Cherokee, have created an improvised harmony that resembles Sacred Harp singing. In recent years, gospel rock has caught the imagination of young Indians as have country and western, rock, and other forms of popular music.

Other new forms of music that express present-day Indian religious values are produced by composers using guitars, electric rock ensembles, and other Western instrumentation to accompany songs about nature, family feeling, and friendship, all part of an Indian "sacred way." As they adapt to increasing exposure to the outside world, North American Indians will continue to express a valuable aspect of the general culture in the continuation and development of traditional religion and music in new, syncretized forms. North American Indian activists have begun making common cause with Indians of the continent to the south in the struggle against discrimination and expropriation. The exchange of religious and musical ideas may well be among the more predictable results of this new extension of pantribalism.

[*See also* Drama, *article on* Native American Religious Drama.]

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Music and Religion in the Middle East

Highly developed musical cultures entirely devoted to religious worship flourished in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt. Each was distinguished by a well-organized ritual, a rich hymnody, numerous musical instruments, and an established musical theory. In Mesopotamia cuneiform texts, artworks, reliefs, plaques, and seals provide a wealth of information concerning the musical culture. In Egypt musical scenes frequently appear on the walls of tombs because the Egyptians believed that pictorial reproductions of domestic life secured a pleasurable existence in the other life. Few musical instruments have been excavated in Mesopotamia, but a great many have been found in Egypt, where the aridity of the desert has preserved them from decomposition.

Despite the great variety of cultures in the region, the general approach to sacred music, its nature, function, and meaning, was imbued with a spirit of unity. The music has been characterized as normative and refined, and as giving primacy to such diverse performing styles as singing to a solo instrumental accompaniment, performing with an instrumental group, dancing, and other ritual gestures. Performances were confined to a distinct class of well-trained male and female musicians and dancers.

It is tempting to conclude that this music lacked the freshness, spontaneity, and devotional expression characteristic of folk worship, yet despite its refinement and professionalism it remained linked in many ways to its magical antecedents and the divine origins from which it drew its vitality. Being essentially associated with worship, sacred music served to honor the gods in the performance of the daily liturgy in temples and to accompany the traditional funeral rites and the annual festivals. The link between past and present and between man and the cosmos is evident in this music in many respects. Thus the Babylonian New Year festival symbolized the reduction of the primordial epoch to a scale of annual duration. This annual celebration of plant life and fertility has been associated with a wedding of the gods and with the epic of the creation of the world, recited on the fourth day of the festival.

Both in Mesopotamia and Egypt, sacred music has been associated with divinities and celestial protectors. The head of Hathor, the Egyptian goddess of heaven, love, and sacred music, was usually surmounted by the sistrum. This shaken musical instrument, consisting of a handle and a frame with jingling crossbars, was used to accompany ritual ceremonies associated particularly with the goddess. The bull, a symbol of fertility and divine power, shown frequently in the gigantic Assyrian reliefs surmounted by a human head as a guardian against misfortune, was associated in the Ur period (2600–2350 BCE) with the lyre, whose sound box was modeled after the body of a bull. The lyre had a yoke-shaped frame consisting of two arms and a variable number of strings stretched over the frontal sound-

board. In a later stylized form, only the bull's head remained as an embellishment. Three precious specimens of the instrument have been excavated at the royal cemetery in Ur.

Any attempt to figure out how this music sounded would be fruitless. It is true that the earliest form of musical writing was the cuneiform system used from the middle of the fourth millennium BCE by the Sumerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians. However, the few written examples that have been deciphered in recent years do not alter the basic fact that sacred music of the ancient civilizations was oral by nature and conception and regarded as a priestly secret not to be divulged. Hence, like other musical traditions transmitted orally, it did not lend itself to a fixed definite version. However, regarding performance practices and particularly the numerous instruments and their functions we are on firmer ground.

Vocal music, which predominated, emphasized the religious texts through varying modes of expression, from a solemn recitation performed in a tense voice to a well-constructed song with instrumental accompaniment. Hymns were sung either by a solo performer or by a chorus in responsorial and alternating rendition. As with the superscriptions of the biblical psalms, Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts frequently included musical instructions whose meanings are still largely unknown. The most significant information concerns musical instruments and their ample usage in worship. They range from the rudimentary to the highly sophisticated. Among the simpler instruments, used mainly for ritual or apotropaic purposes in both Mesopotamia and Egypt, are various small clay or metal bells embellished with symbols of gods; clay rattles in the form of animals; clappers with animal heads or in the form of a human hand, found in Egypt; bronze cymbals of various sizes that can be struck in a vertical or horizontal movement and were used at sacrifices and funerals; and the sistrum.

Drums in various shapes and sizes were also used in worship, particularly in Babylonia where they attained great importance. A table of sacerdotal instructions from Erech, dating from the Seleucid period, gives precise details for making the sizable goblet-shaped drum *lilissu*, as well as a description of its ritual. Made of metal in the shape of a perfectly formed bull, this drum was prepared by means of a long ceremonial process accompanied by sacrifices, libations, and prayers. The instrument was used to raise lamentations of grief for the darkened moon and served as an object of worship in itself. The bronze trumpet made its first appearance in association with cult during the reign of Ramses II (1304–1237 BCE). Two trumpets, richly decorated with bells, were found in the tomb of Tutankhamen. Pipes were rather common in Egypt but rare in Mesopotamia where strings were preferred. The same is true of side-blown flutes, which appeared in the Old Kingdom (c. 3000–2200 BCE).

The richest and most highly developed category of instruments was that of the various harps and lyres. Harps appeared in two main types, one in which the body of the instrument forms an arch and the other in which the neck and body forms an angle. In both types the strings were either vertical or horizontal to the soundboard and were plucked either with or without a plectrum. The arched harp, the earlier type, first appeared in the Sumerian period. The vertical arched harp was most common in Egypt, where it is found in tombs of the Old Kingdom together with flutes and pipes. The lyre arrived relatively late in Egypt, not earlier than the New Kingdom (c. 1569–1085 BCE).

Music in the Bible. The Bible is the chief and richest source of information about music and musical activity in ancient Israel. It seems that in the earliest nomadic period and during desert travel music did not play a significant role in worship. However, the biblical texts provide many references to certain types of folk music used for various popular occasions of rejoicing, such as the celebration of the arrival of the sacred ark in Jerusalem (*2 Sm.* 6:5), the singing of the canticle of the sea, which marked the victory over the Egyptians (*Ex.* 15:20, 15:21), and the welcoming of a hero on his return from the battlefield by dancing and drum-playing women (*Jgs.* 11: 34, *1 Sm.* 18:6–7). A magical character is associated with the various uses of the ram's horn, or shofar, the effects of which are depicted in relation to the theophany (*Ex.* 19:13–19, 20:18) and to the fall of Jericho (*Jos.* 6:6–20). Two references reveal the important role music played in ecstatic prophecies (*1 Sm.* 10:5, *2 Kgs.* 3:15). From the reproachful sayings of the prophets Isaiah and Amos concerning banquets and music, the existence may be inferred of a secular art music (*Is.* 5:12, *Am.* 6:5).

The bulk of biblical references concern sacred music associated with temple worship. This music was similar in many ways to the traditions mentioned above in its ceremonial aspect, organization, and performance practices. It also was confined to a distinct class of highly trained professional musicians, the Levites. The *Book of Psalms* contains many instructions regarding musical performance, as well as the names of the leaders who conducted the ensembles of singers and instrumentalists playing lyres, cymbals, rattles, clappers, and other instruments. However, this music excluded dance from worship and was exempted form all associations with deities or celestial protectors. As to the ultimate origin

of music, the Bible ascribes its invention, in antediluvian times, to a human hero, Jubal "the father of them that play upon the harp and the organ" (*Gn.* 4:21). This statement occurs in a passage also naming other inventions including the products of bronze and iron.

Music under Jewish and Muslim Religious Authorities. After the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans (70 CE) and the dispersion of the Jewish people, the attitude toward music in worship underwent a significant change. Individual and communal intimate prayer replaced the Temple's ceremonial worship, and theologians became more and more involved in the revision of norms regarding the place and nature of music in the synagogue service. The first consequence of this new attitude was the total banishment of musical instruments except for the shofar.

The exclusion of instruments usually has been justified as being an aspect of ongoing mourning over the Temple's destruction. The reasoning involved in the long-lasting debate over the use of sophisticated musical forms in synagogal singing was of a rather ideological nature. It is interesting to note in this regard that the basic views expressed in the rabbinical arguments, with reference to the scriptures, have much in common with those expounded by Muslim theologians very soon after the emergence of Islam (622 CE). In relation to *samāʿ* (Arabic for "hearing"; often also meaning the thing heard, for example, music) there developed a large polemical literature dealing with the question of the lawfulness of music from a theological point of view. The term *samāʿ* has been contrasted with *ghināʾ*, which means "singing," and, by extension, secular art music. [*See* Samāʿ.] This identification led the authorities of both religions to assign the concept of music to secular entertainment music. The resulting frictions and conflicts with that flourishing urban music, echoed in the literature, have determined to a large extent the intransigence of those who oppose music.

Another argument found in this polemical literature concerns the respect for the holy texts and for their adequate rendition. Beautifully composed melodies with instrumental accompaniment and dancing were considered distractions that prevented the faithful from concentrating on the message in the text. Those having the most extreme form of this attitude considered music harmful, capable of affecting adversely the behavior and judgment of the hearer. Some authorities went so far as to attribute the origin of music to satanic forces and held that its direct influence on the listener's soul was basically a temptation of the devil or a delusion.

A Jewish Midrashic exegesis of the biblical verse concerning the invention of musical instruments singled out the fact that the inventor, Jubal, belonged to the posterity of Cain. Cain's descendants were plunged into amusements that combined music, adultery, and drinking of intoxicating liquors. This combination of music making and depravity was said to have incurred God's wrath and thereby contributed to bringing about the Flood. (See Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, vol. 1, Philadelphia, 1956, pp. 116-118.) Some Muslim theologians, referring to this exegesis, actually included Satan among the inventors or promoters of music.

An interesting Arabic version of the origin of music, cited by several writers, attributes the invention of music to Jubal's father, Lamech. It relates that Lamech, at an advanced age, lost his only son. In his grief he refused to be separated from the boy and hung his corpse in a tree so that he could be near him and see him. He later made a *ʿūd* (lute) from a leg of the corpse and sang laments to its accompaniment. Lamech's invention and the lament corresponding to the first biblical song (*Gn.* 4:19) may refer to ideas concerning the making of a musical instrument out of human bones, thus suggesting the incorruptibility of the corpse, the rebirth of the defunct spirit, and the identification of that spirit with the sound of the instrument within which it continues to vibrate.

Music and the Mystical Experience. The Jewish and Muslim mystical movements concerned themselves with various complex views regarding music, its role, effects, and origin. In qabbalistic literature all musical topics are interwoven with a multitude of qabbalistic symbols that are correlated with the whole of creation. Islamic mysticism, or Sufism, which can be traced back to the eighth century, developed complex congregational ritual and spiritual exercises in which music and dance play a determinant role. A related system of symbolism has been elaborated in the appropriate literature.

As to the question of music's origin, both Jewish and Muslim mystics advanced in different formulations the idea that music is neither monogenetic nor monovalent, that is, it oscillates between the divine and the satanic, the celestial and the terrestrial. The impact of music on the listener depends on the individual's virtue as well as the degree of mystical cognition of God and his revelation. In its highest form the listening experience becomes entirely spiritual, according to the Spanish Muslim mystic Ibn al-ʿArabī (1165–1240). He claimed that this form of the listening experience consists of hearing with a spiritual ear the singing of all things in creation praising the glory of God, and in seizing and enjoying the significance of this. The role assigned to music as leading to knowledge and the constant repetition of mu-

sic's revelation through mystical intention indicates, according to the qabbalists, that music was God's creation. He created it on the third day, making angels out of his own breath to sing his glory day and night. This highly spiritual function of music led the founder of the Mawlawīyah order, the poet Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (1207–1273), to declare: "There are many ways leading to God; I have chosen that of music and dance."

The analogy between man and the universe and the sought-after resonance and harmony between them are frequent themes in mystical speculation. The music created by human beings is considered a pale reflection of the most exalted and perfect harmony embodied in the heavenly spheres. Therefore whoever sets out to learn to enjoy the pleasures of the celestial music will find that in order to do so he must first shake himself free of the defilement of matter and release himself from the shackles of this world. On the level of individual experience, music helps the devotee untie the knots that bind the soul to matter, allowing it to go beyond the barriers of its own personal existence. Indeed, human spirits, whose origin is the superior world, recall their homeland when hearing music. The ascent of the soul from its earthly existence to its divine home, which signifies redemption, has been symbolized in the mystical imagery of certain Ṣūfī orders by dance and movement. It is said that dance uproots the foot of the worshiper, transporting him to the summit of the world.

Qabbalah went further by introducing the idea that the power of human sacred music exerts an influence in the celestial realm. Thus man is a protagonist in the cosmic drama. It is said in this regard that everything done by the individual or the community in the mundane sphere is magically reflected in the upper region, that the impulse from below calls forth one from above. Hence the singing of hymns on earth causes an immediate resonance in the upper spheres; by means of his mystical intention the devotee contributes to the establishment of perfect tuning and harmony between himself and the macrocosm. However, the ideal perfection, the harmony that signifies salvation, is hard to obtain. This is because the way leading to it is constantly obstructed by evil forces. Adam's fall and the interference of Satan have been the causes of the contamination of divine music and the disturbance of the original harmony. To overcome these obstacles and restore the original harmony, the realm of darkness must first be defeated. Sacred music and prayer directed by mystical intention are the most formidable weapons in the combat for salvation.

[*For discussion of Jewish cantillation and the relation of music and Islamic recitation, see* Chanting.]

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AMNON SHILOAH

Music and Religion in India

The common premise of the religious music of India is that sound either invokes or symbolically represents the power of the universe. Sound, as representative of

power, is nowhere more evident than in the din and commotion of a contemporary Hindu temple during the *pūjā* or worship ceremonies. Drums, bells, gongs, beaten brass plates, and conch shells all played simultaneously create an overwhelming sonic atmosphere intended to awaken the deity. Cacophony is a part of the metaphor: sound is power.

Vedic philosophy refers to the concept of *nāda brahma* (lit., "sound god") as the source of all vibration, audible or inaudible, in the cosmos. This concept is represented iconographically in sculpture of a later period by the figure of Śiva Tāṇḍava ("dancing Śiva"), who drums the cosmos into existence. The sacred syllable *oṃ* is the oral representation of this sound genesis and in its written form has at least a thousand-year history as a holy graffito. Repetition of a magic *mantra* or syllable such as *oṃ* or verse consisting of such syllables with or without lexical meaning is an ancient meditation practice based on a belief in the efficacy of controlling vibration within the body. [*See also* Mantra *and* Oṃ.]

Complementary to the high status accorded sound is the sacredness of hearing. A distinguishing feature of Indian civilization has been the primacy of the oral/aural tradition. This heritage of hearing sacred sound is reflected in the name given to the most ancient sacred scriptures, *śruti* ("that which is heard"), believed to be divine revelation.

Vedic Chant. The four Vedas, sacred lore of the Aryans, are a series of memorized hymns, chants, and ritual formulas assembled in the first millennium BCE. They were written down on palm leaves by brahman scholars in the latter part of the first millenium CE. Drawing from these palm leaf manuscripts and contemporary recitation, European scholars published printed versions in the nineteenth century.

The Vedic texts were originally kept secret and orally transmitted by male brahman singer-priests. The *Ṛgveda* (stanzas of praise), *Sāmaveda* (chant based on *Ṛgveda* texts), *Yajurveda* (sacrificial prayers), and *Atharvaveda* (magic formulas) were passed down through *śākhā*s (lineages) that supported schools for training brahmans of particular *gotra*s (sub-castes). The recitation of this massive corpus of material required a prodigious and well-ordered memory and a knowledge of the codified rules of musical adaptation.

The four Vedas comprise an extensive collection of liturgical lore, the *Ṛgveda* alone consisting of over 10,000 verses in 1,028 hymns. Additionally, in order to protect the magical power of the sacred words, mathematical formulas were applied to the text, further expanding the already voluminous quantity of material to be memorized by the priests. These *vikṛtī* (alterations) involved reordering, adding, and repeating syllables, words, phrases, and even verses in order to obscure the secret text while invoking the power of the gods. One such *vikṛtī*, named Ghanā ("dense"), places words in the order 1–2, 2–1, 1–2–3, 3–2–1, 1–2–3; 2–3, 3–2, 2–3–4, 4–3–2, 2–3–4, and so forth, transforming a phrase such as "Agni, with a poet's power" into "Agni with, with Agni, Agni with poet's, poet's with Agni, Agni with poet's, with poet's, poet's with, with poet's power, power poet's with, with poet's power."

This fascination with verbal mathematics can also be heard in the *stotra* chant form used in the performance of Vedic sacrifice, in which the priests chant verse phrases in ordered sequences. Internal variation and signaling words in the first phrase of each verse, as well as the use of small sticks placed on a cloth in front of the chanters, help the chanters to keep their place.

The auspiciousness of the Vedic ritual depends on the elaborate correctness of the performance, with all its secret convolutions, thereby obliging the deities to deliver boons to the supplicants. Tales of a single mispronounced syllable bringing ruin to kingdoms and madness to the singer-priest are legend.

It is hypothesized that the syllabic or numerical notation in the songbooks did not prescribe specific melodic movement of discrete tones but simply represented entire melodic phrases or tonal aggregates learned orally. It is also possible that Vedic chanting utilized microtones not specified in the notation in much the same way that contemporary Indian notation omits subtle tonal shadings in its orthography. More specifically prescriptive of melodic shifts, however, are the series of three accents utilized in the notation of the *Ṛgveda: anudātta* (central tone), *svarita* (passing tone), and *udātta* (raised tone).

Theoretically, the meter of the chants was determined by the selection, number, and arrangement of *mātrā*s (syllable lengths) that were to be chanted in a single measure of breath. These units of meter are known as *parvan* (division), of which there are approximately three hundred examples varied by *mātrā* patterning. Discussion of *vṛtti* (tempo) in the Sanskrit musicological texts employed the same terms used in contemporary Indian classical music: *vilambita* (slow), *madhyama* (medium), and *druta* (fast).

Variations in contemporary chanting styles are evident among priests of the same *śākhā*, particularly when they are from different geographical regions. Curiously, the best-preserved systems of Vedic recitation are generally found in predominantly Dravidian South India. There, for instance, can be found the two main *śākhā*s of the *Sāmaveda* tradition (characterized as the most musical of the Vedic chants)—the Jaiminīya of

Kerala and Tamil Nadu and the Kauthuma-Rāṇāyanīya of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka (who also are found in Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh in the north). These two are differentiated by variations of text recension including variations in the vocables, selection of particular *parvan* and choice of musical notation, the Jaiminīya using a numerical system and the Kauthuma-Rāṇāyanīya a syllabic system.

The melodies of the *Sāmaveda* are generally believed to predate the textual material and may have been derived from Aryan folk tunes or aboriginal chants which, as popular melodies, according to Jan Gonda, may have "originated in circles which attributed a decidedly magical power" to them (Gonda, 1975, p. 315). Most of the melodies in the *Sāmaveda* are identified by name indicating either an ancient *ṛṣi* (sage) composer who may have originally set the Vedic text to the folk melody, or simply a name indicating the folk melody to be used. One such melody was named *rathaṇtara*, considered a particularly powerful melody essential for certain sacrifices. [*See also* Vedas.]

Music of Buddhism. Buddhist music in India is absent from all but the historical and archaeological record, with the exception of Tibetan Buddhist music in the Himalayan states. Because Jainism traditionally forbade chanting and the use of musical instruments for worship, its musical activity has been negligible. It was not until the medieval period that a style of Jain religious music developed that was strongly influenced by the Hindu *bhajan* (devotional song) tradition.

The life of the historical Buddha, chronicled in the *Lalitavistara Sūtra* and the *Mahāvyutpatti*, is filled with musical imagery. Buddha's abode in paradise was a place where eighty-four thousand instruments and melodies were played by the daughters of the gods, accompanied by the tinkling of thousands of bells. Buddha marked his commitment to the salvation of all beings on earth by blowing a conch shell. At that moment, all the instruments in the city of Lumbinī miraculously sounded by themselves, then went silent. The silence was followed by the songs of the goddesses, the sound of the conch and *dundubhi* (a type of kettledrum), and the howls and squeals of animals. It was into this world of sound that Buddha was reborn as Siddārtha. Siddhārtha was described as possessing *ṣaṣṭyaṅga svara* ("sixty types of sounds"). In a dream, Siddhārtha realized that music, although it could heighten emotions and stimulate thought, if used as an escape or indulgence could just as easily become an obstacle to growth and enlightenment. This revelation led to his renunciation of the princely life and the beginning of his search for enlightenment.

Nevertheless, the contemplation of sound is a central feature of Buddhist meditation. While some texts such as those contained in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (Book of the Gradual Sayings) stressed the sensual nature of singing and dancing and its distracting affect on monastic discipline, other texts recognized the use of sound to transcend individual consciousness for the development of *śrotra vijñāna* ("aural knowledge"). Monks were exhorted to practice *deva* ("god") hearing by becoming aware of the ritual sounds of the monastery and the natural sounds of the earth. Sound was classified in terms of polarity: internal/external, meaningful/meaningless, or pleasant/unpleasant. One possessing true *deva* hearing could hear each separate source of sound in a cacophony of disparate sounds.

The oldest extant tradition, the Theravāda sect of Hīnayāna Buddhism, currently practiced in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand, base their choral chanting on the Pali canon. They maintain that the Buddha instituted *sarabhaññā* (choral intoned recitation) forbidding melismatic ornamentation and long, held tones. The phrasing of *sarabhaññā* is governed by the Pali texts and the intent of the recitation was to affirm and spread the Buddhist teachings.

In Thai Theravādin communities performances at daily assemblies or for the *upostatha* ceremony at new and full moons begin with the chant leader intoning, in Pali, "Let us now chant, in praise of . . . ," with the chorus entering on the next syllable. A second Thai Theravādin chanting style, *paritta*, is used as a magic charm against wild animals and snakes. It is performed without breaks in the sound. Overlapping breathing patterns within the chorus create a mesmerizing drone of continuous vocalization.

In addition to the chanting, Theravādin musical practice includes the use of musical instruments. Certain characteristic instruments, mentioned in the early Buddhist texts, are still part of contemporary practice, including the wooden gong and the bells, metal gongs, and drums used to call monks for assembly.

During the ascendancy of Mahāyāna practice, Buddhist commentaries noted the use of music as a vehicle for salvation. The *saṃgha* (religious community) chant style that characterized the Mahāyāna period was known as *svarasvastī* (auspicious intonation), later known as *shōmyō* in Japan, *chissori* in Korea, and *dbyaṅs* (tone contour chant) in Tibet. The influence of a Chinese modal system now obscures the heightened intoning of this style, particularly in Korea and Japan, whereas in Tibet, *svarasvastī* is practiced in a more traditional manner (Ellingson, 1979). The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim I-tsing (c. 600 CE) in describing this chant style stated that the text was "intoned in a long, monotonous tone." He also noted that when "the tone is much

lengthened, it is difficult to understand the meaning of the hymn sung." In *Svaraśāstra* (Treatise on Melody), fragments of which were preserved in the seventeenth-century-CE Tibetan commentary by Kun dga' Bsod nams, the Buddhist scholar Candramogin (c. between 500 and 600 CE) specified that "although there are many throats, there must be one voice, and that one voice must be ornamented by many intonations." The musical quality of contemporary *svarasvastī* chant from Tibet includes a melody with a small ambitus, often within a minor third, in which the contours of changing intonation are gradually modified by subtle shifts in pitch, dynamics, and timbre.

In Candramogin's *Vādyaśāstra* (Treatise on Instrumental Music), rules for the monastic percussion ensemble are also elucidated. The cymbal player set the rhythm and tempo while the drum elaborated on the basic structure. In the dramatic "fierce style," still popular today in Tibetan Buddhism, tempo and volume increase, moving like a "flowing stream of beats," then diminish, allowing the beat to "fall like a meteorite." Percussionists were admonished by Candramogin not to play too loudly: "Do not stir the depth of the ocean."

The third period of Indian Buddhist history, from approximately 600 to 1100 CE, witnessed the ascendancy of the Vajrayāna (diamond or thunderbolt), Sahajayāna (spontaneous), and Mantrayāna (magic vocalization) sects—the so-called Tantric Buddhism—still practiced today in Tibetan communities and in Japan. These sects combined body mysticism and magical power rites. Their practitioners utilized specific vocalizations for the purposes of magic and the auspicious recitation of ritual formulas somewhat reminiscent of the Yajurvedic or Atharvavedic traditions. In Mantrayāna belief, ritual vocalization could release the chanter's Buddha nature. The compositions praised the Buddhas encountered in meditation and taught, in poetic and mystical terms, the rules of conduct and philosophy of Vajrayāna.

Hindu Devotional Music. Vedic chant and Buddhist chant have in common a tradition of restricted transmission. Performers of these chants formed an elite either through birth (in the case of the Vedic-chanting brahman), or by initiation (in the case of the Buddhist monastic community). The religious expression of the common people, a blend of animism, ancestor worship, culture hero worship, and polytheism, is a complex history of innumerable diverse sects. Examples cited below are from northern India.

The ancient tradition of chanted mythology relating to goddesses may date from the period of what is considered to be the oldest Purāṇa (religious lore), the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* (c. 200 BCE–200 CE). The central figure of this *purāṇa* is the independently powerful goddess Durgā, whose origins may be traced to pre-Vedic mother goddess cults and whose regional representatives may include Ambā in the west, Manasā in the east, and Māriyamman in the south. Local variants of this goddess mythology exist today in isolated lower-caste communities throughout India.

One such survival, the Devadhvani festival of Assam, celebrates the water or snake goddess Manasā, whose popularity is widespread throughout rural, eastern India. This festival involves the mass possession of female initiates and the singing of *manasāmaṅgal* (also known as *caṇḍīmaṅgal, maṅgalgītī*, or *namanāgītī* in musicological literature) by the *ojhā pālī* (male devotee chorus). Other examples of goddess worship with male choral chanting are found among various Bhīl tribal communities of western India. During *jāgaraṇ* (all-night chant devotions), recitations of the miracles of local goddesses are punctuated with shamanistic prophesying and healing rites.

With the rise of the *bhakti* movement at the beginning of the second millennium CE, the musical form known as *bhajan* developed and gained increasing popularity among the common people. *Bhajan*, often employed as a generic term for "devotional song," is structurally related to the Buddhist *caryāgītī* and to medieval sung epics. This structure consists of *dohā* (couplets) with refrain.

Today, *bhajan maṇḍalī* (devotional song, singing groups) are found throughout India, both in rural and urban areas. The late-night singing session is perhaps the most common choral religious expression and chief entertainment in India. The singing of *bhajans* has as its object the evocation of communal ectasy. The repetitive call-and-response structure of leader and chorus or antiphonal choruses with unison high-pitched singing of folk-inspired melodies and meters produces an intensity and fervor of energetic devotion. This uncomplicated music serves as an appropriate vehicle for the mystical or didactic poetry attributed to the saints honored as the founders of various sects. In some regions, stylized solo dancing may also accompany the singing.

In addition to nonprofessional *bhajan* singing, wandering mendicants and traveling groups of *jogīs* eke out a precarious living by specializing in singing the *bhajan* compositions of one saint or another. Recently some urban professional singers have become popular by singing *bhajans* taken from the sound tracks of Hindu mythological motion pictures. Other urban singers, influenced by Hindustani classical music, set traditional *bhajan* compositions to *rāgas* and render them in a style derived from *ṭhumrī* ("light" classical vocal music characterized by rapidly descending melismatic phrases).

Bhajans can be classified as emanating from either

the *nirguṇa* (deity without form) or *saguṇa* (deity with form) tradition. *Nirguṇa bhajan*s are generally didactic and universalist. *Saguṇa bhajan*s, on the other hand, speak of individual deities, their attributes, and the composer's devotion to his or her chosen lord.

The most popular saint-composer of *nirguṇa bhajan* was Kabīr (1398–1448), the brilliant weaver of Banaras. [*See the biography of Kabīr.*] The founder of Sikhism, Gurū Nānak (c. 1469–1539), was another famous *nirguṇa bhajan* composer, whose songs reflect a softer, more emotional vision than Kabīr's, with a sense of surrender to an ultimate divinity. [*See the biography of Nānak.*] Saint-composers of *saguṇa bhajan*, on the other hand, were *bhakta*s (ecstatic devotees) who longed for union with their god. The theme of separation from the divine, symbolized by the image of lovers parted by distance or social inequality, is best expressed by the songs of the Rajasthani poet Mīrā Bāī (1403–1470), the daughter of a king of Udaipur and a fervent devotee of Kṛṣṇa. Erotically charged, her poetry reflects the willingness to abandon conventional life and defy earthly authority in the pursuit of divine ecstasy. [*See the biography of Mīrā Bāī.*]

In Bengal, one prominent form of devotional song was the *kīrtan*. Influenced by *bhāṭiyālī* (ebb tide) boatmen's folk song of the Ganges Delta, the *kīrtan* has a long history of development. It reached an artistic peak with Caitanya (1458–1533), who idealized Kṛṣṇa's favorite consort Rādhā as the ultimate devotee. Contemporary *kīrtan* singers are preachers who embellish their songs with homilies. Accompanied on the *khol* (tuned, double-headed, tapered barrel drum), the *kīrtan* singer, in a *kathā* (religious discourse) performance, invokes Caitanya as the patron of devotional music, then selects various short songs by different composers praising and elucidating episodes in Kṛṣṇa's life. The *kīrtan* singer uses *ākhar* (heightened speech) for his sermons, explicating significant lines. He then concludes each verse in an accelerated tempo known as *kātan*.

Another form of Bengali *kīrtan, nām kīrtan*, has gained worldwide notoriety through the proselytizing of the Hare Krishna sect. Basic to the philosophy of this Hindu revival group is the belief that ecstatic union with the divine is assured by the constant vocalization of the name of Kṛṣṇa. [*See also* International Society for Krishna Consciousness.]

The Bauls, a mendicant sect also based in Bengal, derive their devotional songs from the Vajrayāna Buddhist tradition of *caryāgītī*, from *nirguṇa bhajan*, and from *kīrtan*. They originally traveled from village to village entertaining and instructing their audiences by singing an eclectic collection of songs that reflected their syncretic religious orientation. [*See also* Bhakti.]

Islamic Devotional Music. For the orthodox Islamic theologian, the *qirā'āt* (cantillation) required for the proper recitation of the Qur'ān and the *adhdhān* (call to prayer) was not considered music. Use of instruments or singing other than for reciting Qur'anic passages was prohibited. However, the Ṣūfī belief that music "leads the soul to the highest realm" (Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī) had great influence in the royal courts of medieval India. In fact the powerful Mughal emperor Akbar (1542–1605) was himself initiated into the Ṣūfī order of musical dervishes, the Chishtīyah. This order, like its counterpart in Turkey, the Mevlevī, believed in performance as a means of bridging the gulf between man and God. While the Mevlevīs dance, the Chishtīyah listen to *qawwālī*, the music of the *qawwāl*s, caste musicians associated with the lineage of specific Ṣūfī saints whose families continue to live in the vicinity of the founder saint's tomb. [*See* Sufism; Tilāwah; *and the biography of Rūmī.*]

Central to an understanding of the music of the *qawwāl*s is the practice of *dhikr* ("recollection"), named for surah 33:41: "O believers, remember God with frequent recollection." [*See* Dhikr.] *Dhikr* is a spiritual exercise, a meditation involving respiratory control and constant repetition of *mantra*-like phrases such as "Lā illāha illā Allāh" ("There is no god but God").

The standard format for presenting melodic material follows closely the structure of the poetic form. New lines of text are to some extent accompanied by new melodic phrases. However, the core of the form is strophic, once the basic melodic exposition has been presented for the first time. New melodic phrases, with new text, enter as inserted improvisational phrases. This melodic structure facilitates the emotional intensification characteristic of *qawwālī:* a new line of text can be accentuated by shifting the tonal center of the phrase upward creating tension at the highest point of the musical line before descending to the refrain.

The traditional *qawwālī* performance, *maḥfil-eisamā'* (performance for audition), in contrast to popular "street" *qawwālī*, is an occasion for the audience of spiritual adepts to experience ecstatic love of the divine. It is often performed in a hall or shrine adjacent to the tomb of a Ṣūfī saint on the occasion of his *'urs* (death anniversary). In its most sacred setting, the *samā'* (listening to religious music of a mystical nature) will occur at a saint's shrine with the spiritual descendant of that saint in attendance. [*See* Samā'.]

As the performance becomes increasingly more intense, the audience utilizes stereotypical expressions to help the musicians gauge their condition. Formal blessings, bestowed by the spiritual elders of the assembly, and formal presentations of money as offerings to the

saint (then given as alms to the musicians) mark moments in the overall performance when emotions are allowed to cool. Many stages of arousal eventually lead to the final stage of *ḥāl* (ecstasy), characterized by members of the audience twitching, weeping, shouting, dancing, or collapsing.

The harmonium (hand-pumped organ) is the favored instrument of melodic accompaniment. The rapid spread of the harmonium in India, introduced by nineteenth-century Christian missionaries, signaled a profound change in Indian musical culture. Indian musicians, regardless of their social and religious backgrounds, were impressed by the volume of sound it could produce, its ability to maintain continuous unbroken sound reminiscent of the vocal or stringed-instrument drone, and its timbral stops. But tempered tunings, ideal for keyboard harmony, imply a diatonic system that is curiously at odds with traditional Indian modal concepts with their subtle microtonal shadings. What melodies were heard in the early days of *qawwālī* before the arrival of the harmonium is a matter of speculation.

Other forms of Islamic religious music include Shī'ī and Sunnī hymns and folk compositions attributed to particular saint-composers. The Shī'īs utilize five different hymn forms to celebrate the martyrdom of Ḥusayn (c. 626–680 CE), grandson of Muḥammad; these songs each have their particular textual and melodic structures. Perhaps the most dramatic in performance, the *matām*, is sung by a male congregation and includes rhythmic beating of the chest and grief-stricken singing often interrupted by the weeping of the singers. *Marsiya* employs the unusual feature of the *ās* (choral drone).

Mīlād are hymns sung by Sunnī women celebrating the birthday of Muḥammad. These hymns consist of verses of praise in alternation with explanatory narration chanted by song leaders, who may be paid for their services.

In Punjab, Bullah Shah (1680–1753) was a saint-composer who, like the *nirguṇa bhajan* composer Kabīr, extolled the unity of religion in images familiar to his audiences. Like the Bengali composer Caitanya, Bullah Shah described the seeker as a young woman seeking union with her beloved. His songs are still sung by itinerant Muslim singers throughout western India and Pakistan.

In the eastern region of India, in Assam, Ajān Fakīr (c. 1600), known also as Shah Mīlān, composed songs on the theme of the unity of religions still sung in all-night song sessions, particularly at Muslim weddings. Countless other anonymous Ṣūfī-inspired mendicant-composers wandered the roads of northern India during the medieval period, and their songs, like the songs of the anonymous *bhajan* composers, attracted the peasantry to one particular sect or another. The charisma of the saint, as demonstrated by the songs to which the saint's name was attached, was conveyed through the message of the text as sung by his fervent devotees.

Summary. Ancient musical styles such as Vedic chant or *namanāgītī* are still sung by the elders in some communities and are being passed down to younger generations. *Bhajan* or *qawwālī* is sung throughout northern India, and new songs, influenced by film music, continue to be composed. Music as an aural icon of power remains basic to all religious music in India. Sound is magic for the Vedic priests with their tradition of calling down the gods or for the initiate possessed by a goddess during the Devadhvani festival. Sound is ecstasy for the *bhajan maṇḍalī* or the *qawwālī* audience overcome by the repetition of an evocative refrain. Processions, the clamor of bells and drums, conch shell trumpets, the din of auspicious noise surrounding any ritual or life-cycle event, all are indications of the Indian belief that sound is sense and hearing is believing.

[*See also* Chanting; Poetry, *article on* Indian Religious Poetry; *and* Dance, *article on* Indian Dance and Dance Drama.]

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DAVID ROCHE

Music and Religion in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is not a culture area but a political-geographic region that includes ten nations whose boundaries have been constituted within the past hundred years. In each of the nations, from the largest to the smallest, there is considerable ethnic diversity (though in each nation one ethnic group predominates). One expression of this cultural diversity is religious music. Religion in Southeast Asia is only somewhat correlated with ethnicity, but the correlation of religious music and ethnicity follows a different pattern from that of belief and ethnicity. For example, Javanese *gamelan* is used by some Christian churches in central Java as accompaniment to religious services, though in most Javanese churches hymnody, *a cappella* or accompanied by Western instruments, is the rule.

In the smallest of the Southeast Asian nations, the urban island-nation of Singapore, there are three major ethnic groups—Chinese, Indian, and Malay—but there are many differences in dialects and cultural practices within each group. The Singapore Chinese are Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese, and Teochew. Dialects used in religious events can differ from one group to another. The musical drama involved in Neo-Confucian religious events, Moon festivals, Hungry Ghost festivals, and services for the propitiation of the gods will differ from one group to another, not only in the languages of dialogue and songs but also in melodic contours and rhythms that parallel language differences in tones and rhythms of poetry.

Music has played a central role in the religious life of Southeast Asian societies from early times to the recent past. The religious functions of music vary from one society to another and for each society from one historical era to another. Within most Southeast Asian societies, the functions of music have changed with the passage of time. Many of the earliest indigenous historical records—texts or inscriptions on stone or copper—dating from the fifth century are religious texts (prayers or mantras) written in poetry meant to be sung. Such texts, coupled with writings from areas in China and India that were in contact with Southeast Asian societies in those times and before, give evidence of organized societies with developed agricultural techniques, crafts, and social systems. Archaeological and ethnological evidence suggests that cultivation of rice was present by 3000 BCE, that metalwork had begun by 2000 BCE, and that navigation across vast distances was

practiced by 1500 BCE. Other evidence shows that some Southeast Asians traveled and settled to the west as far as Africa and to the east as far as the easternmost islands of Oceania. These voyages put the region in contact with music and religion as they developed throughout the ancient world, from at least two thousand years ago. By the time of indigenous historical records, court centers on the mainland and the islands of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo and towns on the coasts and in river deltas of the entire mainland were frequented by travelers from India, China, and the Middle East. These travelers came on religious, educational, and commercial missions and pilgrimages. Sometimes, at the behest of indigenous leaders, they stayed to learn and teach, or to serve as commercial brokers. Little is known about the specifics of music in Southeast Asian societies before 1000 CE, but this evidence of advanced material culture and extensive commerce with cultures outside the region, combined with recent evidence of long-standing patterns of diversity, substantiates theories of complex and diverse musical cultures throughout the region for at least the past three thousand years.

In many Southeast Asian societies of the first millennium, religion and the political power of the ruler were closely linked. Bronze drums, which seem to have had musical purposes, were tools in religious ceremonies of many mainland Southeast Asian societies starting around 100 CE and in many island Southeast Asian societies several hundred years thereafter. These drums were probably owned by ruling families and served as signs of the power of those families. The etchings on some bronze drums show processions of priestlike figures, playing rudimentary free-reed mouth organs, progenitors of the present-day Lao *kaen*. Up until the middle of this century, bronze drums were regarded as sacred among mountain and hill peoples of mainland Southeast Asia, and on the island of Bali. [*See also* Drums.]

The first written materials from Southeast Asia show that poetry in song form was central to religious life—in communication of religious teachings, sacred stories, and prayers. Through contacts with South Asian societies, aspects of Hindu and Buddhist religions came to many areas of Southeast Asia. Both complexes of beliefs and customs were selectively assimilated and transformed to meet the particular needs of regional communities. Some South Asian instruments—strapped drums and possibly bowed lutes—were assimilated into Southeast Asian musical ensembles.

Stories from the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* and the Jātakas became the basis of some Southeast Asian songs. For example, in many societies of Java and Bali the *Mahābhārata* was made a part of, or came as, drama to be acted or stories to be told. These stories and dramas were sung. It is probable that the connections of *wayang* (shadow puppet theater) and the *Mahābhārata* in Java were already quite strong early in the first millennium CE. The first South Asian–language texts of the *Mahābhārata* would have been incomprehensible as language to any Javanese, but the musical elements probably aided in the communication of the foreign phenomena or enabled the spiritual transformation to occur in those who did not understand the language. Then, as time passed, parts of the stories were translated into Javanese and layered between older South Indian sections. Some evidence of these processes can be identified in present-day practices of Javanese *wayang*. During a performance of *wayang kulit purwa* in Java, the *dhalang* (puppeteers) will sing texts in Old Javanese, a language that draws heavily from Sanskrit. Present-day *dhalang* may know little Old Javanese, and thus may garble the meaning of the Old Javanese text. Few listeners understand the meaning of these texts, whether garbled or not. Nonetheless, these *suluk* ("songs of the puppeteer") are essential parts of any *wayang* performance. If, as is the case now more and more, the performance of a *lakon* (the specific play chosen from the larger story cycles as the story for the evening) is shortened from all night to three or four hours, the *dhalang* will retain almost all of these incomprehensible *suluk* and extensively edited spoken dialogue in comprehensible Javanese. The sung *suluk* are considered essential to a complete performance of the *lakon*. The spiritual impact of *wayang* is not tied to the comprehensibility of the text, but to the existence and order of these oldest elements, the *suluk* songs. Here then, the music of the *suluk* is an essential attribute of the spiritual event. This is an analogue to the processes by which South Asian–language texts were assimilated into Southeast Asian contexts in early history. For the listeners the real essence of the spiritual event was probably in its sound. [*See also* Drama, *articles on* Javanese Wayang *and* Balinese Dance and Dance Drama.]

The musical ingredients of religious life in Southeast Asia are diverse. There is, of course, some standardization of musical practice in religions that cross social, cultural, and national boundaries. These similarities occur, for the most part, in the institutional forms of religious life. For example, similarities in the institutional aspects of Islam among the Malay communities of peninsular Malaysia and the central Javanese are paralleled by similarities in the music of Islamic institutions—calls to prayer, songs of prayer in the mosques, or the chanting of the Qur'ān. Islamic chant in Arabic is somewhat standardized across Malay communities in peninsular Malaysia and among the central Javanese in

Indonesia as a result of common origins in Middle Eastern chant. Moreover, tendencies toward standardization are reinforced through the annual Qur'ān-reading contests held within each nation and between nations.

Yet there are also differences in musical practices for missionizing religions found in more than one region of Southeast Asia. These differences sometimes grow out of differences in language. The chanting of texts in Pali is a part of Theravāda Buddhism in both Thailand and Burma. Musical aspects other than the texts of these chants—aspects such as pitch contours and rhythmic values—reflect differences in musical vernaculars. Differences are even more pronounced in the musical aspects of the songs from one religion sung in different regional languages.

Some cross-cultural differences in music associated with the "world" religions in different regions of Southeast Asia can be traced to older patterns of religious belief in specific cultures and regions. For example, certain central Javanese *gamelan* have played roles in institutional Islam. Up to the middle of the twentieth century, during festivals held in celebration of the birthday of the prophet Muḥammad, certain *gamelan* ensembles usually known by the name *gamelan sekaten* were displayed prominently in courtyards of the great mosques of several of the regional rulers in central Java. Each day of the festival, these ensembles played many sets of pieces—taken from a repertory noted for its grandeur and strength—to announce the religious and social festivities and entice people to come join in.

Percussion ensembles are central to the musical activities of many Southeast Asian societies. Commentators on Southeast Asian music have suggested that two types of percussion instruments in common usage throughout Southeast Asia today—the metallophone and the gong—are the most ancient. Ethnological and archaeological evidence suggests, however, that wooden or bamboo stringed, struck, or blown instruments are equally ancient. Actually, some of the latter group were probably in use in most areas of Southeast Asia well before either gongs or metallophones. It is even possible that gongs were introduced into some localities as gifts from one Southeast Asian ruler to another. A reason for their acceptance may have been that they made a sound akin to that of a preexisting blown bamboo tube or struck bass drum.

Throughout these eras, from early historical times to the present, the cultures of many rural, upland, or inland peoples of both mainland and insular Southeast Asia have developed along lines independent from those of the largest ethnic groups in the region. Some of these rural groups, such as the Shan of the Burma-Thailand border, the Mon of southern Burma and western Thailand, and the Cham of southern Vietnam and eastern Cambodia, represent the contemporary vestiges of societies that in times past had dominated regional affairs. Many of these rural peoples have societies enmeshed with those of the major ethnic groups in their region.

In recent history, musical ensembles consisting wholly or partly of hanging gongs or gong-chimes have been important to societies throughout the region. This interest in gongs or gong-chimes is not limited to those societies that had clear contacts with "great" traditions to the north or west, or with court culture. On the mainland, the Bu Noer people, an Austroasiatic ethnic group, play ensembles of hand held knobless gongs in rituals important to village safety and agricultural cycles. On the island of Borneo, large knobbed gongs are venerated as signs of the prestige and power of a leader. The gongs and gong-chimes of central Java were closely linked to the sacral power of Javanese rulers. Many Southeast Asian societies hold in common a belief that metalworking is a sacred activity.

In view of the considerable diversity of purpose and product in Southeast Asian religious music, it is useful to discuss in detail the religious aspects of a complex of musical activities from one sociocultural region and one period of time: the complex of musical activities known in recent times as *karawitan* in the Surakarta region of central Java. *Karawitan* can be divided into three basic categories: purely instrumental music (centering around *gamelan* ensembles), purely vocal music (centering around *tembang*, a generic name for certain types of poems and songs), and music that mixes voices and instruments. According to a system of categorization adopted during the 1970s by some *dhalang* and arts teachers in Surakarta, Indonesia, *karawitan* of the past centuries had magical *(ilmu)*, symbolic *(basa)*, or formal *(agama)* religious significance.

Magical Significance. Specific musical pieces had magical qualities: the main purpose for a dance piece called *Anglir mendung* (Like Storm Clouds), prominent in the courts of central Java, was to promote the safety of the populace; if the piece was played at an inappropriate time or by inappropriate individuals, it caused great harm in the realm. The piece *Denda gedhe* (Great Stick or Club) was instrumental in casting out evil spirits. If played without the necessary accompanying rituals, it induced panic. The connections between magic and *wayang* brought magical powers to the *dhalang*. For example, in the ritual Anak Tiba Sampir ("the child is given over"), the *dhalang* blessed a child by chanting *mantras* (prayers) and by performing a *wayang* in the child's name. From that time on, until his death, the child was responsible to the *dhalang*, though the child continued to live with its parents. There is evidence of

connections between magic and music in the rituals for the propitiation of spirits: in specific ceremonies for each *gamelan*, sometimes as often as once a week, individual *gamelan* instruments were presented with offerings, usually consisting of flowers or food, to expel or ward off bad spirits from around the instruments. Certain Javanese songs had magical powers: the *sekar ageng* (great or old song form) called *Kilayu nadung* was used to stop heavy rains or to tame crocodiles. *Kidung*, a genre of songs said to contain strong religious powers, are used to exorcise evil spirits or keep them away from sick people, people about to be married, and those about to be circumcised. For the mildly ill, two score stanzas of a *kidung* might suffice, but for the very sick, an entire night of song would be necessary.

Symbolic Significance. The *gamelan* pieces played during the overture to the *wayang* were arranged in an order that symbolizes the span of a human life. The piece entitled *Cucur bawuk* (Blood Flowing from the Womb) was played first, symbolizing birth; then *Parianom* (Young People); then *Sri katon* (The Honorable Ruler), symbolizing good deeds in mature life; and finally *Suksma ilang* (The Spirit Is Lost). Moreover, a *lakon* was usually chosen specifically to fit the occasion for which it was performed. In other contexts, specific choices of *gamelan* pieces were made to fit specific functions. *Gamelan* pieces for wedding ceremonies were ordered to meet the needs of the ceremony and to symbolize a successful marriage. *Wilujeng* (Blessings) was played first to welcome the guests; then *Pujangga anom* (Young Scholar) for good wishes that the bridegroom become a wise man; then *Sinom* (The Young Ones) for the couple; then *Longgor* to predict that a child will come early in the marriage and will remain healthy; then *Larasmaya*, to wish for comfort and bliss; and finally *Goyong basuki*, to call for the safety of the couple. Other rituals had musical accompaniments with symbolic significance: the piece *Ludira madu* (Sweet Blood) was often played at circumcision ceremonies.

Formal Religious Significance. *Dhalang* are central in the performance of *ruwatan* (delivery from a curse). They bring to this task all their skills as dramatists and singers. In other religious ceremonies of the village, *sang smaradesa* ("the one who is loved by the village") songs were sung to the favorite god of a village at times. At harvest times, village singers sing *tembang* to the god of the harvest to ask for a good yield. In the *kraton* of central Java, the *bedaya* cycle of dances was performed at the behest of the ruler, to reaffirm his faith in and allegiance to the mythical Nyai Loro Kidul (Queen of the South Seas). A place was left for Nyai Loro Kidul in the dance formation, and if the performance was well done, she took her place among the dancers and was visible only to the ruler. It has already been mentioned that special ensembles called *gamelan sekaten* play important roles in religious festivals in celebration of the birthday of the prophet Muḥammad.

Recent times have seen the erosion of the relationship of music and noninstitutional religion in Southeast Asia. Even the role of music in institutional religion has declined throughout the region. This is partly due to an erosion of older institutions of political power and partly due to the popularity and government support of electronic communications media. The decline in religious music has been accompanied by a rise in the importance of secular music: popular music on radios competes even with chants of muezzins. Moreover, tourism has stimulated the development of new uses for religious music. One of the most frequent uses of Hindu drama in Bali today is to entertain and entice tourists.

[*See also* Southeast Asian Religions.]

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MARTIN HATCH

Music and Religion in China, Korea, and Tibet

The three main streams of religion in East Asia—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism—all employ music to express beliefs and ideas. Ancient shamanic practices as well as Christianity and Islam also play a part in the musical histories of China, Korea, and Tibet.

China. Popular religion in China has for centuries drawn from Confucianist, Taoist, Buddhist, and animist elements. Extremely diverse in their local practices, the various forms of popular religion serve as vehicles for intense spiritual expression. Music is an integral part of this local structure. Festivals of popular religion almost always include processions accompanied by outdoor bands, and lion or dragon dances. Performances of music drama dedicated to the gods also form a key part of these festivals.

Aside from the three major groups, numerous minor religious communities also exist in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Islam, for example, is practiced by about 3 percent of the population in China. No systematic report on Chinese Islamic practice is available to me, but while conducting research on Chinese theater in China during the early 1980s, I observed an evening service in a local mosque in Hangchou celebrated by a small group of Chinese Sunnī Muslims. The service lasted about an hour and consisted of *a cappella* chanting of Qur'anic texts in Arabic by the congregation, lead by a mullah with appropriate obeisances.

Christianity also has a small following in China. Chinese Christian liturgies, whether of the Catholic or the Protestant church, follow their Western models closely. Hymnals used in the Chinese Protestant churches contain primarily hymn tunes from the West with Chinese texts, but "acculturated" hymns by Chinese composers based on Western models are occasionally included in Chinese Protestant hymnals. Protestant hymn tunes became one of the important predecessors of the modern Chinese song genre known as *ko-ming ko-chü* ("revolutionary song").

Imperial ancestral cult rites. *Ya-yüeh* ("elegant music") was the music used in solemn state rites. The term may be used broadly to denote music used in court rituals and entertainments, as well as that performed in secular government ceremonies. Since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), however, the term has come to be used more narrowly to denote music used in solemn sacrificial rites with religious overtones, such as the imperial ancestral cult rites, Confucian rites, and rites dedicated to Heaven and Earth. It is in the latter, more restrictive, sense that the term *ya-yüeh* is used here.

Even though the repertory and musical styles of *ya-yüeh* changed from one dynasty to the next, it has always been performed by chorus and instrumental ensemble. The *ya-yüeh* chorus, called *teng-ko*, varied in size from one dynasty to the next. The *ya-yüeh* instrumental ensemble is sometimes called *pa-yin* ("eight sounds") because its instruments represent eight essential kinds of timbres: metal (bell), stone (chime), clay (ocarina), wood (pounded wooden box and wooden scraper), gourd (mouth organ whose base was made of gourd), silk (zither), bamboo (flute), and leather (drum). A partial list of *ya-yüeh* instruments, according to modern classification, includes, among the idiophones: the *chung*, suspended clapperless bronze bells of varying sizes struck with a mallet; the *hsing*, suspended stone chimes of varying sizes struck with a mallet; the *chu*, a pounded wooden box; and the *yü*, a tiger-shaped wooden scraper scraped with a bamboo whisk; among the membranophones: the *ku*, suspended drums of varying sizes and shapes; the *po-fu*, a two-headed barrel drum placed on a wooden stand, played with bare hands; among the aerophones: the *hsün*, an ocarina; the *chih* and the *ti*, transverse bamboo flutes; the *tung-hsiao*, an end-blown notched bamboo flute; the *p'ai-hsiao*, a panpipe; and the *sheng*, a mouth organ whose sound box was first made of gourd, now of wood; and among the chordophones: the *ch'in*, a bridgeless zither with seven strings; and the *se*, a twenty-five string zither with bridges. The number of individual instruments included in the *ya-yüeh* orchestra varied from period to period. *Ch'in* with one, two, three, five, and nine strings at various times have been included.

Dance was also an integral part of solemn state sacrificial rites. Two kinds of dances were performed: the *wen-wu* (civil dance), and the *wu-wu* (military dance). The number of dancers prescribed was thirty-six in six lines of six persons (*liu-i*, "six rows of six dancers") or in eight lines of eight persons (*pa-i*, "eight rows of eight dancers"). *Liu-i* was prescribed for rites for emperors, and *pa-i* for rites for lesser personages. Occasionally more than sixty-four dancers were used, but such an occurrence was rare and was usually viewed as an aberration. All dancers were male. The *wen-wu* dancers, dressed in civilian clothes, held long pheasant feathers in their right hands and flutes in their left hands; the *wu-wu* dancers, dressed in military clothes, bore swords in their right hands and shields in their left hands.

In addition to the use of music and dance in solemn state rites, other important ceremonial features included animal sacrifice and the offering of vegetarian food and wine to the personage being honored. Two kinds of animal sacrifice were defined: the *t'ai-lao*, or

"great sacrifice," involving the sacrificial killing and offering of oxens, sheep, and pigs; and the *hsiao-lao*, or "lesser sacrifice," involving the sacrificial killing and offering of oxen and sheep only. *T'ai-lao* represented the highest honor to be bestowed and was prescribed only for the rites for emperors and Confucius.

Confucian rites. Shih-tien, a state sacrificial ritual held in spring and autumn in honor of Confucius, was established by the first emperor of the Han dynasty, Kao-tsu (r. 206–193 BCE), who made Confucianism the state ideology. Ceremonial features of Shih-tien rites conducted by the emperor were similar to those of the imperial ancestral cult rites, and like them they underwent many changes over the centuries. Four components remained basic: *t'ai-lao*, the Great Sacrifice; three rounds of offering of food and wine to Confucius, known as *san hsien* ("three offerings"); *ya-yüeh* performance; and *wen-wu*.

Prior to the middle of the Ch'ing dynasty, two ensembles made up the *ya-yüeh* orchestra. One, called *t'ang-shang-yüeh* ("ensemble on the terrace"), sat on the terrace adjacent to the main shrine hall where the rite took place; the other, called *t'ang-hsia-yüeh* ("ensemble on the ground"), was performed in the courtyard below. After the mid-Ch'ing period (around 1766), however, only the *t'ang-shang-yüeh* was used.

In Shih-tien rites conducted by the emperor, the *wen-wu* was always performed by thirty-six dancers (i.e., *liu-i*), except during the mid-Ming period, from about 1477 to 1531 CE, when the prescribed number of dancers increased first to sixty-four (i.e., *pa-i*), then to seventy-two. After 1531 the number of prescribed dancers of Shih-tien was reduced once again to thirty-six.

Ya-yüeh compositions played at Shih-tien rites are referred to collectively as *ta-ch'eng-yüeh* ("music of completeness"), a term derived from the name customarily given to Confucian temples, *ta-ch'eng-miao* ("temple of completeness"). The musical styles and repertoire of *ta-ch'eng-yüeh*, as well as its tunings and modes, changed frequently over the centuries. The most recent *ta-ch'eng-yüeh* was commissioned in 1742 by the emperor Ch'ien Lung of the Ch'ing dynasty (r. 1736-1796). The Ch'ing repertory consisted of six compositions and their transpositions. The original and the transposed versions were played in the spring and autumn rites respectively. All six compositions are for chorus with accompaniment by *ya-yüeh* orchestra. The chorus was made up of twelve male voices.

The texts of the six compositions are hymns of praise to Confucius uniformly composed in eight lines of four words each. Individual words are set syllabically to pitches of equal duration. Melodically, all the compositions are pentatonic with disjunct melodic movement; they were sung in unison in a slow, stately manner.

The vocal melodies were accompanied in unison by bell and stone chime sets and by the entire body of chordophones and aerophones. All the drums and single bells and stone chimes, as well as the *chu* and the *yü*, perform colotomic, that is, structure-marking, functions. Three strokes on the *chu* signaled the beginning of a piece; three strokes on the *yü* signaled the end. The melodic phrase setting of each four-word line was initiated by one stroke on the *po-chung* ("big bell"), and concluded with three strokes on the *chien-ku* ("big drum") and three more on the *po-fu;* these three-stroke *po-fu* patterns consisted of a light first beat played by the left hand, an accented second beat played by the right hand, and a concluding beat by both hands. Preceding the singing of each word, the pitch was sounded on one bell of the bell set; afterward the same pitch was struck on a stone chime of the chime set. The dances were accompanied by chorus and orchestra.

Buddhist liturgical music. Traditional Buddhist services comprise four major categories: regular services; rites for the dead; rites for special services; and services commemorating birthdays of Buddhist deities. Regular services are conducted in two types of Buddhist institutions: monasteries and lay Buddhist organizations. In the monasteries, morning and evening services are held daily; in the lay institutions, regular services (modeled after those of the monasteries) are held once or twice weekly.

In all categories of Buddhist services, music, both vocal and instrumental, plays an integral part. Vocal and instrumental items follow one another without break in any given service. In general, Buddhist liturgical music can be characterized as simple, serene, and solemn. Liturgical texts used in Buddhist services are always chanted or sung, either solo or in chorus. *Fan-pei* is the generic term for all vocal liturgical music. *Fan-pei* is a distinctively Chinese style of liturgical song, though it may have been inspired by the Indian principle of syllabic, monotonic recitation.

Eight types of liturgical texts, some in verse format and some in prose, are used in Buddhist services:

1. *Sūtra (ching)*—Buddhist scripture in Chinese verse translation with ten syllables to the line. This type contains discourses of the Buddha and the *bodhisattvas*. [*See* Sūtra Literature.]
2. *Mantra (chou)*—Central Asian, Pali, or Sanskrit devotional incantations in Chinese syllabic transliteration; *mantra* texts are meaningless to Chinese, though their general import may be known. [*See* Mantra.]

3. Hymn *(tsan)*—eulogy in verse having irregular meter.
4. *Gātha (chi)*—verse exposition organized in eight-stanza structure, each stanza having four lines of equal length and each line containing either five or four syllables.
5. *Nien-fo*—chanting the names of the Buddha or *bodhisattvas*. The length of a line is determined by the number of syllables that make up a name. [*See* Nien-fo.]
6. Prayer (*hsüan-shu* or *wen*)—prayers in verse to Buddhist deities.
7. Invocation (*shang-yin* or *tso-fan*)—verse text calling the congregation to worship.
8. Instruction *(shih-sung)*—priest's address to a deity; in verse.

Fan-pei music is pentatonic. Some items, such as hymn and *gātha*, feature a wide melodic range and varying melodic contour; others, such as *sūtra*, *nien-fo*, and prayer, have a narrower range and a somewhat static melodic contour. The *mantra* tends to be monotonal. A dominant feature of *fan-pei* music is the consistent use of repetitive motifs or pairs of motifs. Variation of motifs is also frequent.

In regular services, each *fan-pei* item is begun by the precentor *(wei-na)*, who sings the first phrase and is then joined by the congregation of monks or laypeople. A vocal piece always begins slowly and gradually gets faster. Heterophony frequently results as some members of the congregation sing variants of the melody according to their different abilities. Instruments are always used to accompany singing in regular services. *Fan-pei* are frequently chanted or sung by a solo voice in special services, but responsorial and antiphonal singing may also be used. Instrumental accompaniment may be absent in solo chanting in special services.

Three melodic styles of *fan-pei* are distinguished by modern writers: syllabic, neumatic, and melismatic. *Fan-pei* in syllabic style have one or two notes to each syllable of the text. To this type belong *sūtra*, *mantra*, prayer, and some *nien-fo* chants. *Fan-pei* in neumatic style feature three, four, or more notes to each syllable. *Gātha* and some *nien-fo* used specifically to accompany the obligatory circumambulation in regular services belong to this type. *Fan-pei* in melismatic style have ten or more notes set to one syllable. To this type belongs the hymn.

In traditional Buddhist services, nonpitched idiophones and membranophones are used to accompany *fan-pei* singing. Instruments are also used to play the preludes, interludes, and postludes of services. In contemporary practice seven types of instruments are used: the *ta-ku*, a suspended two-headed barrel drum played with a mallet; the *ta-chung*, a suspended bell played with a stick; the *ta-ch'ing*, a large inverted metal bowl-shaped bell resting on a cushion and struck with a mallet; the *yin-ch'ing*, a small inverted bell fastened to a wooden handle and struck with a stick; the *mu-yü*, a wooden slit drum in the shape of a stylized fish head, struck with a wooden stick; the *tan-tzu*, a small framed gong fastened to a handle and struck with a stick; and the *ha-tzu*, a pair of cymbals. These instruments are made in various sizes to suit the demands of different ritual contexts. Those used in monasteries, for example, are usually larger than those used in lay institutions.

Buddhist worship manuals provide instrumental notation indicating the usage of musical instruments. Duration of notes and dynamics are not indicated in such manuals but are transmitted orally. Vocal melodies are transmitted entirely by oral means.

The arrangement of percussion patterns in a given vocal piece can be divided into three kinds: regular meter, in 4/4 or 3/4; composite meters, alternating between 4/4, 3/4, or 1/4; and unmeasured pieces, having no fixed temporal units. Some instruments use specific rhythmic patterns known by particular names. For example, the *mu-yü* (slit drum) pattern, known as "Eighty-eight Buddhas," is characterized by a series of accelerated strokes in diminishing volume. Another pattern, "Nine Bells and Fifteen Drums" (referring to the number of strokes on each), is used for the *po-chung* and *chien-ku*. This pattern is made up of an initial slow section consisting of alternating drum and bell strokes, a fast central section consisting of simultaneous strokes on both instruments (with the drum being played twice as fast as the bell), and an accented drum stroke to conclude the pattern. During a regular service this pattern is played several times as an interlude and thereby performs a structural function for the entire service similar to that of the ritornello in Western compositions.

Music in Taoist rituals. The role of music in Taoist ritual practices has not been studied systematically by musicologists. Hence any discussion of music in Taoist rituals will necessarily be highly tentative. The following remarks are based primarily on the examination of a limited number of samples recorded in Taiwan, where monastic Taoism (such as it existed in China prior to the 1950s) does not exist. These examples are from rituals performed by different groups of ordained or lay priests belonging to a variety of orders. In addition, some of the description provided here is based on my observations in Hong Kong.

In contemporary Taiwan and Hong Kong, the most frequently performed Taoist rituals are funeral rites, exorcist rites, and the community rite of purification

(Chiao). These rites are normally performed by a chief Taoist priest, the *tao-shih*, with a small group of assistant priests and a few lay instrumentalists. Performances of rituals usually take place in the local Taoist temple or in the local temple of a popular religion, such as the Temple of Ma-tsu (a goddess protector of seafarers) in Taiwan or the Temple of T'ien-hou ("heavenly mother") in Hong Kong. Funeral rites may be performed at the home of the bereaved family. Some rites are performed in full view of the public, while others (e.g., certain purification rites) are performed behind closed doors to shut out the profane in order that the ritual purpose of purification may be fulfilled.

Music and dance play a central role in Taoist rituals. Both vocal and instrumental music are used. Vocal music, with or without instrumental accompaniment, includes passages in heightened speech, monotonal incantation, chants, and hymn tunes. Texts, in Chinese or Sino-Sanskrit prose or verse, are set syllabically or melismatically to pentatonic or heptatonic melodies; both measured and unmeasured melodies are found. Structurally, most compositions are in strophic form, but some are through-composed. In chants and hymn tunes, repetition of a motif or a phrase appears to be a prominent feature.

Vocal pieces are recited or sung mainly by a solo voice; occasionally responsorial singing and ensemble singing in unison are also employed. Singing is commonly done in a relaxed manner; use of special vocal techniques such as shouts, groans, microtonal vocal inflection or glides, and falsetto are not uncommon. A characteristic opening glissando often precedes a vocal piece, and the insertion of vocable passages are by no means rare.

Instruments are used either singularly or in a group. These include, among the nonpitched idiophones: the *ta-ch'ing*, an inverted bowl-shaped bell struck with a mallet; the *mu-yü*, a wooden slit drum struck by a stick; the hand bell; cymbals; and the gong; among the membranophones: the *fa-ku*, the ritual drum, which is a barrel drum played with two sticks; among the chordophones: the *san-hsien*, a three-stringed, unfretted, plucked lute; and the *er-hu*, a two-stringed, bowed fiddle; and among the aerophones: the *so-na*, a shawm, and the buffalo horn.

Symbolically, the *ta-ch'ing* represents heaven and the male principle, *yang*, while the *mu-yü* represents earth and the female principle, *yin*. When the ritual drum plays a certain pattern, it signals the beginning of a significant phase of a given ritual. Musically, all the idiophones beat time as well as mark off sections of music. Beats of the ritual drum also serve to regulate the tempo in passages where varying tempi occur. In addition to serving a colotomic (structure-marking) function, the cymbals are also used as a solo instrument playing various rhythmic patterns in a virtuosic manner as overtures, interludes, or postludes. One of the special cymbal playing techniques involves the manipulation of the dynamics of the sound after a clash by varying the degree of proximity between the two cymbal plates, resulting in a voicelike quality that can be quite eerie. This technique is used in funeral rites.

Instrumental melodies are played by the *so-na*(s) and *er-hu;* when serving as accompaniment to the vocal melodies, these instruments play a heterophonic version of the vocal melodies. The *san-hsien* is used mainly as a colotomic instrument; it plays tremolo or chords to mark off vocal sections.

In ritual performances Taoist priests not only sing but also dance either alone or in groups. All dance gestures, as well as choreographic formations, have symbolic meanings.

To a believer, a Taoist priest is an indispensable intermediary between the human world and the spirit world. His presence is therefore necessary at a funeral in order to perform rites that ensure repose for the deceased. His presence is also required at exorcism or purification rites in order to perform rituals that will render evil ghosts harmless or to restore health, tranquillity, and purity to a community.

One of the most important community purification rites is the Chiao. Dividing into several phases, Chiao rituals may last three to five days or more, depending on the requests of the sponsors. The introductory part of Chiao is known as *ch'ing-sheng* ("inviting the spirits"). It is initiated with a liturgical item called *pu-hsü* ("dancing in the void"), a generic term for an opening ceremony in which dance and hymn singing serve as preparation for ritual meditation. Both dance and hymns are accompanied by an instrumental ensemble of shawms, gong, drum, and *mu-yü*. The introductory part of Chiao also includes a liturgical item called "Flower Offering," accompanied by voices alone. In the middle part of Chiao the key ritual feature is a liturgy for the souls in purgatory, known as P'u-tu ("salvation"); it is a sung liturgy accompanied by an instrumental ensemble. The most colorful part of Chiao is an exorcist rite for the community called Ta-wang-hang. To the accompaniment of shawms, gongs, and cymbals, the *tao-shih* makes preparations to launch a paper boat, the vehicle that is to transport demons of infectious diseases away from the human world. When preparations are complete, the sounding of a series of water buffalo horn calls, accompanied by the ritual drum and gong strokes in accelerated speed, signals the actual launching of the paper boat. When the music stops, the *tao-*

shih calls upon the demons by name to board the boat and is answered by his assistant. Once this roll call is completed the *tao-shih* plays the water buffalo horn, a signal to launch the boat by burning it.

The final phase of Chiao is a celebration of the restoration of health and purity to the community through the marriage of *yin* and *yang*. In heightened speech the *tao-shih* offers incense to heavenly spirits. He then states the purpose of the Chiao and names the sponsors; both statements are chanted. A prayer whose text is written on a piece of paper is chanted next; it is a petition to the heavenly spirits on behalf of the community. When the prayer is finished, the written text is burned. Thereupon the sounding of drum rolls indicates that the climax of the ritual is to be unfolded. The *tao-shih* calls out the name of Lao-tzu three times, inviting him to visit the site of the altar; each call ends with an abrupt vocal leap encompassing the interval of an eleventh, followed by a long drum roll. Then eight drum beats are sounded three times. The number three symbolizes heaven, earth, and water, the three elements of the cosmos, and also the head, chest, and abdomen, the three essential parts of man. These drum beats summon the spirit of the *tao-shih* to offer tea and incense to Lao-tzu. He first chants and then dances, using stylized and symbolic gestures simulating the acts of offering tea and incense to Lao-tzu.

Korea. Shamanism, the oldest of Korean religions, consists of a group of unorganized beliefs about the supernatural world. It still has some following today, particularly among the rural population. In modern times, the two major social and religious forces existing in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) are Confucianism and Christianity. Christianity was introduced into Korea as early as the late sixteenth century, but it was not until the late nineteenth century that missionaries from the West—both Protestant (mostly Methodist and Presbyterian) and Roman Catholic—began full-fledged missionary work. Korean Christian liturgies follow their Western models closely. Western hymn tunes with Korean texts are used in services. Occasionally, hymns composed by modern Korean composers are also included in the Korean hymnals. Some of these hymns are set in triple meter, a characteristic feature of indigenous Korean music.

Mahāyāna Buddhism was introduced to Korea from China during the late fourth century CE. Today, Buddhist rituals, if performed at all, usually take place in a few temples staffed by a handful of married priests. Some of these priests conduct classes for the laity in Buddhist chanting and in so doing have become the sole perpetuators of the now fragile Buddhist ritual tradition in Korea. The survey given below of Buddhist ritual music is based on field reports conducted by Korean musicologists among married Buddhist priests.

Sacrifice to Confucius. Music used in the rite of sacrifice to Confucius is called *a-ak*. This term is the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese term *ya-yüeh* ("elegant music"). In contemporary usage the term *a-ak* denotes the whole repertory of court music, but in the Yi dynasty (during which *a-ak* was first codified) the term denoted music performed in a number of sacrificial rites observed by the royal court and in government ceremonies. It is in this latter, more restricted sense that the term *a-ak* is used here.

The Korean *a-ak* tradition began in 1116, when the Chinese emperor Hui-tsung, (r. 1100–1125) of the Song dynasty sent a large number of *ya-yüeh* instruments to the Korean emperor Yejong (r. 1105–1125) of the Koryŏ dynasty, as a political gesture. Subsequently, during the Yi dynasty, and particularly during the reign of Emperor Sejong (1455–1468), *a-ak* was codified and expanded. Its codification was directed by the music theorist Pak Yon (1378–1458), who undertook not only the theoretical clarification of *a-ak* based on Chinese sources but proceeded also to construct a large number of musical instruments based on Chinese models. In addition, Pak Yon reconstructed music for the *a-ak* ensemble based on a limited number of notated Chinese ritual melodies, adding to these melodies his own interpretation of Chinese musical concepts and tunings. The result was a body of music with a mixture of Chinese and Korean elements but essentially Confucian in spirit. *A-ak* has been performed continuously from the fifteenth century till the present, with no evidence of decline.

Reflecting the Confucian doctrine of universal harmony, the *a-ak* orchestra employs eight kinds of instruments representing the eight essential kinds of instrumental timbres: metal (bells), stone (chimes), silk (zithers), wood (pounded wooden box and wooden scraper), bamboo (flutes), clay (ocarina), leather (drum), and gourd (mouth organ). In the modern *a-ak* orchestra the gourd category is missing, and wooden clappers *(pak)* have been added; this latter instrument performs a very limited function.

According to present-day performance practices, *a-ak* played in the rite of sacrifice to Confucius is performed antiphonally by two orchestras, one placed on the terrace of the main shrine building and the other placed in the courtyard below the terrace. The terrace orchestra, called *tŭngga*, consists of seventeen players; the courtyard orchestra, called *hŏn'ga*, consists of fifteen players. During Emperor Sejong's reign the number of players in both orchestras was much larger, and vocal items were included. But today *a-ak* is purely instrumental. Two ritual dances are performed in the sacrifice to Con-

fucius, the *munmu* (civil dance) and the *munmu* (military dance). Sixty-four dancers are prescribed for this ritual.

The overall musical characteristics of *a-ak* are refinement, serenity, and simplicity. The repertory consists of two basic heptatonic compositions and their transpositions. Structurally, each composition has eight phrases of equal length, each phrase consisting of four notes of equal duration. The tempo is exceedingly slow. Melody instruments including flutes, panpipes, ocarinas, and stone chimes play in unison; the flute, however, ends each note with an upward slide of about a semitone from each pitch. The drums and bells perform purely a colotomic function by marking off sections of each composition.

Royal ancestral shrine music. The music repertory for this ritual contains a limited number of compositions said to be chosen by Emperor Sejong. In terms of musical style they reflect an acculturated mixture of Chinese and Korean music; native Korean music *(hyangak)* current in the fifteenth century is also represented. These compositions are vocal pieces in Chinese with orchestral accompaniment arranged in suite form. Two orchestras are used to perform this ritual. These orchestras are also called *tŭngga* and *hŏn'ga*, as in the *a-ak* orchestra, but their instrumentation is different.

Buddhist rituals. Traditional Korean Buddhist rites consist of three components or performing genres: ritual chant with or without instrumental accompaniment, outdoor band music and ritual dance with vocal and instrumental accompaniment. Of the three, ritual chant is by far the most important.

Five categories of special Buddhist rites in which music plays a prominent role are distinguished: Kakpae-je, a rite in praise of ten Buddhist deities whose rituals call for the largest repertory of chants and dances; Saengjŏn yesu-je, a purification rite; Sangju kwŏn'gong-je, a rite dedicated solely to Buddha; Surguk-che, a rite for the spirits of water and earth; and Yŏngsan-je, a tribute rite. In addition a number of small-scale rituals associated with rites for the dead also employ music and dance. Today large-scale special rites are held only at the demand of sponsors. A rite may last from one to several days depending upon the request of the sponsors.

Three categories of ritual chants are differentiated: *sūtra* (Buddhist invocation), *hwach'ŏng* (chant based on folk style), and *pŏmp'ae* (a long solemn chant). *Sūtra* chants, also called *yŏmbul* ("invocation"), are of two kinds, each having different texts and employing different instrumental accompaniment. Texts of the first type are Chinese transliterations of Sanskrit and hence are unintelligible to laymen. Texts of the second type are Chinese translations from Sanskrit whose general import may be understood by the laity. In the following discussion the first type of chant will be called "Sanskrit *sūtra*" and the second type "Chinese *sūtra*."

The repertory of Sanskrit *sūtra* is small. The music is for unison chorus with instrumental accompaniment. The vocal part consists of the repetition of a few sets of syllabic phrases. The instrumental part, played by an ensemble of reeds, drums, large gong, and a wooden slit drum called *mok'tak*, consists of the repetition of a melody independent of the vocal one and played by the reeds, with isorhythmic patterns played by drum and gong and the constant beats of the *mok'tak*. There is a subtle relationship between the accentuation of the vocal melody and the instrumental rhythm. Chinese *sūtra* chants are also performed by unison chorus, which sings repeated sets of texts having a limited compass. The constant beats of the *mok'tak* accompany the voices, each beat coinciding with the utterance of a textual syllable. The repertoire of Chinese *sūtra* is relatively large. While Sanskrit *sūtra* chants are employed mostly in special rites, Chinese *sūtra* chants are employed in both regular and special rites.

Hwach'ŏng (lit., "humble request") are chants for solo voice with texts in vernacular Korean. The singer traditionally accompanies himself with strokes played on a small gong; another accompanying instrument used is a suspended barrel drum *(puk)* played by someone other than the singer. The drum player strikes the bottom of the drum with one bare hand while at the same time striking the wooden frame of the right side of the drum with two sticks. Triple meter, a common feature of Korean indigenous music, is usually found in *hwach'ŏng*. *Hwach'ŏng* texts, expounding the benefits of Buddhist enlightenment, are set in verse form.

The third category of Buddhist chants, the *pŏmp'ae*, is said to derive from the Chinese *fan-pei*. *Pŏmp'ae* texts are in Chinese verse, but Chinese rhyming schemes and tonal patterns are not observed in these texts. *Pŏmp'ae* music is made up of repetition, variation, and structural rearrangement of a basic set of stereotyped motifs or phrases. As performed today, *pŏmp'ae* is always sung in free rhythm and in a low register. The meaning of the texts is frequently difficult to grasp because each syllable is set melismatically to notes of long duration. In addition, the practice of liberal insertion of passages of vocables further obscures the meaning of the texts.

Two types of compositions are found in the *pŏmp'ae* repertory: the *hossori* (short chant) and the *chissori* (long chant). Each type is characterized by a distinct melodic and textual organization, as well as by the employment of different styles of performance. *Hossori*

consists of solo, choral, and responsorial chants, all of which are sung in a relaxed, open-throated manner to the accompaniment of a small hand bell. Structurally, *hossori* texts are organized in quatrain form with lines of equal length. These four lines are set to a pair of melodic phrases in repetition; thus musically the structure of *hossori* is in binary form: *abab*. *Hossori* are always sung slowly at first, then faster, and then slowly again to conclude. In the fast sections the motifs within each phrase undergo a process of rhythmic reduction.

For special rites *hossori* may be performed in conjunction with a ritual dance, accompanied by an outdoor band made up of one or two conical double-reed instruments *(t'aep'yŏngson)* and a large gong *(ching)*. A barrel drum *(puk)*, a pair of cymbals *(chegŭm)*, a long trumpet *(nepal)*, and a conch shell *(nagak)* may also be added to the band. The band plays repetitions of a long melodic cycle that has only a tenuous correlation with the vocal melody.

The other type of *pŏmp'ae*, the *chissori*, is regarded as the most important and sophisticated of all Korean Buddhist chants. It is seldom performed today; when performed, *chissori* is always used in conjunction with large-scale special rites. Music for the *chissori* is drawn from a pool of stereotyped melodic phrases, each in turn built on a series of motifs. The way in which these motifs are organized into a piece defines the individuality of a *chissori* composition. The entire repertory of *chissori* contains seventy-two compositions.

Like that of *hossori*, the performance of *chissori* begins slowly and then speeds up; in the fast section the motifs undergo a process of rhythmic reduction; it then concludes slowly. Most *chissori* are performed primarily by an ensemble of voices in unison. But a few compositions may have one or two solo sections inserted either at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. These solo interpolations *(hŏdŏlp'um)* are optional groups of fixed melodies independent of those of the ensemble and made up of stereotyped motifs. Depending on the time available, *chissori* may be sung either with measured rhythm, or with unmeasured rhythm in which the duration of each note is greatly prolonged. Consistent use of micròtonal glides characterizes *chissori* performance. A special feature is the application of a microtonal upward glide prefixed to a given note; this note is then followed suddenly by a falling glide encompassing the interval of an octave. *Chissori* is sung in a tense-throated manner. For notes in the high register, falsetto technique is used.

Tibet. The indigenous religion of Tibet is Bon, which evolved from northern and Inner Asian shamanism. During the periods of the first kings (seventh–tenth century CE), North Indian Mahāyāna Tantric Buddhism was introduced to Tibet. Subsequently Bon and Tantric Buddhism merged and resulted in a highly syncretic form of Tibetan Buddhism.

Music in Bon ritual. Monastic forms of Bon have been largely assimilated by Tantric Buddhism. Many ritual practices of Bon have also been influenced by Buddhism. Bon ritual music employs chanting and instrumental music; the chief instruments are the indigenous *phyed-rṅa* (single-headed drum) and the *gshaṅ* ("flute bell"). Flutes and trumpets made of animal bones are also used. In the instrumental part of the ritual the drum occupies a central place. According to legend, when a Bon priest plays a drum he is thought of as mounting a flying steed to heaven to communicate with the gods. Bon chants are organized in strophic form, and in performance a large variety of vocal techniques are used, such as gliding before and after a given note, whistling, shouting, or masking the voice. Some of these sounds are said to represent the voices of spirits heard through the singer as medium. As the ritual progresses, the tempo of chanting and instrumental music accelerate, and the volume also increases; great intensity is generated as a result.

Buddhist liturgy. Tibetan Buddhists hold that music prepares the mind for spiritual enlightenment. Accordingly, music (vocal as well as instrumental) is employed in the monastic routines that focus on five daily assemblies held in the monastery shrine hall between sunrise and sunset. The daily services consist predominantly of choral chants, with or without instrumental accompaniment, and antiphony between choral chant and instrumental interludes. All music is notated. Important liturgical items include the monks' "invitation" to the deities to visit the place of worship, the ritual of offering, thanksgiving hymns, and hymns of praise to the Buddha and the *bodhisattva*s.

Monks participating in the daily services sit cross-legged in paired rows facing one another. The music of the service proceeds under the direction of the *dbu-mdza* (chant leader). The choral chant is normally sung in unison in a quiet and restrained manner; heterophony occasionally occurs. Texts for choral chants are drawn mostly from the sacred scripture known as the Bka'-'gyur (Kanjur, doctrine attributed to Buddha) and from Bstan-'gyur (Tanjur, commentaries). Three main chant styles are distinguished: solo parlando recitation, *gdaṅ* (hymn), and *abyaṅs* (sustained chant).

Solo parlando recitation, in measured or unmeasured rhythm, is usually employed in short introductory passages. The *gdaṅ* is chanted in a series of meters (duple, triple, or asymmetrical meter such as 11/8), depending

on the textual structure. Melodically, sections of *gdaṅ* are made up of repetitions of one or two pairs of phrases having a limited range in predominantly conjunct motion. The chant may also be monotonal. Words in *gdaṅ* are set either syllabically or melismatically. In performance a variety of ornaments, such as glissando and glides before and after a note, are used. *Gdaṅ* is accompanied by a cymbal and drum whose function is simply to beat time.

The *abyaṅs* is chanted in an extremely low register and essentially in a monotone. Words are set syllabically to notes of long duration prefixed or affixed by a variety of microtonal inflections or vocal glides. A special vocal technique has been cultivated by two monasteries of the Dge-lugs-pa order in which each chanter simultaneously sings two pitches, a deep fundamental and a clear harmonic (either the fifth or the sixth harmonic), resulting in a choral effect. The *abyaṅs* is chanted in a quiet manner.

In contrast to the quiet vocal chanting of *abyaṅs*, instrumental interludes of *abyaṅs* are played loudly. The aerophones are always played in pairs. One of the two *rgya gliṅs*, which are shawms, plays the main melody in an unadorned manner while the other plays the main melody with ornamentation. The other aerophones, the *duṅ*—a trumpet of varying sizes with a low tone quality, the *rkaṅ-gliṅ*—a trumpet made of animal femur or of metal, and the *duṅ dkar*—a conch, play long, sustained notes and repeat chords of two pitches, a two-note ostinato figure. The *domaru*, a rattle drum, and the *dril bu*, a handbell, are played by one person whose strokes serve mainly as signals marking sections of the chants. The cymbals *(gsil snyan* and *rol mo)* and the two *ruga* drums, untuned double-headed drums each struck with a crooked stick, play a variety of rhythmic figures as well as beating time. The resultant instrumental texture is complex and its timbre full of subtle nuances. In contrast to the rhythmic complexity and subtlety of the percussion part, the music for the shawms—the only melody instruments in the ensemble—is rather simple and straightforward; it is played in a rhythmically fixed manner with penetrating volume. Circular breathing is employed in shawm playing so that a continuous line is achieved.

Liturgical drama. The *'chams* is a quasi-liturgical ritual drama performed to exorcise evil spirits. The ritual is performed outdoors and involves the use of music (both vocal and instrumental), mime, and dance, as well as elaborate costumes and masks. The music ensemble consists of groups of chanters and an instrumental ensemble similar to that used in monastic liturgical services, with the addition of special sound effects not found in those services.

[*See also* Chanting *and* Drama, *article on* East Asian Dance and Theater.]

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ISABEL WONG

Music and Religion in Japan

When Buddhism was introduced from Korea in 552, masked dances called *gigaku*, which originated in China, were performed to dedicate temples to the Buddha. In 752, Tōdaiji, the principal national temple, was completed at Nara. To celebrate the completion of a colossal bronze statue of Vairocana Buddha, a magnificent festival was held. Accompanied by the Buddhist chanting of thousands of monks, performances of *gagaku* (court music and dance) were presented on the stage in front of the main building. Eighteen types of instruments have been preserved from this event.

During the Heian period (794–1185), Buddhist chanting was modified according to Japanese styles. The Tendai and Shingon sects established new forms of ceremony that took several days to perform. Eventually these ceremonies were simplified or even eliminated by various sects as membership was opened to a wider public. Hōnen, founder of the Jōdo sect, emphasized the importance of the Nembutsu, the chanting of the name of Amida (Skt., Amitābha) Buddha: "Namu Amida Butsu." This simple chanting gave rise to various folk performing arts, such as *odori-nembutsu* ("dancing Nembutsu"), which contributed to the diffusion of Buddhism in Japan. Other types of popularization of Buddhist chanting can be found in narrative styles of vocal music, such as *uta-nembutsu* ("sung Nembutsu") and *sekkyō* ("sermons, discourses").

The authentic music of Chinese Confucian ceremonies has never been performed in Japan. Instead we find the spirit of Confucianism in the music of the *ch'in* (a long, seven-stringed zither), an instrument favored by the intelligentsia interested in Chinese philosophy and literature during the Edo period (1603–1868). Some shamanistic practices persist among the Itako (Aomari Prefecture) and the Yuta (Amami Island and Okinawa Islands). Here the spirit of the dead possesses a *miko* (female shaman) and speaks through her in simple chanting.

Among various Shintō ceremonies, *kagurasai*, performed in the imperial court, has been preserved in the most complete ancient form. *Kagura* (lit., "music of the gods") is the name of the music and dance used in the ceremony. *Okagura*, which is performed at shrines during folk ceremonies, is distinguished from *mikagura*, performed in the evening at the small shrine in the Kenjo Palace with the emperor in attendance. The song, sung in slow tempo, is rich in melismatic style and accompanied by a bamboo transverse flute *(fue)*, a double-reed pipe *(hichiriki)*, and a long six-stringed zither *(wagon)*. *Fue* and *wagon* date from ancient times; the *hichiriki* was adapted from the court music ensemble introduced from China in the eighth century. One of the principal singers beats a wooden clapper, the *shakubyōshi*.

The general term for Buddhist chanting is *shōmyō*, also called *bonbai*. The texts can be classified into three types: *bonsan* (chanting in Sanskrit), *kansan* (chanting in Chinese), and *wasan* (chanting in Japanese). The text of *bonsan* is written in Chinese graphs that give phonetic translations of Sanskrit. *Kansan* is a system of chanting Chinese texts according to their *kan* reading, that is, according to the Japanese equivalents of the sounds of Chinese graphs. *Wasan* consists of Chinese texts translated into Japanese.

Most chants are sung in unison, though the intervals of the fourth or fifth separating two voice parts moving in parallel motion occur occasionally. The scale, consisting of twelve tones, varies according to ages and

genres. Generally characteristic of the melodic pattern are intervalic skips of the fourth and fifth. The chanting may be either melismatic in free rhythm or consist of one tone sung in metric rhythm. Noteworthy is the fact that the melodic structure of the *shōmyō* influenced other musics. *Heikyoku*, a narrative vocal music telling the famous history of the Heike family (one of the two great political parties of Japan in the twelfth century), and the singing used in *nō* drama were both influenced by chant.

The notation of Buddhist chant falls into three categories. The oldest is called *ko hakase* ("old *hakase* [musical notation]") and indicates the melody with marks representing the four Chinese tonal accents. The second system, called *go-on hakase* ("five-tone *hakase*"), is represented by short vertical and horizontal bars, one for each letter of the text, showing five tones. The youngest category of chant notation, *meyasu hakase* (lit., "*hakase* for easy understanding"), describes the melodic line in more detail, including the delicate ornaments in the melody, by drawing curved lines in addition to the marks for tone pitches. This system resembles the neumes system of medieval Europe. *Meyasu hakase* is found in a manuscript dated 1311 written by Ryōnin, the founder of this chant notation. Many books expounding the theoretical and practical principles, such as *Gyozan shōmyō rokkanjō* and *Gyozan taikaishō*, have been written by learned monks.

A comparison between Buddhist music in Japan and other Asian countries reveals both similarities and differences. The chanting style based on one tone and the use of percussion instruments are common to all, but the use of the double-reed pipe and trumpet is not found in Japan. Vocalization in deep voice is also common to many Asian Buddhist societies. The biggest difference is in regard to melody. Chinese chants, more popular in character than Japanese chants, tend to adapt melodies of folk and popular music. By contrast, Japanese chant has preserved the older style of Buddhist music.

[*See also* Chanting.]

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KISHIBE SHIGEO

Music and Religion in Greece, Rome, and Byzantium

This survey of the interrelation of religion and music in Western antiquity from the Homeric age to the age of Justinian (c. 1000 BCE–500 CE) will examine the religious dimensions of the music of Greece and Rome, the music of the early church, and the liturgical music of Byzantium.

Greek Music. The word *music (mousikē)* originated in the Greek language. However, to the Greeks it meant more than the art of tones sung or played on instruments. It encompassed education, science, and proper behavior, as well as singing and the playing of instruments. To modern man this ancient music—the very little that has come down to us—sounds simple, unmelodious, and occasionally even dull, but in the broader conception of *mousikē* we may recognize the basis for the magical, ritual, and ethical dimensions that characterize Greek music and relate it to Greek religion. This discussion of Greek music during the period from the Homeric epics (eighth century BCE) to the age of the Roman emperor Augustus (first century BCE) will treat, together with religious function, its theory, and main styles and forms.

Pre-Christian Greek religions. Greek religions were polytheistic and based upon popular mythologies. Followers of Homeric religion adored and feared the Olympian gods, who frequently behaved like humans, possessed of very human virtues and vices. Their cult was sacrificial, and its liturgy proceeded by sacrificial action. Sacrifice served in rituals of atonement, imprecation, and thanksgiving, in ceremonies for the dead, and in the fearful adoration of the chthonic divinities of the netherworld. Its aims were gratification of the gods and apotropaic protection from adversary gods or demonic forces. In the seventh and sixth centuries BCE Orphism arose, a mystic movement taking as founder the fabled musician Orpheus. Closely related to Orphism, and also originating in Thrace, was the cult of Dionysos, which worshiped with wine and song in wild bacchanalia its god Dionysos-Bacchus. [*See* Orpheus *and* Dionysos.] Beginning with the fifth century BCE and thereafter, a more philosophical, less ecstatic type of religion emerged under the impact of Pythagorean, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophies. Connection with ethical principles characterized this conception of religion. We may see it in the still polytheistic context of Sophocles' Oedipus trilogy in Antigone's defense of "the infallible, unwritten eternal laws of heaven, which no mortal can overrule." Socrates, who lived by this doctrine, like Sophocles' heroine, paid with his life. Yet

Socrates' teachings were carried on by Plato, whose systematization of Socratic thought wholly reshaped Greek religion. [*See the biographies of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.*]

Musical principles. From earliest times the Greeks took interest in the theory of music, and subsequent to Pythagorean concern with the mathematico-philosophical aspects of music they occupied themselves with it continuously. Their most important achievements were their acoustic discoveries, which were basic to the development of Western music.

From the infinity of tones, sounds, and rhythms with which nature surrounds man, the Greeks selected a limited number of tones, which they ordered, identified, and categorized according to *harmoniai*, or species of scales. In Greek music theory the term *harmony* refers to the various divisions of the octave into scales. The Greeks knew Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian, and other scales, each of which consisted of two conjunct or disjunct tetrachords. Tetrachords composing the scales were divided into three distinct genera: the harmonic, the chromatic, and the enharmonic. (Greek tetrachords and scales progressed downward from a higher tonic rather than upward as in medieval and modern music.) Scales were precise, mathematically constructed systems. The scope of these *harmoniai*, however, was much greater than that of simple scales. The Doric "harmony" was the yardstick by which all melodies were judged. Its strict simplicity was understood as the ideal of moral straightforwardness, indeed, of Spartan fortitude and austerity. Within their various scales, the Greeks also knew certain tropes *(tropoi)*, which characterized the mode of any given melody. The meaning of "mode" in Greek musical theory has been a matter of considerable scholarly debate; I take it to refer to complex melodic types or structures of melodic motives on the order of the Indian *rāgas* or Arabian *maqamat*.

The theory of tone-word relationship is basic to an understanding of Greek music. Poetry and music were closely bound, with the words of the text defining rhythmic structure through the quantities of metrical pattern. The role of stress or accent in relation to meter and music, controversial in late antiquity, remains problematic.

Magic power of music. The Greeks ascribed to music magic and therapeutic powers. It could heal wounds (Homer, *Odyssey* 19.437ff.), and it could move blocks of stone; the singing of Amphion, son of Zeus, was said to have enchanted stones to build of their own accord the walls of Thebes. The historical figure Thaletas of Gortyn (seventh century BCE) tried to drive the plague from Sparta by singing.

Ritual use of music. I have referred to the rituals of sacrifice in Homeric religion. The first canto of the *Iliad* gives a good description of priestly *thusia*, or sacrifice, made by the priest Chryses to his god Apollo (1.447–473). After Chryses has burned pieces of meat and fat and tasted them, a libation is spent accompanied by song. Only the chthonic deities were adored in strict silence. Several ancient inscriptions, as that from Dodona, speak of the ritual of praying, or more properly "vowing," and sacrificing; on such occasions music, at least a kind of hymnic chant, was obligatory. The dedication of a new temple was always a festivity during which vows and sacrifices were offered and hymns or other music heard. At marriages *thusia*, prayers, and hymns inaugurated a happy espousal, at least in the circles of the nobility, as we read in Apollonis of Rhodes (fl. 222–181 BCE).

The aforementioned tone-word relationship has special significance for the ritual use of music. Lamentations for the dead Hector show clearly certain ritualistic traits (*Iliad* 24.720ff.). The choric odes of Pindar (518–438 BCE) served in official worship. Special reverence was paid the Delphic hymns; according to Plutarch (c. 46–after 120 CE), several were so celebrated that they were repeated every year.

The musical ethos. To the Greeks, *mousikē* meant more than mere music. Hence it was judged not only by its audible beauty but also by its moral effect upon the listener. This principle, which the Greeks shared with many great ancient civilizations, constituted the doctrine of *ēthos;* in Greek music theory this doctrine reached its highest expression.

There was extensive philosophical reflection upon musical *ēthos*, that is, the character, nature, or moral effect of a musical work. Every melody, in each of its aspects, was subject to the postulates of its *ēthos;* the *ēthos* was determined by all components of its respective melody. Each scale, rhythm, and trope, when performed at the "right" spot and at the "just" time, has a concrete, predictable influence on the listener's emotions, behavior, and character.

Plato gave the doctrine of *ēthos* its most radical formulation in his *Republic*. According to his thesis, certain scales turn men into cowards and make women unable to bear healthy children; other scales inspire courage, fear, piety, nobility, and so forth (376d, 398b ff.). In the *Laws*, it is really in terms of the doctrine of *ēthos* that he criticizes the professional music of his day (700a ff.). The *nomos*, literally the "law" or "set," had become the main form used by professional singer-composers in musical contests. Consisting of several movements without strophic repetition, and characterized by

its *harmonia* and its specific rhythm as musical representation of meter, it might depict the exploits of some god, such as the famous Pythian *nomos*, which glorified Apollo's battle with the Pythian dragon. Plato decried the musical license that violated the laws *(nomoi)* dividing music into several distinct kinds. The hymn, the lament, the paean, the dithyramb, and the lyric song, each ought be true to its form. Their admixture could only bring disorder to the society in which such confused and irregular music was heard.

The philosophy of musical *ēthos* did not remain undisputed. Its sharpest opponents were Philodemus of Gadara (first century BCE) and an anonymous rhetorician, a sophist whose arguments have come down to us in the *Papyrus Hibbeh*. Even Plutarch, the historian of Greek music, and Aristoxenus (fourth century BCE), its main theorist, speak in rather cautious terms about the doctrine of *ēthos*. Despite these controversies, the *ēthos* doctrine was cultivated by the Neoplatonists and by the church fathers and was championed by as influential a philosopher as Boethius.

Tragedy as musical drama. Attic tragedy originated in ritual, especially in that of Dionysos. The term *tragedy* derives from *tragōidia*, or "song of the goat," in celebration of a totemistic element in the Dionysian cult. The link between tragedy and ritual is clearly discernible in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles; it is less intimate in those of Euripides, the poet of the Greek enlightenment.

The ritual origin of tragedy is well known. Less known are the philosophical treatises devoted to its meaning, parts, and effects, and to the music that best represented the *ēthos* of the drama and its protagonists. According to Aristotle's celebrated *Poetics*, an effective drama has six parts, among which the *melopoia*, or musical composition, was not the least important. In its heyday, the tragedy contained a number of musical forms: the entrance of the choir *(parodos)*, the standing song *(stasimon)*, the song of the choir's exit *(exodos)*, a song with pantomime *(huporchēma)*, a lament *(kommos)*, and the chanted recitatives of the main actors. Certain *harmoniai* were preferred for the drama, for example, the Mixolydian, because of its sorrowful *ēthos*, and the Doric, because of its solemn character.

Musical instruments. The musical instruments most significant for Greek religious practice may be named briefly. The main instruments were the lyre and its variants, such as the *kithara*, *barbitos*, *phorminx*, *trigōnon*, and *psaltērion*. They were all stringed instruments, to be plucked with or without a plectrum. The harp was probably imported from Egypt. They served chiefly the highly regulated Apollonian rite or style, which eschewed all ecstatic or orgiastic expression. Their music was strict, even severe; they were used by priests and the nobility. The hymns of Pindar, composed for accompaniment by lyre, were sacred to Apollo.

More appropriate to the unrestrained Dionysian style were such wind instruments as the *aulos*, a shrill-sounding primitive clarinet that was usually played as a double instrument with two mouthpieces. Sacred to Dionysos, it engendered violent merriment, wild breast-beating, or hopeless mourning. The distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian thus marks contrasting currents both musical and religious.

Relics of Greek music. Fifteen pieces of Greek music are known, of which three were carved in stone (two of these were found in Delphi and one in Tralles, in Asia Minor). Most of these pieces are only fragments. Their transcription into modern notation is, in certain details, controversial. An example of one of those carved in stone is the *skolion*, or libation song, of Seikilos, originating in the first century BCE.

Roman Music. No written musical document of the early days of Roman history has come down to us; we must depend upon archaeological evidence. Ancient Rome was built upon three civilizations: Etruscan, Greek, and, finally, Near Eastern. In general Greek music came to Rome as a study to be learned and exercised. Eventually the powerful influence of Hellenistic music began to recede as the influence of Egyptian, Syrian, and Hebrew music increased.

Pre-Christian Roman religions. Roman cultic and popular customs were invariably accompanied by chanted and played music. Thus, according to the first-century historian Livy, the sodalities of the Salian priesthood regularly used chants at their rites. Numa, the legendary second king of Rome, provided the Salii, or "leapers," with arms and decreed that they chant hymns and dance at the appointed festivals of the martial god Mars. Their heavy-footed dance of arms in triple time was sacred to the god of war. Vergil (70–19 BCE) indicates that the songs of the Salii were executed responsorially (Vergil, *Aeneid* 8.285). The precentor of the priests, the *vates* ("poet" or "seer"), was considered divinely inspired.

Under the leadership of Livius Andronicus, Roman poet of the third century BCE, rites of atonement and consecration sacred to the goddess Juno were celebrated by choirs of virgins. Many of their hymns appear to have had apotropaic functions: to banish death, illness, and danger, and to establish peace between gods and mortals. The poet Horace (first century BCE) refers to the function of the *vates* in such rites, asking, "Where would innocent boys and girls learn their prayers, had not the Muse granted them a poet?" The customarily noisy *nenies*, or lamentations, functioned according to

the principle "The greater the noise, the greater the loss"; they were disliked by Horace and later Roman poets, who were inclined to prefer the refinement of Greek poetry.

Music and poetry. Statius, a poet of the first century CE, no less than the poet Catullus a generation before him, took for granted the chanted performance of his poems. The poet Horace was probably the best-trained musician of his day, for he was commissioned by the emperor Augustus to create the words and music of the *Carmen saeculare.* It appears that Horace also taught its melody to the choir. In the first century BCE Greek dominance was as yet unchallenged, as evidenced by the existence of a Roman association, the Societas Cantorum Graecorum, yet Horace took pride in "having introduced Aeolian verses" to the culture of Rome.

Musical instruments. Because it had an expansive and militaristic culture, Rome used musical instruments more for its army than for its sanctuaries, although the ancient festivals, the Parilia and the Saturnalia, were certainly not celebrated without chants and popular music. The *tibia,* a primitive oboe comparable to the *aulos;* the *tuba,* a kind of trumpet; the Greek *kithara* and lyre; and, later, Asiatic instruments such as the Phrygian *curva tibia,* were heard on many cultic occasions. Wind instrument players were organized into the union of *tibicines,* stringed instrument players into that of the *fidicines.* Noise-making rattles, cymbals, and so forth were played by corybants and priests at Bacchanalian revels and were also heard at funerals.

Musical importations. Mystery cults imported from Asia featured bloody rites of initiation accompanied by the wild sound of noisemaking instruments and the Phrygian *tibia.* From Persia, borne by the legionnaires, came the cult of Mithra, with its ceremony of blood-baptism. The rattling of sistrums and the tinkling of harps accompanied the more peaceful cult of Isis, imported from Egypt. This multitude of foreign sounds was, like the *nenies,* condemned by Horace and later writers.

Early Christian Music. Foreign musics and mythologies were a horror and an abomination to the early Christians, or, rather, Judeo-Christians of the first two centuries, as were any pagan practices. The question of influence by Roman popular songs upon the chants of the early church has been raised, but all too few facts in favor of such a hypothesis can be adduced. The first Latin church fathers were so strongly biased against anything that smacked of paganism that they may well have suppressed any real evidence. Further, the Romans did not invent a musical notation of their own, nor were they interested in musical theory, so that any question of influence is difficult to judge.

The last part of Augustine's philosophical work *De musica* is now lost; it may have contained important views about the music of his contemporaries. Nonetheless, we are in possession of many, often contradictory testimonies of Christian chant in the Roman empire, as it originated in Greece, Palestine, Italy, and other parts of the empire. Among them is just one piece of notated music, the *Oxyrhynchus hymnus,* and a veritable host of descriptions, speculations, and comparisons, ancient and medieval. Possibly some oral traditions were preserved until the ninth century, during which time a musical notation was developed in Europe. Some insights have resulted from this—rarely authentic—material, mainly in modern studies. A few examples will illustrate the state of this research:

1. *Hosanna filio David.* This antiphon for Palm Sunday is of ancient origin. Amédée Gastoué ascribes its intonation to the resemblance of the word *hosanna* with *hoson zēs,* the beginning words of a libation song.
2. Tropos Spondeiakos. Clement of Alexandria, second-century church father, recommended in his work on Christian education, the *Pedagogue,* that Christians should sing psalms before retiring, as the Jews of Alexandria did, and mentioned the Tropos Spondeiakos, or mode of libation, as the most suitable one. Pseudo-Plutarch, a contemporary of Clement, described this Doric-spondaic mode in his book on music and thus made possible its reconstruction. Years ago, I demonstrated that this mode occurs in some of the oldest Christian chants (in Latin, Greek, and Syriac) and in ancient prayers of the Yemeni Jews (*The Sacred Bridge,* vol. 1, 1959).
3. The tune of the *Te Deum.* This tune belongs to the very same family of melodies as the Tropos Spondeiakos and is equally old.
4. *Oxyrhynchus hymnus.* Written in the third century, this work is a praise of Christ that paraphrases a passage from Psalm 93. It represents a perfect mixture of Greek syllabic chant and Hebrew melismatic elements. This interpenetration of Greek and Hebrew elements was characteristic of most chants before the fourth century, when the Council of Laodicea set certain theological standards, which determined the split between Eastern and Roman Catholic liturgies.

Early Christian music thus preserved Greek and Hebrew sources of influence. Emphasis on the Greek elements in this music was made mainly by Boethius in his *De institutione musica.* Peter Wagner, the great expert on Gregorian chant, submitted a number of explanations for the role of Judeo-Christians as transmitters of Hebrew musical tradition to early Christian chants.

The epitaphs of Deusdedit (Jonathan) and Redemptus (Yigael), singers whom Pope Damasus brought to Rome from Jerusalem, contain such remarks as "he sounded his ancient prophet [David] in sweet songs."

Byzantine Music. While the Byzantine empire was a well-defined entity both historically and geographically, its music belongs to its specific liturgy and so must be more closely circumscribed. The music of Byzantium will be sketched here as it developed in its first stage, from its origin in the fourth century during the reign of Constantine the Great until 565, the year of the death of Justinian I, who disbanded the Academy of Athens. The date is significant, for it marks the gradual separation of Byzantine culture from its Greek patrimony.

Music and Byzantine Christianity. We have no traces of early Byzantine secular music aside from reports of the great festivities held in honor of the emperor and his court, and about these noisy occasions we know most details from the tenth-century book of ceremonies by Constantine VII. No Byzantine music antedating the ninth century has come down to us. The term *Byzantine music* is, moreover, limited to liturgical chants. Although Syriac and Hebrew elements were probably integrated, definite evidence of these influences is not available, as the scholarship in this field is barely a hundred years old.

Musical notation. The Byzantine liturgy used two kinds of rhetorical notation. The first, the ancient ekphonetic notation, served the priests in reciting the sacred scriptures in a prescribed system of cantillation. Its connection with Syriac and Hebrew accents is quite obvious, as Egon Wellesz and I have shown. This kind of symbolism did not represent real musical pitches or intervals; instead, it punctuated the sentences and indicated pauses and the rise and fall of the voice. The second kind of notation was not established before the ninth century and so stands outside the scope of this description. This musical notation grew out of ekphonetic and rhetoric beginnings, and came to be applied to the chanted parts of the liturgy, especially to the *troparia*, centos of psalm verses and new poetry; the *heirmologia*, containing the models of traditional melodies; and the *kanones*, poetic paraphrases of nine biblical canticles: two songs of Moses, the prayer of Hannah, the prayer of Habakkuk, the hymn of Isaiah, the hymn of Jonah, the prayer of the three youths in the furnace, the apocryphal continuation of this prayer, and the Magnificat. The second ode was usually omitted in order to make a number equal to the eight modes, or *ēchoi* (Octoechos). From each of the original biblical texts, only a number of verses were chanted, and these were interwoven with poems by Byzantine authors.

The Octoechos. The Octoechos is a system of eight modes (originally not scales), whose names were erroneously borrowed from the classic Greek *harmoniai*. The concept of the Octoechos is very ancient; its origin has been linked to the Babylonian-Akkadian calendar. As a musical term, *'al-ha-sheminit* occurs in the superscriptions to two Hebrew psalms (sixth and twelfth) and, in the Greek literature, in Yohanan Rufos's sixth-century *Plerophoriai*. Under the name "Octoechos" many hymns of the Byzantine and Syrian churches were collected and ordered according to the eight modes and the seven-plus-one Sundays between Easter and Pentecost. Their texts were first published in about 540 by Severus, patriarch of Antioch. This work became the exemplar for many ritual books of the Byzantine church. These books became repositories of an enormous number of liturgical melodies, whose influence enriched many of the chants of the Near East, even after the collapse of the empire in 1453.

[*See also* Chanting.]

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ERIC WERNER

Religious Music in the West

Basic Christian attitudes toward music reflected from the outset the multiple roots of the new faith that, in the course of just a few centuries, proceeded to conquer the European continent as well as the British Isles with unprecedented claims to spiritual universality, covering all aspects of human existence, if not the nature of nature itself. Although compelled to arrive at numerous accommodations with regional customs, early Christianity somehow managed its victorious trek without much serious injury to its twin foundations, biblical Judaism and Platonic thought. In the biblical narrative, needless to say, music occupies an exalted position as the distinctive attribute of several central figures, including King David, the "sweet psalmist" and warrior, Miriam, the prophetess, and her later counterpart Deborah, as well as lesser performers of songs and dances of victory, not to speak of the tribe of Levi, whose duty it was to enhance musically the divine worship in the Jerusalem Temple. Indeed, Jubal, the maker of instruments, is mentioned as early as *Genesis* 4:21, where he is listed among the fathers of mankind.

Yet, dramatic accounts in the Hebrew scriptures, like that of Michal appalled at the sight of David dancing orgiastically before the Ark of the Covenant, suggest an ambivalence with regard to music and dance that was to turn into outright suspicion among the church fathers, whose attitudes were shaped in at least equal measure by the Platonic tradition. With the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE, instrumental music vanished from Jewish worship altogether. But then, it had never been part of synagogue practice, which was to set the pattern for the early Christian ritual. Hence, when John Chrysostom proclaimed in the fourth century CE that where "aulos players are, there Christ is not," he unwittingly offered a variant of a crucial tenet of both rabbinic and Platonic tradition concerned over the potentially detrimental consequences of "lascivious" music, precisely because, in the words of Plato's *Republic*, "more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the innermost soul and take strongest hold upon it."

Not only was care to be taken that none but the most beneficial of musical sounds would penetrate man's soul, but, in order to avoid any possible misunderstandings and/or misinterpretations, untexted music was to be eschewed in favor of melody produced by God-given human voices. Text-dominated chanting in praise of the Lord thus became at a very early stage the *sine qua non* of all Christian divine worship and was, in addition, recognized as an effective means of spiritual education, provided the sheer sensuality of musical activity did not supersede sincere devotion. Plato, after all, had insisted that even vocal music practiced indiscriminately or to excess was likely to have disastrous moral effects. "When he continues the practice without remission and is spellbound," Plato wrote of the virtuoso singer, "the effect begins to be that he melts and liquifies until he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a 'feeble warrior.'"

Christianity, needless to say, depended upon strong defenders of the faith, and the ensuing dilemma has remained a Christian constant through the ages. Possibly its most poetic expression is found in chapter 23 of the *Confessions* of Augustine, which deals with the "pleasures taken in hearing": "Thus float I between perils of pleasure, and an approved profitable custom," laments the great sinner turned saint,

> inclined the more (though herein I pronounce no irrevocable opinion) to allow of the old usage of singing in the Church; that so by the delight taken in at the ears, the weaker minds be roused up into some feeling of devotion. And yet again, so oft as it befalls me to be more moved with the voice than with the ditty, I confess myself to have grievously offended: at which time I wish rather not to have heard the music.

There was another side to the Platonic coin, however, that left lasting traces in the medieval devotion to music as one of the four liberal arts, associated characteristically not with rhetoric or literature but with mathematics and astronomy, that is, numerology. Thus, Plato's musical cosmology, handed down primarily through his *Timaeus*, left its unmistakable imprint on the musical philosophy of Boethius whose authoritative early sixth-century treatise *De institutione musica* is predicated on the notion that "of the four mathematical disciplines the others are concerned with the pursuit of truth, but music is related not only to speculation but

to morality as well." Hence, "Plato not idly said, that the soul of the universe is united by musical concord." From this followed in turn that "any change of music or right moral tendency should be especially avoided," lest, besides the harmony of the soul, the balance of the heavens themselves be upset. Boethius, in fact, postulated three kinds of music that were to occupy speculative minds for centuries to come: the music of the universe ("How indeed could the swift mechanism of the sky move silently in the heavens?"), human music ("What else joins together the parts of the soul itself? . . . What causes the blending of the body's elements?"), and instrumental music, "as that of the kithara or the tibiae or the other instruments which serve for melody."

These two closely related conceptions, music as a vehicle for Christian teaching, on the one hand, and, on the other, music as the sonorous representation of universal harmony, furnished the twin foundations of countless debates concerning the nature and role of music in Christian society and, by the same token, determined decisive aspects of compositional practice. The unyielding conservatism of the Roman Catholic church in matters musical was in effect an integral function of the Platonic teachings pervading all early Christian thought and behavior. If at first instrumental music was rejected because of its close association with certain abhorrent pagan rites, later on objections even to vocal music other than the sacred monophony propagated in the name of Gregory I were often raised in terms of the moral dangers inherent in the very idea of musical novelty for its own sake. In the twelfth century, for example, John of Salisbury, mindful no doubt of Plato's condemnations of virtuosity, wrote: "Could you but hear one of these innovating performances executed with all the devices of the art, you might think it a chorus of sirens, but not of men." And John XXII in a famous bull issued at Avignon in the year 1324/5 sought to ban practically all polyphony at the behest of "the modest risings and temperant descents of the plainsong" that were being obscured by voices "incessantly running to and fro, intoxicating the ear, not soothing it, while the men themselves endeavor to convey by their gestures the sentiment of the music which they utter. As a consequence of all this, devotion, the true end of worship, is little thought of, and wantonness which ought to be eschewed, increases." Well over six centuries later, in a stern encyclical, Pius XII reiterated that "art for art's sake" was quite incompatible with Christian rites.

In the long run, to be sure, musical change, like sociocultural change at large, proved unavoidable. As far as that goes, both John XXII in the fourteenth century and Pius XII in the twentieth century reacted unquestionably to established facts. What the Avignon pope, like many church authorities before and after him, wished to preserve was the fundamental aesthetic of the monophonic chant represented by those "modest risings and temperate descents" that allowed for proper recitation of the liturgical texts within the binding limits of eight specifically sanctioned melodic modes. When, in the mid-sixteenth century, the composer Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina (subsequently known primarily by the name of his native city, Palestrina) was asked at the height of the Counter-Reformation to demonstrate the viability of a truly Christian polyphony, he prudently took his aesthetic cues once again from Gregorian chant as the ideal musical avenue to true worship. The brilliant artistic result was the celebrated *Missa Papae Marcelli*, a six-part *a cappella* mass that has served as a model of polyphonic composition ever since.

Meanwhile, the millennium that separated the papal reigns of Gregory I (r. 590–604) and Palestrina's patron Marcellus II (r. April–May 1555) witnessed the evolution of a unique comprehensive repertory of chants for the entire liturgical year. Nor did this repertory remain limited to the minimal requirements of various religious services. Quite to the contrary, the melodic imagination of thousands of anonymous composers produced multiple specimens for well-nigh every occasion, if only to satisfy local predilections. Before long, though, the stylistic-liturgical differences between the Mozarabic chant of the Iberian Peninsula, the Ambrosian tradition of Milan, and the Gallican tradition of the Franks yielded to the pervasive influence of the Roman rite, which superseded all others under direct orders from that great unifier Charlemagne.

At the same time, what for centuries had been an essentially oral tradition, in accordance with its Middle Eastern beginnings, was subjected to notational experiments that, by the ninth century, had been consolidated into the notational system of neumes, which at first indicated only the general direction of intervallic movement but, once horizontal lines were added as convenient points of reference, proved capable of fixing pitch in a manner quite compatible with the needs of medieval singers, who, accustomed to relying on their musical memories, looked upon notational devices as little more than mnemonic aids. What remained as yet undefined was the duration, or rhythmic value, of the individual tone. But then, the more elaborate chant melodies, again in keeping with their Middle Eastern antecedents, were conceived primarily in terms of pitch groups rather than individual pitches, and the underlying texts furnished ample clues for their rhythmic articulation. In short, there appeared to be no reason to burden a system of notation already stretched to its very

limits with additional symbols merely to satisfy an as yet nonexistent sense of purely musical duration. By the same token, rhythmic values did become a major issue in the eleventh century with the gradual emergence of a prestructured (as opposed to a largely improvised) polyphony that depended on some form of durational measurement for the proper alignment of its constituent melodic elements. [*See* Chanting.]

Throughout the monophonic period, psalmody, the musical recitation of psalm verses in accordance with certain fixed melodic formulas, represented the very essence of Christian liturgical music. These formulas eventually gave birth to the theoretical constructs known as church modes, which, in turn, opened up creative avenues in any number of musico-liturgical directions. This process gained considerable momentum during the reign of Charlemagne with the establishment of the *schola cantorum* as a model institution dedicated to the systematic instruction of church singers and leading in the long run not only to the writing of numerous learned treatises on the subject of chant but also to a growing concern with *organum,* a primitive type of sacred polyphony that found its scholastic justification at least in part in numerical, cosmological terms. As the anonymous *Scholia enchiriadis* put it at the beginning of the tenth century: "Whatever is delightful in song is brought about by number through the proportioned dimensions of sounds; whatever is excellent in rhythms, or in songs, or in any rhythmic movements you will, is effected wholly by number. Sounds pass quickly away, but numbers, which are obscured by the corporeal element in sounds and movements, remain."

The writer goes on to quote Augustine, but he could as well have turned to John Chrysostom, who had reminded his Christian brethren in the fourth century that "nothing so uplifts the mind, giving it wings and freeing it from the earth, releasing it from the chains of the body, affecting it with love of wisdom, and causing it to scorn all things pertaining to this life, as modulated melody and the divine chant composed of number."

With the musical floodgates thus opened as wide as Christian decorum would allow, composers gradually emerged from their monastic anonymity and eagerly accepted the challenge of the new learning and delight in the arts that characterized the Gothic era. The Crusades, themselves products of the same adventurous epoch, offered a number of unexpected musical side benefits, for a variety of European folk traditions passed slowly in review as the soldiers of Christ made their way toward the Mediterranean. And once they reached its eastern shores, the exotic allures of the Orient, which would wield such profound influence on European food and clothing, proved irresistible in the field of music as well.

It was this sudden, and in some instances rather prolonged, exposure to a colorful world of sounds unencumbered by Christian prudence, if not prudery, that manifested itself throughout the waning Middle Ages in the kind of exuberant musical exercises that so disturbed John of Salisbury and John XXII. If *organum* once had been restricted to the simultaneous singing of the same melody at different pitch levels, in early twelfth-century Paris Léonin (Leoninus), one of the first church musicians whose name has come down to us, produced melismatic *organa* that pitted highly ornate melodic patterns against hardly recognizable fragments of liturgical chant, stretched into long dronelike tones, alternating, however, with rhythmically animated dancelike sections that soon became so popular they served as the models for an entirely new compositional genre, the motet. The latter not only featured several (generally three) simultaneous melodies in different rhythmic modes but, as a rule, also used an equal number of vaguely related texts; these were for the most part in the vernacular French and in some cases outright lascivious in nature. The thirteenth-century *conductus,* on the other hand, in keeping with its processional origins, retained an essentially homophonic texture as well as a single Latin text, and it was this "*conductus* style" that spawned a number of subsequent developments, including the first polyphonic settings of the complete ordinary of the mass.

Meanwhile, in the fourteenth century, in the wake of experiments by transitional composers like Petrus da Cruce (Pierre de la Croix), the rhythmic complexity of polyphonic music reached a point where extant forms of notation could no longer cope. The new system, called *ars nova* (in contradistinction to the *ars antiqua* of the preceding era), was capable of distinguishing between rather minute individual note values and thus opened up previously unsuspected compositional vistas. The most important immediate result in the realm of sacred music was the first truly integrated polyphonic setting of the mass ordinary (Kyrie, Gloria, Credo, Sanctus, Benedictus, Agnus Dei) with an added *Ite missa est* by the French poet and musician Guillaume de Machaut (c. 1300–1377). If this extraordinary work dates indeed, as some believe, from the coronation of Charles V in 1364, it would also be the first in a virtually unbroken chain of "festival" masses written for important public occasions. Characteristically, though, Machaut and his French and Italian contemporaries were essentially secular artists in keeping with the general spirit of an age which, in the case of music, did away with the exclusive reign of *tempus perfectum,* the

triple rhythms previously embraced as a symbol of the Holy Trinity. Once their duple counterparts gained acceptance in scholastic circles, church music interacting more or less continuously with its secular counterparts became the fountainhead of all art music.

The Italians, to be sure, had been more liberal than the French in matters of musico-religious doctrines even during the heyday of the Middle Ages, as witnessed in particular by the Italian *laude*, hymns of praise in the vernacular that were frequently cast in such secular musical forms as the *ballata* which, in turn, followed the pattern of the French *virelai* and eventually the polyphonic *frottola*. The French, for their part, handled the secular-religious mix in their own inimitable fashion when they turned their thirteenth-century motets into lively dance movements without jettisoning the theologically mandated system of rhythmic modes.

Early Renaissance music continued to follow a number of such essentially secular practices. But the inevitable reaction was not long in coming. Rejecting secular intrusions like the instrumental parts that pervade even the superb polyphonic masses of Guillaume Dufay, the central figure of the early fifteenth-century Burgundian school, subsequent generations of composers, beginning with Johannes Okeghem (c. 1425–1497), raised strictly vocal polyphony to levels of compositional sophistication as well as stylistic purity and sheer economy of musical means virtually unmatched to this day. Thriving on minimal motivic materials and strictly adhering to the aesthetic of Gregorian chant, the sacred *a cappella* music of the Renaissance engaged four or more human voices in dense polyphonic textures exceeding by far the range and therefore also the sonority of previous vocal music, by the same token eliminating any need of instrumental reinforcement.

This typical manner of composition unquestionably reached its apogee in the motet and mass compositions of Josquin des Prez, arguably the first musician to find general recognition as a true musical genius in his own time, who as the acknowledged leader of a large group of composers of Franco-Netherlandish origin established musical standards for Christian worship that have lost none of their lasting validity. While he clearly excelled in the careful articulation as well as the depth of feeling with which he invested his numerous settings of sacred texts, miraculously his infallible artistic imagination turned even well-known secular pieces into devotional masterpieces richly imbued with the spirit of a humanistic age that celebrated man as God's most accomplished creation. Indeed, sixteenth-century composers like Josquin not only perpetuated the earlier polyphonic tradition of sacred music based on a preexisting secular melody, or *cantus firmus*, but they did not hesitate to seize upon an entire polyphonic *chanson* as a structural and at times symbolic frame of reference.

Among the Protestants of northern Europe, the tendency to adapt secular melodies to religious texts was reflected in numerous chorale tunes based on German folksongs. Martin Luther, an ardent admirer of Josquin des Prez, condemned "popish" musical practices no less forcefully than other aspects of Renaissance religious life. Eager to introduce a new hymn repertory in the vernacular for use in church and at home by Christians of all classes and degrees of musical sophistication, he prefaced his *Gesangbuch* of 1524 with words that would have delighted the early church fathers:

> The hymns collected in this book were set for four voices for no other reason than that I wished that the young (who, apart from this, should and must be trained in music and in other proper arts) might have something to rid them of their love ditties and wanton songs and might, instead of these, learn wholesome things and thus yield willingly, as becomes them, to the good; also, because I am not of the opinion that all the arts shall be crushed to earth and perish through the Gospel, as some bigoted persons pretend, but would willingly see them all, and especially music, servants of Him who gave and created them.

John Calvin in his foreword to the *Geneva Psalter* of 1543 similarly insisted, quoting Chrysostom, that the psalms must be sung by "men, women and little children . . . in order that this may be like a meditation to associate them with the company of angels." In other words, the two principal reformers fully agreed on the crucial role of spiritual song in the daily life of the Christian family. Even so, Luther proved the more decisive not only for the future of Protestant church music but, at least in German-speaking areas, for music generally, since he insisted that the young "should and must be trained in music and in other proper arts." It was this religiously motivated concern for musical education that eventually propelled central and northern Europe into the forefront of musical composition and performance. Calvin's teaching did have a negative effect on the growing role of women in secular music and musical life, however, and the notorious organ controversy, though fortunately an isolated series of events, did result in the destruction of many a fine church organ by overzealous Calvinists in early seventeenth-century Holland.

The Roman Catholic church, needless to say, felt constrained to meet the Reformation challenge in music as much as in matters of church doctrine and organization. Given its established pattern of assigning religious duties in the first place to a loyal elite of professionals, the church could hardly condone the popular tendencies

that were rapidly gaining ground in the Protestant areas. But while it had refrained from extending official sanction to the many instances of interpenetration, if not outright interchangeability, of religious and secular elements in its own musical realm, it had shown little inclination, except during the Counter-Reformation, toward the enforcement of any specific musical aesthetic.

By the end of the Renaissance, church authorities actually looked for ways and means of adapting to their own purposes musical styles developed in and for the theater; witness the Roman oratorio, which presented unstaged biblical stories in an operatic manner as early as 1600. Indeed, the development of Christian music in modern times offers alluring proof that in human affairs theory and practice rarely coincide. For once opera embarked on its triumphant course, nothing seemed capable of keeping it from turning churches everywhere, whether Catholic or Protestant, into sacred concert halls resounding with arias, ensembles, and theatrical choruses. This occurred well before Johann Sebastian Bach wrote his German cantatas, let alone Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, and Schubert their Latin masses. The nineteenth century was particularly intrigued by the requiem mass for the dead, at least in part because the evocation of the Last Judgment in the Dies Irae appealed powerfully to the theatrical instincts of churchgoers and inspired a Giuseppe Verdi, as well as the evermore-flamboyant French Romantic Berlioz, to produce monumental dramatic compositions. Brahms, the German Protestant, on the other hand, made his own biblical selections for *A German Requiem.*

Instrumental music, meanwhile, had an initially intermittent but eventually solid religious history. The huge organ erected at Winchester Cathedral in England as early as the tenth century CE was admittedly reputed more for its loudness than its playability. And technological deficiencies haunted large organs well into the Gothic era. From the fourteenth century on, however, a smaller instrument, known as a "positive," facilitated at least the performance of relatively simple pieces, mostly paraphrases of chant tunes of the sort found in the so-called Faenza Manuscript. The invention in fifteenth-century Italy of separate stops for different ranks of pipes, an important step that permitted organists to select elements of the musical texture for specific instrumental colors, then led in the sixteenth century to effective instrumental adaptations of vocal forms, in particular the motet and its secular counterpart, the chanson. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the organ had become an equal partner in the performance of church music in the new concerted style that pitted human voices against an instrumental bass, as in the *Cento concerti ecclesiastici* (1602) of Lodovico Viadana (1564–1627). In addition, there arose an important solo organ literature, represented at its best in the toccatas, ricercars, and canzonas of Girolamo Frescobaldi (1583–1643), which influenced generations of composers from Frescobaldi's pupil Johann Jakob Froberger (1616–1667) to Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750).

If Italy contributed primarily instrumental adaptations of polyphonic vocal genres, the northern European countries specialized in virtuoso variations. Techniques developed in sixteenth-century England by the Elizabethan virginalists were further systematized and polyphonically enhanced by Jan Pieterszoon Sweelinck (1562–1621), the municipal church organist of Amsterdam and much sought-after teacher known as the "maker of German organists." These organists, led in northern Germany by Dietrich Buxtehude (1637–1707) and in the south by Johann Pachelbel (1653–1706), excelled in the sophisticated treatment of chorale tunes, both as keyboard improvisers and in their compositions, thus laying the foundations for Johann Sebastian Bach's supreme art of chorale preludes, variations, fantasies, and fugues. At the Saint Thomas Church in Leipzig, where Bach officiated for over a quarter of a century beginning in 1723, a typical Sunday service would feature him at the keyboard not only as conductor of a cantata with orchestral accompaniment, composed by him on a text related to the scriptural lesson of the day and consisting, as the case might be, of arias with or without obligato solo instruments, ensembles, and choral numbers, including at least one based on an appropriate chorale tune, but also as a virtuoso improviser and performer of one or more of his organ works. In addition, most German churches encouraged nonliturgical musical activities as well, for example, Buxtehude's famous *Abendmusiken* ("vesper concerts"), and continue to occupy central positions especially in the smaller communities' musical life to this day.

In seventeenth-century Italy, string instruments capable of emulating the expressive flexibility of human voices gradually superseded the more rigid organ in importance. At Christmas in particular, Italian churchgoers enjoyed the characteristic pastoral concertos of Arcangelo Corelli (1653–1713) and Antonio Vivaldi (1678–1741). Indeed, both the orchestral concerto and the aptly called *sonata da chiesa* for an ensemble of solo instruments owed their early development to church patronage, either directly or indirectly, as did the concerted masses commissioned by noble Bolognese families. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, though, when George Frideric Handel (1685–1759) tried his luck in Italy, a good deal of this generosity had abated. The vast majority of Handel's religious compositions, therefore, were products of a freelance career that began in

1712 with his decision to settle in London permanently. Nor were Handel's large-scale English oratorios liturgically conceived. Quick to realize that his great predecessor Henry Purcell (1659–1695), notwithstanding the British tradition of the Protestant anthem, did not favor anything comparable in depth of expression to the German cantatas of J. S. Bach, Handel seized upon the tendency of eighteenth-century British society to identify with the conquering heroes of the Hebrew scriptures, presenting season after season such magnificent biblical dramas as *Israel in Egypt*, *Judas Maccabaeus*, and *Solomon* with the help of sizable amateur choirs. Even the *Messiah*, quite exceptional in that it does not recount Old Testament events but the life and message of the Christian savior, was never intended for church use. Not surprisingly, the many festival performances of Handel oratorios in nineteenth-century Germany had all the earmarks of nationalistic rather than religious events.

The Romantic era, given to extremes, generated both a number of unprecedentedly theatrical works for special quasi-religious occasions, in particular commemorations of the dead, and a strong reaction to the profusion of religious music modeled after secular counterparts, whether opera or symphony. Limited at first to concerned clergy and a few knowledgeable members of the laity, before long well-organized reform movements, in particular that of the "Caecilians," soon rallied even Franz Liszt, the leading virtuoso-composer and matinee idol of the period, to their cause. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the reformers, benefiting from the prevailing general fascination with remote historical eras and events, had managed to promote an impressive a cappella revival designed to restore church music to its supposed erstwhile "purity," with deference to Palestrina as well as to newly recovered examples of earlier Franco-Netherlandish polyphony. This in turn led to a fundamental reappraisal of the nature and liturgical role of Gregorian chant, the restoration of which became the solemn obligation of the French Benedictine monks at Solesmes Abbey.

Throughout its millennial trek across the European continent and the British Isles, the Roman church had managed successfully to absorb compatible alien musical elements without substantially affecting its modal inheritance. Its Eastern rival firmly anchored in Constantinople, on the other hand, was governed by orthodoxy also with regard to the monophonic hymns that formed the poetic core of the Greek liturgy. With the sack of Constantinople in 1453, which spelled the end of the Byzantine empire, Russia assumed the principal guardianship of the Orthodox faith. Anxious to ensure the survival of its musical tradition in an essentially Slavic environment, Ivan the Terrible created the authoritative Russian Imperial Chapel. And from 1589 on it was the Moscow patriarchate that actively promoted the cultivation of monophonic chant. Not until the westernizing reign of Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) did the polyphonic "heresies" of the West leave audible traces in Russian basilicas, and then only gradually. The ultimate turning point came with the return of a highly gifted, forward-looking musician, Dmitrii Bortnianskii, who had visited Italy in 1765 and, inspired by the glorious *a cappella* singing at the papal chapel, laid the foundations for the choral repertory that was to become the hallmark of Russian Orthodox church music. Italian influences eventually yielded to the German Romantic predilections of Aleksei L'vov (1798–1870) and, indeed, Petr Il'ich Tchaikovsky. Still, indigenous Russian traits asserted themselves in virtually all instances, whether in terms of modally determined harmony, melodic progressions centered on the interval of the fourth, or the close textures favored by Russian male singers.

European Jewry, for its part, preserved its ancient monophonic heritage no less jealously, though inevitably with strong admixtures from various host cultures. Its foundation was Hebrew biblical cantillation, which from the ninth century enjoyed the benefit of the Masoretic signs developed by a group of Tiberian scribes. The eventual result was the emergence of a flexible semi-oral tradition based on obligatory prayer modes. When, in the wake of the French Revolution, Jewish political and cultural emancipation finally gained a firm basis, the doors opened also on liturgical reforms affecting virtually all synagogue music in the long run. The remarkable *a cappella* choir formed by Salomon Sulzer, the celebrated chief cantor of the Vienna synagogue from its inception in 1826, actually made a powerful impact upon Christian efforts toward the restoration of purely vocal liturgical music as well. As composer of the first choral repertory for the synagogue, Sulzer found talented disciples not only with Salomon Naumbourg in France and subsequently in Germany with Louis Lewandowski but also in eastern Europe, where choral synagogues soon became tokens of relative affluence, and the congregations in general preferred vocally endowed, humble prayer leaders to operatic virtuosos in liturgical disguise.

Both tendencies are clearly discernible in the United States, which in the nineteenth century witnessed at first a substantial German immigration, comprising numerous Jews especially after 1848, and finally the ever intensifying arrival of those largely destitute "huddled masses" fleeing tsarist oppression. Only in twentieth-century America could an Ernest Bloch (1880–1959) expect to receive a commission from a temple in San Francisco for a complete Sabbath service, which, ironi-

cally, recalls in many ways the concerted masses so beloved in Christian Europe from the late seventeenth century on. Darius Milhaud (1892–1974), a World War II refugee from German-occupied France, responded to the generosity of the same temple with a sacred service based on his native Provençal-Jewish tradition. Indigenous American motifs only gradually surfaced in an occasional piece like Kurt Weill's blues-style *Kiddush*. Old-fashioned cantorial virtuosity, on the other hand, remained the pride and joy of many a well-to-do Jewish Orthodox congregation.

The English colonies in America inevitably perpetuated traditions imported from the British Isles. Even so, serious divergences manifested themselves virtually from the outset with regard to religious song no less than other aspects of cultural life. The Puritan settlers in New England were by no means opposed to music, as has often been alleged. Rather, as strict moralists facing a precarious future, they saw mortal danger to their communities in the bawdy songs that enjoyed such wide popularity in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England; nor did they have any use for instrumental music that reminded them of "popery." Their greatest concern was that music, in the words of the Elizabethan writer of the *Anatomie of Abuses*, "allureth to vanities." Hence, while recognizing music as "a good gift of God," they were as weary of "Genevah gigs" as of the operatic exercises in church.

By the same token, the Plymouth Pilgrims wholeheartedly embraced the *Ainsworth Psalter*, relishing its highly varied metric approach to psalmody and, no doubt, the diversified folksong tradition it reflects. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the psalter, prepared by Henry Ainsworth while the Separatists were still in the Netherlands, had been displaced by what has come to be known as the *Bay Psalm Book*. This, the first book printed in North America, contained no actual music. Instead it referred to other pertinent publications, in particular Thomas Ravenscroft's *Whole Booke of Psalmes*. The considerable metric simplifications that distinguish the *Bay Psalm Book* from its English predecessors deteriorated before long into "the jog trot" of American psalmody that was in no small measure a consequence of the relative lack of cultural sophistication on the American frontier.

The eighteenth-century vogue of psalm paraphrases stimulated a number of indigenous musical settings. By and large, though, creative impulses continued to come primarily from abroad: for example, the Moravians brought with them a rich musical inheritance, both vocal and instrumental; the young English Methodist John Wesley, for his part, published his first American hymn collection in 1737 in "Charles-Town," South Carolina, inspiring others to do likewise. Among the growing number of smaller sects, the Shakers not only cultivated sacred song but, much like medieval Christians, they also danced as an expression of faith.

In the wake of American independence, most of the numerous groups that make up the American religious scene to this day consolidated their respective positions by issuing hymnals representative of specific cultural orientations and aspirations. They were united, however, in the typical Protestant refusal to exclude whatever secular, indeed popular, melodies suited their stated purposes. Nor did the American populist tradition reject the nonwritten musical practices of the nonliterate poor, whether whites in the Appalachian Mountains or black slaves in the South. At first in the late eighteenth century these techniques aroused at most the interest of an occasional native talent like William Billings. However, once indigenous democratic tendencies began to erode the historical hold of European musical elitism, such oral practices left unmistakable traces in the works of American composers, beginning at the latest with Charles Ives, a figure as uniquely American as Emerson or Thoreau. In short, in the realm of religious music, too, America embraced a pluralistic attitude ever ready, if need be, at the expense of its genteel past to adapt to the needs and expectations of the "mixed multitude" that came to its shores in search of spiritual as well as material salvation.

Minority religions have made contributions to American sacred music in any number of ways, whether by perpetuating oral traditions of African origin (e.g., the nineteenth-century spiritual or contemporary gospel music), or by promoting large-scale participatory activities (e.g., the vast choral establishment of the Mormons). While ethnic consciousness is by no means a recent phenomenon in American religious music, current attempts to capture something of music's ecumenical spirit extend beyond native popular motifs to ideas and practices associated with the music of Latin America and virtually every continent. That most worshipers continue to enjoy relatively simple hymns, especially now that the Roman Catholic church has embraced the vernacular language, goes without saying. The most exotic experiments in religious music do capture critical headlines and on some sensational occasions attract even the attention of the mass media. But their affect upon the religious musical attitudes of the broader churchgoing population has been minimal, as if to prove the perennial validity of Augustine's humble words: "So oft as it befalls me to be more moved with the voice than with the ditty, I confess myself to have grievously offended: at which time I wish rather not to have heard the music."

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ALEXANDER L. RINGER

MUSLIM (AH 202/6–261, 817/21–875 CE), more fully Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī al-Naysābūrī; a great scholar of Islam who devoted his career to the collection, transmission, and classification of *ḥadīth*. He was born in Nishapur, an important city of Khorasan, but, as his name indicates, he came from an Arab family of the Qushayr tribe. Little is known of his life except that he began to study *ḥadīth* in 833 and traveled extensively to seek knowledge from as many authorities as possible regarding reports of the prophet Muḥammad's life and words.

Muslim lived during the grand epoch of the formulation of the authoritative *ḥadīth* collections, and his intensive research issued in a compilation that has come to rank second only to that of al-Bukhārī in the Islamic world. Muslim knew the latter scholar and deeply respected him, but the two men were quite independent in their methods of compilation. Both of their collections are called *Al-jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ* (The Sound Epitome), and Muslim scholarship has been much taken up with comparing and contrasting the two. Muslim, like his contemporary, was a competent jurist, and his *ḥadīth* material is arranged according to the subject matter of jurisprudence. However, he did not supply subject headings or remarks of legal interpretation as did al-Bukhārī. He was particularly concerned with the orderly and critical arrangement of *ḥadīth* according to certain carefully chosen chains of transmission that exist for each text. Thus all the versions of a particular report can be found grouped together in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, with the variant readings noted; this arrangement is of great interest to students of the literature because of the light that it casts upon the process of critical compilation. In addition, Muslim prefaced his collection with a substantial introduction in which he discussed his methodology. This introduction, together with the whole *Ṣaḥīḥ*, has been the subject of a number of commentaries, of which that of al-Nawawī (d. 1227) is the best known. Out of a fund of 300,000 *ḥadīth*s Muslim chose 3,033, along with their multiple versions, for his compilation.

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the chains of transmission, giving only the names of the primary narrators.

R. MARSTON SPEIGHT

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. Founded in 1928 by Ḥasan al-Bannā' (1906–1949), the Society of Muslim Brothers (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) was created to bring Egyptian Muslims back to an awareness of the objectives of religion within a society that had, in the view of al-Bannā', been corrupted by alien ideologies and a materialist philosophy imported from the West.

Historical Background. The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 had fueled a nationalist movement seeking independence from British rule; these aspirations culminated in the revolt of 1919 under the leadership of the aging politician Sa'd Zaghlūl and the newly formed Wafd ("delegation") party. The decade of the 1920s offered the Egyptians constitutional government and hopes of an impending settlement between Britain and Egypt through a negotiated treaty. When Zaghlūl died in 1927, these hopes were eroded, and a number of movements appeared as alternatives to the liberal notions of government that had not been successful, partly through interference on the part of the king and the British authorities in Egypt and partly through ineptness on the part of the parliamentarians. In addition to the fascists and the communists, these movements included the Society of Muslim Brothers, who believed that the path of reforming the country's social and political problems lay in the islamization of institutions.

Ḥasan al-Bannā', a primary school teacher who was the son of a small-town religious teacher, was early attracted to Sufism, which, along with classical Islamic studies, formed his major intellectual foundations and became the linchpins of his group. He described the Muslim Brotherhood as a "Salafīyah movement [espousing return to the early principles of Islam], a Sunnī [orthodox] way, a Ṣūfī [mystical] truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural and educational union, an economic company, and a social idea." The movement spread rapidly, representing every segment of society from newly urbanized rural immigrants to high government officials. In its heyday in the 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed to represent one million members; later estimates are difficult to establish.

The structure of the organization was spelled out in the Fundamental Law of the Organization of the Muslim Brothers, promulgated in 1945 and later amended. Leading the organization was the general guide, who chaired the General Guidance Council (the policy-making body) and the Consultative or General Assembly, both of which were elective bodies. A secretary general was in charge of a secretariat linking the council and the rest of the organization. Two further subdivisions dealt with various committees (press, peasants, students, etc.) and with an administrative body supervising branches outside the capital. A chain of command was thus established over the entire membership.

Spread of the Movement. Weekly lectures, preaching in mosques, and periodic conferences allowed for popular participation, and the establishment of a press soon spread the message of the Society of Muslim Brothers further. Unconcerned with doctrinal differences, the participants concentrated on growth, action, and organization, and by 1939 they were ready for political activity. The war years were to provide them with a forum.

Nationalist agitation against the British continued with labor strikes and student demonstrations until, in 1942, the British threatened King Fārūq (Farouk) with deposition and forced him to appoint a Wafd government under Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥās. This incident generated further support for the Muslim Brotherhood, by then the only other grouping with a mass base to rival the Wafd. Even among the Wafd leadership there were many who approved of the society as a bulwark against the spread of communism among the working class. For the next few years the society established links with disaffected officers within the army (who were later to carry out the revolution of 1952), and, unknown to even his closest colleagues, al-Bannā' stockpiled weapons and created a secret apparatus trained in the use of armed violence for tactical operations.

With the end of the war, agitation for the evacuation of British forces from Egypt started once again, with frequent student demonstrations and acts of violence until the British garrison was finally withdrawn to the Canal Zone. The situation in Palestine and the war against Israel in 1948 provided the Muslim Brotherhood with an opportunity to collect more arms as members volunteered during the war and remained in the forefront of the fighting until their organization was dissolved in December 1948. The immediate cause for the government's action against the society was the death of the Egyptian chief of police, Salīm Zakī, who was killed by a bomb thrown at him during student demonstrations protesting the armistice with Israel. Mass arrests followed as the government, fearing the society's growing influence, sought to proscribe it. Three weeks later, the prime minister, Maḥmūd Fahmī al-Nuqrāshī, was assassinated by a Muslim Brother. In February 1949 Ḥasan al-Bannā' was himself assassinated, probably with the complicity, if not the actual participation, of the government of the day.

After the Muslim Brotherhood was proscribed, its property confiscated, and its members put on trial, many of its remaining members fled to other Arab countries, where they founded autonomous branches of the society. In 1951 a Wafd government, seeking a buffer against rising leftist movements, allowed the society to reconvene. A judge with palace connections, Ḥasan Ismā'īl al-Huḍaybī, was chosen as new leader. That same year the Wafd government unilaterally abrogated the treaty of 1936 with England, and Egyptian youth, including the Muslim Brothers, were encouraged to harass British camps in the Canal Zone. In January 1952 British forces attacked the Ismailia police station, and forty Egyptian policemen were killed. On the following day Cairo was set on fire in a monstrous riot that gutted the heart of the city. The Muslim Brothers were suspected of planning the riot, which they had not, although some of them were among the many participants. From then on the country was virtually without effective government until 23 July 1952, when the Free Officers movement, which included future Egyptian presidents Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir (Gamal Abdel Nasser) and Anwar al-Sādāt, seized power and three days later sent the king into exile.

There had been strong links between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers—Nasser and Sadat had both been members of the society. Once all political parties had been disbanded, the only focus for mass support lay with the society. Nasser knew that it represented the lone challenge to his authority and that its leaders expected to share power with the officers; a power struggle was inevitable. In 1954 a member of the Muslim Brotherhood allegedly attempted to shoot Nasser during a public rally, and once again the society was proscribed and its members arrested.

The society remained underground throughout the Nasser era. When Sadat came to power in 1970 all prisoners were released, including the Muslim Brothers, and, to combat the Nasserite current, Sadat allowed the society to reestablish itself under the leadership of an *'ālim* (religious scholar), Shaykh al-Tilimsānī, and to publish its own newspapers. Meanwhile newer associations patterned after the society, the Islamic *jamā'āt* ("groups"), had appeared. Some of these were extensions of the Muslim Brotherhood; others regarded the society as retrograde and beholden to the government. It was a member of one of the latter, more extremist groups who assassinated Sadat in 1981.

Doctrines and Impact. According to the program of al-Bannā', the Society of Muslim Brothers was given a mission to restore the rule of the *sharī'ah* (Islamic law) to Egypt, and to all other Muslim countries where their missionary activities had set up affiliates. Rule of the *sharī'ah* rendered inadmissible the separation of church and state, for the state, they believed, existed in order to serve religion and to facilitate the fulfillment of Islamic religious duties. The Islamic state had the Qur'ān as its constitution; its government operated through *shūrā*, or consultation, and the executive branch, guided by the will of the people, ruled through Islamic principles. The ruler, chosen by the people, was responsible to them and not above the law, with no special privileges. Should he fail in his duties he was to be ousted. Freedom of thought, of worship, and of expression were vital, as was freedom of education. Finally, freedom of possessions was to be maintained within the limits set by Islamic law, which frowns upon the excessive accumulation of wealth and enjoins *zākāt* ("alms") as a basic religious duty. Social justice was to be the guiding principle of government.

The significance of the Society of Muslim Brothers and of its modern offshoots, the *jamā'āt*, is that they represent a protest movement couched in a traditional Islamic idiom that expresses the ethos of a people. The society arose in protest against a foreign occupation that threatened the identity of a people and the dissolution of its culture and religion. It spoke to people in the language they understood and appreciated, that of Islam and its historical past, and it did not posit newfangled notions derived from a Western idiom, although the society did use Western techniques of mass communications and of assembly, even ideas of government, which were garbed in Muslim idiom. As such it was comprehensible to the masses who suffered political discrimination and economic exploitation by a government that was largely indifferent to their welfare, especially during periods of economic recession. Those who were disillusioned with Western ideologies and their ability to solve Egypt's problems, or indeed the problems of any Muslim country, turned to the precepts of the society, or to similar movements that they identified with their roots and cultural authenticity *(aṣālah)*, for guidance and spiritual consolation. The same phenomenon was reproduced during the Sadat regime (1970–1981) when the "Open Door" *(infitāḥ)* policy disrupted society and led to rampant consumerism, which, exacerbated by the influx of oil money, raised fears of becoming engulfed by westernization.

Organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the *jamā'āt* are regarded by some Muslim regimes as dangerous foci of opposition and have thus met with violent repression. In Syria the regime of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad has been in conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood since 1976. In 1982 the army shelled the city of Hama, a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold; portions of the city were leveled and casualties were variously estimated at ten

thousand to twenty thousand. Similar attacks were repeated in Aleppo, Homs, and Latakia. In Iraq the regime of Ṣadām Ḥusayn waged a relentless campaign against the Shīʿī group al-Daʿwah al-Islāmīyah. In Saudi Arabia Muslim militants seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca for several days in 1979. In Sudan the Muslim Brotherhood forced the regime of Muḥammad Jaʿfar al-Numayrī (Numeiri) to adopt Islamic policies in 1977. Comparable militant groups have spread to most Muslim countries irrespective of their forms of government.

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AFAF LUTFI AL-SAYYID MARSOT

MUSŌ SOSEKI (1275–1351), a monk of the Rinzai school of Zen Buddhism in medieval Japan. Born into an aristocratic family, he entered the religious life at an early age, rose to become head of some of Japan's most influential Zen monasteries, and left his stamp on Rinzai Zen and medieval culture.

Musō's earliest Buddhist training was not in Zen, but in esoteric Tendai and Shingon Buddhism. He was drawn to Zen at about the age of twenty and went to study under the Chinese Zen master I-shan I-ning at the monastery of Engakuji in Kamakura. Although an able pupil, Musō was unable to convince I-shan that he had attained a valid enlightenment experience. Finally, he left Engakuji to seek his understanding of the Buddha nature in a life of solitary wandering and meditation, and to test his Zen with other masters. He attained his enlightenment one night, deep in a forest, watching the embers of his campfire. This enlightenment experience was formally recognized *(inka)* by the Japanese Zen master Kōhō Kennichi, with whom Musō studied for several years.

After Kōhō's death in 1314, Musō returned to his solitary wanderings, deepening his insight through meditation in mountain hermitages. His spiritual reputation eventually reached Kyoto and Kamakura. In 1325, at the age of fifty-one, he was invited by the emperor Go-Daigo to head the important Kyoto monastery of Nanzenji. Musō also came to the attention of the Hōjō regents in Kamakura and the early Ashikaga shoguns, all of whom were eager to patronize the monk and study Zen under his guidance. After Nanzenji, Musō went on to head several other important Rinzai *gozan* monasteries. By the close of his life, he was regarded as the most eminent monk in Japan, had become the leader of a rapidly growing band of disciples, and had seven times been the recipient of the prestigious title of *kokushi*, or National Master.

Musō's considerable contributions to medieval Zen and Japanese culture were made in several areas. As a Zen master, with a large following of monks and laymen, Musō advocated a kind of Zen practice that was readily accessible to the Japanese of his day. Although he studied under Chinese Zen masters, Musō himself never visited China. His Zen incorporated the traditional Rinzai practices of seated meditation and *kōan* study, but its Chinese character was tempered by his own early religious training, his continued devotion to Japanese Esoteric Buddhism, and his strong interest in Japanese poetry and culture. In his book *Muchū mondō* (Dialogues in a Dream), Musō tried to explain Zen in straightforward, everyday language as he responded to the questions raised by the warrior Ashikaga Tadayoshi.

Musō also played an important role as a monastic leader and regulator who shaped the character of Rinzai Zen monastic life in medieval Japan. Although his Zen was easily accessible to monks and laymen, he set high standards for his monks. He divided them into three categories: those few who singlemindedly pursued enlightenment, those whose Zen practice was diluted by a taste for scholarship, and those who merely read about Zen and never threw themselves into a search for self-understanding. To help and discipline the practice of all his followers, Musō laid down strict rules for his communities in codes such as the *Rinsen kakun*, a set of regulations for Rinsenji. In this, Musō was setting himself in the tradition of such famous Chinese and Japanese monastic leaders as Pai-chang and Dōgen

Kigen, both of whom had devoted considerable attention to the proper practice of Zen community life.

Musō was also an intellectual and a man of culture. Schooled in Chinese, he wrote poetry in both Chinese and Japanese. He is also renowned as a garden designer. In addition, Musō was a major political figure in his day. He served as confidant and go-between for the emperor Go-Daigo, the Hōjō, and the Ashikaga, encouraged the sending of trading missions to China and the building of new Zen monasteries, and raised Rinzai Zen to a position of political prominence in medieval Japanese society.

[*See also* Gozan Zen.]

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MARTIN COLLCUTT

MU'TAZILAH. A religious movement in early Islam, the Mu'tazilah turned into a theological school that became dominant in the third and fourth centuries AH (ninth to tenth century CE) and persisted in certain areas until the Mongol invasion at the beginning of the thirteenth century CE. The history of the movement is comprised of three different phases: (1) an incubation period that lasted roughly through the eighth century; (2) a short period of less than half a century (c. 815–850) when the Mu'tazilī school, after having defined its identity, developed an astonishing variety of individual, sometimes contradictory ideas and permeated the intellectual life at the Abbasid court; and finally (3) several centuries of scholastic systematization channeled into two branches or schools that were named after the towns of Basra and Baghdad respectively.

Each of these phases presents its own problems for the researcher: the first is badly documented and can only be reconstructed on the basis of later reports, which are frequently distorted and tendentious; the second is better attested but needs detailed monographical treatment; and the third has only recently begun to attract scholarly attention. On the whole, our knowledge of this movement is still rudimentary. Detailed research is hampered by the lack of original texts. This is due to the fact that, after the middle of the ninth century, the Mu'tazilī movement was gradually driven into the position of a heresy; in the areas where it was considered "unorthodox" its books were no longer copied. Therefore we have to rely, at least up to the third phase, mainly on heresiographical reports. For the later centuries we possess a few texts, some of which reach the size of a *summa theologica*, but they belong to a rather restricted period; outside of this limit, many of the thinkers still remain mere names to us.

History. The Mu'tazilī movement is usually traced back to the end of the Umayyad period, the years between 740 and 750. But during the first century of its existence the movement was far from the most important factor in the development of Islamic theology.

Origins. The Mu'tazilah began in Iraq, but there the Shī'ah (in Kufa) and the Ibāḍīyah (in Basra and Kufa) initially had the better thinkers, while the school of Abū Ḥanīfah, which combined juridical competence with an "ecumenical" outlook in theology, enjoyed greater missionary success. We are not even sure whether we can assume—as all of our sources do—that a real continuity existed between the first and second phases: there seems to be almost no doubt that the great thinkers of the second phase did not have any precise knowledge about their spiritual ancestors. When they moved from the old intellectual centers, Basra and Kufa, to the Abbasid court in Baghdad they felt the urge to preserve the memory of their past, but they evidently could not rely on any established historical tradition of the "school." The gap was widened by the fact that they disagreed with certain opinions held in the preceding generation and therefore tried to keep their immediate predecessors out of the picture. Under these circumstances we must reckon with the possibility that they constructed a past which never belonged to them or was only partially true. We should also not forget that the historical reports that were transmitted at that time were not collected and written down until some time later, from the middle of the second half of the ninth century onward.

The lack of historical recollection is amply demonstrated by the discovery that no Mu'tazilī author had any precise information about the original meaning of the name *Mu'tazilah*. Our sources offer a number of explanations, but all of them are secondary guesses and beside the point; some are blatantly tendentious. Modern scholarship has contributed a few more suggestions, but the question still remains open. All that we can prove is that the movement bore this name when it became involved in an insurrection against the caliph al-Manṣūr in 762. But the name does not seem to have been invented at that time, for it does not fit the situation. It means "those who dissociate themselves" or "those who keep themselves apart" and thus calls for political neutrality rather than revolutionary activism. The name already existed in the first century AH (sev-

enth century CE), with this connotation, as a term designating some renowned companions of the Prophet who abstained from any participation in the first civil war (the Battle of the Camel in 656 and the Battle of Ṣiffīn in 657). It was then probably applied to the first Mu'tazilī thinkers since they, too, did not side with any political party of their time.

This attitude was distinctive insofar as it was adopted in a period when almost everybody had to make personal alignments clear, namely during the last years of the Umayyad caliphate, which saw the breakdown of the political order in Iraq and elsewhere. The founder of the movement, a cloth merchant from Basra by the name of Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā', intended to create a missionary organization working inside Islam; he sent his disciples, as "propagandists," to the most remote regions of the Islamic empire—the Arabian Peninsula, Armenia, Iran, India (the Punjab), and the Maghreb—so that they could interpret the Muslim creed and win people over to his own cause. Unfortunately, we do not know what this "cause" really implied. We cannot exclude the possibility that it was originally political, for Wāṣil copied a model that clearly had a political character, that is, the network of agents built up by the Ibāḍīyah, with whom he lived closely in Basra. Most of our information, however, contradicts this hypothesis: Wāṣil wanted reform, not revolution. Islam, was, after all, still the religion of a minority; outside the great centers, the knowledge of what Islam really meant was rather limited, and its definition differed from area to area. It any case, Wāṣil did not live to see the fruit of his efforts; he died in 749, one year before the triumph of the Abbasids.

Wāṣil's "propagandists" were mostly merchants like himself, and when they traveled, they combined business with missionary zeal. This pattern explains how the movement financed itself but does not say much about its spiritual impetus. The inner motivation of Wāṣil's circle seems to have derived from a certain feeling of inferiority: all of the participants were non-Arabs, that is, they did not enjoy the natural prestige of the aristocracy but came, as "clients," from Iranian or Aramaean families who had been converted to Islam one or two generations before. They possessed considerable wealth and were, as a matter of fact, recognized in their society, but they had to rely on Islam as the basis of their identity. They knew something about Islamic law, for Wāṣil advised them to win the favor of their audience by delivering *fatwās* ("legal opinions") to demonstrate their juridical expertise. But they also deliberately distinguished themselves from normal, "worldly" people: they clipped their mustaches and wore turbans (which, at that time, were characteristic of certain nomadic tribes but not of the urban population); they also wore special sandals and wide sleeves. This was the attire of ascetics; it gave them a certain "alternative" touch.

The organization was taken over by Wāṣil's colleague 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd (d. 761), a prominent disciple of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the great figure of religious life in Basra during the preceding generation. 'Amr had to cope with the new situation created by the Abbasid seizure of power. He seems to have given up all relations with the cells outside Iraq and in Basra, where he controlled a considerable number of adherents (who possibly formed youth groups), he kept quiet. This position became increasingly precarious at the end of his life as discontent with the Abbasid government mounted in Iraq. After his death the activists among the Mu'tazilah followed the call of the Shī'ī pretender Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Nafs al-Zakīyah (or rather, that of his brother Ibrāhīm) and took part in the revolt of 762. When the attempt failed, the Mu'tazilah were persecuted and went into hiding; those who had compromised themselves mostly fled to Morocco.

This event seems to be a decisive turning point. We hear that afterward the Mu'tazilah still possessed a mosque of their own in Basra, but we do not know of any leading personality for at least thirty years. Above all, there is no hint of any specific theological activity. Then, toward the end of the eighth century, two figures emerged: al-Aṣamm in Basra and Ḍirār ibn 'Amr in Kufa. But neither of them was a typical Mu'tazilī; as a matter of fact, the later school kept a certain distance from them. Al-Aṣamm was obviously an Ibāḍī, whereas Ḍirār, a judge by profession and one of the most original thinkers of this period, differed from the *communis opinio* of the following generation in his ideas concerning free will and therefore fell victim to a *damnatio memoriae*. The original concept of the Mu'tazilah as a popular missionary movement seems to have survived best in Baghdad where, during the same period, Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir, a slave merchant by profession, exhorted the masses by expressing his theological ideas in simple poetry. That was appropriate for the social climate in the newly founded capital; the town had attracted many people who came to make their fortune and ended up by being uprooted.

The period of success. The Mu'tazilah were propelled from provinciality to prime importance by the theological interest which emerged at the Abbasid court. The change came in two shifts, first through the influence of the Barmakids, the viziers of Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–802), and then, after a short setback caused by their downfall, thanks to the initiative of the caliph al-Ma'mūn (813–833). Both the Barmakids and al-Ma'mūn were not so much interested in theology itself as in lis-

tening to disputations: they liked to have representatives of different religions and confessions argue against each other. This predilection may have been stimulated by a non-Iraqi environment: the Barmakids originally came from Balkh, and al-Ma'mūn first resided in Merv; in Transoxiana, where both towns were situated, Islam coexisted with Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism.

However, the main stimulus came from the intellectual atmosphere of the capital itself. Islam was no longer the religion of a minority, as in the time of Wāṣil, but a creed which had rapidly expanded at the expense of other religions. The conversions to Islam had been prompted mostly by social considerations, but theology had to furnish an *a posteriori* justification: thus the outlook of the new theology was strongly apologetic and its style predominantly dialectical. The Muslims were not entirely unprepared; they had experienced enough internal strife between different "sects" in order to know what methods to use in disputes. Therefore, the Mu'tazilah were not the only ones to sharpen these weapons for the fight with their pagan adversaries. But besides being skillful dialecticians *(mutakallimūn)* they offered a concept of Islam which, by its rationality, transcended the divisions among the old theologico-political factions (Shī'ah, Murji'ah, and others) and therefore had broad appeal, at least among the intellectuals. The Mu'tazilah thus became the first overall, "orthodox" school of theology.

Their path to success can still be traced. Ḍirār ibn 'Amr took part in the sessions arranged by the Barmakids, but there he was only one among many. In Merv, one generation later, the situation was different; the Mu'tazilī Thumāmah ibn Ashras acted as a kind of counselor to al-Ma'mūn, and Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir was among those who put their signature as witnesses to the document in which the caliph nominated the Shī'ī imam 'Alī al-Riḍā as his successor. The real breakthrough came when, in 820, al-Ma'mūn moved the court back to Baghdad. Two figures dominated the scene there: the Basran theologian Abū al-Hudhayl al-'Allāf, who was already about seventy (he died a centenarian in about 840), and his nephew al-Naẓẓām. The latter showed all the features of a courtier: he mocked at asceticism and excelled in light and imaginative poems which celebrated wine and the beauty of youths. He therefore acquired the reputation of being a drunkard and a homosexual. He was not necessarily either, since poetry is not reality, but these characterizations demonstrate that, with their success, the Mu'tazilah also came under scrutiny. Al-Naẓẓām's open identification with the ideals of high society did not tally with Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir's earlier attempt to convert the masses. The split deepened when those who still understood the Mu'tazilah as a popular movement and kept to the old ascetic tradition started adopting Ṣūfī tendencies: they dressed in wool and asserted that the Muslim community should abstain from electing a caliph (a merely symbolic viewpoint, for the community did not have any influence in this respect anyway). In their view, however, court life was a scandal and the entire Muslim world corrupt, full of injustice and violence.

For the moment, the court party had the upper hand. But enjoying the favor of the caliph also meant supporting his policies. When al-Ma'mūn, in a decree sent throughout the empire in 833, asked his governors to enforce the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'ān as a kind of state dogma, the Mu'tazilah were immediately identified with this measure. This evaluation was only partly justified. The caliph had certainly made the decision by himself, as a demonstration of his spiritual leadership of the community, and his main adviser had been a theologian by the name of Bishr al-Marīsī, who, through his belief in determinism, stood apart from the Mu'tazilah. But the Mu'tazilah subsequently had to lend their intellectual support to the measure. When the policy of the caliphs led to a persecution (the so-called *miḥnah*, or "inquisition") the chief judge was a Mu'tazilī: Ibn Abī Duwād. The *miḥnah* lasted for fifteen years, and the government succeeded in purging the ranks of the state officials of any opposition. Resistance remained strong, however, among the population of Baghdad who, with a clear anti-intellectual bias, rejected rational theology in favor of the prophetic tradition *(ḥadīth)*. Therefore the caliph al-Mutawakkil, the third successor of al-Ma'mūn, decided to steer another course. In 848 he ordered some traditionists to preach about (spurious) sayings in which the Prophet allegedly condemned the Mu'tazilah and similar groupings; a few years later, any occupation with dialectical theology was prohibited. The Mu'tazilah were removed from the court.

But the movement was still very strong. Measures taken in Baghdad did not always have consequences outside the capital, and the Mu'tazilah had established themselves in almost all parts of the Islamic world: in Upper Mesopotamia and in the Syrian Desert (among the Kalb); in several suburbs of Damascus and in Lebanon (for instance in Baalbek); in Bahrein and even in the Maghreb (again among certain tribes in what is today Morocco and Algeria); in Armenia; above all in western Iran, in the provinces of Kerman, Fārs (for instance in Arradjān and in Sirāf), and Khuzistan (for instance in Shūshtar, Susa, 'Askar Mukram, and Gundēshāpūr, at that time the seat of a famous medical academy directed by the Nestorians); and finally in In-

dia, in the area along the shore of the Indian Ocean to the west of the Indus Delta. In these centers the trend toward individualistic thinking and dialectical pyrotechnics had certainly not been as predominant as in Baghdad. Many of the Iranian towns mentioned are situated on the main trade routes: it seems that the common theological outlook created an atmosphere of confidence essential for better business.

This extended geographical base helped the Mu'tazilah to survive. However, it also fostered misunderstandings and tensions which came about through separate regional developments. In Baghdad, the caliph al-Mutawakkil had not only acted against the Mu'tazilah but also—and even more violently—against the Shī'ah. Consequently al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 869), a prominent Mu'tazilī author who had maintained close relations with Ibn Abī Duwād and other high state officials, wrote a book in which he praised the Mu'tazilah and at the same time attacked the Shī'ah. This opportunistic turn irritated a colleague of his by the name of Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. about 910), who had just come from the East, where he had acquired a sound reputation within and outside of his school. Iran was governed by the dynasty of the Tahirids, who did not follow al-Mutawakkil's anti-Shī'ah policy. Ibn al-Rāwandī therefore joined the Shī'ah in Baghdad and refuted al-Jāḥiẓ's book. But he did more than that: in a series of treatises he showed that some of the axioms accepted by the Mu'tazilah, such as the createdness of the world or the justice of God, that is, theodicy, were not based on solid premises and that the Qur'ān was full of contradictions. His enemies within the school called him a freethinker for those views, but he apparently wanted only to point out that, with respect to certain positions, the dialectical method allowed for arguments pro and con which simply neutralized each other. Thus the Mu'tazilah, shortly after being deprived of political power, were also faced with the inadequacy of their intellectual instruments.

The scholastic phase. Ibn al-Rāwandī's pinpricks produced a shock. His books were refuted by several authors, in Baghdad as well as in Basra. Although these two towns were far from the only strongholds of Mu'tazilī theology, their names served as labels for the two different schools that took up Ibn al-Rāwandī's challenge and, going beyond mere refutation, began systematizing the material accumulated in the past. At the beginning of the tenth century their main representatives were Abū al-Qāsim al-Ka'bī (d. 931), who was identified with Baghdad although he only studied there and then taught in his hometown of Balkh in eastern Iran, and for Basra, al-Jubbā'ī (d. 915) with his son Abū Hāshim (d. 933). In their efforts to build up a coherent theological framework they had to care more than their predecessors about epistemological and terminological problems; this accounts for their growing interest in precise definitions and questions of logic.

The range of the Basran school, which, like the school of Baghdad, gradually shifted to Iran, is well attested by the work of the *qāḍī* 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 1024/5), chief judge at Rayy (near modern Tehran). His *Mughnī* ([The Book] That Makes [Other Books] Superfluous), a twenty-volume *summa theologiae*, has recently been edited as far as it is preserved and also subjected to some research. Besides this valuable source, further texts written by his pupils and other theologians who followed his views are also available. For Mu'tazilī hermeneutics our best source is Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 1044), with his *Kitāb al-mu'tamad* (The Reliable Book), although this book is concerned with the criteria of jurisprudence, not those of theology.

For the school of Baghdad, on the contrary, we lack extensive original documentation. But its ideas are relatively clear to us thanks to a development that deeply influenced the later history of the Mu'tazilah: the winning over of the Shī'ah. This process took place within two of the three main branches of Shī'ī theology: the Zaydīyah and the Twelver Shī'ah. Only the Ismā'īlīyah preferred to seek support in Neoplatonic philosophy instead. Among the Zaydīyah the door had already been opened to Mu'tazilī thought by the imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (d. 860), though he did not intend to be a Mu'tazilī himself. The final decision was taken somewhat later and in two different regions: first by his grandson al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq (d. 911), who founded a Zaydī principality, an imamate, in Yemen; second, though with certain setbacks, by the Zaydī pretenders in northern Iran, in the area near the Caspian Sea. Among the Twelvers, Mu'tazilī theology was introduced by two members of the Banū Nawbakht, a famous family of state officials and scholars: Abū Sahl Ismā'īl al-Nawbakhtī (d. 924) and his nephew Ḥasan ibn Mūsā (d. between 912 and 922). The trend originally met strong resistance there, especially from the traditionist theologian Ibn Bābawayhī (d. 991), but then it prevailed because of the influence of Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 1022).

The motives for these dogmatic shifts are not altogether clear. The Mu'tazilah still retained, among their theological principles, the obligation to spread the right belief; this may explain their usefulness for the Zaydī pretenders. The Twelvers had lost their spiritual leader through the disappearance *(ghaybah)* of the twelfth imam in 874 and may have clung to rational theology for new reliable guidance. In Baghdad, Mu'tazilī theologians had always had moderate Shī'ī leanings, although they did not normally side with the Rawāfiḍ (i.e., the Twelvers). At the end of the ninth century, even

a Basran like al-Jubbā'ī recognized 'Alī's son Ḥusayn as a righteous ruler. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ka'bī was the secretary of an early Zaydī pretender in Iran. Later on, the crisis of the caliphate revived the hopes for political support. The Mu'tazilah in Baghdad entertained relations with Sayf al-Dawlah (r. 944–967), the Hamdanid ruler of Aleppo, and then with the Buyids; both dynasties had Shī'ī leanings. A Buyid vizier, al-Ṣāḥib ibn 'Abbād (d. 995), promoted the *qāḍī* 'Abd al-Jabbār in Rayy.

The Baghdad school exerted its strongest influence among the Zaydīyah, though only in its Yemeni wing. The Caspian imams were under Basran influence, but their principality did not survive. However, theological works of the Iranian wing were taken over into the Yemen, for instance the great Qur'ān commentary written by al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī (d. 1101). Among the Twelvers, al-Mufīd followed the Baghdad school, but in the generation after him a pupil of the *qāḍī* 'Abd al-Jabbār, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 1044), turned to Basran ideas and determined the Twelver outlook for the centuries to come. On the whole, the Zaydīyah adopted Mu'tazilī doctrine more fully than the Twelvers.

Outside of the Shī'ī areas, the Mu'tazilah were in retreat. But their impact persisted in at least two places. I have mentioned the Berber tribes in the Maghreb; some of them remained Mu'tazilī even after the Fatimid invasion, at least up to the second half of the eleventh century. They called themselves Wāṣilīyah, with reference to Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā'. In fact, they seem to have lost contact with the Iraqi Mu'tazilah very early and did not participate in the move toward intellectualism instigated by the Abbasid court. We find scarcely any traces of theological activity; the claim to be Wāṣilīyah merely constituted a symbol of identity, the implications of which we do not know. In addition, Mu'tazilī theology continued to exert a certain attraction in Baghdad and in Iran, among jurists belonging to the school of Abū Ḥanīfah. In Baghdad, this combination became precarious after the weakening of Buyid power. In 1017, the caliph al-Qādir forced the Ḥanafī judges and witnesses to make a public disavowal; pressure from traditionist, especially Ḥanbalī, circles increased steadily. Eastern Iran, with its fragmented political landscape, offered better conditions. Mu'tazilī thought flourished under the Khwārizm-shāhs up to the beginning of the thirteenth century. We even know about a Mu'tazilī in the environment of Timur Lenk (Tamerlane, d. 1405). He, however, seems to have been an exception; generally speaking, the end of Mu'tazilī influence on Sunnī circles in Iran came earlier, with the Mongol invasion in the first half of the thirteenth century.

In the contemporary Muslim world, Mu'tazilī ideas are evaluated in different ways. In Iran, they still permeate theological thinking, especially after the revival of Shiism. In Yemen, they belong to the Zaydī heritage, but have lost all reproductive vigor. In certain Sunnī countries undergoing the impact of modernist movements, they have been thought of as giving witness to the essentially rational character of Islam; this has led, especially in Egypt during the last two generations, to a certain scholarly interest which was sometimes hailed as a "renaissance." Modern fundamentalism, however, has proved that view premature. Mu'tazilī ideas are again pushed back into the corner of heresy.

Doctrine. That Mu'tazilī doctrine changed over the centuries should go without saying. What is perhaps more important is the fact that its function also changed. During the incubation phase doctrine was less important than group solidarity; at the Abbasid court, Mu'tazilī theology represented the first attempt at a rational and universal description of Sunnī Islam; and in the later centuries certain basic positions, especially the doctrine of free will, served as a label which indicated that a person belonged to the Mu'tazilī "school."

The "five principles." The decisive step toward creating a reliable "dogmatic" framework was apparently taken rather late, by Abū al-Hudhayl, who defined five principles that he considered indispensable to Mu'tazilī identity. These have determined the structure of Mu'tazilī theological works for centuries, in spite of the fact that two or even three of these principles did not retain much importance in later discussion. One of them was already dated when Abū al-Hudhayl took it up: the principle of "enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil" *(al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf wa-al-nahy 'an al-munkar)*, that is, active admonition to follow the right path and resist impiety. This had been the device of the revolution against al-Manṣūr in 762 and was probably the justification for Wāṣil's missionary projects, but it was rather out of place at the Abbasid court.

The second principle, concerned with the intermediate state of the Muslim sinner, was still valid at that time, but derived its importance from an earlier debate that had its roots in the period before Wāṣil. It was a compromise between two attitudes that had arisen in the seventh century, on the one hand the rigorist belief that every Muslim who commits a grave sin excludes himself or herself from the community, and on the other, an "ecumenical," communitarian position which understood the revelation of the *kerygma* as the decisive event by which every Muslim, whether sinner or not, was ultimately saved. Wāṣil was rigorist enough to abhor any laxity or minimalism, but he lived late enough to realize that the exclusiveness practiced by the rigorists could not serve as the basis of the world religion that Islam had meanwhile become. He wanted

the grave sinner to remain a member of the Muslim community, with all the rights that involved (safety of life and property, inheritance from other Muslims, etc.), but he insisted that the sinner would be condemned to eternal punishment in Hell like the pagans if that perdid not repent. Thus, the grave sinner is to be treated neither as an unbeliever nor as a true believer. This doctrinal position was apparently not far from that taken by Wāṣil's teacher, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, but it was Wāṣil who brought it into focus and sharpened it by changing the terminology. Ḥasan had called the Muslim sinner a *munāfiq* ("hypocrite"), using a word taken from the Qur'ān, where it referred to enemies of Muḥammad who had not openly sided with the unbelievers. This led to exegetical problems; the Qur'anic context was not always appropriate for the theological definition wanted. Therefore Wāṣil used the term *fāsiq* ("transgressor") instead. This term was equally Qur'anic but had merely moral and no historical connotations.

The eternal punishment of the "transgressor" was Abū al-Hudhayl's third principle. It turned out to be somewhat flexible. The school sometimes tolerated members who only believed in a kind of prolonged purgatory; the dogma was also mitigated among the Twelvers. This tolerance derived from the fact that the discussion shifted to a related issue that had been Abū al-Hudhayl's fourth (or, according to his own counting, second) principle: God's justice. God does not do wrong: he punishes the sinner and rewards the good. He has the right to do so because he has put human beings under an obligation; he has revealed the law, and men and women have the choice to obey or to disobey. This choice presupposes two things: freedom of decision and an instrument to grasp this possibility of decision, that is, reason. However, the fact that man is an intelligent being then implies that the obligation already existed before revelation; the prophets are sent to confirm what reason knows, or should have known, beforehand. To a certain extent, revelation is merely a sign of God's mercy or favoring help which makes insight easier for man. It may, however, add new commandments; there are rational laws (e.g., the interdiction of lying) and revealed laws (e.g., the prohibition of the eating of pork).

Abū al-Hudhayl's last principle was the unity of God. This had always been an indispensable postulate for Islam, as opposed to the Christian trinitarian beliefs and the dualism of Iranian religions such as Zoroastrianism or Manichaeism. But this unity had been understood in different ways. Early anthropomorphists such as the Qur'ān commentator Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 767 or later) had found it sufficient to assert that God is one and not two or three, which did not exclude his having human shape. They merely held that God's body is compact, not hollow, for he neither eats nor drinks. He is thus one in number and consistence, but he is not one in form, for he has limbs like man. The Mu'tazilah, on the contrary, understood unity as incorporeity, unity in essence: God is beyond time and place, he is unchangeable. They did not even agree when some Shī'ī anthropomorphists in Kufa, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam among others, refined their position so far as to conceive of God as a body of light that radiates like an ingot of silver. For the Mu'tazilah, God is not a body at all but only "something," a being that cannot be perceived by the senses but is exclusively known to us through revelation or through reason, by the effect of his creative will in nature. God will therefore not even be seen in Paradise: he is unlike all other beings.

Divine attributes. Unity then also means that the attributes ascribed to God in the Qur'ān are identical with him and not different entities or hypostases. This is true at least for "essential attributes" such as knowledge, power, or life; they are eternal and unchangeable like God himself and merely tell us something about certain aspects of his nature. "When one states that the Creator is knowing," said Abū al-Hudhayl, "he has asserted the reality of an act of knowing that is God and has denied ignorance in God and has indicated [that there is] some object known [to God] that has been or will be." However, in addition to "essential attributes" there are also "attributes of action" such as willing, hearing, seeing, or speaking, which describe God's temporal relationship with his creation; they are other than God and subject to change, for they come into being when God acts and cease when his action ceases. They do not subsist in him. This is why the caliph al-Ma'mūn declared the Qur'ān to be created: the Qur'ān is God's "speech" or "discourse" and came into being at a certain historical moment.

This theory presented certain problems. The attributes were inferred from Qur'anic statements, where they normally took the form of predicates or "names," in sentences like "God is knowing," "God is (all) mighty," and so on. These sentences then had to be reformulated as, for example, "God has knowledge" and "God has power." How could this be done without reifying the attributes and transforming them into independent entities? And if knowledge really was God, as Abū al-Hudhayl seemed to say, how could it be differentiated from his power and other attributes? Finally, the question of whether there are attributes beyond revelation that have to be deduced rationally must be asked; predicates like "eternal" or "existent" were absent from the Qur'ān.

Since these questions referred to statements contained in the holy text, they were answered by linguistic

analysis. The doctrine of attributes is based not on metaphysics but on grammar. Our understanding must therefore proceed from the Arabic language and medieval grammatical theory. The first differentiation can already be found in the translation of Abū al-Hudhayl's statement mentioned above: instead of "God has knowledge" we have to say "There is an act of knowing belonging to God"; Arabic linguistic feeling and Mu'tazilī theology insisted that "knowledge" is "knowing," that is, an infinitive rather than a noun, and as such not necessarily permanent or independent. This was not, however, a definitive solution. One could still, as did certain opponents of the Mu'tazilah such as Ibn Kullāb (d. 855?), conclude that this formulation referred to a separate entity that subsists in God. Al-Jubbā'ī therefore rephrased Abū al-Hudhayl's doctrine in the following way: "The meaning of one's describing God as knowing is (1) the assertion of [God's] reality, (2) that [God] is contrary to whatever cannot know, (3) that he who says that [God] is ignorant states a false proposition, and (4) an indication that there are things that [God] knows." Here, the act of knowing is completely excluded: what is asserted is only God's reality. This was enough to protect God against any plurality, but there was some reason for doubting whether it was enough to affirm his knowledge.

Al-Jubbā'ī's son Abū Hāshim then established a compromise by going back to the original Qur'anic statements and inserting a copula into them (which is normally absent from nontemporal statements in Arabic): *Allahu 'ālimun* thus became *kāna Allāhu 'āliman*, "God is knowing." The copula was then understood as a "complete verb," that is, it gained existential meaning: "God is"; the assertion of God's reality had been made explicit. The participle for "knowing," however, now put into the accusative instead of the nominative, was no longer interpreted as a predicate but as a *ḥāl*, a "state" of the subject instead of an attribute. In the words of Abū Hāshim himself: "Since it is true that [God] has a state in his being knowing, the knowledge that he is knowing is a knowledge of the thing itself [that is, the subject as] in this state rather than a knowledge of the act of knowing or of the thing itself." This theory allowed the above statements to be understood univocally of all knowers; a theological problem had been put into the general frame of grammatical analysis.

However, since the purpose of this description was ontological we find the later authors unfolding a whole range of different ways of predication and attribution. There are, for example, besides the "essential attributes" also "attributes of the essence," that is, attributes which not only make some statement about the essence but denote the essence itself and thus are not shared by anything else (in the case of God a word like *eternal*). Then there are attributes grounded in the presence of an accident. They were subdivided by the *qāḍī* 'Abd al-Jabbār into several categories: for example, those that specifically qualify the substrate (or object) and necessitate a state in it as a whole, like motion or rest; and those which specifically qualify the substrate but do not necessitate a state of it as a whole, as, for example, colors (which may inhere in a few single atoms of the substrate, but not the whole of it). From them we may distinguish attributes determined by the agent who causes the existence of the thing, like "well ordered" or "skillfully wrought" (with respect to the creation, for instance); attributes directly derived from his action, like "speaking," "commanding," and so on; and finally attributes that are grounded neither in the essence nor in an accident, like "self-sufficient" said with respect to God (since this word which, in Arabic, originally means "rich" is positive only in its form of expression whereas "its strict sense is the denial of need on the part of one who is specifically characterized by a state having which need and self-sufficiency are actually possible").

The Mu'tazilī worldview. The way in which the theory of the divine attributes developed shows that the achievement of Mu'tazilī theology consisted not only in defining basic tenets by which it distinguished itself from other schools but also in the conceptual and systematic framework through which these tenets were expressed. Another case in point is the atomistic model by which the relationship between God and his creation was explained. This model had been conceived as early as the eighth century by Ḍirār ibn 'Amr, but the theologian who gave it its final form was again apparently Abū al-Hudhayl. He thought of atoms as mathematical points that do not have any spatial extension until they touch each other. Atoms therefore are not three-dimensional; only bodies are. Normally it is only in spatial existence, that is, in combination with each other, that atoms take on accidents: color, for instance, and consequently visibility. Only a few accidents are connected with atoms when they are still isolated, namely those that, in the form of an alternative, make combination possible: composition versus separation and, as the medium through which composition and separation take place, motion versus rest. Motion then means that the atoms join each other and receive extension, or that they part and thus lose their corporeity again; rest means that they retain their status of being isolated and therefore cannot be perceived, or of being composite and therefore remain spatial.

What is decisive, however, is that the atoms do not join by themselves, for their composition is an "acci-

dent," and accidents, by definition, are created by God. A body exists therefore only as long as God allows this accident of composition to endure. This is Greek atomism turned upside down. Democritus and Epicurus intended to explain nature by the principle of chance (therefore the church fathers abhorred their philosophy). For the Mu'tazilah, on the contrary, atomism served as an accomplice of divine omnipotence. As mere conglomerates, things do not possess any essence of their own; this demonstrates their dependence on God. However, although objects are reduced to purely material composites, this was not a materialistic theory. The Greek atomists were searching for the monad: they wanted to explain nature. The Mu'tazilī atomists were searching for the pivot of God's will and power: they wanted to explain creation.

That is why, in contrast to the Greeks, the Mu'tazilah extended atomism to the realm of human action. The freedom of choice which is necessary for human responsibility is based upon a capacity which the individual receives from God. This capacity is not a permanent quality, an inborn power of acting, but a momentary capability to do one specific act. The Mu'tazilah shared this basic assumption with their determinist or predestinarian opponents. What made the difference was merely the fact that they did not think that this capacity was given simultaneously with the act, as the determinists did, but one moment before, leaving an interval of one time atom so that people have the chance to make their decisions, to choose whether to perform the action, to leave it, or to do something else. There were Mu'tazilah, especially in the Baghdad school, who believed that the capacity for action was not merely momentary since it was identical with health and the intact functioning of the body, but even they understood this continuum as a mere accumulation of single isolated moments.

Continuity was a factor that never came first in this model. With respect to the physical world, consequences had to be taken into account especially regarding the explanation of movement, for in the context of atomism movement meant only that the atoms of a moving body were, at different moments, opposite to the subsequent atoms of the surface on which this body was moving. Consequently, one had to discuss the problem of when movement takes place at all, whether during the first moment, when it begins, or during the second, when it has already ceased to exist. Movement, it could be said, is only a convention of language; in reality, bodies are always at rest, though at subsequently different places. Continuity is then only an illusion of our senses, as in a film.

With respect to human existence, this lack of continuity comes to the fore in the Mu'tazilī concept of person. For Abū al-Hudhayl the human being was first a mere complex of atoms and "accidents." It is true that he or she is alive whereas other bodies are not, but life is again only an "accident," a quality added to the conglomerate of atoms which form the body. There is something like a soul, but it is conceived of merely as a kind of breath that permeates the body as long as that body is alive. The soul may leave the body during sleep; this explains the phenomenon of dreaming. But the soul is not immortal: it guarantees life and it disappears together with it. What Abū al-Hudhayl and his colleagues wanted to explain was not the continuity or uniqueness of the human person, but God's power to create human beings anew in the hereafter. God adds the "accident" of life to the atoms that form them when God creates them; God withdraws this accident when he makes them die; and adds it again when he resurrects them.

This concept of a fundamentally disjointed world seems to exclude causality. But the Mu'tazilah usually did not go so far as to deny causality completely. To begin with, they gave it a different name: "production," which they defined as the dependence of one act on another. The examples they adduced show, however, that they thought in terms of human actions alone. They did not want to formulate a law of nature but to bind the human being to the consequences of his or her own behavior. They were mainly interested in man and his responsibility; their approach was juridical rather than metaphysical, for they started from man's obligation toward God. Later on, they recognized that they could not neglect the universe completely and would have to give an explanation for the phenomenon of a world that functions in an orderly and foreseeable way in spite of its being dependent on God's will at each moment. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ka'bī spoke of God's "habit" in this respect, the *coutume de Dieu* that changes only in the case of a miracle.

Abū al-Hudhayl's worldview that I have described so far mainly influenced the Basran school, through al-Jubbā'ī. But during his lifetime he was already contradicted by his nephew al-Naẓẓām, who did not believe in atomism but proceeded from the infinite divisibility of bodies. Al-Naẓẓām also reduced God's immediate omnipotence. According to him, inanimate things now have a nature of their own that is independent in its activity, although ultimately created by God. They are still composites of different elements; however, these elements do not simply agglomerate like atoms but mix and grow into organic units. Nor do they depend on God's will at each moment of their existence; they are rather created all at once and then behave according to their own character. The human being, too, is no longer

merely unique because of outward form but possesses a soul which, though still material, persists beyond death; al-Naẓẓām was the first Islamic theologian to take over the Platonic proofs for the immortality of the soul. This soul, a "subtle body," permeates all the limbs and keeps them alive. It can mix with other "bodies" that come to it from outside, such as sounds; this explains sense perception.

For some time, al-Naẓẓām's alternative approach had enormous success. But there were certain excesses that discredited it. Ultimately it did not supplant atomism. Nevertheless, it was not without influence on the Baghdad school. The Baghdadis continued to believe in atomism, but they held that the atoms have extension and endure by themselves, as do their basic accidents. Characteristically enough, it was a Baghdadi like Ka'bī who relied on the concept of the *coutume de Dieu;* like al-Naẓẓām, he believed in the existence of natural qualities that determine the functioning of bodies and guarantee the preservation of the species. However, his natural philosophy was closer to Greek concepts than was al-Naẓẓām's; he followed the classical doctrine of the elements. In most of these points he was attacked by the followers of al-Jubbā'ī, who stuck to the Basran system. [*See also* Occasionalism.]

Epistemology. Arguments for the existence of God were used within the circle of the Mu'tazilah at least from the time of Abū al-Hudhayl. The cosmological proof was known from Christian sources. But the Mu'tazilah preferred by far the argument *e novitate mundi;* deriving the existence of God from the "accidental" character of creation corresponded to their atomistic worldview. Originally, the notion of God had been considered as *a priori*, "necessary," as one said. Abū al-Hudhayl even believed that the "proof" for God's existence, namely the createdness of the world, was also immediately evident. This insight then implied, as he thought, the obligation to speculate further about God's nature and to look out for his commandments; it had juridical consequences. When later theologians, in an attempt to create an overall rational system, gave up the *a priori* character of the notion of God, they were confronted, just because of the juridical aspect mentioned, with a very typical problem: how can man be obliged to know God if he does not already know him, that is, is it not that the obligation to recognize God's existence presupposes that man already possesses a notion of God? Al-Jubbā'ī then answered this question by assuming that man necessarily feel the obligation to know God because when he reaches intellectual maturity he becomes aware of being constantly exposed to the merciful assistance of an unknown reality and then realizes that in order to be grateful for this anonymous help he should know where it comes from; otherwise his benefactor might become angry at being unduly ignored. Man, as it were, awakens with an existential feeling of fear that only ceases when he has recognized that there is a God who will be just and merciful if his commandments are fulfilled. This cognition then grants that "tranquillity of the soul" that always results from knowing the truth.

Influence and originality. Mu'tazilī theology certainly participated in the process of the hellenization of Arabo-Islamic thought that started in the eighth century. But we should not forget that Abū al-Hudhayl and even al-Naẓẓām developed their ideas when most Greek texts were not yet available in Arabic or were just being translated. Obviously neither Aristotle nor the Neoplatonists exerted any impact on their thought. Al-Naẓẓām's system reminds us in some places of the Stoics (especially their theory of *krāsis di holōn*, "total mixture"), but that influence was filtered through Iranian intermediaries and reached him not in the form of a written translation but through his contacts with followers of Bardesanes or Manichaeans who lived in Iraq.

It will not be possible to judge the overall situation adequately until we have further studies of individual Mu'tazilī thinkers and the "dark period" between the great Hellenistic philosophers, up to the time of Proclus (410?–485 CE) and Iamblichus, and the arrival of Islam. What cannot be doubted, however, is the originality of the Mu'tazilī approach: Ḍirār's and Abū al-Hudhayl's atomistic theory is a case in point. They took Greek *spolia* but used them for an edifice that was entirely theirs, a theological system that was juridical in its outlook rather than metaphysical. They rarely quoted the Qur'ān because they wanted to rely on reason, but nevertheless they always took the Qur'ān as their guide. They offered a coherent worldview that was different from that of the later Muslim philosophers. These therefore reacted with reticence and, finally, contempt. Al-Kindī still tried to adjust his thinking to Mu'tazilī axioms in certain points, but al-Fārābī treated the Mu'tazilī theologians as "dialecticians" who used the wrong method. The Mu'tazilah, on the other hand, never changed their approach. A few of them, like Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, became interested in Aristotelian philosophy, but ultimately they did not adopt Aristotle's basic categories in either logic or metaphysics.

[*For a general discussion of Islamic theology, see* Kalām *and* God, *article on* God in Islam. *Related articles include* Attributes of God, *article on* Islamic Concepts, *and* Free Will and Predestination, *article on* Islamic Concept. *See also the biographies of the principal figures mentioned herein.*]

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There is no satisfactory work on the Mu'tazilah as a whole. Albert Nasri Nader's *Le système philosophique des Mu'tazila* (Beirut, 1956) treats the development up to the beginning of the scholastic (third) phase, but this work is marred by philological misunderstandings and gives almost no biographical information. W. Montgomery Watt's *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh, 1973) is an introduction to early Muslim theology where the Mu'tazilah appear in the context of the other theological movements existing during the first three centuries of Islam (until al-Ash'arī). Harry A. Wolfson's *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976) follows the author's earlier works on Philo and the church fathers: it presents stimulating ideas but ignores some recent editions and secondary literature. My article "Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du mu'tazilisme," in *Revue des études islamiques* 46 (1978): 163–240 and 47 (1979): 19–69, gives a biographical and systematic account of the period between Wāṣil and Ibn al-Rāwandī.

For the rest, one has to resort to monographs, of which there are not many. Abū al-Hudhayl's system has been analyzed in a perceptive way by R. M. Frank in his study *The Metaphysics of Created Being according to abū l-Hudhayl al-'Allâf* (Istanbul, 1966) and in an article in *Le Muséon* 82 (1969): 451–506, "The Divine Attributes according to the Teaching of Abū l-Hudhayl al-'Allâf." Hans Daiber's *Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu'ammar ibn 'Abbād as-Sulamī* (Beirut, 1975) treats another early thinker but also presents much material about his contemporaries. The *qāḍī* 'Abd al-Jabbār has been dealt with most extensively in J. R. T. M. Peters's *God's Created Speech* (Leiden, 1976). For the Mu'tazilī influence on the Zaydīyah, see Wilferd Madelung's *Der Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen* (Berlin, 1965). The relationship with the Twelvers is analyzed in detail, at least as far as the beginnings are concerned, by Martin J. McDermott in *The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid* (Beirut, 1978). Much information on individual thinkers is hidden in the relevant articles in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. (Leiden, 1960–), and in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (Leiden, 1982–), but it is not easy for the nonspecialist to find this. Neither encyclopedia has yet reached the entry *Mu'tazilah*. For *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* one may use the index to volumes 1–3, s.v. *Mu'tazila;* in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica* one should note that the entry on al-Naẓẓām appears under *Abū Esḥāq*, that on al-Ka'bī under *Abū' l-Qāsem*, and so on.

Studies of specific problems of Mu'tazilī theology tend to compare the Mu'tazilah with other "schools," especially the Ash'arīyah. On the doctrine of attributes we have Michel Allard's *Le problème des attributs divins* (Beirut, 1965), which contains a chapter on al-Jubbā'ī, and especially R. M. Frank's *Beings and Their Attributes* (Albany, N.Y., 1978), which gives a subtle analysis of the teaching of the Basran school. The arguments for and against the doctrine of free will are listed and treated in detail by Daniel Gimaret in *Théories de l'acte humain en théologie musulmane* (Paris, 1980). Gimaret's interpretation of the Mu'tazilī model is modified by R. M. Frank in his article "The Autonomy of the Human Agent in the Teaching of Abd-al-Djabbar," *Le Muséon* 95 (1982): 323–355. The consequences for Mu'tazilī ethics are described in George F. Hourani's *Islamic Rationalism* (Oxford, 1971). The corresponding physical ideas become clear in Judith Katz Hecker's "Reason and Responsibility: An Explanatory Translation of Kitab al-Tawlid from al-Mughni fi Abwab al-Tawhid wa-l-Adl by Qadi Abd-al-Jabbar al-Hamadhani" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1975). For atomism, Salomon Pines's *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre* (Berlin, 1936) still retains its value; it has now to be compared with Frank's book on Abū al-Hudhayl. Carmela Baffioni's *Atomismo e antiatomismo nel pensiero islamico* (Naples, 1982) attempts a new comparison with Greek atomism, but unfortunately ignores Frank's study. On epistemology, see Marie Bernand's *Le problème de la connaissance d'après le Muġni du cadi 'Abd al-Ǧabbār* (Algiers, 1982). Mu'tazilī polemics against dualism have been treated by Guy Monnot in *Penseurs musulmans et religions iraniennes* (Paris, 1974).

JOSEF VAN ESS

MUTILATION. *See* Bodily Marks.

MYCENAEAN RELIGION. *See* Aegean Religions.

MYERHOFF, BARBARA G. (1935–1985), American anthropologist and scholar of religion, myth, ritual, and symbolism. Born in Cleveland, Ohio, and raised there and in Los Angeles, Myerhoff received her bachelor's degree in sociology and her doctorate in anthropology from the University of California at Los Angeles; her master's degree in human development was awarded by the University of Chicago. Her entire professional career was spent as a member of the University of Southern California's department of anthropology. Writing and conducting research since the sixties, Myerhoff studied a variety of types of social groups. She distinguished herself through her contributions to the development and application of symbolic anthropology.

Myerhoff's scholarly writings analyze those morphological features of ritual that allow it to be effective in secular as well as sacred settings and in complex as well as traditional societies. She understood ritual and its constituent symbols to be capable of formulating experience for its participants and of allowing them to transform their daily roles and statuses by encountering alternate social relations and versions of reality. She eventually ascribed the efficacy of ritual to its feature of repetitive action and to its sensory components, which create certainty through performance. Rituals are the medium for enacting the system of meanings—primarily ideological—that constitutes a religion. These ideas

found their earliest expression in her doctoral research on the shamanic religion of the Huichol Indians of Mexico's Sierra Madre Occidental, whose results were published as *The Peyote Hunt of the Huichol Indians* (1975).

Following this work, Myerhoff turned to the study of ritual in modern society. She explored the commonalities and differences between rituals in complex and primitive societies, indicating that ritual continues even in modern societies to provide messages of order and predictability as well as to set the stage on which cultures and individuals can create and present themselves to themselves. These themes are explored in *Secular Ritual: Forms and Meanings* (1977), which Myerhoff coedited with Sally Falk Moore (see especially their introduction, "Ritual Work and the Problem of Meaning," pp. 3–24).

Her subsequent ethnographic research on the place of religion in complex society led her to claim that, although most men and women continue to require what religion had traditionally provided them, this cultural system is now lacking and hence they are on their own to seek out such experiences where they may. Thus, she analyzed ritual-like expressive and reflexive genres in contemporary society: journal keeping, storytelling, and autobiography. All are areas in which the religious function of self-presentation and the creation of meaning occur.

Myerhoff's study of elderly California Jews, *Number Our Days* (1979), focused on improvised or "nonce" (i.e., nonrecurring) rituals that wed traditional and secular, and open and closed, features (see also her paper "We Don't Wrap Herring in a Printed Page: Fusions, Fictions and Continuity," in *Secular Ritual*, pp. 199–226). She demonstrated that such rituals provide meaning for people by their evocation of childhood and domesticity, creating an orderly sense of personal as well as cultural continuity in their lives. Myerhoff's work on elderly Jews was the subject of an Academy Award–winning film by Lynn Littman (with whom Myerhoff collaborated), also called *Number Our Days* (1977). Their second collaboration, *In Her Own Time* (1985), concerned her final fieldwork with Orthodox Jews in the Fairfax community of Los Angeles and focused on her relationship with the community during the last months of her life.

Myerhoff's symbolic anthropology, while always culturally specific, paid an unusual amount of attention to universal problems of meaning in human life. She saw these problems—including the need for self-reflection and the urge to create an orderly world—as the substance of religion across cultures, and along with anthropologist Victor Turner and others, she formulated a dynamic view of religion as a symbolic process in society.

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RIV-ELLEN PRELL

MYSTERY PLAYS. *See* Drama, *article on* European Religious Drama.

MYSTERY RELIGIONS. Like many other terms that represent concepts in the history of religions, *mysteries*, or *mystery religions*, serves as an umbrella term covering a wide variety of referents. Since the word had its own origin and history, its use needs to be analyzed carefully, especially in the context of comparative studies.

Definition of Terms. The Greek word *mustēria* refers initially only to the "mysteries" of Eleusis and signifies a secret celebration or secret worship that is accessible only to initiates *(mustai)*, who have had themselves initiated *(muein* or *telein)* into it. Other terms used for the celebration are *teletē* and *orgia;* Latin writers either use the Greek word or translate it as *initia*. Originally, then, *mysteries* denotes a specific religious manifestation that is essentially different in character from other, official cultic functions; the mysteries are not open to everyone but require a special initiation. But in Greek, *mustēria* is already applied to comparable rituals of initiation (see below) and thus acquires a general meaning. When taken over by philosophy (especially Neoplatonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism) and Christianity, the term increasingly loses its original concrete religious referent and acquires instead the sense of a revealed or mysterious divine wisdom ("mysteriosophy") that is only available to or attainable by adepts.

The term *mysteries* was familiar, of course, to classical philologists, who knew it from the ancient tradition,

but it was not until the nineteenth century that it again became a technical term in the history of religions for secret cults or ceremonies of initiation (owing especially to James G. Frazer). In particular it was much used by the history of religions school, most often by Richard Reitzenstein and Wilhelm Bousset, in their attempt to render comprehensible the multiplicity that marked the history of religions in the Hellenistic period and late antiquity, as well as to demonstrate the connections between that world and early Christianity. In the view of the history of religions school, the mysteries were an expression of popular piety that drew sustenance especially from the so-called Oriental mystery religions of the Roman imperial age; in the long run, it was claimed, even the early church could not escape the influence of those religions. Discussion of the beginnings of Christianity was carried on for a long time under the sign of the mysteries, which were regarded as one of Christianity's roots; this approach can still be found today.

There can be no objection to a general use of the term *mysteries* provided that its original meaning continues to resonate even as its application is extended. The problem here is the same as with *gnosis* or *gnosticism*. These technical terms have been given a broader meaning, but scholars have not on that account ceased to use them in a restricted regional sense: *gnōsis* as a Greek word meaning "esoteric knowledge" and referring to religious groups of late antiquity. My own inclination is not to detach these terms from the historical context in which they exercised historical influence but to continue to use them primarily in their restricted sense, without, however, forgetting that the history of religions needs such umbrella terms—especially in comparative studies. The danger otherwise is that the terminology will become blurred and cease to be of help in describing original religious phenomena and will serve only for a religious typology that lacks historical depth.

Thus, for example, Buddhism has been explained by Paul Lévy (1957) as a "mystery religion," simply because of certain ritual factors that play a part in the consecration of Buddhist monks and resemble to some extent ritual elements in the Greek and Oriental mysteries. This demonstration I regard as an unsuccessful venture into dangerous territory. Certainly, Buddhism (especially Tibetan Mahāyāna or Vajrayāna Buddhism) has its "mysteries" in the sense of esoteric rituals, just as do most of the other great religions (especially Hinduism). But such instances occur during later historical stages that presuppose a developed hierarchy and represent a kind of ritualization of esoteric teachings that can in turn be traced back in part to older foundations. It is possible in the same way to give the name *mysteries* to various disputed early Mesopotamian and early Egyptian rituals.

We really have no choice but to understand the term *mysteries* as a historical category that registers a specific historico-religious content and that relates in particular to the Greco-Roman age. The general, typological use of the word must be measured against that standard. Mysteries, then, are special initiation ceremonies that are esoteric in character and often connected with the yearly agricultural cycle. Usually they involve the destiny of the divine powers being venerated and the communication of religious wisdom that enables the initiates to conquer death. The mysteries are part of the general religious life, but they are to a special degree separated from the public cult that is accessible to all, and on this account they are also called "secret cults."

The "Phenomenology" of the Mysteries. *Mysteries*, then, refers primarily to the content as found in the history of Greco-Roman and Near Eastern religions. At the cultic-ritual level, which is the dominant level, the discipline of the *arcanum* (the obligation of strict secrecy) means that we know very little more about the mysteries than the ancient sources—including ancient Roman literature—occasionally pass on as supposedly reliable information. Our historical knowledge is limited because Christian writers (such as Clement of Alexandria and Firmicus Maternus) who reported on the mysteries allowed their own polemical or apologetic interpretations to color their accounts.

We are relatively well informed about the general structure of the ceremonies (Eleusis, Samothrace, Isis, Mithras). Processions and public functions (sacrifices, dances, music) framed the actual celebration, which was held in closed rooms (*telestērion*, *spelunca*, temple) and usually comprised two or three acts: the dramatic action *(drōmenon)* with the "producing and showing" of certain symbols *(deiknumena)* and the interpretation (exegesis), through a communication of the myth *(legomena)* and its attendant formulas, of what had been experienced. The sacred action *(drōmenon)* and the sacred narrative *(legomenon, muthos, logos)* were closely connected. We are still rather ignorant regarding the central ceremony, that is, the initiation proper. Any interpretation of it can be hypothetical only, never certain. In my opinion, the heart of the celebration was the linking of the initiate with the destiny of the divinity or divinities, as expressed in performance and word, and the resultant bestowal of hope for some kind of survival after death. This interpretation is also suggested by burial

gifts for the deceased (e.g., the "Orphic" gold plate from southern Italy). The ancient human problems of suffering, death, and guilt undoubtedly played an important part in the efficacy of the mysteries. The idea of rebirth can be documented only in later Hellenism. In any case, there is no evidence of a unitary theology of the mysteries that was common to all the mysteries; the origins and historical course of the several mysteries were too discrepant for that. Even the later philosophical explanation of the *logos* of the mysteries was not everywhere the same.

A word must be said here about the connection often made between the mysteries and the idea of "dying and rising divinities," who are linked to the vegetation cycle. James G. Frazer, who accepted the ideas of Wilhelm Mannhardt on nature myths and folk myths, was the leader and main influence in this area. In addition to an uninhibited use of terminology (e.g., *resurrection* is usually understood in the biblical and Christian sense), the chief defect of this theory is its utter neglect of source criticism. Strictly speaking, the "vegetation theory" is a theory at two removes that, as Carsten Colpe has shown, simply takes a theory at one remove, namely, the ancient *interpretatio Graeca*, and prolongs it in the spirit of nineteenth-century Romanticism. The nineteenth-century scholars did not further analyze the ancient use of symbols and metaphors in which the vegetative processes of withering and blooming (in the myth of Adonis) were already described (especially from the second century on) by such terms as *dying, declining, disappearing,* and *being renewed, reappearing, rising.* I say nothing of the fact that these same scholars made no distinction between primary, cult-related myth and secondary, literary mythology. A whole series of so-called vegetation divinities, such as Adonis, Attis, and Osiris, or Tammuz, were interpreted according to the same pattern, namely, as dying and rising gods; their cults, with their "mystery" character, supposedly served to communicate to the "initiates" the powers associated with the "fruitfulness" of nature. [*See* Dying and Rising Gods.]

As we know today, there is no evidence at all that any of these gods was thought of as "rising" in any proper sense of the term. In actual fact, there were great differences in mythology and ritual; only secondarily (often as early as late antiquity) were the divinities assimilated to one another (e.g., Osiris to Adonis and Attis). The often only fragmentary mythology centering on these divinities told of the disappearance or stay of the god in the lower world, where he lived on (as lord of the lower world or, in the case of Osiris, as judge of the dead) or from which in one or another manner he returned to the light of day (on earth, in the air, or in heaven) and resumed his role as a god (which he had never abandoned). The connection with rituals was also quite diverse; there was by no means always a question of mysteries in the sense of secret cults (see below). We must also allow for the possibility that some of the so-called Oriental mysteries acquired their mystery character only secondarily, under the influence of Greek and especially the Eleusinian mysteries (this was certainly the case with Osiris in relation to Adonis). The interpretation of the mysteries as being, without distinction, ancient vegetation cults should therefore no longer be used as a magic hermeneutical key.

In view of this critique, the historical and phenomenological problem of the origin of the mysteries remains unresolved. Repeated attempts have been made to move beyond the now-outdated nature-myth theory. Ethnologists in particular have repeatedly focused on the mysteries and interpreted them as survivals of ancient "rites of passage" (Arnold van Gennep); in our day this theory has been maintained especially by Mircea Eliade. There is much that is correct in it. The ethnological contributions that play a role in it come in part from the morphology of culture school (Frobenius), in part from the history of culture school of Vienna. The latter, represented by Wilhelm Schmidt and Wilhelm Koppers, sees the initiation of young men or boys and the whole organization of adult male society as one of the important roots of the mysteries. In cultural and historical terminology the mysteries reflect the agrarian, matriarchal stage, in which for the first time the male sector of society, as distinct from the female sector, developed secret societies and initiation ceremonies (as a protest against matriarchal tyranny, according to Koppers). That stage would be located chronologically in the Mesolithic period. The Greek mysteries are not directly linked to that stage and its events, but they are pre-Indo-Germanic and ultimately have their roots in it.

The history of culture theory as developed by Wilhelm Schmidt has been largely abandoned today. It has left behind only the idea—itself not new—that the origin of the mysteries is to be sought in some stage of primitive agricultural development. Even this, however, does not apply to Osiris, who from the beginning was associated with pastoral symbols, thus reflecting a nomadic culture, and had close ties with the Egyptian ideology of kingship; the later Corn Osiris has been assimilated to Adonis, and the Hellenistic mysteries of Osiris, which focus primarily on Isis, have in turn been influenced by the Eleusinian mysteries of Demeter and Persephone (Kore). The role played by female divinities need not be linked to a hypothetical matriarchy; these goddesses are phenomena belonging to an agrarian cul-

ture (Mother Earth). Among modern philologists Walter Burkert is the chief proponent of the view that the root of the mysteries is to be looked for in agrarian culture and specifically in secret society ceremonies (with their tests of courage and their sexual, orgiastic traits) and that they originated in the Neolithic age; the dawning Greek individualism of the seventh and sixth centuries BCE took over these ancient cults and turned them into a deliberately adopted religion centered on the conquest of death.

Adolf E. Jensen has suggested a different ethnological approach. He sees behind the Greek mysteries (especially those of Eleusis) a conception of the world proper to the culture of early food growers; this conception centered on the death or possibly the sacrifice of a female prototypical being (or divinity) who was the source of the life-sustaining cultivated vegetation, and thus it thematized for the first time the mystery of death and life ("the slain god"). There has since been occasional criticism of the interpretation of the Melanesian starting point (the myth of Hainuwele; see Jonathan Z. Smith's "A Pearl of Great Price and a Cargo of Yams: A Study in Situational Incongruity" in *History of Religions* 16, 1976, pp. 1–19, and his *Imagining Religion*, Chicago, 1982, pp. 90–101); nonetheless it is a legitimate question whether earlier food-cultivation stages are to be glimpsed behind the mysteries. The answer can be found only through cooperative study by ethnologists, prehistorians, philologists, and historians of religion. In any case an answer is not directly required for understanding our historical and philological material, which comes to us primarily from Greek sources. All our ancient informants confirm the view that the mysteries in general took their character primarily from the Greek mysteries and became widespread only as a result of hellenization.

The Historical Multiplicity of Mysteries. Within the confines of this article it is necessary to start with the ancient Greek mysteries and move on to related Oriental mysteries.

The Greek mysteries. The Greek mysteries were from the outset cults of clan or tribe. They can in many cases be traced back to the pre-Greek Mycenaean period and were probably ancient rituals of initiation into a clan or an "association." The most important were the mysteries of Eleusis, which in fact provided the pattern for the idea of mysteries. [*See* Eleusinian Mysteries.] The independent town of Eleusis (there is evidence of a prehistoric settlement there in the third millennium BCE) became an Athenian dependency in the seventh century BCE and thereby acquired, especially from the sixth century on, a pan-Hellenic role that in the Roman imperial age attracted the attention of Rome. Augustus, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, and Gallienus had themselves initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. An attempt under Claudius (r 41–54) to move the celebration to Rome failed. The destruction of the sanctuary came under Alaric's Christian Goths in 395 CE. The mythological background for the Eleusinian mysteries was provided by the story of the goddesses Demeter and Kore, preserved in the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*. The pair were presented as mother and daughter. Their relationship developed in a gripping manner the theme of loss (death), grief, search, and (re)discovery (life). The interpretation of the story as purely a nature myth and specifically a vegetation myth is actually an old one and can appeal to ancient witnesses for support; nonetheless it is oversimplified precisely because it loses sight of the human and social content of the myth.

The public ceremonies of the annual Eleusinian ritual are well known to us and confirmed from archaeological findings. The director was the hierophant, who from time immemorial had been a member of the Eumolpides, a noble family that had held the kingship of old. The Kerukes family filled the other offices. All classes, including slaves, were admitted to the cult. According to degree of participation, a distinction was made between the *mustēs* ("initiate") and the *epoptēs* ("viewer"); only the latter was regarded as fully initiated. But this distinction was not original and came in when the Eleusinian mysteries were combined with the mysteries of Agrai on the Ilissos (near Athens) in the seventh century BCE. The Lesser Mysteries at Agrai took place annually in February (the month Anthesterion) and were regarded as a preliminary stage leading to the Greater Mysteries held at Eleusis in September (16–20 Boedromion). Sacrifices, libations, baths, ablutions, fasts, processions (especially bringing the "holy things," the cult symbols, to Eleusis), and torches all played an important role in both feasts. The center of all activity was the ceremony that was not open to the public. It was held in the "place of consecration" known as the *telestērion*, which is not to be confused with the temple of Demeter at the same location.

We know that at the ceremonies at Agrai the initiate knelt down with a ram's skin draped around him and held an unlit torch in his hand. The priestess shook a winnowing fan *(liknon)* over him, and he handled a serpent (sacred to Demeter and Kore). Finally water was poured over him. In the Eleusinian ceremony, of which we know less, the initiation took place at night. It included the handling of an object, not identified with certainty, which was taken from a "coffer" (perhaps the instrument—mortar and pestle—used in preparing the sacred potion; other interpretations see the coffer as an image of the womb). In addition, there was a "viewing"

(epopteia) of the (rescued?) Kore, probably in dramatic form *(drōmenon)*. The cry that the hierophant uttered at this point suggests as much: "The Lady bore a holy boy-child: Brimo bore Brimos" (Hippolytus, *Refutations* 5.8.40). The reference is probably to the birth of Ploutos, the personification of wealth, from Demeter; yet it is questionable whether this was intended as a symbol of the new birth of the initiate and not as a symbol of the limited power of the lower world or death. The latter meaning seems to be suggested by the concluding rite: the showing of an ear of grain by the priest (Hippolytus, ibid.). This must have signified that life is "Mother" Demeter's gift to human beings. A fragment of Pindar (Bowra 121) says of the initiates: "Happy they who see it and then descend beneath the earth. They know life's end but also a new beginning from the gods." To them alone is life given in the underworld; all others encounter evil (see Sophocles, frag. 837, Pearson).

In addition to the mysteries of Eleusis, there was a series of others about which there is unsatisfactory information. Almost all of them were very ancient. They include the mysteries at Phenas in Arcadia (also mysteries of Demeter); those at Andania in Messenia, in which Demeter and Hermes were venerated as great gods; those at Phyle, dedicated to "Earth, the great mother"; and those on Paros and Thasos, which were again mysteries of Demeter. More important were the mysteries of the great gods, or Kabeiroi, on the island of Samothrace, where there was an ancient place of worship until the fourth century CE that attracted many, especially in the second century BCE. The gods in question were probably a pair of Phrygian divinities, father and son (*kabeiros* is a Semitic word). The ceremonies had a pronounced orgiastic and burlesque character and were probably connected with what had originally been associations of smiths (iron rings played a role). Later, however, the Kabeiroi were regarded as helpers in distress at sea. Practically nothing is known of these mysteries; there are hints of links with Demeter and Orpheus.

More important were the Dionysian mysteries, information on which has come down to us from as early as the fifth century BCE (see Euripides, *The Bacchae*). As is well known, Dionysos was an unusual god who represented a side of Greek life long regarded as un-Greek—a view that has caused interpreters many difficulties. His *thiasos* ("company") was probably originally an association of women that spread throughout Greece, especially the islands, and carried on a real proselytizing activity by means of itinerant priestesses. There was no one central sanctuary, but there were centers in southern Italy (Cumae), Asia Minor, and Egypt. Ecstatic and orgiastic activity remained characteristic of this cult as late as the second century CE and only then assumed more strictly regulated, esoteric forms, as can be seen from the laws of the Iobacchant community at Athens, where the cult of Dionysos (Bacchus) had become a kind of club. The myth of Dionysos had for its focus the divine forces hidden in nature and human beings; these forces were thematized and applied chiefly by women. The ecstatic nocturnal celebrations showed traits of promiscuity (Maenads and satyrs) and took place in the open air. It is uncertain to what extent the paintings in the Villa Item at Pompeii and in the Casa Omerica reproduce the later ritual of the Dionysian mysteries. These paintings are more likely a mysteriosophic interpretation within the framework of a bridal mysticism in which the soul (the immortal element as part of the god Dionysos) presents the pattern of a cycle of purifications. The myth of Dionysos was at an early stage combined with the Orphic mysteries. The hope of another world that was promised and confirmed in the rites is well attested by burial gifts (gold plates) from Greece and southern Italy. Even after death, the initiate remained under the protection of the god. [*See* Dionysos.]

The Orphic mysteries are a difficult phenomenon to deal with. Often they are not easily distinguished from the Dionysian mysteries. Also, it is not certain whether they were actually mysteries and, if they were, where we should look for their origin. Testimonies do not go back beyond the sixth century BCE and vary widely. It is certain that at an early date Orpheus was turned into the founder of the Eleusinian, Dionysian, and Samothracian mysteries. [*See* Orpheus.] Orphism therefore had no central sanctuary. It seems to have been more of a missionary religion that, unlike the official cults, devoted itself to the theme of the immortal soul *(psuchē)* and its deliverance from the present world. It had an ethical view of the relation between initiation and behavior. A way of life that was shaped by certain rules served to liberate the soul or the divine in human beings. The anthropogonic and cosmogonic myth that provided an explanation of the hybrid human condition also showed the way to redemption; cosmology and soteriology were thus already closely connected. As a result, Orphism broke away from the religion of the *polis*, not only because it possessed holy books that contained its teachings, but also because the idea of the immortality of the soul made the official cult superfluous. Greek philosophy, beginning with Socrates and Plato, gave a theoretical justification for all this.

The Oriental mysteries. Narrowly understood, the Oriental mysteries comprised only the mysteries of Isis and of Mithras. But since the ancient Alexandrian re-

porters applied the technical terms *mustēria* and *teletai* in their proper sense to any orgiastic cult or ritual, and especially to the numerous and often quite exotic Oriental cults of the imperial period, a whole series of these religions came to be classified as mysteries; this usage has prevailed down to our own time.

Mysteries of Cybele are attested on the Greek mainland and islands from the third century BCE. Oddly, no mention is made of Attis. Pausanias, in the second century CE, is the first witness to the connection; the mythological relation is attested by Catullus in his "Poem 63" (first century BCE). We know nothing about the structure and content of these mysteries; perhaps they were an imitation of the Eleusinian mysteries. In any case, the Roman cult of Cybele, who was worshiped on the Palatine from 204 BCE on, was not a mystery religion. Beginning in the second century CE and down to the fifth century, the literature speaks of the mysteries of Mater Magna (Mētēr Megalē) but tells us no more about them. On the supposition that we are not dealing simply with a misleading terminology, these mysteries may have focused on the ritual castration of novices (Galli) and its deeper meaning. With regard to Attis, inscriptions in Asia Minor dating from the first century CE speak of the "initiates of Attis" (Attabokaoi). Some formulas, preserved by Clement of Alexandria and Firmicus Maternus, show that the reference is to a participation in the destiny of the divinity whereby the faithful are promised deliverance: "Be consoled, O initiates, for the god is delivered; therefore we too shall have deliverance from our troubles" (Firmicus Maternus, *De erroribus profanarum religionum* 22.1–3).

The initiation involved an anointing; there is also reference to a kind of sacred meal (eating from a tambourine, drinking from a cymbal). The meaning of an accompanying formula is uncertain in the version given by Clement of Alexandria (*Protrepticus* 15): "I have entered the *aduton* [bridal chamber?]." Firmicus Maternus has a simpler version: "I have become an initiate of Attis." At the end of the fourth century CE, the cult of Cybele and Attis also included baptism in bull's blood *(taurobolium)*. This ceremony had developed out of an older sacrifice of a bull, attested from the middle of the second century on. It was supposed to bring renewal to the initiates; only a single inscription interprets the renewal as a "new birth." The baptism was a onetime rite and perhaps was intended to compete with Christian baptism.

The Hellenistic cult of Isis in late antiquity undoubtedly involved secret initiatory celebrations. We learn something about them from Apuleius's famous novel, *Metamorphoses*, or *The Golden Ass* (second century CE). Greek influence is especially clear here: it was only through the identification of Isis with Demeter (attested in Herodotus, 2.59) and the hellenization of the cult of Isis that the latter came to include mysteries (first attested c. 220 BCE on Delos). In this form it spread, despite occasional opposition, throughout the whole civilized world of the time, reaching Rome in the first century BCE. It became one of the most widely disseminated Oriental religions of late antiquity, especially from the second century BCE on. Isis became the great thousand-named, universal goddess *(panthea)* who had conquered destiny and was invoked in numerous hymns and aretalogies that display a remarkable Greco-Egyptian atmosphere and tone.

This successful hellenization was probably due to the introduction of the cult of Sarapis under Ptolemy I, son of Lagus (305–283 BCE), when this novel Greco-Egyptian cult (*Sarapis* combines *Osiris* and *Apis*) was celebrated with both an Eleusinian priest (Timothy, a Eumolpid) and an Egyptian priest (Manetho) participating. Isis, Thoth, and Anubis were naturally linked with Sarapis (Osiris). The well-known story of Isis, Osiris, and Horus (Harpocrates) acquired its complete form only in Greek and in this version was probably a product of Hellenism (Osiris being assimilated to Adonis). The ancient Egyptian cult of Osiris was originally connected with the monarchy and displayed the character of a mystery religion only to the extent that the dead pharaoh was looked upon as Osiris and brought to Abydos not simply to be buried but also to be greeted by the people as one restored to life in the form of a new statue in the temple. The hope of survival *as* or *with* or *like* Osiris was the predominant form that the hope of another world took in ancient Egypt, and it continued uninterrupted in the Greco-Roman period; it provided a point of attachment for the mysteries of Isis. [*See* Isis.]

The cult of Isis had its official place in the Roman festal calendar (beginning in the second century CE) and comprised two principal feasts: the Iseia, which was celebrated from 26 October to 3 November and included the *drōmenon* of the myth, with the "finding" *(heurēsis, inventio)* of Osiris as its climax; and the sea-journey feast (Navigium Isidis, Ploiaphesia) on 5 March, the beginning of the season for seafaring, of which Isis had become the patron deity. According to Apuleius (*Metamorphoses* 11) the actual mysteries began with preliminary rites such as baptism (sprinkling), a ten-day fast, and being clothed in a linen robe. At sunset the initiates entered the *aduton* for further ceremonies to which only allusions are made: a journey through the lower world and the upper world (the twelve houses of the zodiac, which represented the power of destiny) and a vesting of the initiate as the sun god *(instar solis)*; the initiate was *renatus* ("reborn") and became *sol* ("the

sun"), or in other words experienced a deification *(theomorphōsis)*. He thereby became a "servant" of Isis and "triumphed over his destiny [*fortuna*]." In addition to a consecration to Isis, there was evidently also a consecration to Osiris, but we know even less about this ceremony.

The cult of Mithras (Mithra) in the Roman imperial age, like that of Isis, was not originally Oriental but was a creation of Hellenistic syncretism. It is true that the name of the god Mithras is Indo-Iranian in origin and originally meant "contract" *(mithra, mitra)* and that some Iranian-Zoroastrian elements are recognizable in the iconographic and epigraphic sources; these facts, however, do not point to a Persian origin of the cult. No testimonies to the existence of Mithraea in Iran have as yet been discovered. On the other hand, the vast majority of these sanctuaries have been found in the Roman military provinces of central and eastern Europe, especially in Dalmatia and the Danube Valley. The Mithraeum at Dura-Europos on the Euphrates is the most eastern. It was built by Roman soldiers from Syria in 168 CE, rebuilt in 209 CE, and expanded in 240 CE. It was thus not the creation of a native community. The "Parthian" style is simply a matter of adaptation to local tradition and no proof of an Iranian origin of the mysteries. There is as yet no evidence of Mithraea in Babylonia (Mesopotamia); three Mithraea have been found in Asia Minor, one in Syria. The oldest Mithraea are from the middle of the second century CE; most are from the third and fourth centuries. Thus an Eastern origin for the Mithraic mysteries is most uncertain.

According to Plutarch (*Life of Pompey* 24) they were introduced into the West by Syrian pirates in the first century BCE. This report may have a historical basis because the veneration of Mithras in Syria, Pontus, and Commagene is well attested, though no reference is made to any mysteries of Mithras. It is likely that soldiers from this area, where Greeks and Orientals came in contact, brought the cult of Mithras to the West in the first century CE. In the second century CE, however, the cult was transformed into mysteries in the proper sense and widely disseminated as a soldiers' religion, until finally Mithras was elevated to the position of Sol Invictus, the god of the empire, under Diocletian (r. 284–305). As in the case of the cult of Isis, the Hellenistic worshipers of Mithras transformed the foreign god and his cult along lines inspired by the awakening individualism of the time with its rejection of the traditional official cult and its longing for liberation from death and fate—a longing especially understandable in soldiers. In addition, the exotic elements (Egyptian, Persian) are to be attributed to the contemporary tendency to emphasize and cultivate such traits as being especially efficacious.

We are, once again, poorly informed about the myth and rites of the Mithraic mysteries. We have no account by an Apuleius as we do for the mysteries of Isis. Instead we have a large mass of archaeological documents that are not always easy to interpret. The so-called *Mithraic Liturgy* is a magical text concerned only marginally with the mysteries of Mithras. What Porphyry has to say about these mysteries in his *Cave of the Nymph* is philosophical exegesis in the Neoplatonic vein.

The Mithraic mysteries took place in small cavelike rooms that were usually decorated with the characteristic relief or cult statue of Mithras Tauroctonus ("bull-slayer" or "bull-sacrificer"). In form, this representation and its accompanying astrological symbols is Greco-Roman; its content has some relation to cosmology and soteriology, that is, the sacrifice of a bull is thought of as life-giving. Other iconographic evidence indicates that the god was a model for the faithful and wanted them to share his destiny: birth from a rock, combats like those of Herakles, ascent to the sun, dominion over time and the cosmos. Acceptance into the community of initiates *(consecranei)* or brothers *(fratres)* was achieved through consecratory rites in which baptisms or ablutions, purifications (with honey), meals (bread, water, wine, meat), crownings with garlands, costumes, tests of valor, and blessings played a part. There were seven degrees of initiation (Corax, Nymphus, Miles, Leo, Perses, Heliodromus, Pater), which were connected with the planetary deities and certain symbols or insignia. Surviving inscriptions attest the profound seriousness of the mysteries. Mithras is addressed: "You have rescued us, too, by shedding the blood that makes us immortal." Since these groups accepted only men (mostly soldiers), they can be considered true religious associations of males. Also worth noting is the close link between Mithras and Saturn (Kronos) as god of the universe and of time (Aion, Saeculum, Aevum); Saturn is the father of Mithras and the one who commissions him, while Mithras is in turn connected with the sun god (Sol, Apollo). (There is still a good deal of obscurity in this area.) Christian apologists (Justin, Tertullian, Jerome, Firmicus Maternus) regarded the mysteries of Mithras as a serious rival of early Christianity; several Christian churches were built over Mithraea. [*For further discussion, see* Mithra *and* Mithraism.]

Impact of the Mysteries. Because the Greek mysteries, especially the Eleusinian and the Dionysian, exerted a growing attraction and influence, Hellenistic literature accepted and developed in varying ways the ideas

and representations proper to the mysteries. An effort has been made (Kerényi, 1927; Merkelbach, 1984) to extend our knowledge of the mysteries, and especially of the ritual concealed from us by the discipline of the secret *(arcanum)*, by examining the novels of late antiquity. Such fictional themes as loss, search, and recovery, (apparent) death and return to life, the passing of tests, transformations (metamorphoses), hints of "mysteries," and so on may very well have been reflections of the mysteries. Ambiguity, allegory, and symbolism served as codes that could be broken only by initiates (and in our day by scholars). Reinhold Merkelbach speaks in this context of an "Isis novel" (in Apuleius, Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles Tatius, the *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*, and parts of the pseudo-Clementine literature as reworked by Christian gnostics); a "Mithras novel" (Syrian Iamblichus, *Babylonica*); a Dionysos novel (Longus, *Daphne and Chloe*); and, in the *Aethiopiaca* of Heliodorus, a "syncretistic Helios novel" that combines the mysteries of Isis, Mithras, and Dionysos.

The philosophical and religious literature of the Hellenistic age was also affected by the mysteries. The *Corpus Hermeticum*, for example, is filled with reminiscences of the terminology of the mysteries, and we are quite justified in assuming that the circles responsible for the corpus had "mysteries" that were given ritual expression. The same holds for some of the gnostic writings, which not only frequently discuss the concept of *mustērion/mysterium* but also adopt in their rituals various aspects of the mysteries and especially the notion of a *disciplina arcani* (see below). Even Hellenistic Judaism, especially in the person of Philo Judaeus (first century CE), underwent the same influence. A work like *Joseph and Asenath* is unintelligible without a knowledge of the mysteries. Even the Greek translation (the Septuagint) of the Hebrew Bible does not escape their influence, any more than the subsequent writings of the Christian community. The language of Christ's apostle Paul (especially in *1 Corinthians* and *2 Corinthians*) and of his disciples (in *Ephesians* and *Colossians*) betrays this environment, as does, no doubt, the *First Letter of Peter*.

The impact of the mysteries became more concrete beginning in the second century CE, as the Christian church found itself increasingly in competition with these forms of worship. The cultic area of the church's life, especially baptism and eucharist, underwent a profound transformation as the sacraments became "mysteries" to which not everyone had immediate access. Preparation (initiation) was now required in the form of fasts, instructions, purifications. The unbaptized and those on the way to baptism (catechumens) were not admitted to the sacred Christian cultic meal, which was regarded as the "remedy bringing immortality" and acquired its efficacy through the epiclesis (invocation) of the priest; in other words, the cultic meal was placed under a kind of discipline of secrecy. As the church became hierarchically organized (especially from the third century on) and as it became an established church under Constantine in the fourth century, it not only won greater publicity to the detriment of the old established religion but at the same time acquired an aspect of mystery whereby it sought to give a Christian direction to a new phenomenon, the religiosity of the masses. *Mystery* now became not only a cultic term but also, following a path blazed by ancient philosophy, made its way into Christian theology, where *mysticism* came to mean a kind of knowledge of God that is not available to everyone.

"**Mysteriosophy.**" A typically Hellenic spiritualization of the language of the mysteries had been going on in Greek philosophy since Plato; in the ensuing period, as the mysteries spread, *mysterium* and *sophia* became more and more closely associated, and in late antiquity the distinction between religion and philosophy became ever more tenuous. The parallelism of the two was due to the fact that, according to Greek philosophy, knowledge of God was attainable only by a path resembling the one followed in the mysteries at the ritual and religious level: that is, there was need of preparations, instructions, and even a kind of authorization *(katharsis)*. For Plato, knowledge of God is identical with the vision of supreme and utterly pure being; the vision brings a participation in that being and even bestows immortality. For this reason, terms taken from the mysteries were often used in philosophy: *epopteia, teletē, mustēria*. Platonic and Stoic philosophers began to impose their own meaning on the available myths connected with the mysteries; they began to "mythologize" them, that is, to link *muthos* and *logos*. Preliminary steps in this direction, or at least parallel manifestations, were already to be found in Orphism, which posited a "hidden" (mystic) link between the cosmos and human beings and made use in addition of the doctrine of the soul (a divine element located in the body). This paraphilosophical explanation has been called "mysteriosophy" (Bianchi, 1979); we met it earlier in the traditions concerned with Eleusis, where it already bore a strong Orphic impress.

Insofar as the philosophy of the Hellenistic age and late antiquity was interested in the mysteries, it took the often bizarre mythical traditions associated with them and sought to extract their rational (logical) nucleus by interpreting them as pieces of natural philoso-

phy or as nature myths (this was especially the case with the Stoics). Unfortunately, we possess only fragmentary examples of such interpretations of the mysteries. Thus Cybele (Magna Mater) was interpreted as Mother Earth (Lucretius, Varro) and as the origin of being, and Attis as the instrument of creation (i.e., of becoming) or as Logos and Savior (Emperor Julian). Isis, understood as mother of the gods and universal goddess *(panthea)*, was identified with Demeter (Plutarch). Mithras (the Sun) became principle ("Creator and Father") of the universe (Porphyry); his identification with Aion ("eternal time") probably also goes back to a philosophical interpretation.

The influence of this kind of philosophical interpretation on the later theology of the mysteries cannot simply be rejected out of hand. Traditions such as Hermetism, a Greco-Egyptian revelatory religion, show the path followed in this alignment of philosophy and religion, which the Neo-Phythagoreanism and late Platonism (Plotinus) led to philosophy being turned into religion, philosophical knowledge into the vision of God, and the life of the philosopher into a religious *bios* ("life"). At work in this process was the conviction that behind both religion (the mysteries) and philosophy was the "ineffable," the "mystery," or "being," as opposed to everything transient or to "becoming," and that this ultimate reality was to be approached not simply through thought *(theōria)* but also through one's way of life *(praxis)*; only the two together could lead one to vision, enlightenment, and immortality (see especially Iamblichus, *De mysteriis*).

This current of thought provided the matrix for gnosticism, a movement that not only continued to some extent the ritual practices of the mysteries, such as cultic meals, baptisms, purifications, anointings, and *drōmena* and was organized as a mystery-association *(thiasos)* but also borrowed from the mysteries at the level of ideology (mythology). The so-called Naassene sermon "On Man" (Hippolytus, *Refutatious* 5.6, 4–10, 2) is an instructive example of this borrowing and, at the same time, one of the few sources that preserve authentic citations from the Eleusinian mysteries. Among other things, Attis is here interpreted as the gnostic Primal Man (Anthropos); his castration by Cybele becomes a deliverance from what is earthly. Osiris, Adonis, and Adam are likewise variants of the perfect human being or of the immortal soul. According to this gnostic sermon, the mysteries of Isis are the root of all nongnostic cults, and Persephone-Kore, in the form of Aphrodite, represents transient becoming. For this reason, all these mysteries are looked upon as the "lesser mysteries," while the mysteries of gnosticism become the "greater mysteries" or the "heavenly mysteries." This synoptic view of all mysteries in the service of a mysteriosophic and gnostic interpretation was a path by which the traditions embodied in the ancient mysteries made their way into late antiquity. Thus transformed and preserved, they became part of the heritage left by heathen and Christian antiquity and, to that extent, remained alive even after the cessation of the cultic practices that had once been their true reality.

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Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

MYSTICAL UNION (Lat., *unio mystica*) is the unmediated, transforming experience of the unification of man or man's soul with the highest reality. Such union represents the supreme and most authentic elevation of the human spirit as it reaches a fusion with, or at least a living cognition of, God (*cognitio dei experimentalis*) or of the transcendent ground of being. While mystical union is arrived at in different ways in different religious traditions, it is always and everywhere accompanied by a heightened sense of release, ineffable joy, and peace. Hence its synonyms: ecstasy, beatific vision, deification, *samadhi*, sanctification, bliss, vision face-to-face, *satori*, *nirvāṇa*, and so forth.

The experience of union between the subject and its divine object is considered the supreme stage of mystical experience and of the contemplative path. In most religions it is to be arrived at only in stages, at the end of a long and strenuous path leading from merely "heightened" awareness to the purgation of the soul or the self (*via purgativa*), to its engagement on the meditative and then the contemplative path (*via contemplativa*), to final illumination (*via illuminativa*). Yet it is the contention of most mystics that the highest stage can never be reached by conscious effort but rather is discovered in a passive way, meaning a total receptivity and openness toward the divine: here the Christian concept of grace offers a useful analogical insight. [*See* Grace.] Mystical union is a crowning point of human destiny in its spiritual aspects, the return of the isolated creature to the unified and resplendent glory of all that is.

Not all states of altered consciousness, no matter how extraordinary, can be equated with the mystical union; seldom can the sensory phenomena (seeing, hearing, smelling, touching) or extrasensory forms of perception (out-of-body experiences, telepathy, clairvoyance, and the like) that may accompany mystical experience qualify as that highest stage of human awareness. Most mystics and philosophers of mysticism would warn against infatuation with the occult, frenetic states, extraordinary visions, and the search for magical powers or easy claims of access to the supernatural. Mystical union is associated either with prayer (as in theopathetic religions) or with stable illumination (in nontheistic ones), and has little to do with hallucinatory experiences or any other illusions of the senses. The beatitude experienced by all mystics may indeed bear superficial resemblances to the states of trance induced by the use of hallucinogenic substances or psychedelic drugs (mainly because of similar language used to describe such states), but it is rather by its transcendent contents than by the subjective feeling of well-being that the authentic mystical state is recognizable. [*See* Psychedelic Drugs.]

In double-blind, controlled experiments, subjects in one group were given psilocybin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and mescaline, and then were questioned about the quality and intensity of their experiences. Although the similarity of their reports to a description of mystical experiences was significantly higher in the group subjected to the drugs than in the controls, the "drug effect" appeared to be more that of a facilitating or triggering factor than of a real inducer of mystical trance. Whether the person was able to report the analogue of a unitive experience depended heavily on his or her religious background, available vocabulary, and previous disposition toward experiencing precisely that kind of "unity." This and similar results should not preclude, however, the possibility that drug-related experiences may lead, under certain psychological conditions and in particular cultural settings, to authentic experiences of mystical union; neither should it exclude the prudent use of drug stimulation in the scientific study of higher states of mystical awareness. Among the new experimental methods employed in the investigation of altered states of consciousness analogous to religious ecstasy the leaders are judged to be biofeedback research, especially of alpha waves, and the study of endorphines (brain-produced, natural opiates discovered in 1973). Some experiments tend to support the idea

that the right hemisphere of the brain is involved in the production of altered states of consciousness; the ineffability of mystical ecstasy would be then due to the inability of this hemisphere to express itself verbally. Yet these and other similar experiments only compound the notorious difficulty in discerning authentic from inauthentic mysticism on the basis of brain physiology alone.

The typological variety of religious beliefs strongly influences the modes of perceiving and describing the mystical union. Natural mysticisms (the beliefs of some Japanese Tantric sects, for example) and all pantheistic systems in which God is diffusely present in all things, from the stone to the star, to all living beings, start with the body considered as a microcosm and elevate its status through meditation (for example, on a *maṇḍala*) to that of the whole nature, the universe, the macrocosm. The final stage, however, is clearly illuminative and detached from all concrete manifestations. One of the deepest aims of mystics seeking to overcome all dualities is the abolition of time. The fusion of eternity with the instant is not only an aspiration but a well-defined, if subjective, experience of those who attain mystical union. "Eternity" means here the endlessness of time as apprehended in an infinitely short instant of illumination: more than a metaphor illustrating the paradoxality of mystical union, this characteristic makes explicit the timelessness of mystical experience, for there can be no sense of time in a state of consciousness in which the notions of "before" and "after" make no sense. [*See* Eternity.]

All types of mysticism culminate in some form of *unitive* experience, perceived as either internal or external unity: the former is characterized by the loss of ordinary sense impressions and a dissolution of the sense of self, without, however, any loss of awareness; the latter may be described as a feeling of oneness underlying the infinite multiplicity of empirical things. In both cases, the fundamental experience may be expressed as "all is one," inasmuch as the experiencer feels totally immersed in a sacred natural universe. The integration or unity of all things seems to be the fundamental characteristic of the highest state of mystical experience. All mystics perceive that, phenomenally, things differ from each other and belong to different ranks and orders, but these differences are illusory; this highest state of awareness, which is mystical union, is bound to annihilate them just as it abolishes all oppositions. There are, however, notable phenomenological differences among religions, attributable partly to the different objects with or in which mystical union is achieved: nature in pantheistic systems; the universal soul (*brahman*) in Hinduism; the supreme soul (*puruṣa*) in the Sāṃkhya system; and God himself, though in different modalities, in Egyptian, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian mysticism. It is otherwise connoted in ancient Greek texts as "sympathy among all beings," the "dwelling of the soul in God" in Catholic theology, the "deification" of man in the Orthodox tradition, and so forth.

Mystical union has, undeniably, a cognitive aspect. Intuitive insight into the nature of all things is claimed by the mystics who achieve the highest unitive state. In Yoga (lit., "union") philosophy, where the self or pure consciousness is the principle of all that exists, *prajñā*, or intuitive knowledge, is a dimension totally different from logical knowledge. This dimension implies a disbelief in the intellect, a move towards its "destruction" and, through *samādhi* (absorptive concentration)—particularly in its highest form, which is "concentration without seed or support"—a gradual realization of truth. The very awareness of knowing disappears, as does the duality of subject and object: the mind identifies with its object of contemplation. Thought penetrates the essence of the physical and psychical world and becomes one of the infinitesimal nuclei of energy that make up their foundation. Actually the final goal of mystical union is to break the bondage of the mind: in *samādhi* the yogin transcends opposites, unites emptiness and superabundance, life and death, being and nonbeing. He reintegrates a primordial modality of being, or rather of creation; it is "transconsciousness" rather than regression into "prenatal deep sleep" that enables this genuine step into transcendence.

In the Upaniṣads, the term *brahman* is used to denote the subtle principle of the whole, self-contained universe, as distinguished from *ātman* or the individual soul, a golden, self-luminous being which makes the body sleep but is itself eternally awake. The two merge in mystical union: "Thou art That." The union of *ātman* with *brahman* abolishes all duality (Skt., *advaita*, "nondual") and results in a final state of consciousness that lies beyond dreaming and even dreamless sleep, and surpasses also the very difference between good and evil in a supreme impassivity. Thus, in Śaṅkara's "mysticism of the soul," this union is understood not as a mere combination but as a real identity.

Although atheistic and skeptical about the soul (Pali, *anatta*, the "no-soul" doctrine), Buddhism knows an analogon of mystical union in the series of trances that led the Buddha to *nirvāṇa*, a timeless state that is "unborn, unmade, unbecome, and incomposite" and, therefore, unifying and unified. As Tathāgata (the enlightened, the perfect one), the Buddha had unlimited insight; he could see all the worlds, below and above, and a good many of his previous lives. *Nirvāṇa*, the essence of

which is nonlogical and indescribable, is to be realized by absolute desirelessness, the complete extinction of all sorrows and pleasures, detachment from sympathy and antipathy, the dissolution of world processes, the highest possible degree of self-control, and a supraintellectual wisdom, unfathomable by ordinary comprehension.

In Theravāda (Hīnayāna) Buddhism, "taking the three refuges" (i.e., the Buddha, the *dhamma*, and the *sangha*) is considered to be a kind of unitive experience. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, however, the supreme mystical state is emptiness, identified with Buddhahood; this is an experience of "sameness" akin to pantheistic mystical union yet one not devoid of moral connotations. Realization of the Buddha wisdom comes from union with the Buddha nature, which may sometimes be viewed as a mystical participation in the "transcendent body of the Buddha." This state (*bodhi*) embodies a supreme ideal of compassion combined with insight. It is *bodhi*, rather than *nirvāṇa* as such, that functions analogically to what mystical union seems to achieve in other—numinous and prophetic—religions. For Zen Buddhism, *satori*, ultimate stage of meditation comparable to mystical union, is often symbolized by an empty circle signifying oneness, whereas penultimate stages are usually represented by complicated, detailed, and colorful paintings. Zen illumination is instantaneous even though there are techniques, from words to acts, for producing a luminous void and the absence of all fluctuations in the mind. *Satori* is said to yield a fresh, intuitive vision of the real that impregnates with novelty every instant of life. As to the properly cognitive claims of such states of attainment, Buddhism (especially Mahāyāna) teaches particular circumspection lest they enhance delusional views that can never capture reality. Discernment and negative reflexivity are to be used constantly in connection with these "unitive" mystical experiences. The point is not so much to get a certain thing, for instance, higher knowledge but, as Dōgen said, to "become another man."

In ancient Egypt, the cult of Osiris, who became god of the dead after being slain by his brother Seth and was restored to life by his wife Isis, involved initiatory rites of purification that led to an experience tantamount to mystical union: that is, of attachment to or identification with Isis, the mother-goddess. The Egyptians had a powerful sense of a god's ineffability: "Amun is the master of silence, . . . the hidden god," says a text from the nineteenth dynasty. Symbolism of places where union with the god might be achieved abound: among them are the desert, the chapel, and the private dwelling.

The Greek mystery religions, characterized by symbolic, allegorical, and enigmatic figures, comprised early enactments of unitive experiences: the Dionysian cult involved orgiastic rites intended to realize the presence of the god Dionysos himself in the inebriated devotees. In the Eleusinian mysteries (originally agrarian rites), secret initiatory cermonies carried the elect to a level where the spirit could "breathe easily." The Orphic mysteries, under the symbol of Persephone's ravishment by Hades, encompassed the passage of the human soul through all the cycles of generation (*palingenesia*) and its return to the origins. All states and degrees of consciousness were grasped and expressed in oracular language. The soul, containing a spark of immortality, was deemed related to the divine; its gradual purification and absorption of successively unveiled mysteries of the universe enabled it to reverse its fall to sublunar spheres and to reascend to its divine origin. Pythagorean mysticism, a philosophical branch of Orphism, was based on the Apollonian archetype of harmony, that is, the idea that numbers, especially the first ten, are the sacred key to cosmic order.

Classical Greek philosophy, influenced by Pythagorean mysticism, cultivated the notion of an assimilation of man with God: thus Plato, who in the *Theaetetus* enjoined men to liberate themselves of all material bonds in order to elevate their souls to the radiant world of Ideas and even beyond, to their rational essences, significantly influenced subsequent mystical traditions of the Western world. Plotinus's emphasis on the One, which is at the same time the object of love, love itself, and self-love, initiated the idea of a tripartite trajectory of mystical theology: the purgative, the illuminative, and the contemplative paths. Plotinian ecstasy, described as the beatitude experienced during the soul's union with the One or with the idea of the omnipresent, immanent God, was taken over by Proclus and by the whole Neoplatonic tradition. It lies at the origin of the patristic theology of mystical unification and has powerfully affected all varieties of Christian mysticism.

The Judaic mystical tradition started as early as Abraham and included Moses' witness to the divine mystery surrounding the revelation of the Law, his radiant illumination in a "vision face-to-face" of the divine. Jewish apocalyptic sources (e.g., *Dn.* 10:1, *4 Ezr.* 14:37–40) mention fasting and prayer as partial methods for inducing final ecstasy, which occasions in the seer the pouring forth of a "flood of understanding." The closest term for mystical union is *devequt* (adhesion), which emphasizes both the closeness and the distance between transcendent God and man. Ecstatic states are recognized but only as manifested in the constant attachment of the human will to the divine will; this adhesion is considered far more important than ecstasy

itself. Qabbalistic literature admits of a special religious intentionality, *kavvanot*, or the meditation on the realm of *sefirot*. Jewish mysticism is universalistic and optimistic, and the so-called heretical mystics were no less so. In the thirteenth century, Avraham ben Shemu'el Abulafia, in search of ecstasy, looked for an object to stabilize meditation, to deepen it, to free thought from its dependence on sensible appearances: he found it in the letters of the alphabet and formulated a theory of mystical contemplation of their forms, as pure constituents of God's name. This meditative technique was deemed similar to mathematical abstraction. Writing is abstract and immaterial, voice is concrete and material. The problem of the mystic is, therefore, to find a way of helping the soul to perceive more than the forms of nature, without being blinded and overwhelmed by the divine light. All that occupies the natural self of man must be made to disappear or else be transformed so as to become transparent to the inner spiritual reality. In Hasidic mysticism we witness a transmogrification of this intentionality into the intensely emotional and enthusiastic act of *devequt*. According to the Besht (Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer), the joy of the heart is the fundamental mystical attitude; Dov Ber of Mezhirich, the Hasidic theoretician, underscores the interior concentration present at the moment of accomplishment of the *mitsvah*, which alone makes possible the close relationship of the Ḥasid with God implied in *devequt*. The Hasidic mystic has at once the awareness of exercising considerable power and of incurring an immense responsibility. The ideal of accomplishment is community-oriented, and, as Isaac Luria has showed, it represents a kind of solidarity of souls on the path to salvation. Man must build up the soul, which is considered to be God's dwelling, and wherein he, as God's subject, is only a temporary guest.

Ineffability is an apparent and declared characteristic of mystical union; at the same time that they cultivate silence and observe a deep sense of mystery all mystics attempt to speak about this experience, often in the metaphoric language of poetry. One of the usual metaphors employed to connote mystical union is that of spiritual or heavenly marriage. Pre-Christian and gnostic religions used the image of sacred or spiritual marriage between God and the soul to symbolize the mystical union: thus, the biblical metaphor of a wedding applied to the covenant between God and Israel. Philo Judaeus wrote of the "commerce of God with the soul" that engenders both virtue and beauty. The *Song of Songs* was regarded by the church fathers as symbolic of the union of the Word with the church and the soul. Valentinian gnosticism used the symbol of a marriage between each pneumatic nature and its own angel—a marriage similar to the union of higher syzygies, for example, that of Sophia and the Savior. All of these suggested the return of the gnostic to an original state of undefiled unity.

In Christianity, as John of the Cross perceived it, the soul is "thirsty of God," and this desire is actually a disposition toward a loving union, a mutual possession by which the soul is made divine and rendered like unto God by participation. The key to Christian mysticism is the gift of love. The object of the beatific vision is spiritual and therefore requires an increasing spiritualization of even human love of one's neighbor as one moves in faith from earthly contemplation toward the higher states illumined by supernatural charity.

The paradigmatic Christian mystical union is the hypostatic union, meaning that in Jesus Christ a human being became the created self-expression of the Word of God through the permanent union of a human nature with the divine. Deification is the revelation of the personal God in man who is illumined with grace, flooded by the Holy Spirit, and lightened with the divine light: union of the created with the uncreated. For Evagrios of Pontus, the "void of the spirit falling perfectly within itself is the true 'place of God.'" One becomes like God through grace. Eucharistic communion was also presented in the patristic period through the metaphor of spiritual marriage. In a sacramental perspective, Tertullian speaks of "happy marriage, that admits of no betrayal" (*On the Soul* 41. 4), Origen calls Christ the "spouse of the soul," and John Chrysostom compares baptism to spiritual marriage. [*See* Hieros Gamos.] Augustine of Hippo speaks of inchoate contemplation, of specular vision; for him, the contemplative union is inseparable from charity. In book 7 of his *Confessions* he provides a glimpse of the ineffability of mystical experience: it is a contemplation of truth and light, and he who knows it knows eternity; but love alone can approach this light, for understanding is absolutely inferior to this divine subject, impotent to comprehend God.

Dionysius the Areopagite describes the mystical union in terms quite similar to those of the Hindu mystics; it is in its highest part that the soul reaches the contemplation of the purest and deepest truths. The union with God results in deification (*Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*). The intellect must be left behind, for the rays of divine darkness are apprehended only in a state that is pure and devoid of everything, even of perceptions. Mystical union transcends the intelligible world: it can be described only apophatically, like God himself, by way of successive negations. In a similar vein, but with less emphasis on the negative way, Thomas Aquinas considers mystical union to be a supreme species of in-

tellectual intuition of the divine essence: infused contemplation, that is, a knowledge inspired by the Holy Spirit, or knowledge by connaturality—an extraordinary path compared to the ordinary one, that of prayer—not ever through the beatific vision. For Gregory I and Richard of Saint-Victor the *visio* is still intellectual intuition, which acts by loving assimilation. For William of Saint-Thierry, the ultimate destiny of the soul is the beatific vision to be achieved in the solitude and secrecy of the monk's cell inhabited by God. Seeing God's face is tantamount to possessing of God the same knowledge that God has of himself.

Johannes Eckhart believed in the direct, intuitive knowledge of God: he took *union* in the rather bold, literal sense of "unite": mystical union is "the experimental birth of the Word in the Soul" signified by the light of divine glory (*lumen gloriae*), in which grace finds its accomplishment. The mystical union is presented above all in terms of a symbolism of light. Eckhart represents the place of union as the soul's noblest part, its sparkle (*scintilla animae*); it unites with God like light to light. Eckhart is also famous for having inscribed in the history of Christian mystical philosophy two metaphysical concepts describing stages on the path to mystical union. One is the state of detachment or separation from all worldly worries (*Abgeschiedenheit*), the other points to the subtlest state in mystical awareness, the letting go of everything, including of God—the soul's supreme release (*Gelassenheit*). Both concepts were capitalized upon in German idealistic (Hegel) and existential (Heidegger) philosophy. Moreover, on the basis of his original approximations of mystical union, Eckhart is treated as the Christian mystic standing nearest to the Oriental understanding of this process, in particular that of Zen Buddhism.

Gregory Palamas conceived of mystical union as a fusion of man with the divine energies that symbolize the emanation of the Trinity toward man. John of the Cross, whose poetical writings constitute a culmination of Christian mystical literature, taught that the soul must preserve its absolute purity from all imaginative perceptions, visions, and the like (which he thought were demonic obstacles) in order to gain access to mystical union. He emphasized the value of "nothingness," of interior emptiness, for the free play of suprasensory and supraintellectual contemplation. Love that silences understanding, memory, and the will is alone capable of opening the gates of active contemplation. Passive contemplation, on the contrary, leading toward divine union, passes through what he called the dark night of the senses and of the intellect, a state similar to the Buddhist *śūnyatā*, through which the "old man" is finally destroyed; the soul becomes analogous to a crystal absorbing the light and becoming one with it (*Living Flame of Love*). In this life, however, one can never attain complete union with God but only elevate oneself above the natural condition. The mystical ascent passes through several degrees (or "nights") of purification at the summit of which stands the night of love magnificently described in the verses of his canticle *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*. Teresa of Avila, while insisting on the need for grace, depicts the soul as consisting of a series of mansions, each corresponding to a degree of attainment in orison and contemplation. She devises stepwise the path of prayer toward mystical union. The seventh mansion, for instance, is that "where the soul remains all the time in that center with its God" (*Interior Mansions* 7.2.335). Theologically, contemplation must take for its object the divine humanity of the Christ, a belief that Ignatius Loyola also professed. The apex of mystical union, however, does not reside in contemplation but in the total abandonment of all personal aims, in the curbing of our own will and in the equally delightful receptivity of that which is sweet and that which is bitter; this is as close as a Christian definition can come to the equanimity (*vairāgya*) of Hinduism in happiness as well as adversity.

In all forms of mysticism the symbolism of ascension is central in describing the stages preparatory to mystical union. Some preserve it even in the case of a retreat by the celestial beings, as in the reactualization of *illud tempus*, the archaic temporal dimension of miracle and sacrality. The techniques of ecstasy in Asian shamanism, for example, imply the belief in a supreme being to whom man can closely relate by effecting a spiritual ascension to heaven. This ascent must be prepared by "mystical death," possession, and meditational procedures comparable to those of the great Eastern or Occidental traditions. Mircea Eliade points out such similarities, from the secret language used by the shamans of northern or central Asia to their pre-ecstatic techniques and the poetic creations occasioned by them. The ecstatic states attained by the shamans through mushroom intoxication, lasting sometimes from four to seven days, seem to represent an early matrix of mystical union. [*See* Shamanism.]

In Chinese mysticism, all ways converge toward the Tao, the "eternally dwelling," "bed of the river," "order of the world." The *jen-tao*, signifying the moral life of man in society, bears a slight trace of the *t'ien-tao*, or the Way of Heaven, which in its turn tends toward the *te*, which designates both virtue and the magic power inherent in the Tao. The supernatural practically participates in a universal consciousness that demands, in order to be reached, a true conversion. The nature of the sacred is revealed only to the interior man capable of

living it. However, interiority and exteriority communicate, and everything is literally in everything. Taoist union is union with nature in its deepest order and significance. Confucian mysticism, by contrast, is social, messianic, cosmic, and existential. It relies on the unity and morality of the people (community). It is a dream of humanity fused in a single body by means of filial piety, brotherly respect, and organic unity; only through the mediation of familial unity can the larger, cosmic unity with heaven and earth and the myriad things be manifested. The *I ching* puts forth a "mystique of the miracle" based on understanding the measure of the divine and the transformation or mutation of everything that is.

In Zoroastrianism, ecstatic states mean a visionary sharing of the seer in Ahura Mazdā's wisdom of omniscience. The Middle Iranian texts present trance as a deep, pleasant sleep induced by the drinking of a special beverage, a state from which one would not want to be awakened. During it, the soul is transported to heaven whence she returns filled with the gift of prophecy.

In Sufism, the mystical aspect of the highly theistic and theocentric religion of Islam, the encounter of the mystic with God is seen as a series of spiritual clashes resulting in ecstasies. Intensive self-observation and concentration on one's own identity are required before attaining perfection, or the true dynamic encounter and union of I and Thou. The "God-intoxicated" prophet Muḥammad had intense mystical experiences, always connected, however, with visions or dreams (interior locutions). His solitary vigils in the desert or around Hira occasioned his visions of the archangel Gabriel, who ordered him: "Read!" Later experiences related in a legend show the Prophet riding on a winged mule and flying up to the seventh heaven, which ever since has symbolized the ascent of the soul to God through successive circles.

Persian and Indian overtones can be discerned in the Islamic concept of mystical union; reciprocally, ancient Mazdean religions were spiritualized and bent toward interiority of contemplation by Islamic monotheism. Abū Yazīd al-Biṣṭāmī, for instance, was influenced by Indian pantheism. He is the author of numerous ecstatic utterances cast in a strange and sublime poetic style (invoking God, for example, as "smith of my self," "mirror of my heart"). The Arabic term for the essence of mystical union with God in the practice of contemplation and ecstasy as understood by the Ṣūfī is *tawḥīd*. *Fanā'* and *baqā'* are the two correlated terms denoting this event: the former, usually translated as oblivion, annihilation, extinction, points to the passing away of consciousness, which is tantamount to the obliteration of its inferior and imperfect attributes in favor of developing the perfect ones. Unlike *nirvāṇa*, *fanā'* is not the mere cessation of individual life but the annihilation of the veil that this personality represents, that is, the annihilation of its characteristics, pleasures, and ordinary consciousness, and the development of a more ample and perfect selfhood. Higher than *fanā'* is *baqā'* ("subsistence," "survival" of the unity of everything in God), which speaks of that perfected existence within the sphere of the new, divinely bestowed attributes.

Mystical experience often stops at *fanā'*; the prophet, however, who is the mystic *par excellence*, endeavors to be constantly both with God and with the world, in order to transmute the course of history through the implementation of the divine will. The *dhikr*, or remembrance of God, a technique strikingly akin to that of the Christian Orthodox "prayer of the heart," or Jesus Prayer, as well as to some yogic Tantric practices and to *buddhānusmṛti* ("remembrance of the Buddha"), is an act of calling God to remembrance verbally or mentally, a ritual glorification of his name and unconditional unity, by repetition of a prayer formula accompanied by special breathings and physical movements. In the realized intimate *dhikr* all duality is abolished, and there is a felt disappearance (*fanā'*) of the subject in his very being.

Superlative, mystic love—the joy of the lover in his beloved—is the principle of Sufism; for the Persian Ṣūfīs, there is an indescribably intense magnetism proper to this encounter (*wajd*), which produces at the same time shock, stupor, and painful bliss. As a state of consciousness it is described as inducing insensitivity to pain, cessation of the normal time-flow experience, higher noetic insights into the essence of divine truth, inexpressible by logical, discursive means, and, sometimes, exterior phenomena such as levitation following the dervish dances. The mystic al-Ḥallāj, who was tortured and executed in Baghdad in 922, is known to have taught a "perfect union with God" through the desire for submission to suffering; on the model of Jesus, possibly, he is said to have prayed for his executioners. Ibn al-'Arabī was a pantheist who expressed in love poetry the monistic identification between man and God. In its ultimate stage, the contemplation of God becomes one with that of the essence of the universe. Once the veils are lifted, reality is perceived in all its nakedness; the soul is absolutely freed. Even the *dhikr* litanies become secondary means at the height of mystical union, which is actually a conjunction between God and man (*ittiṣāl*), a cohabitation (*ḥulūl*) of God in the soul of the mystic.

In spite of the almost universal claim to the ineffability of mystical union, both literary and theological descriptions of it abound in the world's sacred and poetic

writings. The great majority of these descriptions converge on the sublimity, bliss, and unsurpassable freedom obtained in going beyond the state of creaturehood, beyond the fluctuations of the mind and the limits of human understanding and emotions (oceanic feeling), as well as beyond the boundaries of time and space. The individual who enters upon mystical union is, at least ideally, a wholly dispassionate, detached being, who has shed all cravings and desires and thereby becomes the pure consciousness of self as selflessness. Mystical union thus not only signifies a supreme form of individual deliverance from imperfections and finitude but remains a perennial source of psychological rejuvenation, philosophical insight, moral innovation, and artistic creativity. In particular, the "panenhenical" (Zaehner) type of mystical union, which points to the unity of all existence, and in which the individual transcends the boundaries of his own identity, has been shown to generate psychological flexibility and to favor syncretistic syntheses characteristic of both artistic and scientific invention.

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ILEANA MARCOULESCO

MYSTICISM. No definition could be both meaningful and sufficiently comprehensive to include all experiences that, at some point or other, have been described as "mystical." In 1899 Dean W. R. Inge listed twenty-five definitions. Since then the study of world religions has considerably expanded, and new, allegedly mystical cults have sprung up everywhere. The etymological lineage of the term provides little assistance in formulating an unambiguous definition. In the Greek mystery cults, *muein* ("to remain silent") probably referred to the secrecy of the initiation rites. But later, especially in Neoplatonic theory, the "mystical" silence came to mean wordless contemplation. Even this "contemplation" does not coincide with our own usage of that term, since *theōria* denotes speculative knowledge as well as what we call contemplation.

Nor does the early Christian term *mustikos* correspond to our present understanding, since it referred to the spiritual meaning that Christians, in the light of

revelation, detected under the original, literal meaning of the scriptures. Eventually the idea of a meaning hidden underneath surface appearances was extended to all spiritual reality (the sacraments, especially the Eucharist, even nature itself as expressive of God's majesty). Yet the strictly private character that we so readily associate with the term *mystical* was never part of it.

Sometime between the fourth and the fifth centuries, the Christian meaning began to absorb the Greek connotations of silence and secrecy. For Dionysius the Areopagite, the influential Syrian (?) theologian, mystical theory consisted of the spiritual awareness of the ineffable Absolute beyond the theology of divine names. Still, even for him, mystical insight belonged essentially to the Christian community, not to private speculation or subjective experience. Contrary to this objective, communal meaning, Western Christianity, mostly under Augustine's impact, eventually came to understand the mystical as related to a subjective state of mind. Thus Jean de Gerson, the fifteenth-century chancellor of the Sorbonne, described mystical theology as "experimental knowledge of God through the embrace of unitive love." Here we witness the formulation of the modern usage of a state of consciousness that surpasses ordinary experience through the union with a transcendent reality.

Characteristics. With such a wide range of meanings, it is not surprising that commentators disagree about the characteristics of the mystical experience. Those mentioned in William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* rank among the most commonly accepted. *Ineffability* emphasizes the private, or at least incommunicable, quality of the experience. Mystics have, of course, written quite openly and often abundantly about their experiences. But, by their own testimony, words can never capture their full meaning. This raises a delicate problem of interpretation to which we shall return. Secondly, James mentions the *noetic* quality of the experience. To be sure, mystical insight hardly ever augments theoretical knowledge. Nevertheless its insight suffuses a person's knowledge with a unique, all-encompassing sense of integration that definitely belongs to the noetic order. This point deserves emphasis against those who assert that mysticism is the same everywhere and that only the postmystical interpretation accounts for the difference. Distinctions begin with the noetic qualities of the experiences themselves. The *passivity* of the mystical experience may well be its most distinctive characteristic. Its gratuitious, undeserved nature stands out, however much the privileged subject may have applied himself to ascetic exercises or meditative techniques. Once the higher power takes possession, all voluntary preparation appears to lose its efficacy. *Transiency*, a more controversial characteristic, has, I think justifiably, been challenged, for great mystics have remained for prolonged periods in enhanced states of consciousness. Intermittent intensive experiences figured therein as moments of a more comprehensive surpassing awareness. Perhaps we should speak of the *rhythmic*, rather than the transient, quality of mystical life.

To James's four characteristics we may add a fifth: *integration*. Expanded beyond its ordinary limits, the mystical consciousness somehow succeeds in overcoming previously existing opposition in its integration with a higher reality. This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that all restrictions cease to exist. Some of them clearly maintain a sense of transcendence within the union. This is precisely what gives them their distinctly religious character.

Identity and Difference. That a "common factor" underlies the most diverse spiritual theologies has been asserted with great emphasis by such writers as René Guénon, Aldous Huxley, Frithjof Schuon, and Alan Watts. Some assumption of identity also seems to direct the thought of several Indian philosophers. In the West at least, the theory rests on the general principle that only subsequent interpretations distinguish one mysticism from another. Each mystic unquestionably tends to interpret his experience in the light of the theological or philosophical universe to which he belongs. Moreover, the nature of his spiritual quest usually shapes the experience. But to conclude therefrom that the interpretation remains extrinsic is to deny the experience a specific, ideal content of its own and to reduce it to mere sensation. Experience itself is distinctly cognitive and intentionally unique. As Gershom Scholem once pointed out, there is no mysticism-in-general; there are only particular mystical systems and individuals, Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jewish, Christian, and so forth.

The specific quality of the experience in mystical individuals or schools does not, of course, exclude a kind of family resemblance in this variety. A denial of similarity has induced traditional interpretations to study mystical schools exclusively from the perspective of their own theological principles. Thus, for example, R. C. Zaehner's controversial *Mysticism* (1957) ranks mystical schools according to their proximity to orthodox Christian love mysticism. Alternatively, the assumption of a genuine similarity of experiences enables us to consider a variety of phenomena under some general categories without reducing them to simple identity. Such a general discussion would include nonreligious as well as religious mysticism, even though basic

differences separate them. The present essay focuses only on religious mysticism. But a few words must be said about so-called nature mysticism, a term unrelated to the distinction, current in Roman Catholic theology, between "natural" (or acquired) and "supernatural" (or infused) mysticism. Nature mysticism refers to the kind of intense experience whereby the subject feels himself merging with the cosmic totality. Now, a mystical experience of the cosmos may also be religious. But in the religious experience a sense of transcendence persists throughout the experience of cosmic union either with regard to nature as a whole or to its underlying principle. Some descriptions of romantic writers (John F. Cooper, William Wordsworth, Jean Paul) seem to express such a mystical awareness of nature. We also find traces of it in Turner and in the nineteenth-century painters of the Hudson River school. The artist most remembered for his mystical descriptions of nature may well be Richard Jeffries. In his case the distinction between the religious and the nonreligious is particularly hard to maintain. In other cases any religious equation of cosmic-mystical experiences with what John of the Cross or the *Bhagavadgītā* expressed would be clearly inappropriate. Nevertheless, to deny any resemblance between the intense, unifying experience of nature and that of a transcendent presence would be absurd. [*See* Aesthetics, *article on* Philosophical Aesthetics.]

At this point the problem of narcotically induced states presents itself. [*See* Psychedelic Drugs.] Must we dismiss them as not mystical or at least as not religiously mystical because of their chemical origin? Such a simplistic categorization would be a blatant instance of the "genetic" fallacy. Instead of describing the phenomenon itself, we would then be satisfied to evaluate it according to its presumed origin. Of course, any mental state introduced without spiritual preparation is unlikely to foster spiritual development, and, if habitual, the reliance on chemical means may permanently obstruct growth. But however beneficial or detrimental this eventual impact upon personality may be, there can be no doubt that in a religious context chemicals may induce states of undeniably religious-mystical character. Thus the ritual consumption of peyote cactus buttons, dating back to pre-Columbian times, has undoubtedly played a significant role in the religious awareness of native Americans and has since the end of the nineteenth century been instrumental in remythologizing the cult.

Similarly, experiences resulting from pathological psychic conditions (e.g., manic depression, hysteria) should not per se be excluded from the mystical. Nor should these or drug-induced states be considered separately from "nature" or religious mysticism. On the latter alone we shall concentrate. The typology here presented considers only the mystical aspect of various religions: it claims neither adequacy in the general area of religion nor completeness in the classification of mystical religion.

Mysticism of the Self. Mysticism belongs to the core of all religion. Those religions that had a historical founder all started with a powerful personal experience of immediate contact. But all religions, regardless of their origin, retain their vitality only as long as their members continue to believe in a transcendent reality with which they can in some way communicate by direct experience. The significance of such an experience, though present in all religion, varies in importance. Christianity, especially in its reformed churches, attaches less significance to the element of experience than other faiths do. In Vedantic and Sāṃkhya Hinduism, on the contrary, religion itself coincides with the kind of insight that can come only from mystical experience. Their particular concept of redemption consists in a liberation from change and from the vicissitudes of birth and death. Their craving for a state of changeless permanence aims not at some sort of unending protraction of the present life but rather at the extinction of all desire in this life. Hindu spirituality in all its forms displays an uncommonly strong awareness of the sorrowful quality of the human condition. Apart from this common temper and an acceptance of the authority of the Vedas, Hinduism presents such a variety of religious doctrines and practices that a single name hardly applies. Still, a similar, inward-directed mystical tendency warrants discussion under a single title.

The original Vedic religion with its emphasis on sacrifice and rite appears rather remote from what we usually associate with the term *mysticism.* Yet two elements in its development strongly influenced the later, more obviously mystical direction. First, forms of meditation became at some point acceptable substitutes for the performance of the actual sacrifice and were held to yield equally desirable benefits. Though such forms of concentration had little in common with what we understand today by contemplation, they nevertheless initiated an interiorization that Hinduism would pursue further than any other religion (Dasgupta, 1927, p. 19). Second, the term *brahman,* which originally referred to the sacred power present in ritual and sacrifice, gradually came to mean a single, abstractly conceived Absolute. The search for a primal unity is already obvious in some Vedic texts (e.g., the Creation Song, which speaks of "that one thing, breathless, breathed by its own nature"). The subordinate status of the gods ("The gods are later than this world's production," *Ṛgveda* 10.129) may have favored the drive toward unity. Polytheism,

though abundantly present, had remained spiritually so undeveloped that it did not obstruct the road toward spiritual unity.

In the Upaniṣads (eighth to fifth century BCE) the unifying and the spiritualizing tendencies eventually merged in the idea of an inner soul *(ātman)*, the Absolute at the heart of all reality to which only the mind has access.

> The inner Soul of all things, the One Controller,
> Who makes his one form manifold—
> The wise who perceive Him as standing in oneself,
> They, and no others, have eternal happiness!
> (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 5.12)

This is not a metaphysical theory, but a mystical path to liberation. It requires ascetical training and mental discipline to overcome the desires, oppositions, and limitations of individual selfhood. "As a man, when in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing within or without, so this person, when in the embrace of the intelligent Soul, knows nothing within or without" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 4.3.22). Here lies the origin of the *advaita* (nondualist) monism that would become dominant in classical Hinduism. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* anticipates the later, radical expressions in its description of the highest state of consciousness as one beyond dreamless sleep. Above all, it equated the deeper self *(ātman)* thus discovered with *brahman* itself. This deeper self tolerates no subject-object opposition. If taken literally, this state would eliminate consciousness itself and with it the very possibility of a "mystical" state. Yet such a total elimination of personal consciousness remains an asymptotic ideal never to be reached but to be approached ever more closely. The three aspects of *brahman (sat-cit-ānanda)* that even extreme monists distinguish include two that are clearly conscious. Even if any distinction beyond the One were to be a mere illusion, as in the extreme interpretation of *māyā* (originally, the created world itself) given by Śaṅkara (eighth century CE), it still remains an opposition to indiscriminate Unity. Metaphysical speculation in classical Hinduism may occasionally have surpassed its mystical tendency. But that there *was* a religious experience at the basis of this extreme monism cannot be doubted.

> The starting-point of Sankara and the Samkhya-Yoga is the *experience* of the immortality of the soul; and immortality in this case does not mean the infinite prolongation of human life in time: that is *Samsāra* which the Hindus regard rather as a living death; it is death-in-life, not life-in-death. It means rather an unconditioned and absolutely static condition which knows nothing of time and space and upon which death has no hold; and because it is not only pure Being, but also pure consciousness and pure bliss, it must be analogous to life. (Zaehner, 1962, p. 74)

Of course, not all the Upaniṣads were radically monist in their expression (*Śvetāśvatara* is clearly not), nor was the Vedantic theology the only mysticism of the self in India. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga mentioned in the above passage advocates a radical dualism. It recognizes two irreducible principles of reality: *prakṛti*, the material principle and source of energy, cause of both the material world and psychic experience, and *puruṣa*, discrete units of pure consciousness similar to the *ātman* of the Upaniṣads. In contrast to cosmic intellect *(mahat)*, ego-consciousness *(ahaṃkāra)*, and mind *(manas)* as the source of perception and action, the multiplicity of individual *puruṣas* exists independently of the cosmic forces altogether. Yet *puruṣa* must be liberated from a confusion with *prakṛti* by means of concentrated effort. Sāṃkhya thought, although it has no place for deity and is specifically atheistic, was assimilated into the age-old tradition of yoga, providing the practice with a soteriological and cosmological framework. This mystical self-isolation recognizes no absolute One *(brahman/ātman)* beyond the individual spirit. Liberation here means the opposite of merging with a transcendent Self. In its pure form, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, far from leaning toward pantheist monism (as Vedantic spirituality does), results in the most extreme individualism. If the idea of God appears at all, it is as that of one *puruṣa* next to all others, their model insofar as God is entirely free of cosmic contamination. But we must avoid tying the Yoga techniques to the later Sāṃkhya theology: they were practiced also in non-dualist or in the so-called qualified-dualistic (Viśiṣṭādvaita) systems.

What are these qualified-dualistic systems that make up the third school of Hindu mysticism? It seems hazardous to ground them in theological theories. To be sure, each mystical system contains an interpretation as an essential part of the experience, but these interpretations cannot be simply transferred into the kind of logically coherent systems for which we usually reserve the name *theology*. A mystical theology is less concerned about logical consistency and sharply defined concepts than about adequate translations of the actual experience. This is particularly the case in a tradition wherein the mystical element constitutes most of the core of the religion itself. Hence in describing such later writers as Rāmānuja (eleventh century CE) as "qualified dualists," we should be aware that we are referring more to a practical-devotional than a speculative-metaphysical attitude. Rāmānuja may never have abandoned the meta-physical assumptions of the monist tradition in which he grew up. But finding absolute monism inadequate for the practice of spiritual life, he reaffirmed the traditional concept of a God endowed with personal attributes *(saguṇa brahman)*, instead of the attributeless

absolute substance *(nirguṇa brahman)*. God thereby is not merely a model but also a redeemer who assists the soul on its path to liberation.

In thus qualifying the monist doctrine, Rāmānuja was inspired by what the *Bhagavadgītā* (c. second century BCE) had assumed throughout. This mystical poem, perhaps the finest spiritual work to come from the East, is hard to classify by Western canons. The narrative assumes a clearly theistic position: the god Viṣṇu incarnated in Kṛṣṇa exhorts the hero Arjuna on the eve of battle with his stepbrother to take heart and fight. But the message he delivers ranges from traditional piety and observance of the ancient rites to the monism of the Vedānta, combined with the dualistic cosmology of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. The work is a synthesis in all respects. Not only does it unite the monist and theistic strands, but it also presents a method of combining the active with the contemplative life. It advises a mental discipline that enables a person to act with total detachment from the fruits of his deed. By itself, the active life *(karman)* weaves its own web of causes and effects, entailing an endless cycle of birth and death—the very essence of what a person seeks to be liberated from. Yet various kinds of yoga detach the mind from this natural determination, while still allowing a person to fulfill the obligations of his station in life. Through equanimity of emotions, holy indifference, and purity of heart, even the active person will come to detect the one presence of *brahman* in all things. The *Gītā* is not a manual of yogic practice. It is a mystical work that culminates in a vision of God. A most powerful theophany completes Kṛṣṇa's description of God's presence in the world (chap. 11). Still the poem concludes with the sobering advice to seek God in the ordinary way of piety rather than through self-concentration. The advice was taken up by the *bhakti* movement, which produced some of the finest flowers of Hindu spirituality and which continues to nourish much of Indian piety today.

The Mysticism of Emptiness: Buddhism. It seems difficult to conceive of two religious doctrines more different from one another than Hinduism, especially Sāṃkhya, and Buddhism. In one, we find a quest for an absolute self (*ātman, puruṣa*); in the other, the obliteration of the self (*anātman/anatta*—no soul). Yet upon closer inspection the two appear to have a great deal in common. Both are systems of salvation, rooted in a profoundly pessimistic attitude about the changing world of everyday existence, and they aim at a condition of changelessness that surpasses that existence. Moreover, their adherents mostly hope to attain this salvation through enlightenment prepared by moral discipline and mental concentration. In the more radical schools the quest for a unified state of mind leads to some form of practical monism and, in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism no less than in "classical" Hinduism, a theoretical monism. Any kind of "grace"—which would introduce a new dualism—is thereby excluded. Even those parts of the tradition that deviate from these rigorous principles appear to have some common features. Amida Buddhism advocates a faith in the "saving Buddha" that strongly resembles *bhakti* Hinduism.

Meanwhile, the goal of enlightenment is conceived in very different ways. The Buddhist description both of the experience and of the path that leads to it is characterized by a spare simplicity as well as by a persistent reluctance to use any but negative predicates. For our purposes it is not necessary to enter into the basic tenets of the theory. Their development varies from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna doctrines. But even in the Theravāda tradition, the Eightfold Path of virtue concludes with "right concentration," which, in turn, must be obtained in eight successive forms of mental discipline (the *dhyānas*). Once again we are confronted with a faith that from its origins is headed in a mystical direction. The three negative terms—nonattainment, nonassertion, nonreliance—define a state of utmost emptiness by which Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika school (150 CE) described enlightenment. Emptiness appears, of course, also in Hīnayāna schools, as the principal quality of *nirvāṇa*, the supreme enlightenment. But with the Mahāyāna schools the emphasis on emptiness, even in the preparatory stages, becomes particularly strong. *Nirvāṇa* itself thereby ceases to be an independent realm of being: it becomes a particular vision of the phenomenal world. Nonattainment consists in emptying the self of all personal qualities, desires, and thoughts, indeed of all that might be considered to comprise a "self." For ultimate reality is unconditioned and void of all defining distinctions. If this concept is understood ontologically, there is no substantial soul; if understood epistemologically, there is no way of knowing reality as long as the notion of subject remains; if understood ethically, there is no expression of ultimate reality as long as one's desires condition one's existence. As the late Mahāyāna poet Śāntideva wrote:

> The Stillness *(Nirvāna)* lies in surrender of all things, and my spirit longs for the Stillness; if I must surrender all, it is best to give it for fellow-creatures. I yield myself to all living creatures to deal with me as they choose; they may smite or revile me for ever, cover me with dust, play with my body, laugh and wanton; I have given them my body, why shall I care. Let them make me do whatever works bring them pleasure; but may mishap never befall any of them by reason of me. (quoted in Ananda Coomaraswamy's *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*, New York, 1964, p. 321)

Beyond wisdom, then, the Buddhist ideal requires compassion, an attitude rooted in the deep awareness that all beings are interconnected. It is this compassion that inspired the *bodhisattva* vocation in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

As Nāgārjuna defined it, nonassertion became the logical counterpart of the emptiness doctrine. The Mādhyamika paradoxes reveal an intense awareness of the ineffable quality of ultimate truth. No expression is definitive, not even the Four Noble Truths on which Buddhism is founded. The entire Dharma itself, the doctrine, is no more than a dream, a vague echo. To be sure, the conception of an ineffable absolute is also present in Hīnayāna Buddhism, as the following *Udāna* statement clearly asserts: "There is, monks, an unborn, not become, not made, uncompounded; and were it not, monks, for this unborn, not become, not made, uncompounded, no escape could be shown here for what is born, has become, is made, is compounded" (*Buddhist Texts through the Ages*, ed. Edward Conze, Oxford, 1954, p. 95).

Yet the Mahāyāna schools drew more radical conclusions. For the Mādhyamika *nirvāṇa* consists mostly of sets of contradictories, both of which are negated. To Nāgārjuna, *nirvāṇa* is logical "nonsense" to which the principle of contradiction does not apply. One may read this as a program of extreme skeptical philosophy. It is, in fact, a powerful assertion of transcendence in which all distinctions vanish. For the Mādhyamika masters, *nirvāṇa* lies beyond the total peace experience: it has become the Absolute *in itself*, the undivided Oneness of the ultimate reality. No longer separated from conditioned existence, the Mahāyāna *nirvāṇa* becomes indistinguishable from the samsaric realm of phenomenal (and therefore illusory) reality. The Buddhist negation, far more radical than a mere declaration of absence, leaves no common space wherein the Absolute could be compared with any positive qualities. It attempts the logically impossible, namely, to overcome the very interconnectedness of all dependent being and, since all that exists is dependent, of existence itself. Nothing remains here but the road to total silence. Salvation comes through wisdom, but clearly the wisdom here is the opposite of cognitive—it consists in mystical silence.

The ways to emptiness vary. Mental training by the confrontation of paradoxes has been mentioned. Other ways, especially Yogācāra Buddhism, emphasize the attainment of "pure thought." This consists not in thinking *about* something but rather in the insight that thought is not in any object but in a subject free of all objects. Yogācāra pursues the basic truth of emptiness in a practical rather than a logico-metaphysical way.

Of particular importance here is Ch'an (Jpn., Zen) Buddhism, a doctrine imported into China by the Indian Bodhidharma that later spread to Japan. Most consistent of all in its pursuit of emptiness, it rejected all dependence (nonreliance), including the one based on the Buddha's own words. Indeed, the very desire for enlightenment must be abandoned, according to the famous Zen master Dōgen. The name Ch'an, or Zen, derived from *dhyāna* (Pali *jhāna*), indicates the importance of mental concentration. But Zen also requires a systematic surpassing of reason. At an early stage in his training the disciple is given a *kōan*, a paradoxical statement that baffles reason and for which he must find a "higher" sense. Once the mind has become cleared of the ordinary apparatus of conscious thought, unconscious elements emerge from its subliminal depths. Zen masters refer to this stage of hallucinations as *makyō*—the demonic universe—and advise the student not to dwell on any extraordinary experiences. Their advice agrees with the attitude recommended by Christian spiritual directors to mystics passing through the so-called "illumination" stage with regard to visions and voices. All this prepares a state of unification in which the mind gradually sheds the patterns of oppositional consciousness present in desire, fear, prejudice, or even objective conceptualization. C. G. Jung once suggestively described it as "a breakthrough by a consciousness limited to the ego-form, into the non-ego-like self." In the experience of total unity the self becomes reduced to a state of pure perceptiveness. This occurs in the final stage, *satori*, enlightenment itself, often referred to as *kenshō*, the ability to see the essence of things. We might perhaps translate it as "suchness" or "ultimate reality" (the Sanskrit term *tathatā*, used for the one reality that constitutes the entire universe, coincides in Mahāyāna Buddhism with *nirvāṇa* itself).

Most typical of that final state of emptiness as Zen Buddhists conceive of it is that it results not in a withdrawal from the real but in an enhanced ability to see the real as it is and to act in it unhampered by passion and attachment. Thus emptiness creates a new worldliness. Can such a state be called mystical? Not if one reserves the term for a direct contact with an Absolute that can be described by positive attributes. But such a restriction is not warranted. Any form of religious mysticism claims a direct contact with the Absolute. How it defines this Absolute depends on its particular outlook. Judaism and Christianity are religions of the word; Buddhism is a religion of silence that renounces all ways of naming the Absolute. Even to demand the presence of grace as a specific expression of a divine benevolence is to deny Buddhism the right to conceive of the Absolute as lying beyond any form of expression. Mean-

while, the function of what Christians call "grace" does not remain unfulfilled, as appears in the attitude of thanksgiving that shapes the Buddhist monk's life as much as that of his Western counterpart. In thanking the nameless source of all goodness, the Buddhist professes the presence of a benevolent Absolute.

Of course, here as in other cases the outsider is unable to decide to what extent religion blossoms into actual mystical experience. What counts is the possibility it presents of an intense, direct contact with the Absolute, and the methodic way that a particular religion offers for realizing this encounter. Not every form of Zen may be called mystical or even religious, any more than the practice of yoga in Hindu culture or, for that matter, the study of Neoplatonic theory.

Mysticism of the Image: Eastern and Early Western Christianity. Unlike some other religions, Christianity has never equated its ideal of holiness with the attainment of mystical states. Nor did it encourage seeking such states for their own sake. Nevertheless, a mystical impulse undeniably propelled it in its origin and determined much of its later development. The synoptic Gospels present Jesus as dwelling in the continuous, intimate presence of God. His public life begins with a prayer and a vision: "While Jesus after his baptism was at prayer, heaven opened and the Holy Spirit descended on him in bodily shape like a dove" (*Lk.* 3:21–22). It ends with a prayer of total abandonment: "Father, into your hands I commend my spirit" (*Lk.* 23:46). Jesus initiates all important public acts with a prayer. He often withdraws from the crowd for long periods of solitary prayer. He interprets his entire existence through its reference to God, whom he calls Father. To himself he applies Isaiah's messianic words: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me." The same Spirit he promises to those who pray in his name.

The mystical quality of Jesus' life is most clearly stated in the Fourth Gospel. Some of the words attributed to him may have originated in theological reflection rather than in his own expression. But they thereby witness all the more powerfully to the mystical impulse he was able to transmit to his followers. Biblical speculations on the Word of God are reinterpreted as expressions of God's personal revelation in an incarnated divine Logos. The intimate union between the Father and the Word is, through the Holy Spirit, granted to all true believers. Indeed, the presence of the Spirit entitles them to the same love with which God loves his Son. In John's gospel the two principal currents of Christian mysticism have their source: the theology of the divine image that calls the Christian to conformity, and the theology that presents the intimacy with God as a relation of universal love.

The letters of Paul develop the idea of life in the Spirit. "We all reflect as in a mirror the splendor of the Lord; thus we are transfigured into his likeness, from splendor to splendor: such is the influence of the Lord who is Spirit" (*2 Cor.* 3:18). The Spirit's principal gift, in the understanding of Paul, consists in *gnōsis*, that insight into the "mystery of Christ" that enables the believer to understand the scriptures in a deeper, "revealed" sense. This insight into the hidden meaning of the scriptures led to the Alexandrian interpretation of the term *mystical* discussed earlier. Yet the practice long preceded the term. The entire *Letter to the Hebrews* consists of an allegorical reading of the Yom Kippur sacrifice as foreshadowing Christ's definitive sacrifice on the cross.

The tenor of early Christian mysticism was determined by the New Testament and by trends in Hellenistic Judaism (especially Philo Judaeus's scriptural theology and the late Judaic meaning of *gnōsis*). A third factor, usually referred to as Neoplatonism, must be added. Yet that movement, though influential in the development of Christian spirituality, may be too restricted an account of its beginnings; Origen (and, to some extent, even Clement) had already developed a mystical theology of the image before Plotinus. It might be more accurate, then, to look to the entire philosophically Platonic, religiously syncretic, and generally gnostic culture of Alexandria at the end of the second century. In that climate Ammonius Saccas himself, Origen's and Plotinus's common master, grew up and taught. But soon Plotinus's philosophy was to provide much of the ideological apparatus for a Christian theology of the image. Though Plotinus's thought leaves no doubts about its Platonic origins, it was profoundly affected by such religious influences as the mystery religions, gnosticism, Philo's Judaism, and that syncretism of Hellenistic currents and older Egyptian traditions that is usually referred to as Hermetism. Plotinus's philosophy as exposed in his nine treatises (the *Enneads*) is often presented as an emanational process that originates in an undetermined Absolute (the One), becomes intelligible in a realm of mind (the *nous*), and arrives at its final hypostasis in a world soul (the *psuchē*) shared by all individual souls. Such a presentation misses Plotinus's central insight and the source of its mystical fertility, namely, the immanence of the One in all the lower hypostases. The mystical-intellectual process for him consists in a return to that ever-present One, beyond the vision of the intelligible forms. A crucial role in this process is played by the notion of image, so important in early Christian mysticism. For Plotinus each emanation reflects the previous one as an image. Even the world, though steeped in opaque matter that allows

no further emanations, reflects the soul and the mind. Clearly, in this context being an image is more than being an external copy. It implies that each sphere of reality refers in its very essence to a higher one. As such, the image presents, rather than represents. Man alone is able to read his world and his own soul as an appeal to turn inward to mind and, beyond mind, to the One. By a process of asceticism and contemplation, he may overcome the dispersion of time and of all that separates him from the total simplicity (the One) of his inner core. The Plotinian union with the One has been called *ec-static*, but the term *in-static* might be more appropriate for describing a movement of inwardization and simplification. Plotinus's spiritual theology strikes us as decidedly cool: no sensuous feeling, no "visions," and no emotion. Yet more than any other master (outside the scriptures) did this last of the great pagan philosophers influence subsequent Christian mysticism.

The first attempt at a systematic theology of the mystical life in Christ was written by Plotinus's fellow Alexandrian and codisciple, Origen. In his *Twenty-seventh Homily on Numbers* Origen compares spiritual life to the Jews' exodus through the desert of Egypt. Having withdrawn from the pagan idols of vice, the soul crosses the Red Sea in a new baptism of conversion. She passes next through the bitter waters of temptation and the distorted visions of utopia until, fully purged and illuminated, she reaches Terah, the place of union with God. In his commentary on the *Song of Songs*, Origen initiated a long tradition of mystical interpretations that see in the erotic biblical poem just such a divine union. His commentary also presents the first developed theology of the image: the soul is an image of God because she houses the primal image of God that is the divine Word. Even as that word is an image of the Father through its presence to him, the soul is an image through the word's presence in her, that is, through her (at least partial) identity with it. The entire mystical process thus comes to consist in a conversion to the image, that is, to ever greater identity with the indwelling Word. The emphasis on the ontological character of the image of God in man (as opposed to the external copy) persists throughout the entire Christian tradition and holds the secret of its amazing mystical power.

The privileged place of love distinguishes Origen's theology from Neoplatonic philosophy. This emphasis on love becomes even more pronounced in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, the fourth-century Cappadocian bishop. Under Neoplatonic influence Gregory describes the mystical life as a process of gnosis initiated by a divine eros, which results in the fulfillment of the soul's natural desire for union with the God of whom she bears the image. Though akin to God from the beginning, the soul's mystical ascent is a slow and painful process that ends in a dark unknowing—the mystical night of love.

This theology of darkness, or "negative theology," would be developed to its extreme limits by a mysterious, Greek-writing Syrian of the sixth century who presented himself as the Dionysius whom Paul converted on the Areopagus. His enormous (though in the West not immediate) impact steered the theology of the image in a wholly new direction. Neoplatonic as no Christian theologian had ever dared to be, he identified God with the nameless One. Even the divine relations of the Trinity were ultimate only in the order of manifestation. Beyond all names and even beyond being itself lies the dark reality of a divine superessence. The mystical ascent moves toward that nameless unity. Throughout this thoroughgoing negation, Dionysius preserves the core of the image theology, for precisely the primordial union of the soul with God serves as the moving principle of the mystical ascent. Through constant negation the soul overcomes the created world, which prevents the mind from reaching its ultimate destiny. Yet Dionysius's *Mystical Theology* is ecstatic rather than introspective in its concept: the soul can achieve her vocation of union with God only by losing herself in the recesses of the divine superessence. In this respect it differs from the Western mysticism that it so deeply influenced.

Augustine (354–430), the towering figure who stands at the beginning of all Western theology (also, and especially, spiritual theology), described the divine image rather in psychological terms. God remains present to the soul as both origin and supreme goal. She is attracted by him and bears his image. But, unlike its definition by the Greek Fathers, that image remains for Augustine mostly the external effect of a divine cause. Augustine's treatise *On the Trinity* abounds with speculations on the soul's similarity to the Trinity, such as her constituting one mind out of the three faculties of intellect, will, and memory. They would amount to no more than superficial analogies were it not that God's presence in that same inner realm invites the soul to turn inward and convert the static resemblance into an ecstatic union. "Now this Trinity of the mind is God's image, not because the mind resembles, understands and loves itself [the superficial analogy], but because it has the power also to remember, understand and love its Maker" (*On the Trinity* 14.12.15). In actualizing the divine potential of its external resemblance, in allowing it to be directed to its archetype, the soul is gradually united with God. While the Greeks assert the initial identity, Augustine starts from a creator-creature anal-

ogy, which the divine attraction and man's following of it transform into an identity.

Unfortunately, this rich theology of identity remained largely unexplored by Augustine's spiritual followers until, in the twelfth century, the Cistercians and the Benedictines of Saint Victor Abbey combined it with the mystical theology of the Greeks. This fertile synthesis of Augustinian psychology with Greek spiritual ontology culminated in the two movements of Rhineland mysticism and Flemish spirituality. We shall here consider only their chief representatives: Eckhart and Ruusbroec.

Johannes Eckhart, possibly the most powerful mystical theologian of the Christian Middle Ages, synthesized the Greek and Augustinian theories of the image with a daring negative theology in one grandiose system. His mystical vision became the basis of an entire theology and, indeed, of a metaphysics of being. He was a subtle dialectician in his systematic Latin works and a paradoxical preacher in his vernacular sermons, so that his spiritual identity remains even today a subject of controversy. Few have succeeded in harmonizing the two parts of his prodigious output. Yet they do belong together. For Eckhart's endeavor was precisely to present the mystical union not as a privilege of the few but as the very vocation and ultimate realization of humanity. The mystical theory of the divine image holds the key to his theological ontology.

God is Being, and being in the strict sense is only God. With this bold principle, Eckhart reinterprets a Thomist tradition that "analogously" attributed being to God and finite existence. For Eckhart, the creature *qua* creature does not exist. Whatever being it possesses is not its own, but remains God's property. Both its limited essence (what determines it as this being rather than that) and its contingent existence (that it happens to be) are no more than the negative limits of its capacity to receive God's own being. "Every creature," Eckhart wrote, "radically and positively possesses Being, life and wisdom from and in God, and not in itself." Hence, God is totally immanent in the creature as its very being, while totally transcending it as the *only* being. By this presence God is totally like the creature; yet, lacking any of its determinations, he is totally unlike it. On these productive antinomies Eckhart builds his densely rich concept of image. The entire content of the creaturely image of God consists in the divine presence, while the fact that the creature's limitation reduces this identity to a likeness (hence including difference) accounts for the image's total directedness toward the divine exemplar: "Every image has two properties. One is that it takes its Being immediately from that of which it is the image. . . . The second property of the image is to be observed in the image's likeness. And here especially note two things; an image is, firstly, not *of* itself and (secondly) not *for* itself" (*Meister Eckhart*, trans. Maurice O. Walshe, London, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 124–125).

Since the finite subject conveys nothing positive to the image but rather obscures it by its limitations, only God's unlimited self-expression in his eternal Word (the Son) is his perfect image. The quality of the creature's image depends on the presence of that divine image in it, or, more correctly, on the degree of its own immanence in that archetype. The mind—specifically the spiritual mind—fully actualizes that immanence. Eckhart appears to join earlier (Greek) theologians who had defined the image through the presence of God's Word in the soul. But he gives it a more radical turn by declaring that divine Word the soul's very being. Rather than presence, Eckhart speaks of identity. Of course, as a creature the soul totally differs from the divine image. But its created nature contains God's own, uncreated being. In that being the soul coincides with God. "There is something in the soul that is so near akin to God that it is one and not united [to him]. . . . If man were wholly thus, he would be wholly uncreated and uncreatable" (ibid., vol. 2, p. 85).

The soul's being is generated in an eternal now with (indeed, within) the divine Word: "The Father bears his Son in eternity like himself. 'The Word was with God, and God was the Word' (Jn 1:1): the same in the same nature. I say more: He has borne him in my soul. Not only is she with him and he equally with her, but he is in her: the Father in eternity, and no differently" (ibid., p. 135). The mystical process then consists in a person's becoming conscious of his divine being. But this is far more than a cognitive process. It demands that utmost poverty and total detachment whereby he gives up his entire created existence "as he was when he was not [that is, before his birth]" (ibid., p. 271). Indeed, the spiritual soul no longer prepares a "place" for God, for "God is himself the place where He works." Only through that ultimate detachment, that waylessness in which there are neither names nor methods, does the soul come to resemble the image that she was in God "and between which and God there was no distinction before God created."

Farther than Eckhart the mysticism of the image could not go. Yet the identity that he so powerfully affirmed excluded any positive consideration of difference. Must the creature's difference remain without any spiritual significance? Was this no more than the circle of nothingness drawn around God's own being? Were even the trinitarian distinctions in God destined to be surpassed in a permanent rest in nameless unity? These

were the questions that confronted later mystics of the Rhineland and the Low Countries. No one answered them with more balance and deeper insight than Jan van Ruusbroec (1293–1381), a Brussels parish priest and later a hermit in the wooded solitude of Groenendaal. Unlike Eckhart's theology, Ruusbroec's majestic summa of Christian life in the spirit did not conclude in a darkness beyond distinction. For Ruusbroec also the soul must move into God's nameless unity. But this divine desert is not a terminal resting ground. God's own being, as the mystery of the Trinity discloses, is dynamic, never at rest nor permanently withdrawn into its own darkness. Its silence is pregnant with God's revelatory Word. And so the contemplative, after having reached the divine silence, moves into God's self-revelation in the image of the Son and, with the Son, out into the otherness of creation. For Ruusbroec also, God dwells in darkness. But "in this darkness there shines and is born an incomprehensible light, which is the Son of God, in whom we behold eternal life; and in this light one becomes seeing" (*Spiritual Espousals* 3.1). Ruusbroec postulated no unity beyond the Trinity. The One *is* the Father—that is, a fertile unity, a silence that must speak, a darkness that yields light. Through its union with God the soul partakes in the movements within God. Once arrived in the empty desert of the Godhead, she is carried by the divine dynamism and moves with the Father into his divine image and into the multiplicity of creation. At that point the creatures appear both in their divine foundation within the image and also in their divinely constituted otherness. Not only their divine core but also their limited creaturehood are to be respected and cherished. Unlike Eckhart, Ruusbroec included in his mysticism of the image a mysticism of creation. Finitude itself, however different, is never separate from the divine image. Thus his theory of contemplation culminates in the ideal of the "common life," a rhythmic balance between withdrawing into interior life and flowing out into charitable practice.

Toward the end of the Middle Ages the mysticism of the image receded in favor of the more personal but also more private mysticism of love. Yet the theology of the image never died. It survived in the theological theories of uncreated grace (e.g., Lessius, De la Taille, Rahner), in patristic studies (Petavius, de Regnon), and in Cistercian spirituality. Today it enjoys a genuine revival, as the success of Thomas Merton's work witnesses.

Mysticism of Love: Modern Christian Mysticism and Sufism. All Western religions have produced mystics of love. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have known each its own kind of spiritual eros. In singling out love as characteristic of some movements in particular, I restrict the term to those in which personal love of God dominated—namely, Sufism and the spiritual movements that gradually came to prevail in Western Christendom since the late Middle Ages. Chronologically, Sufism precedes Christian love mysticism. Yet I shall discuss the latter first in order to maintain the continuity with the earlier type of Christian spirituality.

Christianity. Some time during the twelfth century, Christian piety underwent a basic change: its approach to God became more human and affective. Love had, of course, always been an essential ingredient. But now it became the whole thing. At first it appeared in conjunction with the newly recovered trinitarian mysticism. The same Cistercians who reintroduced the Greek theology of the image to the West also initiated love mysticism. Thus in William of Saint-Thierry's influential works, the two currents of contemplation and affection, of image-identity and love-likeness appear simultaneously, occasionally in the same sentence. "When the object of thought is God and the will reaches the stage at which it becomes love, the Holy Spirit at once infuses Himself by way of love. . . . The understanding of the one thinking becomes the contemplation of one loving" (*Golden Epistle* 249–250). The duality persisted for centuries. Ruusbroec brought both trends to a powerful synthesis in his *Spiritual Marriage*, a work that incorporates Greek trinitarian mysticism in the scheme of a treatise on spiritual love by subordinating the more extrinsic assimilation through love to the more intrinsic inhabitation of God in the soul.

The emphasis on love is part of a more general tendency to involve the entire personality in the religious act. The new spiritual humanism (partly influenced by the Spanish Islamic culture) would revive interest in the psychological theory of Augustine and pay an unprecedented spiritual attention to the created world. The first great name to emerge was Bernard of Clairvaux. No Christian mystic has ever surpassed "the mellifluous doctor," as he is called, in the eloquent praise of spiritual love. Still, in many ways he remained a transitional figure: his Christocentric love is directed at the divine person of the Word, rather than at the human nature of the Christ, focus of later medieval spirituality. But the tradition he established clearly differs from that of image mysticism. In a famous sermon on the *Song of Songs*, he defines the unity of the spirit with God as resulting rather "from a concurrence of wills than from a union of essences." Here likeness firmly replaces image-identity. Does it mean that Bernard accepts only an external union with God? Not really, for in his treatise *On Loving God* he describes the highest degree of love as the condition of a drop of water disappearing in a quantity of wine. Experience itself becomes trans-

formed. "To love yourself as if you no longer existed, to cease completely to experience yourself, to reduce yourself to nothing, is not a human sentiment but a divine experience" (10.27). Nevertheless, the transient quality of ecstatic love, its submission to the psychic rhythm of the soul, its affinity with human eros, all herald the advent of a different type of spirituality.

The humanization of man's relation to God transforms man's attitude toward a creation in which God now comes to be more intimately present. An interpersonal, and hence more creaturely, relation to God is ready to accept each creature on its own terms and for its own sake. In this respect its attitude differs essentially from the image mysticism that holds the creature worthy of spiritual love only in its divine core, where it remains rooted in God. The love mystic also cherishes its finite, imperfect being, which, resulting from a divine act of creation, is endowed with a sacred quality of its own. The mystery of the divine incarnation here attains a more universal level of meaning, as if Christians suddenly understood how much the creation must matter to a God who himself has become flesh. The new awareness gave rise to the powerful humanism that since the thirteenth century has characterized Western Christendom. Francis of Assisi taught his contemporaries to regard nature with a different eye and to love the deformed and the sick as much as the hale and the sound. His attitude found a uniquely poetic expression in the *Canticle of Brother Sun* and in Jacopone da Todi's lyricism. But the discovery of God's presence in creation was capable of systematic treatment, as one of Francis's followers, Bonaventure, demonstrated in *The Journey of the Mind to God.* By now the Christocentric orientation of the new spirituality had moved to Christ's humanity—the perfect creature so intimately united to God that loving could never detract the soul from loving God himself. Soon that humanity came to fulfill an essential mediating function in spiritual life. Teresa of Ávila would accuse herself of having neglected this link with the divine in her early years.

As the incarnational consciousness spread to all creation, divine transcendence ceased to imply a negation of the created world. Thenceforth God's presence has been found *within* rather than *beyond* creation. Precisely this immanentization of the divine accounts for the earthly quality of Christian love mysticism and for its followers' deep involvement with human cares and worldly concerns. Catherine of Siena, Ignatius of Loyola, and Teresa of Ávila, among many others, led extremely active lives and deeply influenced the culture of their age. This orientation toward the creature created new spiritual problems. For it requires uncommon virtue not to become attached to a creature one loves for its own sake. By no coincidence did most love mystics become "saints," that is, persons who, by heroic virtue, learned to love without possessiveness. All mysticism demands mental purity. But for those whose love of God passes through creation, the purifying process proves especially exacting. Besides renouncing the superfluous, an essential condition of spiritual growth, mystics so deeply involved with creation have to move against the grain of their natural inclination in order to establish the precarious balance of love and detachment. What al-Ghazālī writes about Ṣūfī mortification is a task for all love mystics: "The uprooting from the soul of all violent passions, the extirpation from it of vicious desires and evil qualities so that the heart may become detached from all that is not God." But when the mystical state proper begins, spiritual men and women tend to stop or reduce this active mortification.

Significantly, John of the Cross, one of the most articulate mystics of love, describes the entire spiritual process as an increasing purification, a "night" that starts with the senses, spreads to the understanding, and concludes in the total darkness of union with God. Most mystics would, perhaps more appropriately, refer to the second and third stages as illumination and union. But they equally emphasize the increased need for detachment. Followers of this tradition tend to equate the beginning of the mystical life with a state of passive prayer that excludes the ability to meditate. John of the Cross distinguishes the night of the senses, common to all who enter the mystical life, from the "horrible and awful" passive purgation of the spirit in the advanced. Not all agree with this description, but all stress the need for total passivity with respect to the divine operation. An entire school has taken what Teresa of Ávila calls the prayer of "quiet" to be the goal of spiritual life itself. As practiced by Miguel de Molinos (1628–1696) and Jeanne Guyon (1648–1717), this controversial concept drew upon itself a number of official condemnations. The debate began with the question whether the spiritual person should remain passive with regard to temptations, especially carnal temptations. The quietist attitude, the adversaries claimed, led to gross immorality—as in the case of Molinos. But the discussion then moved toward the more central issue of whether quiet is acquired or infused. The quietists failed to make adequate distinctions and thereby appeared to present mystical graces available to all, while allowing the pious to neglect the pursuit of common virtue and the practice of good works. Finally, with the French bishop Fénelon, both pupil and director of Jeanne Guyon, the dispute turned to the problem of "pure love": only the love that loves God exclusively because of himself is worthy of a spiritual person. Once the mystic has at-

tained this state of pure love, he or she abandons the methodic pursuit of virtue and, eventually, all control over the spiritual process. None of the charges against the quietists was ever fully substantiated. Yet the entire controversy reveals how sensitive the issue of active or passive quiet had become. The question whether the "higher states of prayer" are available to all could hardly have been raised in an earlier, less psychological age.

The "illumination" that normally follows the period of purgation should not be thought of as a succession of new insights. John of the Cross refers to it as a darkness of the understanding caused by the excessive light of faith (*Ascent of Mount Carmel* 3.3.1). Still, the light is often reflected in unusual cognitive states—hallucinatory perceptions, intensively imagined visions or voices, nonrepresentational intuitions—which in unpredictable ways testify to the profound transformation the mind undergoes in the higher stages of mysticism. They are often hard to interpret, and spiritual masters have traditionally adopted a cautious attitude toward them. Yet we should not place them all on an equal footing. John of the Cross distinguishes concrete visions (either sensational or imaginary) from so-called spiritual apprehensions. While he dismisses the former as a breeding ground of moral illusions, among the latter he finds the most direct expressions of God's experienced presence. John equates such "intellectual" (nonrepresentational) visions (ibid., 2.24) with revelations of God's being "in the naked understanding" of the soul that has attained the state of union—"for they are themselves that union" (ibid., 2.26)—and with the spiritual "feelings" that emerge "in the substance of the soul" (ibid., 2.32). In such states illumination has in fact turned into union.

It is in terms of union that Teresa of Ávila discusses the matter in her *Interior Mansions* (Fifth and Sixth Mansions). What characterizes this final stage of love mysticism—whether defined in cognitive or in affective terms—is its permanence. Hence Teresa refers to it as a "marriage." Here the distinction between the "likeness" of love mysticism and the "identity" of image mysticism ceases to exist—even in the terminology. In the highest love union, intentional intermediacy yields to substantial presence. The trend from likeness to unity appears even more clearly in Ṣūfī mysticism.

Sufism. With its stern emphasis on law and orthodoxy, Islam hardly seems to present a fertile soil for intensive personal experience of the love of God. Yet Islam assumes the entire social system, *sharī'ah* (the way), into a privileged communal relation with God. Moreover, the Qur'ān states that, next to the ordinary believers who serve their creator according to the precepts of the law, there are some to whom God communicates his essential mystery inwardly in peace of the soul and friendship with God (Qur'ān 17:27). Here the Prophet allows for the possibility of a realm of personal religion. The possibility was soon actualized and eventually flowered into unparalleled mystical beauty. Even the unique authority of the Qur'ān has in an indirect way contributed to Islam's mystical wealth, for precisely because it remains the supreme norm of its interpretation, pious readers may find in it whatever meaning divinely inspired insight *(istinbāṭ)* privately reveals to them. Only when personal interpretation openly clashes with established doctrine (especially its rigorous monotheism) could religious authorities interfere. Thus, paradoxically, Islam, the "religion of the book," allows greater freedom of interpretation than religions that place less emphasis on the written word. Though early Muslim mysticism stayed in close connection with the Islamic community, conflicts arose. Already at the time of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728), the patriarch of Islamic mysticism, Sunnī traditionalists objected to his attempt to go beyond the letter of law and doctrine. Thus began the opposition between "internal" and "external" religion that, from the tenth century on, led to increasingly severe confrontations. Nevertheless, a deep personal piety remained an essential element of the Islam that substantially contributed to rendering it a world religion.

Most Islamic mysticism could be characterized as love mysticism. Many texts show an amazing similarity in spirit and even expression with later Christian mysticism. Certain passages in the poetry of Rābi'ah al-'Adawīyah (d. 801) appear to throw a bridge across the centuries to Teresa of Ávila, while John of the Cross's *Dark Night* echoes some of Shaykh al-Junayd's poems. The similarity becomes somewhat intelligible through the established influence of Syrian monasticism (especially the hesychastic movement) upon the early Ṣūfīs, and the strong Muslim impact upon Spanish culture as a whole and upon its mystics in particular. The resemblance has often tempted Western scholars to interpret Ṣūfī writings by means of Christian concepts. Yet the difference is substantial and appears with increasing clarity in some later Ṣūfī developments toward monism. Here love no longer represents the highest union with God but is merely a way station on the road to a more total identity. Still, early Ṣūfīs adopted models of asceticism that had closer ties with the spirituality of the Desert Fathers than with the worldly luxury of the expanding Muslim empire. Even the wool dress *(ṣūf)* from which they probably derived their name may well have had a Christian symbolic meaning. At any rate, the passive asceticism of the early Ṣūfīs stood in sharp contrast with the outgoing, active attitude of the Prophet's

early followers. Not until the eighth century, however, did the emphasis shift from an asceticism inspired by a fear of judgment to a mysticism of love for which fasting and poverty served as means to a higher end.

The most attractive figure in this early love mysticism is certainly the former slave Rābi'ah. To her we owe some of the purest mystical love poetry of all time, such as her famous prayer at night: "Oh, my Lord, the stars are shining and the eyes of men are closed, and kings have shut their doors, and every lover is alone with his beloved, and here am I alone with Thee" (Margaret Smith, *Rābi'a the Mystic*, Cambridge, 1928, p. 22). Her "pure" love, even as the love of later mystics possessing that quality, refuses to act or pray out of self-interest, "If I worship Thee from fear of hell, burn me in hell; and if I worship Thee in hope of paradise, exclude me from paradise; but if I worship Thee for Thine own sake, then do not withhold from me Thine eternal loveliness." Only repentance inspired by sorrow for having offended the Beloved is worthy of the spiritual person. For all its erotic exuberance, this and similar love mysticism remained doctrinally "sober." It developed elaborate schemes of the stages *(maqāmāt)* of the love of God. Eventually it used Neoplatonic categories, which strengthened it theoretically but may have favored its later development toward monism.

In Shaykh al-Junayd (d. 910), Ṣūfī mystical theology reached full maturity as well as a systematic unity. Though this religious leader went far in adopting Plotinus's theory, his orthodoxy was never questioned. Louis Massignon, the famous student of Islamic mysticism, describes al-Junayd as "clever, prudent and timid, conscious of the danger of heterodoxy which is peculiar to mysticism," and as a wise spiritual director "who suspends his judgment and defers the question so long as experience does not seem to him decisive and crucial" (Massignon, 1954, p. 275). Still, his theory of emanation from a preexistence in God to a separate existence in time daringly reinterpreted the creation doctrine. In *Kitāb al-Fanā'* he writes, "He annihilated me [in my divine preexistence] in creating me even as, in the beginning, He created me [in my separate existence in time] when I was not," and "He was the source of their existence, encompassing them, calling them to witness when still their eternal life was utterly negated, a state in which they were from all pre-eternity" (Zaehner, 1957, pp. 165–166).

By following this principle of emanation to its ultimate consequences al-Junayd's disciple, al-Ḥallāj, ended up with the allegedly monist theory for which he was executed in the year 922. With al-Ḥallāj begins a wholly new phase in Ṣūfī mysticism that continued to use the language of love, but frequently in a more symbolic sense than had the earlier Ṣūfīs. Meanwhile it remains very doubtful whether al-Ḥallāj, despite his strong expressions, ever considered himself fully identical with God. His claim of divinization refers to a passive, transient state—not to a permanent self-deification. Such ecstatic exclamations as "I am the Truth," by no means unique to him, express a temporary, divinely granted awareness of identity with God. He probably remained a love mystic always longing for a union that was only occasionally attained, as in the following oft-quoted verses: "Between me and Thee lingers an 'it is I' that torments me. Ah, of Thy grace, take this 'I' from between us." Even the supreme expression of union still indicates a remnant of duality. "I am He whom I love, and He whom I love is I. We are two Spirits dwelling in one body" (Nicholson, 1939, p. 218). Elsewhere al-Ḥallāj firmly upholds God's transcendence with respect to his creation, as in the words quoted by al-Qushayrī: "He has bound the whole to contingency, for transcendence is His own. . . . He remains far from the states of his creation, in Him there is no mingling with His creation, His act permits of no amendment, He is withdrawn from them by His transcendence as they are withdrawn from Him in their contingency" (Louis Massignon, *La passion d'al Hossayn-ibn-Mansoûr al Hallaj*, Paris, 1922, p. 638).

After al-Ḥallāj, Ṣūfī piety reached a temporary truce with orthodox learning in al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), the greatest of the Islamic theologians. A learned teacher of law and doctrine, he abandoned his chair to spend eleven years as a wandering Ṣūfī, and at the end of his life retired to a Ṣūfī monastery. Bypassing the antinomian trends that emerged after al-Ḥallāj, he returned to a more traditional attempt to emphasize experience over the letter of the law. With Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) the dependence on Neoplatonism (especially the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*) and, with it, the movement toward monism became more pronounced than ever. He provided the link between Western classical culture and Eastern Islamic mysticism that culminated in Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. Ṣūfī mysticism, however much inclined toward monism, never abandoned the language and imagery of love. Ibn al'Arabī, with al-Ghazālī the most philosophical of all Muslim mystics, never ceases to integrate his Neoplatonic vision with the Qur'ān's dualistic doctrine of man's relation to God. Still one may doubt whether he did more than adapt the terminology of traditional Ṣūfī love mysticism to his own kind of monism. The Absolute for him is an indistinct One that, overcome by the desire to be known, projects itself through creative imagination into apparent otherness. In this projection the relation of the One to the created world, specifically to man, determines that of the Abso-

lute to the differentiated idea of God, the intellectual pole as opposed to the cosmic pole of finite being. All that the creature is, is divine, yet God always exceeds creation. Through man's mediation the dependent, created world returns to its primordial unity. As the image of God, man imposes that image upon the cosmos and reflects it back to its original. In fulfilling this mediating task he approaches the (gnostic?) archetype of the Perfect Man, the ideal link that restores the broken oneness. Only the Muslim saint realizes the model in its fullness.

All of this appears far removed from Islamic love mysticism and even from monotheism. But the same Ibn al-'Arabī also wrote a collection of sensual love poetry to which he later added a mystical interpretation. Even his "monist" *Bezels of Wisdom* concludes with a dithyramb on spiritualized sexual love as providing access to the perfect love of God. It states that in woman, man most perfectly contemplates God. "The greatest union is that between man and woman, corresponding as it does to the turning of God toward the one He has created in His own image, to make him His vice regent, so that He might behold Himself in him. . . . If he [man] knew the truth, he would know Whom it is he is enjoying and Who it is Who is the enjoyer; then he would be perfected" (*The Bezels of Wisdom*, in *The Classics of Western Spirituality*, ed. John Farina, New York, 1980, pp. 275–276). However thorough Ibn al-'Arabī's doctrinal monism may have been, it never prevented him from attributing to love a primary role in the practical process of reunification with God. His readers, both inside and outside Islam, have always emphasized this dualism of mystical praxis. This explains his impact both on Spanish Catholic (Ramón Lull, John of the Cross) and on Persian Ṣūfī mystics.

In the refined mystical poetry that constitutes the glory of Persian Sufism, the same drift toward monism is frequently expressed in erotic language. Here the undisputed master is Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273). He himself was influenced by others (such as 'Aṭṭār, and Ibn al-'Arabī's disciple in Konya, al-Qunawī, and especially his strange mentor, al-Tabrīzī), yet sang, with a voice uniquely his own, of the longing for the Beloved.

> I am not the kingdom of 'Iraquain, nor of the country of Khorasan, I am not of this world, nor of the next, nor of Paradise, nor of hell. My place is the Placeless, my trace is the Traceless; 'Tis neither body nor soul, for I belong to the soul of the Beloved. I have put duality away, I have seen that the two worlds are one: One I seek, One I know, One I see, One I call. He is the first, He is the last, He is the outward, He is the inward. (*Dīvānī Shamsi Tabrīz*, trans. R. A. Nicholson, Cambridge, 1898, p. 125)

Persian poets after Rūmī expressed a similar synthesis of monist reality and erotic longing, none with more force and evocative power than 'Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 1492):

> Beware! Say not, "He is All Beautiful,
> And we His lovers? Thou art but the glass,
> And He the face confronting it, which casts
> Its image on the mirror. He alone
> Is manifest, and thou in truth art hid,
> Pure Love, like Beauty, coming but from Him,
> Reveals itself in thee."
> (E. G. Brown, *A Year amongst the Persians*, Cambridge, 1926, p. 138)

Yet most important for the later mystical life of Islam in Iran were the flourishing Ṣūfī orders of dervishes (one of them founded by Rūmī himself). As they spread, mystical life reached all layers of the population, and the search for mystical trance reached unprecedented proportions. After the fifteenth century, Persian mysticism produced no more great writers. Generally speaking, the trend of the past three centuries in Islam has been more toward communal piety and law than toward personal devotion. Yet in our own day we witness a revival of Ṣūfī movements.

Eschatological Mysticism: Jewish Mystics. The section headings in this article do not capture the full meaning of the content. At best they approximate a definition of a dominant trend in a particular, more or less unified mystical school. In the case of Jewish mysticism the description may not even serve this minimal purpose: Judaism has produced forms of mysticism so unlike any other and so variant among themselves that no common characteristic marks them all. At most we can say that they "commune" with one another, not that they share an identical spirit. Gershom Scholem wisely embedded this irreducible diversity, reflective of a spiritual Diaspora, in the very title of his authoritative work *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (1941). The closest he comes to a general characteristic is the point at which he draws attention to the persistent presence of eschatological traits in Jewish mysticism: "This eschatological nature of mystical knowledge becomes of paramount importance in the writings of many Jewish mystics, from the anonymous authors of the early Hekhaloth tracts to Rabbi Naham of Brazlav" (p. 20). The eschatological element most clearly appears in the earliest trend: the often gnostically influenced mythical speculation on Ezekiel's vision of the throne-chariot, the *merkavah*. Mysticism around this theme began in the first centuries of the common era. It consisted of an attempt to ascend to the divine throne beyond the various intermediate spheres (the *heikhalot*). Except for its biblical starting point (first developed in the Ethiopic

Apocalypse of Enoch), the impact of gnostic *plērōma* mythology dominates this spiritual "throne world." But also the typically Hellenistic connection of mysticism and magic appears to have been strong. *Merkavah* mysticism declined after the seventh century, but enjoyed a steady revival in Italy in the ninth and tenth centuries, which, in turn, may have influenced medieval German Hasidism.

Whereas *merkavah* mysticism had been esoteric, Hasidism (from *ḥasid*, "pious one") began in the twelfth century as a popular movement closely connected with the *halakhah* (law). The early development has been fixed in the *Sefer Ḥasidim* (Book of the Pious), which contains the spiritual testaments of the prolific Yehudah the Pious and of two other early writers. The eschatological element, present from the beginning, gradually became more pronounced. Yet various other elements appear as well, among them an almost monastic emphasis on the religious virtues of simplicity, humility, and indifference. While *merkavah* mysticism attained its goal by contemplation, Hasidism did so primarily by prayer and spiritual practice. To pure transcendence it opposes the intensive awareness of an omnipresent creator accessible to the *Ḥasid* even in his daily activities. Finally, while *merkavah* mysticism displays gnostic traits, Hasidic "theology" shows a resemblance to Neoplatonism even in its Greek Christian development. God's glory *(kavod)* is distinct from God's being as a first manifestation of his presence *(shekhinah)*, which mediates between this hidden essence and the fully manifest creation. The Ḥasidim indulged in elaborate speculation about the inner and outer glory of God, and about the kingdom of his created yet hidden presence.

These daring speculations seldom developed into a coherent theology. In that respect they differed from the spiritual movement that, from the fourteenth century on, would largely replace it—Qabbalah. It originated in thirteenth-century Spain as a highly esoteric doctrine, one that its followers were reluctant to divulge. After the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1492), however, it developed into a theology of exile that spread to large segments of the Jewish world. More speculative than ecstatic (though methods for ecstasy were not absent), it was deeply influenced by gnostic theologies. Its masterwork, the *Zohar*, by its daring adoption of gnostic cosmogonies surpassed in this respect even *merkavah* mysticism. In addition, it absorbed the Neoplatonic currents that had swept through the Arabic and Jewish culture of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Spain. Considering the hazardous nature of its thought, its relation to normative tradition and official authority remained, on the whole, remarkably peaceful, if not always amiable. Indeed, the branch that produced the most daring speculation found its expression mostly in traditional rabbinical commentaries on the sacred text. Another trend of Qabbalah, culminating in Avraham ben Shemu'el Abulafia (1240–after 1291), is more prophetic. It combines in a highly original way philosophical theory—much of it derived from Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204)—with mystical speculations on the divine names. Abulafia left his native Saragossa early in life to travel all over the Near East and to settle down in Sicily, where he wrote most of his many works. They all aim at assisting the soul to untie the "knots" that bind it to this world of multiplicity and to allow it to return to its original unity (surprisingly named after Aristotle's Agent Intellect). This union may be attained through contemplation of a sufficiently abstract object, such as the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. Any combination of letters results in word figures that in some way refer to the sacred tetragrammaton of the divine name, *YHVH*. In meditating upon them—somewhat as the yogin uses a *mantra*—consciousness moves to a higher state of unity that releases man's prophetic faculty.

Wholly different is the theophysical mysticism that resulted in that unsurpassed masterpiece of mystical speculation, the *Zohar* (Book of Splendor). Its origin remains mysterious, because the anonymous author has carefully covered his tracks (even to the point of writing in Aramaic rather than Hebrew) and attributed his work to earlier authorities. Yet internal criticism suggests that it was written in Spain in the last third of the thirteenth century, probably by one author. The writer, familiar with the philosophies of Maimonides and of Neoplatonism, has, above all, undergone the influence of unknown gnostic sources. Synthesizing all qabbalistic writings of the century, he attempts to stem the rationalist trend by giving traditional Judaism a hidden mystical interpretation. Thus this highly esoteric work was, in fact, written for the enlightened Jewish intelligentsia of late-fourteenth-century Spain. Central in the *Zohar* doctrine is the theology of the *sefirot*, the ten "regions" into which the divine emanation extends itself. Importantly, the divine *plērōma* of these *sefirot* does not emanate *from* God: it remains *within* God as his manifest being, in contrast to the "hidden God." Gershom Scholem writes: "The point to keep in mind is that the *sefirot* are not secondary or intermediary spheres which interpose between God and the universe . . . not steps of a ladder between God and the world, but various planes in the manifestation of the Divinity which proceed from and succeed each other" (Scholem, 1961, pp. 208–209). Here also language fulfills a crucial function: the *sefirot*, the creative names God gives himself, antic-

ipate the faculty of speech in man. The ultimate manifestation consists of God's simple, immanent presence in the entire creation, the *shekhinah*. In becoming aware of this divine presence, man comes to understand his own deeper self.

Creation takes place *within* God as a transition from the divine *Nothing*, the mathematical point frequently identified with God's Wisdom (the *ḥokhmah* of *Proverbs*). Even evil proceeds from a negative principle in God himself that has become isolated from the rest of the divine organism. Man's reaction consists in restoring creation to its original union within God.

The idea of an immanent creation was taken one step further by some sixteenth-century mystics of Safad in Palestine, exiled from Spain after the expulsion decree. The new Diaspora gave Qabbalah a distinctly messianic, eschatological aspect that had been less prominent in the *Zohar*. Thus the mystical return to the aboriginal creation now came to be seen as anticipating the messianic era. According to Isaac Luria (1534–1572), the most important mystic of the school, creation originates through a process of self-emptying whereby God withdraws from a mystical space within himself in order to establish the possibility for a reality other than his own omnipresent being. The concept of *tsimtsum* (withdrawal) allows Luria to distinguish the world of creation from the emanations that occur *within* God's own being and to prevent creation from collapsing into a pantheistic oneness.

The gnostic idea of the primordial man, *adam qadmon*, which models God's manifest being on the human organism, provides a transition between the sphere of the *sefirot* and the created world, while, at the same time, explaining the origin of evil. The light of the divine being is refracted through this supreme emanation. The first six *sefirot* receive and reflect the divine light radiated by *adam qadmon*. But the lower six are not powerful enough to retain the light, and it "shatters the vessels" *(shevirat ha-kalim)*. Here evil begins to exist as a separate entity. Through the breaking of the vessels, the forces of evil that were mixed with the divine light become segregated from the good. This purgative event, good in itself, would have allowed the total elimination of evil in the final reintegration of the last *sefirah*. But Adam's fall, once again, reintroduced chaos into the cosmos. The Diaspora symbolizes this general disarray in which the *shekhinah* itself is sent into exile.

Luria's mystical theory culminates in his idea of redemption, a redemption, mystically conceived, that coincides with the messianic era. Through prayer, spiritual man plays an active role in restoring the original order of the universe. Mystical piety will recall the *shekhinah* back to the spiritual *plērōma* and prepare the world for the messianic coming. The powerful concept of *tikkun* (reintegration) conveyed meaning to the bitter experience of the exile. Yet, combined with messianic expectations, it also created a tense and potentially explosive sense of anticipation. Luria's mystical theology therefore prepared the terrain for the pseudomessiahs and the antinomian movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus the unstable Shabbetai Tsevi (1625–1676) was able (largely through the efforts of his "prophet," Natan of Gaza) to render himself accepted as the Messiah and even to retain many of his followers when he himself apostasized to Islam. Was this not part of the Messiah's vocation in a world that had exiled him to the realm of darkness? Large groups of Shabbateans apostasized publicly while secretly preserving their messianic faith—thus repeating voluntarily what Marrano Jews had been compelled to do involuntarily. The exile among the infidels initiated the condition for the final separation of good and evil of the messianic era. At the same time, antinomian behavior inaugurated a reign in which the restrictions of the Law would be abolished and the primordial state of freedom restored.

Qabbalah was not to end in this state of general disintegration. A new Hasidism on the rise in eighteenth-century Poland incorporated much of its mystical piety while rejecting its messianic excesses. It was neither esoteric nor elitist. More emotional than intellectual, it appears more as a revivalist movement than as a theological school. Yet its nonsystematic character has not prevented it from occasionally attaining speculative peaks. It honored the charismatic leader more than the learned rabbi, even though most of its leaders were rabbis and all endeavored to remain within rabbinical orthodoxy. The new Hasidism began with two inspired men: the Besht (Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer, 1700–1760) and his disciple, Dov Baer, the Maggid of Mezhirich. They, like all their major followers, distinguished themselves more by the striking gesture, the memorable story, than by interpretation of the Torah. It is hard to evaluate the precise "mystical" significance of so popular a movement. Yet the intensive religious experience of its greatest writers leaves no doubt. Here particularly we should restrain ourselves from imposing too narrow limits on the term *mystical*. Hasidism may be more practical and certainly more social than earlier spiritual movements, but its emphasis upon a joyful spirit and moral living derives from a mystical source.

Jewish mysticism shows an unparalleled variety of forms ranging from deep speculation to purely emotional experience. It consistently appeals to scriptural authority, yet no mystical movement ever strayed further from theological orthodoxy than late messianic Qabbalah. And still for all the variety of its forms and

of the external influences to which it was exposed, Jewish mysticism unquestionably possesses a powerful unity of its own. In it the word dominates, and the often tragic experience of the present lives in constant expectation of the future.

[*For other theoretical discussions of mysticism and mystical experience, see* Consciousness, States of; Attention; *and* Religious Experience. *For a treatment of discrete but closely related phenomena, see* Esotericism. *See also the entries on the specific mystical figures and traditions mentioned herein.*]

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MYTH. [*To introduce the importance of myth in the history of religions, this entry includes two articles. The first,* An Overview, *discusses the nature and role of myth and the history of the study of myth. The second,* Myth and History, *examines the relation of mythical and historical modes of thinking. For discussion of specific myths and systems of myths, see articles on particular traditions, especially articles on* Mythic Themes *under* African Religions; Australian Religions; Chinese Religion; Indian Religions; Japanese Religion; Mesoamerican Religions; North American Religions; *and* South American Religions.]

An Overview

The English word *myth* comes from the Greek *muthos* ("word" or "speech"), which owes its significance precisely to its contrast with *logos;* the latter can also be translated as "word," but only in the sense of a word that elicits discussion, an "argument." *Muthos* in its meaning of "myth" is the word for a story concerning gods and superhuman beings. A myth is an expression of the sacred in words: it reports realities and events from the origin of the world that remain valid for the basis and purpose of all there is. Consequently, a myth functions as a model for human activity, society, wisdom, and knowledge. The word *mythology* is used for the entire body of myths found in a given tradition. It is also used as a term for the study of myths.

The definition given here contains elements on which not all specialists would agree or place the same emphasis. The use of the word *sacred* might impress some as defining the subject, "myth," in terms of something that lacks clarity more than the definiendum itself. It should be understood, however, that for the historian of religions no obfuscation exists here. The distinction between "the sacred" and "the profane" emphasized by the philosophically inclined French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) is based on a sober observation: all human traditions and societies heed the sacred and

mark it in one way or another. Its ultimate or metaphysical reality is not the issue. The most general characteristic of the sacred is not that it is exalted, no matter in how many instances that may be the case, but that it is distinct from ordinary, profane, everyday worldly things. In communicating the sacred, a myth makes available in words what by no other means is available, and its words are different from other words; again, most generally, they have an extraordinary authority and are in that perceivable manner distinct from common speech. The language of myth does not induce discussion: it does not argue, but presents. The most familiar example in the West, the opening words of *Genesis*, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth," are very different from the words in any theological chapter on "the doctrine of creation," precisely because the latter are meant to analyze, to systematize, or to discuss God's creative acts, not to present them. They have to make a case for their validity, while the myth *is* its validity.

A myth, whether its subject is the acts of deities or other extraordinary events, always takes us back to "beginnings of all things"; hence the cosmogony, the birth of the world, is a principal theme. In each case, the age to which the myth transports us is very different from our own; it is in fact a time beyond any human being's ken, and hence the events and realities dealt with are literally altogether different from the facts men are concerned with in their everyday lives. The authority of myth is not a mere analogy to authorities on earth.

Myth is one of the three forms of religious expression: that is, sacred speech, sacred acts, and sacred places. As such, it occurs side by side in most traditions with sacred places or objects (or, in short, symbols) and sacred acts (that is, cult rituals). The chief reason why myths attract scholarly attention is their medium: words. They can be expected to elucidate the entire religious life of a community, shedding light especially on the ritual acts and sacred objects that by themselves do not speak at all, or certainly not often, and not as clearly. For instance, a central temple or a sacred pole may be of paramount significance in the religious life of a community, yet it is a recorded myth that is most likely to explain this significance, its origin, its basis, and the reason for its pivotal role in the community's religious life.

Myth, Symbol, and Ritual. The fact that the mode of a mythical expression is words may account, to quite an extent, for the problems the subject has caused for intellectuals from antiquity to the present age. Myths have been looked upon as conscious efforts to veil rational propositions, as allegories for historical events, as poetic imageries, or as unconscious verbalizations of inner desires, mental classificatory schemes, or social structures. Many scholarly attempts have been helpful in highlighting such relationships, yet each of these attempts has failed to arrive at an overall explanation. Admittedly, an overall explanation may not be possible any more than in other inexhaustible subjects of inquiry, such as "art" or "the universe."

As in the case of the latter subjects, however, our understanding must do more than accumulate the results of specialized cultural and historical approaches and fragmentary methodological views. Rather, a determined inquiry, and in our case, any true science of mythology, should take into serious consideration also the whole of religious expressiveness within which myths function. Of course, myths are language and speech and literature. Of course, myths may reveal something of the society in which they were formulated. Of course, myths may manifest deeper human drives than those displayed in civilized life. Nevertheless, human religious expressiveness in its threefold form of sacred speech, sacred acts, and sacred places remains essentially one, and the three forms we distinguish had best be considered as mere aspects visible to us; our differentiation among the three forms is external, conceptual, formal. The three always occur together, in any culture. We can only observe that, as a rule, one of the three has a dominant role; some civilizations have a wealth of myths, some of rituals, others of sacred places. Looking at myth or at either of the other forms of expression in isolation may be required by our data. Focusing on myths will certainly be useful to our inquiry.

Similarly, a sociological, psychological, or other special scholarly view may provide illuminations, yet the coherency of a religious tradition should not be allowed to fall between the cracks. As in the case of a computer, where "output" depends structurally on the questions asked, each of our sciences and scholarly disciplines can only provide answers in accordance with its own definition of problems. For instance, the "semantic" problem of the historian of religions is not a mere extension of linguistics. Whatever the details in any historian of religions' definition of religion may be, it must have something to do with the "totality" of human orientation, hence with the underlying certainties or assumptions concerning each special or fragmentary investigation, activity, or creation. The history of religions deals with such "totality" not in the manner of philosophy, by reflecting on premises for coherent and defensible thought and action, but by studying the evidence of religious documents in human traditions. The principal question is not "What is true?" but "What have societies, civilizations, communities found necessary to point to and preserve as centrally valid for their entire

existence?" Here the study of myths becomes the obvious topic within the entire store of religious documentation.

The Unity of Myth and the Variability of Culture. The variety of cultures, of their languages, means of production, and their evaluations of what is essential is overwhelming. This variety invites us to look for an explanation of myths in the specificity of each society, and certainly many an answer to many a question can be obtained in this manner. Ignoring the specificity of a tradition would be the worst methodological error. Even after stating this, however, it is essential to remember that by definition myth emphasizes realities and events from the origin and basis of the world. A certain difficulty seems to be hidden here just below the surface. "The world" suggests a oneness, and yet the myths from a multitude of cultures and ages are manifold. It would be easy to conclude that oneness of the world depicted by the myths is in each case at best a collective fiction peculiar to an isolated tribe, and yet such a conclusion would be questionable.

The issue of what is the origin of the world, and what it is that remains basic to the world, does not call for one immutable formula. It does not lead to an answer that prohibits variety but rather to one that includes it. Myths do not only vary from culture to culture, but each one is itself open to transformation. Staple foods, basic provisions, and tools are among the topics that occur in cosmogonic myths, and these essential elements of human existence vary from the hunting and gathering communities and the early peasant and pastoral societies to the most complex historical traditions. How essential are these elements to the cosmogonic myth? The answer is that they are at the same time essential and completely insufficient, because the issue goes far beyond nutrition and all the concerns of *homo faber* with his culture-specific requisites. Just the same, each myth takes account of these absolute necessities and can even rank them as taking a direct part in the origin of the world. In principle, the problem that the modern reader faces is comparable to that of modern physics, in which two theories of light—the wave theory and the particle theory—can hold their own at the same time, although it is not really possible to reconcile the two. Physics has employed here the notion of complementarity rather than throw itself into fruitless debates on their mutual exclusion. Admittedly, the theoretical puzzles for the history of religions are not limited to one or even a few such cases. Nevertheless, epistemologically the problem is comparable; the exact number of varying accounts is not relevant.

In spite of the similarity presented here between a science such as physics and the history of religions, in one respect the history of religions situation differs considerably: the multiplicity of mythologies has immediate and fundamentally important methodological consequences from the outset of our inquiries, for the multiplicity is observed from the beginning and is not a mere by-product of our final conclusions. An important consequence here concerns the necessity of any investigator's own position in a given mythological tradition; and indeed this orientation is necessary in order to gain any perspective on any myth. There is no such thing as "objectivity" that amounts to neutrality; there is no understanding if the subject has eliminated himself. This absolutely necessary "subjectivity" is not a whimsical individual stance or solipsism but the recognition of the only ground on which a religious phenomenon can be traced. (Superficially, this necessity for the student's "grounding" may seem comparable to the position of "the observer" of which the physicist is aware, but this comparison does not go very far, as the observer's place is a physical inevitability, and not the necessity of a "tradition.")

Having made a limited methodological comparison between the history of religions and physics, one may also state that (1) the world of religions, spawning its myths, is not as remote from the natural sciences as has been supposed in the humanities and the social studies that have developed in the wake of the German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey's work. (2) Furthermore, the world of science may be affected by mythology in spite of the intentions of scientists. (3) A third conclusion seems most certain: to the extent that the first two conclusions have any significance, they should be seen as complementary. As to the significance of the first two, it will depend on "the subject" or "the observer," whichever one seems most reasonable or profitable. "Complementarity" is a conclusion of a different order; it follows only after an additional "secondary" reflection and has bearing on the hope needed for all ongoing life and inquiry; on closer inspection, it was there all the time, from the first assumptions made to the very latest theorems.

It is interesting for the historian of religions concerned with myths that at the present time the ancient problem of the unity of nature elicits new interests among scientists. There is no reason to jump to conclusions and equate those interests and their expression with age-old myths, yet the revival of the interests by itself is fascinating and promises to overcome unnecessary barriers between "the humanities" and "the sciences." Students of subatomic particles theorize on a possible "supersymmetry" in nature. These theoretical considerations are hard to separate altogether from the ancient and universal mythological interest in the mys-

tery of oneness (whether of the world or of God or "the ultimate"). Still a reservation is in order here. What distinguishes modern scientists is that they search for precise, mathematical formulation of "supersymmetry," a direction that obviously cannot be applied to the mythical narration and poetry available to us. [*See also* Intuition.] To scientists, a complementarity such as that between the wave and the particle theories of light, when it becomes a serious object of study, is principally an invitation to precise, calculable demonstration of relationships.

The examples from physics have useful parallels elsewhere and are not meant to justify, least of all to apologize for, religio-historical procedures with myths. The topic of symmetry has received more attention and has deeper roots in aesthetics than in physics, yet here also ties to mythology are visible, even if difficult to define. For the church father Augustine, symmetry is a rational entity, because it does not occur in nature but in man's creations. It exists in human reason itself, because through it God created man in his own image. Whether one should speak about Augustine's reasonings as philosophy, science, or mythology will depend on one's intellectual frame of reference.

In the study of politics, power is a necessary concept. It is, of course, an abstraction. Wielders of power are not sterile laboratory tubes filled with that element. Religion, and hence mythological elements, play a great part in the exertion of political control over others: for example, the Indian ruler Bimbisāra supported the earliest monastic community of the Buddha; the British monarch holds the official title of *defensor fidei* ("defender of the faith"); and there has been a significant growth of ideological theories, slogans, and policies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With all these examples, the issue at stake is the nature of religion and myth. They too, like power, never occur in pristine purity, but always in admixtures. The fact that man is a religious (as well as a political, philosophizing, and knowledge-gathering) being is not necessarily a pleasant or attractive fact. To say that man is *homo religiosus* is not to say something "nice" about him. The "unity of myth" in various cultures and human inquiries is accordingly the statement of a problem, rather than of a supposed mysterious, pure, informational, and dialogic core of all human existence.

Another point is in order: each society, culture, or historical epoch has nothing but its own vocabulary to tell even its most basic myths. The point is so obvious as to run the risk of being overlooked. Again, a comparison with modern science is illuminating. Our century's astronomers and physicists have come to discuss a theory of the universe's origin they have labeled the "big bang" theory, distinct from the "solid state" theory. No matter how carefully mathematical equations are calculated, the discussions could not very well be carried on without labels taken from the common speech of our age and civilization; in the final analysis, they are poetic similes that have taken on a life of their own. They have a pregnant metaphorical significance similar to the imageries in traditional cosmogonic myths.

More than anyone else, Mircea Eliade has shown the basic significance of cosmogonic myths. No doubt, in most traditions that significance is evident. Whatever other myths are told—about the origin of animals, plants, institutions, or anything else—they take for granted the basis provided in some myth of the creation of the universe. Even eschatological myths, seemingly positing "the end" as if in contrast to the beginnings of the world, do not cut the relation to the cosmogony altogether. This abiding relation is not as paradoxical as it might seem. All thoroughgoing eschatologies express themselves as renewals of the real origin. Well known is the reference to Jesus Christ as "the new Adam." In the history of Christianity, the Protestant movement was engaged in reestablishing the pure, original form of Christianity. [*See also* Millenarianism *and* Cargo Cults.] In Marxism (and according to ideas of the young Marx himself) even the most typical eschatological myth of the classless society is expressly concerned with the restoration of a mankind as it was originally—without private property.

Character and Content of Myth. At first sight, myths have much in common with many other forms of folk literature. They deal with "supernatural" events, as fairy tales do; they deal with extraordinary figures comparable to those in legends and sagas, and so on. The authority of myths, already mentioned, is however clearly distinguishable from features in the other narratives. Typically, the myth presents itself as telling its listeners of a time altogether different from the time of our experience ("In the beginning . . . " or "Before heaven and earth were created . . . "), whereas the typical fairy tale, no matter how wonderful its events, begins "Once upon a time . . . ," that is to say, a time like ours. The saga's hero and the legend's saintly protagonist are no doubt superior to all normal human beings, yet their time is shown as just like the historical time of our experience.

Epics present a special case, for they are often a prime source for our knowledge of myths: Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are famous instances in Western history. Nevertheless, epics as such do not have the authority of myths, no matter how they function as educational tools held in the highest esteem by a society. The myths they narrate in the body of their texts and the mytho-

logical references they make can be seen as part of an educational pattern: in this manner people should understand the basic, authoritative models in the religious tradition. Moreover, in addition to instruction, epics provide entertainment for their audience. One cannot say this of myths, even though there are good reasons to speak of the "style" of myths, which can be truly arresting and spellbinding. (About the style of myths, see below.) Raffaele Pettazzoni, the great Italian historian of religions, went so far as to see in epics the first clear signs of a process of secularization.

The themes of myths are innumerable. The characters are often gods and goddesses, sometimes animals, plants, mountains, or rivers. In each case, the myth directly or by implication links its striking presentation of events to an altogether different time and thereby posits its authority. The astounding variety of myths can best be discussed not in terms of their characters, or even in terms of the events described, but with respect to the various cultures in which they came into being, and as corollaries to their structures, which are not identical with cultural conditionings. The most important information on myths, their themes, and classifications is presented in the appropriate place, where the questions concerning the origin and nature of the world are discussed. [*See* Cosmogony *and* Cosmology.]

Structure and Style. What follows here will not repeat the enumeration of myths and their many specific themes, such as that of the earth diver and the world parents, and their relation to specific economic and cultural settings, but instead will attempt to summarize what characterizes mythical recitations and what constitutes their purpose.

First, as to their purpose, contrary to the assumption of most traditional scholarship, myths are not essentially etiological (from Gr. *aitia*, "cause"), understood in the sense of "explaining origins or causes." It is true that the word *etiology* could be used, with some caution, but only if one adheres to the sense the Greeks themselves sometimes gave to the term *aitia:* a "primeval condition." Hence the term could also refer to primary states or first principles. This meaning of the term, however, was not usually in the minds of the scholars that thought in terms of etiology. Until recently many students saw in myths prescientific endeavors to establish causes for the universe, natural phenomena, and everything else that occupies modern scientists, thereby overlooking the fact that this scientific preoccupation with causality is a very precisely determined feature of modern history, as much so as the attendant confidence in technological progress. For instance, it was certainly no coincidence that the very influential folklorist and classicist James G. Frazer launched his idea of "fertility" as the principal explanation for most myths and rituals in the world shortly after artificial fertilizer was marketed for the first time in the nineteenth century. Such widely held explanations of a supposed "prescientific" nature of myths were incongruous with another view sometimes held at the same time by the same theorists, namely, that myths contained the text necessary to accompany rituals, after the manner of a libretto to an opera. [*See* Myth and Ritual School.] Since the latter theory entailed as a rule also the idea that rituals were only magical acts, hence predating "modern man," all these theories, incongruous or not, were really variations on the theoretical theme of a "prelogical mentality," one of the most enduring products of cultural evolutionism and best known through its articulation by the French philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939).

Yet myths are not attempts at causality preshadowing nineteenth-century scientific discussion. The notion of an origin and basis of all things should be taken quite seriously. If indeed the isolated and desiccated notion of "first causes" was the central issue in myths, as if one could ascertain beforehand that the myth's only concern was epistemology, one could not very well imagine any need for ritual related to myth in any manner. Instead, an academic-style presentation would suffice. Obviously, no myths in that style exist. And that is precisely the issue. A myth does something else, and something more encompassing than presenting a reasonable (or even prereasonable) explanation of things. This is the reason why Eliade has rightly emphasized the cosmogony as the fundamental myth. In whatever cultural or religious tradition a creation myth is recited, it is paradigmatic in a special, one might even say "pregnant" manner, because of the many things to which its sheer force as a model is able to give birth.

In a number of instances, the myth is recited in a special, archaic language, different from the vernacular. Once such instance is a creation myth in the Ngaju-Dayak tradition (South Kalimantan, Borneo, Indonesia). Its unusual language is not meant to keep it secret but rather serves to underline its significance, preserved by experts in the community. The narrative itself establishes not only the world at large but at once, and within it, the land, orienting the villages and also their mirror-image counterparts in the heavenly realms; it creates the social divisions and their functions, as well as the principles of the legal system. As to the externals of its style, the myth is couched in lyrical poetry, as are many myths, including those expressed in vernaculars, in Southeast Asia. Sometimes, the cosmogonic myth is recited on special occasions, as in the ancient Near East on the occasion of the enthronement of a king, or the renewal of life and kingship together in the New Year

festival. Elsewhere instances occur where the cosmogony functions to cure the sick or to renew a poet's inspiration. In all these examples the creation of the world is the model invoked for its fundamental and founding power.

A number of special features common to all myths have their common ground in the very basic character indicated. In simple terms, the question is: how does human speech succeed in expressing the underlying reality of all existence; how can something so ungraspable be expressed at all? All myths can be seen as coming to terms in their way, within their culture, within their necessities of life, with this question. The special features of myth, in spite of great cultural diversity, result from the unusual task for speech itself to go beyond the ordinariness, the givenness of the world, and the limits of common knowledge and perception.

An archaic language for myth, somehow artificially made up or preserved, is a feature used not only among the Ngaju-Dayak but also elsewhere. In very different civilizations and circumstances, with very different motivations, comparable phenomena occur: the use of Latin in the liturgy of the Roman Catholic church, the importance of Church Slavonic in the history of the Orthodox church, the use and cultivation of Sanskrit in Hinduism, and in the ancient world of Babylon the attention given to the study and use of Sumerian for many centuries after that language had ceased its vernacular existence. Although far from universal, such strangeness of language is one feature of myth indicative of the awareness of a tradition deserving special protection. Among other features in many traditions is the special care taken that myths are recited only at specific times and places. This points out clearly that myths are not like other stories. The awareness of the special nature of myths is illustrated in a folk tale of the North American Wichita Indians concerning a contest between Coyote and an opponent. The two contestants tell stories, and the winner will be the one who knows the most stories. Coyote wins, because his store of stories is inexhaustible: he can make them up at will. His opponent, the loser, restricts himself to stories that have not been "made up." He tells only true stories, and those are limited in number. True stories are, of course, what in our study are called "myths."

One of the features of myths that is indeed universal can best be described by the word *humor*, in spite of misunderstandings to which the term might give rise. It is not a matter of jokes or quick-wittedness, and least of all is it a cause for uproarious laughter. It is rather closer to what the German Romantics, who were intrigued by the experience of humor, seemed to think of as a smile that liberates us from the anxieties, and especially from the doldrums, of our existence. If successful, myths, setting out to do what ordinary speech cannot reach, have to break through a barrier that is set for our normal understanding, and hence *liberation* is the proper word for what is envisaged.

An alternative to seeing the humor of myths is to view myth as a primitive form of doctrinal system in the general evolution of the world of thought, as evidence that "the primitives" or "ancient man" could not think as one should (and as modern man presumably does), or in some other way to force myth into some scheme of logic that satisfies our contemporary sense of what reason and empirical reality are really all about. In all instances, these distortions neglect the actuality and the immediate presentaton of the myths themselves.

A myth of the Ge (in Brazil) begins by stating that in former times the Indians had neither corn nor fire. The myth immediately goes on to narrate (should the outsider say "laconically" or "with irony?") how one member of the tribe takes his wife to a distant place in the forest where they set up a plantation and plant corn as well as other staple foods. The man turns into a man-eating snake. The wife's lover visits the wife secretly and later returns with another man from the village. The man-snake devours the latter. Thereupon the villagers kill the snake and bring to their village corn and the other cultivated plants as well as fire. In the course of the story, the wife gives birth twice to a number of snakes, first in the forest, later in the village. The villagers kill those born in the village, but the woman goes back into the forest and orders her offspring there to bite men.

Whatever one should say or may want to say about the *aitia* of the enmity between men and snakes, or about hidden logical systems, or about the frequently attested relation between the acquiring of a civilized life and violence, the myth conforms to other myths in that it contains events that strike the listener as strange or contradictory, beginning with the juxtaposition of the Indians who formerly had neither corn nor fire with the departure of one man with his wife to a place in the forest where they set up a plantation and suddenly acquire mastery over fire. Of course, humor cannot be posited as a final, absolute doctrine of interpretation. Not all etiology is discarded, not all logic made superfluous; no less attention should be paid to cultural patterns and conditionings. Nevertheless, something that "liberates," something that shakes listeners loose from their customary habits of mind, is given form in myth.

One does not have to look far to find other examples. In the familiar story of *Genesis* 1, God creates light on the first day of creation, yet the sun, the moon, and the other heavenly bodies do not come into being until the

fourth day. By the end of the chapter, on the sixth day, God gives all green plants for food to the wild animals, the birds of heaven, the reptiles, every living creature. Obviously, this last statement is at odds with what every listener knows who is familiar with the eating habits of such animals as lions, for instance. One may argue that the narrative is not really a creation story but rather a paradise story. Whether we are convinced by this argument or by the realization that, according to the story, the creator god is something other than a prime mover, we are more shocked than persuaded into that novel idea. The accepted lines of thought are ruptured and replaced by new ones.

The German writer Jean Paul (pseudonym of Johann Paul Friedrich Richter, 1763–1825), known for his literary essays, was thoroughly aware that humor does not deal with trifling matters but, on the contrary, with matters of ultimate importance. The forms of humor he defined do not need much modification to be applied to mythical literature. All of them are characterized by their defiance of the "wooden" habits of human minds.

1. The "dimming of opposites" is probably characteristic of most myths. Imageries abound such as that of a time before creation, when heaven and earth were not yet separated, or of a beginning in which the two were so close that people could not stand up straight. The act of creation in *Genesis* 1 involves a separation of the waters below from the waters above.

2. In a variety of ways myths depict an "inverse effect." Somehow, a disastrous event in the story leads to infinite bliss that in no way could have been anticipated by the listener. An illustration is the Hindu cosmogonic story of the churning of the ocean. Before all ordinary time, in fact, before the creation of the world, the gods and the demons existed in some apparent harmony. The gods raise the question as to how they may attain immortality. Together with the demons they begin their quest for it by churning the ocean. Completely unexpectedly, instead of immortality, a most deadly poison turns up. All variants on the myth narrate that the great god Śiva rescues the world (which, curiously, had not been born yet) from the poison by swallowing it. The *Rāmāyaṇa* version has the interesting detail that it is the god Viṣṇu who suggests that he drink the poison on the grounds that the first offering is duly his. The accounts and their interpretations vary, but Śiva does drink the poison, and the world is established. The seriousness of the humor involved is evident, as is also the case with the crucifixion of Jesus Christ at the origin of Christianity, followed—without anyone among the human actors and witnesses involved anticipating it—by the resurrection.

3. "Subjective reservedness" may be the best formula for the awareness in a myth and its narrator of the curious togetherness of the human voice that narrates and the sacred, more-than-human reality narrated. The awareness is expressed in many ways, sometimes elaborately, sometimes in a matter-of-fact manner. The standard beginning of Buddhist *sūtra*s, telling listeners of the wonderful teachings and miracles of the Buddha, which make freedom, *nirvāṇa*, accessible, is the following: "Thus have I heard." A number of myths are interspersed with phrases such as "it is said that . . . " or "they say. . . ." Part of the tradition of many a Hindu is that he reveres his spiritual teacher, who in turn, of course, has his teacher, and so on, until the line finally reaches God. Tradition requires that the entire list of names be recited regularly. Thus, the mere subjective, limited individual quite consciously elaborates on his relation to the absolute divine ruler.

4. *Grotesque* is a term one might feel hesitant to use for sacred traditions, and yet it is the most striking form of humor in any tradition other than one's own. Some traditions speak of worlds that were created before the present one, and that were failures, as does the tradition of the Hill Saora in India. According to this tradition there was a world made of a resinous substance; in that world some brothers set up a still and made liquor. The liquor was not merely excellent, it was too excellent; when it flowed out, it burst into flames, and as a result the entire world burned up and sank back into the primordial ocean. It is not difficult to see here grotesque elements. Likewise, myths referred to previously, such as that of the Ge in Brazil and the Hindu story of the churning of the ocean, bristle with examples. Often "the grotesque" is a matter of exaggerated attention to detail or to measurement. It is as if the grotesqueness helps to emphasize the complete otherness of that time at the beginning of the world or that time on which all liberation, salvation, or bliss hinges.

History of Study. Problems with religion, including the subject of myth, are at least as ancient as recorded history, and hence a full history of the study of myths would have to begin a very long time ago, if not in that undatable period hidden from us in which religion originated. Explicit intellectual discussions on the subject are closer to us and have an important beginning with the ancient Greeks. Some of the standard methods of explaining myths owe their first formulation to the Greeks, so a rapid survey of mythology, in the sense of the study of myths, ought to commence with them. The concentrated intellectual discipline of a religio-historical study is, however, much more recent; it cannot be said to begin until the eighteenth century, not coming into its own until the early nineteenth century.

The classical world. Greek thinkers developed three manners of explanation that can be distinguished clearly. All three continued in the scholarship of later centuries. Hence, in Western civilization the Greek ideas on the subject do not merely represent a start but form the roots that nourished systems devised by later scholars.

In the first place, *allegorical explanations* served to account for the meaning of myths for many thinkers in classical civilization. As the term implies, the text of myths was explained not for what it said literally but as depicting or concealing in poetic images a reality or events that could be envisaged behind the text, if the text could only be properly understood. A clear example is the widely accepted interpretation in classical Greece of Homer's *Iliad* as intending not the physical involvement of the gods in the war that the epic describes but instead the inner struggle in all men between good and evil. No single person can be credited with the invention of this allegorizing explanation of myth. It has its origins all over the world and in many periods, whenever texts or customs that cannot be summarily dismissed are no longer understood or may have taken on an offensive quality in a new age. Many of the well-known classical thinkers, beginning with Theagenes of Rhegium (sixth century BCE), Heraclitus (c. 500 BCE), Parmenides (born c. 515 BCE), Empedocles (fifth century BCE), and including Plato (c. 429–347 BCE), made use of allegorical explanations of myths. An interesting feature, not only surviving long but expanded into an elaborate system in nineteenth-century nature mythology, was the assumption that many myths could be read as allegorical accounts for natural phenomena.

Rational explanations of various sorts also occur throughout the classical texts. One type of explanation that strikes the modern reader as far ahead of its time is a famous fragment by Xenophanes (sixth century BCE):

> Mortals suppose that the gods are born, and that they wear men's clothing and have human voice and body, . . . but if cattle or lions had hands, so as to paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do, they would paint their gods and give them bodies in form like their own, horses like horses, cattle like cattle.

We should see in the proper perspective this anticipation of what the twentieth century would call a projection mechanism: Xenophanes, though only known from some fragments, must have had in common with the majority of classical thinkers the desire not merely to destroy religion by means of some sharp rational analysis but to make room for a philosophy worthy of the name; in the case of Xenophanes this philosophical concern was to create a proper understanding for the idea of transcendence. Other thinkers, nevertheless, spent great efforts to show the worthlessness of traditional myths. The eclectic Latin writer Cicero (106–43 BCE) is quite critical in this regard; and very sharp in his rational criticism is the Latin didactic poet Lucretius (c. 99–55 BCE).

A third manner of explaining myths that definitely has its origin with the Greeks is euhemerism, named after the author Euhemeros (fl. 300 BCE). Euhemeros was not a philosopher or a scholar but the writer of an imaginative story in which the narrator tells his readers of a voyage to an island in an eastern direction whose kings bestowed gifts of lasting value on their subjects. These subjects, given gifts such as the calendar (granted by Ouranos), elevated their kings to divine status. According to the story, Zeus himself engraved the inscription read by the narrator in Euhemeros's story. This piece of fiction had a career no one could have foreseen, not merely in the classical world but long thereafter.

The Christian world. The intellectual world of Christianity with respect to mythology was in most respects an immediate continuation of what the Greeks had generated. Allegorical and rational explanations, as well as euhemeristic reasonings, abounded for centuries. Nevertheless, especially in euhemerism, the apologists and church fathers introduce something new. Whereas the classical world told of men who had come to be venerated because of their contributions to mankind, the Christian world speaks of mere men remembered not because of their great deeds but because of their evil deeds and vices. This change is the result of a larger shift in orientation than Plato, Aristotle, or any of the ancient thinkers could have foreseen. The new, Christian world makes much of the distinction between "true" and "false" religion; a distinction the classical philosophers had never made with such emphasis. Now, however, that the true religion is thought to be known, it is more than a topic of discussion, and traditions outside of the true religion are examples of "paganism." The pagan gods are not really gods but demonic beings. This twist in euhemerism filled an intellectual need and was generally accepted. Nevertheless, during the Middle Ages a narrative tradition of many streams, akin to the original euhemerism of the classics, also continued. Thus the Norse gods could be "explained" by deriving them through stories of kinship from the heroes in the *Iliad* and ultimately linking them through the same procedure to the creation story in the *Book of Genesis*.

The eighteenth century. The eighteenth century is the prelude to the modern study of myths. For the first time serious efforts were made to assess the discoveries by voyagers during the Renaissance. One very important

group of mythological disclosures was the evidence collected by Jesuit missionaries in North America. Questions concerning revelation and truth raised in the tradition of Christianity were revived and given new, complex forms. In the work of Bernhard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757), old and new ideas intermingle. Like other authors of the period, he begins by assuming the factual reality of God's revelation in the Old Testament and speculating on the intellectual inability of other nations to accept that original knowledge. The new age is visible in his effort to show (1) the similarity of myths found among American Indians and the ancient Greeks and (2) that the inability of those peoples to accept true religion reflects an intellectual childishness. The "childishness" of the ancient and "savage" races becomes a standard image in many of the explanations to follow in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The most original idea of Fontenelle, next to his insistence on comparisons of different "pagans," is his inference that all peoples have the same mental disposition and that, as a result, comparable developments occur in different parts of the world. More clearly than Fontenelle, Charles de Brosses (1709–1777) makes a case for comparative studies and shows an interest in questions of origins that will characterize much of the scholarship of the next century. His studies led him to the conclusion that elements of West African religion in his time could explain Greek mythological conceptions. Hence, in his view, the study of later "savages" can reveal matters of much earlier traditions.

In addition to the expanding knowledge of the world an even more significant factor marked the eighteenth century as a watershed: the rationalism of the Enlightenment. This change within the history of philosophy made it possible to narrow down whatever existed in narrative euhemeristic reasonings into a principle of explanation. For the study of myths, their style and wealth of images, this new intellectual concern was of course a mixed blessing. The new mood asked for laws of causation rather than for the coherencies visible in myths. Although the greatest significance of the philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) is his critique of an overconfidence in reason, his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* has many passages typical of the rationalistic eighteenth-century obsession with definitions of a mathematical clarity. In fact, de Brosses, who was certainly a man of the Enlightenment, made extensive use of Hume's ideas in his own work.

The Romantics. The Romantic movement that swept Europe and America had its most pronounced exponents in Germany, and its influence was profound on the study of myths, the study of historical linguistics, and on other, related comparative disciplines of study such as art, law, and culture. Indeed, many of these disciplines were initiated under the Romantic influence. While the Enlightenment had sharpened the tools of the intellect in its resistance to the *ancien régime* politically and to the church religiously, the Romantic movement, without rejecting the Enlightenment's accomplishments, created a very different center of attention. This can be captured by such words as "emotion," "vision," and "genius" (of poets or other creative artists). Emotion comes to be seen as at least of equal importance with the *ratio* of the previous age. Vision suggests a comprehension of a whole rather than analysis as an end in itself.

The theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), who left his mark on all areas in the study of religion in the nineteenth century and beyond, was of the opinion that the divine, in itself ungraspable, was represented "mythically"; "the mythical" he explained as a "historical representation of the supra-historical." As was typical of the Romantic outlook, the emphasis fell on the vision of something eternal, not subject to the vicissitudes of history, yet paradoxically expressed in history. The age that saw the Faustian creativity of Beethoven, the fully Romantic works of Mendelssohn, Chopin, and Schumann, the writings of the young Goethe, Blake, and the German poets Friedrich Hölderlin and Novalis, as well as the paintings of Delacroix, Turner, and Théodore Géricault, saw also the philosophical creations of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). Hegel's philosophy was the first since late antiquity (most especially, that of the non-Christian Roman thinker Plotinus, third century CE) to develop a system of thought free from the Christian philosophical opposition between true and false religion. Another idealistic, Romantic thinker, F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854), wrote a *Philosophy of Mythology* likewise centered on a totality of man's vision. An important early Romantic, especially for his essays on poetry and mythology, was Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). Many works of scholarly intent were written on symbolism and mythology, yet few made a lasting mark. Among these few are writings by Karl Otfried Müller (1797–1840) and the brothers Jakob (1785–1836) and Wilhelm (1786–1859) Grimm. The general importance of the Romantic impulse for nineteenth-century scholarship in the area of mythology and religion cannot be overestimated.

Nineteenth-century evolutionism. Without the Romantic impulse, the astounding nineteenth-century scholarly achievements would be incomprehensible. During this century many new data became available through ethnology, archaeology, and the study of ancient and distant civilizations and their religious materials. The compiling of dictionaries, the construction of gram-

mars, and all the linguistic work that began with the study of comparative Indo-European linguistics demanded an extraordinary effort. This effort, whether among government officials in the colonies acquired by Western powers, in the expansion of newly established missionary societies, in the laboratories and experiments of science, or in historical inquiries and classifications of documents, owed its principal inspiration to the Romantic thinkers. The theory of evolution—the law of development from low to high, from simple to complex—that became widely accepted is inseparable from the Romantic impulse, predating the influence of Charles Darwin's successes in theorizing *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, through Hegel and also through the much more positivistic works of the English social theorist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857).

The cumbersome work on facts and their compilation and a Romantic attitude are perhaps nowhere as clearly united as in the person of the Vedic scholar F. Max Müller (1823–1900). In his theories on the origin and development of language and myth, he posits as a beginning (supposedly documented in the Vedic texts) a pure awe in man's experience before nature (especially in his experience of dawn); then Müller utilizes all his knowledge of ancient Indo-European languages and literatures as a basis for his theory that a "disease of language" accounts for the formation of misunderstandings deposited in myths such as those in the Hindu Purāṇas. The finishing touch is provided by the general theory of evolution, according to which religions evolve to ever higher and purer forms.

Modern studies. Inevitably, the nineteenth-century developments led to an increased complexity in materials to be studied and in methods employed. It is impossible in a brief sketch to enumerate all the achievements in the area of mythology by anthropologists, folklorists, psychologists, philologists, sociologists, and historians of religions. Nevertheless, for a general intellectual orientation it is possible and helpful to speak of the many variations that have occurred on the theme that was set with the opposition/complementarity of rationalism and romanticism. Some might perhaps see a much more general opposition/complementarity traceable in the history of thought such as that of the entire history of Western philosophy, being, as has been suggested, a running commentary on Plato and Aristotle. If one is disinclined to give weight to lasting historical influences, one might certainly speak of a peculiar, constitutional or "structural" contrast between scholarly concerns for the problem of variety and scholarly concerns for unity in the study of myths. Most concisely, this opposition/complementarity may be summed up with the image of the difference between the fox and the hedgehog of the seventh-century BCE Greek poet Archilochus, an image renewed through the work of Isaiah Berlin: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." In the study of myths, however, there are many reasons to think of the rationalists and the romantics as having given a general distinction such shape and color on such a wide canvas as to make later discussions seem like specifications and embellishments to their discussions.

The earliest Romantics, in the 1770s, known in German literary history by their association with "storm and stress," can be understood in their opposition to the rationalism ushered in by the French *philosophes*. Even the influential ideas of J. G. Herder concerning the origin of language and myths, composed in his ecstatic writings and revels in adoration of nature, can be read for their reaction against an intellectualist attitude that was then prevalent. The growing Romantic movement, however, was not engaged in a fight against the progress the Enlightenment had brought and had spoken about so frequently. The new expressions we find in such Romantics as Schleiermacher point rather to a transformation of the manner in which subjects such as the study of myths and history can be conducted. A complementarity rather than an opposition is in evidence here.

The two sides, rationalism and romanticism, can indeed be seen as convenient signs under which, or as poles between which, the study of myths has continued ever since. More extreme Romantic scholarly work, such as that by G. F. Creuzer (1771–1858), elicited severe criticism from C. A. Lobeck (1781–1860) because of its speculative features, its lack of evidence. As indicated above, in F. Max Müller's work and, as we must infer, in his personal make up, the two sides existed harmoniously.

It would seem that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the nonromantic side predominates. Scholars such as the classicists Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903), Franz Cumont (1886–1949), and Martin P. Nilsson (1874–1967), who have contributed greatly to our knowledge of mythology, are splendid examples. Perhaps fewer in number, scholars with an avowed romantic interest have vied for readers' attention. Among them are the German classicist Walter F. Otto (1874–1958) and the Dutch historian and phenomenologist of religion Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890–1950).

Sometimes the two attitudes are openly discussed, yet more often they are not. Whatever names are given to the two sides may not be accepted by one or the other "party" involved. Mircea Eliade preferred the term *mor-*

phology of religion to the term *phenomenology*, which was employed by van der Leeuw. Whichever term one likes, it is easy to see that in Eliade as well as van der Leeuw the emphasis is on "the sacred" and the study of its different manifestations. This interest goes back to Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) and to Friedrich Schleiermacher. The reaction to this interest in the sacred is not difficult to detect, though it is multifarious. Many a historian (such as Raffaele Pettazzoni) has been more concerned with a proper understanding of the variety of myths than with what seemed "speculation" on a unity behind that variety; such scholars have been suspicious of theologically inspired apologetic tendencies as well. Many an anthropologist, especially in the school of Franz Boas (1858–1942), has been too preoccupied with the puzzling coherencies of specific cultures in all their creations to pay much attention to an underlying "ultimate" signification of myths.

Among many other instances of the opposition of attitudes in the study of myth, two more may be mentioned. In the first place, the opposition/complementarity occurs as a "natural" state of affairs within any discipline in the entire field of mythology. Next to "structural anthropology," "historical anthropology" makes its voice heard. Whereas the former, if not concerned with an "ultimate unity," is at the very least concerned with coherencies in myths and other human creations, the latter spends more time on the specificities and changes in any culture. An example that has received no profound discussion is difference or, rather, lack of contact between the search for unity among phenomenologists (or morphologists) and among structuralist anthropologists. That both are searching for coherencies in myths is clear, yet the nature of a unifying goal is assumed in very different manners. The choice of "rationalism" and "romanticism" as labels may be most justified in this case: Eliade's conception of "the sacred" is missing in the foremost anthropological structuralist Claude Lévi-Strauss; instead, Lévi-Strauss shows an equally obvious interest in man's ceaseless drive to reconcile his empirical knowledge with his mental, conceptual control over the world.

The existing differences cannot be ignored. At the same time, in the study of myths, they are the differences that can give rise to most illuminating discussions for our understanding.

Myths and the Modern World. Myths and myth-making can easily make the impression on casual observers of being distant and ancient matters. That impression is mistaken. Myths and myth making have certainly not disappeared from the modern world. In spite of still-popular ideas fostered in nineteenth-century scholarship, suggesting a general decay of religion as part of the general evolution of the world, it is not at all easy on the basis of our evidence to think of myths as a type of art produced only in some period of the past or among nonliterate, tribal peoples. Nor is it necessary to limit our search for myths in the modern world only to the uncovering of survivals or fossils of earlier, now-defunct religiosities. The process of history is complex and does not give up its most basic constituents, including its mythological creativity, because prevailing ideas change. The fact that in common parlance the word *myth* has a derogatory meaning has no bearing on the issue. Antiquity was already familiar with that same use of the term. Paul is among those on record as despisers of mere myths (*1 Tm.* 1:4, *2 Tm.* 4:4, *Ti.* 1:14). Two religions of India, Buddhism and Jainism, have both expressed strong misgivings about existing religious ideas, and these misgivings fall into the same category of depreciation of myths. Myths have continued to flourish, and the misgivings of any given religion, religious grouping, or age do not change that fact today anymore than in the past.

In entering upon the study of myths, one should reject one illusion as soon as possible, namely, that we are entitled to speak of "the mythology" (in the sense of the entire body of myths) of, for example, ancient Mesopotamia, of an African people, or of a village in Irian (New Guinea). In none of these cases are we ever looking "objectively" at "a total belief system." We are never in a position to do so. All we have before us are at best good selections by a scholar or a good sampling by a fieldworker. The availability of the collection in print between two covers does not make our position that of an objective observer readying himself for a complete understanding. We look only at a fragment in time and place. The nature, structure, and style of myths, described before, point not merely to the existence of bodies of material but to live traditions. The "humor" in myths changes in time, together with everything else in history, but it also indicates a universal human propensity. The erroneous idea that our own world is largely devoid of myths or is rapidly purified from such things rests largely on the assumption that "our world," in whatever manner that term is defined, is "real" and does not depend on "fiction." Every age, however, and every civilization rests on that type of assumption. The philosopher Alphonse de Waelhens has rightly pointed out that we are able to see quite clearly the outline of a myth only after that myth has ceased to function unassailed and unquestioned, that is to say, as an expression of "reality."

In our own present-day world we lack the distance necessary for such clarity in our views of our own myths, and the question as to which ones will stand out

as central can be discussed seriously only by a later generation. This future generation also will have to make up their minds on the basis of fragmentary information, in the same manner in which our scholarship must remain conscious of its fragmentary information concerning live streams of mythology in ancient Mesopotamia or Irian or with respect to the nineteenth-century myths of evolutionism, materialism, missionary optimism, colonialism and imperialism, or Marxism. "Our own world" with respect to its mythology is completed by the manner in which we orient ourselves not merely in space and time, and in which we refer to "our" transcendencies, but also vis-à-vis other people before and around us in our endeavors to define and interpret their myths. This, one might say, concludes our circle of interpretation.

The Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) once conjured up the image of a man with his mouth so full of food that he could not swallow. Kierkegaard raised the question as to whether one might better help that man by stuffing more food into his mouth or by taking some out. Obviously, only the latter could be a solution. In the same manner, Kierkegaard argued, a man can be so filled with information, which he mistakes for useful knowledge, that even in the face of his own protests and his insistence on adding even more to his store of learning, the only cure is taking some of that knowledge away. This is the task Kierkegaard assigned himself in using "the comical" to make the overburdened man see the uselessness of what he knew. Kierkegaard's parable is a perfect illustration of the unceasing propensity toward myth-making in modern times and, at the same time, of the need for the mature intellect to occupy itself with the issue of mythology. Change continues to occur and the forms taken on by myths will remain endless; yet the issue is fundamentally the same as it has always been in distant times and in distant places.

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Myth and History

At first glance, myth and history appear to be complete opposites. To be sure, they are both narratives, that is to say, arrangements of events into unified stories, which can then be recounted. But myth is a narrative of origins, taking place in a primordial time, a time other than that of everyday reality; history is a narrative of recent events, extending progressively to include events that are further in the past but that are, nonetheless, situated in human time.

This initial definition, however, calls for a series of qualifying remarks that reveal a network of more complex relations in the place of this stark opposition. Let us first consider the fact that our very model of myth has come down to us from the stories of the gods in ancient Greece. Furthermore, a transition from myth to history can be seen in the Greek myths themselves, as they extend to include the history of heroes and the histories of ancestors. These are more properly termed legendary narratives, unfolding in a time lying between the time of origins and that of recent events. History will encroach on this legendary time, extending its grasp to include an ever more distant past.

An even more significant intersection between myth and history has been brought to light through the extension, familiar from contemporary anthropology, of the notion of myth to types of narrative that are extremely widespread in contemporary archaic societies. These narratives are characterized by being anonymous, and so without any determinant origin. They are received through tradition and accepted as credible by all the members of the group, with no guarantee of authenticity other than the belief of those who transmit them. History will mark an "epistemological break" with this mode of transmission and reception, but only after an evolution involving many intermediate stages, as we shall see later.

A source of even more serious conflict between myth and history, and therefore also an occasion for more complex forms of transition or compromise, has to do with the object of myth itself, which we temporarily designated as a narrative of origins. The concern with origins extends far beyond the history of gods, heroes, and ancestors. The questions pertaining to the origins of things extend to all the entities of individual and social life. [*See* Cosmogony.] Thus myths can reply to any of the following types of question. How did a particular society come to exist? What is the sense of this institution? Why does this event or that rite exist? Why are certain things forbidden? What legitimizes a particular authority? Why is the human condition so miserable; why do we suffer and die? Myth replies to these questions by recounting how these things began. It recounts the creation of the world and the appearance of humans in their present physical, moral, and social condition. With myth therefore we are dealing with a very particular type of explanation, which will maintain a complex relation to history. This type of explanation essentially consists in myth's foundational function: the myth recounts founding events. Its tie and subsequent conflict with history result from this function. On the one hand, myth exists only when the founding event has no place in history but is situated in a time before all history: *in illo tempore*, to borrow Mircea Eliade's now classic expression. On the other hand, what is at stake in any such foundation is to relate our own time to this other time, whether this be in the form of participation, imitation, decadence, or abandonment. It is precisely this relation between our time and the time of the myth that is the essential factor constituting the myth, rather than the types of things founded by it, whether the latter include the whole of reality—the world—or a fragment of reality—an ethical rule, a political institution,

or even the existence of man in a particular condition, fallen or innocent.

In the light of this brief phenomenology of myth, it appears that the relation of myth to history can be situated on three different levels. In a limited, narrow sense, myth and history are two different kinds of narrative. Myth is a narrative concerning the origin of everything that can worry, frighten, or surprise us. History, on the other hand, is a precise literary genre, namely the writing of history or historiography. Taken in this strict sense, history can enter into a variety of relations with myth; history's own origin from myth is not the only such relation. The genetic point of view must not blind us to other possible viewpoints. If, as we shall see, history does not necessarily take the place of myth but may exist alongside it within the same culture, together with other types of narrative, then the question of the relation between myth and historiography must be approached from the perspective of a classification of the various kinds of narratives that are produced by a particular society at a particular moment. The genetic and taxonomical perspectives must each be allowed both to complement and to limit the exclusive claims of the other.

As a backdrop to this well-defined problem a vaster one arises, related to a second meaning of the term *history*. History is not only a literary product; it is also what men do or suffer. Many languages preserve these two meanings of their word for "history": history (or story) as the narrative of the events of the past, and history as the whole of these events themselves, as human beings make them or are affected by them. Beyond the question of the writing of history is the question of how a given culture interprets its historical mode of existence. A number of problems arise in this connection. How, for instance, is the stability or change affecting a culture's mores or institutions perceived? What value is attributed to it? Does change itself have meaning? That is to say, is change at once meaningful and directed toward an end, or is it incoherent, given to disorder, chance, and meaninglessness? And, if there is a sense to it, is it an improvement, a form of progress, or a degeneration, a decadence?

To move from the first sense of *history* to the second is not difficult. The writing of history as an essentially literary activity is after all one of the ways a society accounts for its own past. It inevitably leads to the more general question of the sense that that society ascribes to its own historical development. This interrelationship between history as literary activity and history as lived experience gives a new meaning to the question of the relation between history and myth. Myth, to the extent that it is defined by its foundational role, can function to ascribe a positive or negative value to history in general, to the extent that the latter is understood as a mode of human existence.

When dealing with myth and history at this level, we must avoid the temptation to engage in simplistic oppositions between types of civilizations or to employ genetic interpretations that are overly linear. A single society may in fact have both myths of decadence and myths of progress, whether in different epochs or in the same period. This competition of myths may express the uncertainty that a society experiences concerning the meaning of the changes that it undergoes. Furthermore, in a given culture, historiography may be intended to provide only partial explanations that make no claim to be comprehensive, while the broader question of the meaning of history is left to legends and myths. As a result, two cultures may differ as to their most fundamental myths and yet present striking similarities in both the techniques and goals of their historiography. This was true of the Greeks and Hebrews, as will be shown below.

Finally, in the background of the question of the meaning of history, we find the question of a society's interpretation of the time in which its history—and all history—unfolds. This third question is implicit in the two preceding ones. In the first place, historiography can be defined as the narrative of human actions in the past. [*See* Historiography.] Since this interest in the past is inseparable from an interest in the present and from expectations about the future, historiography necessarily includes in its definition a reference to time. It is knowledge of societies and people in time.

This reference to time cannot help but affect the first and second senses of *history:* both the meaning that a class of literati gives to the act of writing history and the meaning that a particular society gives to its history through narrative activity imply a specific perception of time. The evaluation of time may even become the object of reflection, or it may remain implicit, in much the same way that change may be evaluated positively or negatively. It is at this level that the so-called cyclical and linear conceptions of time oppose one another.

The question of the supposed opposition between cyclical and linear conceptions of time is a thorny one. [*See* Sacred Time.] To begin with, it is not certain that the notion of cyclical time has but one meaning. In addition to the paradigmatic case of the periodical regeneration of time by specific rites, there are many other ways of conceiving the periodical return of the same situations and the same events; a number of periodicities are to be distinguished here. Nor is it certain that the notion of linear time was clearly perceived as a global alternative to that of cyclical time before modern as-

tronomy and cosmology or the even more recent ideologies of progress. Last but not least, a single culture can give rise to contrary myths concerning the cyclical or linear character of time. This is part of the uncertainty that a particular society may foster concerning its own historical condition and that of the human race as a whole. Then too, the culture that produces myths of cyclical time or of linear time may also produce a historiography that is deliberately developed outside of this framework, limiting its scope to restricted temporal segments that can be inserted in either of those versions of time. For these reasons, the problem of the apparent split between cyclical and linear time should not be tackled head-on. Instead, this debate should be carried on within the horizon of the two preceding investigations.

Ancient Greece. To guide us in this problem, it will be helpful to take as our reference the relations between myth and history in ancient Greece. In the cultural sphere of the ancient Near East and the Mediterranean, they alone—along with ancient Israel—produced a historiography worthy of the name. In addition, the variety of the relations that this production maintained with myth (a Greek term if ever there was one!) permits us to verify the extreme complexity of the problem and the validity of the three-stage model that we have just suggested.

If we adhere to the definition of history as historiography, then history's relation to myth is determined in its essential features by the birth of a type of knowledge and a type of discourse (prose narrative) that make a series of decisive breaks with the mythical mode of thought and with its privileged mode of literary expression, versified poetry. The earliest witness that we have to history's break with myth was provided by Herodotus in the middle of the fifth century BCE, whose work stands as a literary landmark. Its title—*Historiē* in the Ionian dialect—has ever since determined not only the name of the discipline that he inaugurated but also the principal meaning of this term, namely investigation. These "histories" are in fact investigations into the causes of the wars fought between the Greeks and the Persians. Unlike myths of origin and heroic tales situated in distant times, the histories of Herodotus are concerned with recent events. Herodotus was interested in the causal role of antecedent events and in the role of responsible agents in the events that he investigated. His writings are thus far more than mere descriptions. They are expressions of a mode of thinking that characterizes what has been called the Ionic Enlightenment and so take their place within a vaster ensemble of investigations into cosmology, geography, and ethnography. They find their speculative equivalent in philosophy as such, where *phusis*, a term we translate as "nature," constitutes at once the field of exploration and the key word. In Ionian philosophy the notion of *archē* in the sense of "principle" decisively splits off from *archē* in the sense of "beginning." This bifurcation of the notion of origin is of great importance for the understanding of the separation of history from myth.

The epistemological break with myth that marks the emergence of history, geography, ethnology, cosmology, and the philosophy of nature does not entitle us to represent the process as simply genetic and linear, however. This would be to overlook the intermediate stages that exist in the transition from myth to history, as well as the continued dependence of the new mode of thought on the earlier mythical mode. In addition, we would thereby overlook the simultaneous existence of several different types of narrative within the same culture.

In contrast to a simplistic representation of the "Greek miracle," we should be attentive instead to this phenomenon of transition, which preserves a sense of the different elements that went to make up the "event" of the Ionic Enlightenment. Herodotus was in fact preceded by an entire series of prose writers who paved the way for him. The most important of these was certainly Hecataeus of Miletus, whom we know only through a few surviving quotations. Already in the second half of the sixth century, this prose writer was the author of a *periēgēsis*, a realistic account of a voyage around the world that relates history to geography, cartography, and ethnology, and of the *Genealogies*, which constructed the great family tree of the heroic age. The break between myth and history did not, therefore, take place all at once, but only gradually. Herodotus's *Histories* themselves did not cut every tie with the stories of the heroic age, as can be seen from his attempts at a general chronology dating back to the Trojan War. And if Herodotus was concerned so specifically with the Persian Wars, this was because, in his opinion, they deserved to be reported as much as had the Trojan War. Finally, the epic dimension of Herodotus's work, which allows him to preserve the chronological and analogical ties between heroic and historical times, must be attributed to the influence of the versified epic of Homer.

The twofold relation of break and filiation between myth and history on the level of narrative form becomes clearer when we consider the end or goal assigned to this new kind of literature. Here we move from the first to the second senses of *history*. The end that Herodotus assigned to his investigations can be found in the prologue of the *Histories:* "Here are set forth the researches *(historiē)* of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, that men's actions may not be forgotten, nor

things great and wonderful, whether accomplished by Greeks or barbarians, go without report, nor especially the causes *(aitiē)* of the wars between one and another."

Three features of this prefatory remark deserve emphasis. The struggle against forgetfulness is cited first; later we shall discuss the conception of time that is implied here. It is then to the great deeds of the Greeks and the barbarians that this exercise of memory is applied. The very notion of great deeds marks a tie with the epic of the age of heroes, even though it is being applied here to recent times. But, in particular, this cult of memory binds history to the self-understanding that a people acquires by giving an account of its past. The memory that history cultivates is therefore that of a people taken as a single body. In this way, history takes its place within the body of traditions that together constitute what could be called the narrative identity of a culture. To be sure, it does this within a critical mode that is entirely different from mythical traditions, since the latter draw their authority from the very act of transmitting the immemorial. But the opposition between the critical mode of historiography introduced here by Herodotus and the authoritative mode of the reception of myth in Homer occurs within the larger phenomenon of tradition: the poet and the man of letters are united within the single great melting pot of culture.

The third feature of Herodotus's project points in the same direction: the object of his research is to discover the cause of an essentially conflictual event, namely the Persian Wars. These wars not only served to oppose Greek and barbarian but fundamentally threatened a whole configuration of peoples, just as the Trojan War had done in heroic times. This is the major crisis for which history now seeks a cause. By attributing this cause to a responsible agent, the *Histories* give an ethical coloration to the entire course of events, which at the same time attests to a striking kinship between history and tragedy. It was the *hubris* of Cresus that endangered the harmony of a people, and even the victory of the Greeks appears as a retribution *(tisis)* that reestablishes this lost harmony. In this way, a certain divine justice is effected by the course of events. One cannot help thinking here of a fragment from Anaximander: "for (existing things) pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time." This fragment displays a manner of thinking halfway between myth and what, with the Sophists, Socrates, and Plato, will be termed *sophia* ("wisdom").

From this threefold analysis we can see that the passage from myth to history cannot be reduced to the mere substitution of the latter for the former. In competition with this linear evolution, we must make room for an accumulation of literary genres and the modes of thinking related to them: theogonic myths written in the style of scholarly and literary mythology, myths of the heroic age cast in the literary mode of the epic and of tragedy, and, finally, history. So little did history replace myth that Plato still wages war against myths in his dialogues, though not without including here and there some *palaios logos* received from the Orphic tradition or from alleged Egyptian wisdom. What is more, he invents certain myths himself, in the form of philosophical tales.

A third problem now remains. This is the problem of the representation of time that underlies history, a problem that forms the backdrop to the debate between history and myth. If Greek historiography holds some importance in this area, it is less in relation to the so-called opposition between cyclical time and linear time than to the dividing line between the time of the gods and the time of men.

With respect to the debate concerning the Greeks' supposed opposition of cyclical and linear conceptions of time, opened by Thorlief Boman in *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek* (1960), it is clear that historiography not only does not provide any confirmation of the thesis that holds Hellenism to be massively in favor of a cyclical conception of time but in fact refuses to take either side. As Arnaldo Momigliano stresses, to the extent that Herodotus concentrates his attention on a limited segment of history, he is entirely unaware of an historical cycle, much less an eternal return. Of course, he believes that there are forces operating in history, forces that are ordinarily tied to the intervention of the gods in human life, which become visible only at the end of a long chain of events. Such was the *hubris* against which Solon warned. Nothing, however, indicates that these interventions attest to a cyclical time. Herodotus "attributed to the Persian War a unique, non-cyclical significance, chiefly as a conflict between free men and slaves" (Momigliano, 1977, p. 187).

It is instead to the second problem, that of the split between the time of the gods and the time of men, that the earliest Greek historiography makes the most decisive contribution. The comparison with Homer, Hesiod, and the tragedians is instructive here. In Homer, the little substance that human time takes on is due still to the family tie that unites most of the heroes to the gods. In order to evoke these heroic times ordinary memory is not enough: it is not a mere literary convention when in book 2 of the *Iliad* (lines 484–7), the poet asks the Muses, the daughters of Memory (Mnemosyne), to guide him through the confusion of human time and space. "And now, tell me, Muses, dwelling on Olympus, for you

are indeed goddesses: present everywhere, you know all things; we hear only noises, we ourselves know nothing. Tell me who were the guides, the leaders of the Danaans?" It is because time is utter confusion for the human observer that the poet calls upon a Muse to unite him with the higher vision of the gods. In Hesiodic myth, the ages and the races that live in them are inserted between the time of the gods and human time, serving as much to separate them as to connect them. This is a history of decadence, interrupted only by the fourth race, that of heroes. The fate of the race of the last age, the iron age, is to suffer fatigue and hardships and hence to live painfully in time. The only remedy for this is the monotonous repetition of work in the fields. Nevertheless, the cycle of time is already that of a human time.

In the works of the tragedians, man is defined as "ephemeral." This is not because man's life is short but because his condition is tied to the accidents of time. The "sovereign time" sung by the chorus can at the same time be the "avenging time" that will reestablish justice. Historiography, on the other hand, by virtue of the task that it sets for itself, introduces a certain consistency into the time of men, relating it to the human time of the "first inventor" *(protos euretēs)*. On the one hand, Herodotus recognizes these first inventors in those who first gave offense to the Greeks and thereby brought on the Persian Wars. On the other hand, the historian himself, by naming himself, by giving the reasons he has for recalling the past, and by seeking the sense of past events, establishes himself as a first inventor. It is in this double manner that he gives human time its consistency. Despite its linear framework, however, this human time still leaves room for analogies and correspondences that elevate the characters above and beyond time.

It is only with Thucydides that a logical time will govern the disorder of historical time that stems from the repetition of the same dissensions between cities, which make innumerable and terrible evils "occur and recur unendingly." The second great Greek historian is then able to define his work as a means of "seeing clearly into events of the past and those yet to come by reason of the human character they possess, offering similarities or analogies" (*History of the Peloponnesian War* 1.22). This is the sense of the famous expression *ktēma eis aei* ("acquisition for all times"): human time will take on consistency in the face of the time of the gods only when the narrative is anchored to a sort of logic of action.

Ancient Israel. Following the majority of exegetes and cultural historians, we have adopted the working hypothesis that only the Greeks and the Hebrews developed a historiography comparable to that of the moderns. It is therefore in reference to the birth of history in Greece that we shall discuss the similar phenomenon in ancient Israel. Obstacles to this sort of comparative undertaking are by no means lacking, however.

The first source of difficulty lies in a difference of literary genre. Literary genres such as epic, tragedy, lyric poetry, and history, which are represented in Greece by distinct works and authors, are found grouped together and often interwoven in the Hebrew Bible, a book that is itself actually a collection of books. Therefore, if we are to find in the Hebrew scriptures a collection of texts comparable to Herodotus's *Histories*, we will have to ignore the important question of context at the risk of serious distortions. This is the case, for instance, with the story of David's rise (*1 Sm.* 16:14–*2 Sm.* 5:25) and the succession story (*2 Sm.* 7, 9–20; *1 Kgs.* 1–2).

A second difficulty lies in the complexity of narrative as a genre. The narrative genre is represented by such a wide variety of forms that we cannot restrict our classification merely to an opposition between history and myth. It is necessary to work out a typology of narrative forms, however rudimentary and merely provisional, before we can inquire into the possible filiations between one form and another.

There is still another difficulty. In addition to the variety of literary genres surrounding the narrative core and the diversity of narrative forms themselves, the Hebrew scriptures present a hierarchy of different texts. First-order units that represent the entire range of narrative forms are incorporated into larger ensembles such as the compositions of the Yahvist, which present narrative features that differ from those of the first-order units. In order to account for the difference of level and structure between these larger narratives and their smaller, properly historiographic segments, it is advisable to refer to the former as "history-like *narratives*."

Finally, concerning the specific problem of myth and history, we must be prepared to confront the paradoxical situation that, in contrast to the evolution that led from myth to history in Greece, in Israel the quasi myths or myth fragments borrowed from neighboring cultures were incorporated into the great narrative ensembles mentioned above in the form of historicized myths, as is the case in *Genesis* 1–11. This reinterpretation of myth on the basis of history appears quite specific to the literary sphere of ancient Israel.

We can navigate our investigation through the reefs of these difficulties by proceeding along the lines of the three levels of inquiry outlined in the first paragraph: namely, a typology of narrative forms, an analysis of the historical mode of understanding of the community that produces these narratives, and, finally, a brief look

at the conception of time that may be implicit either in the literary forms or in the self-understanding revealed in ancient Israel.

With respect to the typology of narrative forms, in which history and myth take their place at the two opposite poles of the spectrum, it is important to note that genetic investigations, stemming principally from the work of Hermann Gunkel and Hugo Gressmann, have employed structural analysis to establish criteria for the identification of narrative forms and then gone on to work out their filiation. Gunkel (1928) himself argued that the historiography illustrated by the two narratives concerning David mentioned above stemmed from legends *(Sagen)*, rather than from the myths of the ancient Middle East or from the lists, annals, and chronicles that were widespread among Israel's neighbors. In order to establish this thesis, Gunkel had to work out a brief typology that allowed him to distinguish legends from other types of stories. He first distinguished legends *(Sagen)*, which refer to characters in the real world but living in times gone by, both from myths, which are origin narratives, taking place in a time different from that of ordinary experience, and tales *(Märchen)*, which are pure fictions intended for amusement. Then, within the *Sagen* themselves, he distinguished between father legends *(Vatersagen)* and hero legends *(Heldensagen)*. Father legends are tied to family leaders who are representative of their social group. They are sometimes related in a series, like the stories of Joseph; Gunkel calls these "novellas" *(Novellen)*. Hero legends *(Heldensagen)*, to the extent that they concern public figures like Moses, Joshua, Saul, and David, can contain a genuinely historical element. According to Gunkel, it is within this subgroup that we can follow the evolution from the pure heroic legend, illustrated by the story of Gideon, to history in a sense similar to that of Herodotus, as in the two narratives of David referred to above. Gressmann (1910) then carried this approach further by calling attention to the prophetic legends, whose purpose is devotional and edifying.

Gressmann's major contribution, however, was his tripartite division of history. First there is the history that concerns recent events (it is assumed that the narratives relating to David were written shortly after the events recounted). Then come legends, concerning distant events, and, finally, myths, relating to primordial times. The advantage of this threefold division is that it brackets the question of the presumed degree of veracity, as measured by our modern notion of documentary proof. Nevertheless, in Gunkel and Gressmann the concern for typology is immediately swallowed up by the interest in genesis: their major interest is in determining how historiography as a scholarly genre arose out of legend.

The same question is considered by Gerhard von Rad (1962), but on the basis of different preoccupations. He too asks about the preconditions for the emergence of historiography, but whereas Gunkel stresses the decisive role of the emergence of a monarchic state, von Rad focuses on the demand for explanation present in the etiological function of legends, on the formation of a prose literature, and especially on the organizing role played by a theological vision of history. It is under the influence of this third and decisive factor that the narrative organization prevails over the parataxic presentation of the heroic legends. By the same token, the relation of filiation between the legend and the myth appears even weaker. And it is an enlightenment similar to that in Ionia that permits the passage from the novella, which itself is already relatively complex, to even larger ensembles, such as the stories of David and the Yahvist document, which are thus placed on the same level as the historiographical core, at least as far as their organization is concerned.

Armed with these sketchy typological criteria for distinguishing between genres, Hebrew exegesis set out to examine the question of their filiation, a question held to be fundamental. It is within this framework that Gunkel's continuist hypothesis has been tested by his successors (Gerhard von Rad, Martin Noth, William F. Albright, Umberto Cassuto, Claus Westermann, and John van Seters). This hypothesis can include a number of different emphases. Emphasis can be placed on the political factor, on the enlightened spirit of the age assumed to be close to the reported events, or on the degree of organization in the legends themselves prior to their literary phase. One can emphasize the possible existence of early Israelite epics influenced by Mesopotamian and Canaanite epics, the constitution of court archives, lists, annals, and other documents similar to those found among Israel's neighbors, and finally and most especially the organizing power exerted by the theological motif. In fact, however, these rival genetic hypotheses have shown themselves to be practically unverifiable in the absence of Israelite sources distinct from the canonical texts of the Hebrew scriptures. It is not even certain that the texts that appear closest to Greek historiography were actually written at a period close to that of the events reported, or even that there was an Israelite literature prior to the writing of *Deuteronomy*.

The responses of scholars to these doubts have taken three forms. Some have sought a renewal of genetic investigations on the basis of new hypotheses. Others

have accorded a privilege to a more detailed structural analysis of narrative forms, and still others have undertaken a properly literary study of the narrative art, which is found in all narrative forms.

The first orientation is illustrated in particular by the works of John Van Seters and Hans H. Schmid, who date the first Israelite writings five or six centuries later than previous scholarship did and thereby overthrow all the earlier hypotheses concerning filiation.

The second orientation is illustrated by the taxonomical concern that presides over the works of George W. Coats on *Genesis*. Coats divides the main narrative genres into the saga, the tale, the novella, legends, histories, reports, fables, etiological narratives, and, finally, myths. The term *saga* (not to be confused with the German *Sage*, "legend") here refers to the Icelandic and Nordic sagas of the Middle Ages, which are long, traditional narratives in prose, subdivided into family sagas and heroic sagas. The tale is characterized by the fact that it has few characters, a single setting, and a simple plot. The novella, in turn, is a complex tale with a plot involving tension and its resolution. Legends are static narratives with no plot in praise of the virtues of a hero. A history is intended to report events that actually took place; a report describes an isolated event. Fables depict a fictional world, while etiological narratives purport to explain a situation, to name a place or a character. Finally, myths are reduced to the sphere that remains, namely the imaginative domain relating to the activity of the gods in the divine world (hence *Genesis* 6:1–4).

A noteworthy example of the third orientation is given by Robert Alter and Adele Berlin. These authors, unhampered by typological concerns, have studied the art of narrative composition, basing their studies on the poetic model applied to the modern novel. So-called primitive and naive narratives suddenly appear to be works of consummate refinement in the use of dialogue and in the handling of events with reticence and understatement. At the same time, the literary analysis enhances the theological import of these texts and suggests that the conflict between the inevitability of the divine plan and human recalcitrance is in itself the source of narrative developments.

The development of structural analysis has tended to obscure the problem of the relations between myth and history behind its more detailed typologies. Nevertheless, the problem reemerges at another level as the problem of the self-understanding of a culture as this is expressed through its traditions. This new line of questioning is called for by the typology itself, to the extent that the aim of any narrative form is to contribute to self-understanding. Here, then, in the context of the Hebrew scriptures, we confront the second sense of *history:* history as it refers to the historical mind of ancient Israel, its manner of conducting itself historically. In this regard, most exegetes agree in characterizing the self-understanding of ancient Israel as globally historical, something that cannot be said of the Greeks. If the latter did indeed produce a historiography that is more clearly set out on the level of its works and more deliberately critical with respect to received traditions, they nevertheless sought their identity—without perhaps ever actually finding it—more in the political sphere of their existence. At the same time, their philosophers developed a cosmological and nonhistorical philosophy of reality as a whole. Israel alone understood itself principally through the traditions of which it was at once the author and recipient. This is essentially what von Rad wanted to stress in his *The Theology of Israel's Historic Traditions* (1962), the first volume of his *Old Testament Theology*. With Israel, the act of narrating had from the outset a theological value, and the theological intention was instilled in the collection of traditions, which the theologian could not help but retell.

This second level of investigation must not be confused with the first; the "historical" understanding of a people through its literature is not exclusively, nor even principally, expressed in historiographic writings. It may instead be expressed through an entire range of narrative forms and even, little by little, by all the other literary genres inasmuch as they are historicized or, better, "narrativized." This expansion of the historical mind beyond the narrative form characteristic of historiography finds its expression in the internal hierarchy characteristic of the narrative literature of the Hebrew scriptures, through which the narrative units distinguished by the typology are subordinated to larger ensembles, of which the Yahvist document is a good model. Not only does this vast composition reach back before the monarchy, before the settlement, before the patriarchs, to the very creation of the world; it also encompasses units that represent the entire range of narrative forms distinguished above, as well as vast nonnarrative texts, such as laws, sapiential segments, praises, curses, and blessings—in short, a wide variety of literary forms and "language games." As noted above, in order to preserve this internal variety and difference of level, it is advisable to reserve the term *history* for those units that display a structural and thematic kinship with early Greek historiography and to refer to other narratives as "history-like," following Hans W. Frei in his *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative* (1974).

It is on the level of this vast history-like narrative,

and on that of the different narratives superimposed on the great Yahvist narrative, that the theological design of narrative literature itself is revealed. In this regard, there has been noticeable evolution in interpretation since Gunkel sought to save the ancient historiography that he considered to be contemporary with the epoch of Solomon from the regretted influence of the prophets. Von Rad considerably reworked the problem by seeing in the great Yahvist construction the expansion of the confessional recital that can be read in *Deuteronomy* 24:5–9 and *Joshua* 24:2–13. According to von Rad, this "historical credo," with its own distinctive liturgical roots, governed the history of the settlement, leading the people from Egypt to the Promised Land. It then incorporated into itself the Sinai tradition, which, as a distinct cult-legend with its revealed commandments and its theology of the covenant, had heretofore had a separate existence. Around this core was clustered the history of the patriarchs, prefaced by the majestic history of the creation of the world and the origin of humanity. The Yahvist would then be the writer of genius who, due to the shifting of the myths from their original matrix, used the theological motif inherent in the tradition of the settlement to give coherence to this collection of heterogeneous narratives. With the Yahvist, we are no longer dealing with a storyteller but with a theologian-narrator who expresses his vision of the relations between God and his people by means of a continuous history, in which the history of the chosen people is bound up with the universal history of mankind and with the history of the world itself.

Starting from the historiographic pole, von Rad's successors have asked how the historical recital of the settlement relates to the narratives of the succession and to those of David's rise to power. What exchanges took place between the sacred and political vision of God's sovereignty over history and the idea of a divine guidance operating throughout the migration and the settlement? Did the former serve as a structural model for the latter, and the latter as a theological model for the former? It is in this connection that Robert Alter's suggestion takes on its full importance: he asks whether the paradox of the inevitability of the divine plan and human recalcitrance is not revealed in even the smallest narrative units when these are examined in the light of the art of biblical narrative. The most significant narratives turn out to be those in which the divine intention is realized, not through divine intervention, but through the very play of human passions, after the fashion of a *nemesis* inherent in human conduct.

We move from the historiographic pole back to the mythical by inquiring into the theology of history that is evinced in the large narrative units, or even in the smaller ones. Actually, we should speak of theologies of history, for it is not certain that what has been called salvation history *(Heilsgeschichte)* covers all the intentions of the biblical writers. We must be careful not to project the biblical theology of today onto the Hebrew scriptures. The interweaving of a number of different theological themes must be respected: the covenant, the promise and its fulfillment, ethical instruction through the narrative, and so forth. Aside from this plurality of the theologies of history, there is the question of the function of the theological plan as a whole. As a kind of counterpart to the historicizing of the origin myths, could it not itself function as a myth, in the sense of the transcendent founding of present history on the basis of a more fundamental history? More precisely, it seems that the theology of traditions has been assimilated into an etiological myth of the settlement in a foreign land, hence of the gift of the soil. After the catastrophe of the exile, this myth was itself capable of being transformed into an etiological myth of the loss of the land. This second etiological use of the myth results in a new theology of history, centered around the theme of retribution—in short, a theodicy. In the Deuteronomic narrative, this new theodicy finds an expression that may be weak historiographically but is strong in its moral resources. Nevertheless, we must admit that by calling salvation history itself a myth, we are stretching the notion of myth beyond its strict sense of a history of origins *in illo tempore*. Salvation history unfolds in the time of men rather than in the time of the gods. This fundamental difference must make us more careful in using the term *myth* to characterize theological interpretations like those of salvation history.

We must reserve for a third level of analysis the controversial question of whether the conception of time in ancient Israel was explicit or merely implicit. James Barr, in *Biblical Words for Time* (2d rev. ed., 1969), warns us of the temptation to seek information on the Hebrew conception of time at the level of the language itself, in its vocabulary and semantics, or in the etymology of individual words. The meaning of words, Barr observes, results from their use in determined contexts. Thus in our attempt to discover a Hebraic conception of time we are led back to the contexts provided by the narrative forms considered above and to the historical mentality discussed earlier.

An initial question arises: is a specific conception of time implicit in the narrative forms used in the Hebrew Bible? The reply would seem to be negative. The various types of narrative taken separately include very different temporal implications. No general view of time can be extracted from the historiography of *Samuel* and *Kings;* it concerns a given segment of time that

permits no extrapolation. To be sure, we can admit that the historiography of the Hebrew Bible, like that of the Greeks, assumes a certain familiarity with temporal succession and chronology. But this relation to time is purely pragmatic. In addition, and this is the most important point, other narrative forms, such as the saga and the legend, on the one hand, and the origin myth, on the other, take place in qualitatively different times, which can be usefully described as "recent," "distant," or "primordial." Thus the "days" of creation are incommensurable with the years in which the monarchs reign; the same is true concerning the patriarchs, who are situated, so to speak, "between" primordial times and historical time. It is therefore advisable to respect the specific temporal qualities belonging to the various classes of narrative.

If we now consider the great narrative compositions, like that of the Yahvist, in which the historical mind of ancient Israel is expressed, it cannot be denied that the various traditions with their heterogeneous durations are submitted to a single temporal order that we should probably represent as a rectilinear and irreversible time underlying a universal history that stretches from creation to the end of the monarchy and to the period of the return from the Babylonian exile. However, besides the fact that this representation is never made explicit by the brilliant composer of the Yahvist document, it would be sorely inadequate for the narrative style of this quasi-historical narrative even if it had been made explicit. This is so for several reasons.

First of all, the time unfolded by the great narrative remains a creation of the narrative art itself. The time immanent in the great narrative configuration by no means abolishes the differences between the heterogeneous time-spans that it encompasses. Thus we cannot say that the election of Abraham occurs after the seven days of creation. The mere succession of narratives does not allow us to project along a single time scale the time of origins, that of the patriarchs, that of the settlement in Canaan, and that of the monarchical period. The idea of a single narrative scale common to all the time-spans is a modern idea foreign to the thinking of ancient Israel and even to that of ancient Greece.

In addition, a series of correspondences and analogies are added to the temporal succession in which one event follows another, as for instance between the various covenants and the various laws, and even the various theophanies. In this regard one could speak of a cumulative aspect of time in the Hebrew Bible rather than of a purely successive one.

Finally, and what is most important, the relation between God's faithfulness and man's recalcitrance, which is illustrated in so many different ways by the special narrative art of the Hebrew storytellers, narrators, and historians, does not lend itself to interpretation in terms of the categories inherited from Platonism and Neoplatonism, where divine immutability is diametrically opposed to the mutability of all things human. God's faithfulness, which marks the history of men, suggests the idea of an omnitemporality rather than that of a supratemporality. This omnitemporality, moreover, is in perfect agreement with the sort of cumulative history we have just mentioned. In order to be able to speak of a biblical time, we would have to take all of the literary genres into account and not only the genre of narrative. There is an immemorial time of the laws, a proleptic time of prophecy, an everyday time of wisdom, a "nowness" of hymnic complaint and praise. Biblical time—if this expression has any meaning—is made up of the interweaving of all the temporal values that are added onto the numerous temporal qualities preserved by the variety of narrative forms. The representation of a linear and irreversible time is wholly inadequate for this chorus of voices.

Would we then be justified in speaking of a return to mythical time by way of a history-like narrative, on the basis of the theologies presiding over the narrative composition itself, as, for example, in the conception of history as salvation history? This could be done only by ascribing to the term *myth* the extremely broad sense of a founding narrative that is related to everyday existence. In fact, it is just as important to stress the historicization of myth as it is to emphasize the mythologization of history. The position of the origin myth in *Genesis* 1–11 attests to this decisive subordination of myth to history. It is only as a broken myth that the archaic myth is reasserted within the gravitational space displayed by the historiography of the monarchic period and by the narrative of the conquest and settlement.

Perhaps it is in this that the hidden kinship between Greek thought and Hebrew thought resides. Each of them in its own way breaks with myth. Each, too, reinvents myth, one as a philosophical tale, as we saw in Plato, and the other as a broken and historicized myth, as in the Yahvist account of creation.

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MYTH AND RITUAL SCHOOL. The term *Myth and Ritual school* refers to two movements, one in Great Britain in the second quarter of the twentieth century, connected with the name of S. H. Hooke of the University of London, and the other, less clearly identifiable, appearing at about the same time in Scandinavia. The "school" or movement arose in reaction against an evolutionary approach to the study of ancient religions, although it depended upon data collected by scholars holding to the evolutionary outlook. It arose also as a result of a growing recognition in many circles of the central importance of ritual acts for ancient peoples and of the accompanying texts—the myths. The movement thus was rightly designated the "Myth and Ritual school," for it sought to show how pervasive were the central ritual acts of ancient societies and how inseparable from these acts were the accompanying words. The school gave great prominence to the religions of the ancient Near East; the most weighty applications of the school's findings were made to the study of the Hebrew scriptures and the New Testament.

The pattern of religious activity identified by the school was focused upon the celebration of New Year's Day and upon the place of the king in that celebration. The community was enabled to participate in the actual renewal of the cosmos as the various elements of the ritual were observed. The Myth and Ritual school thus stressed the enormous cultural significance of right observance of the ritual; ritual and its accompanying words were, according to the Myth and Ritual theorists, at the heart of an ancient society's self-understanding.

Background. Many elements contributed to the appearance of the Myth and Ritual school. The gathering of data on religious practices by ethnologists and anthropologists such as was carried out, for example, by James G. Frazer and reported in his multivolume work, *The Golden Bough*, 12 vols. (1911–1915), provided vast comparative materials for the school's use. Specialized studies of the social and psychological aspects of the life of ancient Israel, in particular the work of the Danish scholar Johannes Pedersen (*Israel, Its Life and Culture*, 2 vols., 1926–1940), proved influential in Great Britain and in Scandinavia. And the studies of the great Danish historian of religion and specialist in Germanic religion Vilhelm Grönbech were a highly influential factor in shaping the school's appreciation of the dynamism and power of cultic life, with its many-faceted ritual acts. Also influential were the studies of the German scholar Wilhelm Mannhardt on cultic practices related to agriculture and the agricultural year (see especially his *Wald- und Feldkulte*, 2 vols., 1874–1876, 2d ed., 1904–1905).

Beginnings. Both branches of the school originate in association with the work of the great Hermann Gunkel, founder of the method of form criticism. An Old Testament specialist whose work firmly rooted the study of the Old Testament in the cultic practices of the ancient Near East, Gunkel also saw the connection between ritual and myth, especially in his studies of the myths and

legends of *Genesis* (*Genesis*, 1901; 2d ed., 1922). But it was the Norwegian scholar Sigmund Mowinckel who first applied the insights and approach of Gunkel to the cultic materials of the Hebrew Psalter in a series of studies (*Psalmen-Studien*, 4 vols., 1921–1925).

For Mowinckel the early Israelite cult was a living reality, marked by the existence of wonder-workers and mischief makers who had to be dealt with by means of ritual acts and formulas. The New Year's Day celebrations saw the Israelite God Yahveh enthroned afresh as lord of the universe, with whom the earthly king was cultically associated. Details of this celebration would later be worked out by the Myth and Ritual school, but Mowinckel gave the basic structure of the celebration in this early study of the Israelite cult. Mowinckel gave examples from the surrounding religious practices to show that this cult of Yahveh in Israel had very close similarities with those of its neighbors. Many other scholars would join in the search for parallels and for further evidence of the influence of ancient Near Eastern myth and ritual upon the religion and cult of early Israel.

The British School. The Myth and Ritual school in Great Britain was a remarkable instance of scholarly collaboration in an age in which individual scholars tended to work in relative independence of one another. The moving force within the school was S. H. Hooke, longtime professor of Old Testament studies in the University of London. He edited a series of studies during a twenty-five-year period in which he and his colleagues sought to identify the connection between ritual acts and the words that accompanied them—that is, the myths, the "libretto" of the ritual score. The first study appeared in 1933 under the title *Myth and Ritual.* The second, entitled *The Labyrinth*, was published two years later. These two works covered the rites of the peoples of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Anatolia, and Canaan, and dealt at length with the myth and ritual of ancient Israel and of early Christianity. The third of the volumes came out in 1958 under the title *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship.* It included an essay by H. H. Rowley, "Ritual and the Hebrew Prophets," in which Rowley indicated reservations about aspects of the school. It also included an important critical assessment of the school by S. G. F. Brandon, which called attention to certain critics of the school and included several points of sharp disagreement by Brandon himself. This chapter in the book is addressed by Hooke in his introductory essay. It was a salutary thing that this open debate on the school's view was furthered by publications in which the school's central positions were espoused.

For the British school, the central undertaking seemed to be to show how many of the cultic practices and the motifs of ancient Near Eastern myths and sagas had their counterpart in texts of the Hebrew scriptures. The reconstruction of the annual festival in ancient Israel produced an amazing richness: recitation of the story of creation; humiliation and ritual murder of the king; descent of the king into the underworld; resurrection from death and restoration to the throne; the sacred marriage of the king and his consort, representing the divine pair; the reestablishment of the cosmos and the historical order; and the recitation of the divine law. The pattern was derived from the New Year ritual text preserved in the Akkadian language and dating to Seleucid times, augmented by many texts from other times and societies.

Critics pointed out that these elements were actually drawn from many places in the Hebrew scriptures, never appearing together, if indeed some of the elements actually appeared at all. Critics also made the point that Israel's earthly king is a latecomer in Israel to the historical scene and is often under the most severe challenge and indictment by the prophets. But for about three decades the British Myth and Ritual school pressed its viewpoint, enlisted scholars of great learning and influence into its ranks, and sought to refine its position.

The Scandinavian School. Less formally associated with one another than were those of the British group, the Scandinavian specialists dealing with myth and ritual also gained much of their initial perspective from the work of Hermann Gunkel and from the early writings of Sigmund Mowinckel. Other works of special importance for the Scandinavian school included a study of *Exodus* 1–15 by Johannes Pedersen in which the author saw these chapters to be a text that accompanied the celebration of the Passover festival in early Israel. The whole drama of the call of Moses, the move to Egypt to effect deliverance, the plagues, the last dreadful night as the Passover was observed, closing with the legend of the crossing at the Red Sea, the defeat of Egypt's forces, and the triumph song of the Israelites, would have been recited as the libretto of the Exodus celebration. Early stages of the text that accompanied the ritual could to some degree be distinguished from the later stages of the tradition; but the character of *Exodus* 1–15, said Pedersen, was better explained as the Passover ritual text than on the basis of separate literary sources or traditions. Pedersen recognized Passover to be a nature festival of pastoralists that, by means of the annual celebration with its accompanying legend, rooted the natural festivity in Israel's historical consciousness.

The work of the Swedish scholar H. S. Nyberg on the *Book of Hosea* also greatly influenced the Scandinavian

school. In *Studien zum Hoseabuche* (1935) Nyberg argued that the text of *Hosea* was probably preserved orally until the time of the Babylonian exile, but he also argued, on the basis of analogies from the ancient Near East, that oral tradition is very reliable indeed. Thus Nyberg spoke for the value of the cultic community of ancient Israel in the preservation of the words of its leaders and for their reuse in the cult, thereby (like Pedersen) expressing mistrust of the "bookish" approach of western European and North American scholars. In addition, the comparisons drawn by Nyberg to early Arabic practices would prove useful in the later work of the Scandinavian Myth and Ritual school.

Other studies followed. Alfred Haldar examined the relations of ancient prophets to the cult and came to the conclusion that although prophets were often critical of the cult, they were themselves usually the product of the cult as well, functionaries who had their regular place in the ceremonies and rituals by means of which the society's life was renewed. Aage Bentzen of Denmark, in one of his very influential writings (*King and Messiah*, 1955), dealt with later eschatological writings, showing that the kingship ritual of early times continued to exercise influence in postexilic times, as Israelite messianism developed. Richard Reitzenstein (1978) did the same for Hellenistic religious rites and practices, bringing to the study and evaluation of the New Testament a wealth of history-of-religions materials reflecting cultic practices believed to illuminate the world of the New Testament. A lengthy commentary on the *First Letter of Peter* by Frank Leslie Cross (1954) presented this New Testament book as the text to accompany the celebration of the Christian "Passover," Easter.

Ivan Engnell and Sigmund Mowinckel, in quite different ways, brought the work of the Myth and Ritual school in Scandinavia to a new level. Engnell was a vigorous exponent of the king's central position in the cult. He probably overstated the case for the accuracy of oral tradition and related too many biblical texts to the royal cult, thus producing a reaction against the entire position of the school. An essay by Martin Noth was considered by many scholars to have offered the definitive refutation of the Scandinavian approach to the place of the king in the Israelite cult ("God, King, and Nation," in *The Laws in the Pentateuch and Other Essays*, 1966). Noth pointed out how late kingship appears on the scene. Israel's very identity as a people is formed in the Israelite traditions long before there is a king. The kings are held under constant surveillance by the ancient prophets, according to the biblical record. And the eschatological pictures of the king of the time of consummation offer such a picture of this "last" king that further judgment is expressed against all incumbents. Mowinckel, in his major work on Israelite messianism and eschatology, *He That Cometh* (1955), provided a seasoned and thoughtful critical assessment of the work of the Myth and Ritual school in both its British and its Scandinavian forms. At the same time, Geo Widengren continued his specialized studies dealing with the relation of myth and ritual, refining the outlook of the Myth and Ritual school and making it evident that in most particulars the school's outlook had stood the test of time.

Continuing Influence. Despite the weaknesses of the school, as pointed out by Henri Frankfort (*Kingship and the Gods*, 1948), Martin Noth, and many others, the result of the work of these scholars has been on the whole very positive. The Myth and Ritual school presented a forceful critique of evolutionistic schemes employed in the study of religion. It kept critical scholarship continuingly alerted to the need to take the actual practices of a religion at least as seriously as it took that religion's ideas and its literary heritage. It underscored the significance of the king for the entire life of ancient societies. Moreover, the comparative approach of the school has endured and become characteristic of the study of religion. Historical, comparative, structural, and systematic studies of religion all have their place in the study of religion, and the Myth and Ritual school contributed much to the enlargement of the vision of scholars engaged in the study of religion.

The school was able to bring together specialists from many backgrounds, linguistic interests, skills, and schools of interpretation, forging a working team (as in Great Britain) or furthering collaboration on several interlocking problems (as in Scandinavia), offering creative and comprehensive interpretations of central features of religion, especially the religions of the eastern Mediterranean area and Mesopotamia.

The school claimed too much for the pervasiveness of the pattern of ritual observance in the societies studied. It did not sufficiently allow for the differences in the understanding of kingship in the different lands. It seems also to have reconstructed patterns that turned out to be not nearly so widespread as its members thought, such as ritual marriage and the death and resurrection motif. But the school also brought to prominence several features of religious understanding and cultic practice that are unmistakable as the study of religion and religions continues.

Some of the critics of the Myth and Ritual school also went too far in their contentions. The differences between the historical consciousness of ancient Israel and that of Israel's neighbors were exaggerated by Martin Noth and others. And if the chief festival in the life of

ancient Israel was centered upon the covenant rite or upon Jerusalem, rather than upon the king as representative of the deity, even so the role of the king in the cult of ancient Israel was very prominent indeed.

Two aspects of scholarship need much stronger emphasis today than they received even in the work of the Myth and Ritual school. The first is collaboration with scholars in other fields, especially with sociologists, ethnologists, and anthropologists. Indeed, the study of religion today is unthinkable without such collaborative work; yet it is possible to overlook the fact that the Myth and Ritual school did much to further this collaboration and to display its fruitfulness.

The second aspect is the comparison of texts in religious studies. Not only should text comparison help to fill out and understand ritual acts and their meaning; it should also help scholars to see the strength and meaning of the texts as literature. Here the interest of the Myth and Ritual school was too narrow. The story of creation does belong in association with ritual acts, but it also has a life outside its ritual use. The great prayers and hymns of the ancient world and of Israel are cultic texts to be used as the community participates in the re-creation and reestablishment of its world and of the cosmos, but they too have a life of their own. These cultic texts offer perspectives, a worldview, an understanding of certain fundamental realities upon which the social existence of the peoples depended. Nevertheless, the school's insistence that these cultic texts were to be seen as actual parts of the ritual life of the people was an invaluable recognition.

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WALTER HARRELSON

MYTHIC ANCESTORS. *See under* Ancestors.

N

NABATEAN RELIGION. The main difficulty in investigating Nabatean religion lies in our limited knowledge of early Nabatean history. The Nabateans themselves left very few documents relating to their social, economic, and religious life, and the nature of their political and social structures is still a subject for research. It is not even known what the original language and script of the Nabateans were. (Aramaic, in which their documents were written, was acquired by the Nabateans rather late in their history.) Classical sources offer little help. Allusions to Nabatean religion are rare and sometimes misleading. However, the paucity of literary sources is partly compensated for by extensive archaeological research carried out in various districts within the Nabatean realm.

It is generally accepted that the Nabateans originated in north Arabia, where celestial bodies—the sun and the moon, Venus and other planets—were venerated. This assumption is supported by linguistic analysis of Nabatean personal names, among which Arabic theophoric elements are very common. However, the Nabateans' long sojourn in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean also caused the introduction of local Semitic, and later also Greco-Roman, elements into the Nabatean cult.

The Deities. In Nabatean inscriptions of the first and second centuries CE, Dushara (Dusares in the Greek sources) is considered the head of the Nabatean pantheon. *Du* means "he [of]," and *Shara* is the name of a region, mountain, or road. Several locations in Arabia bear the name, but as far as the Nabateans are concerned it possibly originates in the mountains of Edom, where they established their capital. However, the relative paucity of personal names connected with this god, as well as the frequency of names based on the element *illah (ay)*, suggests that Dushara may have been preceded by the Arabian deity Illah (Sem., El, Elohim). As *el*, the original form of the element *illah*, it occurs in the Nabatean royal name *Rabel*. Dushara was venerated as a local deity at Gaya, a locality in the vicinity of Petra, and at Oboda in the Negev. Under the name "God of our Lord Rabel," Dushara also served as a dynastic deity. He was identified with Zeus/Jupiter and possibly also with Dionysos and Ares. He was the protector of water, and his statue, in the form of a stela, was placed in niches in the walls of reservoirs. Other male deities in the Nabatean pantheon include al-Kutba, Shaialqaum, and Obodas, the deified Nabatean king Obodas II, as indicated by an inscription (yet unpublished) recently found in the vicinity of Oboda, referring to a statue dedicated to this god.

The most important Nabatean goddess was Allat. In the Roman period she was identified with Athena, Aphrodite, and Venus. Through Venus she was identified with the older Ishtar-Astarte. She was also identified with Atargatis and venerated as a local tyche. Her busts, with such attributes as ears of corn, dolphins, and the zodiac, have been found in the ruins of the temple of Khirbet et-Tannur in Edom.

Of much greater antiquity than Allat is Manawatu, the Arabian goddess. As goddess of fate she is mentioned in a Nabatean inscription together with Dushara. Al-Uzza ("the strong one") was an Arabian goddess, identified with Aphrodite in a Greco-Nabatean inscription found on the island of Kos. She is one of the goddesses of the planet Venus and in addition was associ-

ated with al-Kutba (Mercury). She was also venerated in Sinai.

The Cult. The only clear early reference to the Nabatean cult is found in Strabo (*Geography* 16.4.26), who wrote: "They worship the sun, building an altar on top of their house, and pouring libations on it daily and burning frankincense." Archaeological research, however, has produced ample evidence by which the Nabatean cult can now be reconstructed.

Open-air sanctuaries. Sanctuaries are located in the open air on mountaintops surrounding the large necropolis of Petra. Along the rock-cut paths leading from the valleys below, cult niches were hewn into the face of the rocks. In these were engraved various cultic objects, such as horned altars, stelae representing deities, and (rarely) human images. In some cases these were accompanied by short invocations and the names of dedicators. On the way to the main open-air sanctuary at Petra stand two huge stone obelisks, also representing deities. The sanctuary regularly included a rock-cut triclinium for the solemn meals, an important component of the Nabatean cult. Higher up is the altar of sacrifices, and near it are found some water installations, also associated with the cult. The image of the deity, possibly in the form of a stela, was placed on an elevated socket in the middle of the triclinium.

Temples. None of the Nabatean temples dates earlier than the last quarter of the first century BCE, and none was built later than the middle of the first century CE. Some of these temples were renovated during the period of Rabel II (70–106 CE) and even later. Nabatean temple architecture possibly derived from two sources: local Canaanite–Iron Age traditions and Iranian fire temples. Temples of the first type, typical of Edom, Moab, and the adjoining regions, are tripartite buildings consisting of a porch (*ulam* in the Bible), a hall *(heikhal)*, and an adytum, or holy of holies *(debir)*. In most cases the adytum too was of tripartite division, the central elevated chamber most probably housing the image of the god. The best-known temples of this type are Qasr Bint Fara'un at Petra and at Dibon in Moab, both built in the times of Obodas II (30–9 BCE) or Aretas IV (9 BCE–40 CE).

The temples of the second type are square structures in which the inner shrine, possibly covered by a roof, was surrounded by an outer shrine enclosed within a wall. Sometimes there was no outer shrine. At Khirbet et-Tannur in northeastern Moab the inner shrine is a solid structure with steps leading to its top that is surrounded by a richly decorated outer shrine occupying a large paved court with colonnades all around. The whole structure was covered with stucco and painted in bright colors. The facade of the outer building was flanked by two staircase towers, most likely for the performance of a solemn procession to the flat roof of the building. Four temples of this type have been discovered in the Hauran (hence the name "northern" for this type of temple), two of which were located in the large religious center of Seeia. The main temple on this site was dedicated to Baal Shamin, the "lord of the heavens," a deity venerated at Palmyra. The temple was placed at the back of a large paved court of three colonnades. There were stone benches under the porticoes, along the three walls by which the court was enclosed. A Nabatean-Greek inscription found in the ruins of the temple refers to this court of porticoes by the terms *theatra* in Nabatean and *theatron* in Greek. In all probability this is the place where the festive meals took place. In addition to the porticoed courts, some temples (Iram, Khirbet et-Tannur, Sahir) had covered halls and rooms with stone triclinia along their walls. At Sur (Tyre) the covered triclinia were replaced by a small theater, where festive meals were probably served in the winter.

The various elements of the Nabatean cult may now be put together. On approaching the sacred precinct the worshipers bathed. (Large baths for this purpose have been discovered near the gates of Qasr Bint Fara'un at Petra and at Seeia.) After paying dues to the keepers of the temple (whose offices have been discovered adjacent to the gate in all religious centers in the Hauran) the worshipers proceeded along the *via sacra*. While animals were being slaughtered on the main altar, a solemn procession ascended to the roof of the temple, using the two staircase towers. There, libations were poured and incense was burned. Descending to the court, the members of the congregations then took their places under the covered porticoes, in the summer, or in the roofed triclinia and theaters, in the winter. (In both northern and southern regions temperatures fall below freezing in the winter.)

During the reign of Rabel II a new type of cult developed at Oboda. On the occasion of the dedication of agricultural installations, large libation altars were set up in the fields, dedicated to Dushara in his capacity as a local deity. Festivities, called *marzeha* in the Nabatean inscriptions of Oboda, were conducted by a religious association (*havroht*, in the same inscriptions) during the years 88 to 98 CE. About a century later the old Nabatean temple at Oboda was rededicated to Zeus-Oboda and Aphrodite. The numerous dedicatory inscriptions are all in Greek, but the personal names of the builders and dedicators of the temple are all Nabatean.

Temple administration. At Jebel Moneijah, a low mountain near the oasis of Feiran in southern Sinai, there is a small bedouin shrine that local herdsmen as-

sociate with Moses, patron of shepherds. It is built of flat stones, many bearing much older invocations in Nabatean. Other inscriptions on the rocks along the path leading to the sanctuary and around it refer to functionaries of a temple. There were four priestly offices: *katabah* (scribe), *kahanah* (priest), *ifkala* ("priest" in Akkadian; the relationship between the two priestly orders is unknown), and *mubaqerah*, possibly a priest in charge of sacrifices or an administrator of the temple. (This last function is also mentioned in the temple scroll of the Dead Sea Scrolls.) One of the inscriptions is dated 219 CE.

Burial. Strabo (*Geography* 16.26.26) wrote of the Nabateans: "They have the same regard for the dead as for dung, as Heraclitus says: 'Dead bodies are more fit to be cast out than dung'; and therefore they bury even their kings beside dung heaps." Scholars have attempted to explain this enigmatic statement by relating Greek *kopron*, "dung," to Nabatean *kafra*, "sepulcher," but both Strabo's statement and the modern attempt to explain it seem mistaken in the light of later discoveries about Nabatean funerary customs.

In the first century BCE and in the first two centuries CE the Nabateans, a nation of caravaneers, established central cemeteries in different parts of their kingdom. The better-known ones are at Petra, the capital of the kingdom; at Egra, a provincial capital in northern Arabia; and at the religious center of Seeia in the Hauran. In the necropolis of Egra, thirty highly detailed funerary inscriptions have been discovered. We learn that the less richly decorated monuments were made by or for women, whereas the more adorned ones were those of merchants, administrative and military personnel, a doctor, and a reader of omens. The right of deposition in a tomb was granted to members of the family who could produce a written document of ownership. The sale, lease, or disposal by any other means of a tomb was forbidden, as was the violation of a sepulcher in any way. Violators of tombs were often heavily fined by religious or civic authorities and were cursed by the gods. Corpses were sometimes buried in loculi cut into the walls of the chambers, but most burials were in smaller containers, also cut into the walls. These latter contained the bones of people who died on the caravan routes, far away from home, or those who lived in smaller localities in the same region. In addition to the monuments of the Egra types, the necropolis of Petra contained about two dozen still more richly adorned tombs, probably those of the royal house and of a class of dignitaries not present at Egra.

The mountains of pottery shards that surround the large burial grounds at Petra could only have come from funerary meals. In all probability the Nabateans followed the Jewish funerary practice, according to which pottery used in funerary rites was considered ritually unclean and had to be broken on the spot. It is thus the rotting bodies and the heaps of broken pottery that must have given rise to Strabo's reference to the burial of "even their kings beside dung heaps."

The necropolis of Mampsis. There were two basic forms of the disposal of the dead: direct inhumation and bone collection. In direct burial a shaft was dug into the soft loess, at the bottom of which the body was deposited in a wooden coffin, either directly on the ground or in an ashlar structure without a floor (again, similar to Jewish practice, according to which the body must come in direct contact with the earth). Heavy cover stones were then placed over the coffin, and the rest of the grave shaft was filled with fieldstones and earth. A monument in the form of a stepped pyramid was erected above the surface. No offerings were placed in the tomb except for personal jewelry of women and an occasional silver coin in the dead person's mouth as payment for the keeper of the underworld. In one woman's tomb a wooden box contained the hardened clay seals of documents that had been burned during the funeral.

Bones were collected in one of three ways: in stone containers built above the ground, in a charnel house in which bones of more than one person were collected, or in a Judean type of stone ossuary in which the bones were placed in a regular shaft, which was then filled with stones. Above this last was constructed the regular stepped pyramid, with an uninscribed stela at the head of the monument. Pulverized bones were placed in a linen wrapper, and two small glass bottles were placed in the corners of the ossuary, all consistent with Jewish funerary practice. On the perimeter of the necropolis are several stone tables for serving funerary meals. Nearby, in remnants of campfires, are numerous intentionally broken pottery vessels in which food was served. The funerary meal consisted of meat, fowl, olives, dates, and some beverage. At least one pottery lamp was always present, possibly to commemorate the soul of the dead person. This cemetery was in constant use from the end of the first century BCE to the beginning of the fourth century CE; only with the advent of Christianity was this burial ground neglected.

A similar cemetery has been discovered at Elusa, the capital of the Nabatean Negev. Here, family plots were enclosed by low ashlar walls. The food, cooked in a special kitchen built into the ground, was served on stone triclinia. The only tomb that has been excavated in this cemetery contained bones collected in a regular stone coffin, above which a monument was erected. The similarity between the burial customs of the Nabateans and

those of the contemporary Jews of Judaea may reflect a common belief in the eternity of the soul after death.

Traces of the cult can be discerned in the religious practices of the Nabateans until the fourth century CE, although the old Nabatean temples were renovated in the second and third centuries CE. At Oboda this was done by Nabateans who, writing in Greek, dedicated the new temple to Zeus-Oboda and to Aphrodite. The victory of Christianity in the fourth century, however, marks the end of Nabatean religion in its various forms.

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AVRAHAM NEGEV

NABU was a god, possibly of West Semitic origin, who became a major divine figure in Babylonia and Assyria of the first millennium BCE. He is first mentioned in official Babylonian documents of the time of Hammurabi (c. 1760 BCE) and may have been brought to Babylonia by the West Semites, who migrated there in large numbers in 2000–1800 BCE. Nabu was closely aligned with Marduk, whose minister, scribe, and ultimately son he was considered to be. The cult of Nabu began to spread in the Old Babylonian period. He grew in importance, becoming the god of the Ezida temple and the city of Borsippa by the beginning of the first millennium BCE. Nabu and Marduk are frequently mentioned together as the major pair of gods in Babylonia. *Nabu* appears in many personal names, including *Nabu-kudurri-usur* (the biblical Nebuchadrezzar), which means "Nabu protect our boundaries." In Assyria, Nabu was revered as one of the most important gods, and his popularity was still increasing at the end of the Assyrian empire.

Nabu appeared in several important cultic festivals of the first millennium BCE. The most important was the Akitu, the spring New Year festival, which began when Nabu came in solemn procession from Borsippa to Babylon. The festival celebrated the reign of Marduk, but Nabu's participation was important enough that the absence of the festival during a period of political disturbance was referred to as "when Nabu did not come from Borsippa." He also appeared in the Babylonian celebration of his marriage to Nana and the Assyrian celebration of his marriage to Tashmetum.

Nabu is best known as the god of writing. He was the patron of scribes, displacing Nisaba, who played this role until the Old Babylonian period (1800–1590 BCE). As Marduk's scribe, Nabu was the writer of the tablets of destiny. He was associated with Marduk and Ea and consequently was considered a god of wisdom. By the end of Assyrian history Nabu was also assuming some of the characteristics of the hero figure Ninurta.

[*See also* Marduk; Akitu; *and* Ninurta.]

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For further information on Nabu, see Francesco Pomponio's *Nabû: Il culto e la figura di un dio del pantheon babilonese ed assiro* (Rome, 1978).

TIKVA FRYMER-KENSKY

NĀGĀRJUNA (fl. c. 150–250), Indian Buddhist thinker associated principally with the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nāgārjuna advocated a practice of virtue and insight based upon the Buddha's teaching of the Middle Way, a path that lies between extreme asceticism and hedonism and between the teachings of absolute reality and nonreality. He continued the traditional Buddhist approach to freedom from suffering by using a mental and moral discipline that sought to break the self-made bonds of ignorance and attachment. This required a procedure for becoming aware of the impermanence and interrelatedness of all existing things. However, to communicate the radical character of this spiritual practice Nāgārjuna used a philosophical dialectic to eliminate attachment to ideas, even revered Buddhist doctrine, asserting that all existing things are empty of absolute reality. At the same time,

he advocated the use of established Buddhist practice such as morality, compassion, and meditation.

Nāgārjuna is most often remembered for his teaching of "emptiness" *(śūnyatā)*, which he identified with the interdependent origination *(pratītya-samutpāda)* of all existing phenomena. This teaching, some of which is preserved in Sanskrit texts and in Tibetan and Chinese translations, was the basis for the development of the Mādhyamika, or Madhyamaka ("middle path"), school of Buddhism. Within a hundred years after his death devotees are reported to have honored him as an enlightened being (a Buddha), and in subsequent centuries several Mahāyāna schools recognized him as a patriarch.

There are no firsthand historical accounts of Nāgārjuna's life. In various references to, and descriptions of, Nāgārjuna in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, dates ascribed to his life and work cover a range of over five hundred years and credit him with extraordinary feats, suggesting that the intention of such references was more to edify than to record actual events. These sources present often conflicting accounts of his life. Many contemporary scholars affirm that this variety of assertions indicates that there are at least two, and perhaps several, Nāgārjunas whose careers formed the basis for the Nāgārjuna legend.

The earliest available description of this Mādhyamika teacher is by the renowned Chinese translator of several Mādhyamika texts, Kumārajīva. His account (early fifth century) describes how the young man Nāgārjuna used the magical art of making oneself invisible to insinuate himself and three friends into the women's quarters of the royal palace and seduce the women. Surprised by the entry of the palace guards, Nāgārjuna escaped, but his friends were killed. This experience so profoundly moved him to perceive that selfish desire is the root of suffering that he became a mendicant.

Another story emphasizes Nāgārjuna's intellectual acumen and deep spiritual capacity to perceive the most profound truth. He was able to master the Tipiṭaka (Pali Buddhist canon) in ninety days, but was not completely satisfied. In response to his eager pursuit of deeper learning a Mahānāga *bodhisattva* (Skt. *nāga*, "serpent, dragon," also the name of a South Indian tribe) provided him with the Mahāyāna writings on the perfection of wisdom (the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras). These, too, Nāgārjuna mastered in a short time, and then propounded this teaching so skillfully that he defeated many opponents in debates. Other traditional accounts indicate that Nāgārjuna spent his final years in a monastery built for him by a devoted king, that he lived to an old age, and then decided voluntarily to end his life.

Some elements in the traditional accounts are supported by archaeological and textual evidence. The Chinese and Tibetan biographies say that Nāgārjuna was born in a brahman family. This is supported by the critique of Hindu (as well as other Indian) thought and the sophisticated level of scholastic debate to be found in his major writings. The location of his birth and the accounts of some portions of his life in South India are attested by references in stone inscriptions found there, and by a letter that he wrote to a king, probably of the South Indian Śātavāhana dynasty. His writings, which include philosophical and doctrinal analyses, homilies on morality and spiritual practice, and hymns, also indicate a profound grasp of Indian Buddhist teachings. They suggest a sensitive care for others, and a personal practice of piety, morality, and meditation in order to integrate an "emptying awareness" with everyday activities. While some scholars claim that Nāgārjuna could have lived as early as 50 CE and as late as 280 CE, most place Nāgārjuna's life between 150 to 250.

There is little evidence for judging the extent to which Nāgārjuna made an immediate impact on contemporary Indian, especially Buddhist, religious life and thought. However, the resulting development of the Mādhyamika school and the concern of Kumārajīva to translate some of Nāgārjuna's writings into Chinese in the early fifth century indicate that Nāgārjuna had disciples who perpetuated his dialectic critique of other Buddhist teachings, and that by the fourth century his work was studied as far as the Gandhāra area in Northwest India. Eventually several of his writings were placed in the Chinese Buddhist canon and the Bstan-'gyur (commentarial teaching) section of the Tibetan Buddhist canon. There is serious doubt about the authorship of all the writings credited to the Mādhyamika philosopher-monk Nāgārjuna. In the Tibetan tradition a significant number of Tantric texts (portraying a spiritual discipline for enlightenment that uses symbols and visualization) and medical manuals are attributed to a Nāgārjuna. In India toward the end of the first millennium references are found to a great *siddha* (an accomplished religious adept) who acquired magical power through the use of spells, mystical diagrams, meditation, and diet. There are also stories of a renowned alchemist by the name of Nāgārjuna who possessed the elixir of immortality. Owing to the lack of corroborating historical evidence, present scholarship distinguishes the Nāgārjuna who was the author of Tantric texts and/or the great sorcerer from the second-century philosopher.

A number of writings attributed to Nāgārjuna are accepted by modern scholars as the core of his works. Two philosophical treatises are extant in Sanskrit. They

are *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*Mādhyamikakārikā*, Fundamentals of the Middle Way, The Middle Stanzas) and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Averting the Arguments). Other philosophical treatises available only in Tibetan translation are *Śūnyatāsaptati* (Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness), *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (Sixty Stanzas on Coherence), and *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (Explanation of the *Vaidalya Sūtra*). Two expository and homilectic letters to a king are also available in a Tibetan translation; they are *Suhṛllekha* (Friendly Letter) and *Rājaparikathā-ratnamālā* (The Precious Garland of Advice to the King), portions of which are also available in Sanskrit, and a version of which is found in Chinese. A number of hymns, prayers, and devotional verses are attributed to Nāgārjuna. The *Catuḥstava* (Four Hymns) are found in Sanskrit and Tibetan; others are found in Tibetan and Chinese versions, and some only in Chinese. Three important Mādhyamika texts attributed to Nāgārjuna are found only in Chinese. While some contemporary scholars question Nāgārjuna's authorship of all or parts of these treatises, they have been important in the Chinese Mādhyamika tradition and in the Pure Land schools of China and Japan, as they affirm trust in the Buddha Amitābha's vow to aid all beings in gaining enlightenment as a significant spiritual practice. They are *Ta chih-tu lun* (Skt., *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra*, Exposition on the Great Perfection of Wisdom [Sutra]), *Shih-chu p'i-p'o-sha lun* (Skt., *Daśabhūmivibhāṣā Śāstra*, Exposition on the Illumination through the Ten Stages [of Bodhisattvahood]), and the *Shih-erh-men lun* (Skt., *Dvādaśadvāra Śāstra*, Exposition on the Twelvefold Entrance). The last of these, when joined with the *Kārikās* (Chin., *Chung-lun*) and with Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* (Chin., *Po lun*), constitute the three treatises from which the Mādhyamika lineage in East Asia (San-lun-tsung in China, Sanronshū in Japan) derives its name.

Historically, Nāgārjuna stood at the convergence of two spiritual traditions of Buddhist monastic contemplation, both of which sought the clear apprehension of the nature of things in order to gain release from suffering. One of these traditions was the contemplative method for analyzing human experience practiced by the Abhidharma masters. They continued the early Buddhist practice of defining and contemplating the momentary factors *(dharma)* in the arising and dissipation of existence. The Abhidharma texts—Nāgārjuna probably focused on the claims of the Sarvāstivāda school—were developed between the third century BCE and the first century CE. They sought to analyze, clarify, and systematize the early canonical teaching of the Buddha describing the arising of existence, its causes and conditions, and the release from pain and ignorance. The concern to learn the causes of suffering and their elimination was not a speculative endeavor; the Abhidharma formulations were supposed to be verified in meditation by a direct perception of the factors conditioning personal attachment and self-deception. The Abhidharma techniques included a careful awareness of the momentary sensory, mental, and psychic factors in cognition, a detailed and multiple classification scheme for sorting the momentary perceptive and cognitive states, and an enumeration of the conditions that prevailed in the arising and dissipation of these states. The result of such an analysis was a direct awareness that a human being has no permanent essence *(ātman)*, and that apparently substantial things were only a changing conglomerate of interacting material, mental, and emotional factors. It also resulted in extensive descriptions and classifications of these factors, explanations of the causal relations between them to account for the arising of one state rather than another, and an experiential focus on the factors and their causal relations in monastic spiritual training. While there is no historical evidence that Nāgārjuna practiced the Abhidharma mode of contemplation at any time in his life, his detailed criticism of the basic notions, causal explanations, and logical structure common to this analysis indicate his deep familiarity with the psychological and philosophical aspects of the Abhidharma approach to religious knowledge.

The second Buddhist spiritual tradition that is reflected in Nāgārjuna's teaching is that found in the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) literature, and other sources that formed the basis of the Mahāyāna Buddhist movement, such as the *Ratnakūṭa* and *Avataṃsaka*. The *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (Eight-Thousand-Line Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) was probably composed as early as the second century BCE. There the perfection of wisdom is said to consist of the recognition that all things are empty, that there are no self-existing entities and no essential characteristics in either a person or the factors of existence, that liberating wisdom is a continual avoidance of attachment even to spiritual ideals (*nirvāṇa*, perfection of wisdom, or "coursing in the *bodhisattva* path"), and that perfection of wisdom is intrinsically related to "skillful means" *(upāya kauśalya)* for aiding the enlightenment of all beings. In the contemplative approach of the Perfection of Wisdom tradition the factors of existence *(dharma)* are no longer regarded as important objects of perception in meditation, for they are deemed without essential characteristics. The discussion of causal relations that account for the arising of existence is regarded as only a limited apprehension of the nature of things, not the highest insight, formulated in Mahāyāna texts as the recognition that there is "no-arising" and "no-dissi-

pation" of existence. The spiritual ideal is not release *(nirvāṇa)* from conditioned existence by an individual person, because that effort implies an essential distinction between *nirvāṇa* and conditioned existence *(saṃsāra)*. Rather, the ideal is the *bodhisattva* ("enlightenment being"), whose awareness of the nonsubstantiality *(niḥsvabhāvatā)* of bodhisattvahood is expressed in a kind of wisdom that seeks the release of all beings.

Nāgārjuna, like other "teachers of emptiness" (*śūnyavādins*) depicted in the Perfection of Wisdom literature, gave a central role to the notion of emptiness. For him, the deepest spiritual awareness required the recognition that all existing things are empty *(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.19–20). The Buddha's teaching of the Middle Way was a life informed by the recognition that each experiential phenomenon depends on other conditioned phenomena *(pratītya-samutpāda)*, a recognition, claimed Nāgārjuna, that was precisely the awareness of emptiness (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18). Nāgārjuna's creative genius in the development of Mahāyāna thought and practice is seen in the following contributions: (1) the dramatic form for expressing the nonsubstantiality of all phenomena (including *dharmas*) in a negative logical dialectic that results in a tetralemma, such as: all existing things are not being, not nonbeing, not both-being-and-nonbeing, and not neither-being-nor-nonbeing; (2) the centrality of his affirmation that the deepest meaning of emptiness applies both to the dependent co-origination *(pratītya-samutpāda)* of existence and to the highest spiritual reality, so that one recognizes no essential distinction between the two; (3) the clarity with which he articulated the recognition that there are two levels of truth (the conventional and the highest) and that each is useful in different situations to communicate the power for release from attachments; and (4) the persistent advocacy of moral activity, personal piety (such as showing honor to Buddha images and scriptures), compassion for suffering beings, and cultivation of attitudes conducive to insight (for example, serenity, fearlessness, and friendliness) as reciprocal aspects of the insight into the emptiness of all phenomena.

The writings of Nāgārjuna have influenced Buddhist thought and practice in Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan for two millennia. Even though a teaching lineage for a separate Mādhyamika school was not maintained beyond several centuries after his life, his writings became a part of the Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist canons, and were studied by advocates of many schools. Besides the Chinese San-lun school, the monastic communities of T'ien-t'ai (Jpn., Tendai), Hua-yen (Jpn., Kegon), and Ch'an (Jpn., Zen) in China and Japan, and all the Tibetan schools, have included aspects of Nāgārjuna's teaching in their understanding of the Buddha's *dharma* ("law"). Today many of the core writings attributed to Nāgārjuna have been translated into several European and East Asian languages. Some contemporary Japanese and Western philosophers, together with some Christian theologians, are studying his work, concentrating on his logic, his use of a negative dialectic for expressing the incomprehensible reality, and his recognition of the interdependency of all mental and physical phenomena in the process of existence.

[*See also* Mādhyamika; Śūnyam and Śūnyatā; Nirvāṇa; *and* Pratītya-samutpāda. *For a discussion of the Abhidharma doctrines against which Nāgārjuna's critical philosophy was directed, see* Sarvāstivāda; Sautrāntika; *and* Dharma, *article on* Buddhist Dharma and Dharmas.]

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NĀGAS AND YAKṢAS and their female counterparts, *nāgīs* and *yakṣīs*, are pre-Aryan fertility deities of the Indian subcontinent whose fundamental relationship with agricultural pursuits has led to their incorporation into the Hindu and Buddhist pantheons as low-level *devas* (gods), or as a separate category of deities between *devas* and demons and ghosts. In addition, *nāgas* and *yakṣas*, often likened to the guardian *nats* of Thailand and *phī* of Burma, are intimately related with kingship symbolism and play a significant role in the

myths and rituals of the Buddhists of South and Southeast Asia.

Early Hindu and Buddhist texts state that *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s reside in *caitya*s, ancient places of worship marked by a tree, stone altar, pool, or stream, and a railing to designate sacred territory. From these sacred sites, *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s are believed to determine the fertility and wealth of a bounded territory as small as a paddy field or as large as a state. If properly worshiped, these deities can guarantee abundance and health to a region through their control over water and its essences, such as semen and sap. They can also bestow gems and the wealth of the underworld, which they are believed to protect. If, however, these territorial fertility deities are slighted, they can withdraw their gifts, bringing famine and spreading disease. This ambivalent power over life and death is revealed in many sculptures in which a *nāga* or *yakṣa* in human form wields in the right hand a sword to protect or chastise and in the left a jar of fertilizing liquids.

In myths and art, *nāga*s are represented as living among the roots of trees or on anthills—entrances to the underworld. They appear as cobras with one or many hoods or can metamorphose into humanlike creatures with dilated cobra hoods springing from the neck and spreading over the head. *Yakṣa*s, who are said to live in tree trunks, can also take human forms that may disguise a demonic side. The female *yakṣī*s are often portrayed as voluptuous maidens, with large breasts and hips, clinging to trees in full bloom—an important fertility motif in India.

As guardians of a region's abundance, *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s have come to be intimately associated with kingship in South Asia. In ancient India the *caitya* altar was used as a place of coronation, a practice suggesting that the king's authority was guaranteed or enhanced by deities such as *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s. This thesis is supported by *jātaka* tales and many dynastic myths in which kings are granted rule over a region by forming an agreement with a *nāgarāja* (*nāga* king) or a liaison with a *nāgī* or *yakṣī*. If the king fails in his duties, these deities withdraw their fertilizing powers and bring an end to the king's reign.

The portrayal of *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s in the Theravāda canon and in the Buddhist myths and rituals of Southeast Asia suggests the incorporation of the symbolism of kingship into the figure of the Buddha and the taming of the powers of nature through the Buddha's *dharma*. These themes reveal an interesting relationship between the otherworldly thrust of Buddhism and the importance of Buddhism for this-worldly existence. In widespread myths the Buddha confronts evil *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s who are ravishing a region, reveals his greater command of the forces of nature in combat with these deities, converts the deities with the force of his virtues, and leaves behind a relic as a symbol of the contract that guarantees the good behavior of the deities. These myths, which parallel the Buddha's confrontation with the *yakṣa*-like Māra, seem to emphasize the chaotic powers of *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s in order to reveal the Buddha's virtues and assert his continuing rule over a region. It appears that very early in Buddhism worshipers honored the Buddha's relics placed in stupas and then went to nearby shrines of *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s, to remind these deities of their obligations. Such contracts are recalled in Sri Lankan exorcism rituals today, to assure that *yakṣa*s leave the person they are possessing. In this manner the Buddha, while withdrawn, remains a lord or ruler of this existence through the power of his *dharma*.

The incorporation of kingship symbolism by the figure of the Buddha can also be seen in his association with the *nāgarāja* Mucilinda. In myth and art, after the Buddha attains *nirvāṇa* he is protected from the weather by the coils and hoods of Mucilinda. Such protection designates kingship in South Asia. These myths help to explain why *nāga*s and *yakṣa*s become guardians of the Buddha's relics. They are offering not only their protection but their powers over nature to the Buddha and his followers.

The relationship of the this-worldly powers of the *nāga* and the world-denying view of Buddhism is also revealed in the fascinating figure of Upagupta and in the ordination ceremony. In Burma and Thailand, the monk Upagupta is said to have been born of a *nāgī* maiden. This association allows the fertility powers of the *nāga* to be controlled by the rigorous meditative discipline of the monk, and Upagupta is called upon in rituals to tame the forces of nature. It also can be speculated that the reason a candidate for ordination into the monkhood is called a *nāg* is that he is about to tame his physical desires for the good of society and for the higher goal of Buddhism.

[*For a discussion of* nāga*s and* yakṣa*s among the peoples of the Himalayas, see* Himalayan Religions. *The Burmese counterparts of* nāga*s and* yakṣa*s are discussed in* Nats.]

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Religiosity," *History of Religion* 13 (August 1973): 36–53, surveys the symbolism of the *nāga* and *yakṣa* in Buddhist literature.

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NAHMANIDES, MOSES (c. 1194–c. 1270), also known by the acronym RaMBaN (Rabbi Mosheh ben Naḥman); Spanish name, Bonastrug da Porta; Talmudist, biblical exegete, mystic, and polemicist. Born in Gerona, Catalonia, in a period of cultural transition and controversy, Nahmanides confronted the traditions and attitudes of Spanish, Provençal, and northern Ashkenazic Jewry in a wide range of intellectual pursuits.

His Talmudic education with Yehudah ben Yaqar in Barcelona and with Me'ir ben Yitsḥaq of Trinquetaille exposed him to the dialectical methodology of the tosafists of northern France, which had penetrated into Languedoc and was revolutionizing the study of the Babylonian Talmud, the central text in the Jewish curriculum. [*See* Tosafot.] Nahmanides adopted this methodology, which he enriched with the Talmudic studies of Provençal scholars and the textual traditions of Spanish Jewry, to produce *novellae* and legal monographs that would establish the dominant school of rabbinics in Spain until the expulsion of 1492. Aside from his *novellae*, Talmudic commentaries that served as standard texts in medieval Spain, Nahmanides' works in this field include *Milḥamot ha-Shem*, a defense of Yitsḥaq Alfasi's code against the strictures of Zeraḥiah ha-Levi, in which Nahmanides presented what is essentially a complex commentary on selected portions of the Talmud; a critique of Maimonides' *Book of the Commandments* which was also a defense of the geonic *Halakhot gedolot; Torat ha-adam*, a lengthy monograph on the laws of mourning; a series of studies on other aspects of Talmudic law such as vows, menstrual impurity, and indirect causation of damages, some of which were modeled after Alfasi's code; and, of course, *responsa*.

Although Nahmanides is a towering figure in the history of Talmudic study, his greatest direct impact on the masses of Jews probably came through his wide-ranging and enormously influential commentary on the Pentateuch, which was to become one of the first printed Hebrew books. Nahmanides was persuaded that all knowledge could be found in the Torah, and his efforts to explicate the text touched upon all the areas of his intellectual interest. He was, first of all, deeply concerned with the plain meaning of the text. This concern went beyond questions of philology and syntax; Nahmanides was extraordinarily interested in the structure and order of biblical narrative, which he perceived, despite an apparent rabbinic statement to the contrary, as carefully chronological. The commentary contains nuanced and richly textured observations about the morality, motivations, and personalities of biblical characters; Nahmanides did not hesitate, for example, to question the moral legitimacy of Abraham's apologia to Abimelech that Sarah was indeed his half sister (*Gn.* 20:12). Though he provided an ongoing critique of the commentary of Avraham ibn 'Ezra', often accusing him of insufficient respect for rabbinic exegesis, Nahmanides allowed himself considerable independence in areas that do not touch upon legal norms, and his frequent deviations from Rashi's interpretations can involve a rejection of their rabbinic sources as well.

Nevertheless, for Nahmanides, the straightforward meaning of the Bible, however complex, does not begin to plumb its depths. He stressed the typological understanding of scripture, which, despite Midrashic precedent, was rather unusual among medieval Jews. Thus, the patriarchal settlement of the Land of Israel is taken to foreshadow the later conquest and remains a source of assurance that Jewish rule will be restored at the end of days.

The profoundest level of meaning in scripture, however, is not typological but mystical. This layer of meaning is the one that Nahmanides discusses at the very beginning of his commentary, where he asserts that the Torah consists entirely of esoteric names of God. Nevertheless, neither this extreme esotericism nor his conviction that mystical doctrines could be known only through tradition prevented him from finding these doctrines in the "plain" meaning of scripture as well, so that straightforward exegesis and what Nahmanides called "hidden wisdom" intersected in a fashion that legitimated the teachings of the Gerona qabbalists by an appeal to the biblical text itself. Although Nahmanides' allusions to esoteric lore remained brief, elusive, and inaccessible to the uninitiated, these doctrines move toward center stage in his commentary to *Job*, where belief in transmigration of souls emerges as the only satisfactory resolution of the problem of evil. This problem and its qabbalistic solution are also at the heart of the theological monograph *Sha'ar ha-gemul*, which Nahmanides appended to *Torat ha-adam* and which treats theodicy both exoterically and esoterically.

In the final analysis, Nahmanides' crucial role in the history of Qabbalah does not lie primarily in the content of these passages and similar, sometimes more elaborate discussions in his sermons *(The Law of the Lord Is Perfect, Sermon for a Wedding, Sermon on Ecclesiastes, Sermon for Ro'sh ha-Shanah)*, nor is it to be

sought in his partially preserved commentary on *Sefer yetsirah* (Book of Creation). His key contribution was the legitimation of Qabbalah by the very fact that he advocated it; the problems raised by this system for Jewish theology could not readily be pressed if the critic would thereby be raising questions about the orthodoxy of so unimpeachable a figure as Nahmanides. Consequently, the mere fact that Nahmanides was a mystic was a significant factor in the triumphant progress of Qabbalah in late medieval and Renaissance Jewish history.

Aside from his mystical, exegetical, and homiletical writings, Nahmanides produced two other influential works on non-halakhic topics. *Sefer ha-ge'ullah* (Book of the Redemption) was prompted by some signs of messianic skepticism among Spanish Jews. Although Nahmanides did not consider the redemption to be in the first rank of Jewish dogmas—one could, after all, expect greater heavenly rewards for observing the Torah under James I of Aragon than under the much more benevolent messianic king—defense of the belief in redemption was important theologically and crucial for the collective psyche of medieval Jewry. Nahmanides insisted on the continuing relevance of eschatological passages in the Bible, which, he said, are both unfulfilled and unconditional. Finally, he joined the ranks of messianic calculators, arguing eloquently that a straightforward reading of the end of *Daniel* points to the arrival of the ultimate redeemer in 1403, a date sufficiently close to buttress Jewish morale yet sufficiently removed to discourage messianic hysteria.

Any discussion of exile and redemption inevitably had polemical implications for Jews in Christian Europe, but Nahmanides' major polemical work was thrust upon him late in life under extraordinary circumstances. A Jewish convert to Christianity began to engage in vigorous missionary activity utilizing the relatively new argument that Talmudic passages demonstrate the truth of Christianity. In 1263 in Barcelona, Nahmanides was forced to defend the Jewish position in a disputation witnessed by James I. Despite the reservations of some scholars, there is every reason to believe that Nahmanides, who received an award from the king after the debate, acquitted himself with distinction; he later recorded his version of the proceedings in a work that lifted Jewish spirits and influenced subsequent polemicists through the medieval period and beyond.

His boldest and most controversial argument, which was probably sincere, maintained that rabbinic *midrash* was not dogmatically binding; hence, the Jewish polemicist was free to reject some uncongenial statements of the rabbis. The reaction of later Jews to this approach was profoundly ambivalent, and they wondered both about Nahmanides' sincerity and about the ultimate utility of an approach that undercut Christian arguments and respect for the rabbis at the same time. Nahmanides' own reverence for the rabbis even while differing from them is illustrated in his one other foray into Jewish-Christian polemic—a brief commentary on *Isaiah* 53 in which he asserted his conviction that the suffering servant is the Jewish people, but devoted the work to explaining how the Talmud could have understood the figure messianically without drawing Christian conclusions.

The disputation at Barcelona was not Nahmanides' first encounter with controversy of significant historical dimensions. In 1232, he had played a major role in the dispute over the writings of Maimonides and the legitimacy of philosophical inquiry. Some rabbis in northern France, responding to complaints by Provençal antirationalists, had proclaimed a ban against the study of Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed* and the first section of his code, while Maimonists had reacted by placing the Provençal anti-Maimonists under the ban. Nahmanides, who admired Maimonides but had deep reservations about the standard form of philosophical study, proposed a compromise to the rabbis of northern France that may well have persuaded them to withdraw from further involvement in this dispute. The code, including its first section, should be studied with enthusiasm; public study of the *Guide* should be banned; private study of both the *Guide* and philosophy in general should gently be discouraged.

Modern scholarly views of Nahmanides' position in this controversy as well as of his overall philosophical posture reflect considerable disagreement. Many scholars perceive him as a thoroughgoing antirationalist who despised philosophy and saw a world of omnipresent miracles in which no natural order existed; others, with greater justice, see a far more complex figure who absorbed much of the medieval philosophical legacy, made his living as a physician, saw a naturalistic world punctuated by miracles, and espoused disciplined theological inquiry within carefully delineated limits.

The Land of Israel had always played a particularly significant role in Nahmanides' thought, and when he found himself under pressure in the wake of the Barcelona disputation, he went there to spend his remaining years. This was no placid retirement. Nahmanides revived the Jewish community of Jerusalem, which had been decimated by the invasion of the Khwarazan Turks in 1244. He became the head of the Jewish community in Acre, and it was in Israel that he put the finishing touches on his *magnum opus* on the Pentateuch.

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NAḤMAN OF BRATSLAV (1772–1810), Hasidic master and founder of the Bratslav sect, born in Medzhibozh, Ukraine. A great-grandson of Yisra'el ben Eli'ezer (1700–1760), the Besht, the first central figure of Hasidism, Naḥman proclaimed a path that stood in direct opposition to that of his esteemed forebear. Naḥman's complex and tortuous struggle for faith stood in sharp contrast to the Besht's ideal of simplicity and wholeness: theologically, Hasidism's earlier enthusiastic proclamation of the all-pervasive presence of God is replaced in Bratslav Hasidism by a painful awareness of his absence. The relative "neutralization" of messianic energies, characteristic especially of the Mezhirich school, is also reversed in Bratslav, where Naḥman, whom Bratslavers consider the only true *tsaddiq* ("righteous man"), is clearly depicted at least as a proto-messianic figure.

Given the family into which he was born, it was probably expected of Naḥman that he lead a Hasidic following in a movement that was becoming firmly entrenched in a pattern of dynastic succession. In his early years he refused this role, feeling himself inadequate to it and perhaps disdaining Hasidism as it was popularly practiced in his surroundings.

In 1798 Naḥman undertook a pilgrimage from the Ukraine to the Holy Land. Arriving in the Galilee right in the midst of Napoleon's battle with the Turks, he suffered numerous hardships and was at times close to death. He saw this journey as a private rite of passage, and later in life often looked back on it as a source of inspiration. Only on his return from the Land of Israel was he ready to assume the mantle of leadership, and this he did in a highly selective manner. Gathering around himself an elite cadre of disciples dedicated to a revitalization of the Hasidic movement, Naḥman issued an open challenge to such popular figures as Aryeh Leib of Shpola and his own uncle, Baruch of Medzhibozh. He saw Hasidism as having grown self-satisfied, compromised by the shallow assurances of blessing such self-proclaimed *tsaddiqim* would offer in exchange for the rather considerable gifts they were receiving. In Naḥman's community poverty was the ideal, miracles were disdained, and the master was not to be bothered with such small matters as material blessings. The disciples were to devote themselves to an intense regimen of private devotion and penitence. In the early years of his leadership, Naḥman insisted that each new disciple confess all of his sins to him. Sin was taken quite seriously in Bratslav, where earlier Hasidic warnings against excessive guilt were set aside.

The essential practice that Naḥman demanded of his disciples was *hitbodedut*, which in Bratslav meant a daily "conversation" that each Ḥasid was to have with God. *Hitbodedut* had to be practiced for an hour each day, spoken aloud in one's native tongue, and performed by each Ḥasid in private, preferably outdoors. During this hour the disciple was instructed to "break his heart" and confess before God his most secret thoughts. While the Bratslav sect remained fully within Jewish orthodoxy, including full observance of the law and recital of daily liturgy, it was this new practice of *hitbodedut* that was the true focus of its spiritual attention.

Naḥman was filled with ambivalence about his role as leader. Some of his statements exude an exaggerated sense of self-importance, a claim that he is the only true *tsaddiq* of his generation, and an air of megalomania. Others reflect just the opposite: an acute sense of unworthiness, a feeling of personal emptiness, and a regret at having allowed himself to accept a mantle of which he was unworthy. These alternating attitudes fit in with Naḥman's well-documented alternating states of elation and melancholy, a pattern that would today probably be diagnosed as manic-depression. It was in the course of his recurrent bouts with depression and guilt that Naḥman came to articulate his distinctive theological position.

The absence of God from human life is a reality that must be treated seriously. The religious person must come to terms with the fact that he lives in a world from which God has absented himself. Moments of

doubt, inevitable in such a situation, must be treated as recording a valid aspect of human experience, and the notion of faith must be so expanded as to dialectically encompass doubt and denial within it. The seeker must struggle constantly with the eternal questions; one who does so will ascend through a constant spiral of doubt, denial, longing, faith, renewed challenge, doubt and denial, a higher rung of faith, and so forth. The great danger to such a quest is complacency; its highest ideal, that of constant growth. The nature of faith becomes ever more complex as it seeks to contain within itself ever more serious questions and conflicts.

Faith, a term more prevalent in Bratslav than in any other premodern Jewish ideology, is defined as a constant longing for God, an outcry of the broken heart aware of his distance. Such faith can only be cultivated, Naḥman taught, in a world where God's absence is real and where no easy answers are available to fill the painful void. Thus the absence of God is paradoxically God's greatest gift, allowing us the psychological room in which to build up the reservoir of faith that is our most important human asset. The awareness that this self-absenting (*tsimtsum*, as the older qabbalistic term is read in Bratslav) is itself a divine gift allows one to suffer life in the void, but does not alter its reality.

The sharp inner tensions that drove Naḥman to seek a path of redemption for himself, his disciples, and the Hasidic movement as a whole culminated in a brief messianic attempt in the year 1806. Once that attempt had failed (Naḥman saw the death of his infant son as a sure sign from heaven), a new and more subtle way to deliver the message of redemption was sought. This led Naḥman to the telling of his tales, now collected, symbolic fantasies that give fresh and vital expression to the mythic themes of qabbalistic thought. Redemption is the central underlying motif in most of these tales, the purpose of which seems to have been the preparing of his hearers' minds for the great events to come. Published in 1815, the tales take their place alongside Naḥman's collected teachings, *Liqquṭei Moharan* (1809, 1811), as unique classics in the Hasidic corpus.

Naḥman died tragically of tuberculosis at the age of thirty-eight, leaving no male heir. His faithful disciple, Natan of Nemirov, led the community after him but always acted as the master's surrogate rather than his successor. Bratslav is unique in surviving as a Hasidic community that has no living master; in later times, when they were much persecuted within the Hasidic world, they were referred to by others as the "dead Ḥasidim." The small but hardy band of Bratslavers treated this as a badge of honor, however, as they remained true to the memory of the one master who had been theirs and who, according to some Bratslav sources, was yet to come again.

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NAHUATL RELIGION. The speakers of Nahuatl dialects compose the largest group of indigenous people in Mexico. Numbering about 800,000, they live primarily in the Federal District and the states of México, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Guerrero, Veracruz, and San Luis Potosí. Smaller populations can be found in Jalisco, Nayarit, Oaxaca, and Tabasco. The proportion of Nahuatl speakers in central Mexico is declining, but their absolute number is fairly stable and is augmented by millions of Spanish-speaking villagers who preserve elements of Nahuatl heritage. Among both these groups, remnants of pre-Hispanic Nahuatl religion persist in combination with a Catholicism that retains much of the character of its sixteenth-century Hispanic origins.

Folk Catholicism in most Nahuatl villages is more than a superficial veneer on a pre-Hispanic substratum; it constitutes the very meaning of village life. Social solidarity is expressed in terms of spiritual kinship, that is, as godparenthood and ritual commensality. Godparenthood is associated not only with the sacraments of baptism, first communion, confirmation, and marriage but also with many nonsacramental events ranging from the blessing of dwellings, stores, tractors, and trucks to curing ceremonies and graduation from sixth grade. Baptism, the other sacraments, and blessings sanctify persons and objects and so recruit them into the spiritual family (i.e., the village or neighborhood conceptualized as a sacred community).

Life within the spiritual family is symbolized by the fiesta, which bears an obvious similarity to the Eucharist and the agape (love feast) of early Christians. The fiesta, or ritual meal, consists of three courses—rice, turkey in mole sauce, and beans—accompanied by alcoholic beverages. Fiestas honor the patron saints of neighborhoods and villages and mark the sacramental rites of passage. The festivities occasion momentary conviviality, and their preparation promotes enduring

amity by requiring villagers to give generously of their time and resources for the benefit of others. The familial symbolism and sentiments associated with the fiesta system come into sharp focus during the Christmas-Candlemas season, at which time festivities center on the Holy Family—the Christ Child, Mary, and Joseph.

On or about the third of May, fiestas are held to honor mountainside crosses that protect communities and neighborhoods during the rainy season. In a weather-working cult in northern Morelos, crosses are associated with San Miguel Arcángel, four lightning-hurling saints, and groups of "rain dwarfs" *(awaque)*. The weather-working shamans hold their own ceremonies at mountainside shrines at the beginning of May and again in early November, or roughly at the start and the end of the rainy season.

In contrast to the saints and members of the Holy Family are many evil and Adamic beings who threaten the villagers. Some of these beings are satirized by dancers at carnivals and fairs, where the Devil may be represented by a figure in a red suit with horns. In apparitions, the Devil may appear as a Spanish gentleman, or *hacendado*, mounted on horseback. Other sinister beings include Death; goblins (the spirits of unbaptized children) who offer women bribes for sexual favors; were-animals called *naguales*, who molest drunkards and women on unlit paths after nightfall; La Llorona, also known as La Malinche, a sirenlike apparition who aborted or murdered her children after being abandoned by a lover who is sometimes identified as the Spanish conqueror Cortés; witches who cause illness and poverty, and who suck blood from children's necks; Water Snake and Little Bull, two supernatural animals that bring forth crop-damaging winds and rain; and harmful spirits called *ehecame* ("winds") or *los aires*. *Ehecame* cause paralysis, tics and twitches, neuralgia, loss of sensation, skin disorders, and other afflictions. Witches use a technique called *aire echado* ("thrown air") in which dirt from a grave containing a *tonalli*, or shadow-soul, is mixed with other ingredients and hurled against the victim's house.

Ehecame can also cause *susto* ("fright"), an emotional reaction that affects the shadow-soul of a living person and results in depression, insomnia, and loss of appetite. The parts of the shadow-soul are dispersed throughout the bloodstream, but in response to fright they retreat toward the heart or leave the body. In some communities the shadow-soul fragments are likened to animals or are said to take animal form when outside the body. Persons with weak natures are more vulnerable than others to fright-illness.

Fright-illness and various other beliefs indicate that persons having strong—even tainted—natures enjoy more protection against evil than do persons with weak or sensitive natures. Indeed, nature as well as spirit is seen as a necessary and inevitable part of a person's total makeup. Thus Nahuatl rituals repeatedly express the place of evil and nature in the overall scheme of things. Ritual impersonations of La Malinche, Cortés, Huehuenches ("old ones"), Tenanchis (the grandmothers of the Christ Child), and the figures of the bull and the deer testify to the importance of the Adamic. In mock bull slayings and deer hunts, the killer/hunter assumes a role analogous to that of the serpent who tempts Adam and Eve. The Tenanchis appear during the Christmas-Candlemas season as enticing, tempting figures suggestive of Eve. Huehuenches dance during Carnival, also evoking the Adamic, but in more sinister fashion: as Herod's agents they are enemies of the Christ Child. In some communities the struggle between the forces of good and evil is dramatized during local fairs by mock battles between "Christians" and "Moors."

The Nahuatl ritual complex thus includes various vestiges of the pre-Hispanic pantheon, but its basic armature is nonetheless recognizably Catholic: Eve and, through her, Adam are deceived by the serpent and so denied immortality, but they generate natural life; by contrast, Christ is killed by the agents of the devil, yet his death offers spiritual immortality. The appeal of these conceptual polarities for Nahuatl villagers may be grounded in the realities and contradictions of peasant existence. The villagers subscribe to spiritual values, but the exigencies of daily life continually remind them of the importance of nature and the ever-present problem of evil.

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JOHN M. INGHAM

NAJM AL-DĪN KUBRĀ. *See* Kubrā, Najm al-Dīn.

NAKAE TŌJU (1608–1648), Japanese Neo-Confucian thinker. Tōju, often called the Sage of Ōmi, was born in Ogawa in Ōmi Province on Lake Biwa in central Japan. With the exception of sixteen years spent in Ōzu on the island of Shikoku, he passed his life in Ōmi engaged in studying, teaching, and writing. His grandfather, who had adopted him at the age of nine, took him to Shikoku and encouraged his early education. After his grandfather's death, when Tōju was fifteen, he attended lectures on the *Analects* by a visiting Zen priest. After this he began serious study of the Four Books *(Analects, Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Mencius)* and of Chu Hsi's commentaries on them. In 1634, citing as motives his own ill health and his desire to be with his widowed mother, he returned to Ōmi. Although some sources indicate that another motive may have been the desire to escape political entanglements, most accounts mark this as the beginning of his focus on the virtue of filial piety.

In 1636 he set up a school called the Tōju Shoin and accepted pupils of all classes and backgrounds. The Four Books and Chu Hsi's commentaries were the core of the curriculum, but Tōju wished to avoid the behavioral formalism sometimes associated with the transmission of Chu Hsi's thought. Instead, he stressed the need to adapt Neo-Confucianism to time, place, and rank. It was during this period that he studied the Five Classics *(History, Odes, Rites, Changes, Spring and Autumn Annals)*. Inspired by them, he wrote two works on moral cultivation, both in 1638: *Jikei zusetsu* (The Diagram of Holding Fast to Reverence, Explained) and *Genjin* (Inquiry into Man). In the following year he wrote *Rongo kyotō keimō iden* (Resolving Obscurities Concerning the Hsiang-tang Chapter of the *Analects*), in which he discussed the reverential attitude displayed by Confucius in daily activities and in religious rituals.

Tōju had been moved by this aspect of Confucius's character and wished to return to the religious spirit he saw in Confucius and in the Five Classics. He began to recite each morning the *Hsiao ching* (Classic of Filial Piety), and he subsequently became increasingly convinced of its profound implications. In 1641 he wrote *Kōkyō keimō* (The True Meaning of the Classic of Filial Piety). His other major work, written a year earlier and continually revised until his death, was *Okina mondō* (Dialogues with an Old Man). Here, in addition to discussing filiality, Tōju noted how Confucian morality was essential for the samurai class.

Tōju has been considered the founder of the Wang Yang-ming school in Japan, but it was not until three years before his death that he acquired Wang's complete works. Although deeply affected by them, he had already been exposed to the writings of late Ming thinkers such as Wang Chi, who some scholars feel may have had an even stronger influence on him. It is clear that his doubts about Chu Hsi's thought arose from his aversion to its formalistic interpreters. The appeal of the Ming Confucians was their emphasis on interiority, innate knowledge, universal sagehood, and a religious sense of reverence.

Tōju's principal religious ideas can be summarized as a profound reverence for the Supreme Being *(jōten)*, manifested in an optimistic doctrine of moral self-cultivation based on the innate knowledge of the good. Tōju taught that the heart of self-cultivation was filiality, for it was the "root of the human" and an intricate part of the transformative processes of nature itself. As the dynamic reciprocity between all created things, he saw filiality as the basis of social relations and as a nurturing principle in the natural order. Thus Tōju's distinctive religiosity drew on various strains of Confucian and Neo-Confucian thought, and combined a reverent theism, interior cultivation, and filial devotion.

[*See also* Confucianism in Japan.]

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NAMĀZ. *See* Ṣalāt.

NAMES AND NAMING activities are central to human symbolic and communicative processes. To be human is to name, and be named, and thereby to possess full being and the ability to relate to the world in meaningful ways. In the Bible, God is said to have brought all the newly created animals to the first human, "to see what he would call them" (*Gn.* 2:19). In all human communities there is thought to be a close relationship between the name of a person or other phenomenon and its character, status, and very being.

Names often have a mysterious quality, whether they refer to sacred beings of a transcendent nature or to humans and other concrete entities. There is power in names, because they both participate in the reality named and give definition and identity to that reality. That is, name and named exist in a mutual relationship in which the power of the former is shared with the

being of the latter. Being without name has a very marginal status in the world of phenomena. For example, traditional Christian teaching holds that unbaptized children who die go to limbo. They have no clearly defined status because they have been given no name by the proper ceremonial means. The act of christening during baptism renders a new life human in the religiocultural sense, which is more significant than mere biological humanness. Similarly, among the Netsilik, in a traditional Inuit (Eskimo) context, once a female infant had received a name it was absolutely forbidden to kill her, though female children were often considered superfluous.

Persons have often been thought to persist after death through the remembrance of their names. In ancient Egypt, children had the solemn duty to preserve the names of their parents through ritual means. The Old Kingdom Pyramid Text of Pharaoh Pepi I refers to his continued existence by means of the repetition of his name: "Thy name which is on earth lives; thy name which is on earth lasts; thou wilt not disappear; thou wilt not be destroyed in all eternity" (cited by Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods*, Chicago, 1948, p. 113).

Not only humans, whether of high or low degree, but also gods exist and express their power, presence, and will by means of their names. In ancient Israel, God was believed to dwell in his Temple through his name *(shem)*, while he himself dwelt in heaven. That is, by his name, *YHVH* (probably then pronounced as *Yahveh*), God resided in revealed form among his creatures. In this case, Yahveh's inner being was not coterminous with his name; but his power, will, and presence were made manifest in his sanctuary through it. Islamic belief holds that Allāh likes to be called upon by his names, which provide vehicles for communication and even union between Allāh and his human servants. In Hinduism, the mention of a god's name has soteriological value. One view even holds that the name of God is greater than its referent, because sound *(sphoṭa)* is absolute. But not all traditions have a name for God, nor is it always considered proper, because of their holiness, to utter those names that are associated with divinity.

Names of Gods and Other Sacred Entities. It is common to nearly all religious practices that in order to communicate with a deity one must know its name. Knowledge of a divine name gives the knower both power and an avenue of communication with its source. This intimate relationship between knowing a name and participating in its power has both religious and magical aspects.

Ancient Israel and Judaism. Moses asked the voice from the burning bush, identified as "the god of your fathers," what his name was, and was answered "I am" *(ehyeh)*, which, in a different Hebrew grammatical form, is rendered *Yahveh* (approximately, "He causes to be"; *Ex.* 3:13–14). In keeping with this most mysterious and potent of God's names in the Hebrew tradition is the conviction that God's names are, generally speaking, according to his acts. Causing to be is the greatest of acts and thus the name *Yahveh* is the most sublime name. Yahveh, as name and as theological concept, affirms both God's eternal reality and his reliable presence with his covenant people, Israel.

There are many names for God in the Hebrew scriptures; some of them appear to be very archaic, and some were shared by other Semitic peoples in antiquity. Other names came into being during the long covenant history of Israel, both through contact with neighboring peoples and through the deepening insights of Hebrew prophets and poets. *Baal* ("lord"), a term common to Canaanite religion and Hebrew faith, came to be associated with Yahveh for a time, only to be repudiated later. *Adon*, which also means "lord," did not earn the opprobrium of *Baal* and continues to the present to be an honorific substitution for *Yahveh*, the name that postexilic Jews considered too holy to utter. *Adonai* ("my lord") came to be a potent religious term because of its referent, whose real name was different. Here sacred names can be seen operating on different levels, with one gracious name serving as a protective shield for another, more sacred name. Certain other divine titles and names emerged from Israel's cumulative experiences and convictions: political ones meaning "king," "judge," "shepherd"; kinship terms meaning "father," "brother," "kinsman"; and metaphors from nature with such meanings as "rock."

Christianity. The New Testament community inherited most of the Israelite names and convictions associated with God but never developed the strong sense of taboo connected with the holiest name, *Yahveh*. Jesus took the Hebrew name of God as "father" but rendered it in the familiar form *Abba* ("daddy"), which astonished people because it is ordinarily used only between an actual begotten child and its father. *Father* has remained the most characteristic Christian appellation for God, used especially when the speaker draws near to him in prayer, worship, and praise. All other names for God, whether inherited from the biblical tradition of the Jews or generated within the Christian movement, have been tempered by the intimate personal dimension that Jesus emphasized.

The Christians accepted the older Hebraic custom of speaking or acting "in the name of" someone, whether God or a human, as a representative or witness. The New Testament sometimes uses the names of God and

Jesus almost interchangeably as the ultimate divine authority, while never suggesting directly that Jesus is other than the mediator between God and humankind, and not to be worshiped himself. The identification between Father and Son, however, becomes almost total in later christological developments, when Christians came increasingly to conceive of God in terms of Jesus' incarnation. "At the name of Jesus, every knee should bow" (*Phil.* 2:10) is one way in which the New Testament expresses the exalted nature of Christ, whose name is holy.

Islam. In characteristic Abrahamic fashion, the religion of Muḥammad and the Qur'ān places heavy emphasis on the name of God. All utterances, written or spoken, should be prefaced by the phrase "In the name of Allāh, the merciful, the compassionate" (Arab., "Bismillāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm"). The word *Allāh* is probably an archaic contraction of the Arabic definite article *al-* and *'ilāh*, "deity" (cf. Heb. *el, eloh*, "god"). Allāh, "the god," or God, was central in the pre-Islamic pantheon but as the highest and not the sole divinity. The ancient Arabs believed that Allāh had three daughters, but this as well as other views of Allāh's relatedness and contingency were swept away by the prophetic activity of Muḥammad and the message of the Qur'ān. The Islamic scripture emphasizes Allāh's incomparable uniqueness. It also provides many names and titles of Allāh, sometimes outright but often in the sense of derivations of divine attributes and activities (e.g., *Knower, Provider, Relenting*). Later Islam developed out of the Qur'ān a list of the "most beautiful names of Allāh" *(al-asma', al-ḥusnā)*, which are traditionally believed to number ninety-nine. The names are recited by Muslims, often with the aid of a string of beads called a *subḥa*. Each name has a particular power and should be recited according to the spiritual station of the seeker.

In addition to *Allāh*, two other names figure prominently in the Qur'ān. The first is *Rabb* ("lord"), a term that occurs most frequently in passages containing material about Jews and Christians. The message of Allāh's uniqueness and sovereignty is often declared with the use of *Rabb*, beginning with what is commonly considered to be the first passage to have been revealed: "Recite: In the name of thy Lord [*rabbika*], who created man of a blood clot" (surah 96:1–2). The second frequent Qur'anic name besides *Allāh* is *al-Raḥmān* ("the merciful"), which is the same as the old South Arabian Jewish name for God. The Qur'ān commands the believers to "call upon Allāh, or call upon al-Raḥmān; whichsoever you call upon, to him belong the names most beautiful" (17:110).

Muslims have never observed a taboo respecting the name of God. Instead, they have preferred to utter their praises with as many divine names and attributes as possible, following the Qur'anic command: "O believers, remember God oft [by means of *dhikr*, "mentioning" his names], and give him glory at the dawn and in the evening" (33:41). [*See also* Dhikr.]

Sikhism. The Indian combination of devotional Hindu and Ṣūfī Islamic doctrines founded by Gurū Nānak (d. 1539) emphasizes the magnification of God by his name in a special form of devotion known as *nām mārga* ("the path of the name"). A variety of names for God are recognized and uttered by Sikhs, including both Muslim and Hindu ones, but the most common is *Sat Nām* ("the true name"). Although Sikhs believe that it is beyond humankind's capacity to describe and define God, people can become purified and free of their egos by means of the veneration of his names, with intelligent awareness and detachment from the world.

Hinduism. There is a persistent conviction within the rich and complex Hindu worldview that the mysterious, unknowable ultimate reality, *brahman* (which literally means "expansion, swelling, growth"), transcends and undergirds all. *Brahman* is the holiest of beings, the most real being, and the source and goal of all being. Hindus have developed highly abstract pantheistic and theistic philosophical doctrines of *brahman*. At bottom, the name *brahman* means "prayer," in the sense of sacred utterance, so that by speaking the word one participates in its reality as power and speech. The believer is able to meditate on divine themes by means of *mantras*, special patterns and techniques of oral utterance that center on the name of a deity, or on a sacred syllable or sound. A *mantra* is not limited to divine names as words only but may be rooted in the whole realm of sound and breath. *Mantras* are recited under the guidance of a guru, or preceptor, who knows the correct pronunciation of the formulas and other aspects of ritual performance, such as posture and breath control.

It is of the utmost importance in Hinduism that the correct name for a deity be used, depending on the purpose and status of the worshiper. The many named divinities of Hinduism, although never universally regarded as belonging to a single system, nevertheless can be identified as components of a comprehensive and balanced worldview, with prominent social and cultural dimensions.

The invocation of names of gods is especially prominent in devotional *(bhakti)* Hinduism. Singing and recitation of the divine names, especially that of Kṛṣṇa, is believed to bring release *(mokṣa)* from the round of rebirth *(saṃsāra)*. Some Hindus meet regularly to perform *nāma vali*, a "necklace of names" in which an emotionally charged congregation and its leader sing the name of a deity, beginning slowly, and building up

to a spirited climax. The Purāṇas contain much on name praise, such as the following passage: "Hari's Name, Hari's Name, and Hari's Name alone is my vocation. In the Kali age there is no other, no other, indeed no other course [for *mokṣa*]" (cited in Singer, 1966, pp. 143–144).

Mahāyāna Buddhism. Mahāyāna Buddhism places considerable emphasis upon the soteriological efficacy of invoking the Buddha's name. The Pure Land schools of East Asia stress faith in Amitābha (called Amida in Japan), focusing on the simple ritual of reciting the name of the Buddha in order to be saved and enter paradise.

Nembutsu. The devout repetition of the phrase "Namu Amida Butsu" ("Homage to Amida Buddha") is believed to deliver one from sins and, if uttered on the threshold of death, will effect one's rebirth in the Pure Land of Amida. There are different schools of the ritual remembrance of the Buddha's name, called *nembutsu* in Japanese and *nien-fo* in Chinese. The Japanese monk Hōnen (1133–1212) taught that one should repeat the name of Amida with faith, a practice open to practically anyone, not requiring long apprenticeship in meditation. Hōnen and some of his disciples insisted that the *nembutsu* formula should be repeated continuously, as many as seventy thousand times in one day. Shinran (1173–1262), who followed his master Hōnen in *nembutsu*, considered a single recitation of the ritual invocation, "with faith," as sufficient for salvation. In Japan, the name is a key dimension, whereas in China and India, invoking the name of Amitābha Buddha has been associated with the less central contemplation of the gigantic features of the Buddha's cosmic body. [*See also* Nien-fo.]

The Lotus Sutra. Another ritual naming practice in Mahāyāna Buddhism is the invocation of the *Lotus Sutra*, a major book in the Buddhist canon that became a central scripture of Tendai Buddhism in China and Japan. Nichiren (1232–1282), a Japanese seeker who studied Tendai, Zen, and Pure Land Buddhism, concluded his spiritual training with the discovery that enlightenment could be achieved by anyone who has sincere faith in the teaching of the *Lotus Sutra*. This faith was then to be expressed in the formula "Namu Myōhōrengekyō" ("Homage to the *Sutra of the Lotus of the Wonderful Law*"). Implicit in this Japanese statement of affirmation is the sense of humble submission to the power of what is named, which is also somehow the name itself. Nichiren chanted the name of the *Lotus Sutra* to the accompaniment of a drum.

China. The Chinese have traditionally stressed the importance of names, whether in the Confucian doctrine of the "rectification of names," a philosophy of balance, propriety, and equity in the universe, or at the practical level of naming gods, humans, and other beings. Confucianism has always emphasized the veneration of ancestors, but the Way of Heaven *(t'ien-tao)* has traditionally been ultimate. *T'ien* ("heaven") is sometimes a name for the impersonal sky that overarches all things; at other times *t'ien* has taken on a somewhat more personal meaning, as the divine ruler of events on earth. A variant is *shang-ti* ("supreme ruler," or God). But *t'ien*, even when it means "deity," is subordinate to *tao*, the universally acknowledged ultimate reality in Chinese religious thought. *Tao* cannot be named, nor can it be translated. To characterize the term as the impersonal, creative, and regulating power of the universe is to approach its essence, which in any case is mysterious and transcendent. But, paradoxically, *tao* is also immanent and natural. Lao-tzu's classic treatise, *Tao-te ching*, opens: "The way [*tao*] that can be spoken of is not the constant way; the name that can be named is not the constant name. The nameless was the beginning of heaven and earth; the named was the mother of the myriad creatures" (trans. D. C. Lau, Baltimore, 1963).

Nonliterate and archaic traditions. The appellations for divinity and humankind alike among nonliterate peoples are often extremely varied and complex. Names and naming are frequently surrounded by taboos and employed only with specified ritual procedures, including considerations of status, relationship, season, age, place, and power.

Australia. Among the Aborigines of southeastern Australia, before Europeans arrived, there was a fully developed belief in a "high god," as scholars have named the category of supreme being in archaic religion. In Australia, the high god's names, myths, activities, and associated rituals were closely guarded secrets, known only to the initiated males of high status. *Baiame* is one of the names for the Australian high god, who is believed to have created the world, given moral laws, and established the initiation rites by means of which humans attain their full being and come into contact with ultimate reality. The Australian high god is a sky divinity who performed his greatest labors at the beginning of things, but who nevertheless continues to live and have influence. *Baiame*, *Daramulun*, *Nurunderi*, *Bunjil*, and *Biral* are some of the names for the "sky-hero," as A. P. Elkin (1954) calls the Australian high god. The secret name of this deity was divulged during initiation rites, when his voice was heard in the sound of the bull-roarer.

Africa. Celestial supreme beings are also known in traditional African religions. Some are distant and uninvolved in human affairs, as in Australia. But others

are active and engaged in the world, especially on the moral plane. The Yoruba believe in a high god called Ọlọrun ("lord of the sky"). Ọlọrun is not directly involved in historical existence, but rules through intermediaries. Among the Dinka, on the other hand, Nhialac, whose name means "above," is honored as both creator and sustainer of the world. The Dinka tend to identify all other gods and sacred forces with Nhialac, who thus becomes a sort of only god, in the monotheistic sense, as well as supreme being. The Nuer have no special name for God, but simply use the term *kwoth* ("spirit"), together with appropriate qualifying words or clauses.

Ancient Egypt. The celestial type of deity is clearly discernible in ancient Egyptian religion, where the pharaoh was believed to be the divine embodiment of Horus, the falcon god, and Re, the sun god. Celestial names and attributes are always reserved for royalty in such traditions as that of Egypt, in which the close relationship, even identification, of the divine and human realms is bound up with rule and cosmic order. Ancient Egyptian sources indicate a great concern for names and their power. The most powerful name for a god was his or her unknown name, as is evident in the famous story of how Isis tricked the supreme god Re into revealing his secret name, which resulted in the goddess's appropriation of his power. Name magic became highly developed in ancient Egypt, especially with respect to deities, who exercised direct power over humans for good or ill.

Ancient Rome. The naming of deities in Roman times was a highly complex and carefully regulated affair. The Romans kept long lists of divinities, both known and unknown; and they also preserved secret lists of divine names. Hermann Usener wrote a celebrated book called *Götternamen* (Names of Gods; 1896) in which he argued that the Romans distinguished both "momentary" and "functional" deities, who received names according to their times and kinds of activities. Every time, place, thing, and event had its own deity, according to this theory, and the myriad deities that inevitably resulted from such a view were arranged hierarchically. Usener's thesis that momentary and functional gods gave rise to more pervasive, overarching gods, and finally to God, has not fared well in recent times, although his researches still provide a detailed review of the naming systems employed by the ancient Romans.

Human Names and Naming Processes. Human names and naming practices are often as important ritually and symbolically as those connected with deities. For example, in ancient Egypt, the name of a god, person, or object was equivalent to its inner being; without *ren*, "name," there was no existence. In the case of humans, *ren* came to be equal in importance to the *ka*, the individual's "spirit" or "vital force." Likewise, in traditional China the name and its owner were identical. In Confucian ancestral rites, the deceased had a "spirit tablet" or a gravestone engraved with his or her name. If the name were omitted or effaced, then there was thought to be no spirit in the grave, and the person utterly ceased to exist. Similar ideas, with different specific rites and behavior patterns, can be found in other traditions (e.g., in Africa, Oceania, and the Americas).

Judaism. Jews have traditionally employed biblical names, which in turn were derived from many sources: kinship (e.g., *Yehoshu'a ben Nun*, "Joshua the son of Nun"), animals (e.g., *Raḥel* or *Rachel*, "ewe"), plants (e.g., *Tamar*, "palm"), personal characteristics (e.g., *Esav* or *Esau*, "hairy"), circumstances of birth (e.g., *Ya'aqov* or *Jacob*, "he who takes by the heel"), and relationship to God (e.g., *'Ovadyah* or *Obadiah*, "servant of Yahveh"). In biblical times, the Hebrews practiced name changing because of status changes or special circumstances and experiences. Ya'aqov's (Jacob's) name was changed to *Yisra'el* (*Israel*, "let God contend" or "he who strives with God") after his struggle with the angel (*Gn.* 32:29). Avram's (Abram's) name was changed to *Avraham (Abraham)* and Sarai's to *Sarah* when they were commissioned with their auspicious roles as parents of multitudes (*Gn.* 17:5, 17:15). Jews have also adopted foreign names in certain periods. In medieval Europe, they adopted both sacred and secular names, a practice that endures.

Christianity. Christians have sometimes insisted on specifically Christian names for their children, but they have often also adopted names current in the countries where they have lived. Where Christians have constituted a minority, for example in Islamic regions, "Christian" names (like *Peter*, *George*, *Paul*, *Mark*, and *Thomas*) have been important factors in preserving religious and social identity. Although it has rarely been required that children take biblical names, it has often been done. More common has been the practice of giving a child the name of a saint. Persons entering holy orders or elevated to high ecclesiastical office have also taken saints' names. During the Reformation, Protestants began using Old Testament names for their children, to distinguish themselves from Roman Catholics. The Council of Trent decreed that all baptized infants must be given a saint's name.

Islam. The conversion to Islam is accompanied by a change of name. Muslim names are partly based on ancient Arabic or other (Persian, Turkish, or Indian) usages, partly upon the sayings of Muḥammad reported in the body of traditions known as *ḥadīth*. Muḥammad taught that the best names are *'Abd Allāh* ("God's ser-

vant") and *ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān* ("servant of the merciful"). From this basis, the use of *ʿabd* with any of the ninety-nine "most beautiful names" of God became very common. The name *Muḥammad* and its parallels are widely used for males, for according to tradition every man with the name of Muḥammad will go to paradise. The Muslims developed a list of ninety-nine names of the Prophet *(asmāʾ sharīfah)* to parallel the ninety-nine names of God. Among them are *Aḥmad* ("most praised"), *Ṭāhā* (the first word of surah 20), *Mudaththir* ("wrapped," the opening word of surah 74), *Munīr* ("radiant," surah 33:45), and so forth. Also popular are the names of the Prophet's family and his companions, although in Shīʿī circles one will never find the names of the first three caliphs or of ʿĀʾishah but will very frequently find those of Fāṭimah and the imams, from ʿAlī to Taqī or Riḍā. Names of the Qur'anic prophets are widely used, including those of Mūsā (Moses) and ʿĪsā (Jesus).

Traditionally, a Muslim name has several different parts, among them the *ism*, the *nisbah*, and the *kunyah*. The *ism* is the religious name, like those mentioned above. The *nisbah* shows the relation to one's birthplace, tribe, or line of thought; in Arabic, it ends in *ī*, as in *Makkī* ("from Mecca"), *Thaqafī* ("from the Thaqīf tribe"), and *Ḥanafī* ("belonging to the Ḥanafī school of law"). The *kunyah* indicates the relation of a parent to a child; either *Abū* ("father of") or *Umm* ("mother of") is given to a firstborn child, as in *Abū ʿAlī*, or is used in a more general sense, as in *Abū al-Fawāris* ("father of the riders"). The *kunyah* is the name of honor by which one ought to be addressed.

A Muslim name is often complemented by a *laqab*, a nickname pointing to some special quality, as in *al-Aʿraj* ("the lame one"). Often, composites with *al-dīn* ("of the religion") are added to the *ism*, as in *Jalal al-Dīn* ("majesty of religion"). To people in political positions compounds with *al-dawlah* ("of the state") may be given as honorific titles, as in *Sayf al-Dawlah* ("sword of the state"). Rulers surrounded themselves with long chains of honorific names, the central one pointing to their relation with God, as in *al-Mutawakkil ʿalā Allāh* ("who trusts in God"). Male children were sometimes given repellent names to avert the evil eye, but slaves were often given such delightful names as *Marjān* ("coral") and *Kāfūr* ("camphor").

Non-Arab Muslims traditionally continued using their inherited names, complemented by Muslim names; in countries under Persian cultural influence, such as Turkey and India, Persian names were often used among the upper classes. Indo-Pakistan has produced unusually colorful names, which are often incompatible with Arabic grammar.

Names are often given by an elder member of the family or a venerated master. If a child is born on an auspicious day or in a sacred month, he or she may be named accordingly: by *Ramaḍān*, for instance, or *Mawlidīyah* (for a girl born on the birthday, *mawlid*, of the Prophet). If the child is the result of a special prayer he may be given the name *Nabi-Bakhsh* ("gift of the Prophet"), *Dād-ʿAlī* ("Alī's gift"), or *Ghauth-Bakhsh* ("given by Ghauth," i.e., *ʿAbd al-Qādir Jīlānī*). Often, especially in India, the Qur'ān is opened and the first meaningful word found is taken for a name. Family names were long unknown in some parts of the Muslim world, or have only recently been introduced, as in Turkey; in such cases the *nisbah* or the *laqab* may develop into a family name.

Hinduism. Hindu names are extremely varied and numerous. They often include the names of deities, as in *Devadatta* ("given by God"). A Hindu name should reflect the bearer's place within the caste hierarchy. Sometimes a secret name is given to a boy and will remain as part of what survives of him after his death. A close relationship exists between name and personality, and so one's name must be guarded and respected. A traditional Hindu wife never calls out the name of her husband or utters it to others, nor will her husband use her name aloud. The more names a person has, the more secure he or she is from evil and harm. A change of name occurs when status is altered, as when a person becomes a ruler or is recognized as a great spiritual leader.

The ritual of name giving is an important family event, requiring new clothes, an auspicious spatial orientation for the ceremony, the bestowing of a consecrated gold object on the child, and anointing. The name is selected by a family priest or astrologer. Careful attention is given to the number of syllables in the selected name (an even number for boys, odd for girls), its source, and other similar matters.

China. There is an intimate relationship in Chinese tradition between a person's name and his essential being. After a person's death, if no spirit tablet is attached to the grave, there is no continuing inhabitant of the grave in the sense of a distinct personality. The spirit tablet, or "soul silk," is inscribed with the taboo name of the deceased and receives the prayers and veneration of his family. Although names are maintained for generations, the real name of the deceased is never uttered aloud; rather, another name or title is used. This applies also to living persons, who are commonly referred to by inferior names, which are often apotropaic, considered capable of warding off evil because of their unattractive associations. A demon is unlikely to take an interest in a child with a name meaning "stupid

dog" or "sweet potato." Inferior names are known in other cultures, too, such as those of Africa and of ancient Greece. Paired with the inferior name is a "fate name" *(ta ming)*, which bears an auspicious meaning (prosperity, happiness, success). The fate name is also never uttered. In traditional China, each name was thought to require an adequate portion of each of the five elements of the universe, which were symbolized by certain Chinese characters. The precise determination of a new name was made by consulting the horoscope.

The naming of persons, especially males, has been a complex matter in China. The "milk name," given a month after birth, remains with the person for life. It is used by relatives and others close to the person. Additional names include a "book name," bestowed upon starting school; a "great name," received at marriage; a name to be used by friends outside the family circle; a "studio name," for scholars; and a posthumous, or taboo, name, inscribed on the spirit tablet. Females receive fewer names than males, but they, too, have a milk name, a surname, a marriage name, and nicknames.

Chinese emperors had many names, some connected with their years of rule and any favorable factors connected with them. A ruler's personal name was taboo during his lifetime. At the domestic level, a child was forbidden to utter the name of his father, and wives avoided using their husbands' names, as in India.

Nonliterate traditions. The use of secret names has been widespread among otherwise very distinct and dispersed cultures. In Aboriginal Australia, name taboos were associated with secret rituals featuring the names of sacred and totemic beings. A person's secret name was never uttered beyond the ritual setting, when the *tjurunga* was being examined, and it was not known beyond the circle of initiated males of his local totem group. Even when the secret name was spoken, it was whispered, lest an enemy learn it and work evil magic by it. The secret name among Aboriginals represented the real self, linked with the past, present, and future in the timeless Dreaming.

Among the Inuit (Eskimo) of North America, the Netsilik distinguished between a personal soul and a name soul. The former was the source of health and energy but was vulnerable to attacks by evil spirits and wicked shamans. A name soul was an actual name, with life and power of its own, and it could protect the person who bore it. Therefore, people acquired as many names as possible, because they served as guardians. Males and females bore names without regard to sex, and the names often came from nonhuman categories such as animals, natural objects, and activities. Hunters liked to have additional names for greater strength, and women obtained them in order to have healthier children. When giving birth, a mother would often call out various names; if the birth was made easier after the mention of a particular name, then it was believed that a name soul had already entered the baby's body, and that would be its name.

In Native American cultures, names were thought to shape and influence the personalities and characters of individuals. Names might serve as an ideal or goal if they were auspicious or represented some virtue. Or names were given that reflected failings and character flaws. It was common for a person to earn a series of names during his lifetime. Among the Blackfeet, a man normally had at least three names: he received the first at birth and used it until he went to war for the first time. The second was a nickname given to him in boyhood by his playmates. It was often unflattering and would sometimes remain attached to its bearer for life. The third was the tribal name, bestowed after the young man had fought his first enemy. The tribal name was based on the outcome of that fateful experience and he bore it for life, whether it reflected honor or dishonor. If a person earned an unflattering name because of his first battle, he could possibly redeem himself through later exploits and then be awarded a meritorious name by the tribe. An individual might earn as many as a dozen names during his lifetime, all of which were his exclusive possessions, forbidden to others. It has also been traditional among Native Americans not to divulge their own names when asked. Someone else must utter the name, because it would be boastful as well as inauspicious to speak one's own name aloud. In many Native American cultures, names were drawn from the totemic and animal worlds, as well as from incidents in life. Names of deities were rarely used in connection with human names.

[*For further discussion of the names of deity, see* Attributes of God; God; *and* Supreme Beings. *Many entries on individual deities include discussion of the meanings of their names.*]

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FREDERICK MATHEWSON DENNY

NĀNAK (1469–1539), founder of Sikhism and the first of ten Sikh *gurūs*, or spiritual prophets. Born on 15 April 1469 in a small town west of Lahore, Punjab, Nānak spent his early life in business, family matters, and study. In 1499, he became a wandering missionary. After two decades of extensive tours and preaching a message of salvation based upon his evolving perspective on religion and salvation, Nānak resumed domestic life and founded a village, Kartarpur, in Sialkot district (now Pakistan). At Kartarpur, Nānak and a small band of followers led a life of meditation, religious discussion, and worldly activity. That experience produced the religious outlook and way of life that eventually became key elements in Sikhism. Nānak died on 22 September 1539.

Many details about Gurū Nānak's life and teaching remain cloudy because of inadequate or conflicting his-

torical documentation. His travels and major ideas are surveyed in a series of *janamsākhīs*, traditional biographies written in Panjabi in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The accuracy of the generally hagiographic accounts is questionable and should be evaluated in light of other contemporary sources and particularly the corpus of Nānak's hymns in the *Ādi Granth* (the Sikh holy scriptures, compiled by Gurū Arjun around 1604). The existing evidence nevertheless makes possible an appreciation of the basic tenets of Nānak and his contribution to the Sikh faith.

The content and style of Nānak's message grew out of the Hindu Sant tradition of North India. The Sants, a group of mystical poets that included Kabīr, believed in one supreme, eternal God, without form, whose love is manifest in creation and within the human heart or soul. The Sants stressed devotion to God, the *satguru* ("true teacher"), and rejected current notions of social distinctions, pollution, and ritualistic religion in general. Sant teachings often were in the form of hymns and stories, communicated in the vernacular so as to reach the common person.

Gurū Nānak drew upon basic Sant tenets in developing his own views about the nature of God, divine communication, and man's place in the universe. Although Nānak did not set out to create a new sect or religion, his synthesis of contemporary ideas and his unique ability to deal with complex issues in a clear, coherent fashion clearly marked his religious and social ideas from those of his day. Nānak did not attempt to create a systematic theology, but rather presented a fresh and beautifully articulated understanding of man and God that was to be perpetuated by acts of meditation, worship, and community service.

For Nānak, God is Ik Onkar, the monotheistic creator and sustainer of the universe, the source of wonder and awe, a God of grace who makes known his *hukam* (order or will), the divine order and purpose of all things. God reveals himself to man through the *sabad* (the "word") and calls for a response of devotion and sacrifice. God is manifested through his omnipresent name *(nām)* and the voice and the word of the *gurū*. In order to hear the *gurū*'s message, people must perceive, and according to Nānak, such perception only comes through God's grace. Hearing God is insufficient for salvation; it is only a first step, to be followed by sustained meditation and a transfer of the individual's commitment from worldly matters to the divine name and purpose.

From Nānak's perspective, man is attached to the world through pride, illusion, and materialism. The effects of earlier action, *karman*, determine present existence, but man has the opportunity to break attachments to the world and, with it, death and transmigration. Man tends to be tied to a pattern of following his own mind rather than that of the *gurū (manmukh)* because of self-reliance and egotism *(haumai)*. Cut off from God through reliance on the faulty senses and limited understanding, man therefore ignores the essence of the universe, the need for liberation, and the possibility of attaining it.

Salvation depends on God's grace, expressed through an inner voice, and the individual's response in the form of assuming *sādhana* (discipline) to bring life into accordance with divine order. This means rejecting reliance upon brahmans, idolatry, and external rituals as avenues for salvation. The true source of pilgrimage is not a river or another allegedly holy spot, but within one's own heart. Living as an ascetic does not assure salvation and should be replaced by living in the world and yet not being affected by illusion and false attachment. Human life affords the joy of sharing and doing good for others. Also important is devotion to God. Thoughts about God and submission to him in turn produce words and deeds consonant with his will. The five evils—lust, anger, greed, attachment, and pride—continue despite *nām simran* (disciplined meditation on God and the meaning of life), but they will diminish gradually, and bliss *(samādhi)* then can be attained.

In Kartarpur, Gurū Nānak preached and began the institutionalization of the Sikh faith. He insisted on daily devotional acts, both individual and communal. *Kīrtan*, or the singing of praises, became a common feature of communal life. Nānak also gave regular religious instruction. Those too attached to material things or ritual were admonished, and competing viewpoints were countered in public debate. In addition, daily labor became part of community activity, as did maintenance of normal family relations. *Seva*, or service, became accepted as an essential element of the emerging Sikh ethic. Finally, to ensure continuity of doctrine and practice, Nānak made arrangements for an orderly succession, naming a disciple, Lehna (renamed Angad, "my limb"), as the second leader of the community.

During his lifetime, Bābā Nānak, as he was called, emerged as the leader of both the spiritual and public life of those gathered at Kartarpur. Subsequently, his contributions in the formative years of Sikhism became highlighted by the prominence given to his hymns in the Sikh scriptures (the *Ādi Granth* or the *Gurū Granth Sahib*), and the focus on his life and teaching by the collators of the various *janamsākhīs*. Nānak did not ascribe to himself the title *gurū*—that was to come later as Sikhism spread and grew from its humble beginnings. Nānak's last act reinforced the primacy of his influence on future Sikh developments because from the Sikh perspective, the later succession of *gurūs* was seen not as

one person following another, but one person following himself. The bodies of the *gurūs* might be different, but they were inhabited by the same spirit, the original Nānak sent by the *satguru* to assist in the salvation of mankind. The *Gurū Granth Sahib* contains the utterances of five *gurūs*, but each has the same name—Nānak.

[*For further discussion of Nānak's role in the Sikh religion, see* Sikhism. *Nānak's hymns and their incorporation into Sikh scripture are discussed in* Ādi Granth.]

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N. Gerald Barrier

NANJŌ BUNYŪ (1849–1927), also transliterated Nanjio Bunyiu; Japanese Buddhist scholar who first introduced Sanskrit into Japan from Europe and laid the foundation for Western-style Sanskrit and Buddhist studies in Japan. Nanjō was born in Gifu Prefecture on 12 May 1849 and was educated in a school run by the Higashi-Honganji. In 1876 he was selected by the abbot Gennyo to study Sanskrit and Sanskrit Buddhist texts in England. F. Max Müller, whom he visited at Oxford in 1879, advised him to study Sanskrit there under A. A. Macdonell, one of Müller's students. Nanjō returned to Japan with an M.A. degree in 1884, and the following year he began to teach Sanskrit at the University of Tokyo.

During his stay in England Nanjō helped Müller to publish Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts that had been preserved in such Japanese temples as the Hōryūji and the Kōkiji. Their collaboration resulted in the publication of *Buddhist Texts from Japan* (Oxford, 1881), published under Müller's name, and the two other volumes published jointly by Müller and Nanjō: *Sukhâvatî-vyûha, Description of Sukhâvatî, the Land of Bliss* (Oxford, 1883) and *The Ancient Palm-Leaves Containing the Pragñâpâramitâ-hridaya-sûtra and the Ushnîsha-vigaya-dhâranî* (Oxford, 1884). These were the first contributions Japanese scholars had made to the international field of Sanskrit studies.

Nanjō's most significant contribution to Sanskrit and Buddhist studies was *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan* (Oxford, 1883), which has long served as the only guide to the Chinese version of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka for European and American scholars who do not read Asian languages. Nanjō also rendered valuable service to the study of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. His work here includes publication, with H. Kern, of the text of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* (Saint Petersburg, 1908–1912), the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (Kyoto, 1923), and the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra* (Kyoto, 1931), with Izumi Hokei.

In 1888 Nanjō received the D.Litt. degree from the University of Tokyo; he was appointed a member of the Imperial Academy of Japan in 1906. In 1914 he became president of Ōtani University and in 1923 professor emeritus at the same university. He devoted himself to research, education, and administrative duties and the propagation of Jōdo Shinshū until he passed away at the age of seventy-nine on 9 November 1927.

[*See also the biography of F. Max Müller.*]

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Mayeda Sengaku

NANNA is the Sumerian name of the Mesopotamian moon god; his Akkadian name is Sin. Depending on different theologies, he was considered either the son of An (Anu), the nominal head of the pantheon, or of Enlil, the pantheon's real head. In cuneiform, Nanna's name was commonly represented by his sacred number, thirty, corresponding to the number of days in the lunar month. The Sumerian myth *Enlil and Ninlil* explains how the moon god came to have his dwelling in the sky. Originally he was to be born in the netherworld, but

Enlil worked out an ingenious scheme whereby three other gods would be substituted in Nanna's place. Hence he was free to inhabit the sky.

Nanna's consort was Ningal ("great queen"), called Nikkal in Aramaic and Phoenician. Their children were the two other great astral deities, Inanna (Ishtar) and the sun god, Utu (Shamash). In southern Babylonia Nanna's principal cultic place of worship was Ur, while in northwestern Mesopotamia his center was Haran. It is curious that both these cities are associated with traditions about the patriarch Abraham before he entered Canaan (*Gn.* 11:27–32).

Although the moon cult rose with the political fortunes of Ur, particularly during its third dynasty, founded by Naram Sin ("beloved of Sin") circa 2000 BCE, Nanna maintained his popularity throughout the entire history of Mesopotamian civilization. The great diffusion of the moon religion in Mesopotamia is attested by the frequent occurrence of Nanna's name in theophoric personal names in all periods and by the numerous hymns and prayers praising him as a friendly and beloved god. Notwithstanding Nanna's popularity, the attempt of the last Neo-Babylonian king, Nabonidus, to place Nanna at the head of the pantheon in place of Marduk did not gain acceptance and indeed met with strong opposition.

Nanna's cosmic function intimately concerned mankind. The moon god lit up the night and measured time. Hence he was viewed as the controller of the night, the month, and the entire lunar calendar. Similarly, observations of the moon and, in particular, reports of the moon's appearances and disappearances constituted the basis for many omens that directly affected the land, the king, and the people. The enigmatic phenomenon of the constant rising and setting of the moon found its echo in the Akkadian epithet of the moon god as "a fruit that arises from itself and produces itself."

A cause for considerable anxiety was the occasional occurrence of an eclipse, which was considered a bad prognosis and spelled nothing but trouble. In the so-called eclipse myth, the phenomenon is explained as resulting from an attack on the moon by seven evil demons. The moon's capture by these demons causes its light to become cloudy. Prayers and sacrifices are therefore necessary to strengthen the moon and keep it free from future attack (i.e., from another eclipse).

In the hymns and prayers there is a tendency to ascribe to Nanna nearly all the qualities attributed to the other celestial deities. He is unfathomably wise, the organizer of life, guardian and leader of mankind, judge of heaven and earth, master of destinies, helper of the destitute and the lonely, and so forth. He is also associated with royalty. Nanna has the ability to confer royalty on kings by means of a divine halo, the same luminous halo that was observed to surround the moon. Furthermore, kings often expressed the wish that the great gods would confer on them a life renewable every month like the moon.

In the moon god's honor a special month of the year, Siwan (the summer solstice month), was dedicated to him. During the third dynasty of Ur, festivals called *eshesh* ("all-temple" or "general" festivals) were celebrated on the first, seventh, and fifteenth days of the month, corresponding to the phases of the moon.

The symbol of Nanna on cylinder seals and boundary stones was the crescent moon. Because the crescent moon appeared in Mesopotamia with its convexity at the bottom, the idea arose that the crescent was a boat carrying the moon god across the skies. This idea was furthered by the fact that the crescent shape was similar to the shape of the long, graceful boats which were—and are today—the chief means of transportation in the Mesopotamian (modern-day Iraqi) marshes (Jacobsen, 1976). Not surprisingly, then, another of Nanna's common epithets was "the shining boat of heaven."

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There is to date no full-length treatment of Nanna. Åke Sjöberg's *Der Mondgott Nanna-Suen in der sumerischen Überlieferung* (Stockholm, 1960) deals primarily with texts of Sumerian prayers to the moon god up till the end of the Old Babylonian period. The best surveys are still those by Édouard Dhorme, *Les religions de Babylonie et d'Assyrie* (Paris, 1945), pp. 54–60, 83–86; by D. O. Edzard, "Mondgott," in *Wörterbuch der Mythologie*, edited by Hans Wilhelm Haussig, vol. 1, *Götter und Mythen im Vorderen Orient* (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 101–103; and by Thorkild Jacobsen, *The Treasures of Darkness: A History of Mesopotamian Religion* (New Haven, 1976), pp. 121–127.

DAVID MARCUS

NAOMI. *See* Ruth and Naomi.

NARCOTICS. *See* Psychedelic Drugs.

NĀ-RO-PA (1016–1100), also known as Nāḍapāda and Nāroṭapa; one of the eighty-four Indian Vajrayāna *mahāsiddhas* ("completely perfected ones"). Nā-ro-pa was the chief disciple of the *siddha* Ti-lo-pa (988–1069) and the second human member of the Vajrayāna lineage. This lineage runs from the celestial Buddha Vajradhāra to Ti-lo-pa, thence to Nā-ro-pa and his Tibetan disciple Mar-pa (1012–1096), and then to the Tibetan Mi-la-ras-pa (1040–1123), with whom the Bka'-brgyud-pa, one of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism, properly

begins. Although the Bka'-brgyud-pa lays special claim to Nā-ro-pa, he is highly regarded throughout Tibet; in fact, most of the major Tibetan schools have over the course of time integrated his major transmissions and teachings into their own doctrinal formulations.

The earliest and one of the most important biographies of Nā-ro-pa (approximately twelfth century) outlines the major movements of his life. This biography is a typical example of Vajrayāna hagiography in its intermingling of the ordinary and tangible with the cosmic, magical, and supernatural. Within the genre, however, this biography of Nā-ro-pa emphasizes the spiritual development of its subject, concentrating on the earlier phases of his career where he is presented as an ordinary, struggling human being seeking spiritual awakening. Only toward the end of his biography do we find Nā-ro-pa emerging as a fully enlightened *siddha*, majestic in demeanor and surrounded by miracles.

According to his biography Nā-ro-pa was born in Bengal of the *kṣatriya*, or royal caste. At the age of eleven he went to Kashmir for three years of formal study of Buddhism, a study that continued with tutors upon his return to Bengal. His Buddhist education was cut short when, at the age of sixteen, he was forced by his father to marry a brahman girl named Ni-gu-ma. The marriage lasted eight years, and was then dissolved by mutual agreement so that Nā-ro-pa could further his religious training. Ni-gu-ma was also spiritually inclined, took up Buddhist training herself, and in due course became the founder of an important Vajrayāna and Tibetan lineage.

After the divorce, Nā-ro-pa returned to his Buddhist training, taking ordination and continuing his study for nine more years, becoming accomplished in the various major areas of Buddhist learning. In 1049 Nā-ro-pa went to the famous Buddhist monastic university of Nālandā in northeast India and successfully participated in a religio-philosophical debate. As a result, he was elected to the powerful and prestigious position of abbot or gate-keeper, thus fulfilling the ideals of conventional monastic Buddhism and receiving his recognition within that world.

Eight years later a shift occurred in Nā-ro-pa's spiritual development, from satisfaction with a predominantly intellectual understanding of Buddhism to the search for greater depth of comprehension, and from the monastic life of conventional Buddhism to the nonmonastic form of the Tantric yogin. Such a shift is described in the lives of several other of the eighty-four *siddha*s and we may suppose that it was not entirely uncommon in those days. Nā-ro-pa's biography tells us that one day while studying a Buddhist philosophical text he suddenly had a vision of an ugly old hag. She made it clear to him that while he understood the text he was reading on a conceptual level, he had no inner understanding of it at all. She further revealed that if he wanted to attain genuine understanding, Nā-ro-pa should seek one Ti-lo-pa, who alone could help him.

Nā-ro-pa was devastated by the vision, and was unable to discount the truth it revealed. His response to the hag's revelation was to give up his position at Nālandā and to abandon the monastic life, wandering forth in search of the *siddha* Ti-lo-pa. He experienced eleven further visions, which he dismissed as worthless because they contradicted his preconceptions about spirituality, but which in retrospect were revealed to him to have been manifestations of Ti-lo-pa himself. In despair over his failure to find his teacher, Nā-ro-pa came to the brink of suicide; at just this moment, he met Ti-lo-pa.

As depicted in Nā-ro-pa's biography, Ti-lo-pa is a strange, enigmatic figure, anonymous in his context and unnoticed by others, but recognized by Nā-ro-pa as a powerful and uncompromising teacher and, most important, as his authentic *guru*. However, as Guenther rightly comments, Ti-lo-pa "is more than the individual who happened to become Nāropa's Guru. In a certain sense, Tilopa is Nāropa's total self which summons him to find himself" (Guenther, 1963, p. iv). Nā-ro-pa committed himself unreservedly to serve Ti-lo-pa, and attended him for twelve years, until the latter's death in 1069. During this time Nā-ro-pa underwent a rigorous training marked by much hardship and ordeal, and was put through twelve major trials by his teacher. These trials, depicted as external, literal events, no doubt epitomize moments in Nā-ro-pa's inner spiritual journey: at Ti-lo-pa's behest, he hurls himself from the top of a three-story temple roof; he leaps into a blazing fire; he is beaten senseless on several occasions by people he deliberately provokes at his master's command; he offers his body to leeches; and so on. Finally, he cuts off his own head and limbs and offers them as a fit offering to his master. At each offering Ti-lo-pa restores his disciple and instructs him in the next stage of his Tantric training. [*See the biography of Ti-lo-pa.*]

By the time of Ti-lo-pa's death, Nā-ro-pa had purified his being and achieved realization, possessing a rich array of Tantric teachings to pass to his disciples. These teachings included the "six *yoga*s of Nā-ro-pa" *(Nā-ro chos drug)*, practices particularly associated with the Bka'-brgyud-pa lineage but which subsequently became known and practiced among the other Tibetan schools. Nā-ro-pa had seven chief disciples among the many he trained, including Maitri-pa, Ḍombhi-pa, and Mar-pa. His chief legacy is his consolidation of the teachings received from Ti-lo-pa, which he then passed on to his

chief disciple, the Tibetan Mar-pa, thus enabling their flowering within Tibet in the Bka'-brgyud lineage and other Tibetan traditions. [*See the biography of Mar-pa.*] Nineteen works in the Tibetan Bstan-'gyur (Tanjur) are attributed to Nā-ro-pa, including several Tantric *sādhanas* (liturgical meditations) on the Vajrayāna deities Vajrayoginī, Hevajra, and others particularly important to the Bka'-brgyud tradition, two collections of Tantric realization songs *(vajragīti)*, and a number of commentaries on Vajrayāna topics.

[*See also* Buddhism, *article on* Buddhism in Tibet; Buddhism, Schools of, *article on* Tibetan Buddhism; *and* Mahāsiddhas.]

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REGINALD RAY

NĀṢIR-I KHUSRAW (AH 394–465 to 470, 1004–1072 to 1077 CE), properly Abū Mu'īn ibn Khusraw; distinguished Persian philosopher and poet as well as the most celebrated of Ismā'īlī thinkers.

Life. Born in the town of Qubādiyān near Balkh, Nāṣir-i Khusraw hailed from a small family that was either Sunnī or Twelver Shī'ī but definitely not Ismā'īlī. Although he came to be considered a descendant of 'Alī and was often given the title of *'Alawī*, many modern scholars doubt this genealogy.

As a young man he was attracted to the study of various sciences and philosophy as well as that of other religions, which remained a major concern for him throughout his life. He entered government service early on and rose to high positions that allowed him to enjoy the life at court, but at the age of forty-two, his life was transformed by a dream admonishing him, ordering him to awake from the life of forgetfulness and journey to Mecca. Following the directives of the dream, he set out immediately for Mecca in December 1045. The transforming experience of this journey was to come, however, in Egypt, where he formally embraced Ismā'īlī Shiism. Remaining in Cairo for six years, he received the title of *ḥujjat* ("proof") before leaving as Ismā'īlī "missionary" *(dā'ī)* to Khorasan.

In Khorasan he encountered fierce opposition, to the extent that his house was attacked, and he was forced to take refuge in the far-off valley of Yumgān, in the mountains of the Hindu Kush, under the protection of the emir of Badakhshān. In this bleak and isolated valley Nāṣir-i Khusraw was to spend the rest of his life. To this day his tomb is a center of pilgrimage for Sunnī Muslims, who view him as a Ṣūfī pir, and for the Ismā'īlīyah of the area, who venerate him as an Ismā'īlī sage.

Thought and Work. Nāṣir-i Khusraw's philosophy represents the most complete and mature synthesis of early Ismā'īlī and Fatimid philosophy and must be considered the final development of the philosophical school that had already produced Abū Ḥatim Rāzī (d. 933/4) and Ḥamīd al-Dīn Kirmānī (d. after 1020). Nāṣir-i Khusraw was very much concerned with the issues these authors addressed, such as confirmation of the necessity of prophecy as against the views of Muḥammad Zakarīyā' al-Rāzī (Rhazes; d. 925) and emphasis upon esoteric hermeneutics *(ta'wīl)* as against both legalism and rationalism. Also, like these earlier figures, he had keen interest in religions other than Islam and followed earlier formulations of Ismā'īlī metaphysics based upon the supraontological principle and the effusion of the intellect, soul, and nature through the process of contemplation.

Many apocryphal works bearing Nāṣir-i Khusraw's name are known, but only the following eight authentic books remain extant:

1. *The Dīvān*—The celebrated metaphysical and moral work based, on the one hand, upon Ismā'īlī philosophical doctrines and, on the other, upon disdain of the world and its pleasures. It also contains some autobiographical material, including the "confessional ode" depicting the dream that transformed his life and beginning with the lines

   > O widely read, O globally travelled one,
   > (still earth-bound, still caught beneath the sky),
   > what value would the spheres yet hold for you
   > were you to catch a glimpse of hidden knowledge?
   > (trans. P. W. Wilson and G. R. Aavani)

2. *Rawshanā'ī-nāmah* (The Book of Light)—A poem of some 582 verses dealing with metaphysics and eschatology.
3. *Safar-nāmah* (Book of Travels)—One of the most famous travel books of the Persian language, which is an important source not only for Nāṣir-i Khusraw's life but also for the contemporary geography and history of Iran and the Arab East.

4. *Wajh-i dīn* (The Face of Religion)—A major work of Ismāʿīlī exegesis of both the doctrines and the practices of religion based upon the method of *taʾwīl*.
5. *Gushāyish va rahāyish* (Release and Deliverance)—Answers to thirty questions dealing at once with metaphysics, physics, and religious law.
6. *Khwān al-ikhwān* (The Feast of the Brethren)—A work written in fairly simple langauge dealing again with both doctrine and practice of religion and using many earlier works, including some of the author's own lost treatises.
7. *Zād al-musāfirīn* (Provision for Travelers)—An almost purely philosophical work, including extensive quotations from earlier philosophers such as Rhazes.
8. *Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn* (Harmonization of the Two Wisdoms)—Nāṣir-i Khusraw's last work, written in Badakhshān in 1070 and perhaps his greatest philosophical masterpiece. It seeks to harmonize the tenets of Greek philosophy, especially the thought of Plato and Aristotle, with the teachings of Islam as expounded in Ismāʿīlī philosophy. The whole book is a response to a well-known philosophical poem by the tenth-century Ismāʿīlī Abū al-Haytham Jurjānī.

An additional eight books, including *Bustān al-qulūb* (Garden of Hearts) and *Kitāb al-miftāḥ wa-al-miṣbāḥ* (Book of the Key and the Lamp), are mentioned by Nāṣir-i Khusraw himself but are seemingly lost.

Influence. Nāṣir-i Khusraw, although greatly neglected in general accounts of Islamic philosophy, must be considered a major philosophical figure in the history of Islamic thought. His influence in this domain is not confined to later Ismāʿīlī thought but extends to later Islamic philosophy in general as it developed in Persia and in certain forms of Sufism. One of the very few Persian poets to be honored with the title of *ḥakīm* ("sage"), he has retained his reputation for centuries. To this day his *dīvān* remains part and parcel of classical Persian poetry that is read and often memorized from Persia to the borders of China.

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SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR

NĀṬARĀJA. *See* Iconography, *article on* Hindu Iconography; *see also* Śiva.

NATHAN (tenth century BCE), or, in Hebrew, Natan; a prophet in the court of King David. Nathan is presented in the Hebrew scriptures as a prophet and intimate of David's court, appearing in three different scenes. In the first scene (*2 Sm.* 7:1–17), Nathan is consulted by David about the king's plans to build a temple for Yahveh. Nathan approves of the plan, which will be carried out by David's son, and also promises David by divine oracle the establishment of a perpetual dynasty. This scene constitutes the climax of the Deuteronomist's account of David's reign, in which Nathan acts as the spokesman for the historian's royal ideology.

In the second scene (*2 Sm.* 12:1–15), Nathan presents to David the divine reprimand for his adultery with Bathsheba and his murder of Uriah. By means of a parable about an unjust rich man who robbed a poor man of his only lamb he is able to get David to condemn himself. He also predicts future troubles for David's household.

In the third story *(1 Kgs.* 1*)*, Nathan is part of a court conspiracy in which he advises Bathsheba of a plan to persuade the senile David to make Solomon king instead of his older brother Adonijah. The plan is successful, and Nathan and Zadok anoint Solomon even before David's death. Here divine guidance plays no part in the events, only human ambition.

These last two scenes are part of a literary work known to modern scholars as the succession story, which some would date to the time of Solomon and thus have it reflect a historical memory of these events. But there are reasons to believe that the succession story is a late fiction and tells us nothing about the nature of prophecy in the time of David. Also suspect is the Chronicler's attribution to Nathan of historical chronicles that he suggests are his sources for the reigns of David and Solomon (*1 Chr.* 29:29, *2 Chr.* 9:29).

[*See also* David.]

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Treatments of the prophet Nathan are invariably included in the broader studies of King David. A more detailed review of the scholarly discussion on these texts may be found in my book *In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and the Origins of Biblical History* (New Haven, 1983), chap. 8.

JOHN VAN SETERS

NATIONALISM. *See* Civil Religion.

NATION OF ISLAM. *See* Afro-American Religions; *see also the biographies of Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X.*

NATS. The *nat*s of Burma make up a structured system of animistic spirits, predating the advent of Theravāda Buddhism but coexisting with it and with other systems of divination and prediction such as astronomy and alchemy. The *nat* cult is oriented to handling immediate and personal crises and avoiding evil, whereas Buddhism, the dominant higher religious ideology in Burma, is concerned chiefly with rebirth and eventually with salvation. Most students of Burmese religion agree that the term *nat* refers to any one of a host of animistic spirits, including human beings who have died violent deaths; former royal figures; spirits in fields, trees, and rivers; and regional, territorial overlords. The *nat*s that are propitiated in Burma are the *auk nat*s, the lower active spirits. The *deva*s of Hinduism are also called *nat*s, but they are not a ritual entity in Burma. In the time of King Anawratha (c. 1044 CE), an official list of *nat*s was compiled. Since then, the members of the list have changed, but the number, thirty-seven, remains constant. The thirty-seven official *nat*s share with the remaining *nat*s the capacity to cause harm and, sometimes, to offer protection. They need to be respected and propitiated if evil is to be warded off.

Anthropological studies of Burmese religion have discovered the surprising fact that the *nat*s of Burma form a structured system. This is in contrast to similar systems of animistic spirits in other Theravāda Buddhist countries, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Laos, and Cambodia. The Thai *phī* and the Sinhala *yakā* spirits, which play the same role as the *nat*s, do not form a structure as they do in the Burmese system. Here, the *nat*s are differentiated on four levels: the territorial *nat*s reign over a region; the village *nat*s guard a human settlement; the *mizaing* and *hpazaing* are *nat*s at the family level inherited from the mother and father, respectively; and finally there are *nat*s connected with special activities such as travel, domestic protection, and other frequent and mundane activities.

*Nat*s are often represented in carved figures or other symbolic modes such as the coconut and red cloth of the house-protecting *nat*, Min Maha Giri, found on a house pole in every Burmese home. There are also festivals held to honor certain *nat*s. The most important *nat* festival, of national prominence, is the celebration consecrated to the Taungbyon brothers, a pair of *nat*s. At some *nat* festivals, and at other occasions where many people are gathered, there is often dancing by *natgadaw*s. These *nat* wives are said to be possessed by their *nat* spouses, and in the trance of possession they offer prognostications for onlookers who feed them strong drink and tobacco. The *natgadaw*s do not take actual husbands, since the *nat*s are said to fill that particular role.

[*See also* Burmese Religion.]

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MANNING NASH

NATURALISM. In the broadest sense, *naturalism* can denote any philosophy in which "nature" or "the natural" functions as the most general explanatory or normative concept. What counts as naturalism in a particular context depends upon how the term *nature* and its cognates are used. Given the long and varied history of such terms in Western thought, it should not be surprising that any two doctrines named "naturalism" may have little more than etymological connections in common.

History and Definitions. Even in ancient Greece, "naturalism" designated several distinct positions. For the Cynics, naturalism consisted in severe condemnation of conventional values and artificial virtues. The virtuous man is one who lives naturally, but living naturally requires a rigorously ascetic practice in which all conventional and artificial goods are shunned. Stoic natural-

ism also sought detachment from the conventional and the artificial, and agreed that the virtuous man is one who lives naturally, but its conception of nature was articulated in an elaborate cosmology. Human nature, for the Stoics, is part of cosmic nature, and virtue is identified with conformity to natural law. Both Cynicism and Stoicism take us a great distance from Aristotle (384–322 BCE), who resisted any attempt to abstract the virtuous life from the *polis* but who nonetheless looked with favor upon something called "naturalism." Man, according to Aristotle, is by nature political, and this conviction leaves no room for the contrasts Cynics and Stoics need to define their positions. His naturalism, unlike theirs, was directed mainly against Eleatic skepticism about change and against the denial of "nature" and "natural motion" by Democritus (460–363? BCE) and others. Aristotle aimed to develop and defend natural science as knowledge of what exists "by nature." The nature of a thing, for him, is its power of acting in a particular determinate way, as defined by its end. The study of man is thus continuous with physics, for to study man is to study a specific kind of natural body by seeking out its nature. Man stands within nature, which is an intelligible, teleological order of motions. If Aristotle's philosophy is definitive of classical naturalism, then Democritus would surely qualify as an antinaturalist, despite his materialism, though both are routinely referred to as naturalists by modern writers. "Naturalism" later acquires specifically pejorative connotations in some Platonic, gnostic, and Christian writings, where the natural is contrasted with the spiritual in a way foreign to Aristotle and Democritus alike.

These ancient usages have had some impact on recent discussions of naturalism, mainly via Christianity, which transmitted an unstable amalgam of Hebraic, Stoic, Platonic, and Aristotelian conceptions of nature to the modern world. Nor can the rediscovery and dissemination of ancient writings since the late medieval period be entirely discounted as an influence. Still, modern debates over naturalism are best viewed as responses to the rise of modern science. The central point at issue is the scope of scientific inquiry as we now practice it, and the basic terms of debate are set by the development of the sciences since 1600, not by conceptions of nature inherited from antiquity. [*See* Science and Religion.]

"Naturalism," when used as the name of a general philosophical outlook in contemporary discussion, usually signifies the view that all objects, truths, and facts fall within the scope of scientific inquiry, that nothing is in principle insusceptible to scientific explanation. This view may usefully be termed unrestricted naturalism. It differs from restricted forms of naturalism in that its thesis is not confined to a specific domain of inquiry, such as ethics. An ethical naturalist holds that ethical truths, facts, or values fall within the scope of scientific inquiry. As a form of restricted naturalism, ethical naturalism can be defended without committing oneself to the unrestricted position. Furthermore, one can accept a form of unrestricted naturalism without committing oneself to, say, ethical naturalism, provided one is prepared to deny that there are ethical truths, facts, or values in the relevant sense. To adopt a naturalistic attitude toward something is to maintain that it falls within the scope of scientific inquiry. Unrestricted naturalists sometimes argue, however, that failure to bring a domain of putative truths or facts within the scope of scientific inquiry shows only that there are no truths or facts to be found there, thus calling that domain, rather than the scope of science, into question. Such arguments can bring unrestricted naturalists into conflict with those defending naturalistic approaches in a specific area, a fact responsible for much terminological confusion, not least of all in debates over religion.

Many different conceptions of scientific inquiry and its findings have flourished in the modern period, and the content of both restricted and unrestricted forms of naturalism has varied accordingly. Where materialism has reigned as a philosophy of science, "naturalism" and "materialism" have tended to be used interchangeably, and Democritus has made his way onto lists of early naturalists. Materialist versions of naturalism define themselves polemically over against supernaturalism and idealism, neither of which is compatible with an ontology designed to reduce everything that exists and happens to matter in motion. That is, both supernaturalism and idealism postulate entities and occurrences that fall outside the scope of scientific inquiry as materialists conceive it. But it is important to see that scientific inquiry can be conceived in other ways and associated with other sorts of ontological assumptions. [*See* Materialism.]

A group of twentieth-century American philosophers known as critical naturalists has consistently gone out of its way to deny materialist methodological and ontological principles. Critical naturalists often cite Aristotle and Barukh Spinoza (1632–1677) as the great representatives of the naturalistic tradition. Some, like Frederick Woodbridge (1867–1940), have made extensive use of ideas from such figures in their own constructive projects. Many have tried to make room, within a naturalistic outlook, for the human phenomena—such as mind, intention, and culture—formerly claimed as the special province of the idealists. Some have argued that, because naturalistic methods place

no *a priori* constraints on the types of hypotheses one may consider in science, acceptance of naturalism involves no bias against supernaturalist ontologies as such. Hence, in recent philosophy, as in the remainder of this article, "naturalism" is not tied to a particular ontology, though a naturalist in this sense remains bound to embrace whatever ontological scruples and commitments the course of scientific inquiry, rightly understood, entails.

Debates over Naturalism. The most common general charge leveled in the literature of the middle and late twentieth century against versions of unrestricted naturalism is that they cannot successfully account for themselves. Can naturalism account for itself without either falling into contradiction or arguing in a circle? Does naturalism in fact presuppose something that cannot be brought within the scope of scientific inquiry as naturalists construe it?

Taking these questions as their point of departure, some antinaturalists argue as follows. Naturalism is, in its unrestricted forms, a philosophical thesis about the validity and scope of scientific inquiry. How, then, is naturalism to be justified as a philosophical thesis? By appealing to scientific inquiry? That would be consistent with the naturalistic thesis, but it also seems circular. How can we establish the validity and limitless scope of scientific inquiry by appealing to scientific inquiry itself without begging the question? It seems that we cannot, and what this shows is that any attempt to vindicate the naturalist's thesis without arguing in a circle necessarily makes an appeal to standards of judgment that do not belong to scientific inquiry per se. Hence, naturalism cannot be justified; the only noncircular means one could use in trying to justify it obviously contradicts it.

This line of argument may seem compelling, but it hardly forces naturalists to abandon their position. Does not the same problem arise for any standards or principles anyone might propose as valid and ultimate? If so, then naturalists are at least no worse off than their critics. The real question, naturalists will argue, is how critics intend to stop the regress of standards short of infinity without themselves arguing in a circle.

The antinaturalist can stop the regress, it would seem, only by invoking a set of standards that are self-justified, intuitively known, or demonstrably indispensable to rational thought as such. What, then, prevents naturalists from claiming similar status for the principles implicit in scientific practice? Once this question has been raised, naturalist and critic seem on equal footing: each seems to require arguments capable of certifying some set of principles as fundamental in the relevant sense. Furthermore, the debate can easily degenerate into a merely verbal dispute at this point, for it is not necessarily clear why the antinaturalist's principles cannot be said to be part of scientific method—namely, the foundational part.

Increasingly, however, naturalists have expressed skepticism about such notions as self-justification and intuitive knowledge, whether defended by other naturalists or by their critics. So they have sought a more radical response to the problem, arguing that scientific inquiry is just the honorific title we give to the continuing process of rational criticism and revision of inherited theory and practice. This process, while perhaps best exemplified in the natural sciences, is not confined to them and is essentially continuous from field to field. It derives its justification not from foundational principles on which it rests but rather from the way it helps us adapt to our environment through progressive self-correction. Justification is a dialectical affair directed toward the pragmatic resolution of problems. In this view, we are saved from infinite regress in justificatory arguments not by foundational principles but by the settling of real doubts, and if the process as a whole is circular, it is not viciously so. Naturalistic philosophy is simply scientific inquiry gone self-conscious, reflecting on itself. The great pragmatist, John Dewey (1859–1952), offered something like this defense and reformulation of naturalism, recently restated eloquently by the leading living pragmatic naturalist, W. V. O. Quine.

When some critics have charged naturalism with an inability to account for itself, they have argued somewhat differently from the way considered thus far. Their point is that defending naturalism and practicing science are human activities involving thought and purposeful behavior in the pursuit of values, and that naturalism is unequipped to account for any such activity. This argument challenges naturalists to show that they can explain thought, intention, and value without violating naturalistic scruples. But then unrestricted naturalism, to be vindicated, must ultimately be prepared to either explain or explain away every domain of putative objects, truths, or facts in naturalistic terms. So the appraisal of unrestricted naturalism must sooner or later take up each member in a long series of analyses of restricted topics, one of which is religion.

Naturalism and Religion. What can naturalists make of traditional religious utterances, such as the theist's discourse about God? Assume for the moment that some of what the theist says is to be interpreted as asserting the existence of a supernatural being who created the universe. If the theist is right in making this assertion, presumably, the naturalist will be obliged to show that

God can be brought within the scope of scientific inquiry. The naturalist will, in other words, have to construct a "natural theology." Some naturalists, such as the eighteenth-century Deists, have adopted this strategy, but most have deemed it unsuccessful, concluding instead that no supernatural being exists. [*See* Deism.] If no such being exists, naturalists need not be held responsible to account for its existence scientifically. The task, in that event, would be to explain God's existence away while still making sense of religious behavior, including the theist's utterances about God, reports of religious experience, and so on.

If, however, the theist's utterances about God are not to be taken as true assertions about a supernatural being, how shall we take them? One alternative is to say that they are true but elliptical assertions about something else, something that does fall within the scope of science. Some followers of the French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1859–1917) argue, along these lines, that religious utterances are best interpreted as symbolic assertions about society, that the actual object of religious worship is the social group, and that religious behavior can be fully explained in a systematic science of society. [*See* Sociology.] Similar proposals have been developed by other theorists who take economics or psychology, not sociology, as the appropriate idiom of reduction.

A second alternative is to claim that the problematic religious utterances are not properly viewed as assertions in the strict sense at all. Instead, they are to be assimilated to some other class of speech-acts, such as expressions of emotions, wishes, or moral prescriptions. An example of this approach would be the emotivist theory of religious language popular among logical positivists. [*See* Logical Positivism *and* Analytic Philosophy.]

Third, a naturalist may take the apparent assertions in religious discourse at face value while ascribing false beliefs to those who utter them, a strategy much simpler than the others but also one that raises the additional question of how these allegedly false beliefs came to be accepted. Here again at least two options suggest themselves. It may be argued, on the one hand, that religious assertions—while not to be construed as nonpropositional expressions of emotions or desires—are nonetheless determined by essentially nonrational forces in the human personality, society, or history. On the other hand, one could argue that religious beliefs, though now known to be false, arose under circumstances that tended to make them seem reasonable to reasonable people.

Those committed to defending traditional religious claims as true are not the only people interested in opposing the naturalist's attempts to explain religion. The other major source of antinaturalism in the study of religion is the claim, often made by thinkers in the hermeneutical tradition of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), that the objective procedures of scientific inquiry are insufficient for use in the study of human beings, least of all their religious and artistic self-expression. Human beings are, of course, objects within nature, and the naturalist's methods can teach us a great deal about humankind as a natural species. But human beings are also spiritual, self-creating subjects. Understanding them involves determining the meaning that their behavior, verbal and nonverbal, has for them, and therefore calls for an interpretive approach distinct from the naturalist's explanatory methods. [*See* Hermeneutics.]

Naturalists have responded to the hermeneutical tradition's antinaturalism in several ways. The most common sort of response can be seen in various attempts to reduce much of what hermeneutical theorists want to say about meaning and understanding to the languages of natural science. Critical and pragmatic naturalists move in another direction, accusing Dilthey and his followers of uncritically taking over unduly narrow conceptions of scientific inquiry from the materialists and positivists they otherwise oppose. Broaden the conception of scientific inquiry enough, and the line hermeneutical theorists have drawn between the natural sciences and humanistic studies *(Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften)* will disappear—as will the rationale for viewing hermeneutical philosophy and naturalism as exclusive alternatives.

Finally, it should be noted that some naturalists have been as interested in reconstructing religion as they have been in criticizing or explaining it. Dissatisfied with traditional religion on naturalistic grounds, they have attempted to devise religious systems capable of fulfilling the essential personal or social functions they assign to religion without departing from naturalism as a creed. The most ambitious such attempt was that of Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the French positivist, who took the rituals of Roman Catholicism as models for his own conception of the sacraments and identified humanity as the proper object of religious devotion and service. [*See* Positivism.] Dewey's proposals, in contrast, were much less ambitious and involved no attempt to found an organized religion. According to Dewey, any ultimate end that serves to unify one's life and actions takes on a religious quality. Dewey's aim was to portray this-worldly concern with "the problems of men" as the optimal religious ideal. There have been other recent attempts to reconstruct religion in naturalistic terms, but none has won much of a following.

[*See also* Nature, *article on* Religious and Philosophical Speculations; Supernatural, The; *and the biographies of philosophers mentioned herein.*]

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NATURAL LAW. Most broadly construed, natural law is a canon of action derived from the essential character of reality. Throughout the development of Western cultures from ancient times to the present, the idea of natural law has been repeatedly invoked as a standard or goal to which individuals and institutions, to be consistent with their own true being, ought to conform.

Sometimes, especially since the rise of modern science, the idea of natural law has also been used to designate uniformities of interaction discoverable in the physical world and human behavior through scientific methods. How strictly scientifically ascertained laws of nature are descriptive of the actual universe is a question currently under debate in the philosophy of science, but for some time in the modern period a radical distinction was drawn between natural law in descriptive and prescriptive senses of the term.

Predominantly, however, throughout the history of the West, the idea of natural law has signified an evaluative judgment about the intentions, actions, and institutional relations of human beings. The idea of natural law is rooted in an impulse for justice, a justice that is universal and immutable, nonarbitrary and eminently fair, a justice that is not an artifice of human construction but that proceeds from the nature of the universe, perhaps from the being of God, perhaps from the inborn qualities of humanity.

Interpretations of the idea of natural law vary considerably, depending partly on practical concerns (for often the idea of natural law arises in response to some perceived need in historical circumstances) and partly on theoretical considerations. Both key terms in the idea of natural law—*law* and *nature*—are subject to theoretical controversy.

In general, a law is a canon of action, but in the tradition of natural law it may be taken several ways. A law may be an ideal to be realized so far as possible given limitations of one's context (e.g., no person should exercise dominion over any other person since, in some ultimate sense, all persons are free and equal). Alternatively, a law may be a broadly formulated standard requiring additional specification for concrete guidance but constituting a point of appeal in the explanation of such specification (e.g., it is impermissible to injure other persons). Finally, a law may be a rule held to be binding exactly as stated (e.g., artificial methods of birth control are prohibited as inconsistent with the natural function of sexual organs).

The term *nature* in the natural law tradition is of ontological and epistemological significance. Ontologically, it identifies the character of reality, the nature of things, as the ground or source of canons of action. The reality, however, may be the mind of God (theology) or the structure of the world (cosmology); it may be the nature of humanity (philosophical anthropology), the essential purpose of a particular association (normative sociology or political theory), or the intrinsic function of a specific bodily organ (biology).

Epistemologically, the term *nature* signifies that the canons of action may be known independently of any special revelation or sophisticated techniques of discovery that are the province solely of an exclusive class of persons. In principle, at least, every normal person is capable of knowing what the basic canons of natural law are. One's knowledge of natural law may be incomplete and in need of refinement. One may, furthermore, be in error about the substance of natural law. But procedures for refinement and correction are not extraordinary. Theories of natural law, however, diverge on the question of precisely how the canons of action are known or discoverable. They may be known by inborn instinct, by intuition into the essence of things, by rational insight into the natural inclinations of one's

being, or by generalizations drawn from broad historical experience.

The idea of natural law has been particularly prominent in theological and philosophical reflections in three allied fields of practical thought: ethics, jurisprudence, and political theory. In ethics, natural law stands against forms of relativism and subjectivism that deny the possibility of any universal or objectively grounded principles of moral action. In jurisprudence, natural law is joined in controversy against kinds of legal positivism that deny the possibility of a higher law to which statutes and judicial decisions ought to conform. In political theory, natural law is contrasted with types of voluntarism and absolutism according to which politics is but a struggle for power.

In all three fields, the canons of natural law are presented as a ground for assessing social mores, legal systems, and political institutions and as a means for determining the content and limits of moral, legal, and political obligation. During the modern period, from the democratic and bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the present, the natural law tradition has been manifest in a persistent drive to incorporate principles of human rights in social, legal, and political practice.

For analytic purposes, the natural law tradition is sometimes divided into three historical periods: ancient (Greek philosophy and Roman law), medieval (early Christian thought, canon and civil law, Scholastic theology), and modern (international law and natural rights theory). But the actual tradition is more complicated and fraught with divisions and variations than that typology allows.

Ancient Times. Although scholars are in disagreement over the precise moment the idea of natural law first emerged, they locate its origins generally in the ancient world and find its earliest classical formulation in *The Republic* by the Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero (106 – 43 BCE):

> True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. . . . It is wrong to alter this law or to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it completely. Neither senate nor people can free us from its obligation, and we need no one outside ourselves to expound or interpret it. It does not ordain different laws for Rome and Athens, for now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one common teacher and ruler over us, God, author of this law, interpreter, and enforcer.

Cicero's political philosophy was responsive to the chaos of the final years of the Roman republic, but he was influenced, directly and indirectly, by trends of thought reaching back at least to the fifth century BCE in Greece.

During that period, the Periclean age (495–429 BCE), Athens was at the height of her power but was experiencing rapid social change, which provoked the Sophists, a school of rhetoricians and philosophers, to debate the question of the ultimate source of rules of justice. Some (e.g., Protagoras) claimed that it is convention or law (*nomos*), whatever a people determines; others argued that it is nature (*phusis*). Among the latter, some (e.g., Callicles) insisted that nature favors the strong over the weak, whereas others (e.g., Hippias and Antiphon), denouncing slavery and Greek ethnocentrism, asserted that, by nature, all persons are and should be treated as equal. Given that debate, expressed also in literary form (Sophocles' *Antigone*) and historical writing (Thucydides' interpretation of the Peloponnesian wars), some interpreters suggest that the idea of natural law (*nomos phuseōs*) in ancient Greek is a confusion in terms, although the idea of natural justice is not.

In the works of two preeminent philosophers of the time, Plato (c. 427–347 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE), the idea of natural justice occupies an honored place in the understanding of ethics and politics. Plato, in the *Republic*, argues that the natural function of a thing determines what it should become, that the fulfillment of that function is what is intended by justice, and that the issue of justice is harmony both in the soul and in the city. There is, by implication, an intelligible order in the world in conformity with which persons and communities may find peace and happiness.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of political justice, natural (justice with the same validity everywhere) and conventional (justice that must be settled by human agreement), and in his *Rhetoric* he suggests that lawyers may appeal, where it suits their case, beyond laws of the community to universal laws of nature. More significantly, in his *Politics*, Aristotle presents a principle whose influence throughout the history of natural law theory cannot be gainsaid: that purposes or ends are constitutive of the nature of things. Thus the essential nature of a thing—a person or an association—is its inherent purpose, which, in turn, is its good. Conditions may constrain the perfect realization of that good, but persons and associations are to do what they can toward its fulfillment.

Despite important differences between the two philosophers (Plato, for instance, argues for the equality of men and women, whereas Aristotle holds that women are naturally inferior), both were critical of Athenian democracy as falling short of the principles of natural justice.

Stoicism, a philosophy initiated in Athens by Zeno of Citium (c. 336–264 BCE), has traditionally been cited as a primary source of the idea of natural law, a source influential in the development of Roman jurisprudence and Christian social ethics. To the Stoics, the entire cosmos is composed of a single substance, called variously reason, God, *logos*, world soul. All beings in nature more or less fully represent that substance. Humans, unique as rational beings, determine how fully they will represent the character of this substance, although natural law mandates an unqualified conformity. The purpose of life for them is to establish a *cosmopolis*, a city of the world in which all persons are equal. The seemingly revolutionary implications of this doctrine were blunted, however, by the Stoics' almost total concentration on *cosmopolis* as a quality of the inner life.

Cicero synthesized these several sources into a legal and political philosophy that, though applied by Cicero amid the tumult of Roman politics in a moderately conservative way, has been quoted extensively throughout the centuries in support of varying causes. To Cicero, political authority derives from the people, and political rulers are subordinate to the republic's laws, but the republic in all its parts is subject to the higher law of justice, the law of God.

Philo Judaeus (d. 45–50 CE), a leader for the Alexandrian Jews in their delicate negotiations with the Roman emperor Caligula, produced a theory of natural law that creatively joined traditions of Greek philosophy (its doctrine of nature) and Hebrew religion (its doctrine of law). Natural law is, in effect, the Torah, manifest in unwritten form in the *logos* (the structure of nature), present in written form in the law of Moses, and impressed in the minds of human beings, who are created in the image of God. Thus did Philo subordinate the obligation of the Jews to Rome to a higher authority, the *logos* of the *megalopolis*, the great city of God.

Although strictly speaking, the idea of natural law as such does not appear in Hebrew or Christian scriptures, Philo is not alone in appropriating biblical materials into the natural law tradition. Some scholars find an equivalent theory in the rabbinic teaching that fundamental laws were conveyed to Adam in the act of creation and that an ancient covenant was made with Noah (and, through Noah, with all humanity) prohibiting idolatry, murder, adultery, and the consumption of flesh with blood.

Christian theologians, from the time of the early church fathers, adopted select passages of the Bible as demonstrating the reality and meaning of natural law. The Decalogue, particularly the group of commandments requiring respect for fathers and mothers and prohibiting murder, theft, adultery, false testimony, and the craving of another's goods, is presented as a set of obligations necessary for the viability of society. The Golden Rule and the twofold love commandment (*Mt.* 22:37–39) are interpreted as summations of the law. The prologue to the *Gospel of John* ("In the beginning was the *logos*, and the *logos* was with God, and the *logos* was God") is allied with the Stoic doctrine of the world soul. But the *locus classicus* in Christian scriptures for the natural law tradition is the opening section of Paul's *Letter to the Romans*, particularly the statement "When the Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts."

What Paul intended by that statement is debatable; not debatable, however, is the appropriation of the idea of natural law in the theology of the church fathers during the initial centuries of the Christian era. By appealing to natural law, the church fathers were able to demonstrate a convergence between the thought of the classical tradition and that of Christianity, to criticize laws of the Roman empire as contrary to the laws of God, and to construct a social ethic and eventually a theory of civilization. A linchpin in the convergence of classical and Christian thought was the doctrine of Christ as the preexisting *logos* or structure of the world and of humankind as the "seed of the *logos*," a doctrine that has persisted since the time of Justin Martyr (c. 100–163/5) throughout the Eastern Orthodox tradition. On the basis of this doctrine, all people everywhere are assumed to know the laws of Christ, that is, what is universally just.

As Seneca (c. 4 BCE–65 CE), a Roman Stoic, distinguished between a golden age of freedom and equality and the present miserable condition of human life, so Christian theologians during this period distinguished the story of the garden of Eden from the history of humankind since the Fall. The distinction resulted in a two-tiered understanding of nature and natural law. To John Chrysostom (c. 347–407) and other church fathers, God intended, in creation, that no person should dominate over any other. Because of sin, however, slavery, private property, male dominance, and government came into being. To Augustine (354–430), on the other hand, such institutions are not just a result of sin; they constitute a remedy, for they sustain at least a degree of peace in the world. They are unlawful under conditions of perfection, but altogether appropriate relative to the sinful nature of humankind. Hence a distinction is drawn by interpreters between an absolute or primary natural law and a relative or secondary natural law. Nevertheless, the distinction did not deter church fa-

thers from a vigorous critique of governmental overbearing, military violence, and the abuses of the wealthy class.

From the time of Cicero, the idea of natural law was increasingly incorporated into Roman jurisprudence, as witnessed in the *Corpus juris civilis* (534 CE), the compilation of laws and legal thought ordered by the Roman emperor Justinian. While the *Corpus* assembles significantly divergent perspectives, it tends to promote a tripartite division of laws: *jus civile*, principles established by and for a particular community; *jus gentium*, principles common among several or all nations; and *jus naturale*, principles that, in cases of conflict or uncertainty, seem "always equitable and good." The latter two categories, sometimes identified with each other, served the cause of Roman expansionism. They were not so much a ground for critical judgment of the *jus civile* as they were a practical means whereby jurists could resolve conflicts as more and more territories were brought under the central administration of the empire. But they also promoted the idea of a universal rule of law as a procedure for realizing world peace.

Medieval Times. In subsequent centuries, a magisterial conception of higher law developed out of which political theorists from Isidore of Seville (c. 560–636) to John of Salisbury (c. 1120–1180) identified the idea of natural law as a measure for distinguishing kings from tyrants and as a basis for justifying tyrannicide, since rulers derelict of their duty are not true rulers but usurpers and a threat to the community. Particularly during the high Middle Ages, with the gradual emergence of an urban and commercial civilization, the conception of a perfectly lawful universe became prominent through significant evolutions in parallel legal systems: civil law (with the renewed study of Roman law initiated in the eleventh century) and canon law (with the publication about 1149 of Gratian's *Decretum*, a fundamental compilation of church law). The idea of natural law as a body of moral principles binding all peoples everywhere is central in both legal systems. But the canonists, identifying natural law with divine law, argue that the church is independent of the state and, in some spheres of conduct, has hegemony over the state. Thus, in various forms, the medieval idea of natural law promoted the correlative principles of rule of law and limited government, later called constitutionalism.

The grand theological synthesis of Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), stimulated partially by a rediscovery of works of Aristotle, contains a treatise on law that subsequently became, though not without variation, standard Roman Catholic teaching, and remained so well into the twentieth century. Thomas defines law generally as a reasonable rule directed toward the common good designed by the whole community, or by those in authority, and promulgated. Eternal law, the governance of the entire universe by divine reason, is the basis for interaction among all beings in the world. But humans, by sharing in eternal reason, constitute a special kind of being; hence Thomas calls the participation of eternal law in them natural law.

Granting the primary precept of natural law (i.e., to do good and to avoid evil), Thomas locates the good for humans in their natural inclinations toward self-preservation, the propagation and education of the species, and especially knowledge of the truth and engagement in social and political life. Regarding the last point, contrary to the early church fathers but in keeping with Aristotle, Thomas declares that humans are naturally social and political beings.

Natural law, however, must be completed through human law, that is, through customs and mores, statutes and judicial decisions, to give it concreteness and efficacy and to apply it to changing historical circumstances. Thomas thus provides for both the universality of fundamental law and the relativity of particular legal and moral systems. But, as the expression of divine reason and as a directive necessary for human fulfillment, natural law is both the purpose and the limit of human law, the ground of its legitimacy and the measure of its propriety.

Whereas to Thomas law is a rule of reason, to William of Ockham (1280?–1349?), an English Franciscan, in a divergence of thought characteristic of the fourteenth century, law is a command of will. William distinguishes three senses of natural law. The first two reiterate old traditions within a new theological setting, defining natural law as principles of natural reason that are universally binding (e.g., commands against adultery and deception) and principles of natural equity that are appropriate only in the original state of nature (e.g., communal ownership of property and equal liberty for all people). William's third sense of natural law is novel: here it means principles emerging out of, and changeable by, the customs and agreements of peoples, supposing conditions of life to be whatever they are at any given time (e.g., rules permitting self-defense and commanding the return of borrowed goods). In this sense, natural law, sanctioned by divine will, legitimates the principle of active consent in political and ecclesiastical governance and leads William to support the conciliar movement in the church and to claim that the papacy is subject to election and, where needed, deposition by the people.

Rejecting Thomas Aquinas's distinction between the natural and the supernatural and his seeming optimism about human life, the major sixteenth-century Protes-

tant reformers nonetheless incorporate a form of natural law in their theologies, although scholars disagree over the precise role of the idea. Both Martin Luther (1483–1546) and John Calvin (1509–1564) hold that the sinfulness of humankind radically corrupts everyone's powers of understanding and acting and that only the grace of God, received in faith, can remedy that effect. Both also hold that natural law, commanded by God and expressed in the Decalogue, can be apprehended, but only dimly and distortedly, by conscience.

To Luther, the faithless live in a temporal kingdom in which law in its many forms serves two functions: to restrain the wicked and to force the confession that justice without God's grace is impossible. The faithful, on the other hand, do by love more than the law requires among their own, but they also cooperate with authorities outside the community of faith, conduct that, unwittingly, served the emerging cause of nationalism. To Calvin, law serves a third function: to guide the faithful as, growing in sanctity, they construct a holy community through disciplined conduct in their callings and through government, which is subject to the letter and spirit of natural law.

The Reformation also induced a diffuse but widespread sectarian movement, the Anabaptists, who, identifying the idea of natural law with the love ethic of the Sermon on the Mount, formed small egalitarian communities and refused cooperation with established political and legal authorities. Some (e.g., Thomas Münzer) condoned violence to effect social change. Most others (e.g., Menno Simons and the Mennonites) were principled pacifists. During the English revolution of the mid-seventeenth century, subsequent groups of Baptists, largely from lower socioeconomic classes, invoked the idea of natural law to support principles of radical parliamentary democracy (John Lilburne and the Levelers) and economic communism (Gerrard Winstanley and the Diggers).

Opposing sides in the turbulent religious wars occasioned by the Reformation and by the emerging nation-state system in Europe called on the idea of natural law to support their respective causes. Jean Bodin and some theorists of the divine right of kings insisted that sovereigns were constrained by canons of natural law but proscribed, as incompatible with sovereignty, all institutional means of assuring that constraint. Monarchomachs, French Huguenot and Jesuit supporters of the people's right to resist tyrants, on the other hand, found in natural law grounds for religious freedom and constitutional limits on political authority.

During the seventeenth century, a time of tensions in relations among nations, both the Spanish school of jurisprudence, represented by Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), and the Protestant school of natural law, represented by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), appropriated the idea of natural law as a foundation for international law. To Suárez, a Catholic Thomist, a universal human society exists by nature prior to the formation of particular nations and empires. The power to create particular political entities derives from God, is a requisite of human life, but is mediated through the human community, which means that the consent of the people is required for the formation of political institutions. That consent, directed by the natural precept of mutual love, is binding. Thus international law (designated *jus gentium* by Suárez), though it assumes various forms at various times according to the customs and agreements of nations, is a means of giving expression to the universal human society and of honoring the precept of mutuality.

Modern Times. Grotius, styled in his own time as founder of modern natural law theory, agreed with Suárez that all humans participate by nature in a universal society and that particular nations and their relations are artificial constructs, formed by contract, but subject to principles of natural law—most basically, that contracts must be respected. Pufendorf's variation, however, conjoining the ideas of Grotius with those of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), posits conflicting inclinations in human nature toward sociability and toward love of self, which constitute the basis for persistent struggles among individuals and nations.

Richard Hooker (1554–1600), in his defense of Anglicanism against the Puritans, is sometimes considered a transitional figure between medieval and modern versions of natural law, but his countrymen Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (1632–1704) are prototypical exponents of the latter. Interpretations of their political theories diverge widely, but at the foundation of each is a doctrine of natural rights whose individualistic character is distinctively modern.

To Hobbes, the right of nature is the liberty of each person to do whatever is needed to preserve oneself. But to avoid a potential war of all against all, persons are directed by maxims of natural law to the creation of a sovereign through whom peace and self-preservation are possible. To Locke, all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and property. For the convenience of securing these rights, persons contract to form a parliamentary system governed by a majority, but always held in check by the people's right to revolution. To neither Hobbes nor Locke is natural law an expression of a cosmic moral order; it is a protection of individual human rights, a doctrine comfortably concomitant with the emergence of modern science and philosophy and of democratic capitalism.

Throughout the eighteenth century, even in cases where the language of natural law was subordinate, the idea of natural human rights, or at least of the legitimate liberty of the individual, was prominent: in the constitutionalist theories of Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694–1748), in the effort by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) to reconcile the autonomy of the individual with the coercive power of civil society, in the conservative commentaries on the laws of England by William Blackstone (1723–1780), in the moral and legal philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and in the pamphlets and books written by Thomas Paine (1737–1809) to rouse support for the French and American revolutions.

During the last half of the eighteenth century, through pamphlets and sermons, letters and speeches, the revolutionary impulse of the American colonies was persistently encouraged by principles of natural law and human rights, drawn with equal force from the Calvinist religious tradition and Enlightenment philosophies. Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Otis, Alexander Hamilton, and John Adams relied on thoughts from Locke, Burlamaqui, Grotius, Pufendorf, Montesquieu, Blackstone, and even Cicero to support the cause of political separation from England and, not so incidentally, the commercial interests of the propertied classes. The climactic document, the Declaration of Independence (1776), appealed to "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," declaring as self-evident the truths that all persons are created equal and endowed by their creator with unalienable rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In 1789 a similar declaration was adopted by the French National Assembly.

The idea of natural law was subject to severe criticism throughout the nineteenth century under the influence of empiricism in ethics (David Hume), utilitarianism in political theory (Jeremy Bentham), historicism in jurisprudence (Friedrich Karl von Savigny), and positivism (Auguste Comte) and historical materialism (Karl Marx) in social thought. However, during midcentury the idea was invoked in the movement for women's rights and in the controversy over slavery. William Lloyd Garrison, Francis Wayland, and William Ellery Channing were among those who argued that slavery, even if economically profitable, was contrary to natural rights and the laws of God. A few antiabolitionists (e.g., George Fitzhugh) argued the reverse, that God and nature intended the blacks for slavery.

Furthermore, in the development of American constitutional law in the early nineteenth century, the idea of natural law, implying limits to the legislative process, was background for the emergence of the principle of judicial review under Chief Justice John Marshall. From the end of the Civil War into the first third of the twentieth century, the doctrine of implied limits was persistently invoked to protect property rights and to blunt efforts to control the increasing economic powers of large corporations. Justice Thomas M. Cooley, in an influential text on constitutional limitations (1868), argued that the safeguard of "vested rights" of citizens, particularly rights of property, was an implication of the due process of law clause in the Fifth Amendment and newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Justice Stephen Field, eventually joined by a majority of the Supreme Court, employed Cooley's interpretation to overturn legislation regulating industry and advancing the interests of labor. The trend was reversed in 1937 when a reconstituted Supreme Court determined to uphold economic legislation. However, in time, the Court in effect applied a doctrine of implied limits to another sphere of legislative action by considering specific civil rights of individuals and minorities, even if not explicitly stated in the Constitution, as fundamental or preferred freedoms in a democratic society.

Although criticisms of the idea of natural law abound in twentieth-century philosophical and theological literature, the idea persists in traditional and revised forms. The charge of crimes against humanity introduced at the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals (1945–1946) assumed the pertinence of natural law to the judicial process. Many natural law theorists claim that the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is an expression of their tradition. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famed "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" (1963), a classic document in the black civil rights movement, invokes a religiously grounded idea of natural law in justification of civil disobedience. Papal encyclicals such as John XXIII's *Pacem in terris* (1963), which mandated acknowledgment of the inherent rights of all peoples, and Paul VI's controversial *Humanae vitae* (1968), which prohibited artificial methods of birth control, often invoke the idea of natural law in their arguments.

In political theory, Neo-Thomists (e.g., Jacques Maritain, John Courtney Murray, Yves Simon) have used natural law to criticize totalitarian movements and bourgeois liberalism and to construct a foundation for a democratic alternative. In jurisprudence, the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust provoked the conversion of Gustav Radbruch to propose the necessity of natural law in legal procedures. Other jurists have, as well, proposed the relevance of the idea in legal doctrine, ranging from H. L. A. Hart's modest suggestion of natural law with minimal content, through Lon L. Fuller's concept of an internal morality of law, to those (e.g., Brendan F.

Brown, John T. Noonan, William A. Luijpen, John Finnis) for whom the idea of natural law is fundamental to the entire legal process.

In ethics, several contemporary philosophers (e.g., John Wild, Anthony Battaglia, Henry Veatch) have promoted natural law as a form of moral realism contrasted with subjectivist and relativist kinds of moral understanding. Among Protestant theologians, some (e.g., Karl Barth, Helmut Thielicke) dismiss the idea of natural law, but others (e.g., Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, John Macquarrie) are sympathetic. The idea remains central in the ethics of Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g., as presented by Stanley Harakas).

But within Roman Catholicism, especially since the Second Vatican Council (1965), theologians are divided over how to interpret the idea of natural law—in a more traditional way (e.g., Josef Fuchs, Germain Grisez) or in a more historically oriented, personalistic way (e.g., Bernard Häring, Robert Johann, William H. Van der Marck). Transcendental Thomism (e.g., Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan) presents a theological foundation for the latter approach.

In its many permutations over the centuries, the idea of natural law signifies a restless, perhaps unending, search for a principle of justice that is other than a sheer figment of imagination and that, disclosable to the common person, is a grounding for the proper dignity of humankind.

[*For a detailed discussion of Western views on the human capacity to apprehend natural law, see* Conscience. *For a treatment of the tension between the predictable and the unpredictable components of human experience, see* Chance. *In addition,* Cosmic Law *presents a survey of this topic in worldwide perspective, demonstrating how different models of the structure of reality have led to varied models for the organization of human life. Three general articles will direct the reader further to those areas of social endeavor that are most profoundly affected by the notion of natural law:* Morality and Religion; Law and Religion, *overview article; and* Science and Religion.]

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NATURE. [*This entry consists of two articles. The first,* Worship of Nature, *is a survey of the many ways in which natural phenomena have served as a focus in the religious history of mankind. The second,* Religious and Philosophical Speculations, *is an in-depth treatment of the history of* Naturphilosophie *in Western culture.*]

Worship of Nature

What we ordinarily speak of as "nature"—the physical world, including all living beings beyond the control of human culture—often appears to the religious consciousness as a manifestation of the sacred. Through nature, modes of being quite different from the specifically human reveal themselves to the religious imagination. The sun, the moon, and the earth, for example, can symbolize realities that transcend human experience. Throughout the history of religions, "nature" frequently is perceived as initiating a relationship with humankind, a relationship that is the foundation of human existence and well-being. In large part, this relationship is expressed in forms of adoration, a response of the total personality, or of an entire religious community, to the phenomena of nature.

The worship of nature underscores the fact that the sacred can appear in any guise. The religious person is confronted by the paradox that the sacred can manifest itself in material form without losing its essential character. [*See* Hierophany.] In the worship of nature, radically different levels of existence are felt to interpenetrate and coexist. The possibilities of the human spirit become coextensive with the sacred capacities of the rest of the physical universe. The worship of nature thus

highlights both the freedom of the sacred to appear in any form, and the capacity of the human being to recognize it for what it is in any expression. It also underlines the capacity of profane reality itself to become a transparent symbol of something other than itself, even while remaining what it is. In such a religious perception of the universe, nature transcends its brute physicality. It becomes a cipher, a symbol of something beyond itself. From this point of view, nature's existence is like the human situation in the world. Its modes of being as a manifestation of the sacred become resources for understanding the human religious condition. In many traditions, in fact, the belief in the shared destiny of nature and humanity is highly elaborated, so that the objects of nature are held to possess the same essential qualities as human beings: emotions, life cycles, personalities, volition, and so on.

The value and function of nature thus goes beyond the concrete sphere to the mystery of the sacred as it appears in the fuller reaches of religious experience. Only by keeping this in mind will we understand the forms in which communities respond to powers revealed in the physical universe. The following provide a series of suggestive illustrations of worship of nature.

The sky is often revered as a manifestation of divinity or venerated as the locus of the gods. [*See* Sky *and* Supreme Beings.] The Konde of east-central Africa adored Mbamba (also named Kiara or Kyala), a divinity who dwelt with his family in the heights above the sky. The Konde offer prayer and sacrifice to the god who dwells in the sky, especially at times when rain is called for. Many divinities of the sky originally lived on earth or with the first human beings. Eventually, they withdrew on high. Not much is recounted about them in myth. [*See* Deus Otiosus.] The Samoyed peoples adored Num, a god who lived in the seventh heaven and whose name means "sky." Num overspreads the entire universe and is identified not only with the sky but with the sea and the earth. Tengri (Sky) is the supreme being among Mongols (Tengeri among the Buriats).

Baiame is the supreme god among tribes of southeastern Australia (Kamilaroi, Euahlayi, and Wiradjuri). He welcomes the souls of the dead into his dwelling place beside the flowing waters of the Milky Way. His voice is thunder; he is omniscient. Although supreme beings of the sky like Baiame reveal important mysteries to the first ancestors before they withdraw on high, and although they play a major part in initiation ceremonies, they do not usually dominate liturgical life.

Objects fallen from the sky come from the sacred locus of the heavens and often become the objects of religious cults. For example, the Numana of the Niger River valley in West Africa, who accord an important place to the divinity of the sky, vernerate small pebbles, which they believe have fallen from the sky. They install these sacred pebbles on top of cones of beaten earth some three feet high and offer sacrifices to them. Since the pebbles have fallen from the sky, they are believed to be fragments of the sky god. Actual meteorites are frequently the center of a cult associated with sky gods. In the same way, flints and other species of "thunder stones" or "rain stones" fallen from the sky are treated as sacred, for they are believed to be the arrowpoints shot by the god of lightning or by other celestial divinities.

Worship of the sun is widespread, especially at the times of the solstices. [*See* Sun.] The Chukchi of northern Asia, for example, offer sacrifices to the light of the sun. Among the Chagga of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, Ruwa (Sun) is the supreme being, who receives sacrificial offerings in times of crisis. In societies engaged in intensive agriculture, the sun is worshiped in connection with the fertility of the crops and regenerative life of the cosmos. Such is the case with Inti in the Inca pantheon. The sun's power in such cases is not limited to the fertility of foodstuffs but extends also to human progeny. Privileged groups of human beings reckon their descent from the sun as did the Inca nobles, the Egyptian pharaoh, and important chiefly families on the island of Timor that reckon they are the "children of the sun." In many cultures the sun is believed to traverse the underworld at night. Therefore the sun becomes a sacred guide for the soul's journey through the land of the dead. In the Harvey Islands, the dead cluster in groups to await the biannual postmortem trek. During the solstices the sun leads these groups through the netherworld. Veneration of the sun takes the form of following his tracks when he sets. The sun carries into heaven the warriors who have fallen in battle.

Frequently the sun is worshiped because of its heroic achievements, including the creation of human beings. The sun and the moon created human beings from gourds, according to the tradition of the Apinagé people of South America. In the tradition of the Desána, a Tucano-speaking group of southern Colombia, the sun inseminated his daughter with light (through her eye) and caused the creation of the universe.

The moon is one of the most fascinating and rich religious characters. [*See* Moon.] It has long been an object of worship in many cultures. The moon's shifting shape and changing disposition in the sky at various times of the night, day, and month makes it the focus of a wide range of associations that have led to its veneration. Sin, the Babylonian god of the moon, had important connections with the waters of the earth. Their ebb

and flow were connected with the rhythmic capacities and periodic nature of Sin. Sin also created the grasses of the world.

The moon is frequently a lascivious being associated with the wanton powers of fertility. Often the moon is venerated as the source of sexual life and originator of reproductive processes such as menstruation and intercourse. The Canelos Quichua of eastern Ecuador, for example, treat Quilla, the moon, as a central supernatural being. When the new moon is immature, it is called *llullu Quilla*, the "green" or "unripe" moon. During these phases it is a prepubescent girl unable to conceive offspring or fashion pottery or prepare beer. The adult moon, *pucushca Quilla*, however, is a lascivious male whose incestuous exploits are recounted in myth. The moon's illicit exploits with his sister, the bird Jilucu, engendered the stars. When they discovered their origins, the stars wept and flooded the earth (Norman Whitten, *Sacha Runa: Ethnicity and Adaptation of Ecuadorian Jungle Quichua*, Urbana, Ill., 1976, p. 45).

Among the Siriono of eastern Bolivia, Yasi (Moon) is the most important supernatural being. He once lived on earth as a chief, but after creating the first human beings and teaching them the fundamentals of culture, he ascended into heaven. The waxing of the moon occurs as Yasi washes his face clean by degrees after returning from the hunt. The Siriono build lean-tos made of leaves in order to protect sleepers from exposure to the dangerous rays of the moon. These would cause blindness. Yasi provokes thunder and lightning by throwing jaguars and peccaries down to earth (Holmberg, 1960).

Mountains are an ubiquitous object of cult. In the Kunisaki Peninsula of Japan, for example, a tradition that dates back to the Heian period establishes a systematic, metaphorical relationship between the image of the mountain and the salvific power of the Lotus Sutra (Grapard, 1986, pp. 21–50). The sacred mountain of this peninsula represents the nine regions of the Pure Land and is an important pilgrimage center. Its eight valleys are the eight petals of the lotus blossom that represents the Diamond Mandala and the Womb Mandala. These structures become the basis for the architecture of temples, the divisions of the text of the Lotus Sutra of the Wondrous Law, and the program for the spiritual lives and geographic travels of pilgrims. All of these isomorphic structures represent the Pure Land of the Dainichi Nyorai. "This mountain is the permanent residence of the heart-mind of the Marvelous Law. It is the Lotus Pedestal on which the Buddha rests" (verses attributed to Enchin and quoted in Grapard, 1986, p. 50). The sacred mountain embodies the six realms *(rokudō)* of existence: that of the gods, human beings, titans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hells. Within these realms, arranged in a vertical hierarchy, all beings and all forms of rebirth have their place. [*See* Center of the World.] Mount Haguro, another sacred mountain on the northern part of the Japanese island of Honshu, serves as the center of worship during four seasonal feasts. The New Year celebration is one of the most important and dramatic of these, for at that time the sacred combat between the old and the new year determines the outcome of the future year (Earhart, 1970; Blacker, 1975, chap. 2).

In South America, offerings are made to the mountains of the Andes throughout the year to sustain and stimulate the life of the community. The mountain is a divine body in whose life all beings participate and from whose abundance and well-being all benefit. The community cultivates food from the body of the mountain. It gives forth fluids (water, semen, milk, and blood) that sustain life. Sacrifices and offerings placed in specific holy sites on the mountain replenish the fat, the power source, of the mountain body (Bastien, 1985, pp. 595–611).

Waters are frequently presented as supernatural beings worthy of worship. [*See* Water.] Water, according to mythic accounts, is often the source of primal life. Such is the case in the Babylonian creation story recorded in the *Enuma elish*, wherein Apsu and Tiamat (fresh water and sea water, aspects of the primordial ocean) mingle chaotically to give rise to all subsequent forms of life. Springs, rivers, and irrigation waters are the centers of religious attention throughout the world. They are celebrated not only during the episodes of the agricultural cycle but also at moments of rebirth into initiatory societies and at moments of initiation into culture itself. Immersion water, standing in a stream or under a waterfall, or other forms of extended exposure to water serve as ordeals commonly associated with initiation. For the Akwẽ and Chavante peoples of Brazil, for example, the lengthy exposure of initiands to water recalls the time when mythical heroes created the world's contents at the time of the flood.

In Scandinavian mythology Ægir (the Sea) is the boundless ocean. His wife, Ran, casts her net through the ocean and drags human beings into its depths as sacrificial offerings. The nine daughters of Ægir and Ran represent the various modes and moments of the sea. All of these divine beings dwell in the magnificent castle at the bottom of the ocean where the gods occasionally gather around a miraculous caldron. Apparently the cult of disposing of caldrons at the bottom of seas or lakes is associated with this mythology.

Water monsters are also the object of cultic action. They are placated or combated to stave off a repetition

of the cosmic deluge. Aquatic dragons embody the fertile principles manifest in moisture. They must be slain or tamed to release their fecund powers and to prevent drought. Thus the Chinese dragon Yin gathers together all the waters of the world and controls the rain. Images of Yin were fashioned at times of drought and at the onset of the rains (Granet, 1926, vol. 1, pp. 353–356).

The earth is sacred in many traditions and is the object of devotion and affection. [*See* Earth.] As the source of life, Pachamama (Mother Earth) of the Andes is worshiped on various occasions throughout the year. The agricultural cycle is coordinated with her menstrual periods, the times when she is open for conception. The earth is frequently a partner of the sky or of some other celestial fertilizing divinity. Among the Kumana of southern Africa, for example, the marriage of the sky and the earth makes the cosmos fertile. Liturgical life is directed toward the fruitful accomplishment of this union. Among North American Indian peoples such as the Pawnee, the Lakota, the Huron, the Zuni, and the Hopi, the earth is the fertile partner of the sky and the source of abundant life. The care extended to the earth takes involved forms of worship. The earth is also frequently the locus of burial. As such the earth becomes an ambivalent source of regenerative life, for it is a regeneration accomplished through devouring. All that is buried in the earth and rises to new life must undergo the decomposition of the seed. Rituals associated with the earth, such as agricultural orgies, frequently reenact this furious and destructive episode of degeneration in imitation of the experience of the seed in the earth.

Plants, trees, and vegetation also have their place in worship. [*See* Vegetation.] The tree of life or the cosmic tree expresses the sacredness of the entire world. Scandinavian myth offers the example of Yggdrasill, the cosmic tree. Yggdrasill sinks its roots into the earth and into the netherworld where giants dwell. Divinities meet daily near the tree to pass judgment on the world's affairs. The Fountain of Wisdom flows from a spot near the tree as does the Fountain of Memory. Yggdrasill miraculously renews itself in spite of the fact that an enormous serpent named Niðhǫggr (Nidhogg) gnaws at its roots. The universe will continue to exist because Yggdrasill perdures. An enormous eagle defends it from its enemies and the god Óðinn (Odin) tethers his horse to its branches.

Other kinds of vegetation also manifest sacred powers and divinities. Thus the Vedic and Puranic creation accounts identify the lotus floating upon the water as a manifestation of the divinity and of the universe. Miraculous trees, flowers, and fruits reveal the presence of divine powers. Rites of spring frequently center on plants, boughs, or trees that are treated as sacred. The fertility of the cosmos is symbolized by the union of male and female plants or by the blossoming of a bough from a specific species of plants. Around the world, the agricultural cycle is hedged around with religious acts directed toward the furthering of the powers of fertility manifest in various crops. In particular, the moments of sowing and reaping are marked by sacrifices. The seeds themselves undergo a form of sacrificial death as do the harvested stalks at the end of the growing season. The picking of first fruits and the gathering of the last sheaf of the fields is frequently the occasion for religious festival and ceremony.

Animals have also stimulated the religious imagination in such a way as to warrant devotion. [*See* Animals.] Animals, birds, fish, snakes, and even insects have all become the focus of adoration in one culture or another. Often their bodies represent the transformed expression of supernatural beings that underwent metamorphosis at the beginning of time (Goldman, 1979).

Examples of the worship of nature could be multiplied endlessly. There is hardly any object in the natural cosmos that has not become the center of cult somewhere at one time or in one place or another. How this should be interpreted is a matter of extreme delicacy. In general modern interpreters have failed to settle on a satisfactory explanation. Even the term *nature* carries a range of connotations that obscure the meaning of sacred objects of cult in many cultures. Each generation of scholars in the last century spawned a number of interpretive theories in which the worship of nature figured as a large element in the assessment of religion in general. [*See* History of Religions.] In fact, the effort to desacralize nature in the Western perception and to identify the perception of nature as sacred with "primitive" peoples played a large role in the foundation of the social sciences and in the self-understanding of the modern West (Cocchiara, 1948). Offering a nuanced interpretation of the worship of nature would require a detailed deconstruction of the cultural sciences as well as a subtle appreciation of the religious terminology of each culture in question. James G. Frazer contended that the worship of nature and the worship of the dead were the two most fundamental forms of natural religion (1926, pp. 16–17). F. Max Müller founded his school of comparative religious studies on the principle that myths spoke about nature. E. B. Tylor also established his influential theory of animism, a still-lingering interpretation of religion on the notion that human beings projected onto nature certain animate qualities of their own character, visible especially in dream and in the rational explanations of death. Claude Lévi-Strauss pushes this intellectualized perception of nature in the formation of religion even further, contending

that religion involved the humanization of the laws of nature (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 221). A politico-economic interpretation of religion points to the intricate unity between nature and human beings, bound together by common origins and by reciprocities visible in ritual. According to Michael Taussig (1980), it is ritual action that aligns human beings with the helping spirits of nature. These rituals are extended in the modern rites of labor, such as those associated with miners and farmhands. The rituals dedicated to nature are aimed at enlisting nature's power in the cause of liberation of human being in the cosmos. The worship of nature, in this view, is an example of cosmological principles and the rituals dedicated to nature are also the arenas where these principles are created, renewed, and reformed (Taussig, 1980). The worship of nature has also become an important object of scholarly study in order to study nature as a category in the conceptual schemes of different cultures (Ortner, 1974; MacCormack and Strathern, 1980).

[*See also* Ecology.]

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Religious and Philosophical Speculations

In the West, "natural philosophy" and "philosophy of nature" have developed side by side and at times have been confused because of an ever-present ambiguity. They differ in principle, however: the first has been defined by Galileo, Comte, and Darwin as the pursuit of a total but essentially objective knowledge of phenomena, whereas the second has oriented such thinkers as Leibniz, Hegel, and Bergson toward an intuitive approach that nevertheless strives to be rigorous regarding the reality that underlies data derived from observation.

Among the thinkers of this second category, those who have come more and more to be labeled *Naturphilosophen*, or "philosophers of nature," since the time of German Romanticism occupy a special place. They are generally committed to grasping the concrete character of nonmechanical, nonphysical reality or, as Schelling put it, the "productivity" concealed behind sensible appearances, without, as a rule, neglecting the study of appearances themselves. That is, they are not satisfied with a natural philosophy based on empiricism alone. Their ideas indisputably bear the mark of the religious, indeed of gnosticism—not in the sense this word evokes when it is applied to the gnostics of the beginning of our own era, but in the sense of a frame of mind fixed on defining the nature of the relationships linking God, man, and the universe by means not relevant solely to the experimental method. The study and the discovery of these relationships define the activity of the theosophist, but whereas he most often takes God as the point of departure for his speculations, the *Naturphilosoph*, while conserving this tripartite schema as a basis of his program, mainly concentrates the efforts of his experimentation, speculations, and imagination on nature.

We must not, therefore, confuse them with the thinkers who are content to celebrate the beauty of nature

and of mathematical formulas, or suggest that the natural order might well be found again in a spiritual order. Thinkers like Einstein certainly do propose the existence of a meaning beyond scientific analysis concealed behind the appearances of things; and this manifestation of respect is indeed quite different from materialist or positivist agnosticism. However, it must also be further distinguished from the approach appropriate to *Naturphilosophie*. The *Naturphilosophen* do not limit themselves to confirming that there is something other than the phenomenal world; they aspire to attain to the very secrets of the universe, that is, to know, as Goethe's Faust would, "Was die Welt an innersten zusammenhält" ("the inmost force that undergirds the very universe"). A kinship more important than their differences unites these thinkers in comparable forms of inspiration that, in Western civilization, are found among the pre-Socratics, in certain currents of medieval thought, in the Renaissance, and throughout German Romanticism.

Antiquity: The Pre-Socratics, Stoicism, and Hermetism. Certain components of modern *Naturphilosophie* can be found in the writings of most of the pre-Socratics. In particular, they did not oppose matter to mind, soul to body, or subject to object, but had a tendency to approach nature with a nondualistic, noncategorical attitude. In such a view, all being is concrete. Yet their thinking contained dynamic and creative contradictions. Cosmologies and anthropologies rested on pairs of opposites. The pre-Socratics had a sense of analogy and homology insofar as they did not think in Aristotelian categories—and this for obvious reasons. Their imaginary world was grounded in concrete nature, interpreting and molding it into living structures. Hence the importance of the elements (whose inexhaustible symbolism would later be taken up again by the alchemists): water for Thales, air for Anaximenes, fire for Heraclitus. For these physicist-metaphysicians, especially Heraclitus, the logic of antagonism was primordial. "Night and day," he said, "they are one." Novalis, in eighteenth-century Germany, would not forget this lesson, as can be witnessed even in his poetry: nature expresses herself in her works; man works by expressing himself. We are, as the Stoics might say, nature's co-workers. Hence the pre-Socratics' labyrinthine style, which seems obscure because it is made of paradoxes and which later inspired Western alchemy. Parmenides was already moving away from such categories of nature with his linear thought, his *doxa*, which tended to annul these contradictions. Thus, too, Anaxagoras, who saw in nature a thinking principle that is co-present in the ordering of the world, but that also separates man from the cosmic ambience. Not until Empedocles do we once more find some of the elements belonging to *Naturphilosophie*. He affirmed six principles—reassemblage and dispersion, plus the four elements—and presented the history of the world as the reconstitution of a dislocated unity.

Stoicism, which continued throughout almost six centuries, prepared the way not only for Neoplatonism and certain gnostic and Hermetic currents but for *Naturphilosophie* as well. Indeed, it placed emphasis on the need to know the concrete universe, harmoniously blending wisdom and technique, and taught the necessity of a *savoir-faire* that rejects pure speculation and must lead to the knowledge of an organic whole, assuring the accord between things heavenly and terrestrial. This is a trait that appeared again and again in a more systematic manner as one of the important aspects of Alexandrine Hermetism, where several texts affirm that God is known through the contemplation of the world. Hence the preference of the Hermetica for the particular, the *mirabilia*, over the abstract and the general; science is not "disinterested" but aims to rediscover the general by means of an enriching detour through the concrete and through individual objects: nevertheless, the notion of "concrete" is not absolutely the same in Heraclitus, in the Stoa, in the *Naturphilosophie*.

This focus on the concrete did not occur in Neoplatonism, where the intelligible reality, the realm of the mind to which one strives to gain access, has no purpose at all in explaining the world of the senses. Instead, it aids us in quitting this world in order to enter more easily into the pure region where knowledge and happiness are possible. The sensual, of course, reflects the intelligible, but the *sens*, or meaning, of the sensual is of little importance. The essential thing is to go beyond the sensual to get to the world of ideas. Nevertheless, there is in Plotinus something like the outline of a *Naturphilosophie*. The diverse branches of early gnosticism, even more than Neoplatonism, were, by definition, hostile to all forms of *Naturphilosophie*, since according to most of them the world of the senses, which was the work of an evil demiurge, has nothing good to offer us and is not even capable of nurturing our knowledge. This hostility toward anything pertaining to nature is a dualist trait, one that reappeared later in Catharistic thought.

Medieval Perspectives. The ninth-century theologian John Scottus Eriugena was born in Ireland but later lived at the court of Charles the Bald. In his major work, *On the Division of Nature*, or *Periphyseon*, Eriugena proposed a philosophy of nature that was to nourish much of subsequent theosophic speculation up to the age of German idealism in the nineteenth century. The different kinds of nature that Eriugena distin-

guished and examined, particularly those of nature *naturans* and *naturata*, and of nature creating and created, were later, as it seems, to inspire qabbalistic literature. His philosophy of expansion and contraction appears much closer to the mechanics of Qabbalah than to classic Platonism.

Beginning in the ninth century, the Arabs translated many ancient texts and, inspired by Aristotle, wrote commentaries on them. But together with the rationalistic empiricism of Aristotle, and in the margins of a form of positivism, we see Arab thought also expressing a highly mythicized vision of a world ruled by spiritual forces that only intuition can aspire to grasp. The medieval West received this teaching by way of the Latin translations of Arabic texts that were often concerned with the theory and practice of medicine and magic.

The high Middle Ages. The twelfth century saw a return to the cosmological themes of Greco-Roman antiquity, in other words, to a universe conceived and represented as an organic whole, subject to laws that must be sought in the light of analogy. The "discovery" of these laws would entail twofold consequences: on the one hand, a powerful process of secularization was set in motion, so that the sense of the sacred was lost. On the other hand, a lasting renewal of what might be called the feeling of cosmic participation took place. This latter corresponded to the systematic and poetic elaboration of a network of relations between the visible and invisible realms of creation. The universe was approached by form of philosophical speculation that was committed to deciphering living, concrete meanings. According to Jean de Meung, nature became the "chamberlain," or vicar, of God—a God incarnated in stone in this age that saw the emergence of the only true sacred art of the West.

Nature, its unity and its laws, is what interested the Platonism of Chartres as it appeared in the works of William of Conches, who was much concerned with physics, propagated the teachings of Eriugena on the world soul, and undertook, like Bernard Silvestris of Tours, to integrate a Platonic philosophy of nature with Christianity. The Platonic doctrine of ideas, and the reflection on numbers, could certainly have incited the intellect to remove any form of reality judged to be absolute from the sensible world and to place it in the realm of the archetypes. The school of Chartres did not succumb, however, to this temptation inherent in true Platonism, from which Augustine had not escaped. They owed this integration of the intellect with the material world to the natural sciences, and their debt to Arabic science in this respect is quite evident—especially in medical science, which had only recently been made accessible to the West. The occult philosophy of the Renaissance, already a philosophy of nature in the sense of *Naturphilosophie*, was in many ways close to that of the school of Chartres.

Dominicans and Franciscans. In the thirteenth century two opposing tendencies divided philosophical and religious reflection. The Franciscan spirit, represented mainly by Bonaventure, showed renewed interest in all things in nature. This was followed by the Dominican spirit, derived from Aristotle and represented by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who elaborated a philosophy based on abstraction and practically devoid of the universal analogical correspondences in which the individual plays an integrating part. From another source came a third tendency, that of the school of Oxford, which shared with the spirit of Chartres a desire for universal intuition.

Aside from the mystic path, nature holds the largest place in the thought of Bonaventure. The "Seraphic Doctor" considered it equal to the Bible and considered it as a book whose signs must be deciphered. The spirit of Oxford blossomed further in the work of the early thirteenth-century bishop Robert Grosseteste. Neoplatonism and an interest in the sciences, two traits characteristic of both these English masters, appeared clearly in Grosseteste, a precursor of the modern *Naturphilosophen*. His preferred subject, speculations on the nature of light, made him interesting in the eyes of posterity. The nature of light as the "first corporeal form" *(lux)* accounts for the presence of all of the bodies of the universe and the constitution of the world by its expansion, its condensation, or its rarefaction. Grosseteste imagined that a point of light created by God was diffused in such a manner that a sphere of a finite radius was formed, which is the universe (a hypothesis that prefigured the "big bang" theory). The limit of its power of diffusion determined the firmament, which in turn sent back a light *(lumen)*, which engendered the celestial spheres and the spheres of the elements. Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, a Parisian contemporary of William of Auvergne and another theologian of light, prefigured several of Grosseteste's intuitions with his *Liber de intelligentiis*. Five centuries later, in the age of German Romanticism, light examined from a similar perspective would once again be at the heart of the preoccupations of *Naturphilosophie*.

There has been a tendency in modern times to make Roger Bacon, a thirteenth-century Franciscan of Paris and Oxford, a rationalist precursor of the experimental method. This gives the false impression of a character bristling simultaneously with illuminism and experience. These two attitudes are here inseparable, for what Bacon called "experience" *(experimentum)* should be taken not in its current sense (related to "experiment")

but in the sense of "the work of an expert." Thus, the practices of the alchemist and the astrologer fall under the heading of *experimenti*. Paracelsus would later reason in the same way when he dealt with "experience" in medicine. We must understand that this word means the study and knowledge of concealed natural forces. For Bacon, experimental science meant secret and traditional science, with the condition that concrete science not be separated from the scriptures but that the two be linked together for their mutual clarification. This is comparable to the science to which Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, following Paracelsus, would devote himself in the eighteenth century.

The late Middle Ages. To these works must be added what was a relatively well-known genre in the thirteenth century, that of the *summae* ("sums") and *specula* ("mirrors"), of which Alexander Neckam's *De naturis rerum* is the first example. To this genre belong such works as the *Speculum majus* of Vincent of Beauvais, an exposé of natural history in the form of a commentary on the first chapters of *Genesis*. Aside from this, other works of the same sort worthy of note include *De natura rerum* by Thomas of Cantipré and Bartholomew the Englishman's *De proprietatibus rerum*. Only occasionally do these works offer a philosophy of nature in the full sense of the term, but since they increase the number of histories and observations on the powers of plants, animals, and minerals, as well as on the heavenly signs, they prepare the way for the occult philosophy of the Renaissance.

The problem of nominalism versus realism, which was posed so sharply in the fourteenth century, entailed a debate with high stakes for the construction of a *Naturphilosophie* and, indeed, even for the survival of such lesser philosophies as prefigured it. Nominalism was loath to see in the laws and the realities of the sensible world a collection of analogous and homologous replicas of worlds hierarchically ordered in correspondences with one another. Nominalism emerged victorious from the debate, clearing the field for the development of modern science, beginning with physics. A heavenly mechanism assembled in the image of a terrestrial mechanism now filled the void left by the disappearance of the guiding intelligences. Thus the continuity between a spiritually structured universe and self-sufficient, purely physical laws, which had been sustained by traditional philosophies, was broken. At the same time, the influence of nominalism joined with that of Averroism and, in bringing about the downfall of the Avicennian concept of the universe, prepared the way for a sort of Cartesian *res extensa*, in itself incompatible with a *Naturphilosophie*. And yet realism itself was not a sufficient foundation for a *Naturphilosophie* because a good number of those who had defended it in the Middle Ages had generally done nothing more than distract attention from the reality of nature and of the individual for the aggrandizement of the universal.

For all that, however, *Naturphilosophie* did not die. It had not yet even seen its finest hour. The *Ars magna* of Ramón Lull, written in 1308 and inspired by Qabbalah, was an instrument of knowledge that claimed to be applicable at all possible and imaginable levels, from God himself down to the lowest orders of nature, by way of the angels, the stars, and the four elements. Lull's *Ars*, far removed from Scholasticism, was like a canal through which a part of the medieval Neoplatonism revived by Eriugena passed, in other words, a dynamic Platonism close to the Jewish mysticism then flourishing in Florence and Spain. Lullism enjoyed a broad dissemination, but only from the Renaissance onward. Nicholas of Cusa, Marsilio Ficino, and Pico della Mirandola drew a goodly part of their knowledge and their methods from it. A grandiose conception of nature is also found in the contemporary writings of Peter of Abano. Astrological Hermetism makes up half of his encyclopedic work, of which the *Conciliator* is the most important volume. Here nature is seen as controlled by the stars and objects are filled with spirits.

To all this the role of alchemy, which began to regain currency in the West in the twelfth century, was apparently added. It assumed three forms, which may have been complementary in the minds of certain alchemists, but which it is convenient to distinguish. These were simple research into procedures of metallic transmutation (for example, the production of gold); a "spiritual" alchemy, in which the chemical metaphors served as an aid to meditation, with a conscious or unconscious transformation of the experimenter himself as the goal; and third, an alchemy presented as a *Naturphilosophie*, as by Petrus Bonus in the *Pretiosa margarita novella* and by many other speculative adepts of the "high science" who were trying to harmonize Aristotle's philosophy with the ways of the "great work." In the middle of the fourteenth century, the Franciscan Jean De Rupescissa (or Jean de Roquetaillade) developed at length the idea that a "quintessence" is at work in each object, and he proposed theories on the four elements and the "principles"—in other words, on the nature of nature. All this heralds Paracelsus, but before him a great name emerged in the thought of the fifteenth century—Nicholas of Cusa, the apostle of a total science in which the *ars coincidentiarum* is clearly distinguished from the *ars conjecturarum* of common science. The first corresponds to the principle of the intellectual knowledge of objects, the second to the principle of a purely rational knowledge. Nicholas gives us a glimpse of the possibility of

dynamic forms in science. What he called the *docta ignorantia* is a form of superior knowledge, a gnosis of the coincidence of opposites, or state of the unity of all things. [*See also* Alchemy, *article on* Renaissance Alchemy.]

The Renaissance, Paracelsianism, and Pansophy. The Renaissance promoted the revival of a philosophy of nature, primarily in Germany. This country was thenceforth the preserver of a tradition characterized by a theosophy that embraces the fullness of the world. In the sixteenth century, when the Jewish tradition detached man from nature in order to place him once more in the hands of God, the idea that nature speaks to us of God was defined, whereas Jewish Qabbalah had not been exempt from such a tendency but was mainly concerned with a theosophy of the relationships between God and man. The idea of nature in the Middle Ages, even among the Franciscans of the schools of Chartres and Oxford, had not gone as far as the new theosophy, to which the name *pansophy* has sometimes been given, in order to emphasize its "universal" character, in the concrete sense of the term. This new theosophy stressed the possibility of knowing God by knowing nature. It was Paracelsus, the famous physician of Einsiedeln, Basel, and Salzburg, who here played the determining role, with his immense oeuvre and his abundant posterity. He made all of nature enter into Christian mysticism by joining the latter to the Neoplatonic tradition, at the same time transforming its contribution. For while Paracelsus preserved the Neoplatonic idea of intermediaries between man and heaven, he did so less as a spiritualist meditating on the nature of intermediary intellects than as a practitioner seeking to discover the analogical relationships between a concrete, living, dynamic heaven and the human being studied in all his constituent parts.

In opposition to Neoplatonism, nature for Paracelsus emerged directly from divine power. He distinguished two orders of suprasensible realities, or "lights." There was the "light of grace," of a uniquely spiritual order, a divine world to which man is related through his immortal spirit. This is the domain of pure mysticism and divine and human eternity. Paracelsus did not venture to occupy himself with it, except in order to be reminded by it of ontological preeminence and existence. His domain of research was the other "light," that of nature, or *philosophia sagax*, which was not the intellective approach of the Scholastics, and which he described as the autonomous power of revelation. Between these two lights he placed astronomy or astrology as a third area or term. Everything that concerns these three realms, as well as biology, human psychology, and even the arts, emerges from nature's light and obeys the laws of analogy, which it is increasingly important for us to decipher: correspondences among metals, the planets, the parts of the human body, and so forth. His is a complex universe and, despite all, heterogeneous; it is an expanding universe—one in which time itself, far from being considered a container, is nothing other than the growth of beings. In this construction, it is essential to continue to improve one's understanding, through observation and experiment, of the complexity of nature's divinely created unity. Chemistry and medicine are emphasized in the search for that comprehension. One must, as Paracelsus himself said, "acquire the wonders of God through the mediation of nature."

Paracelsianism spread through Germany and the rest of Europe at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, at least two generations after the death of its initiator, whose work was not well known or widely published until then. Among his successors and disciples, Gerhard Dorn, Adam Bodenstein, Michael Toxites, Alexander von Suchten, and Oswald Croll occupy an important place. Their philosophy, like their master's, is not autonomous but is set within a theology; it has dynamic character that is found at all levels of their speculations, up to the level of God himself, who is by no means a *deus otiosus*. The manner in which they conceive the organic unity of the world with its multiple hypostases always results in a "sacred physics" far from the dryness that characterizes most of the cosmologies of the Middle Ages except those of the kind of Bonaventure or Hildegard von Bingen. The important thing is not so much the anatomy of the body of God and of the universe as it is God's physiology. Paracelsianism corresponds to the irruption of a "physiological" cosmology—or cosmosophy, rather—in the West.

This "pansophy," as it was called more and more often in the seventeenth century, subsequently led to three developments. First there was Paracelsianism proper, which seldom, because of the personal nature of Paracelsus's method (better characterized as "bubbling up" rather than systematic), appeared in the form that its initiator originally gave it. Next there was chemical philosophy, more or less influenced by alchemy, which practical science struggled to get rid of throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was a science that aimed to be objective and generally did not encumber itself excessively with theological considerations. Finally, there was pansophy, in other words, a theosophy that took into consideration the tissues of analogical relations between God, man, and the universe. It involved philosophers who sometimes had the tendency to go further than Dorn, Croll, or Paracelsus himself in the direction of theosophy.

This third current culminated in one of the major inspirational themes of the Rosicrucian movement—as the first manifestations of this movement, the *Fama* and *Confessio*, attest—and in the early seventeenth-century work of Robert Fludd and Jakob Boehme who, though more theosophist than pansophist, owed much to Paracelsus. For all of them, God is known through his works. Since he is immersed in nature, he participates in it in a thousand ways. To know nature is at the same time to know God—and conversely, as we discover the center of the whole by studying the whole, we discover the creator by studying his creatures. [*See* Rosicrucians *and the biography of Paracelsus.*]

The Direct Sources of Romantic Naturphilosophie. In the seventeenth century the influence of magnetism, and particularly the Boehmian type of theosophy, joined the influence of Paracelsianism. We must wait until the middle of the following century, however, before we see *Naturphilosophie* arise from the aggregate of these currents. The Swabian Friedrich Christoph Oetinger was the greatest German theosophist of his time, and, if we add to his name those of his satellites Johann Ludwig Fricker, Prokop Divisch, and Friedrich Rösler—known as the "theologians of electricity"—then he was quite possibly the first *Naturphilosoph* in the Romantic sense of the term. The current of Oetinger's thought is characterized by a continuing, simultaneous recourse to two sources of inspiration, which serve both as a heuristic and a verification: nature and the Bible. There develops from the seventeenth century onward a *"physica sacra,"* or "physicotheology," which might be considered the chronological link between the cosmosophical views of the Renaissance and the German *Naturphilosophie* of pre-Romanticism and Romanticism. Thomas Burnet, Joseph Addison, John Hutchinson, and George Berkeley (see his *Siris*) belong to this trend. The teaching of the one ought not contradict that of the other; on the contrary, they should clarify one another. Neither biblical literature nor biblical fundamentalism are at issue here, because if the revealed images are taken concretely—whether they have to do with the days of creation, the garden of Eden, or the vision of Ezekiel—they are understood in a perspective of spiritual realism that preserves and promotes interpretations at several levels. Almost immediately afterward, Mesmerism, that is, the works and teachings of Franz Anton Mesmer, popularized the taste of the age for magnetism by establishing a basis for it that appeared truly scientific. There was, at the turn of the eighteenth century, a great infatuation with anything touching on magnetism, galvanism, or electricity. Between Oetinger's Neo-Boehmian theosophy and the pragmatism of Mesmer, a physician little given to metaphysics, Romantic *Naturphilosophie* was born. It was not, however, a result of these two currents alone; at least three other factors now entered the picture.

The first of these is French naturalism. This might seem paradoxical, but with Buffon's *Histoire naturelle* and Diderot's *Rêve de d'Alembert*, a new physics appeared, presented more in the form of a literary exercise than as a scientific calculation. With Buffon we see emerging once again the old theme of the world soul. Buffon, and even Holbach, gave back to Germany what had originally come from there, that is, from Leibniz. But this was a Leibniz revised and corrected by French naturalism, which transferred the monad, an intelligible substance accessible to understanding alone, into phenomenal nature itself.

The second and more decisive factor was the philosophy of Kant. Schlegel, Novalis, and others were happy to find (particularly in Kant) a concept according to which the world is a product of the imagination, in other words, a synthetic, spontaneous activity of mind. Beginning with his *Anfangsgründe*, Kant had presented the two forces of Newtonian physics—attraction and repulsion—as the components of all nature. The Romantics further complicated this polarity in order to make it a key to the understanding of human nature, all the more so because to Kant's influence they added that of the contemporary Scottish physician John Brown, author of a theory also based on polarities, the *Elementa medicinae*, which was destined to enjoy considerable success in Germany. Then came Fichte, who tried to finish the work of Kant's critique by freeing the human mind from the only bonds that Kant had not removed, those of the "thing in itself." For Fichte, there is, in fact, no absolute existence outside of the subject, for it is the subject that creates the real. Schelling said that Fichte had restored fundamental confidence in the object, a natural confidence that is proper to the human being that had been shaken or destroyed first by Descartes and then by Kant. Fichte had reinstated it by positing the thing and our mental representation of it as identical.

The third factor involves religion and theology. The rediscovery of Spinoza at the end of the eighteenth century must be taken into account here for, having until then been considered an atheist, he was now fervently received as a man intoxicated with God. It was now recognized that his formula "Deus sive natura" ("God or nature") was not a profession of faith disguised by materialism, but rather an affirmation that nature is something divine. Thinkers came more and more to posit a God not identical with things—*Naturphilosophie* generally avoids pantheism—but conceived of as the source of energy, as a development of organic forces, from

which the entire finite world proceeds. Guided more or less by the influence of Herder, the first German Romantics tended to replace the notion of cosmic organism—such as that found in Hamann and Jacobi—with that of a dynamic force, in order to erase the Spinozan concept of substance in favor of a more energetic concept. Moreover, at the moment when *Naturphilosophie* was emerging, religion was also undergoing a crisis. This was the age in which Chateaubriand, in his essay *Sur les révolutions*, was asking what kind of religion would succeed Christianity. In response to the *Génie du christianisme* by the same author, there appeared almost immediately a book that is perhaps the sole French work of *Naturphilosophie:* Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin's *De l'esprit des choses.*

Romantic Naturphilosophie. It was largely due to these factors that the study of nature in the last years of the eighteenth century, and for half a century thereafter, was approached in a very new way. In 1798 there appeared almost simultaneously the *Weltseele* (Soul of the World) of Schelling and the essay *Über das pythagoräische Quadrat in der Natur* (On the Pythagorean Square in Nature) by Franz von Baader. This twofold beginning was then furthered by A. K. A. Eschenmayer who, together with Baader and with the help of Schelling, contributed to some extent to the unification of the data of traditional pansophy with the new spirit of Kantian philosophy. Among the principal representatives of this school, which lasted almost until the death of Carl Gustav Carus in 1869, and in addition to those already cited, were Karl Friedrich Burdach, Wilhelm Butte, Joseph Ennemoser, Gustav Fechner, Justinus Kerner, Giovanni Malfatti, Adam Müller, Novalis, the Dane Jean-Christian Oersted, Lorenz Oken, Johann Nepomuk Ringseis, Johann Wilhelm Ritter, Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert, Henrik Steffens, Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, Ignaz Troxler, Johann Jakob Wagner, and Karl Joseph Windischmann. These are primarily Germans or men attached to German culture. There is little to add from other countries except for two English philosophers somewhat influenced by this school: William Paley, who published *Natural Theology* in 1802, and Sir Humphrey Davy, author, in 1830, of *Consolations in Travel.*

For most of these philosophers, knowledge of the self and knowledge of the world go hand in hand. Together, knowledge of the self and knowledge of the world are passion, initiation voyage, and immersion in becoming. The consciousness of these Romantics was not solitary but, rather, interdependent with nature, with the entire cosmos; hence the interest of Baader, Schubert, Kerner, and others in metempsychosis, psychical and metaphysical research, somnambulism, and animal magnetism. Despite the impact of Newton and mechanism on the age, we see the idea of an intelligible interdependence of man and cosmos affirmed among these scholars and thinkers. It was expressed in a broad spectrum of speculations regarding light, electricity, and chemistry, and often used inspired, poetic tones. But this lyricism should never let us forget that German Romanticism was ultimately a philosophical and religious movement rather than a literary one. In this respect it was clearly a continuation of Paracelsianism and pansophy, but it benefited from the acquisition of the experimental sciences and placed emphasis on the figurative systems, the polarities, and architectonics in a spirit often recalling certain forms of Pythagoreanism. Nature is a text to be deciphered with the aid of correspondences and symbolic implications; as a consequence, rigorous experimental science is never more than an obligatory point of departure in the movement toward a gnostic apprehension of invisible processes. These, the real, are of a *natura naturans* that is always posited as a postulate or, more correctly, as an initial belief.

Thus physics and metaphysics are two sides of the same coin. Almost all of the representatives of Romantic *Naturphilosophie* were scholars working with the concrete: chemists, physicists, geologists, mining engineers, and physicians. It is not surprising, then, to see a Romantic image of the physician disseminated in the literature of the time. The picture is seductive because it is based on the analogy of the two activities medicine and poetry. The physicians Marcus and Roeschlaub embodied this twofold activity quite nicely. Marcus had, moreover, published—as had Schelling—in one of the scholarly journals serving as a forum for these ideas the *Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft.* There we read, from the pen of Philipp Walther, a spokesman for the same idea: "How the cure of a malady takes place remains eternally hidden from understanding and is among those things that are quite simply incomprehensible. . . . Now, just as the idea blends in with the material in a work of art, so the physician who heals attempts a critical effort at healing the conflict. . . . And, likewise, in the work of art, beauty of form only proceeds from the marriage of the idea and the substance, just as health is produced by the artistic effort of the physician." We are not far from Paracelsianism, which should not surprise us greatly, since many of the *Naturphilosophen* of the time came to reinforce the position of Paracelsus, making themselves the heirs of a theosophy that supported the foundations of Paracelsian pansophy itself.

Certainly, not all *Naturphilosophen* were theosophists by any means, but theosophy—notably that of the Boehmian variety—colored the works of most of them. Baader was certainly the greatest theosophist of that school as well as the most appealing and profound. Con-

versely, the theosophists did not disdain to have recourse to science in the spirit of *Naturphilosophie*, as we can see in the works of Johann Friedrich von Meyer, the theosophizing qabbalistic theologian of Frankfurt. It was always essential to rediscover the constitutive principles of things by simultaneous experimentation and meditation. But, even as they are revealed to us in a symbolic manner and develop in clusters of meanings, everywhere there are intermediaries, mesocosmic elements (invisible structures, principles, angels, qualitative stages of light, etc.), and from these arises the polymorphic, richly peopled world. From this grows a veritable polytheism, which does not occur at the level of religious dogma and which remains compatible with Judeo-Christian monotheism. "Monotheism of the mind and of the heart," writes Schelling, "polytheism of the imagination and of art. This is what we need." This is because the creative imagination, a fundamental notion of this movement, lets the gods play in us in a harmonious world of the concrete where each occupies, alongside the others, a place of his own.

The most remarkable common denominator of all of these currents of thought is the affirmation of the identity of mind and nature. This is what posterity has always retained as most specific or most suggestive, doubtless because it poses the basic metaphysical question. This "philosophy of identity," to use Schelling's expression, is the belief in a relationship between man and nature in which each is bound partly to the other. This relationship refers neither to an abstract knowledge of nature nor to a practical or utilitarian exploitation of it, but to a level of comprehension and reality where the negative or destructive opposition of the two is surmounted. Mind—and not only the mind of man—becomes nature, spiritualized nature. "The more we advance this agreement," wrote Oersted in 1807, "between nature and mind, the more perfect you will find it, and the more easily you will agree with me in admitting that these two natures are the seeds of a common root." Understood in this dynamic way, this "agreement" is an animated and passionate dramaturgy, especially when attached to a mythic narrative.

These polarities, generally presented as a quaternary, constitute the basis of most of the vital and unifying schemas so characteristic of this philosophy. The fourfold structure underlying most of these polar representations is made of an undifferentiated pole (chaos, or primordial night); from it emerge two further terms that are opposite and complementary: fire and water, fire and light, masculine and feminine, or attraction and repulsion. Then appears the fourth term, which reflects the original one and which is the common product in which the two opposite terms combine. Such a quaternary makes a mythic narration possible, indeed, at times even necessary, and a thinker is theosophical to the extent that he emphasizes such a narrative. If we want to identify it by reducing it to its simplest elements, we can find it in what Schelling termed "the repressed mystery of Christianity," which is basically alchemy, but in the form of the Hermetic myth of the "redeemed redeemer." It is the story of a captive, or "captured," light that another light, having remained free, awakens. Here is the crux of this Romantic narrative, present in the form of an opposition between light and weight, the latter understood as a substance in which primitive energies have been swallowed up. Certain of these energies, which were once close to the Absolute, have become inaccessible since their capture by attraction, that is, by weight, but can reappear or be resuscitated. This progressive reappearance of light in the world, in life, establishes, implicitly or explicitly, the narrative of *Naturphilosophie*.

Decline and Epigoni: Perspectives. Consequent upon the decline of *Naturphilosophie*, even before the middle of the nineteenth century, a corresponding "estrangement" of nature occurred: the view developed that nature is savage, in the sense that it increasingly ceased to be felt by man as the place where he could recognize himself, where he lived, or where he felt at home. More and more, nature came to appear as "other." This process was prepared by Schopenhauer in 1819, with *The World as Will and Representation*, in that he considered nature, once and for all, as outside of the categories of understanding.

Goethe's case is rather special. His scientific works, especially those on the metamorphosis of plants and on color, place him close to the great choices of the *Naturphilosophen*, but he was most interested in grasping eternity in an instant, or infinity in an object. Finally, he was more interested in the differences among origins than in their commonality. Throughout his life and works he preserved the notion of a vital universe; but he did not ask what it is that things symbolize in the invisible.

Romantic *Naturphilosophie*, in no way a product of spontaneous generation, has never been completely extinguished and has always been more or less actualized as a "philosophy of nature," in the meaning given to that term here. Thus, from the beginning of the nineteenth century on, it became difficult to say precisely how much in the impulse of that movement—which was never fully interrupted in the West—could be attributed to German Romanticism, or whether it was, rather, a more general movement, to be understood as a form of *philosophia perennis*. Whatever the case may be, Romantic theories of the unconscious colored the ideas of nineteenth-century thinkers such as Eduard von Hartmann, and it is in Schubert, with his *Dream Sym-*

bolism, and even more so in Carl Gustav Carus, that the sources of psychoanalysis should be sought. However, we need not see too much resemblance to *Naturphilosophie* in the various forms of vitalism and esotericism that followed for the next century. The philosophers Ludwig Klages, Hermann Keyserling, and Max Scheler have, to be sure, reclaimed some of this heritage, but in an essentially speculative manner; moreover, they are neither chemists nor geologists nor astrophysicists nor physicians.

We find the most obvious survival of Romantic *Naturphilosophie* in the concept of the unconscious, particularly in Schopenhauer's monolithic conception of it and in the slightly different but still monolithic unconscious as described by Freud, but also in that notion of the unconscious whose structure Jung has depicted—it is even a quaternary structure! Without a doubt, Jung is the last of this school. What is more, he has even given us the key to understanding it, for what he says of the alchemists—that what they saw in stone was, in fact, a constellation of their own personal unconscious—could undoubtedly be said of the German *Naturphilosophen*. Though they themselves did not make discoveries significant in the history of science (in this area Johann Wilhelm Ritter was a brilliant exception), they nevertheless expressed truths of a different order, which could well be that of the Absolute. They were the last representatives of an age when man—at least the scholar—felt at home on this earth, before the appearance of an entirely different, definitively alienated nature.

Judeo-Christian theosophy, or rather, the little of it that survives in the twentieth century, continues the tradition of a philosophy of nature, some of its branches pressing forward in a traditional direction. Thus, Rudolf Steiner, like Jung, teaches the restoration of human harmony at all levels, but in addition, like the disciple of Goethe that he has always been, he assigns that part that is beautiful to nature. Today it is not so much tradition that orients man to a return to a philosophy of nature, for there is scarcely anyone left who dares, as Oetinger did, to confront science and the Bible. Increasingly this orientation occurs in the scientific communities themselves. There are many members of these communities who, often unwittingly, take up anew or rediscover these elements of the past. In the so-called exact sciences alone, we may mention the idea of intelligent matter, which has been addressed more and more by the specialists (Arthur Stanley Eddington, V. A. Firsoff, Fritjof Capra, Jean Charon), and the corollary tendency to establish relationships between the concepts of modern physics and the ideas on which the philosophical and religious traditions of the Far East are based—it is true that our own traditions, even in these areas, are generally unknown. Thus, a sort of visionary physics is developing. Werner Heisenberg's physics approaches the microphysical structures of Platonic schemas; Jack Sarfatti argues that matter comes from light, which is gravitationally self-trapped. For Arthur Koestler, in *The Roots of Coincidence*, matter is modeled on the spirit. One can easily multiply the examples.

Let me conclude with a word about the Colloquium of Cordova in 1979. Although it did not deal directly with the question of Romantic *Naturphilosophie*, in the published proceedings emerges the idea of a universal interdependence in a science that, at its triumphant peak, had the power to eradicate this idea once and for all. Some observers are tempted to detect in this interdependence the polar, dialectic, and dynamic schemas, which are now organized according to arithmological laws, themselves containing symbolic schemas of which esotericism could not have been ignorant, or which pertain to *Naturphilosophie*. These are apparent in the work of the physician and biologist Stéphane Lupasco. The current tendency in the history of the sciences and in the work of science itself is often to place the emphasis on structural types, on models of hierarchization, and on other categories or formal research procedures. The theories of modern science could find new horizons in the texts of *Naturphilosophie*.

Of course, if *Naturphilosophie* in the full meaning of the term—that is, the Paracelsian or Baaderian—is to regain full citizenship, then it must once more incorporate a theology or true theosophy, a myth in the sense that Oetinger had of the word; and it must launch a scientific investigation that, in turn, will release new meanings from the scriptures, meanings that complement science. One must remember that even at the zenith of Romantic *Naturphilosophie*, men who were both true theosophists and *Naturphilosophen* were never numerous. What we may nonetheless imagine, for our own late twentieth-century age, is a form of speculative spirituality capable of encompassing the full richness of the world, as the Christian theology of the twelfth century tried to do, in order to develop a new vehicle for perceiving the ordering principles of the universe under the threefold and complementary sign of mind, anthropology, and the comprehension of the real. We speak here of a many-sided reality not limited to the projection of a single flat, truncated belief, but rather one that brings flesh and flame together.

[*See also* Hermetism; *for related discussion, see* Science and Religion.]

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NAVĀ'Ī, 'ALĪ SHĪR. *See* 'Alī Shīr Navā'ī.

NAVAJO RELIGION. The Navajo, whose population in the 1980s has been estimated at 170,000, now live primarily on the Navajo Nation (a reservation approximately the size of New England) in northern Arizona and New Mexico. Archaeological and linguistic evidence suggests that the Navajo were latecomers to the American Southwest, arriving between 1000 and 1525 CE. Through contact with the Spanish and Puebloan peoples they acquired horses, sheep, goats, and agriculture. Anthropologists believe that after the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, refugee Puebloan people living with the Navajo greatly influenced Navajo religion. Similarities in their origin legends, parallels between Pueblo and Navajo cosmologies, their use of masked figures in ritual, and their use of sand paintings probably date from this period.

Cosmogony and Worldview. The Navajo origin myth recounts their emergence from a series of underworlds onto the Earth Surface. Using a medicine bundle brought from the underworlds, in an all-night ceremony at the place of emergence, First Man, First Woman, and other Holy People set in place the "inner forms" of natural phenomena (earth, sky, the sacred mountains, plants, and animals), creating the present world. It was into this world that Changing Woman was born; she was impregnated by the sun and gave birth to twin sons, who killed various monsters that had been endangering the Holy People. Using the medicine bundle First Man had given her, Changing Woman created maize. She also created the Earth-Surface People, or the Navajo, from epidermal waste rubbed from her skin.

The Navajo creation myth indicates that there is no dichotomy between the natural and supernatural in Navajo religion. Further, the human (the Earth-Surface People) and the divine (the Holy People) are conceived of in terms of the same set of motivating forces: the notion of "wind" *(nłch'i);* the concept of inner form *(bii'gistłín),* or "in-lying one" *(bii'siztinii);* and the opposing notions of "pleasant conditions," or harmony and balance *(hózhǫ),* and "ugly conditions," or disharmony and disorder *(hóchǫ').*

Wind is a unitary phenomenon that is the source of all life, movement, and behavior. However, wind has various aspects that have different functions and hence different names. Before the Emergence, winds are said to have given the means of life (i.e., breath) to the inhabitants of the underworlds. After the Emergence, mists of light were placed along each of the cardinal directions and four sacred mountains were created in each direction. Each direction is said to have an "inner form" *(bii'gistłín)* as well as a closely associated wind. From the four directions these winds give the means of life, movement, thought, and communication to the natural phenomena, the Holy People, and the Navajo. Wind's Child is sent to guide and advise the Earth-Surface People. Finally, each Navajo also has a "wind within one" *(nłch'i bii'siztinii)* that enters at birth and guides the individual.

Thus both natural phenomena and humans have inner forms or "in-lying ones" animated by wind. As Gary Witherspoon has written, "In most cases the Holy People of the fifth world are those who are the inner forms of various natural phenomena and forces, including animals. These in-lying ones are the controlling and animating powers of nature. Navajo ritual is designed to control the Holy People who are the inner forms and controlling agents of natural phenomena" (Witherspoon, 1983, p. 575).

The Holy People *(diyin dine'é)* are immune to danger, destruction, and death. They are not holy in the sense that they are virtuous but rather in the sense that they are powerful. It is a Navajo's responsibility to maintain harmonious relations between himself and the Holy People, though they may be persuaded to aid in the restoration of a person who has become ill through improper contact with them. In Navajo religion the term

hózhǫ́ refers to a positive or ideal environment. The phrase *są'áh naaghái, bik'eh hózhǫ́* ("long life, in accordance with happiness, harmony") occurs in most ritual songs and prayers and even more clearly exemplifies the Navajo ideal. As Witherspoon puts it, "The goal of Navajo life in this world is to live to maturity in the condition described as *hózhǫ́*, and to die of old age, the end result of which incorporates one into the universal beauty, harmony, and happiness described as *są'áh naaghái bik'eh hózhǫ́*" (ibid., p. 573).

Illness is thought to be a state of "ugly conditions" *(hóchǫ́')* that has resulted from the patient's contact with something "dangerous." Wyman and Kluckhohn (1938, pp. 13–14) list four groups of "etiological factors" that can produce sickness: (1) natural phenomena such as lightning, wind, and thunder; (2) some kinds of animals, including bears, deer, coyotes, porcupines, snakes, eagles, and fish; (3) coming into contact with ceremonial paraphernalia at inappropriate times; and (4) ghosts of Navajos, aliens, or witches, including werewolves. Illness may result from a direct attack, in which case the "weapon" *(deezláá')* or "arrow" *(bik'a')* of the animal or lightning is thought to lodge in the person's interior, or the "in-standing one" or wind *(nłch'i)* of a dangerous animal, a natural phenomenon, a witch, or a ghost may enter the body and become temporarily or permanently the "wind within one" of the person. The process of curing during a Navajo "sing" thus entails removing the "ugly things" (anger, weapons, or even the "in-standing one" that has entered the patient's body) if the person is to regain the state of *hózhǫ́*.

Types of Chants. Anthropologists have identified twenty-four chant complexes; only about eight were well known and frequently performed in the 1970s; six were extinct and four were obsolescent. There has been little agreement among either Navajo consultants or anthropologists as to how these chants might be ordered into a system. (See Wyman and Kluckhohn, 1938; Haile, 1938; Reichard, 1950; Wyman, 1983; Witherspoon, 1983; and Werner et al., 1983, for various possibilities.)

The Navajo Blessingway is, however, one of the central ceremonies. Its myth (recounted in full in Wyman, 1970) recounts the events of the Navajo creation after the Emergence, and the activities of Changing Woman play a central role. The Blessingway ceremony, two nights in length, is used to prevent *hóchǫ́'* and to preserve a state of *hózhǫ́*, or blessing. The Kinaalda, or girl's puberty rite, is another ceremonial that uses Blessingway songs and reenacts Changing Woman's first menstruation.

Enemyway *('anaa'jí)*, in contrast, is designed to counteract contact with non-Navajos and to exorcise their ghosts. According to Wyman (1983, p. 541) it is one of a mostly obsolescent group of ancient war ceremonials and is now classed with other ceremonies labeled Evilway *(hóchǫ́'ojí)*. Enemyway lasts three nights, and much of its symbolism revolves around war and the exorcism of "ugly things"; the ceremony includes a mock battle and the shooting of a scalp.

Other chants (Shootingway, Beautyway, Mountainway, Nightway, and Navajo Windway, to name the most popular) are dominated by one of three ways of performing the chant: Lifeway, Evilway, and Holyway. Two chants can be conducted according to the Lifeway ritual, and there is a fundamental Lifeway chant called Flintway. Lifeway is used to treat injuries resulting from accidents; in it, the person who is undergoing treatment is painted red, the color of flesh and blood, which symbolizes a return to life and health. Evilway ritual is characterized by techniques for exorcising native ghosts and for chasing away "ugly things." Most chants are performed according to Holyway ritual, which is directed toward the Holy People and is concerned with the attraction of good and the restoration of the patient. I shall discuss the Holyway version of Navajo chants in more detail to illustrate the themes of Navajo ritual and the curing process itself.

Holyway chants. Navajo Holyway chants are two, five, or nine nights in length (a "night" being counted from one sunset to the next). They consist of component ceremonies strung together in a specified order. Many chants include a bath, a sand-painting ritual, a sweat and emetic ceremony, and an all-night sing on the last night. Each component ceremony is composed of ritual acts that are directed against the etiological factor (for example, bears, snakes, or lightning) causing the illness that the ceremony is designed to cure.

The Navajo model of the cosmos as laid out in the creation myth is expressed in the setting of the ceremony itself. The chant takes place in a Navajo hogan, which is circular like the horizon. Movement during a ritual is always clockwise or "in the direction of the sun." Men sit on the south side of the hogan; women sit on the north side. The singer sits on the southwest side and the patient, when resting, sits on the northwest side. The east (where the door is located) is associated with *diyin;* prayer sticks and other offerings are deposited toward the east. The north is associated with *hóchǫ́'*, and objects that have been pressed against the patient in order to remove *hóchǫ́'* are deposited toward the north. Each chant uses color and directional symbolism as a condensed code for ordering and interpreting the myriad of ritual actions that are performed during the chant.

During the sing, the singer uses a number of ritual

objects including (1) the fetishes that are a permanent part of his pouch, (2) the objects constructed during the chant (e.g., prayer sticks and sand paintings) partly from the singer's supplies and partly from materials (such as ground stone, yucca root, and corn meal) obtained by the patient's relatives according to the singer's specifications, and (3) medicines prepared during the chant from the singer's supply of pollen and plant materials.

During the chant, ritual objects are combined with several kinds of ritual actions: prestations to the Holy People, actions that identify the patient with the supernatural, and actions of removal that rid the patient's body of "ugly conditions." Identification with the Holy People takes place through actions of "applying to" or "taking in"—for example, pressing articles from the singer's pouch against the patient's body to make him or her *diyin*. Other important ritual actions include feeding the patient "sacred food" or herbal medicine, pressing the sand from the supernaturals depicted in a sand painting on parts of the body, and inhaling the dawn's breath or *nłch'i* at the very end of the sing. There are also several actions that remove "ugly things": for example, the "unraveling ceremony" (where feathers or herbs are bound in bundles with strips of yucca, pressed against the patient, and then yanked off) and the forced vomiting during a sweat and emetic ceremony.

The three themes (prestation, removal, and identification) occur over and over again during the entire Holyway chant. They are repeated in each subceremony, in each prayer, and in each song set. However, one of these themes may be dominant or emphasized in a particular subceremony. During the prayer stick ceremony, in which a supernatural is compelled to aid a patient, prestations are important; during a sweat and emetic ceremony, the removal of *hóchǫ́'* is crucial; and during a sand-painting ceremony the identification of the patient with the *diyin* is the focus of effort.

Comparisons. There are striking similarities between Navajo ceremonialism and that of the Apache, on the one hand, and the Pueblo, on the other. Both the Navajo and the Apache place emphasis on the central theme of long life, and both center their ceremonies on the individual, that is, on changing his or her state through prestation, the removal of evil objects, and identification with supernatural power. Like Pueblo religion, Navajo religion entails a view of the cosmos that is structured as a bounded universe where the present world is the top of several layered worlds through which the ancestors emerged. Navajo ritual replicates the cosmos more clearly than does Apache ritual; but, by using color, sex, and directional symbolism to do so, Navajo religion parallels Pueblo ritual and worldview (see Heib, 1979; Tedlock, 1979; and Ortiz, 1969).

The similarities between the ceremonies of the Navajo, the Apache, and the Pueblo suggest that there are unifying features to ceremonialism in native Southwest cultures. Southwest religion, like that of other Native American cultures, is closely tied to the natural environment. Native cosmologies are rooted in conceptions of time and space that lay out the local terrain in a particular way, imbuing it with supernatural meaning. Natural objects are made into ritual objects and are used to attract positive supernatural power, to remove dangerous power, and to represent sacred presence. Ceremonial specialists using these objects and ritual actions communicate with the supernatural in order to ensure that the natural and cultivated plant and animal life will continue to be abundant and that individual and communal health and prosperity are maintained.

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NAVARĀTRI ("nine nights"), also known as Durgotsava ("festival of the goddess Durgā"), is a festival celebrated in India and Nepal at the time of the vernal and autumnal equinoxes. The nine nights are followed by a festival known both as Daśarā (or Daśaharā, "destroying the ten [sins]") and as Vijayādaśamī ("victory on the tenth [day]"). Although the festival of the vernal equinox is not celebrated in all regions of India, it appears in modified form in local festivals dedicated to the Goddess. The great autumnal Navarātri, which takes place during the nine nights following the new moon in the lunar month of October-November, is pan-Indian and is regarded as an important rite performed to benefit a variety of aspects of Hindu life (see Kane, 1958, vol. 5, pt. 5, pp. 156–157).

The theology and function of the Goddess, particularly of Durgā and of all popular female deities, find expression in the Navarātri (Biardeau, 1981, pp. 142–156). Its main textual source is the *Devīmāhātmya* (Glorification of the Goddess), which is a section of the *Markaṇḍeya Purāṇa* often extracted and regarded as a text in its own right. According to that text, the demons (*asuras*) at one time overcame the gods, and Mahiṣāsura, the Buffalo Demon, took the place of the king of the gods. From the palpable anger of the gods was formed the body of the Goddess, known variously as Mahāmāyā ("great illusion"), Caṇḍī ("the cruel"), Durgā ("unattainable"), and by other names. The Goddess, incarnate at the energy *(śakti)* of the gods, obtained weapons from the gods and in her various forms fought against the multifarious *asuras*, whose archetype is Mahiṣa.

When she is regarded as a virgin, as distinct from any male consorts, or as the supreme deity, the Goddess in India is depicted as a fearsome and terrible deity who demands blood sacrifices. From the defeated Buffalo Demon springs a *puruṣa*, a "man" who when sacrificed becomes a devotee of the Goddess. Navarātri is thus closely associated with sacrificial themes, although in most regions vegetable substitutes now take the place of sacrificial animals in the ritual. The many forms and aspects of the Goddess and of the *asuras* correspond with the various interests and evils of this earth, for the continuation of which she manifests herself. What is more precisely at stake in the story of the *Devīmāhātmya*, however, is Mahiṣāsura's usurpation of the gods' power over the world. Hence it follows that the Goddess's close relationship with the king is a crucial element for the preservation of the Hindu cosmo-social order and for the prosperity of the kingdom as well.

The Navarātri is more complex in some regions of India than in others. In some areas it is primarily a festival marking the growing season. In others, it centers mostly around the worship of a local goddess, who may be thought of as the spouse of an untouchable. It may also be a highly ceremonialized and intricate festival, as in the former princely states, where the king was required to perform the Buffalo Sacrifice.

The main Navarātri ritual consists of installing the Goddess in the home and in the temple throughout the nine nights of the ceremony. In Tamil Nadu the Goddess is seated among many other images in a royal audience and is visited daily by women singing devotional songs; there, the ninth night is consecrated to the worship of Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning, and to *āyudhapūjā*, the worship of weapons and tools. In other regions young girls are worshiped as embodiments of the virgin Goddess. In Mysore (modern-day Karnataka) and Bastar the nine nights were a time of ascetic practices for the king.

In Bengal, the installation of the Goddess in a royal temple is an elaborate life-giving rite (see Östör, 1980, pp. 71ff.). The night between the eighth and ninth days serves as the climax to the ceremony as a whole. Navarātri is also an important popular festival in which the Bengalis build huge, richly decorated images of the Goddess. These icons of Devī are destroyed during the Vijayādaśamī rites. Large and excited crowds of people (who at times transgress the norms of conduct) parade the many images of the Goddess to bodies of water, where they are immersed.

Vijayādaśamī concerns primarily the *kṣatriya* caste. In royal states and in Nepal the king performs *āyudhapūjā*, officiates at parades of soldiers astride horses and elephants, and symbolically conquers the world by throwing arrows to the four directions. Ritually crossing the boundaries, the king goes toward the northeast to perform *śamīpūjā*, the worship of the *śamī* tree, traditionally associated with the sacred fire. This appears to be a ritual restatement of an event recounted in the *Mahābhārata* in which the heroes of the epic retrieve

the weapons they had hidden in that tree. Seated in a royal audience, the king receives the renewed allegiance of his subjects. In some regions there are dramatic enactments of the victory of Viṣṇu's incarnation as Rāma over Rāvaṇa, the demon-king of Sri Lanka. In former times, the end of Navarātri, which coincides with the end of the monsoon, marked the time for kings to return to their wars. Moreover, the close association between the *asura*-slayer, Devī, and the kingdom, which is under her protection, symbolically restores prosperity to everyone in the domain.

[*See also* Durgā Hinduism *and* Hindu Religious Year.]

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NAWRŪZ (lit., "new day"), the Iranian national festival that celebrates the arrival of spring. A festival of renewal, hope, and happiness, Nawrūz begins on the first day of Farvardīn, the first month of the Iranian solar calendar, at the spring equinox, and continues for twelve days. It is the most widely celebrated, the longest, and the most colorful of Iranian festivals, and though inherited from Zoroastrian Persia, it is the only festival that is not confined to a single religious group.

The origins of Nawrūz are obscure. In popular legend its institution is associated mostly with Jamshēd, the mythical Iranian king. In Firdawsī's epic, the *Shāh-nāmah* (completed about 1000 CE), it is said that the feast commemorates Jamshēd's ascent into the skies in a chariot built by the demons whom he had subdued and forced into the service of mortals. Nawrūz appears, however, to have been originally a pagan pastoral festival that marked the transition from winter to summer: rites of fertility and renovation can be easily recognized in some of its customs.

Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), the ancient prophet of Iran, probably reconsecrated Nawrūz to his religion. In any event, like Mihragān, the festival that marked the end of summer, Nawrūz continued to be observed in Zoroastrian Iran with full vigor; the two celebrations formed the festive poles of the Iranian calendar year. Nawrūz was immediately preceded by Hamaspathmaēdaya, a major religious feast that fell on the thirtieth day of the last month of the year (20 March) and was dedicated to the spirits of the departed, the *fravashis*. These spirits were thought to come down to the earth during this period to visit their abodes and to dwell with their families. In anticipation of the *fravashis'* arrival, houses were cleaned, and food and drink were laid out for them. Nawrūz thus had a sober and commemorative prelude, informed by the remembrance of the departed family members, ancestors, and pious believers. Among the Zoroastrians the two festivals eventually merged, and the Farvardīgān holidays came to comprise both.

In Zoroastrian Iran, Nawrūz proper began at dawn as the *fravashis* withdrew and the old year faded away. For the Zorastrians the festival also celebrated the creation of fire and its celestial guardian, Artavahisht. On the first day of spring, prayers were offered to Rapithwan, a helper of the powerful deity Mehr (Avestan, Mithra). Rapithwan, who personified noon, the ideal time, would withdraw underground during the winter months to protect the roots of plants and springs of water from frost, a creation of the demons. At Nawrūz, he would appear above ground to usher in the summer season.

The Achaemenid kings (559–330 BCE) celebrated Nawrūz above all at Persepolis, their capital, and some scholars have hypothesized that the parade of gift-bearers from various nations depicted in the bas-reliefs of the palace walls represent Nawrūz ceremonies. Under the Sasanids (226–652 CE), Nawrūz, together with Mihragān, was to some extent secularized. Contemporary accounts as well as reports in early Islamic sources attest to the Sasanid kings' lavish celebration of Nawrūz and its colorful ceremonies and customs. Some of these tended to observe the number seven: for instance, seven kinds of seeds were grown in small containers as part of the festival rites and decoration, a custom still observed in the few remaining Zoroastrian villages in Iran. Furthermore, it is said that at Nawrūz seven kinds of grain, twigs from seven different trees, and seven silver coins were placed before the king. Today an essential and cherished decoration of Nawrūz is a collection of seven items whose names begin with the letter *s* in Persian *(haft sīn)*. Of ambiguous or obscure origin, these are most often apple, vinegar, sumac, garlic, silver coins, sorbapple, and fresh grass.

Stripped of its Zoroastrian connotations, Nawrūz survived the advent of Islam and continued as the Iranian national festival. The Shī'ī Muslims of Iran, however, came to associate important religious events with Nawrūz. Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī quotes a number of tra-

ditions from the Shīʿī imams (in *Biḥār al-anwār*, volume 14, the section on *nayrīz*), who report that it was on Nawrūz that Adam was created, that God made a covenant with humankind, that Abraham destroyed the pagan idols, that the prophet Muḥammad took his young son-in-law ʿAlī, on his shoulders to smash the idols in Mecca, and, most important of all, that he chose ʿAlī as his rightful successor. The Muslim rulers of Iran, continuing the Sasanid tradition, celebrated Nawrūz with pomp and circumstance. The ceremonies generally included the recitation of congratulatory panegyrics, feasting, the reception of dignitaries, music and dance, and the exchange of gifts. From about the middle of the sixteenth century, when Iran came into the possession of firearms, the onset of Nawrūz was announced in larger cities by the firing of cannon.

As a religious feast, Nawrūz apparently began as a one-day celebration, but calendar reforms, combined with the popular tendency of observing the festivals according to the old calendar, seem to have stretched it first to six days, with its division in Sasanid times into Lesser Nawrūz (the first day) and Greater Nawrūz (the sixth day), and eventually to its present length. In or about the year 1006, the first of Farvardīn fell on the first day of spring, and a calendar reform, in which the poet ʿUmar (Omar) Khayyām participated, fixed the date of the feast on the first of Farvardīn and arranged for keeping it constant by intercalating one day before the New Year festival every four years.

Preparations for Nawrūz begin well in advance of the holiday. Although there are local variations, some practices are fairly general. A week or two before the New Year, grains of wheat or lentils are soaked in water and, after they germinate, are spread over a dish to grow. The resulting fresh mass of green blades *(sabzeh)* is an essential and symbolic decoration of the festival. In addition to the *sabzeh* and the *haft-sin*, the Nawrūz table is adorned with a mirror, a copy of the holy book of the household's faith, a bowl of water in which green leaves or flower petals may float, and colored eggs, as well as fruits, fresh herbs, cakes, and candies. The "turn" of the year is awaited with eagerness and excitement, particularly by the young. A few moments before the solemn announcement of Nawrūz, the members of the family, by this time all bathed and clad in new or clean clothes, gather around the table, ready to embrace and exchange greetings and gifts. The visiting of relatives and friends is a common Nawrūz activity. In villages young men often engage in wrestling and other athletic games.

On the thirteenth day of Nawrūz, the ceremonies are brought to an end with a picnic in the countryside. The *sabzeh* must now be taken out and thrown into running water, which is thought to take away with it any bad luck of the previous year. Wishes are made, especially by young girls, for a happy future. The Parsis of India, who left Iran in the tenth century in order to preserve their Zoroastrian faith, also continue to celebrate Nawrūz *(jamshedī Navroz)* as a major feast.

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EHSAN YARSHATER

NAẒẒĀM, AL- (d. between AH 220 and 230, 835 and 845 CE), more fully Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār al-Naẓẓām; Muslim philosopher and theologian of the Muʿtazilī school. Born and raised in Basra, al-Naẓẓām was accepted, despite his poverty, in wealthy and intellectual circles, originally because of his ability as a poet and a wit. He studied theology with his uncle, Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 849/50?). Later he moved to Baghdad, where by 819 he was established as one of the leading Muʿtazilī theologians at the court of the caliph al-Maʾmūn (d. 833). He wrote extensively on philosophical, theological, and juridical topics and against both diverse non-Muslim doctrines and the teachings of other Muslim thinkers. Although none of al-Naẓẓām's works is preserved, he is so extensively quoted by later writers, particularly by his pupil al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 868), that his teachings are better known than those of any other Muslim theologian of the same period.

Al-Naẓẓām elaborated a complex theory of the nature of material bodies, which, although derived from earlier (ultimately Stoic) traditions, was largely original. Against the atomism of Abū al-Hudhayl and others he held that bodies are infinitely divisible, being constituted of various kinds of body (such as coldness, dampness, smell, sound, color, brightness); while totally interpenetrating one another, these bodies alternate in being either manifest or "latent" according to the balance of the mixture. It is God who creates the bodies and mixes and maintains the contraries. Motions of bodies occur in discontinuous "jumps." The natural actions of bodies result from the natures of their components. The human being is a subtle body (spirit, soul) that permeates the coarse, manifest body. By its nature the human spirit is alive and capable of voluntary motion. Since the coarse human body is subject to defects, humans frequently err. In the next life these defects will be removed from the blessed. God, the creator of all bodies, cannot act unjustly and can, moreover, do only what is best *(aṣlaḥ)* for his creatures. God's nature transcends that of creatures, and all predicates of God other than action predicates are interpreted by al-Naẓẓām simply as denials of their contraries.

In al-Naẓẓām's time, the traditions ascribed to the Prophet and to his companions, together with the notion of the consensus *(ijmāʿ)* of the companions, were gaining widespread acceptance as the basis of law. He vehemently attacked the validity of these by citing numerous conflicting and contradictory statements ascribed to individual companions. He held, accordingly, that only reason, direct evidence, and the Qur'ān furnish a sound basis for legal judgment.

Al-Naẓẓām's teaching did not lie in the mainstream of Islamic thought; he was attacked even by fellow Muʿtazilah, among them Abū al-Hudhayl. Nevertheless, even though his system was adopted integrally by no one, he had a significant influence on the development of the Baghdad school of the Muʿtazilah and, through them, on al-Māturīdī (d. 944).

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NDEMBU RELIGION. The Ndembu, also called the Lunda, number about sixty thousand and inhabit small villages in the district of Mwinilunga in the northwestern province of Zambia. Although their descent system is matrilineal, women leave home to marry into their husbands' villages, a system that sets up social tensions and, before the advent of Christianity, used to result in a high divorce rate. In this conflict-torn society, cult associations formerly had a great unifying power, calling together members from many different kinship groups to cooperate in rituals that gave moments of spiritual revelation, which in turn resolved conflicts and healed illness.

Cults of Affliction. Among the Ndembu, affliction was seen as having a spiritual cause: the spirit of a dead matrilineal relative *(mukishi)* afflicted a living descendant, "coming out" in a range of different modes of spirit visitation. Thus the spirit might "come out in Nkula," the mode of menstrual troubles; Wubwang'u, the mode of twins; Isoma, the miscarriage mode; Ihamba, a spirit tooth wandering in the patient's body, needing ritual extraction; Wuyang'a, the mode for hunters; Tukuka, the mode of Western diseases; or Chihamba, the mode of the demigod of thunder. Wubwang'u and Ihamba afflictions still exist today.

The spirit "caught" a living relative in the first place because he or she had not honored the spirit's memory. When afflicted, an individual required a complex ritual, the mode of which was determined by the consideration of symptoms and by divination. The ritual (*n'goma*, "drum") was performed by a cult association consisting of those who had already been afflicted in that mode. The aim was to bring the spirit up out of the ground (the place where the spirits dwell) so that by recognizing its existence and giving it a concrete form—as a figure, effigy, tooth, or voice—it could be revealed. *Kusolola*, "to reveal," was a basic element of Ndembu religion and curative ritual. The religion taught: "what hurts you, when discovered and propitiated, helps you." Through the use of medicines, drumming and singing, and distinctive rites appropriate to each mode, the spirit was brought once more into the social milieu and would, at a switch point in the ritual, begin to do good instead of harm to the patient. Often what triggered the change was a sacrifice, which might be the beheading of a fowl or a blow on an effigy, signifying killing; while the victim embodied the spirit, the act gave a sense of

innocence and *communitas*. Ndembu sacrifice was the point where the visible and invisible components of the cosmic order interpenetrated and exchanged qualities. When the spirit world and the world of the living were at one, the patient was healed.

Life-Crisis Rituals. A young girl or boy could not become a full member of the Ndembu people without an initiation ritual. The matrilineal character of the descent system emphasized the bond of breast feeding; thus, a forest shrub called *mudyi*, which has milky sap, was a dominant symbol for both girls' and boys' initiations. *Mudyi* represented the matrilineage itself and the virtues of good family living; its "milk" was the sensory pole of the symbol's meaning, hinting at the satisfactions associated with mother's milk—a pole that gave power to the ideological pole of goodness.

Both girls' and boys' initiations were rites of passage, and they are still performed in a truncated form. The novice passes ritually from childhood into a liminal time of seclusion when she or he is neither child nor adult. Finally the initiate is reincorporated into society as a full member.

Girls are initiated singly, at puberty; the initiate used to be laid down under a blanket at the foot of a milk tree for an entire day, while the women danced around her. At evening she was carried into a seclusion hut, where she received training for three months. At the end she performed a public dance and might then be married.

Boys from five to fifteen years of age are still circumcised in groups in a sacred enclosure away from the village. They are secluded there during healing, and in former times used to be visited by an *ikishi* dancer, a spirit from ancient times (not an ancestor spirit). Finally the boys would rejoin society in a public celebration that used to include a triumphal dance before the chief. In both rituals the place of ordeal and humiliation used to be called "the place of death"; symbolic death and rebirth were basic features of these and many of the curative rites.

Death itself was celebrated by a masked dancer *(kadang'u)* who was both mourner and clown. Among the funerary symbols were three trenches filled with white-, red-, and black-colored water, representing goodness, blood and ambivalence, and death; these trenches were known as "rivers" proceeding from Nzambi, the creator god. Formerly, a stilt walker, the head of the funerary society, would come to beat and initiate the small boys of the mourning camp. Medicines and rituals are still used to keep the ghost of the dead person quiet.

Thus Ndembu religion was directly concerned with human events, whether sickness, bad luck in hunting, conflict in the village, or phases in the maturation of an individual. It was mainly through sickness that an individual began to sense the presence of an ancestor spirit; thus it was the very irregularities of life, its negative events, that created the positive sense of the supernatural, especially when the spirit possessed a patient and she swayed, her body physically released by its presence. The palpable existence of spirits developed in the course of the experience of misfortune. This is not to be explained as a compensation mechanism; misfortune did more than arouse fantasies, for it triggered well-recognized faculties *(wanga)* that needed the stimulus of trouble, and then of social cooperation, in order to flower. Senior doctors still train their apprentices in those faculties and teach the appropriate material accompaniments of medicine, drumming, confession, and trance in order to exorcise evil spirits. In spite of the growth of Christianity in the late twentieth century, traditional healers are increasing in numbers. Owing to the suppression of ancestor cults, they do not appeal to the ancestor spirits of the patients, but instead are helped by tutelary spirits from among their own ancestors or from some strong departed personality. Formerly a doctor entered his vocation after being sick himself. In the case of an incipient diviner he might be troubled in his breathing until he gave in to the demands of his spirit and underwent the Kayong'u initiation.

Spirits. In the past, Ndembu religion centered upon ancestor spirits who communicated with humans frequently but unpredictably. Like the people's own lives, their domain was process, not the absolute. Continually involved in human life, they could heal their descendants and make them sexually potent. Such spirits could also be reborn in their patrilateral descendants. They were often whimsical, difficult, and easily offended when forgotten, but beneficent when treated with respect. Thus all of humanity, past, present, and future, was strongly knit together. *Mukishi* ancestor spirits and the ancient *ikishi* spirits, however, are no longer recognized as necessary agents of healing or change in rites of passage.

The Ndembu also believed in the *mwevulu*, the spirit shadow that was thought to leave a person and wander about when he or she was asleep and dreaming. It was this "shadow" that left a person when he or she died. Certain evil spirits are still feared, principally the *mufu*, the dangerous ghost that arises when funerary rites have not been properly fulfilled, and the harmful *andumba* (sg., *ndumba*), familiars sent by witches in the shape of little men with their feet reversed, or in the form of hyenas, jackals, owls, or small rodents. Two other types of beings are also feared: the leader of the *andumba*, the *kahwehu*, often the ghost of the witch's

murdered husband, who is said to have continued intercourse with her, and the *musalu*, or zombie, which can be raised from a corpse by a witch and sent out to kill.

God. The pre-Christian Ndembu recognized a creator god who was known as Nzambi. Having once created the world Nzambi never intervened in the lives of humans: and his role in religion was exiguous except in a negative sense. The Ndembu girl during her sacralization and seclusion was carefully shielded from his sight—as represented by the sun. This male god, the sun, and men and boys, must be absent from her scenes of rebirth. Nzambi's place was far away above the world. He was thought to be connected with rain, animals, and fertility, and also with the moral order, which decreed piety to the dead and compassion to the living. Christians have appropriated the name *Nzambi* to translate the term *God;* and now even traditional healers pray to Nzambi, just as Ndembu Christians have been doing for decades.

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NECROMANCY, the art or practice of magically conjuring up the souls of the dead, is primarily a form of divination. The principal purpose of seeking such communication with the dead is to obtain information from them, generally regarding the revelation of unknown causes or the future course of events. The cause of the death of the deceased who is questioned may be among the facts sought.

More generally, necromancy is often considered synonymous with magic, sorcery, or witchcraft, perhaps because the calling up of the dead may occur for purposes other than information seeking, or because the separation of divination from its consequences is not always clear. There is also a linguistic basis for the expanded use of the word: the term *black art* for magic appears to be based on a corruption of *necromancy* (from Greek *necros*, "dead") to *negromancy* (from Latin *niger*, "black").

Limited to the practice of magical conjuration of the dead, necromancy does not include communication employing mediums, as in spiritualism or spiritism. Nor does it include encounters with the souls of the departed during the spirit journeys of shamans, apparitions of ghosts, or communications in dreams, with the possible exception of those in dreams resulting from incubation.

Divination is undoubtedly a universal phenomenon, to be found in all cultures. In the form of necromancy, however, it is relatively infrequent, though widespread. We possess only limited descriptions and documentation of the phenomenon and only for certain periods and regions. Necromancy presupposes belief in a form of life after death and the continued interest of the dead in the affairs of the living. As such, it may well be associated with complex funerary and postfunerary customs and with ancestor worship.

Techniques of Necromancy. Necromancy is a theme often found in myths, legends, and literary works. Such texts may describe communications with the dead or state their messages, but they seldom provide information on techniques employed in a given community. Where actual descriptions exist, rather than fabulous accounts or rumors and accusations, we find inquiries connected with burial and burial preparation. Here the questioning of the corpse may concern the cause of death and the identification of a murderer. Other necromantic practices involve rites at the grave site with the use of some part of the deceased, often his or her skull, or name. The response may be in the form of an utterance produced by the diviner, either in a trance state or through ventriloquism. It may also be revealed in the form of a sign; this may involve the interpretation of an omen or the drawing of lots.

The concept of necromancy is of limited utility for at least two reasons. (1) It is linked to its history in the Western tradition and therefore difficult to employ in analyzing beliefs and practices of other cultures, with different traditions. (2) Necromancy is also only one of several types of divinatory practices, and these tend to shade into each other. For both of these reasons the term is of limited value in cross-cultural research, and it is not generally utilized in modern ethnographic studies.

Necromancy in Antiquity. The ancient Greeks believed that the dead had great prophetic powers and

that it was possible to consult them by performing sacrifices or pouring libations at their tombs. Such offerings were also part of the funerary and postfunerary ceremonies. The visit of Odysseus to Hades to consult Tiresias, as described in book 11 of the *Odyssey*, has also been classified as an instance of necromancy. There are references in various other classical texts to formal oracles of the dead; however, these are generally to practices in remote locations or among barbarians.

Most of our information on necromancy among Nordic and Germanic peoples comes from the sagas. A number of references appear, for example, in the Eddas. Óðinn (Odin) is, among other things, god of the dead, and in one account he awakens a dead prophetess in order to consult her. In addition to conjurations, interpretation of the movement of rune-inscribed sticks appears to have been practiced. Necromancy was only one of numerous techniques of divination, and one considered to be particularly dangerous, especially when the dead were not family members. It appears to have been prohibited even prior to the conversion of these peoples to Christianity.

Necromancy appears to have been unknown, or at least unreported, among the Etruscans and in the earlier periods of Roman history. It may have been introduced with other Hellenistic and Oriental divinatory and magic practices, all of which were prohibited by Augustus. Like other forms of divination and magic, which might include the use of poisons, necromancy was perceived as a potential political tool, dangerous in a world of personal power and ambition. The emperors, however, surrounded themselves with diviners of all sorts. The concerns of medieval Christianity with necromancy and magic have their roots in this period, as well as in biblical prohibitions.

Numerous divinatory techniques are mentioned in the Bible. The account of the so-called Witch of Endor (*1 Sm.* 28) is frequently cited as an example of necromancy and of the prohibitions attached to it (cf. *Deuteronomy*, *Leviticus*, and *Isaiah*). Necromancy is mentioned in the Talmud among other divinatory practices. Although it is severely condemned, several examples are cited. The practice appears to have been rare, but it left its trace in rabbinic sources and medieval Jewish magical beliefs, perhaps reinforced by the beliefs of the Christians among whom the Jews lived. Magical beliefs, many of pre-Christian origins, continued throughout the Middle Ages. It was, however, between the late Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance that a great fear and persecution of witches took hold. One of the crimes of which witches were accused was necromancy, conjuring up the dead as well as (or with the help of) the Devil. Indeed, the term *necromancy* is primarily associated with this period.

Necromancy in Archaic Cultures. Spanish chronicles composed shortly after the conquest of Peru record that the Inca had two special classes of diviners who consulted the dead, one group specializing in dealing with mummies of the dead and another consulting various spirit beings and their representations, which the Spaniards referred to as idols. The reports are written from the perspective of sixteenth-century Spaniards, at a time when, in their own country, the Inquisition searched out necromancers and others considered sorcerers and heretics.

In the Huon Gulf region of New Guinea, throughout the nineteenth century and prior to the arrival of missionaries, all deaths were attributed to magic. The identification of the sorcerer who had caused the death was carried out by a diviner, who conjured the spirit of the deceased into one of several types of objects. It was then questioned, and "yes" or "no" responses were obtained from the motion of the object. The most common object used was a stunned eel, whose convulsions were interpreted as "yes" responses. Other objects might be an upturned shell or a piece of bamboo held in the hand. The movements of these objects were subject to some manipulations, and the answers were often used to confirm suspicions held by popular opinion.

In Haiti, a tradition exists that is derived from both European influences of the colonial period and West African traditions. As part of postfunerary rites of Voodoo initiates, one of the two souls with which every person is endowed is removed from a temporary sojourn underwater and settled in a family shrine. During this ceremony, the soul is questioned on various matters of interest. At a later time, it may be called into a jar for purposes of consultation. Like conversations with the dead in parts of Africa, as, for instance, among the Zulu, this process appears to involve ventriloquism by the performing ritual specialist. It is also believed that sorcerers can send the spirit of one or more dead persons into the body of a victim, to cause illness and eventual death if appropriate counterrites are not performed. These involve the identification of the dead and of the sender. The diagnostic process may involve the direct questioning of the dead using the patient as a medium, or by scrying (water gazing) or other divinatory techniques. The Haitian example suggests the difficulty in drawing clear lines between divination, sorcery, diagnosis, and healing, or even among the various divinatory techniques.

[*See also* Divination.]

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NEGRITO RELIGIONS. [*This entry concerns the peoples of Southeast Asia known as Negritos. It consists of four articles:*

An Overview
Negritos of the Philippine Islands
Negritos of the Andaman Islands
Negritos of the Malay Peninsula

The introductory article surveys the common elements of Negrito religious systems. The companion articles focus on the three principal areas of Negrito population.]

An Overview

The term *Negrito* (Spanish for "little Negro") has been used by some Western scholars to indicate those inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula, the Philippine Islands, and the Andaman Islands (off the coast of Burma) who are characterized by small stature, dark skin, curly hair, and generally "negroid" facial features. Scholars disagree regarding a possible genetic connection between these small and widely separated populations. The traditional view is that they are all remnants of a single ancient race that was once widespread in Southeast Asia but has now been largely exterminated or absorbed by more powerful and populous immigrant groups. A second view, put forward by some biological anthropologists, is that the distinctive features of the Negritos are examples of "parallel evolution," similar physical changes among unrelated local populations resulting from their common adaptation to the tropical rain forest. Although plausible hypotheses have been advanced as to why that environment might favor "negritoid" characteristics, it is still not clear why such features have not arisen in similar environments elsewhere, such as the Amazon Basin of South America. The genetic relationship between the Asiatic Negritos, then, remains an open question.

The cultures of the various Negrito groups have many similarities, but whether these are due to a common ancestral culture, to contact between the different groups, or to parallel adaptations to similar environments is often unclear. Before 1900 almost all Negritos lived by hunting and gathering, supplemented in some places by small-scale trade in forest products. Their hunting-gathering economy produced such social consequences as small living groups, a lack of wealth accumulation, and informal leadership. Most groups were also nomadic, although the rich environment of the Andaman coast permitted its inhabitants to become partially sedentary.

The religions of the Andamanese, the Semang (Malayan Negritos), and the Philippine Negritos have many features in common, some very general but others highly specific and undoubtedly due to contact or common origin. The similarities are most striking with respect to deity conceptions and the corresponding prohibitions and rituals. The most personified and individualized deities are those associated with weather, especially destructive storms. Most groups have deities responsible for making thunder, and even some of the names given them are similar: Karei in the Malay Peninsula, Kayai and Kadai in the Philippines, and Tarai in the Andamans. These beings are thought to bring thunderstorms as punishment for breaking prohibitions against such diverse acts as incest and burning leeches. The Semang and some of the Philippine groups attempt to avert the storms by offering their own blood to the thunder god. Such common features are striking, but they form only part of each group's religion. In other respects their beliefs and rituals diverge, sometimes so radically as to place even the common features in different lights. For this reason it is best to treat the religions of the Andamanese, Semang, and Philippine Negritos as separate entities, although certain similarities will be apparent.

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"Andamanese-Semang-Eta Cultural Relations," *Primitive Man* (now *Anthropological Quarterly*) 13 (April 1940): 29–47. William C. Boyd's "Four Achievements of the Genetical Method in Physical Anthropology," *American Anthropologist* 65 (April 1962): 243–252, provides a useful introduction to recent thinking on the question of whether the Asiatic Negritos constitute a single race or represent parallel adaptations to similar environments.

KIRK ENDICOTT

Negritos of the Philippine Islands

The Negritos of the Philippines comprise approximately twenty-five widely scattered ethnolinguistic groups totaling an estimated fifteen thousand people. They are assumed to be the aboriginal inhabitants of the archipelago. Many of these Negrito groups still live by hunting and gathering, trading wild meat and forest products to the Filipino farmers around them in exchange for rice or corn. They also practice some marginal cultivation.

The traditional religion of all Philippine Negritos is animism. Today, most of them remain animists, although some of their beliefs have been modified by Roman Catholic Christianity.

One salient feature of Negrito religion is its noticeable lack of systematization. Consequently, it has a secondary place in Negrito ideology. Because the animistic beliefs and practices of Philippine Negritos are individualistic and sporadic, they exert less control over the people's daily lives than do the religious systems of other, non-Negrito animistic societies in the Philippines. Likewise, the minor function of religion in most Philippine Negrito cultures contrasts markedly with the important role of religion among the Negritos of Malaysia, which is reported by Kirk Endicott in *Batek Negrito Religion* (Oxford, 1979).

Nevertheless, there is a universal belief among Philippine Negritos in a spirit world, containing many classes of supernatural beings. These beings are seen to have some influence over processes of nature, as well as over the health and economic success of humans. Negritos especially have a preoccupation with malignant ghosts of deceased humans. Most Negritos also hold to a belief in a supreme deity. Scholars have debated the question of whether this "monotheism" is of pre-Hispanic origin or is merely the result of Christian influences.

Agta Religion. The Agta, or Dumagat, of northeastern Luzon are typical of the least acculturated Philippine Negrito societies. They show little inclination to adapt to the dominant Roman Catholic religion of their peasant Filipino neighbors. The Agta believe in a single high god and in a large number of supernatural spirit beings that inhabit their surrounding natural environment. Depending on the class of spirit, these various beings live in trees, underground, on rocky headlands, or in caves.

There are two general classes of spirit beings in the Agta worldview: *hayup* ("creature") and *bélet* or *anito* ("ghost"). The latter are always malignant. Ghosts are wandering disembodied souls of deceased humans. The ghosts of recently deceased adult relatives are especially feared, as they are prone to return to the abode of their family during the night, causing sickness and death.

There are several varieties of *hayup* creatures. Although these are nonhuman, they are bipedal and may appear in human form. Most varieties of *hayup* beings are malignant; others are neutral, and a few can be called upon for help in curing disease.

Agta Shamans. In Aurora Province, 8 percent of Agta adults are shamans, of whom two out of ten are women. They practice only white magic. A shaman (*bunogen*) is defined by the Agta as an individual who has a familiar spirit "friend" (*bunog*) who aids him or her in diagnosing and treating disease. The primary role of shamans is curing. They do not practice black magic. (Agta do not practice sorcery, although they are aware of the custom among other Filipino societies.) Shamans may treat their patients with herbal medicines and simple prayers to their spirit "friends." For difficult cases, they may conduct a séance. In such cases, shamans will enter into a trance state, chanting prayers over the patient until they are possessed by their familiar spirits. These chants are not in the normal Agta language but are sung in a form of glossolalia.

It would be incorrect to say that Agta worship the spirits in their environment. Rather, they fear them, and placate them. The Agta do not have a sacrifical system as do other Philippine tribal groups, but they do occasionally offer small gifts to the *hayup* spirits if they are taking something from the forest. These gifts may consist of a few grains of rice, a few ounces of honey, or just a piece of thread from a man's G-string. In some areas, when a new garden is cleared a shaman may set up a small table with spirit offerings of betel quid or food.

Agta religious practices are done haphazardly, when it is convenient, and usually on an individual basis. Most such practices revolve around the prevention or treatment of illness. Agta have only a vague interest in the afterlife, the realm of the dead, creation of the world, immortality, or the future. They do not seek religious experiences. Rather, it is the chronic fear of sickness and death that activates Agta religious behavior. While it would be wrong to say that religion is unimportant to the Agta, it does play a lesser role in their culture than it does in other animistic groups.

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THOMAS N. HEADLAND

Negritos of the Andaman Islands

The Andaman Negritos are extremely primitive hunter-gatherers representing a prelithic stage of cultural development. They fall into two separate divisions, the Great Andamanese and the Onge-Jarawa-Sentinelese. As a result of colonization and the introduction of syphilis and other diseases, the Great Andamanese tribes have already become extinct; only a hybrid group of some twenty-eight individuals survives on a tiny islet called Strait Island. The Jarawa and the Sentinelese live in complete isolation and eschew all external contacts. Consequently, nothing is known about their religion. The remaining tribe, the Onge, lives on Little Andaman Island.

The universe as conceived by the Onge is a multilayered structure with Little Andaman at its center. There are six layers above Little Andaman and six layers below, and each is inhabited by a different class of spirit. These spirits are neither divine nor immaterial. They eat, drink, marry, multiply, and die just like human beings. The most important among them are the *onkoboykwe*, a class of benevolent spirit inhabiting the first layer above Little Andaman, and the *eaka*, a class of harmful spirit living immediately beneath the island. Above the Onge universe there is a limitless void and below there is Kwatannange, the primary sea, which is full of turtles.

The sun, moon, stars, and clouds are believed to be the creation of the *onkoboykwe*. The Onge do not personify and worship the heavenly bodies. There are two monsoons in the Andamans, the southwest and the northeast; spirits living in distant islands across the sea send the monsoonal winds.

The Onge believe that one's life after death depends on how a person has met his death. If he dies of illness, he becomes an *eaka* and goes below the earth. If an Onge is killed by a wild boar, by snakebite, or by a fall from a tree, he becomes an *onkoboykwe* and lives above the sky. If drowned, he becomes a sea spirit.

The Onge hold that all non-Negrito people are the spirits of dead Onges. The term *inene* is collectively applied to them. In the event of death from illness, one day before the emergence of *eaka* from the dead body, another miniature human form called *embekete* comes out from the corpse and swims across the sea to the land of *inene* where he soon transforms himself into another *inene*. Thus, according to the Onge, we the outsiders were Onge in our previous birth. The belief in the existence of two spirits, *embekete* and *eaka*, in one individual probably emanated from their attempts to rationalize the origin of non-Negritos and find a place for them in their scheme of the universe.

From the fragmentary data that are available on the religion of the Great Andamanese, it appears that they, like the Onge, believed in different classes of spirit living above the sky, below the earth, and in the sea. There is, however, an important difference between the Great Andamanese and the Onge. The former believed that the sun was the wife of the moon and that the stars were their children, whereas the Onge hold that the sun and the moon are flat, disc-shaped, inanimate things created by the *onkoboykwe*. Concepts of a superior spirit or high god, heaven and hell, virtue and sin, are conspicuously absent among the Andaman Negritos.

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PRANAB GANGULY

Negritos of the Malay Peninsula

The Negritos of the Malay Peninsula, who are generally called the Semang in the literature, numbered about two thousand in 1974. They live in small groups scattered about the foothills in the northern half of the peninsula (4°N–6°30'N; 100°E–103°E). They speak a number of related languages in the Mon-Khmer language family. Until about 1950 most of the Semang were nomadic hunter-gatherers. The staple of their diet was wild yams, and their main source of meat was arboreal animals—monkeys, gibbons, squirrels, and birds, which they hunted with blowpipes and poisoned darts. They also carried on some trade with neighboring Malay farmers, exchanging such forest produce as rattan

and resins for iron tools, salt, cloth, and cultivated foods. They lived in camps of five to fifteen related nuclear families, moving every week or two when the local resources were exhausted. Each family was politically independent, the only leadership in a group being the informal influence of a particularly wise or persuasive person. Since 1950 well over half the Semang have settled down, often under the direction of government agencies, and adopted shifting agriculture. Yet even in these changed conditions, they have clung to their traditional religion, which has served as an important symbol of their ethnic identity.

In the cosmology of the Semang, the land forms a disk that is surrounded and underlaid by sea. It rests on the back of a giant snake, called Naga', which by shifting position can cause eruptions of water from underground. The firmament is a solid dome or series of layers, on top of which live the benevolent superhuman beings, called *chinoi* in the west and *hala'* in the east, who bring the seasonal fruit blossoms to earth. After death the shadow-souls of the Semang are believed to join these beings, on top of the firmament or on an island in the western sea. A stone pillar rises at the center of the world and reaches the firmament. Near its top is a cave, the home of the thunder god. The thunder god, whom most Semang groups call Karei, is generally regarded as male—sometimes a single being and sometimes a pair of brothers. The Semang believe that Karei causes thunderstorms to punish persons who have broken prohibitions against disruptive or disrespectful behavior. Karei is aided by a female earth deity, sometimes pictured as a pair of sisters, who is occasionally identified with the earth-supporting snake.

The rituals of the Semang are few and simple. The best-known rite is the blood sacrifice—throwing blood from the leg to the thunder god and earth deity—which is used to avert thunderstorms. Most groups also have singing and dancing sessions in which they thank the superhuman beings for the fruit and request their general support. These sessions may culminate in trancing and journeys of the shadow-soul to the haunts of the superhumans. Among the western Semang, a shaman may perform a séance in a special hut called a *panoh*, in which he calls down the *chinoi*. Semang rituals are intended to promote the fecundity of nature and to avert the dangers of their forest world.

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KIRK ENDICOTT

NEHEMIAH (mid-fifth century BCE), or, in Hebrew, Nehemyah; a governor of Judah in the Persian period, known for rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem. In the twentieth year of the reign of Artaxerxes I (445 BCE), Nehemiah received a commission from the Persian king to return to Judah and take on the task of rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem. The *Book of Nehemiah* gives an account of his activity in the first-person style of memoirs. It begins with his reception of distressing news from the homeland while he is in the royal service in Susa. This leads to his petitioning the king for support in repairing the walls and gates of Jerusalem and to his appointment as governor to carry out the task. In spite of opposition from Sanballat, governor of Samaria, and other local authorities of the region, the work is successfully completed. With the walls rebuilt, the city was repopulated with settlers from the countryside.

Nehemiah is credited also with social and religious reforms. He is presented as showing concern for the poor while maintaining a modest administration. In his second term as governor, which is not precisely dated, Nehemiah carried out a series of religious reforms having to do with Temple regulations and provisions for the priests, observance of the Sabbath, and the dissolution of mixed marriages. These reforms emphasize a tradition of religious conservatism and concern for ethnic purity that eventually leads to the Samaritan schism.

Nehemiah 8–9, having to do with the mission of Ezra, does not properly belong to the "memoirs" source and has seriously confused the historical relationship between Ezra and Nehemiah. [*See* Ezra.] It seems preferable to view Ezra's activity as subsequent to that of Nehemiah, building on the latter's work of restoration.

Nehemiah is recognized by tradition (*Sir.* 49:13) and by modern scholarship as largely responsible for restoring Jerusalem to a place of political prominence and

semiautonomy with a chance to grow into a city of destiny.

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JOHN VAN SETERS

NEMBUTSU. *See* Nien-fo.

NEO-CONFUCIANISM. *For discussion of the Sung revival of Confucianism, see under* Confucian Thought.

NEOLIN, known as the Delaware Prophet; a religious leader active among the Ohio Delaware Indians in the 1760s. Neolin (whose name means "the enlightened") was one of several Delaware prophets who arose in the latter part of the eighteenth century along the Susquehanna and Allegheny rivers in Pennsylvania and the Cuyahoga and Muskingum rivers in Ohio. The teachings of the prophet were widely known throughout the tribes of the frontier. Pontiac, the famed Ottawa chief, saw in the prophet's message divine authority for his own attempts to unite the frontier tribes. Through Pontiac, Neolin affected the policies of nearly twenty tribes from Lake Ontario to the Mississippi, including among them the Ojibwa, Ottawa, Potawatomi, Seneca, Huron, Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware. Pontiac tempered somewhat the anti-European thrust of Neolin's message by affirming the rights of the French and opposing the British. Whatever setbacks the British suffered during the 1760s west of the Alleghenies were the result not only of Pontiac's leadership but also of the appeal of the Delaware Prophet's message.

This message came from a great dream-vision journey of the prophet to the mountain home of the Master of Life, or Great Spirit. The Master instructed him to tell the people that they must give up their drunkenness, sexual promiscuity, internecine fighting, and medicine songs dedicated to the evil spirit. In addition, they were to cast off all of the influences of the whites and return to hunting with bow and arrow. Ritually, they were to purify themselves through sexual abstinence and the use of emetics, and they were to reinstitute sacrifices. These reforms would result in a revitalization of their power that would enable them to drive the whites from the continent (Peckham, 1947).

The Master of Life also gave the prophet a stick on which was written a prayer, in native hieroglyphs, to be recited by all of his followers every morning and evening. John Heckewelder, a Moravian missionary who lived with the Delaware at this time, reports seeing a map used by the prophet in his preaching (Heckewelder, 1876). In the center of the map was a square that represented the dwelling place of the Great Spirit. This land, full of game and forests, had been the goal of the soul's journey after death. Now, however, it was all but inaccessible because of the barriers set by the whites. Only a very few souls could now reach that land. Most fell into the hands of the evil one when attempting to overcome these barriers and were taken to his land of emaciated game animals and parched soil.

East of the inner square the prophet had drawn a map of the lands formerly occupied by the Delaware but now in the control of the British. Once the Delaware had dwelt beside the ocean and in the coastal areas, where they hunted, farmed, and fished with great delight. Then they allowed the Europeans to settle, gave away or sold their land, and became dependent on the white man's goods. The result of their own follies and English acquisitiveness was migration, fragmentation, and deterioration. If they followed the instructions of the prophet, however, they could have their land and their old ways back again.

Neolin played an essential role in helping his people interpret their situation. In Neolin's image of heaven, the Delaware saw their own recently lost state. In his image of the evil spirit's land, the Delaware perceived the despoiled land of the white settlements. The entry into paradise was not only a difficult eschatological event, it necessitated a historical expulsion of the whites. A further dimension of Neolin's message was not always grasped by Pontiac: that is, that the Great Spirit had allowed the whites to control the land and had taken away game animals as a punishment for the immorality of the Indians. Neolin's map depicted not only the barriers on earth and in heaven but also within the hearts of the people. They had corrupted themselves by their dependence on the whites. More importantly, the increasing dependence on the whites eroded the Indians' previous dependence on the spirit-forces of forest, field, stream, and sky. Only a spiritual purification and moral reform could give them the inner strength to cut loose from the whites and supply them with the capacity to enter again into the paradisal state they had abandoned. The prophet interpreted the social and historical situation using the religious symbolism of death and rebirth. His paradigm allowed for no compromise. This rite of passage from a state of degeneration and chaos to one of rebirth and a new order could not be

entered halfheartedly. Nor could it be successful if halted before completion. The recovery of lost innocence and the regaining of lost land were intimately linked.

The prophet had faced squarely the problem that confronted his people: a problem that would continue to confront Native Americans. Namely, how does a people recover its identity and pride in the face of socioeconomic erosion and a calculatingly aggressive foe? Neolin's answer was not necessarily wrong; it came, however, too late. Nevertheless, it was a course that others followed, even when they knew it was too late, for it seemed to them the only honorable course to take.

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DONALD P. ST. JOHN

NEOLITHIC RELIGION comprises the religious concepts, cults, and rituals of the early farming communities that sprang up throughout the world in the Early Holocene period (8000–3000 BCE). Unlike the Paleolithic and Mesolithic periods of prehistory, the Neolithic period was characterized by climatic conditions, very similar to those of the present, that directed human activity chiefly to the soil and its fruits. Attention that previously had been focused on stone now shifted to earth, which became not only the basic raw material but a multivalent symbol. [*See* Earth.] These preoccupations gave rise to a specific ideology, to sedentary ways of life and the construction of permanent settlements, to the domestication of plants and animals, and to important technological inventions such as pottery making—developments identified as the basic achievements of the "Neolithic Revolution."

The association of complex ideas and numerous activities with earth was not, however, a process completed rapidly. It took Neolithic communities centuries to learn to use earth as a new material and to find it more necessary, more valuable, and more meaningful than stone. Since, in the Paleolithic and Mesolithic periods, not only everyday activities but complex religious beliefs, cults, rituals, and probably myths were also associated with stone, this "Neolithic Revolution" may be defined, from the point of view of the history of religions, as a gradual process of the desacralization of stone and the sacralization of earth.

Because the basic achievements of the Neolithic period were attained neither simultaneously nor in a particular area only, the chronological and territorial boundaries of the Neolithic world are very flexible. Its beginnings date from the eighth millennium BCE at the earliest, but only in a few comparatively limited and mutually distant territories (in Asia: Palestine, northern Mesopotamia, Thailand, and Japan; in Europe: Crete, Thessaly, and the central Danubian region). It was only in the period between 6500 and 5000 BCE that the Neolithic cultures established themselves and began to expand and influence one another (in the Near East, northern China, southeastern Europe, and the western Mediterranean). The period between 5000 and 3000 BCE was a particularly dynamic one; while Neolithic cultures in the Near East and southeastern Europe began to disintegrate, others began to emerge and take root in northern Africa, southwestern Europe, India, Mesoamerica, and Peru.

Neolithic cultures differed not only in their chronology but, much more important for the study of religion, in their basic content: their methods of production, technological skills, social relations, and achievements in art. The earliest ware was produced in Japan by the Jômon culture during the eighth millennium BCE, long before communities of that region had mastered the cultivation of plants and the domestication of animals. Finds from the Spirit Cave in northern Thailand, however, suggest that the beginnings of the Neolithic period in southeastern Asia (the Hoa Binh culture of the ninth and eighth millennia BCE) was characterized by the cultivation of leguminous plants; pottery was made only from the end of the seventh millennium, and general farming was practiced beginning in the fourth millennium. In northern Mesopotamia, the beginnings of the Neolithic period were marked by the domestication of sheep (as evident at Zawi Chemi during the Shanidar phase, c. 8000 BCE), and in Palestine (Jericho, eighth millennium BCE) and Anatolia (Hacilar, seventh millennium BCE), by the cultivation of grain. In the Iron Gate region of Europe (the Lepenski Vir culture), dogs and pigs were domesticated and grain was cultivated as early as the seventh millennium BCE. These two basic

achievements of the "Neolithic Revolution" were fully utilized only in the middle of the sixth millennium BCE.

The Neolithic world was not uniform but, as these diverse developments indicate, varied and very dynamic. It is therefore necessary to modify the general assessment of the period as one in which the economy was limited to farming, social relations were limited to tribal organization and the matriarchate, and religion was confined to a fertility cult and the worship of a supreme female deity (Magna Mater, Mother Earth, and the like). One cannot really speak of a Neolithic religion, but only of Neolithic religions. Lack of evidence that might enable us to define each of these religions does not justify generalization or neglect.

Archaeological artifacts, which constitute the main sources for the study of Neolithic religions, for the most part still lie buried; those that are known are usually fragmented and ambiguous. The material at our disposal documents chiefly the places and objects used for cult and ritual purposes within these religions, rather than the words and gestures that were their most essential and explicit expressions. Two other major obstacles preclude a fuller reconstruction of Neolithic religions: large areas of the world (parts of Australia, South America, and the Pacific islands) are still archaeologically unexplored, and evidence concerning the other spheres of Neolithic life with which religion was closely associated, such as the economy, social relations, and art, is fragmentary.

Attempts have been made to compensate for these limitations and to use, as clues to the meaning of Neolithic religious concepts, cults, and rituals, ethnographic materials related to the psychology and behavior of farmers, the mythology of ancient civilizations, and the scientific reconstruction of the earliest known Indo-European and Semitic languages. Although the usefulness of these approaches should not be denied, the most reliable method is to study the religion of Neolithic communities on the basis of what has been discovered in their settlements and graves. The most relevant of these finds are cultic places and objects, ritual instruments, remains of sacrifices, and various symbols. However, these material expressions of the religious consciousness of Neolithic communities have not been discovered in all Neolithic cultures; in some, they have been documented only sporadically. Accordingly, this narrows down even more the chronological and territorial boundaries within which it is possible to study the origin, distinctive traits, and evolution of Neolithic religious conceptions.

The fullest evidence for the study of Neolithic religion comes from Asia Minor and Europe, the two regions that have been best explored. Within this large territory, which extends from the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to Denmark and the British Isles, three religious spheres can be distinguished: the Near East, southeastern Europe, and the western Mediterranean with northwestern Europe. The remaining regions of Europe either were under the direct influence of these spheres or, as in northeastern Europe, were inhabited by hunting-gathering communities that held on to the traditional religious concepts of the Paleolithic and Mesolithic periods. The latter was also true of communities inhabiting the forest zone of northern Asia, primarily Siberia.

In spite of the scarcity of relevant archaeological finds, three religious spheres can also be distinguished in southern and eastern Asia: the Malay archipelago, northern China and Manchuria, and the Japanese islands with Korea. The inhabited regions of central Asia probably did not constitute a separate religious zone. In Africa, only two Neolithic religious spheres can be distinguished, one in northern Africa and the other in the Nile Valley. Nothing is known of developments south of the Sahara. The situation is similar in the New World, where only one sphere of Neolithic religion, comprising Middle America and the coastal zone of Peru, is known.

Of the nine religious spheres that may be distinguished on the map of the Neolithic world, those in Asia Minor and southeastern Europe were the earliest, the most long-lived, and the most influential. Future investigations will probably show that Neolithic religions in southeastern and eastern Asia were much more specific and influential than present evidence suggests. In the western Mediterranean area and in northwestern Europe, religion acquired specific traits at an early date but began to radiate far and wide only in the Late Neolithic. The other Neolithic religions appeared comparatively late and were mainly of brief duration and local importance.

The Near East. The Neolithic religion of the Near East originated between 8300 and 6500 BCE in the zone of the so-called Fertile Crescent (Palestine, Syria, northern Iraq, and Iran). It flourished between 6500 and 5000 BCE in Anatolia, and disintegrated between 5000 and 3000 BCE in the lowlands of Mesopotamia.

Evidence of a sedentary way of life, a basic trait of the Neolithic period, is clearly discerned in the Natufian culture, which developed in Palestine and Syria between 10,000 and 8300 BCE. Excavations of Natufian settlements have yielded indirect evidence of the use and cultivation of grain (for example, stone mortars, pestles, and sickles). Such evidence, together with the remains of dogs, marks the Natufian as the dawn of Neolithic culture in the Near East (the so-called Proto-Neolithic). Although no objects of an undoubtedly sacred character

have been discovered at Natufian sites, it is nevertheless possible to form some idea, on the basis of surviving houses, graves, and art objects, of the religious concepts, cults, and rituals extant in this period.

No cult places have been found in Natufian settlements, with the possible exception of the remains of a large oval structure discovered in Jericho. Its isolated location on virgin soil beside a spring indicates that this may have been a cult site visited at certain times of the year.

That all of the figural representations belonging to this culture were carved from pebbles suggests beliefs associated with water and its creative potential. These representations include schematized human heads from Ain Mallaha and Al-Oued and an "erotic" statuette from Ain Sakhri showing an embracing couple, perhaps illustrating the concept of the "holy marriage." [*See* Hieros Gamos.] Sexual attributes are not marked on any of the figures, and the relationship of the sexes is expressed in an allusive way: the large stone mortars with circular recipients in their middles probably represent the female principle, as the phallus-shaped stone pestles probably represent the male principle.

These mortars, used for the grinding of grain, were sometimes sunk into the floor of circular houses, next to the hearth (as at Ain Mallaha). They were also frequently associated with burials and used either as grave markers (Wadi Fallah) or as altars around which graves were arranged in a semicircle (Al-Oued). Frequent burial of the dead in pits used for the storage of grain, and the occasional building of hearths above graves (Ain Mallaha) or in cemeteries (Nahal Oren), emphasizes a close connection between the dead and the processes of providing, keeping, and preparing grain food. There is also evidence to suggest some link between certain animals, the dead, and the underworld: for example, a grave in Ain Mallaha contained a human skull framed with the horns of a gazelle; another grave at the same site contained the skeleton of a dog; and seven human skulls, each accompanied by an equid's tooth, were found in Erq el-Ahmar. These finds may indicate that the Natufians believed that ancestors provided all the basic sources of food, that they looked after plants and animals and caused them to multiply.

Evidence of a cult of ancestors is also found in the complex funeral customs of the Natufians, especially in their burial of detached skulls, sometimes grouped in fives or nines. At Ain Mallaha, two graves lay beneath a circle of stone with a diameter of two and one-half meters; upon it a quadrangular hearth was built. A skull and two uppermost vertebrae lay on the hearth, an indication perhaps of human sacrifice. This structure and a hearth in the cemetery at Nahal Oren, with a deposit of ashes one-half meter thick, present reliable evidence of a chthonic cult. Here were altars on which sacrifices were offered to the heroic dead or to the forces governing the underworld. There is, however, no evidence of a transition from the chthonic to an agrarian cult in the Proto-Neolithic period.

Throughout the entire zone of the Fertile Crescent, the period between 8300 and 6500 BCE saw the appearance of villages in which cereals were cultivated and animals domesticated, as is now known through the discovery of remains of barley, wheat, sheep, goats, and pigs at scattered sites. Pottery was very rare, and therefore this period has been termed the Pre-Pottery Neolithic. The number of finds associated with religion is comparatively large, but they were discovered chiefly in Palestine, Syria, and northern Mesopotamia.

The traditional cult of ancestors, manifested primarily in the detachment and special treatment of skulls, developed further, culminating between 7500 and 6500 BCE. Complete burials or detached skulls, sometimes placed in special structures, were discovered beneath the floors of houses in almost all sites from this period. In Mureybet, skulls were placed on clay benches along the walls of the houses, so that they were always within reach. In Jericho, a skull might be covered with a kind of plaster, and then a face, sometimes with individualized features, was modeled upon it. Evidence of the same practice exists at Beisamoun and Tell Ramad (both in Syria), where each plastered skull was placed on a clay support in the form of a seated human figure. [*See* Ancestors.]

Baked or unbaked clay was also used for the making of other cult objects. In the upper Euphrates Valley, in Mureybet and Cayönü, there appear, in addition to the traditional stone statuettes, the earliest figurines made of baked clay. They date from the beginning of the seventh millennium BCE and represent, sometimes realistically but more often in a very schematized way, a standing or seated naked woman. At Munhata in Palestine, only elongated cylindrical figurines, some of them masculine, were made. Clay, baked or unbaked, was also used for the modeling of figurines of horned animals (caprids and bovids), as well as for the fashioning of discoid and cylindrical objects of undetermined use. Anthropomorphic and zoomorphic figurines were made in very limited numbers until the middle of the seventh millennium BCE. Since they were not found in a ritual context, their meaning and use remain unknown.

Cult centers discovered in Palestine (Jericho and Beida), in the upper Euphrates Valley (Mureybet), and in western Iran (Ganjadareh) provide more detailed evidence for the religion of the Pre-Pottery Neolithic. In Jericho, two rooms and a structure are supposed to

have served cult purposes, primarily because of their unusual shapes: a room with a niche in which a block of volcanic rock stood on a stone support was discovered in a house; a pit filled with ashes was found in the middle of another house, which suggests that some ritual was performed in that place; finally, figurines representing oxen, goats, and, perhaps, pigs were found in a large structure with wooden posts placed in an unusual arrangement. In Beida, a group of three enigmatic oval structures, located some fifty meters distant from the settlement and approached by a paved path, were explored. In the middle of the central structure, a large block of sandstone was set upright; a large slab with a parapet built around the edge lay against the southern wall, and a triangular basin, made of a large slab and partly filled with ashes, soot, and charred animal bones (probably the remains of a sacrifice or a ritual feast), was found outside the wall. In Ganjadareh a room with a niche containing fixed, superimposed rams' skulls was found in the middle of the Neolithic village, and in Mureybet rooms were discovered in which horns of wild oxen, perhaps bucrania (sometimes flanked by the shoulder blades of oxen or asses), were embedded in the walls.

These rooms were mostly house shrines, for they were directly linked with dwelling rooms. Only the group of three oval structures in Beida and the building with wooden posts in Jericho might have been communal shrines. The cult objects from these shrines suggest that the powers venerated in them had not yet acquired an anthropomorphic shape and that their presence was expressed by aniconic forms, mostly by upright stones or the heads of bulls or rams. Two finds only, dating from the very end of the Pre-Pottery Neolithic, might be associated with anthropomorphic deities. These are the remains of three plastered human statues from Jericho and the deposit of at least ten human statues, 80 to 90 centimeters high, and twelve busts, 30 to 45 centimeters high, found in Ain Ghazal (Palestine). The Jericho statues make up a group representing a man, a woman, and a child, possibly a divine triad. The Ain Ghazal statues have stylized bodies but individualized heads; one of them represents a man, and the others have female breasts.

The meaning of these statues, and of the busts that were found surrounding them, is difficult to decipher. Since miniature clay figurines of pregnant women, often deliberately damaged, were also found in Ain Ghazal, we may surmise that the small anthropomorphic figurines were used in fertility rites or in some chthonic-agrarian cult; the larger statues may have been representations of particular deities and therefore objects of the greatest veneration.

The cults performed in individual households became clearly distinct from those in the care of the broader community or of persons specially chosen by the community (priests and priestesses) only in the period of the full consolidation of the Neolithic culture, between 6500 and 5000 BCE. A gap between the sacred and the profane opened during this time, as is evidenced by the very limited number of sacred objects, mainly fragmented anthropomorphic and zoomorphic figurines, found in villages from this period, in conjunction with their high concentration in some settlements; this causes us to speak of religious centers.

The best example of such a center is Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia, where fourteen building horizons, dating from 6300 to 5400 BCE, were discovered. Each of these levels consists of dwelling rooms linked with storage spaces and shrines, of varying size, that contain sacred representations (reliefs and frescoes), stone and clay figurines, and graves of privileged members of the community, possibly priests and priestesses. A certain consistency in the arrangement of representations on walls suggests the existence of a coherent religious concept or myth in which the character and mutual relationship of superior powers were clearly defined. We may assume that the reliefs depicted the divine powers, the frescoes described the sacred activities (religious ceremonies, sacrifices, and ritual scenes), and the statuettes represented the chief actors in the myth. Scenes associated with the world of the dead were always shown on the northern and eastern walls of the shrines, scenes related to the giving of birth were depicted on the western walls, and representations of the goddess and the bull appeared on all of the walls. The most common motifs used in the reliefs were bulls heads and the so-called "twin goddesses," whereas most of the frescoes depicted bulls and vultures. In addition, there were various other symbols, such as representations of the human head, the boar's head, and the female breast. Viewed as a whole, these complex motifs represent the confrontation between the creative powers (the bulls, the twin goddesses) and the destructive forces (the boars, the vultures), and the opposition of birth and death or light and darkness. The statuettes express a similar opposition: they are representations of the great female deity (sometimes in her positive and sometimes in her negative aspect) and of the goddess's son or male consort. [*See* Goddess Worship.]

Representations of the same female deity were discovered in the Neolithic settlement of Hacilar (southwestern Anatolia), dating from around 5500 BCE. Statuettes, modeled in a naturalistic way and frequently colored, represent a young or mature woman, naked or clothed, in a standing, seated, or reclining position,

sometimes with a child or an animal in her lap or arms. Plastered bulls' heads, as well as stone amulets in the shape of bulls' heads, were also found, but there were no shrines. Some houses, however, had niches with stone slabs, a type of which had a human face with large eyes incised on it. These may have been figures of ancestors, household spirits, the guardians of the family. The later settlements of Hacilar, dating from 5400 to 5000 BCE, yielded two shrines associated with the cult of the dead, standardized feminine statuettes, almost violin-shaped masculine figurines, and anthropomorphic and zoomorphic ritual vessels. Over the following two millennia, the number of figurines decreased, but painted pottery became very common, and its decoration frequently incorporated basic religious concepts.

At the beginning of the fifth millennium BCE, Anatolia lost its importance, and the centers of culture and spiritual life were transferred to Mesopotamia, Khūzestān, and the Transcaspian lowlands. The intensive migratory movements, exploitation of new materials (copper and gold), and increased exchange of goods transformed the traditional religion in almost all of the regions of the Near East and led, at the end of the fourth millennium BCE, to the disintegration of all Neolithic cultures. Although a number of distinct and frequently unrelated cultures emerged in the period between 5000 and 3000 BCE, the religion of this period was characterized by three general features: the separation of the world of the living from the world of the dead, as manifested in the increasing practice of burying the dead in special cemeteries outside the settlements; the separation of cult centers from dwellings and the establishment of communal shrines; and the abandonment of figural representations of deities and the tendency to suggest their potency and activity by means of abstract symbols, signs, and ornaments.

All these traits already are evidenced clearly in the cultures from the first half of the fifth millennium BCE. In northern Mesopotamia (the Halaf-Hassuna-Samarra cultures), the dead were buried mainly outside the settlements, and only children were interred beneath the floors of houses or shrines. Anthropomorphic figurines either disappeared or underwent a change in significance. The number of feminine figurines was comparatively large in the Samarra and Halaf cultures, and costly materials (for example, alabaster) were frequently used for their manufacture, but they were usually placed in graves. Shrines from this period can be identified by their special position in the settlement rather than by their decoration or by the objects found in them. In Eridu (southern Mesopotamia), the shrine formed the nucleus around which the settlement was built; in Pessejik and Dashliji (Transcaspian lowlands), shrines were distinguished not only by their size and rich decoration but also by their position.

In the cultures of the second half of the fifth and the fourth millennium BCE, the processes manifested earlier developed further. In the Al-Ubayyid culture, there is evidence of monumental temples on platforms and of cult places separated from settlements. Some temples (for example, the temple from Layer VIII in Eridu) already resembled ziggurats. No statues or figurines of deities were found in these temples, but there were altars around which rites, probably similar to those shown on the seals of the Gawra type (processions, ritual dances, the adorning of altars, and the like), were performed. Burials were made in cemeteries separated from settlements (Tell Arpachiya, Eridu, Al-Ubayyid), and grave goods included both feminine and masculine figurines as well as a type of figurine representing a woman with a child in her arms. These figurines did not represent deities; rather, they were instruments used in funerary rites. It is obvious that deities became remote and abstract toward the end of the Neolithic period. The religion of the Al-Ubayyid culture, as well as that of other contemporaneous cultures of the Near East, was basically transcendental. In this respect, it anticipates the religion of the early urban civilization of Mesopotamia.

Southeastern Europe. The Neolithic religion of southeastern Europe was based on local traditions and the religion of the Epi-Paleolithic hunting-gathering communities, the presence of which is attested on numerous sites from Peloponnese to the northern fringe of the Pannonian plain, and from the western shores of the Black Sea to the Alps and the eastern coast of the Adriatic. As early as the twelfth millennium BCE, this extensive territory was incorporated into the sphere of the Mediterranean Gravettian culture, in whose religion the most important artifacts were pebbles colored with red ocher and engraved objects of bone and antler. When the climate became gradually warmer at the end of the ninth millennium BCE, the Tardi-Gravettian culture began to disintegrate. This disintegration had different consequences in different regions: in the southwestern part of the Balkan Peninsula, the traditional culture was impoverished and gradually became extinct; in the Aegean and, particularly, in the Danubian region, it became richer, developing, between 7000 and 6500 BCE, into the culture of the first farming communities.

As in the Near East, the beginning of the Neolithic culture in the Danubian region and the Aegean was marked by a sedentary way of life. The first permanent open-space settlements appeared at the beginning of the eighth millennium BCE, in the central part of the Danu-

bian valley, on low river terraces near large whirlpools abounding in fish. The local Epi-Paleolithic culture began to change rapidly and, at the end of the same millennium, evolved into the Proto-Neolithic Lepenski Vir culture. The shrines of this culture were associated not only with the earliest monumental sculptures in Europe but also with the first achievements in the domestication of plants and animals.

The earliest settlements of the Lepenski Vir culture were small. No places used for cult purposes were discovered in them, but finds did include ritual instruments and pebbles colored with red ocher. Later settlements, dating from the beginning of the seventh millennium BCE, yielded varied material. Some contained a number of specialized implements and a great quantity of bones of fish and game animals, whereas others (for example, Lepenski Vir and Hajdučka Vodenica) had shrines, sculptures made of very large boulders, and graves containing evidence of complex funerary rites. This turning of human faculties toward different goals led, on the one hand, to the transition from a gathering economy to a food-producing one, and, on the other hand, to the appearance of monumental sculptures and the cults and myths associated with them.

A total of 147 dwelling places were discovered at Lepenski Vir, the religious center for the entire central Danubian region between 7000 and 6500 BCE. About 50 of them had small shrines, each consisting of a rectangular hearth surrounded by large stone slabs embedded in a floor made of limestone mortar, an altar with a circular or ellipsoid recipient, and anywhere from one to five sculptures made of large boulders. Directly against the stones surrounding the hearth, one to fifteen triangular openings were sunk into the floor, framed with small slabs of red stone and, sometimes, with human mandibles.

All of these dwelling places with shrines had a uniform ground plan in the form of a truncated sector of a circle, with an angle of about sixty degrees. Skeletons of infants (from one to five) were found beneath the floors, and secondary or partial burials (consisting mainly of skulls) were made within the shrines. In each shrine, the hearth structure and the altar lay on an axis extending from east to west, whereas the dead and the sculptures had a north-south orientation. This fixed orientation implies a clear division of the world. The shrines probably reproduced the world's structure, and the sculptures, both abstract and figural, probably illustrated the myth of its creation. Abstract sculptures were more numerous, and the intertwining on their surfaces of rounded, "female" signs with open, "male" ones suggests the idea of continuous fertilization. The figural sculptures probably represent only what was born out of that intertwining: hybrid, fishlike beings, water spirits, lords of the great river, and primeval ancestors. Regardless of how we interpret these stone figures, their close association with the hearth (on which food was prepared for the living and where sacrifices were offered to the dead) shows that the religion of the Lepenski Vir culture was based on the cult of the domestic hearth.

In the period when religion and art in this region reached their apogee, two major advances were made in the sphere of economy: the cultivation of some sorts of grain and the domestication or selection of some animals (dogs, pigs, deer) were mastered, so that the Lepenski Vir culture assumed the traits of the Pre-Pottery Neolithic. The uniform character of its shrines and sculptures shows that all ancestral knowledge was combined into an integral system and incorporated into cult, myth, and ritual.

In the middle of the seventh millennium BCE, in the period when the cultivation of plants and the keeping of animals were taken out of the ritual context, the Lepenski Vir culture lost its specific traits and developed into the culture of the earliest Danubian farmers, the so-called Starčevo-Körös-Criş culture. Concurrently or a few centuries later, Early Neolithic cultures appeared, either autonomously or as a result of acculturation, in other regions of southeastern Europe as well. However they came into being, an almost uniform sacred world, centered again on the domestic hearth, established itself throughout the whole of southeastern Europe as early as around 6000 BCE. [*See* Prehistoric Religions, *article on* Old Europe.]

The sixth millennium was a period of stabilization for Neolithic cultures in southeastern Europe. The most creative regions were Thessaly-Macedonia (the Proto-Sesklo and Sesklo cultures), the Danubian region (the Starčevo culture) and the Maritsa Valley (the Karanovo culture). No shrines have been discovered in any of these regions; the only possible exception is a building in Nea Nikomedeia (Aegean Macedonia), which, because of its large dimensions, was probably a shrine. Some houses in northwestern Macedonia (in Porodin, Madžare, and Zelenikovo) had stoves next to which stood richly decorated clay tables (perhaps altars) and sometimes also clay models of houses with head-shaped chimneys or breast-shaped roofs. These finds, as well as the considerably more modest models of houses from Thessaly and the Danubian region, suggest that the entire house was considered to be under the protection of a household deity.

Anthropomorphic figurines, mostly representing pregnant women, were common only in Thessaly, Mace-

donia, and the Danubian region, usually at places where utensils for everyday use were also found. Feminine figurines were the more numerous, but they are not earlier than masculine ones. Zoomorphic figurines (mostly representations of oxen and deer) were produced in great numbers, as were amulets, each in the shape of a stylized bull's head. Types of sacrifices can be deduced on the basis of several finds in Crete and Thessaly, where narrow, deep pits filled with ashes, animal bones, and occasional anthropomorphic figurines have been found. These were probably places where sacrifices were offered to chthonic deities, and the figurines were probably placed there as substitutes for human sacrifice, indications of which are evident only in the hilly and marginal areas of southeastern Europe. The cult of the dead was not particularly important. The deceased were buried in contracted position in various places—in the settlements, outside them, or in caves. They were buried without rich gifts and without any fixed orientation. The idea of death apparently did not play an important role in the life of the Neolithic communities of southeastern Europe.

The fifth millennium BCE was the period of the flowering of Neolithic cultures in southeastern Europe, especially in the inland regions of the Balkan Peninsula and in the Pannonian plain, where the Vinča culture was dominant. There were no essential innovations in the religious sphere, but the traditional elements of religious life became more clearly defined and more numerous. There is no evidence of shrines; cultic life was still associated with households, especially with the rooms for the storage and grinding of grain or for the preparation of food. Rooms with bucrania on the walls and an abundance of cult objects have been found on several sites of the Vinča culture. The geographical distribution of these sites shows that in the entire territory of the Vinča culture, covering some 120,000 square kilometers, there were only five or six large settlements that were major religious centers. Vinča itself was certainly one of them, for each change in the sacred objects produced in it was reflected in the surrounding territory up to about one hundred kilometers in diameter. Several thousand anthropomorphic figurines and hundreds of ritual vases, amulets, and various cult instruments have been found at Vinča.

The anthropomorphic figurines were very varied and included naked and clothed human figures, figures in flexed, kneeling, or seated positions, two-headed figures, figures of musicians, and masked figures. Some scholars have seen in them representations of particular deities, such as the Great Goddess, the Bird and Snake Goddess, the Pregnant Vegetation Goddess, and the Year God. But these figurines were not found in ritual contexts, and the differences in their appearances probably resulted from aesthetic rather than religious considerations. Only about 5 percent of them are clearly defined as feminine or masculine. All examples whose place of discovery is known have been associated with various elements of the household (for instance, the stove, the hearth, the guern, the weaving loom, and the storage pit) or with particular domestic activities. A number of figurines have been found in graves but these are exceptions confined to some local cultures (for example, the Hamangia culture in Dobruja). The fact that they were commonly found together with objects of everyday use, and that they had frequently been fragmented and discarded, suggests that they lost their value once the ritual had been performed and the desired end achieved. These figurines were probably held to incorporate the powers presiding over the household, granary, flocks, or farmed land. The relationship between these powers and the community seems to have been direct, so that the religion of this period was, in fact, a popular one. It was manifested in the performance of rites associated with rain, sowing, reaping, the seasons of the year, birth, sickness, and death, rather than with the veneration of particular deities.

The discovery of copper and gold in the Carpathian Mountains at the end of the fifth millennium BCE, and the later inroads of nomads from the southern Russian steppes, caused a crisis in the old values and goals; as a result, traditional shrines lost some of their importance. In the fourth millennium BCE, the centers of sacred life were transferred to the eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula (the Boian-Gumelniţa culture) and to Moldavia and the southwestern Ukraine (the Cucuteni-Tripol'e culture). It was only in this period of crisis that special attention was devoted to the dead—separation of cemeteries from settlements, fixed orientation of burials, exceptionally rich funerary gifts—and that special rooms in the houses were set apart for cult purposes. The cult of the bull continued to be practiced (shrines with bucrania, amulets in the form of bulls' heads) as did the cult of the household hearth (concentration of sacred objects, especially of anthropomorphic figurines, around a stove used for baking bread).

At Căscuiareke (Romania), however, a shrine was found that contained evidence of the cult of the sacred pillar and, possibly, of the sun. A group of miniature clay objects (altars, stools, figurines in positions of adoration, and ritual vessels) with painted decoration (concentric circles, triangles, and spirals) representing the sun and other celestial bodies was discovered at Ovcharevo (Bulgaria). Similar ornaments found on painted ware suggest that religious thought was primarily directed to the sky and was concerned with cos-

mogony. These ornaments consist of ideograms for the sun, moon, four sides of the world, heavenly spheres, earth, air, fire, and the like. Later they came to include human, animal, and fantastic figures (giants with two pairs of arms, winged dogs, and so on); one may thus surmise that a special mythology was being evolved in southeastern Europe during the fourth millennium BCE. This mythology could not be fully developed: in the middle of the fourth millennium BCE, southeastern Europe was overrun by nomadic horsemen who destroyed the shrines of local farming communities and paralyzed their creativity.

Other Regions. The separate religious spheres of the Neolithic world were the western Mediterranean with northwestern Europe; the Sahara; the Nile Valley; China; Japan; and Middle America. The hunting-gathering communities of Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and the adjacent islands became acquainted with the main achievements of the "Neolithic Revolution" at the end of the seventh millennium BCE, but they mostly continued to live in caves and rock shelters and to hold on to ancient customs. In coastal districts and the adjacent hinterlands the preoccupation with earth was first established through pottery making rather than farming. Something of the spiritual life of these communities is reflected in the ornaments on their pottery, which includes such motifs as wavy lines, flamelike patterns, and crescents. These motifs may have symbolized objects of the greatest veneration—the moon, sun, and sea—and may be taken as evidence of the cult of waters and celestial bodies.

In the fifth millennium BCE, influences from the Aegean began to modify the culture of the Apennine Peninsula, while the Iberian peninsula saw the beginning of processes that in time led to the emergence, throughout western and northwestern Europe, of cultures characterized by megalithic tombs for collective burial (such as dolmens, passage graves, and gallery graves) and by sacred architecture consisting of large stone uprights (menhirs) set in parallel alignments or in circles (cromlechs). [*See* Megalithic Religion.] These were the basic forms, but some other types of sacred stone structures were built in other regions, for example, shrines with a U-shaped plan in Denmark and temples with niches and a central courtyard in Malta. The dominant cult was that of ancestors. Highly stylized idols with large eyes in the form of rosettes (the "all-seeing goddess") have been found in megalithic graves in Spain and Portugal. Special places for sacrificial offerings have also been discovered at certain sites, such as the cemetery in Los Millares, Spain. Gravestones were frequently decorated with abstract engravings and reliefs, more rarely, with representations of snakes, oxen, or double-edged axes. At the end of the Neolithic period, some upright gravestones were modeled in the form of human figures (statue menhirs).

All these megalithic shrines were surrounded by the graves of ancestors; since they were placed far apart, it is certain that they marked sites at which large groups of farming communities gathered on special occasions. The gigantic cromlech Stonehenge (southern England), as well as the alignment of stone monuments in Carnac (Brittany, France), must have attracted thousands of believers who gathered to establish contact with ancestral or divine powers. Malta, with its numerous temples, was probably a holy island *(isola sacra)* to which believers came from all parts of the world to be initiated into the mysteries of the Great Goddess, whose colossal fragmented statue has been discovered under one of the temples. Each Maltese temple has a ground plan in the form of a uterus or the silhouette of the Great Goddess. Figurines with deformed bodies and representations of the so-called "sleeping ladies" found in these temples suggest that they were also healing places and oracles where believers could, through a period of sojourn (incubation), obtain cures for the body or soul. The very act of walking through these uterus-shaped temples, between alignments, or through the circles of cromlechs had the significance of an initiation.

The religion of the Neolithic populations of Africa was based on quite different concepts and cults. The predominantly pastoral communities of the Sahara left rock paintings and drawings that usually represent oxen or human figures in the position of adoration. Farther east, in Egypt, the first farming communities paid greatest attention to their dead and to the Nile. The earliest Neolithic graves (middle of the fifth millennium BCE) already had a fixed orientation. The dead were buried facing east, with grains of wheat in their mouths (the Merimde culture). In some cases, models of boats and anthropomorphic figurines made of clay or ivory were placed in graves (the Badari culture). Vases from the second half of the fourth millennium BCE (the Naqada II culture) show processions of decorated boats, probably depicting the rite of offering sacrifice to the Nile.

The Neolithic religion in the countries of the Far East also had distinct features. The Yang-shao culture of China seems to have fostered the cult of ancestors and fertility. Judging from motifs on painted ware, an important role was also accorded to the cult of evergreen trees (fir and cypress) and, perhaps, mountaintops. A significant role was accorded as well to the dynamic forces of the universe and cosmic radiation, which influence nature and the destiny of man. The Neolithic population of Japan, which had long remained in complete

isolation, also left some traces of its religion. They include enigmatic stone circles—the so-called sundials, with a radius of up to forty five meters—and figurines with large protruding eyes and stone phalli, sometimes of large dimensions. These represent mere fragments of a Neolithic religion based on the worship of stone, the sun, and the phallus.

The Neolithic religions of the Malay archipelago and of Mesoamerica must have been equally specific, since the development of a Neolithic culture in these regions was specific and autonomous. The archaeological evidence is, however, so slender that it does not permit us to form any definite conclusions about the religious ideas of Neolithic communities in these areas.

[*See also* Agriculture. *For the mythical framework of the Neolithic period that led to the discovery of metallurgy, see* Metals and Metallurgy.]

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NEOORTHODOXY. [*This entry discusses Protestant neoorthodoxy. For discussion of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy, see the biography of Hirsch.*]

Neoorthodoxy is the term used mainly in the English-speaking world to designate a theological movement within Protestantism that began after World War I as a reaction to liberal theology and broadened into diverse attempts to formulate afresh a theology of the Word of God grounded in the witness of holy scripture and informed by the great themes of the Protestant Reformation. Since its leaders had no interest in producing a new orthodoxy along the lines either of seventeenth-century Protestant scholasticism or of twentieth-century fundamentalism, the neoorthodox movement could more accurately be called neo-Reformation theology, but the former term has prevailed in common usage.

In its broadest sense *neoorthodoxy* is an umbrella term that includes a number of diverse but related theologies and theologians. Among them are dialectical theology, or "theology of crisis" in Switzerland and Germany (Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf Bultmann); motif research at Lund, Sweden (Gustaf Aulén, Anders Nygren); reconstructionist theology in Scotland (John Baillie, Donald M. Baillie, Thomas F. Torrance); and realistic theology, or Christian realism, in the United States (Reinhold Niebuhr, H. Richard Niebuhr, Paul Tillich). Related to these are a multitude of others who, from the 1920s to the 1950s, joined in the tasks of overcoming the weaknesses perceived in liberalism and of finding a more adequate way

of expressing the gospel of Jesus Christ in the social setting of the twentieth century.

Because of its emphasis on the Bible as the written witness to God's self-revelation and on the church as the locus of God's continuing revelation, neoorthodoxy provided stimulus and support for two significant parallel developments: the biblical theology movement, which strove to express the unity of scripture, and the ecumenical movement, which was established to foster church unity.

The characteristic themes of neoorthodoxy, as well as its divergent emphases, are found in two prophetic books that shocked theological communities in Europe and America and sparked the neoorthodox movement. The first was the publication in 1919 of *Der Römerbrief* (The Epistle to the Romans) by Karl Barth (1886–1968); the second was the appearance in 1932 of *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, by Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971). Both men had had extensive experience in the parish ministry (Barth in the Swiss village of Safenwil, Niebuhr in the American industrial city of Detroit), direct encounter with movements advocating the social responsibility of the churches (Barth with Swiss religious socialism, Niebuhr with the American Social Gospel), education in the liberal tradition (Barth at Berlin and Marburg, Niebuhr at Eden and Yale), probing intellects, and powerful personalities. Barth's commentary on Romans was written with the problem of the preacher in mind; he discovered the message of God's sovereign grace that declares divine judgment upon all human pretension, especially that of bourgeois society and its religion of human perfectibility. Niebuhr's book was written with the problem of the ethicist in mind; he probed the difference between the social behavior of individuals and that of social groups, in light of the Reformation doctrines of sin and justification by faith. Barth's theology tended to move from God to humanity, Niebuhr's from humanity to God; they found their common ground in the centrality of Jesus Christ.

Neoorthodoxy erupted as a fresh theological movement during the period of social upheaval caused by World War I and the Great Depression. Liberal assumptions about human goodness and historical progress were shaken, if not destroyed, by the sudden outbreak of evil in the midst of a modern civilization that had considered itself enlightened and humane. Liberal theology was closely allied with German idealistic philosophy, and therefore assumed a basic continuity between the human and the divine. God was to be found in human consciousness, in the human sense of morality, and in the progressive evolution of human society toward the kingdom of God. Belief in the immanence of the divine within the human self and in world history led to an optimistic view of human progress and a focusing of theological attention upon the religious experience of individual Christians and the historical experience of the religious community. The result was a blending of Christian perspectives with those of so-called modern, scientific society. Liberalism tried to hold on to the Christian tradition while adjusting it to the changing worldview; modernism, a more radical option, accepted the worldview of science and then attempted to reclaim as much of Christianity as possible. As Karl Barth and his colleagues discovered in the midst of a culture in crisis, both liberalism and modernism inevitably distorted biblical faith and the theology of the Protestant reformers.

Barth began to study Paul's *Letter to the Romans* because of his disillusionment with the theology and ethics of his liberal theological professors in Germany, especially after one "black day" in August 1914 when he learned that they, together with other intellectuals, had declared their support for Kaiser Wilhelm's war policy. In Paul's letter to the Romans Barth discovered what he later referred to as "the strange new world within the Bible," a world concerned not with the right human thoughts about God but with the right divine thoughts about humans, not with what we should say about God but with what God says to us, not with how we can find God but with the way God has taken to find us. The Bible speaks not of our religious experience but of God—God's sovereignty, God's glory, God's incomprehensible love, God's covenant with humankind, sealed once and for all in Jesus Christ.

Barth likened the 1919 edition of his commentary on *Romans* to the unexpected ringing of a church bell at night. It awakened the theological world, especially in postwar Germany, and won Barth an invitation to teach theology at the university at Göttingen. He accepted the position in 1922; the same year he published a completely rewritten, more radical second edition of *The Epistle to the Romans.*

Other theologians had come to similar conclusions about the inadequacy of liberal theology. In 1923 another Swiss Reformed pastor, Eduard Thurneysen (1888–1974), and a German Lutheran pastor, Friedrich Gogarten (1887–1967), joined Barth in publishing the journal *Zwischen den Zeiten* (Between the Times) as the organ of their movement. Soon another Swiss pastor, Emil Brunner (1889–1966), and a German Lutheran New Testament professor, Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), began contributing articles to the journal. All of these prominent collaborators eventually attained professorships, so that the neoorthodox movement, which had begun in the pastorate, gradually reached the universities. From there its influence spread abroad, espe-

cially to Scandinavia and Scotland, and then to the United States. Between the two world wars, neoorthodoxy was the dominant force in Protestant theology and was influential in Roman Catholic and Orthodox circles as well. Despite serious theological divisions that caused them to cease publishing *Zwischen den Zeiten* in 1933, the originators of the movement and their followers remained united in their opposition to certain elements of liberalism and in their commitment to a theology of the Word of God.

Since neoorthodoxy began as a reaction within liberal theology and at first intended to provide a mere corrective, it is not surprising that the movement retained some of its liberal heritage: respect for the scientific method of investigating the natural world, acceptance of historical-critical research on the Bible, and aversion to metaphysics and natural theology. Nevertheless, the following characteristic emphases of neoorthodoxy were all formulated in opposition to positions common in liberal theology:

1. the transcendence and otherness of God instead of God's immanence in nature and history, and thus a fundamental discontinuity between the divine and the human that can be overcome by God alone;
2. divine revelation rather than human religious experience as the source of the knowledge of God, and thus the Word of God—incarnate in Jesus Christ, attested in scripture, and proclaimed in the church—as the seat of authority for Christian thought and action;
3. the Christ of faith rather than the Jesus of history as the basis and/or object of Christian faith, and thus the acceptance of the conclusion of the eschatological interpretation of the New Testament that the quest for "the historical Jesus" is fruitless and unnecessary;
4. the meaning of history as hidden and thus not to be viewed as a progressive movement in which humans cooperate in the building of the kingdom of God; rather, Christ provides the only clue to history's ultimate meaning, and the kingdom of God is an eschatological event that depends solely upon the action of God;
5. sin as a rebellion against God caused by the abuse of human freedom rather than a result of human ignorance or failure to curb natural impulses; thus, the self-centeredness and alienation resulting from sin cannot be overcome by education but only by an act of divine forgiveness that calls forth repentance and new life.

Behind the rise of neoorthodoxy lay a number of factors. First was the general cultural crisis of Western bourgeois society that was reflected in two world wars. The nineteenth century's optimistic view of the future, based on scientific advances, evolutionary theory, and idealistic philosophy, was seriously undermined by historical events. There were other important factors as well: scholarly investigations of the New Testament that established apocalyptic eschatology as the framework for interpreting Jesus and his message of the kingdom of God and viewed the Gospels as products of the early church for preaching and worship rather than as biographies of Jesus; the thesis of Martin Kähler (1835–1912) that church and faith are dependent not on the results of historical inquiry into the life of the so-called historical Jesus but on the preaching of the early church's kerygma of the risen Christ, who is known in faith; the renaissance of interest in the study of the theology of the Protestant reformers, especially of Luther; the writings and preaching of Christian socialists (on the continent, Christoph Blumhardt, Leonhard Ragaz, Hermann Kutter; in America, Walter Rauschenbusch); the literary explorers of the ambiguity of human existence, such as Fedor Dostoevsky (1821–1881) and, above all, Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), the Danish "father of existentialism," whose writings were first translated during the early decades of the twentieth century; and the personalistic philosophy of Ferdinand Ebner (1882–1931) and Martin Buber (1878–1965), who insisted that God always remains a subject with whom humans can have an I–Thou, but never an I–It, relationship.

All these factors supported the neoorthodox attack on the nineteenth century's legacy of anthropocentric religion and helped to turn the church's attention to the God of the Bible, who is "wholly other" than the world and whose word enters the world "from outside" and never comes under the control of humans—not even in the sphere of religion. Inspired by his biblical studies, by the religious socialists' critique of present-day society in the light of God's coming kingdom, and by Kierkegaard's message of the infinite qualitative difference between the eternal God and finite, sinful humanity, Barth led the attack on the pious religiosity and cultural captivity of the church. He emphasized the "Godness" of God (God is not "man writ large"), the difference between the Word of God and the word of humans, and the judgment *(Krisis)* that God's word pronounces on human pretension and hypocrisy, whether in civil or religious affairs. Barth stressed that God pronounces a No to human sinfulness, but in and through that No comes the unexpected and incomparable Yes of God's mercy and forgiveness. This word of judgment and grace, which breaks into our world "from above," he insisted, can be understood by us in history only in a dialectical manner, and this in two senses: first, as the

dialectical relation between eternity and time, and, second, as the dialectical movement from God's No to God's Yes.

Barth's appeal to revelation and his attack on the psychologism and historicism of liberal theology generated early support from Gogarten, Brunner, Bultmann, and even Tillich (1886–1965), but it soon became evident that they disagreed with Barth's stringent opposition to natural theology and with what some considered to be an unwarranted supernaturalism. Each in his own way declared the dialectic to be not between two separate worlds (God's and ours) but within human existence (unfaith and faith, the "old man" and the new). Thus each affirmed the necessity of incorporating into theology an analysis of human existence prior to faith, whether it be based on a personalist philosophy of I–Thou relationships (Gogarten), on the phenomenon of human "respond-ability" as the formal image of God that remains even in sinful humanity (Brunner), or on a human "pre-understanding" derived from existentialist philosophy (Bultmann and Tillich). In response, Barth, who in his early work had agreed that God's self-revelation was "the answer to human existence," determined henceforth to free his theology from any dependence on an analysis of the "existential question of man" and to base it solely on God's self-revelation in *one* man: Jesus Christ.

Subsequent events in Germany tended to confirm Barth's suspicion of any theology that appealed to a revelation of God "outside Christ," in the natural order or in history. With the rise of Nazism, the so-called German Christians hailed the advent of Hitler and his policies as a new revelation of God. Their attempt to blend Nazism with Christianity was decisively repudiated at a meeting of the representatives of the Lutheran and Reformed traditions at Barmen in 1934, when it was declared that the Christian church must listen to Jesus Christ as the one Word of God, and to him alone.

Barth's split with Gogarten over the latter's initial support of the German Christians led to the cessation of publication of *Zwischen den Zeiten* in 1933, and the following year Barth repudiated Brunner's call for the development of a Christian natural theology. Thenceforth this group of "dialectical theologians," who had found their closest unity in what they opposed, followed their own paths toward mature theological positions that in many respects differed markedly and yet in the broad perspective of theological history still shared the basic characteristics of neoorthodoxy.

Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik* (Church Dogmatics), consisting of thirteen volumes originally published between 1932 and 1967, represents the premier intellectual expression of neoorthodoxy. In it Barth conducted a critical examination of the church's present teaching in the light of the scriptural attestation to God's self-revealing Word become flesh in the man Jesus of Nazareth. While not relinquishing his earlier stress on the deity of God, Barth more and more centered his focus on the "humanity of God," that is, on the triune God's covenental relationship with humankind that is fulfilled in Jesus Christ, in whose person we encounter both the true God as humanity's loyal partner and the true human being as God's loyal partner. God and humankind are thus reconciled in Christ, and those who respond to God's word of free, self-giving love become participants in Christ's earthly, historical body—the church—and witnesses of the Word to the world. Barth's biblical, Christ-centered theology reinterprets for today all of the doctrinal themes of classic Protestantism: God's sovereign grace, the lostness of humankind, Christ's reconciling deed, and renewed life under the rule of God.

Brunner, whose apologetic, or "eristic," interest on behalf of the church's mission was expressed in a number of theological and ethical monographs, ultimately summarized his theology in a three-volume *Dogmatik* (1946–1960), which is representative of neoorthodox thinking. He emphasized that for sinners who are living in contradiction to their true being, truth comes in the personal encounter with the Word of God that evokes the response of faith and new life in the church, which he considered to be a spiritual community rather than an institution.

Unlike Barth and Brunner, both of whom were in the Swiss Reformed tradition, Bultmann and Gogarten were German Lutherans who, ostensibly guided in their thinking by Luther and the apostle Paul, emphasized the nonobjective character of the revelatory event of faith. For Bultmann, whose *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (1948–1953) sets forth a demythologized, or existentialist, interpretation of the New Testament, the event of faith produces a new self-understanding that enables the believer to live authentically in the present. Gogarten, who after World War II produced a number of significant books on the relation of Christian faith to secularism, proposed in his magnum opus, *Der Mensch zwischen Gott und Welt* (1952), that the Christian gospel itself leads to a secularizing of the world insofar as it depopulates the world of its "principalities and powers" and calls humans to assume the responsibility of ordering and caring for the world as mature sons and daughters of God.

Echoes of continental neoorthodoxy in Great Britain were strongest in Scotland, where John Baillie (1886–1960) entered into the debate between Barth and Brunner over natural theology in his book *Our Knowledge of God* (1939); his brother Donald M. Baillie (1887–1954)

wrote a profound essay on incarnation and atonement, entitled *God Was in Christ* (1948), in which these doctrines were interpreted as "paradoxes of faith." In Swedish Lutheranism, neoorthodoxy is represented by two studies: the seminal treatise of Anders Nygren (1890–1978), *Eros och Agape* (1930, 1936), in which Nygren stressed the radical difference between agape as God's self-giving love and eros as human love fueled by desire; and the monograph of Gustaf Aulén (1879–1977) *Den kristna försoningstanken* (1930), translated as *Christus Victor*, which argued for the superiority of the classic view of the atonement held by Irenaeus and Luther over Latin and moral-influence theories.

Reinhold Niebuhr and his brother H. Richard Niebuhr (1894–1962), both Christian ethicists, led the neoorthodox battle against liberalism in the United States. Influenced by the Augustinian-Lutheran understanding of the profundity of sin, Reinhold Niebuhr probed the Christian understanding of humankind in his two volumes, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (1941, 1943). His realism regarding sin, especially as it is manifested in the structures of society, plus his keen sense of God's action in history, made his writings significant for both church and political constituencies. H. Richard Niebuhr in his best-known book, *Christ and Culture* (1951), applied his knowledge of sociology and theology to illuminate the relationship between faith and culture. The thought of both Niebuhrs was enriched by their association with Tillich, who emigrated to America in 1933. In his three-volume *Systematic Theology* (1951–1963), Tillich attempted to correlate the questions raised in modern culture with the answers provided in the Christian tradition.

By the end of the 1950s the influence of neoorthodoxy had begun to wane. Critics questioned its sharp separation of sacred history from world history, its pronounced discontinuity between Christianity and humanity's secular experience, its seeming lack of interest in the historical Jesus, its tendency to collapse eschatology into Christology, its failure to address sufficiently the challenge of world religions, and the inadequacy of its answers to the ethical problems of a nuclear age. In spite of these questions, however, all subsequent theology has acknowledged its enormous indebtedness to neoorthodoxy, realizing that it can ignore the neoorthodox legacy only at its own peril.

[*See also* Protestantism; Modernism, *article on* Christian Modernism; *and the biographies of Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, Niebuhr, and Tillich.*]

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NEOPLATONISM is the Platonic philosophy systematized in the *Enneads* by Plotinus (205–270), whose thought was further developed by others through the sixth century. [*See the biography of Plotinus.*] Earlier, in the first century BCE, the "divine Plato" had been revived as the supreme religious and theological authority by the Middle Platonists; at about the same time the Neo-Pythagorean philosophers were active. Plotinus was influenced by both these theistic and apophatic (negative) schools, which upheld the transcendence of a su preme mind and being called *theos* (God) and placed within this mind the Platonic Forms conceived as divine Ideas. These conceptions became the basis for kataphatic (positive) theology and a doctrine of divine providence.

Neoplatonism's most distinctive doctrine, however, opposed Middle Platonism in holding that the First Principle and source of reality, the One, or Good, transcends being and thought and is naturally unknowable. This doctrine, which originated with Plotinus, was taught more forcefully by his pagan successors, especially Iamblichus and Proclus. Christian thought in the fourth and fifth centuries remained more Middle Platonist in asserting both the unknowability and the intelligibility of the supreme being because Christians were guided in their positive statements about God by the New Testament revelation of the divine Trinity. Conflict between pagan philosophy and Christianity began in the second century with the anti-Christian treatise of the Platonist Celsus, to which the Christian theologian Origen responded in the third century; the dialogue continued with Porphyry's fourth-century treatise *Against the Christians*. Nevertheless, Origen regarded Plato and philosophy as Christianity's most powerful allies. By distinguishing between Classical Greek religion and Greek culture, which they assimilated, the Cappadocian fathers who followed Origen productively related Christianity to Hellenism, thus gaining cultural and intellectual leadership for Christianity.

The Neoplatonic One, or Good, was the object of religious aspiration. It was conceived as a transcendent, infinite, productive goodness and freedom attainable through mystical experience. The One distributes love (*eros*) to all souls; this love in turn leads each soul back, with necessary attendant intellectual and moral effort on the part of the soul, toward mystical union with the One. Neoplatonists separated their pagan philosophical doctrine from pagan worship, and this enabled intellectual Christians to learn from them. Still, it cannot be assumed that all borrowing between Christians and Neoplatonists must have been on the Christian side. Around the third century AD the goal of the philosophical life and of philosophy itself had become more explicitly religious. The task of the philosopher was to guide his followers, without drawing conclusions from religious myths and oracles, to the experience of the divine. Christians were thus able to find in Neoplatonism a purer notion of God than was present in Classical Greek religion. In his *Enneads* Plotinus presents an ordered structure of living reality eternally proceeding from the One and descending in continuous stages from the Nous, or Divine Intellect, with its living forms, through Soul, with its different levels of experience and activity, to the last and lowest realities, the forms of bodies.

Development of Neoplatonic Ideas. Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism developed in four stages, distinguishable in part by modifications on the Plotinian scheme.

1. The first stage is the teaching of the disciples, Porphyry, Amelius, and Eustochius. The most influential of these was Porphyry (232–305), who developed a more monistic philosophy than that of Plotinus by telescoping the hypostases into a unity of being, life, and understanding and by eliminating the distinction between Intellect and Soul.
2. The fourth-century Syrian and Pergamese schools were based on the teaching of Iamblichus (d. 326) that theurgy was the way to God.
3. During the ascendancy of the fifth- and sixth-century Athenian school, Neoplatonism became the official teaching of Plato's Academy, the chief member of which was Proclus (410?–485), who upheld pagan worship against imperial policy. Proclus placed theurgy as the soul's salvation above philosophy. Under him the main principles of Neoplatonism were expressed scholastically. The first two hypotheses of Plato's dialogue *Parmenides* inspired his work.
4. The Neoplatonism of the Athenian school also prevailed with the Alexandrian school (fifth and sixth centuries) of commentators on Plato's and Aristotle's psychology and logic. The Alexandrians, however, abandoned theurgy for philosophical scholarship.

Early Christian Thought. Plotinus and Origen, who studied under Ammonius Saccas, greatly influenced the Cappadocian fathers—Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa—who interpreted Christianity and its mission as the fulfillment of the system of education (*paideia*) proposed by the Greeks of the Classical period. Reading the Bible, rather than classical Greek literature, they believed, would mold mankind into the form of Christ. For the Cappadocians, Platonism was the prologue to Christianity. Like the Neoplatonists, the Eastern church valued the material world as a "theophany," or manifestation of the divine.

Cappadocian thought informed *On the Division of Nature* of John Scottus Eriugena (fl. 847–877), who spoke of creation as the natural unfolding of divine unity.

Proclus influenced the fifth-century thinker known under the name of the apostle Paul's first Athenian convert, Dionysius the Areopagite, as well as Michael Psellus (1018–1078?), whose school stimulated the eleventh-century Byzantine renaissance. At the Council of Florence (1438), called to unite the Eastern and Western churches, George Gemistus Plethon (1360–1450), from the Platonic school at Mistra, inspired Cosimo de' Medici to open a Platonic academy in Florence. Its head, Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), translated Plato and Plotinus into Latin and wrote commentaries aiming to harmonize Platonic Chaldean traditions with Christianity. The literary tradition of the Byzantine East was brought to Italy by Greek scholars after the fall of Constantinople (1453); the Christian humanism of Erasmus is rooted in the theology of the Greek fathers.

Islamic Neoplatonism. The Alexandrian school, with its neoplatonized Aristotelianism, continued during the ascendancy of Islam, moving to Antioch in 720 CE and to Baghdad in 900. The Syriac translations of Aristotle had challenged Islam, stimulating efforts both to reconcile philosophy with the Qur'ān and defend philosophy's autonomy. The Islamic interpretation of both Plato and Aristotle was Neoplatonic, making the Aristotelian God an efficient as well as a final cause. Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus all influenced Islamic thought. The so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, which was translated into Arabic, was really the *Enneads* 4–6, with explanations perhaps derived from Porphyry's lost commentaries. *Liber de causis*, a work based on Proclus's *Elements of Theology*, was presented to the West by Muslims as a work of Aristotle. Late Islamic Neoplatonism leaned toward Numenius and the anonymous *Parmenides* commentator.

Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. Marius Victorinus (fourth century) in his work on the Trinity was influenced by Porphyry's triad of being, life, and intelligence and by the anonymous Neoplatonic commentary on the *Parmenides;* it is evident also that he knew Plotinus and Aristotle. Augustine was indebted to Victorinus's Latin translation of the books of the Neoplatonists, whose thought liberated him from Manichaean materialism and recalled him to interiority. Boethius also knew Victorinus's works and had access to Neoplatonism.

Until the twelfth-century translations of Plato's dialogues *Meno* and *Phaedo*, the Western medieval world was Middle Platonic, because its only access to the Platonic dialogues was through Chalcidius's fourth-century commentary on the *Timaeus*, which was influenced by Numenius. Neoplatonism indirectly influenced medieval thought, however, through Augustine, Dionysius, and Boethius.

In medieval Jewish thought, Neoplatonism is evident in the Qabbalah and in the doctrines of Shelomoh Ibn Gabirol (1021–1058), who elaborated Plotinus's views on intelligible matter. Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon, 1135/8–1204) accepted Neoplatonic negative theology but remained predominantly Aristotelian. This Jewish Neoplatonic tradition influenced Barukh Spinoza.

Not until the West recovered Aristotle through translations of Arabic texts into Latin did it fully recover Neoplatonism. Then, in the thirteenth century, William of Moerbeke translated from the original Greek not only Aristotle's works but Proclus's *Elements of Theology* and his commentaries on the *Parmenides* and *Timaeus*. The translations enabled Thomas Aquinas to identify the *Liber de causis* as non-Aristotelian and freed Aristotle from the Neoplatonic accretions of the Muslims. Neoplatonism reached Thomas through Augustine, Dionysius, Boethius, and Proclus; Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–1327) was deeply affected by Neoplatonism, as is indicated by his distinction between God and the unknowable godhead and his doctrine of the uncreated element in the soul. Equally Neoplatonic and within the tradition of Dionysius are the other Rhineland mystics, Tauler (c. 1300–1361) and Suese (1295–1366), as are Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno.

Neoplatonism in Modern Thought. Neoplatonism may form the background of Descartes's philosophy of consciousness. It also is evident in the Cambridge Platonists, Henry More (1614–1687) and Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), as well as in Berkeley's *Siris*. It is present in Spenser, Coleridge, Blake, and Yeats. It is discernible in Spinoza's monism and in Leibniz's monadism. In the nineteenth century Schelling shows the influence of Plotinus, and Hegel that of Proclus. In the twentieth century Bergson tried to reconcile Plotinus's philosophy of soul with modern science.

Only in the nineteenth century was Neoplatonism clearly distinguished from Platonism and so named. I have noted its philosophical pluralism and religious diversity. Plotinus and Iamblichus not only have opposing ways of interpreting divine immanence versus transcendence but differ on whether salvation is attainable by nature or by grace.

Neoplatonism was the first theology constructed on the basis of religious experience, and although it insufficiently appreciated the body and the material world, its cosmic religion—the veneration of star-gods—prevented any absolute rejection of the sensible world; moreover, its promotion of human interiority was a benefit to religion. Religion also gained by the Neopla-

tonic insistence on the infinity of God and therefore on the need for apophatic (negative) theology and by the philosophical analysis of the inner life, that is, the universalizing of religious experience as a reasonable demonstration of God's existence and the doctrine of divine immanence as the ground for mystical experience.

Making no sharp distinction between God and the world, between faith and reason, between religion and philosophy, Neoplatonism provided from the third to the sixth century a center of opposition to Christian dogmas like those of the incarnation, the redemption, and the resurrection of the body. Yet Christians and Jews freely borrowed Neoplatonic principles to express their own religious convictions to educated audiences. Because they accepted divine providence in history, Christians recognized God teaching through pagan wisdom before teaching through the Law and the Prophets to the Jews. Christians saw in the core of ideas common to Greek culture and Christian faith an assurance of Christianity's universality. The spread of the Greek language within the Roman empire had provided an international culture through which the church could move from its Middle Eastern birthland to the wider world. Was Christianity hellenized in this movement? It was, but only to the extent that the church fathers used the Greek language and Greek philosophical concepts to communicate with the educated public in the Roman empire. In most cases divine revelation guided the use of Hellenic ideas. Christianity was only hellenized so as to christianize the Greek-speaking world and universalize Christianity, which, originating as a Jewish sect, became a world religion. Moreover, through the Christian classicists of the fourth century, such as Augustine in the West and the Cappadocians in the East, classical culture and literature survived and was made available to all. Theologians filled Neoplatonic categories with Christian content and used the Neoplatonic ideals of asceticism and contemplation in advocating the monastic life as a means toward the full realization of Christian perfection—that is, assimilation to God. Neoplatonic philosophy was used to reinforce but not replace those dogmas in which the strength of Christianity lies.

[*See also the biographies of the philosophers and religious thinkers mentioned herein.*]

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NEPALESE RELIGION. *See* Himalayan Religions.

NERGAL was a Mesopotamian god of the netherworld. *Nergal* (properly, *Nerigal*) is a phonetic rendering of the Sumerian *Enirigal(a)* ("lord of the big city [i.e., the netherworld]"). Nergal was also called Meslamtaea ("one

who comes out of the Meslam [temple]"). His consort was Ereshkigal ("queen of the big place [i.e., the netherworld]"). As one able to decimate mortals by contagious diseases, Nergal often assumed the personality of Erra, the god of plague. How he came to be king of the netherworld is described in the Akkadian myth *Nergal and Ereshkigal.* His cultic center was Cuthah, in central Babylonia, where his consort was Laz (Akk., *la asu*, "no exit [i.e., the netherworld]"), also called Mamma, Mammi, and Mammitum. Because of the complete identity of Nergal with Cuthah, that city's name became synonymous with the netherworld.

As king of the place to which all mankind must eventually journey, and as the deity considered to be the source of fever and plague, Nergal was much feared and his protection was much sought after. It is not surprising that outside of Cuthah he was worshiped alongside the local gods. Sennacherib dedicated a temple to him at Tarbis, northeast of Nineveh, and temples in his honor have been found in Elam, Mari, and Palmyra, on the upper Euphrates. Nergal was the recipient of a considerable number of hymns and prayers, in which he is frequently portrayed as an invincible fighter. His symbol on Middle Babylonian boundary stones is a mace with a lion's head, and in Old Babylonian cylinder seals he is depicted in human form, holding either a mace from which two lion heads protrude or a sickle-shaped sword. In the texts Nergal is symbolized by many animals, including the lion, the dragon, the bull, and the raven, all indicating his power, skill, and voraciousness.

[*See also* Mesopotamian Religions, *overview article.*]

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DAVID MARCUS

NERSĒS OF CLA (1101–1173), also known as Nersēs Clayatsi and Shnorhali; theologian, catholicos, and saint of the Armenian church. Born in the province of Tlouk' in Cilician Armenia (the central part of southern Turkey), Nersēs lost his father at an early age. Together with his elder brother Grigor, he was entrusted to the guardianship of his maternal granduncle, the catholicos Grigor II Vekayaser who commended them to the Monastery of Shoughri. Grigor's successor then placed them under the tutelage of the monk Stepanos Manouk, a renowned scholar and theologian.

Ordained a celibate priest when he was seventeen years old, Nersēs was consecrated a bishop at the age of thirty-five. He then served his church and nation in numerous capacities, including contributing to the establishment of peace in Cilician Armenia. Endowed with a keen mind and a Christian spirit, he became the architect in developing intercommunion and reconciliation between the Armenian and the Greek churches. Following the death of his brother, the catholicos Grigor, Nersēs was consecrated catholicos of the Armenian church in 1166. He died in 1173 and was buried in Hromcla.

Nersēs is considered one of the great literary figures in the ecclesiastical history of the Armenian church. He composed prayers, liturgical songs, and chants, sometimes written acrostically (consisting of thirty-six verses after the order of the Armenian alphabet or according to the alphabetical arrangement that spells his name). Uniquely impressive is Nersēs's prayer, Havatov Khosdovaneem (I Confess with Faith), currently available in thirty-six languages. Chief among his literary achievements is *Vipasanoutyoun*, a novel in poetic form; *Voghb Yedesyo* (Lamentation of Edessa); and commentaries on the first five chapters of the *Gospel of Matthew*, Gregory of Nyssa's discourse *On Evil*, and the discourse of the Neoplatonist Armenian philosopher David the Invincible. Also renowned is *Toukht Enthanrakan*, an exhortation on Christian behavior and a treatise on pastoral theology. It also supplies information concerning the hierarchy of the Armenian church, the stratification of society, and the manner of life in twelfth-century Cilician Armenia.

Nersēs always struggled to maintain the autocephalicity of the Armenian church, defining the important issues facing church unity in eight letters to the Byzantine emperor Manuel I Comnenus (c. 1122–1180). Nersēs remarked that unity cannot come by imposing royal force but through love, tolerance, and humility, thus indirectly warning the Byzantines not to impose their Chalcedonian faith on other churches. He saw the truths of Christianity in the unity of its parts, since no single church may consider the Christian faith its sole possession. His approach regarding unity was slowly finding adherents when his death halted the progress of further negotiations.

Nersēs dominated the thought and orientation of the Armenian church in twelfth-century Cilician Armenia, thus crowning its silver age in literary achievements. In due time, Nersēs received the appellation Shnorhali

("grace-filled") in recognition of his deep Christian faith and accomplishments.

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AVAK ASADOURIAN

NERSĒS THE GREAT, a saint of the Armenian church and chief bishop of Armenia from circa 353 to 373. During his youth Nersēs was brought up and educated in Caesarea Mazaca (modern-day Kayseri, Turkey). He was married and served as a chamberlain in the court of King Arshak II of Armenia. Because the office of bishop of Armenia was the patrimony of the family of Gregory the Illuminator, Nersēs's great-great-grandfather, Nersēs was chosen chief bishop and returned to Caesarea to receive episcopal ordination from the metropolitan bishop of that city. He called a council of bishops at Ashtishat, where his see was located. The council established general discipline in the Armenian church and set rules and regulations. At Nersēs's urging, provisions were made to found hospices for the sick, to open schools, to build hospitals, and to establish other benevolent institutions.

The fifth-century sagas of P'awstos Buzand refer to a rift between Nersēs and King Arshak that brought about the downfall of the bishop. The reason for the conflict is said to have been the immoral conduct of the king, who had his Greek wife poisoned and his nephew killed, and then married the latter's wife. The actual reason for the rift, however, was probably political. Nersēs represented the pro-Byzantine faction in Armenia. He had headed a delegation to Constantinople in the mid-fourth century and had reinforced the alliance between the Byzantine empire and his sovereign, who remained faithful to the empire until the treaty of 363, when the emperor Jovian agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Armenia and left the country exposed to the Persians. Nersēs was forced to abdicate from his office and was immediately replaced by another bishop, who was probably the candidate of the pro-Persian faction in Armenia. Nersēs reappeared as chief bishop circa 370, when the Byzantines succeeded in restoring the kingdom of Armenia and placed Pap, son of Arshak II, on the throne. During his second tenure of office, Nersēs participated in a council of bishops held at Caesarea in 372. He came into conflict with King Pap, presumably because of the latter's Arian leanings. The king is said to have poisoned Nersēs. This detail, however, is not supported by most sources. Nersēs probably died from natural causes.

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NESTORIAN CHURCH. The proper name of the church that is called Nestorian or Assyrian is the Ancient Church of the East. *Nestorian* is an appellation dating from the fifth century and *Assyrian* from the nineteenth. By *East* is meant those ancient territories lying east of the former Byzantine empire comprising modern-day Iraq, Persia, and the southeastern part of Turkey. These territories had their religious center at Edessa (Orhoi in Syriac), known as Urfa in present-day Turkey. Edessa was the capital of a small Syriac-Aramaic principality ruled by Syriac toparchs (rulers or princes), known also as Abgarites. According to the *Doctrine of Addai*, a late fourth-century church document attributed to Thaddaeus (known in Aramaic as Addai, one of the seventy evangelists and the twin of the apostle Thomas), Thaddaeus, following the Resurrection and at the behest of Christ, went to Edessa and healed its toparch, Abgar V (d. AD 50). Thaddaeus stayed to preach the gospel, made converts, and ordained his disciple, 'Aggai, a bishop. He then journeyed to and preached the gospel in Mesopotamia, southern Turkey, Iraq, and southwestern Persia.

By the second century, Christianity had spread throughout the East, from Najran in southwestern Arabia, through southern Turkey and Iraq, to southwestern Persia. In the third century, Christianity also spread to

the island of Socotra in the Indian Ocean and to Riyordashīr, the capital of Fārs in extreme southern Persia, as well as to the Sasanid capital of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, where the bishopric was founded under Phafa. By the latter part of the fifth century, the bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon (by that time followers of Nestorius) were claiming that the see had been established by Thaddaeus and his disciple Mari.

The bishop (metropolitan) of Seleucia-Ctesiphon was recognized as being under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Antioch. At a synod convened in 410 by Marutha of Miya-farqin, who was sent by the emperor and the patriarch, the metropolitan of Seleucia-Ctesiphon was made a catholicos (a church position higher than a metropolitan and lower than a patriarch). Given the authority to ordain bishops in the name of the patriarch of Antioch, and using his new powers to advantage, the catholicos was able to bring under his jurisdiction all the dioceses in the East except the metropolitan see of Riyordashīr. This see remained independent until the ninth century when Catholicos Timothy I (d. 823) brought it under his aegis after offering its metropolitan some special privileges.

Meanwhile, under the Sasanid kings Shāpūr II (309–379) and his brother Ardashīr II (379–383) the Ancient Church of the East suffered persecution and martyrdom because of its ties to the Byzantines whom the Persians considered enemies. Persecution continued sporadically until the conquest of Persia by the Arabs in the first part of the seventh century.

In the first half of the fifth century the Church of the East was rocked by a theological controversy so serious that it resulted in schism. This was the so-called Nestorian controversy. Nestorius, a Syrian by origin, became patriarch of Constantinople in 428. Fully developing the theological implications of the school of Antioch, he taught that Jesus Christ had two distinct natures: divine and human. Nestorius was condemned at the Council of Ephesus in 431 but his teaching spread, and by 451 most of the eastern part of the Church of the East had become "Nestorian," rejecting the Council of Ephesus. By 451 the Nestorians were almost completely cut off from the rest of the patriarchate of Antioch, and Nestorians controlled the see of Seleucia-Ctesiphon. [*See* Nestorianism *and the biography of Nestorius.*]

Between 484 and 486 Bishop Bar Sauma convened several councils that issued new canons for the foundation of the new Nestorian church. Those bishops in the East who did not accept Nestorian teachings met in 487 and ordained Accacius as their catholicos. However, through threats and coercion by Bar Sauma and his group, Accacius yielded to the Nestorians. What gave added strength to the Nestorians in the East is that many students of the celebrated school of Edessa became Nestorian partisans. When the emperor Zeno, in retaliation, closed it in 489, many of these Nestorian students left for Persia, where they spread their beliefs under the protection of the Persian state. Thus, the Church of the East came also to be known as the Persian church. By 498, at the Council of Seleucia, the Nestorians severed forever their ties with the patriarchate of Antioch.

After the Arab conquest of Iraq in the beginning of the seventh century, the Nestorians, like other Christians, became *dhimmīs* under the protection of the Muslims. Under the Abbasid caliphs (750–1258) the Nestorians enjoyed relative peace, and in 762 their catholicoi moved their see to Baghdad, the Abbasid capital. In Baghdad, the Nestorians were the first to promote Greek science and philosophy by translating Greek texts into Syriac and then into Arabic. They were highly favored by the caliphs and were the first to introduce Greek medicine into Baghdad.

Although the Nestorians were generally favored, there were times when they, like other Christians, were persecuted or humiliated by the caliphs. The Nestorian church generally prospered until the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258, when the widespread disruption in the Middle East drained its vitality. The Nestorian catholicoi left Baghdad and settled in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) in the vicinity of Mosul and Alqosh.

The most detrimental effect of the Muslim conquest on the Nestorian church in the countries lying between Persia and China was that its missionary activity, begun among the Mongols, Turks, and Chinese, was cut off. Eventually the early blossom of Christianity in China died. The inscriptions in both Syriac and Chinese on the stone at Chou-chih, fifty miles southwest of Sian Prefecture, China, containing a long list of Nestorian clergymen, is evidence of the expansion of the Nestorian church in China. Nestorianism also reached the coast of Malabar in South India and made converts among the Christians there. The new converts used the Syriac liturgy and honored the memory of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia. [*See the biography of Theodore.*] From 1599 to 1663 they were reconverted to Roman Catholicism through the efforts of Jesuit missionaries. Many however returned to Nestorianism when the power and influence of the Portuguese empire began to fade. [*See also* Christianity, *article on* Christianity in Asia.]

In the fifteenth century the small Nestorian community on the island of Cyprus joined the church of Rome. Power struggles within the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the mother Nestorian church also caused large segments of it to join Rome. The struggle in the East began in 1450 when the catholicos, Shimon Baṣīdi, restricted

the election of future catholicoi to men of his own family. This interdiction continued for the next hundred years. After the death of the catholicos in 1551, a group of Nestorians who opposed his successor met in Mosul and chose a monk, Yūḥanna (John) Sūlāqa, to send to Rome to be ordained. Arriving in Rome, Sūlāqa professed the Roman Catholic faith before Pope Julius III, who ordained him a bishop and then a catholicos in April 1553. It is most likely that it was Julius who gave the name *Chaldean* (in reference to ancient Chaldea) to Sūlāqa and his followers; thus was born the "Chaldean" church. Sūlāqa returned to Diyarbakır, Turkey, where he made few converts. He was assassinated by the Kurdish chief of 'Amadiyya, allegedly at the instigation of his rival, Shimon Bār Māma. Several catholicoi served at Diyarbakır, not all of whom were ordained by popes and whose loyalty to Rome was dubious.

About this time, a Nestorian bishop, Shimon Dinbah, united his congregation with Rome, and the Chaldeans made him their catholicos. He moved his seat from Diyarbakır to Urmia in northern Persia where many Nestorians lived. In 1670 one of his successors renounced the church of Rome, returned to Nestorianism, and was accepted as catholicos by the Nestorian catholicoi, one in Urmia and the other in Alqosh.

In the middle of the eighteenth century a Nestorian bishop, Mar Yūsuf (Joseph) of Diyarbakır, joined the church of Rome and was ordained by the pope as a successor to the line of Sūlāqa as catholicos of the Chaldeans in Diyarbakır. In 1778 a Nestorian bishop, Yūḥanna (John) Hormizd, embraced Roman Catholicism and began to contend for the office of catholicos with his cousin, Mar Eliyya XI of Alqosh. Rome could not ordain Hormizd catholicos of the Chaldean community because Mar Yūsuf was already catholicos in Diyarbakır. When Yūsuf died in 1779, Rome entrusted the Chaldean church to his nephew, Augustine Hindi. Finally, after long waiting and through the machinations of Roman Catholic missionaries, Hormizd was confirmed by Pope Pius VIII as the catholicos of the Chaldean community. By then most of the Nestorians of the plains of Mosul had become Roman Catholics. Since then, the Nestorian community has retreated into the mountains of Kurdistan.

Since 1820 the Protestant churches in the West have taken a rather special interest in the Nestorian communities of the East. The American Presbyterian church became the first to organize missions among them when, in 1830, the Presbyterian Board of Missions sent the first missionaries. The mission headquarters were located in Urmia, where there were doctors as well as a printing press.

The Church of England became involved with the Nestorians when in 1842, George P. Badger, chaplain of the East India Company, was sent to Iraq. He wrote two volumes (published in 1852) on the Nestorians and their church. The interest of the Church of England continued until after World War I and the establishment of the national government of Iraq (1921).

For more than a hundred years (1830–1933), the Nestorian community in Kurdistan and Iraq suffered continuous tragedies. Being Christians they were always prey to Kurdish chieftains, who plundered their villages. The activity and existence of Western missionaries among the Nestorians most probably motivated the Kurds and their patrons, the Ottomans, to agitate against them.

The outbreak of World War I saw the Nestorians hopeful of an eventual Allied victory. This happy consequence would certainly alleviate the persecution aimed at them by both Kurds and Ottomans. Encouraged by the Russian advance into eastern Turkey in 1915, the Nestorians revolted against the Turks and assisted the Russians. But when the Bolshevik revolution erupted and Russia withdrew from the war in 1917, they were in great danger. Consequently, about twenty thousand Nestorians struggled to reach the British lines in Iraq to avoid reprisal by Kurds and Ottomans. With fear of reprisal haunting the rest of the Nestorians of Urmia, in the summer of 1918 some hundred thousand of them attempted to reach the Kermānshāh-Qazvīn region, which was then under British occupation. Less than half made it through; the rest were rounded up and settled by the British authorities in the mountains of northern Iraq.

As a result of their association with the British, the Nestorians ("Assyrians") developed nationalistic feelings. They asserted that the northern part of Iraq, the ancient land of Athūr, was their ancestral and rightful home. They fostered the hope of an independent Assyrian state in Iraq. This dream was probably encouraged by minor British army officers, and, in 1919, a group of Assyrians, including many from the United States, submitted a petition to the peace conference in Paris outlining their nationalistic aspirations. There was no response.

After the establishment of national rule in Iraq in 1921, the Iraqi government granted autonomy in internal and religious affairs to the Nestorian community (in northern Iraq) led by their catholicos, Mar Ishāi Shimon XXI. But Mar Shimon, barely thirteen years old, was ill advised by members of his household and demanded complete independence from Iraq on the premise that northern Iraq was the ancestral land of the Assyrians. This demand was not acceptable to either Iraq or Britain. The Iraqi government tried to dissuade Mar Shimon from acting as if he were head of a state within a state but failed. Finally, in 1933 it notified the Assyr-

ians either to behave as Iraqi citizens or leave. About a thousand Assyrians decided to leave and crossed the Euphrates into Syria, which was occupied by the French. The French authorities turned them back, where they faced an Iraqi army force. A stray shot was fired, and the Iraqi army used the occasion to massacre most of the Nestorian contingent. Subsequently, Mar Shimon was stripped of his Iraqi nationality and deported to Cyprus. From Cyprus he went to England, and then to the United States, where he became an American citizen.

In 1973 Mar Shimon resigned because of a conflict with his community over his violation of some church rules. After his death in 1975, he was succeeded by Mar Ḥānania Dinkha IV, who was installed in London in 1976 as catholicos patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East. The Assyrian community, which numbered about 500,000 in 1980, still has many members living in Iraq and Iran, but their greatest concentration is in the United States, especially in Chicago, Illinois. This latter group is mostly composed of immigrants who left Iraq after 1933 and their descendants.

The Nestorian church in the latter part of the twentieth century forms the extreme eastern branch of the Syriac-speaking church of Antioch. Its liturgical language is Syriac-Aramaic with a distinct dialect and script. It recognizes only the first two ecumenical councils and rejects the Council of Ephesus, which condemned Nestorius. Its rite is the Old Eastern Syriac rite, and it has three main liturgies: those of the evangelist Thaddaeus and his disciple Mari, of Nestorius, and of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Other liturgies, such as those of Bar Sauma, Narsai, and Diodore of Tarsus, are presumed lost. The liturgy begins with the practical making and baking of the bread for communion but does not contain the words of institution. The communion is given in both elements, bread and wine. The hierarchy consists of the catholicos, also called patriarch, who always takes the name Mar Shimon. Under him come the metropolitans, bishops, priests, and deacons. The church is essentially iconoclastic, although the Cross is revered. Through the vicissitudes of time, schism, persecution, and apostasy, this once grand church of the East has been reduced to a tiny community, living for the most part in a Western diaspora. It has become a member of the World Council of Churches.

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MATTI MOOSA

NESTORIANISM is a doctrinal position on the nature of Jesus Christ. In its extreme form the doctrine has been condemned by Christian councils, but the ideas associated with Nestorianism have come to represent one of the two main traditions of christological thought in

Christianity and have been ably defended and articulated by successive generations of Christian thinkers. The name goes back to Nestorius, a patriarch of Constantinople in the early fifth century who was deposed at the Council of Ephesus in 431 and exiled to Egypt in 436. Nestorius was not, however, an original thinker, and the theological views that came to be associated with his name had arisen late in the fourth century among Christian thinkers in eastern Asia Minor and Syria (in the vicinity of ancient Antioch), notably Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. The distinctive features of Nestorianism can be made clear by contrasting it with another tradition of thought associated with the city of Alexandria in Egypt. [*See also the biography of Nestorius and* Nestorian Church.]

After the councils of Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381), the majority of Christians affirmed that Christ was fully God and was one with God the Father, creator of the world. The question then arose of the relation between this divine Son of God, the eternal Logos, and the human person Jesus of Nazareth who lived in the first century and is portrayed in the Gospels of the New Testament. The Alexandrian theologians, led by Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444), taught that Jesus Christ was the eternal Logos under the conditions of humanity. All the actions predicated of Jesus (e.g., human birth, growth in wisdom, suffering, and death) were predicated of the divine Logos as well. The Antiochene theologians (the forerunners of Nestorianism) believed that Jesus Christ was the result of a union between the divine Son of God and the man Jesus. They explained this union by analogy with the Jewish prophets, outstanding men on whom the spirit of God descended, except that in the case of Christ, God indwelt as in a Son, and the union between God and the Son was inseparable and perfect.

In the early fifth century these two ways of thinking, Alexandrian and Antiochene, clashed over the issue of whether Mary was *theotokos*, the one who gave birth to God, or *christotokos*, the bearer of Christ. After Nestorius became bishop of Constantinople, one of his priests, without Nestorius's objection, criticized the concept of *theotokos* as theologically erroneous. He urged the use of the term *christotokos*, which conformed to the Antiochene way of thinking of Mary as having given birth to the man Jesus, not to the eternal son of God. The term *theotokos*, however, had begun to be used by Christians and had the sanction of recent tradition. To Cyril of Alexandria, as well as to the bishop of Rome, denial of the concept of *theotokos* implied that Mary was not the Mother of God, and hence that God had not become human in the birth of Jesus Christ and that Mary was simply the mother of an exceptional man. Nestorius appeared to teach that there were two persons in Christ, the man Jesus and the divine Son of God. A flurry of theological polemics and political maneuvering ensued. In 430 Celestine, bishop of Rome, condemned Nestorius, and a year later Cyril presided over the Council of Ephesus, which also anathematized him. Emperor Theodosius supported the decision.

Nestorius's writings survive only in fragments, except for an obscure work, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, discovered in 1895 in a Syriac translation from the original Greek. Nestorius wrote the *Bazaar* some years after the controversy as a defense against the charges of his opponents.

Nestorianism, however, is not to be identified with the teaching of Nestorius, though he is venerated by the Nestorian church (i.e., the church of eastern Syria and Persia). Nestorius's supporters thought that their views were vindicated by the Council of Chalcedon in 451. During the course of the fifth century, they constituted themselves as an independent Christian body, with a school in Edessa under the leadership of Ibas, bishop of Edessa (435–457) and an ecclesiastical center and see of the patriarch (who is called *catholicos*) at Seleucia-Ctesiphon on the Tigris River. A small body of Nestorians has survived into modern times.

Under the leadership of distinguished theologians such as Babai the Great (d. 628), the Nestorians forged an alternative to the way of thinking about Christ that had become normative for most Christians in the East and West. They believed that the dominance of the Alexandrian tradition, with its stress on Christ's unity with God, jeopardized the integrity of his human nature. One of their favorite biblical texts was *Luke* 2:52, "Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man," a passage that is extremely difficult to interpret if one does not allow genuine human growth in Jesus. Other texts came from passages in *Hebrews* (2:10, 3:1–2) that suggest that Jesus had become perfect by what he had accomplished as a human being. Long after the ancient disputes a systematic presentation of Nestorian theology was written by Abdisa (d. 1318), metropolitan of Nisibis, in *The Book of the Pearl.*

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NESTORIUS (381?–451?), Christian bishop after whom was named one of the major heresies concerning the doctrine of Christ. The figure of Nestorius is much less significant than the teachings associated with his

name and the theological developments after his deposition. [*See* Nestorianism *and* Nestorian Church.] He was born in Germanicia in Cilicia, a Roman province in southeastern Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey). In the Syrian city of Antioch, he distinguished himself by his asceticism and skill in preaching. When the clergy of the capital city of Constantinople could not agree on a replacement for the patriarch Sisinnius, the emperor invited Nestorius to accept the post. As bishop he was zealous in stamping out heresy, particularly Arianism and Novatianism. He soon became embroiled in controversy, however, initially because of the preaching of his assistant Anastasius, a presbyter he had brought with him from Syria, but later through his own lack of judgment.

Nestorius criticized the term *theotokos* ("God bearer"), a slogan for the idea that Mary, in giving birth to Jesus Christ, had given birth to God. He preferred *christotokos* ("bearer of Christ," i.e., the human being Jesus Christ). Since the term *theotokos* had become a sign of orthodox teaching, Nestorius's imprudence made him vulnerable to the charge of heresy, as his opponents swiftly recognized. Cyril of Alexandria, the ambitious patriarch of a rival see and the exponent of the theological ideas behind the concept of *theotokos*, obtained copies of Nestorius's sermons and initiated proceedings against him.

Nestorius was deposed, and in 436, after spending several years in a monastery in Constantinople, he was exiled to Egypt, where he remained for the rest of his life. He lived until the Council of Chalcedon (451), which he and others saw as a vindication of his views and a repudiation of Cyril. Nestorius was not, however, rehabilitated. His name has been associated with the view that there are two separate persons in Christ, the one divine and the other human (orthodox teaching is that there were two "natures"), but his theological contribution is insignificant. Of his writings a few sermons remain, as well as some fragments from theological works and an amorphous and difficult book, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, a defense of his views written long after the controversy and discovered in 1895 in a Syriac translation from the original Greek. He is revered by the Nestorian church, and his tomb in Egypt was venerated by his followers for centuries.

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NETHERWORLD. *See* Underworld.

NETS. *See* Webs and Nets.

NEUMANN, ERICH (1905–1960), German-Israeli analytical psychologist and writer. Neumann's upbringing in Berlin was Jewish but not orthodox; he was influenced, nevertheless, by Hasidism, in response perhaps to his strong mystical leaning. Long before the rise of Hitler, Neumann was drawn to the Zionist ideal of the renewal of Jewish life in Palestine. At the University of Erlangen, he earned his Ph.D. degree with a dissertation on J. A. Kanne, a mystical philosopher of the time of the Enlightenment who, although a Christian, had been deeply influenced by Jewish esoteric thought. In his youth Neumann wrote a novel, *Der Anfang* (The Beginning), a story of self-fulfillment, which was partially published in 1932. He also wrote poetry and literary essays, notably on Franz Kafka and biblical themes.

Neumann's growing interest in psychology led to his choice of profession; he started medical training and completed his studies in 1933, but Nazi restrictions blocked his qualifying as a physician. In 1958, however, the University of Hamburg awarded Neumann an M.D. degree *in absentia*, having accepted his book *Die Ursprungsgeschichte des Bewussteins* (1949, translated as *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, 1954) as his thesis. Neumann opted for immigration to Palestine in 1934, pausing on the way in Zurich for a period of analysis and study with C. G. Jung. Gerhard Adler has written: "Here, in Jung's approach, he found the dynamic focus of his various interests and gifts. Analytical psychology provided the instrument that helped him to translate his creative insight into practical work with other people, and for them" (preface to Neumann's *Creative Man: Five Essays*, 1979, p. xiii).

In Palestine, Neumann devoted himself to building a practice and to pursuing studies that, after the enforced isolation of World War II, brought forth an enormous burst of creative work. He revisited Europe only in 1947, for a family holiday in Ascona, Switzerland, where he had two crucial encounters—with Olga Froebe-Kapteyn, the director of the Eranos Conferences, and with John D. Barrett, the editor of the Bollingen Series. Neumann lectured the following year at Eranos on "mystical man" and at each of the conferences thereafter as keynote speaker. His last lecture there was delivered in 1960, shortly before his death. In 1948 he was awarded a Bollingen Foundation fellowship, which continued for twelve years and supported his copious literary activity.

The Origins and History of Consciousness aims to illustrate archetypal stages in the development of human consciousness by interpreting basic mythologems drawn from several religious traditions. Neumann argues that individual consciousness passes through the same developmental stages that mark the history of human consciousness. Published in the same year, *Tiefenpsychologie und neue Ethik* (1949, translated as *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, 1969) demonstrates the impact that the idea of psychological wholeness had made on Neumann, on whom self-realization seemed to impose a new ethical outlook and an obligation beyond conventional ethical concepts. The book aroused controversy; Jung commented, "If Neumann recommends the 'inner voice' as the criterion of ethical behavior instead of the Christian conscience . . . [he] stands on the best footing with very many Christian mystics" (*Letters*, vol. 1, 1973, p. 519). *The Great Mother* (1955), a study of the archetypal feminine, is based on images from numerous cultures that were collected in Froebe-Kapteyn's Eranos Archive. Feminine psychology here becomes a focus of Neumann's interest, vying for priority with the psychology of creative art. Both concerns are effectively blended in *The Archetypal World of Henry Moore* (1959). In his later years, essays, lectures, seminars, and analytical training preoccupied Neumann, and he produced no more longer works.

When an illness he had was diagnosed as terminal in October 1960, Neumann returned from London to Israel, where he died a month later, leaving many projects unfinished. In Gerhard Adler's words, "Neumann was the one truly creative spirit among the second generation of Jung's pupils, the only one who seemed destined to build on Jung's work and to continue it" (preface to Neumann's *Creative Man: Five Essays*, 1979, p. xv).

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NEUROEPISTEMOLOGY is a relatively new discipline that considers questions of the theory of knowledge in terms of what has recently been learned about the structure and function of the brain. In this essay, I shall consider the neuroepistemological status of the experience of the Absolute, but, before doing so, I shall review briefly what has been learned in the past twenty or so years about how the human brain organizes sensory input and how it "constructs" the subjective representation of reality that we call knowledge. Accordingly, the first part of this article will briefly allude to what is known of the brain's capacity to structure ordinary experience and will then present a model to help explain the mystical state that I shall call the experience of "absolute unitary being" (AUB). The basic philosophical assumption of the first part of this article will be naive scientific realism. The second part of the article will consider the epistemological status of the experience of AUB *per se* as well as the limitations of scientific realism in analyzing this experience.

The Brain's Organization of Knowledge. To simplify the understanding of how the brain abstracts elements of meaning from external input and organizes such elements, it is necessary to introduce the concept of *cognitive operator*. When the term is used, *operator* is employed analogously to the way it is used in mathematics. In mathematics, an operator is the means by which certain mathematical elements are made to relate to one another in specific ways. Similarly, a cognitive operator represents a probable neural structure that processes sensory input by relating various elements in ways specific to that operator. For the purposes of this discussion I shall describe six operators.

1. The *causal operator* permits reality to be viewed in terms of causal sequences of abstract elements.
2. The *abstractive operator* permits the formation of a general concept from the perception of empirical individuals.
3. The *binary operator* permits the extraction of meaning by ordering abstract elements into dyads involving varying degrees of polarity so that each pole of the dyad derives meaning from contrast with the other pole.
4. The *formal quantitative operator* permits the abstraction of quantity *per se* from the perception of empirical individuals, generating arithmetic and mathematics.

5. The *value operator* permits an affective valence to be assigned to various elements of perception and cognition.
6. The *holistic operator* permits reality to be viewed as a whole or as a gestalt. It is responsible for the generation of absolute unitary being discussed in the second part of this article.

Space limitations do not permit me to present in detail the probable neuroanatomical bases of operators 1 through 5. (The interested reader is referred to my works cited in the bibliography, in which I have delineated in detail the neuroanatomical and neurophysiological substrates of the major cognitive operators.) Operators 1 through 5 are responsible for our organization of sensory input into the world of daily experience. In this article, this world of baseline reality will be juxtaposed with the experience of absolute unitary being. To understand the experience of AUB it is necessary to go into a little more detail concerning the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of operator 6, that is, the holistic operator.

Recent experiments with animals—as well as observations of humans in whom the corpus callosum and anterior commissure of the brain have been sectioned to prevent the interhemispheric spread of epilepsy—have strongly supported the early clinical observations of neurologists that the parietal lobe on the nondominant side of the brain is intimately involved in the perception of spatial relations (Leehey and Cahn, 1980; Franco and Sperry, 1977). The evidence indicates that this perception is of a "holistic" or "gestalt" nature (Sperry, Gazzaniga, and Bogen, 1969; Nebes and Sperry, 1971; Gazzaniga, 1970; Gazzaniga and Hillyard, 1971). It is of more than passing interest that certain areas on the opposite, or dominant, side of the brain (specifically the angular gyrus) are related to the performance of mathematical operations and to the performance of certain basic logical-grammatical operations, particularly the perception of opposites and the ability to set one object over against another to emphasize its full semantic properties (Luria, 1966, 1973a, 1973b).

It is probably no coincidence, then, that those neural structures that appear to generate "gestalt" spatial perception on the nondominant side are homologous to those structures on the dominant side that underlie mathematical, logical, and grammatical relationships. It is certainly not news that mathematics and mathematical operations appear to derive from the quantification of spatial properties. It is my contention that basic logical-grammatical operations are likewise so derived. If the holistic perception of spatial relationships is considered as the more primitively evolved or more "basic" function of the parietal lobe, it is possible to postulate that this has been preserved or even elaborated in man on the nondominant side. Modification on the contralateral, or dominant, side has been in the opposite direction, that is, breaking down spatial wholeness into various composite units and relationships. Such breakdown processes most probably involved a modification and elaboration of the more primitive wholeness operations (on what is now called the nondominant side) into what are recognized as the analytic functions that are associated with the dominant hemisphere of the brain. I have proposed that the loci of these analytic operations (e.g., binary, abstractive, and formal quantitative operators) reside in various areas of the parietal lobe on the dominant side (d'Aquili, 1982, 1983). The evidence of Sperry and others cited above leads me to localize the holistic operator in the parietal region of the nondominant side. This operator permits the perception of reality as a gestalt, or single perceived unity. Thus the function of the parietal lobe on the nondominant side (i.e., the holistic operator) becomes of crucial importance in the generation of the sense of absolute unitary being central to metaphysics and mystical religion.

A principal source for the concept of deity may involve the subjective experience of the almost pure functioning of the holistic operator. By the "pure" or "total" functioning of a cognitive operator, I mean the subjective experience of the cognitive operator functioning on minimal content or on no content, when content is described as the normal, empirical, individual entities in the environment that are experienced in day-to-day living. Under normal circumstances each cognitive operator functions on material derived from the environment. I am suggesting that, under special and somewhat rare circumstances, a cognitive operator can be experienced subjectively in its pure functioning unrelated to content derived from the environment. In normal awareness it is very difficult for the holistic operator to function alone. As noted above, all the operators apparently function in concert so that the various parts of the entire neocortex are constantly operating simultaneously, processing information both synthetically and analytically. Under certain conditions usually produced by altered physiological states, the holistic operator can function briefly in an absolute sense so that the world is perceived as a unity. When this occurs, even the self-other polarity is dissolved, and the experience so often described by mystics of both East and West is obtained. This experience represents the subjective awareness of a cortical operator functioning in a pure way—that is, devoid, or almost devoid, of individuated content. This state of awareness is so ineffable as

to be affirmed after the fact as representing unquestionable and ultimate reality.

Absolute Unitary Being. The sense that is attained through the absolute operation of the holistic operator yields the subjective perception of absolute and total unity of being without a temporal dimension. Reality is thus perceived as "ultimate wholeness" without any admixture of fragmentation whatsoever. When absolute unitary and atemporal being is perceived as suffused with positive affect it is generally perceived as personal (see d'Aquili, 1982). This perceived experience of unitary atemporal being is interpreted in most world religions as either a direct perception of God or as the *unio mystica* of the Christian tradition, which, though a manifestation of God, is not considered a revelation of his inmost nature.

The existence of the phenomenon of direct experiential perception of unitary atemporal being is attested to not only in the mystical literature of the great world religions but in the experience of a few individuals occasionally met in day-to-day living. The experience transcends any perception of multiple, discrete being, and the awareness of the subject-object difference is obliterated in this perception. The experience is ineffable, but it is frequently interpreted (when experienced with strong positive affect) in terms that express a union with, or a direct experience of, God.

But the experience of ultimate wholeness does not have to be theistically labeled. It can be understood philosophically (usually with neutral affective valence) as an experience of the absolute, the ultimate, or the transcendent. In the Buddhist tradition the experience (also with neutral affective valence) is interpreted as the "void," or *nirvāṇa*, and is generally expressed as impersonal. It is interesting that the perception of the logical opposite of ultimate wholeness—that is, ultimate fragmentation—does not seem to be possible. For anything to be known at all, however chaotic it may be, some sense of wholeness or form must be perceived or imposed. The *post hoc* description of ultimate wholeness may be of an experience of a personal God or of a completely nonpersonal experience of total being, but in any case the experience is always interpreted as absolutely transcendent, or ultimate, or in some sense beyond ordinary experience.

Whether or not the phenomenon is interpreted as the experience of God or as the experience of a philosophical absolute tends to depend on the *a priori* conceptual frame of the subject. But there can be no doubt as to the reality of the experience for those few who have had it; furthermore, these people are absolutely certain of the experience's objective reality. This experience, for those individuals, contains at the least the same subjective conviction of reality as does the subjective conviction of the reality of the external world. Although it is true philosophically that we cannot prove the existence of the external world as perceived (or even of the external world at all), nonetheless each of us carries a subjective and pragmatic certainty of its existence. The experience of absolute unitary being carries to the subject the same or perhaps even a greater degree of certainty of its objective reality. Research indicates that this is true even in people whose orientation is materialist, reductionist, or atheistic prior to the experience of absolute unitary being.

As noted above, it seems highly likely from recent research into the function of various parts of the cerebral cortex that the experience of AUB arises from the total functioning of the parietal lobe on the nondominant side (or at least certain parts of that area). These parts of the brain may have evolved to yield such transcendent experiences, or perhaps such experiences are merely a by-product of cortical machinery that evolved for other purposes. In any case, the experience of absolute unitary being can be explained in terms of the evolution of the present structure and function of the central nervous system. The point that I would like to emphasize, however, is that such an explanation, although unquestionably legitimate from a scientific perspective, in no way alters the subjective sensation of the objective reality of the experience. So strong is this feeling of objective reality that, for most people (at least in my research), even a detailed neuroepistemological analysis does not alter the conviction that something objectively real has been experienced. For those few who have experienced both realities—the reality of the day-to-day world (and objective science) on one hand and the reality of transcendent unitary being on the other—the problem is not one of trying to decide which reality is real. These people say that they know both are real. Rather, the problem is one of reconciling the two drastically different and seemingly contradictory perceptions of reality.

In an attempt to reconcile the sense of baseline reality with the certainty of the reality of the transcendent, a number of models have been put forward. One possible approach is that embodied in a strand of Vedantic thought known as Māyāvāda. For the great Vedānta philosophers and mystics, the reality of the transcendent is so great that they deny the reality of everyday experience, relegating such experience—that is, the world of causality and the world of chance phenomena—to the realm of illusion. For them, the appearance of the external world—all the relationships between discrete entities, all the relationships of causality, and even all the laws and inferences of science—would sim-

ply represent the breakdown of an ultimate wholeness that alone is "really real." The ultimate reality for them is the experience of transcendent, unitary, atemporal, absolute being.

The position of most Christian mystics is somewhat different. In the Christian view, both realities (the everyday world and AUB) are alike in terms of certainty of their existence. On one hand, the reality of the external world of chance, cause and effect, and objective, discrete being is definitely real, but so is the perception of absolute unitary being, or what some Christian mystics would call God (although, as stated above, some would deny that God's inmost nature is revealed in such experience). In the Christian synthesis the priority is given to the transcendent experience. The explanation for the duality is often that the two worlds run parallel to one another, and that the world of absolute unitary being, or God, is the ground, the foundation, or the cause (in the ultimate sense) of the world of everyday experience.

A third model is possible that reconciles these seemingly contradictory realities—a model that also respects the subjective certainty of the objective reality of absolute unitary being as reported by people who claim to have had the experience. This model begins with the everyday world in which we usually live, whose neurophysiological basis I have considered elsewhere (d'Aquili, 1982, 1983). From within the perspective of ordinary reality, one makes certain assumptions, among them that the external world in fact exists. Obviously, this assumption can never strictly be proved, but everyone accepts it in practice. A second assumption is that there is some sort of isomorphism between the world as it exists "out there" and its subjective representation "in" one's own consciousness. (This assumption can likewise never be proved, but it has great practical merit for survival.) Third, one assumes that whatever relationships are perceived to be invariant between elements in the external world are, in fact, invariant. That is, we believe that the laws of nature are, at least for the most part, real, and that scientific method yields valid results.

In constructing this model of reconciliation, we next move from the examination of the world of everyday reality to a consideration of a recent discovery in brain physiology, namely that of "hemisphericity," or the differential function of the brain's hemispheres. First, it is clear that a number of perceptions—perceptions of discrete entities, of causality, of temporal relationships, and of chance events—and the organization of these perceptions into cognitive structures are related to and arise out of the function of the dominant hemisphere (most commonly the left hemisphere). Second, it is probable that the existential perception of God (or of absolute, unitary, atemporal being, or of ultimate wholeness) arises from the "gestalt" or holistic functioning of the nondominant hemisphere, particularly from the functioning of parts of the parietal lobe.

If we grant the objective reality of this "machinery" of the brain, and if its objective functioning is granted, we may venture to say that "something is going into" the machinery of both of the brain's hemispheres. Under most conditions, the dominant side of the brain is indeed dominant, and what emerges as subjectively perceived is the world of discrete reality. Under certain special conditions, however, the nondominant hemisphere assumes dominance, and out of its machinery arises the perception of absolute, unitary, atemporal being.

Despite the difference between the hemispheres, we must presume that what "goes into" each of these "machines" is the same thing (or things); however, what "comes out" of each of these "machines" is very different from what emerges from the other. If (1) we do not become embroiled in the knotty epistemological problems regarding the existence of the external world or the validity of scientific reasoning, and if (2) we simply accept the assumptions of scientific method, the reality of the external world, and the validity of the laws of nature, and if (3) we examine the differential functioning of the hemispheres of the brain, then I believe that it is possible to conclude that something "out there" is being manifested in two modes. One mode is the everyday world that all people experience; the other is the world of ultimate wholeness often interpreted as God.

I conclude further that each mode has equal reality since neither mode can be systematically reduced to the other. It might be said, of course, that the experience of the everyday world is primary. According to such an argument, experiences of absolute unitary being, insofar as they are recalled later, would form a subset within the world of ordinary reality. This argument only holds true, however, from within the viewpoint of everyday reality. From within the mode of AUB, there is no question of its reality, for ultimate wholeness is a primary epistemic state as well. There is no scientific thought in the world of AUB. There are no philosophical assumptions. There is simply the experience of unitary reality. And from the viewpoint of the world of AUB, the other world of discrete reality is not even given thought. In this situation, the question involves how to reconcile subjectively the two realities that appear to be in conflict despite each seeming absolutely certain and true when experienced.

It is possible to reconceptualize this conflict by going a step further. In the terminology that I am using, what "goes into" both "machines" comes out, in one case, as

the everyday world of the relative breakdown of spatial wholeness into various composite elements, and, in the other case, as God, *nirvāṇa*, or the "void" (or, at any rate, an experience perceived as absolute and transcendent). It is obvious that whatever is "going into" both machines is in fact no *thing*. And yet it is not "nothing" as understood in everyday parlance, but rather "no thing" in the sense that it cannot be conceptualized outside the constraints of the mind. The mind—that is, brain physiology—has only two ways of interpreting this "no thing": as absolute, unitary, transcendent being or as the discrete world of everyday living—the baseline world of chance and causality. It is important to emphasize our inability to resolve this conflict between the certainty of absolute unitary being versus the certainty of temporal contingent being.

At this point, we begin to consider the meaning of what it is to know at all, the nature and consequence of the certainty of reality, however reality is perceived, and the neurophysiological limitations and constraints upon knowing anything whatsoever. To consider the meaning of knowing is to be forced into the heart of subjective experience, of which objective reality is but a subset (and science but a subset of this subset). It is probably impossible to resolve the conflict between the two realities as experienced. Given the phenomenology of the experience, it is clearly impossible to undercut the certainty of the Absolute in those people who have experienced it. My research indicates that they cannot be dissuaded from their conviction of AUB's objective reality no matter how often the adaptive value of the transcendence-generating parts of the brain is pointed out to them. Science is a product of the everyday world, but the experience of absolute unitary being is another world, and is essentially cut off from the world of discrete reality (unlike hallucinations and delusions, which are epistemically part of the world of discrete, transient being). I conclude, therefore, that absolute unitary being, whatever its significance may be in *post hoc* religious description, has in itself an epistemological status equivalent to baseline everyday reality and, at least from a neuroepistemological perspective, must be dealt with accordingly.

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EUGENE G. D'AQUILI

NEW CALEDONIA RELIGION is best known from the work of Maurice Leenhardt, a former Protestant missionary (Société des Missions Évangéliques Pratique de Paris), who was Marcel Mauss's successor as professor of comparative religions at the École Pratique des Hautes Études.

Because each local group *(mwaro)* in New Caledonia is linked with an animal or plant or other natural phenomenon, Western observers have described the religion of the island as "totemism." Though this term is now less fashionable than it was in the period from 1880 to 1940, it can still, for convenience' sake, be applied to the New Caledonia religious system. The local groups have divided among themselves all the aspects of nature that either can be utilized or need to be feared, with each group becoming the master of a particular aspect. Within each group, one of the members of the most junior line, referred to as the group's "master," is in charge of performing the ritual that will protect or benefit all the *mwaro*. Thus, the master of the yam ensures a good crop over the whole of the valley. Along the sea one finds masters of the trade winds, the shark, the whale, or the mosquito, while masters of the thunder are to be found nearer the mountain range.

Each master not only ensures prosperity and wards off natural disasters, but also controls the specific sickness thought to be linked with the totemic entity assigned to him. If someone is ailing, word is sent to a seer, who divines the cause of the sickness. A messenger

is then sent to the master in charge of the force responsible for the sickness. The master prays and gives the necessary herbal remedies to the patient; many of these medications are quite effective in treating at least those illnesses that were not brought by Europeans.

The natures of the New Caledonia gods are complex, and Leenhardt spent considerable time attempting to understand them. R. H. Codrington, in *The Melanesians* (1891), distinguished two principal types of gods: those who were once human and those who have never been human. The New Caledonians, however, make no linguistical distinction, both types of gods being referred to either as *bao* or *due*. The two kinds of deities are linked in the figure of Teê Pijopac, a god who has himself never been human but who controls the subterranean or submarine land of the dead, where all must go. According to local belief, the dead reach the entrances to this land by following ridges that lead down to the sea. At one of these entrances, known as Pucangge (near Bourail), the goddess Nyôwau examines all those who wish to enter to make sure that their left earlobe is pierced. She pierces any unpierced lobe with the mussel-shell knife that she also uses to peel yams.

There is constant communication between the living and the dead. The dead can be seen and spoken with when needed. They can be called upon to help in a crisis such as sickness or war, or to favor the results of family labors. Myths speak of the living going to the land of the dead and of the dead acting in the land of the living. There are, for example, various versions of a myth in which a loving husband attempts to bring his young wife back from the land of the dead. He either succeeds in his quest through the help of a bird (a common link for communication with the dead), or he fails. Among the stories about people from the underworld acting among the living there are those that describe an unsuspecting husband who might find, for example, that his new wife snores at night, or that she is double-jointed, both of which are characteristics of people from the underworld. There are also numerous versions of a myth about a goddess, usually Toririhnan, who, after drowning the pregnant wife of a chief, disguises herself as the wife by filling her belly with pots. The true wife, however, is saved by a miracle and taken away to a distant island. Later, this woman returns with her grown sons; their identity is revealed, and the usurper is killed.

Other gods preside over agriculture, such as Kapwangwa Kapwicalo, who protects irrigated taro terraces in the Gomen area, or Toririhnan, who causes it to rain each time she blows her nose at the top of the Hienghène Valley. There are also a great number of gods whose function is the protection of a given clan, protection that is often traced back to the clan's mythical origin. Gods can have sexual relations with humans, an event that either can have terrifying consequences—such as the death of the mortal or the turning backward of his head—or can resemble normal human sexual acts. Myths in which families trace their origins to instances of intercourse between gods and humans record both types of occurrences.

Indeed in Melanesia, as in Polynesia, all genealogies have divine origins, and although the religion of New Caledonia is totemistic in appearance there is no available evidence that any of the kinship groups believe that they are descended from the animal species or natural phenomenon with which they are spiritually associated. These totem entities—called *rhë re* (sg., *rhë e*)—represent the "spiritual belonging" of the group and are passed along through the male line. When a woman marries outside of her totem group, her *rhë e* is sometimes said to follow her. This does not mean, however, that the *rhë e* has left its original abode; because mythical beings are understood to be ubiquitous they are thought to be able to dwell in the two places at once.

There are occasions on which the *rhë re* and the *bao* (who were formerly human) meet. Such a meeting will take place in part of the landscape that is outside of human control, such as the bush, the forest, or the mountain range. The dead, those *bao* who were formerly human, can merge with the *rhë e* that is linked with their clan. Thus, for example, if thunder is associated with a particular group, the rumbling of the thunder is also the voice of the dead of that clan. Also in accordance with this pattern, no ancestor of the octopus group, for example, will appear in the form of a shark, unless they have what early authors referred to as "linked totems," that is, clusters of symbols all of which are linked to a certain *mwaro*. In some cases a group's *rhë e* will manifest itself in various forms depending on the setting: thus, for some chiefly families of the so-called Naacuwe-Cidopwaan group the *rhë e* takes the form of a lizard if seen inland, but becomes a water-snake on the beach, or a shark in the sea, and is also thought of as a masked male dancer said to emerge from the sea.

Missionaries who worked among the New Caledonians attempted to find the natives' idols in order to destroy them; they discovered objects resembling idols that had been carefully preserved by clan leaders over the course of centuries. Pierre Lambert (1900) has published illustrations of some of these items. They are stones of various shapes about which little is actually known except that they turn up from time to time in yam gardens, are linked with the clan's totem entity, and are in some way connected with success in farming, fishing, weather control, and so forth, as were the thun-

derstones (meteorites) of the Europeans of old. It has been observed that when these artifacts are used as repositories of the divine presence for sacramental purposes—and not as representations of gods—they can be replaced if lost or confiscated. This provision allows for the indefinite preservation of this type of link with the divine.

It is important to recognize that the mythical systems of the hundreds of different clans are highly diversified, a diversity that appears most clearly in the origin myths of the various groups. Some clans believe their spiritual origin to be the mountain that is called Souma (in the Ajië language) or Caumyë (in the Paici language). The vernacular texts obtained by Leenhardt demonstrated that the mountain had a connection with the creation of mankind and that its importance stems from the gods who live in the various principal mountains. For instance, Ka To Souma, the god associated with Souma, guards one of the possible entrances to the subterranean land of the dead. So great is the respect for, and fear of, this god that his proper name (Gomawe or Kavērē) is never uttered. Other clans, usually those living near the watershed, claim a spiritual link with one or another of the forms of thunder. These different forms are grouped in distinctive ways according to the local theology, thereby giving each clan a powerful mythical protector. We can thus classify clans according to their myths; conversely, mythical beings in charge of protecting the various clans may be classified according to the patrilineal marriage moieties with which they are associated in the Paici area or, in the north, according to the political phratries to which they belong.

The nearby Loyalty Islands (Uvéa, Lifou, and Maré) present a different set of problems. Although the inhabitants have been Christians for a century and a half (twice as long as the natives of New Caledonia proper) sacred groves still exist there, the old deities are remembered, and the cult of the dead continues to surface from time to time. However, the distribution of mythical beings among the families of the islands is significantly different from what prevails in New Caledonia. One essential aspect of the religion of the Loyalty Islands is that direct relations with the invisible world are the prerogative of the oldest established clans. These privileged clans, called *ten adro* (on Lifou), *wäi* (on Uvéa), or *èlètok* (on Maré), act as hosts to visiting gods. It is this status as host to the gods that provides legitimacy to the chiefly lines of today. The senior clans are also, however, the wardens of the invisible road along which the dead travel, eventually diving into the sea and reaching the island of Heo (Beautemps-Beaupré), where the entrance to the world of the dead is located. At the court of each of the paramount chiefs, a special person (called Atesi on Lifou and, on Maré, Acania) has the role of being the representative of these clans. He acts as their intermediary, for neither they nor their yams can enter a chief's house since their presence would endanger his life. On these islands there is thus a formalized distinction between families having the privilege of communicating with the divine world—each *ten adro* has its own god, to which only it can pray—and those who must be satisfied with praying to their own dead. The latter use diviners to discover whom they must negotiate with in order to ward off any invisible power which is causing injury to the clan.

[*See also the biographies of Codrington and Leenhardt.*]

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The oldest, but still quite illuminating, work on the subject of New Caledonia religion is R. P. Gagnère's *Étude ethnologique sur la religion des Néo-calédoniens* (Saint-Louis, France, 1905). It vividly describes the man and lizard cult relation in the Pouebo area of northeastern New Caledonia. Pierre Lambert's *Moeurs et superstitions des Néo-calédoniens* (Nouméa, New Caledonia, 1900) is interesting, although Lambert is at times less than accurate in his descriptions of the religions of the Belep Islands in the north and the Isle of Pines in the south. The monumental, two-volume *Ethnologie der Neu-Caledonier und Loyalty-Insulaner* (Munich, 1929) by the Swiss ethnographer Fritz Sarasin contains an indispensable atlas. The classic works in the field are Maurice Leenhardt's two volumes: *Notes d'ethnologie néo-calédonienne* (Paris, 1930) and *Documents néo-calédoniens* (Paris, 1932). Admired for their precision at the time of their publication, Leenhardt's books are full of information, and continue to be valuable research tools. My own contributions to the subject include the following: *Structure de la chefferie en Mélanésie du sud* (Paris, 1963), *Mythologie du masque en Nouvelle-Calédonie* (Paris, 1966), *Des multiples niveaux de signification du mythe* (Paris, 1968), and *Naissance et avortement d'un messianisme* (Paris, 1959). Recent publications in the field include Marie-Joseph Dubois's *Mythes et traditions de Maré, Nouvelle Calédonie: Les Elètok* (Paris, 1975) and Alban Bensa and Jean-Claude Rivière's *Les chemins de l'alliance: L'organisation sociale et ses représentations en Nouvelle-Calédonie* (Paris, 1982).

JEAN GUIART

NEW GUINEA RELIGIONS. Any summary of traditional religions in New Guinea must address itself to two issues: the people's subjective view of the phenomena, and outside observers' arbitrary definitions of them, which are often at odds with each other. Melanesians as a whole appear to have no collective term for religion as a separate cultural category in their own languages, so that it is difficult to specify the limits of inquiry. In their eyes, however important to them, "re-

ligion" is merely one facet of their generalized sociocultural system. The foreign observer has to select and concentrate on those features that most closely resemble religion in his own society. It must also be asked what the foreign observer's most appropriate approach to the study of religion would be. During the last hundred-odd years anthropology has been rich in definitions of religion, three of which—the intellectualist, the economic or technological, and the social—dominated field inquiry. Before I survey New Guinea religions, I will consider the theoretical relevance of these three approaches, especially with regard to their one common tenet: the strict dichotomy between religion and magic.

For E. B. Tylor and James G. Frazer, writing in the last third of the nineteenth century, religion was man's belief in superior spirit-beings (such as gods and ghosts), whom he had to placate by means of prayer and sacrifice, whereas magic was his belief that he himself, ideally without the aid of spirit-beings, could use sympathetic techniques to control nonpersonalized occult forces. Although this approach is consistent with the great intellectual importance New Guineans attach to religion and magic, the dichotomy it posits between religion and magic often cannot be substantiated. Many New Guinea rituals are designed not to placate spirit-beings but to place them in morally binding relationships which leave them no option but to comply with human wishes. Indeed, some sympathetic techniques are believed to derive their power from spirit-beings, who gave them to mankind. Clearly, this definition would continually produce unsatisfactory hybrid forms.

Bronislaw Malinowski, whose approach derived from fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands (now part of Papua New Guinea) during World War I, distinguished religion from magic on the basis of the ends sought by those engaged in a ritual. A religious rite, on Malinowski's view, is an end in itself with no obviously pragmatic objective, while the aim of magic, vitally important for economic production, is "always clear, straight-forward, and definite." Although its stress on economic affairs is quite correct, this approach pays too little attention to a people's intellectual life. Again, Malinowski's dichotomy between religion and magic is not supported by later research in New Guinea: virtually every ritual observed and described has a specific end in view, which those performing it can explain without difficulty.

Finally, Émile Durkheim, in the early twentieth century, differentiated religion from magic on the grounds of the human personnel holding particular beliefs and performing particular rites. Religion was seen as social and cohesive: its beliefs symbolize and validate, and its rituals reinforce, the social order. Magic is individual and isolative: its beliefs and rituals do not symbolize or reinforce any social collective. Once again, this approach has two weaknesses. Although its reference to society is justified, it tends to reduce religion to an oblique and almost secular replica of the social order at the expense of human economic and cognitive interests. As will appear, most New Guineans would reject this. Furthermore, Durkheim's dichotomy between religion and magic also cannot be sustained. In virtually every New Guinea society, even if they are not privy to all its secrets, all its members share and more or less endorse its beliefs, and the personnel involved in any ritual depends on the number of people necessary to carry it out efficiently. This varies according to each situation.

Although none of these approaches on its own offers a comprehensive answer to the problem or a convincing distinction between religion and magic, with due modification each makes a contribution. It is possible to select from them and combine those features that make sense in New Guinea. At the outset it is wise to dismiss the idea of a dichotomy between religion and magic and retain a single concept, religion, of which magic forms a part. Thus from Tylor and Frazer, I adopt the principle of intellectualism, which stresses religion's contribution to a people's mental life by helping them interpret the world around them. With Malinowski, I emphasize religion's role in the economic system. With Durkheim, I examine religion's relation to society.

Broadly I define traditional religion as man's beliefs about and putative interaction with what Westerners call "the supernatural" or "the transcendental," although, as I shall argue, these terms have little relevance to New Guinea. To explain this I shall outline the total cosmic order that the people conceive to exist: its general structure, the types and location of spirit-beings within it, and its dynamics, especially the methods by which humans believe that they communicate with spirit-beings to consolidate their own interests.

The General Structure of the Cosmos. New Guineans' conceived cosmic order has two parts: the empirical—the natural environment, its economic resources (including animals), and its human inhabitants; and the nonempirical—spirit-beings, nonpersonalized occult forces, and, sometimes, totems. Theoretically it has three analytically separate systems: men in relation to the natural environment and its resources, or the economic system; relationships among human beings themselves, or the sociopolitical system; and men in relation to spirit-beings, occult forces, and totems, or religion. In fact, these systems interdepend, so that it is essential to understand how religion impinges on economic and social life and, in so doing, how it contributes to intellectual life and leadership.

The traditional economic and sociopolitical systems of New Guinea must be summarized, insofar as religion directly relates to them. The whole of New Guinea (Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya) has about a thousand distinct language groups, each one virtually a separate society. The economic system is generalized: most of the people are settled agriculturalists with few specialized skills apart from religious ritual, which a limited number of adult males (the leaders) monopolize. Without specialized occupational groups, social structure has to be based on kinship, marriage, and descent, although even within this broad framework there is much variation. Some groups are congeries of relatively large phratries or tribes, while others consist of small clans or even lineages. Some have over 100,000 members and others as few as 150.

Diversity of social structures is paralleled in religions, which, although based on common principles, show a degree of heterogeneity. In general terms, most New Guineans recognize the following kinds of spirit-beings: autonomous creative or regulative spirit-beings (deities or culture heroes); autonomous noncreative or malevolent spirit-beings (demons, tricksters, and pucks); and spirits of the dead. Many also recognize clan totems and practice sympathetic magic. Variations of belief are most marked with respect to deities and spirits of the dead. Some peoples, such as the Huli and the Kainantu of the Highlands, claim relatively few gods, to each of whom they attribute multiple creative or regulative functions. Others, such as the inhabitants of the southern Madang Province littoral and Karkar Island, have a few major deities and a large number of minor ones with limited powers. Yet others, such as the Mae Enga of the Highlands and the peoples inland from Madang, believe in many deities, no one of whom has primacy and each of whom has only one creative or regulative function. Again, although belief in ghosts is ubiquitous, some peoples (especially Highlanders) distinguish between the recent and remote dead, while others (especially those on the coast) do not. One group inland from Madang, the Garia, assert that after three generations ghosts turn into fruit bats or pigeons and cease to have any religious significance.

Yet despite this heterogeneity, New Guineans appear to hold one concept in common, that the cosmos is essentially a finite physical realm with, as hinted, almost no supernatural or transcendental attributes. Gods, ghosts, demons, and totems are superhuman but terrestrial. They are more powerful than humans but still corporeal, taking human or animal form with normal physical attributes. They normally live on the earth in special sanctuaries near human habitations. There are a few exceptions, such as the Mae Enga sky people, who live in the clouds but who are in easy contact with the earth. This stress on earthliness gives New Guinea religions a quality of nearness and immediacy lacking in some of the higher religions, as is especially apparent in ritual. The significance of this will emerge later.

The Function of Religion. As the criticism of Tylor and Frazer's approach indicates, it is inadequate to concentrate on the form of New Guinea religions, as if they were purely philosophical systems; it is necessary to consider also their functions. Melanesians believe that they have inherited a generally predictable cosmic order, which is anthropocentric and materialistic. It exists for man's benefit, and its material resources (crops, livestock, and artifacts) are concomitants of his existence. Hence religion has two principal functions. First, myths (regarded as the source of ultimate truth) explain and thereby validate the cosmic order. Second, just as the fulfillment of obligations between human beings maintains the secular social structure, the observance of ritual duties assures men that superhuman beings will guarantee the success of their major undertakings and protect the cosmic order from unforeseeable dangers.

Religion, therefore, is a technology, and, more particularly, ritual is man's means of contacting superhuman beings so as to exploit it. Ritual techniques, which I describe later on, again tend to vary. For deities they may involve placation, bargaining, coercion, or striking moral relationships through invocation or esoteric spells. Sympathetic magic, sometimes used on its own, is said to be more effective if taught to men by gods. For demons ritual is based on placation and bargaining, although some say it is futile and will never use it. Ritual directed at spirits of the dead is usually an expression of honor, often involving mourning, feasting, and music. For totems there is no specific ritual but only avoidance behavior: taboos against harming, killing, and eating. As indicated, ritual knowledge is the prerogative mainly of leaders or big men. Women have limited access to it, and then principally to contraceptive and abortifacient techniques. Yet although Melanesians use ritual to approach superhuman beings, there are grounds for believing that they regard it as a substitute for face-to-face interaction. Many of them have assumed that their first European visitors were either deities or ghosts appearing in their midst, but there is no evidence that they performed ritual in their honor. Rather, they engaged in ordinary social behavior, offering food, and trying to create beneficial exchange relationships.

Throughout New Guinea the use of myth and ritual to explain and maintain the cosmic order is uneven. The people tend to ignore the aspects of it that they can take for granted and concentrate on those that involve risk

and cause anxiety. I shall examine this in the context of the economic and sociopolitical systems and then discuss religion's role in the intellectual system.

The natural environment and economic resources. Not many New Guinea religions are greatly concerned with the natural environment as a whole. Except for occasional volcanic eruptions and droughts it is never seriously threatened, so that the people do not fear for its continuance. Hence elaborate accounts of its origin and rituals to preserve it are rare. In most cases there are only short, albeit sometimes explicit, statements to the effect that the earth always existed or suddenly came into being in some miraculous way.

Mythology and ritual are generally more detailed and complex for the economic system, which, for reasons given below, is more uncertain and thus needs to be buttressed. Whether the people attribute creation to few or many deities is irrelevant. Except in the few societies that do not acknowledge deities, there is normally a myth cycle or set of discursive myths telling how specific gods and goddesses invented economic resources —staple crops, pigs, dogs, wild animals, and important artifacts—and gave them to human beings.

Yet, as is implicit in the foregoing argument, explanation and validation on their own, however necessary, are not enough. People also want knowledge that they can use to their advantage, knowledge that will make sure that economic resources do not fail. Crops may wither, livestock remain barren, and newly made artifacts prove faulty. Ritual should eliminate these risks. It is performed for both the relevant deities and spirits of the dead.

The performance for economic ends of ritual in honor of the dead is very common in New Guinea. Specifically, it consists of formal keening at funerals, food offerings, dancing, and the celebration of the male cult (which I shall discuss later). In response, ghosts are said to help their living descendants by protecting gardens from wild pigs and landslides, helping hunters find game, bringing presents, and, especially in dreams, by giving messages about impending events. These ceremonies are particularly important among peoples who either do not acknowledge deities, or have no elaborate ritual for propitiating them. Yet there are two differences in this context. First, as noted, Highlanders tend to distinguish between the recent and remote dead. They regard the recent dead as minatory—interested mainly in punishing transgressors—and expect economic benefits from the remote dead, to whom, with the exception of mortuary ceremonies, they address their rituals. Most seaboard peoples, who do not hold this belief, honor the recent dead, many of whom they remember as living persons. Second, there are different interpretations of the likely responses of the dead to the rituals performed in their honor. Some Highlanders, noted for their general aggressiveness, are said to apply to ghosts the same techniques they apply to the living: bargaining and bribery, in which the aim is to manipulate and curb pugnacious egalitarian rivals. Ghosts are said to respond in kind. Seaboard peoples are less assertive. Their view is that ritual should create strong ties between men and ghosts; as long as men fulfill their obligations, ghosts should automatically reciprocate.

The sociopolitical order. Likewise, total sociopolitical systems receive irregular treatment in religion. Some groups (for example, the Mae Enga, the Kainantu people, and the inhabitants of Wogeo Island) have myths that attribute society's existence and forms to their deities. Others, like the Ngaing, do not. They see no need to validate the social order in its entirety: they are unaware that any other kind of social order exists, and theirs is not threatened by conquest from outside or revolution from within. Nevertheless such peoples are by no means unconcerned about society; they implicitly realize that it has sensitive areas—key institutions, groups, and relationships that must be buttressed at all costs. Thus the Ngaing have war gods, who protect their bush groups, their main political units, and a myth of origin for the male cult, which binds together the inhabitants of a whole locality, as described below.

In this context, spirits of the dead are most important. They validate the social order in a number of ways. Among the Garia, the life of the dead replicates that of human beings. Ghosts build and live in ordinary settlements with their kin; they plant gardens and celebrate exchanges. Again, throughout New Guinea, ghosts are the ultimate custodians of their living descendants' land rights, a vital component of the social system, and they punish trespass. Yet it is above all the ceremonies of the male cult—exchanges of pigs, food, and valuables coupled with feasting and dancing to solemnize birth, initiation, marriage, and death—that induce ghosts to preserve and strengthen the sociopolitical order.

The primary function of the male cult is the initiation of boys into manhood. After they are about ten years old, boys in adjacent settlements are assembled, segregated from women, placed under the supervision of adult males (especially leaders) in a cult house, and given special instruction. They are taught the rudiments of myths and ritual. They observe stringent taboos and are subjected to a physical ordeal that may include beating, scarification, penile incision, or forced nose bleeding. Thereafter they are returned to village life. The severity of initiation appears to correlate with society's pattern of male-female relations. In general, men

are dominant in both secular and ritual affairs. Where this is particularly marked, as in the eastern Highlands and among the Ilahita Arapesh (in the East Sepik Province) and the Garia, initiation is either traumatic or protracted over many years and stresses sexual antagonism. Where women are less subordinate, male initiation rites are less exacting and less shrouded in secrecy and may be paralleled, as on Manam and Wogeo islands and among the Ngaing, by special puberty rites for girls. Nevertheless, despite these differences of emphasis, in most of New Guinea boys during their initiation are said to be under special protection of the spirits of the dead, who guarantee their safety, health, physical maturity, and ability to attract wives and thereby perpetuate society. The male cult has also a latent function: it promotes the solidarity of the clans or other local units that must assemble all the wealth going out in exchange and reaffirms the kinship or marriage relationships, which link these groups and provide the network for its distribution.

The last two important aspects of religion in the context of the sociopolitical order are (1) religion's impingement on moral obligation, and (2) the role of sorcery. Once again, the relationship between religion and moral obligation has no standard pattern: for some groups it is an important issue, but for others it is not. Thus the Huli insist that their primary god Datagaliwabe enjoined moral precepts on them, while the Kainantu people have a secondary mythology devoted to the inculcation of ethics, and the Manus of the Admiralty Islands believe themselves to be under the continual surveillance of the dead, who punish the infringement of any rule. In other societies, such as the Wogeo and the Ngaing, good conduct is said to be enforced only by secular sanctions.

Belief in sorcery is virtually universal. The art has many forms: contagious magic (theft and destruction of personal leavings such as cast-off clothing, hairclippings, or excrement); projection of missiles into a victim; figurative removal and replacement of a victim's head or entrails; and actual immobilization of a victim by inserting slivers of bamboo (or, nowadays, lengths of wire) into vital parts of his body. With possible exception of the last example, which is in fact physical murder, the efficacy of sorcery is guaranteed by the performance of ritual, often to harness the power of a deity or familiar spirit.

It is difficult to state precisely the reasons for belief in sorcery. The degree to which a religion does or does not uphold the moral code and to which it is or is not intellectually elaborated seems to be irrelevant. Sorcery is found in societies whose religions either stress or ignore ethics and are either closely or loosely articulated. Hence it is wiser to consider two issues: the forces that promote belief in sorcery and the intellectual climate that allows it to flourish.

Belief in sorcery is motivated by personal anxiety. This is immediately intelligible in societies that have weak group structures and unstable, ever-changing patterns of local organization—for example, the Dobu (of Papua), Huli, Tangu, and Garia. As individuals continually move in and out, settlement and neighborhood populations are never permanent. A person can never be sure where his friends and foes are. Unless he can attribute illness or bad luck to an angry god, ghost, or demon, he will search for a human enemy lurking in his locality. Yet, by way of contrast, belief in sorcery is found also in societies with territorial organizations based on stable, permanently localized descent groups. Possibly sorcery has come to be regarded as more important than it was since modern centralized government banned traditional warfare, leaving it as the only way to relieve feelings of aggression.

There appear to be two prerequisites for an intellectual climate in which the belief in sorcery will thrive. First, the belief must be integrated with other aspects of religion, taking a normal place in both myth and ritual. Thus the Garia believe that the god Yeyaguliba invented it and taught men his secret names as spells to make it effective. From a technical point of view, sorcery is no different from agricultural ritual. Second, the belief helps solve the perpetual emotional and cognitive problem of death. Thus, although the Garia claim that the goddess who first gave birth to human beings was responsible also for human mortality, they regard this as a sufficient explanation only in the case of old people. The young should not die. Sorcery, by offering the solution of the hidden enemy, at least removes the agony of an impenetrable riddle.

Leadership and the intellectual system. Myth and ritual are for many New Guineans the principal means of understanding the cosmic order and maintaining their central position in it. Everyday experience largely endorses their certitude of the truth of religion. Normally crops do mature, livestock and human beings reproduce their kind, and artifacts meet their owners' expectations. The rituals used are obviously effective, so that their acquisition is an essential prerequisite of leadership. Big men are those who "know": they are experts in mythology and, particularly, in harnessing the power of gods and spirits of the dead that will ensure the success of their followers' purely secular activities. Secular skills are "knowledge" but at a low level: they are something anybody can acquire by imitation. It takes a special kind of man, however, to master "true knowledge," the religious secrets that are the core of the instruction

given boys during initiation. Thereafter, those who aspire to leadership must undergo a long and exacting apprenticeship under acknowledged experts until they are accepted as qualified practitioners. Yet it would be false to conclude from this that the people's thought is mystical. Rather, it is pragmatic, even mundane, because of their conviction that the cosmos is a purely terrestrial realm. Gods and ghosts live on the earth, and their interaction with men and women in response to ritual is not illusory but as real as cooperation among human beings themselves.

Inevitably, the intensity of intellectual commitment to religion is not found to be consistent throughout New Guinea. The peoples of the northeastern seaboard and hinterland from Lae to Bogia typify the paradigm I have sketched. Traditionally they have always been theologians, and it is significant that they have provided many of the leaders of the Christian churches since Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975. Others, such as the Ilahita Arapesh, are perhaps more skeptical. Yet about one area there has been particular controversy. The first anthropologists in the Highlands after World War II depicted its peoples as if they had relatively little interest in religion—that is, the Highlanders were portrayed as hard-working and secular-minded with leaders who relied for their positions more on tough negotiation and military prowess than on ritual expertise. The early absence of cargoism, so prevalent on the seaboard, seemed to confirm their argument. Recently, however, we have been forced to reconsider it. There are now more numerous outbreaks of the cargo cult as well as Pentecostalism and other eccentric quasi-Christian movements. [*See* Cargo Cults.] This suggests that, even allowing for random differences of degree, the dominantly secular image of all the peoples in the Highlands is unjustified and may have been the result of uncritical addiction to the Durkheimian social approach to the study of religion at the time the field research was carried out. Certainly the issue is unresolved. Yet it is still justifiable to conclude that for the great majority of New Guineans religion has been not merely an important part but the very quintessence of their sociocultural systems. It represents the final rationale of their cosmic experience.

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PETER LAWRENCE

NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY (1801–1890), Anglican and Roman Catholic controversialist and cardinal.

Life and Works. Newman was born in London. He was raised an Anglican, but in 1816, under evangelical influence, he underwent a profound religious experience that transformed his understanding of his faith. The same year he entered Trinity College, Oxford, and in 1822 was elected a fellow of Oriel College. There, for-

mative contacts with the so-called Noetics Edward Hawkins and Richard Whately, who freely applied logic to traditional Christian doctrines, introduced him to rationalist analysis of religious concerns. After 1828 illness, bereavement, and personal friendships with Richard Hurrell Froude, John Keble, and Edward Bouverie Pusey drew him toward the high church tradition. At this time he began to read the documents of the patristic church; this interest led to the publication of *The Arians of the Fourth Century, Their Doctrine, Temper and Conduct as Exhibited in the Councils of the Church* (1833) and *The Church of the Fathers* (1833–1836).

Newman was ordained an Anglican priest in 1825 and was appointed vicar of the university church Saint Mary the Virgin, where he gained fame as a preacher. His sermons there were collected in *Parochial and Plain Sermons* (8 vols., 1834–1843), *Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford on Faith and Reason, 1826–1843* (1843), and *Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day* (1843).

In 1833 Newman traveled to the Mediterranean. He fell ill in Sicily, and there experienced a special vocation, which he expressed in the words "I have a work to do in England."

In September 1833, with publication of the first *Tract for the Times,* Newman launched the Oxford Movement, a high church movement within Anglicanism that emphasized Catholic elements in the Church of England and continuity with the early church. Editor of the series, he contributed twenty-nine tracts. During this period, he also wrote two important works: *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism* (1837), which argued for the *via media,* or foundational position, of the Church of England as true representative of the unbroken tradition of the Fathers; and a theological masterpiece, *Lectures on Justification* (1838). In 1841 his *Tract 90,* in which he tried to give a Catholic interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles, touched off national alarm and was censured by the university and condemned by twenty-four Anglican bishops.

Research in patristics, together with his philosophy of development, at last led Newman to conclude that his *via media* existed only on paper and that the Anglican church was in fact schismatic. In 1841 he retired to Littlemore, near Oxford; he resigned the care of Saint Mary's in 1843 and his Oriel fellowship in 1845. That year he confirmed his position in *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* In the same year he converted to Roman Catholicism. After study at the College of Propaganda Fide in Rome, Newman was ordained a Catholic priest and entered the Congregation of the Oratory. Upon his return to England he founded an oratory at London and another at Birmingham, which in 1852 was transferred to nearby Edgbaston. There Newman remained until his death.

As a Catholic preacher and controversialist Newman wrote a novel, *Loss and Gain, the Story of a Convert* (1848); two collections of talks, *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations* (1848) and *Lectures on Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Submitting to the Catholic Church* (1850); and a masterpiece of defensive controversy, *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England* (1851), which occasioned the Achilli trial in which Newman was prosecuted for libel. In 1851 he accepted the rectorship of the Catholic University of Dublin, but he resigned in 1859, believing that he had been unsuccessful in attaining his goals. His university publications, however, are among the best achievements of English prose: *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education* (1852) and *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects* (1859), later published as *Idea of a University* and *Office and Work of Universities. Callista, a Sketch of the Third Century* (1855) reflects his own path from conscience to steadfast Christian faith.

In 1859 Newman founded the Oratory School and accepted the editorship of *The Rambler,* a magazine opposed by the Catholic bishops, in which Catholic laity and converts independently judged ecclesiastical affairs. Newman, who sympathized with the cause of lay emancipation and education, contributed to the magazine his famous article "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine." This article was delated to Rome and, at the request of his bishop, Newman resigned the editorship in October 1859. He lived under the cloud of suspicion until his *Apologia pro vita sua* (1864), written in response to attacks by Charles Kingsley, at once won over public opinion. Henceforth Newman actually became the main authority in Catholic public affairs. Roman mistrust, manipulated by Cardinal Henry Manning, defeated his last attempt to found a Catholic college at Oxford in 1865, but Ambrose St. John, an Oratorian and his dearest friend, in 1867 cleared him of suspicion in Rome. Newman answered E. B. Pusey's criticism of the Roman Catholic cult of Mary in his *Letter to Rev. E. B. Pusey on his Recent Eirenicon* (1866).

Although invited, Newman refused to assist at the First Vatican Council. He believed in the pope's infallibility but strongly opposed its definition as unripe and inopportune. But when former prime minister William Gladstone attacked Catholics for being unable to remain loyal British subjects, Newman countered by giving, on solid theological grounds, the now generally accepted minimizing interpretation of papal infallibility in his *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation* (1875).

Newman revealed his deepest Catholic feelings in his longest poem, *The Dream of Gerontius* (1865), and presented his basic philosophical ideas on the working of the human mind in his *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (1870). His last important publication was the "Preface to the Via Media" (1877), the introduction to a new edition of his main Anglican controversial writings. In 1877 he was elected the first honorary fellow of Trinity College. Pope Leo XIII created him cardinal deacon of San Giorgio in Velabro in 1879. He died on 11 August 1890 and was buried at Rednal.

Thought. Newman's thought reflects the nature and development of his individual personality. An introverted and self-conscious man, he engaged in constant self-analysis, assimilating scholarship and personal experience to germinate the religious and philosophical insights that characterize his work. Hence his writings manifest those opposing forces and tendencies that made his mind "from opposition grow"—reason versus imagination, love of detail versus comprehensiveness, doubt versus certitude, faith versus sight, reserve versus frankness, emotionalism versus self-control, strategy versus honesty. These conflicting tendencies gave rise to a false image of Newman as sentimental, resentful, paradoxical, mysterious, and even deceitful, but in their integration they yield a thinker of greater complexity and genius, whose worldview combines the consistency of a logical system with the organic wholeness and beauty proper to a work of poetic imagination. This view was grounded in two basic religious experiences: that of conscience as the inner witness of God, and that of the material world's merely relative reality, which directs the soul to communication with an invisible world.

Conscience. For Newman, conscience is an original and irreducible "moral sense"; by it, without logical medium, we instinctively discriminate the morally good and bad in concrete situations. Its essential characteristic, through which it differs from all other inner spiritual senses (such as the sense of beauty), is an adjoined yet distinct "sense of duty" grasping the unconditional demand of doing the good and avoiding the evil. As such, conscience bears witness to the inner presence of an omniscient and almighty master. But it must develop from an implicit and confused feeling to an explicit and distinct apprehension and assent. Conscience may be silenced, although never extinguished, through infidelity and thoughtlessness. It grows in clarity and scope through faithfulness and attention, so that the inner voice of our nature becomes recognized beyond doubt as an echo of the voice of God.

Sacramentality. At first doubting the reality of the exterior material world, Newman came to recognize its genuine reality as an instrumental one. The material world is the medium of communication between the soul and the invisible world of God and his heavenly court. Hence, Newman believed that God revealed himself in and through the visible historical world and that we communicate with him through sacramental actions.

First principles. Three principles derive from the experience of conscience and of world as sacramental medium. These ruled Newman's thought and judgment in all matters.

The principle of providence. All things and events—visible and invisible, natural and historical—are part of an almighty creator's universal providence. All are directed to one end: the manifestation of the creator's justice (reflected in the painful experiences of a bad conscience) and of his goodness (reflected in the joyful experiences of a good conscience). Newman's concept of God, stressing providence, has as counterpart his concept of the universe as a process of constant development. To be, to live, is to develop.

The principle of nature. God governs all things in conformity with their nature. Hence the supreme universal rule and method in our attempts to know the truth and to act rightly and adequately is to consider "the nature of the things" and to submit to what is required by "the nature of the case."

The principle of analogy. The universe as governed by God is a unity of extreme diversity. Unity implies conformity of part to part; diversity implies degrees of similarity. Hence Newman generally justifies a judicious use of argument from analogy and fittingness.

Epistemology. In accordance with the principle of nature, Newman's epistemology rests on a descriptive analysis of the nature of the mind and its actual operational patterns. The logic of the human mind cannot be established *a priori;* rather, mind must be scrutinized in all its complexity; one must ask how the mind generally proceeds in its quest for truth, and how it actually attains to certitude. The mind is spontaneously, instinctively, aware of an objective world of particular things, persons, and events. It apprehends the meaning of propositions about them and assents to these propositions if it feels them to rest upon convincing grounds. Inference is this movement of mind from premise to conclusion.

Assent is real (termed also "imaginative") when the meaning grasped strikes the imagination as a concrete reality, rousing the individual's powers of affection and action. Assent is notional when the meaning grasped conveys to the intellect alone combinations of general concepts. These two aspects may and should go together, giving the mind depth and holding power combined with breadth and clarity of view. Inference differs from assent in that inference is by its nature conditional

and admits of degrees, whereas assent is by its nature unconditional and does not admit of degrees.

Inference is either formal or informal. Formal inference is deduction from general principles and can neither prove its first principles nor reach conclusions regarding concrete states of affairs. This gap must be bridged by informal inference, at its most spontaneous and implicit termed "natural" inference. An individual mind, at the convergence of independent probabilities, indications, and clues—often too numerous and too subtle to be exhaustively analyzable—grasps the concrete pattern of evidence and its conclusion *per modum unius*, by an act of intuitive comprehensive imagination. Newman calls this mental power the "illative sense." It is a power of judgment, in part a gift of nature, in part the result of experience and exercise. As a power of concrete, and not merely notional, judgment, it may depend upon mastery in a specific field of endeavor.

Newman's account of inference stresses its status as mental attitude; it is an attitude toward the conclusion as following from its premises. Likewise, Newman contrasts certitude with certainty. Certainty pertains to propositions in their formal interrelation; certitude pertains to the living mind in exercise of the illative sense.

Theology and the sciences. Reality is one, but complex. Our conceptual knowledge of reality is one in its ultimate aim, but by virtue of its abstractive nature, knowledge necessarily divides into an increasing number of sciences treating various parts and aspects of the whole. The intellect can neither take in the whole nor adequately reconstruct it by addition and composition of all the available sciences. Each science has its own principles and methods imposed by the nature of the subject matter. Hence a certain amount of disagreement between scientific views is inevitable. The clash between the exact sciences and theological science may be expected. Scientists will easily imagine that their conclusions are irreconcilable with faith, for the experiences with which theology starts are rather elusive, whereas the data of the exact sciences are clearer and more compelling; moreover, the prevailing methods of the exact sciences are inductive, whereas those of theology are deductive.

As truth is one, the very evolution of scientific investigation may be expected to solve the difficulties that it raises. Hence, total freedom, tolerance, dialogue, mutual esteem, and understanding should govern the relationship between all the sciences in their living coexistence.

Faith. For Newman, faith is both objective and subjective. As objective, faith is a doctrinal system of revealed truths, articulated in plain human language, inadequate yet true. This is the principle of dogma, which Newman sternly opposed to all forms of religious or theological liberalism. It is contained in scripture, gradually clarified in the life of the church under the guidance of divine providence (the Holy Spirit), in the course of history confirmed, at least in its essentials, by its magisterium, and proposed as a condition of ecclesiastical membership by its present authority. In the end, Newman saw this Catholic position as being in the nature of a church called to survive substantially in the flux of historical experience.

As subjective, faith is acceptance of dogma combined with a personal surrender to the realities signified by dogma, that is, real apprehension and assent. It is a gift of God's "illuminating grace," yet justified by reason.

Influence. During his years in the Anglican church, Newman was the most influential leader of the Oxford Movement, defining the position of Anglo-Catholicism in the Church of England and deepening the life of devotion through his sermons. In the Roman Catholic church his controversial writings, especially his *Apologia*, fostered among the British people a better knowledge of and higher esteem for his religion and his coreligionists. Moreover, his minimizing theological attitude in matters of faith and his critical open-mindedness with regard to difficulties and disagreements prepared that spirit of dialogue and conciliation in the Roman Catholic church that characterizes so much of contemporary theological thought and is believed to have strongly influenced the spirit of the Second Vatican Council.

Perhaps Newman's most important influence is that which his ideas increasingly exercise on contemporary thought, especially through his pioneering investigations into the nature and workings of the human mind in the individual *(Grammar of Assent)* and in society *(Development of Christian Doctrine)*. Further, his *Idea of a University* has become a classic in intellectual education and the philosophy of the sciences. In this last regard it is widely known that Newman influenced Alfred North Whitehead.

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J. H. WALGRAVE

NEW RELIGIONS. [*This entry consists of four articles on the phenomena of "new religions":*

An Overview
New Religions and Cults in the United States
New Religions and Cults in Europe
New Religions in Japan

The first article provides definitions and historical background, broadly surveys new religions and cults throughout the world, and focuses on the contributions to understanding made by recent social scientific study of these phenomena. The following three articles treat in detail the major features of new religious movements in the United States, western Europe, and Japan.]

An Overview

New religions and cults are a normal outgrowth of religious change, but interpretations of their meaning and importance vary highly. To some, they represent new tempi in the gentle rhythms of religious change; to others, disharmony and noise. The serious student of religion, however, cannot ignore the contribution made by new religions and cults to the richness, complexity, and above all to the liveliness of religion today.

The Concept. Terms such as *new religion*, *new religious movement*, and *cult* are used in widely differing ways, yet their application is not arbitrary: it is conditioned by historical and theological, as well as academic, considerations. While there seems to be agreement that "new religions" are adaptations of such ancient traditions as Shintō, Buddhism, Hinduism, and the primal religions of Africa, the definition of *new religious movement* is much looser. In fact it serves as an umbrella term for a stunning diversity of phenomena ranging from doctrinal deviation within world religions and major churches to passing fads and spiritual enthusiasms of a questionably religious kind. *Cult* also lends itself to different meanings but is further complicated by pejorative connotations of exoticism and insignificance.

By contrast such terms as *revival movement*, *revitalization movement*, or *reform movement* are narrowly circumscribed by academic specialists. They refer to movements of increased energy and fervor within a framework of existing religious groups or traditions. Thus *Christian revivalism* denotes periodic outbursts of personal conversions and recommitments to faith in the redemptive power of Jesus Christ. While it refers most commonly to the Protestant sphere, it also has been used in connection with the preaching of certain Roman Catholic orders in the Middle Ages and with their missions to the United States in the nineteenth century. *Revitalization* is usually applied by anthropologists to attempts to invigorate a declining primal or traditional culture in response to perceived threats to that culture's integrity or survival. "Reform movements" are more loosely thought of as attempts to adjust major religious traditions to the markedly changed circumstances of the modern world; Hinduism and Islam have had a great number of these movements since the eighteenth century.

In the study of new or "cult" forms of religion, it is important to recognize that disagreement over definitions and concepts is endemic, and that the empirical diversity of these phenomena defies the selection of any single, all-purpose term. Attempts to legislate usage are doomed, but the search for distinctions in usage can help to explain what is taken for granted about the old and the new in different religious traditions.

New forms of religion are new only in relation to earlier expressions. Relatively innovative features appear from time to time as with medieval European movements of millenarian fervor, for example, or late nineteenth-century Japanese healing movements, or the Neo-Pentecostal movement in North America and Europe in the 1970s. But the character of the novelty varies from case to case. The teachings of the monk Nichiren, for example, were new to Japan in the twelfth century CE, but they were also considered no less novel in the very different circumstances of the mid-twentieth century when revived by the lay Buddhist movement of Sōka Gakkai. The same teachings were subsequently exported to the United States and are now the basis of Nichiren Shoshu of America, which undoubtedly qualifies as a new religious movement there and elsewhere in the West. In short, a religion's novelty is relative to both time and place.

The designation *new* also has strategic significance. It may be an attempt to discredit a religious movement's claims to seriousness, or it may be claimed as a mark of attractiveness and relevance. The term therefore is essentially contestable and cannot serve as a neutral qualifier.

The term *new religious movement* was first applied by

social scientists to the bewildering variety of spiritual enthusiasms that emerged in the West in the 1960s, gathered momentum in the 1970s, and that began to slacken in the 1980s. Some, like the Unification Church, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), the Divine Light Mission, Eckankar, and the Rajneesh Foundation, had their origins in Asian traditions of philolosphy, religious devotion, meditation, or shamanism. Others, like Scientology, est, and Psychosynthesis came out of a largely American tradition of positive thinking, mind cure, and humanistic and Gestalt psychology. The generic "human potential movement" is often applied to them all. This category veers imperceptibly into a third "revival" category that includes esoteric systems of astrology, the occult, numerology, divination, magic, Sufism, and witchcraft. Finally, evangelical Christianity has given rise to numerous "Jesus People" groups and communal living experiments, some of which emphasize itinerant asceticism and radical politics.

The increased application of the term *new religious movement* over *cult*, *sect*, or *heresy* reflects social and cultural change. At a time when the influence of religious organizations and thinking are generally in decline, secular agencies have taken over many previously religious tasks, religion increasingly is considered more a matter of private or subjective feeling than of shared meaning, pluralism is gaining in popularity, and the sheer diversity of religious expressions in most societies seems endless, the old vocabulary of *church*, *sect*, and *cult*—resonating with defiant orthodoxy and judgmentalism—has lost much of its credibility. Moreover, few of today's new religious movements are sectarian secessions from mainstream churches, and the growing popularity of "new religious movement" is itself an indication of the pluralistic context in which the post-1960s innovations in religion have occurred. By contrast, movements that have acted contrary to the spirit of liberal pluralism have continued to be labeled "sects," "separatisms," or even "fanaticisms." This has been the case notably with Western characterizations of Islamic, Hindu, and Sikh varieties of fundamentalism in the 1970s and 1980s.

The term *new religious movement* connotes the more or less simultaneous appearance in the 1960s of a number of separate innovations which together seem to amount to a new force in the field of religion. Individually they may be novel only in a marginal sense, but together they give the impression that significant innovation has taken place. The so-called New Christian Right in the United States, for example, does not contain any groups with absolutely new doctrines or practices, but the fact that a resurgence of conservative, evangelical, and fundamentalist Christianity occurred in so many different groups and networks in the mid-1970s warranted the designation *new movement*. Methodical exploitation of the mass media and computerized administrative methods were other indications of innovation.

The belief that something decidedly new had happened, then, was based on perceptions of a simultaneous proliferation of culturally diverse initiatives which forsook denominational or churchlike forms of religious organization and which tended to recruit young people on an individual basis. Many new movements were preeminently concerned with questions about the authentic self, the intense experience of the numinous, and practical methods for improving the quality of life.

Interpretations. The emergence of new religions has often been associated with periods of the most rapid, intense, and wide-ranging social changes. But it would be a mistake to infer that changes in religion are merely responses to changes in other aspects of society, for in fact the relationships between them are highly complex.

Religious innovation has been associated with disruptions of social structures. For example, the introduction into primal societies of wage labor, mining camps, company towns, and artificial geopolitical boundaries has undermined not only preexisting patterns of residence, government, and kinship but also structures of authority, power, and property ownership. In particular, notions of tribal or communal integrity and continuity have been eroded by the rationalizing, individuating tendencies of modern methods of political, economic, and military organization. As a result religious activities have become relatively separated from other aspects of social life; organizations of a specifically religious character have been created; and voluntarism has become the principal means of religious participation. Religious movements have proliferated under these conditions, and the rates of migration among them have been high, especially in urban areas where religious innovation flourishes. This has led to the belief that participation in such movements can serve as an apprenticeship for modern living, especially in this era of democratic pluralism. But others have interpreted the same movements as escapism, irrationality, or withdrawal from socioeconomic realities. Still others see these movements as signs of implicit rebellion against the irrationality of the modern world. This kind of disagreement is most apparent in the divergence of views about the long-term significance of Pentecostalism in Latin America, evangelicalism in Central America, cargo cults in Melanesia, and Protestant sects in Eastern-bloc socialist countries.

At the highest level of abstraction, religious innovation can be considered as a means for reinterpreting the meaning of history and of its significance to humankind. The disruption of traditional patterns of culture, for example, inspired Hindu reform movements in the eighteenth century, Middle Eastern millenarian movements in the nineteenth century, and twentieth-century independent churches in southern Africa. In each case traditional components of culture were reworked into a new, distinctive pattern which also incorporated ideas derived from contact with foreign cultures and military powers. Indeed, imperialism and colonialism have stimulated countless religious innovations in many parts of the world. The clash between primal cultures and missionaries, traders, and colonial administrators has produced a particularly rich crop of new religious movements among the Maori in New Zealand, Latin America Indians, the coastal inhabitants of New Guinea, the indigenous peoples of what was formerly Dutch East Indies, the Plains Indians of North America, Caribbean islanders, and innumerable African peoples. Themes of resistance and rebellion convey visions of either a return to precolonial independence or a complete assimilation of the colonial powers into a new native order. As a result, both the meaning and periodization of historical change are radically reinterpreted. Islamic revivalism embodies yet another kind of response to perceived threats to traditional culture: a keen sense of historical and cultural threads linking past, present, and future lies at the root of many fundamentalist proposals for reorienting Muslim societies toward the values enshrined in the ancient and sacred texts.

By contrast, the new religious movements that emerged in the West in the 1960s have shown relatively little interest in history. The present and immediate future appear to be their major preoccupations, especially in those movements that aim to induce forms of mystical consciousness or expressions of authentic selfhood. History is accorded less significance than is the possibility of adopting a new self-identity in response to perceived cultural tensions. These movements concentrate on resolving moral ambiguity, confusion, and conflict either through the adoption of absolutist principles (as with the Unification Church and the Hare Krishna movement) or through relativistic strategies (as with est, various Zen Buddhist groups, and the Rajneesh movement).

Apparently, the subjective experience of life in increasingly fragmented, rationalized, and mobile societies has been conducive to experimentation with new forms of religion. Tensions or disparities between communal and individual ideals of integrity, for example, have led either to the creation of new forms of religious community or to the cultivation of new models for authentic, individual selfhood. Competing illustrations and proposed resolutions of these tensions can be seen in the variety of new religions that proliferated in Japan and Korea at the end of the nineteenth century, in the vitality of prophetic healing cults in central and southern Africa, and in the profusion in the 1970s of new religious movements in North America and Western Europe.

Regardless of whether analysis takes place at the cultural, social, or personal level, however, special attention is usually paid to the role of the innovative religious leader. Prophets, healers, and messiahs have all played crucial roles in articulating cultural tensions and social conflicts, in mobilizing spiritual energies and material resources, and in providing models of ideal conduct. Some leaders have based their claims to authority on charismatic qualities; others have drawn on tradition; while a few have also sought legitimacy on rational-legal grounds. There has been no less diversity in the processes whereby their personal authority has been—with varying degrees of success—institutionalized and transmitted to their successors. Indeed, a recurrent dilemma facing religious innovators involves having to decide whether to orient their movements toward greater social power (at the possible expense of doctrinal and social purity) or to preserve purity at the cost of reduced power. Some movements lurch back and forth between these two poles.

Contributions of Social Scientific Study. Studies of allegedly heretical or deviant religious movements have long enjoyed popularity, especially among religious conservatives. But only since World War II have social scientists come to examine religious movements systematically and from a more detached point of view. The shift from primarily textual and historical methods of study to research based on participant observation, questionnaire surveys, and, above all, interviews with participants and apostates can be interpreted as evidence of a new-found willingness to take new religious movements seriously. The consequent gains in ethnographic richness have not been without costs, however: allegations of unethical conduct have been leveled against some covert researchers; writers have been threatened with legal actions for libel; the dangers of reductionism have increased; the problem of using "snapshot" methods to study slow-moving, deep-seated changes have been aggravated; claims of ethical neutrality and objectivity have been seriously challenged; and there has been an increasing risk that scientific students of religion might "go native" during fieldwork.

One effect of the shift toward social scientific methods of study is that the boundary between religious ortho-

doxy and deviation is no longer considered that important. At the same time, concepts and theories originating in the study of nonreligious phenomena have been applied to religious movements in a fruitful way: group dynamics, organization, ideology, and symbolism; patterns of resource mobilization; and strategies for recruitment and socialization have all been greatly clarified through comparison with other types of social movements. A further consequence has been greater sensitivity to the complex relations between religious movements and their sociocultural environments.

The increased interest of social scientists in religious movements has helped to counterbalance the criticism previously leveled at religious minorities by theologians. It has also exacerbated public controversy surrounding such better-known movements as the Unification Church, Scientology, and the Children of God. In fact the findings of social scientists have been skillfully manipulated in the struggles between cults and anticultists. Controversy has raged over the accusations, supported by some psychologists, that cult movements brainwash and deceptively exploit recruits. No less controversial, however, has been the moral support lent by some social scientists and theologians to embattled religious movements struggling to defend their interests in courts of law and in the mass media.

Indeed, present-day controversies about religious movements illustrate the variable meaning of religious innovation. Whereas religious reform movements during colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent and parts of Africa and Southeast Asia were often suppressed on grounds of alleged subversiveness, the new religious movements that became popular in the West after 1960 have been accused primarily of damaging their followers' psychological well-being and of alienating them from their families, friends, and careers. Defense of a highly individualized (if not atomized) concept of the normal self, therefore, is the basis for much anticult activity, and this is entirely congruent with the dominant patterns of culture and social relations.

The irony here is that many legal precedents benefiting religious movements in the West in the 1980s were set by an earlier generation of movements, including the Mormons, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Old Order Amish, none of which had any kind of individualistic ideology. Their claims to practice their religions freely indirectly strengthened the universal right to freedom of religion. Many new movements, by contrast, promulgate universalist, monist, and holistic doctrines that are not easily reconciled with the utilitarianism of the welfare state or the organicism of more authoritarian regimes. Thus the declining significance of the major churches is not matched by a relaxation of tensions between church and state. It is with the new religious movements that social scientists have discovered new versions of this old problem. These tensions are most evident in the case of movements in newly created, one-party, or totalitarian states.

The benefits of social scientific studies of religious innovation should not be exaggerated: competition among theories and types is still rife; there is no agreement about the most important perspectives on the topic; and methodological disputes are endemic. Policymakers show few signs of taking the results seriously, and many students of religion are reluctant to acknowledge the usefulness of the social scientific approach to religion. In fact, the study of religious innovation has found no ready niche in the philosophy, history, or phenomenology of religion, and theologians still tend to ignore new movements in religion unless there is a direct bearing on conventional theological or ecclesiastical debate.

Meaning. The importance of the study of new religious movements and cults has been established on several grounds. First, it indicates the extent to which established religious organizations are challenged, both for the allegiance of their members and because of the influence that they wield. Second, the conditions in which people are prepared to participate in new movements are revealing in that they display the shifting lines of tension or fracture in social and cultural structures. Third, the controversies which surround many new movements reflect deep-rooted assumptions and prejudices. In short, the main reasons for studying such movements have to do less with what they represent in themselves and more to do with what they indirectly reveal about the state of society, other religious bodies, or structures of meaning. Very rarely have new religious movements been seriously analyzed for the metaphysics, morality, or motivation that they offer. More often they are taken to be important primarily in their roles as deviant, even epiphenomenal, minorities. The shift from the notion of heresy to that of deviance is paralleled by the growing concern with controlling, rather than suppressing, such outbursts of religious enthusiasm.

Many new religious movements are individually insignificant and short-lived. Their members lack power and influence, and their organizations are ineffectual. But it is questionable whether a focus on separate movements would be helpful. More interesting in the long run would be to examine the higher-level cultural, social, and spiritual tendencies that are exemplified in particular movements. Such tendencies' significance may transcend the fortunes of individual movements, especially when roughly parallel innovations occur

across numerous groups. This was the case, for example, with the two Great Awakenings and the spiritualist and positive-thinking movements in the United States. The worldwide spread of Pentecostalism in the early twentieth century is a comparable case, as is the Islamic revival of the 1970s. The significance of these phenomena is best assessed in terms of the very general changes that they may produce in moral sentiments, spiritual sensibilities, and political motivations among people inside and outside the organizations of specific religious movements. Broad currents of innovation in religion imply movement in a sense that goes beyond the narrowly canalized activism of any particular organization.

Systematic studies of new religious movements and cults have helped to scotch several common, but mistaken, assumptions. They show that modern people are not necessarily less religious than their ancestors, that religious innovation is no more likely to be progressive than conservative, that religion is not the exclusive prerogative of church-type organizations, and that the dynamics of new religious movements cannot be separated from social change. On the other hand, it must be recognized that the greater availability of purely secular channels for political action in most societies makes it unlikely that religious movements will serve as major vehicles of experimentation or innovation in the contemporary world. Though this still does happen, as in Iran and Pakistan, it is increasingly rare.

What is more likely to happen is that, with the acceleration of technical and social change, traditional patterns of religious activity will be increasingly assailed by innovative religious movements seeking either to restore and revitalize the old order or to usher in a new dispensation. New religious movements and cults look to become more numerous, and the rate of their proliferation will probably increase in the foreseeable future. The study of their dynamics is therefore central to an understanding of the place of religion in all societies.

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JAMES A. BECKFORD

New Religions and Cults in the United States

Since the 1960s the United States has been experiencing conspicuous spiritual ferment and innovation, which has been compared by some observers to the "Great Awakenings" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Four principal elements seem to have contributed to the present ferment: (1) a substantial growth of "Eastern" mystical religions (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism, Sufism); (2) a similiar spread of quasi-religious, therapeutic or "human potential" movements such as Scientology, est (Erhard Seminars Training), Arica, and Silva Mind Control, whose philosophies are often composites of Eastern mysticism and pop psychology; (3) a parallel surge of evangelical, pentecostal, and fundamentalist movements both within established churches and as new independent churches and fellowships; and (4) the growth of a number of controversial authoritarian sects or "cults." The "cults," especially, have met vehement hostility from a variety of groups including converts' relatives, embittered apostates, some clergymen from conventional Christian and Jew-

ish organizations, and, finally, a number of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers who have expressed concern about the cults' alleged "brainwashing" of members. A vehement controversy has erupted over the legality and propriety of "deprogramming" tactics that are utilized to "rescue" cult converts. Indeed, it is arguable that a fifth vital element of the present effervescence is an intense "anticult movement" that may itself possess certain "religious" or "cultic" properties.

Sources and Significance of Contemporary Ferment

In his essay "On Knowing How We Know about New Religions," Donald Stone notes that currently "the new religious movements often serve as spiritual inkblots: reports of movements may tell us more about the observers than about the observed" (Stone, 1978, p. 42). Not only the particular movements themselves but the collective phenomena of the present "new religious consciousness" have appeared differently to different analysts, who have discerned a variety of meanings in the surge of esoteric groups and meaning systems.

Spiritual Keys to Wealth and Power. Writing from an economic-determinist point of view, anthropologist Marvin Harris interprets the contemporary surge of esoteric spiritual movements as embodying a revival of magic at a time of declining economic expectations, "a misunderstood attempt to save America's dream of worldly progress by magical and supernatural means" (Harris, 1981, p. 141). The overtly instrumental quality of groups such as Silva Mind Control, est, and Scientology reinforces this view. Such groups are often characterized by a belief in the omnipotence of thought: the devotee learns to "take responsibility" for his thoughts and thereby "impose" them on events, believing this will enhance his personal capabilities to attain worldly success and power. Such groups typify "the manipulative and power-hungry side of the new consciousness" (ibid., p. 147).

A somewhat similar instrumental emphasis can easily be discerned in contemporary evangelical groups, who believe that Jesus will supply financial needs right now as well as heal cancers. Even seemingly ascetic communal groups such as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON, or the Hare Krishna movement) and the Unification Church (the "Moonies") have a substantial worldly and instrumental involvement. "The need to create the material base for the spiritual war dominates the actual daily life of the Moonie communes" (ibid., p. 149). Followers of Sun Myung Moon believe that the messiah must become very rich to fulfill his spiritual destiny, and must reclaim all wealth and land from the dominion of Satan. Harris sees each of these cults as having "a definite worldly commitment—a yearning for control—which contradicts the notion that the current religious awakening is best understood as an Asian-inspired 'critique of the expansion of wealth and power'" (ibid., p. 149).

The strength of such a materialist analysis is that the groups to which it seems clearly applicable are generally larger than the groups for which the analysis might appear forced. However, one weakness of this analysis may be that the proliferation of esoteric movements and "cults" began in the seemingly prosperous late 1960s. Another problem may be the lack of distinction between the original sources of religious impulses and the subsequent instrumentalization of these impulses. Nevertheless, Harris draws the general conclusion "that humankind's religious impulses are more often than not as much instrumentalities in the struggle for worldly wealth, power, and physical well-being as manifestations of the search for spiritual salvation" (ibid., p. 150).

The Context of Secularization. It is generally accepted that various "secular" trends in Western culture provide the context for the current growth of spiritual experimentation and esoteric movements. Thus trends in mainline churches toward deemphasizing supernaturalism or ritualism have been viewed as "disinheriting" many spiritually hungry persons, some of whom will pursue satisfaction elsewhere (Stark, 1981). But to what extent does the current spiritual innovation constitute a reversal of secularist tendencies? Andrew Greeley sees the proliferation of exotic movements as a *prima facie* refutation of what he calls the "secularization myth" (Greeley, 1972). However, an alternate interpretation views today's surge of esoteric movements as confirming the extent of secularization. Daniel Bell notes that cults arise "when religions fail . . . when the institutional framework of religion begins to break up, the search for direct experience which people can feel to be 'religious' facilitates the rise of cults" (Bell, 1977, p. 443).

Bryan Wilson also argues that the number of spiritual movements and their range of variation may temporarily increase under the impact of secularization and a general decline in religious commitment. Modern society is characterized by a hegemony of impersonal bureaucratic patterns of social control, which preclude any real "great awakening" capable of transforming society and culture. Today's "new religions" actually reduce religion to a consumer item. Spiritual "shoppers" choose from a variegated and provocatively packaged array of mystiques in the "spiritual supermarket." But each shopper's personal consumption choice has "no real consequences for other institutions, for political power structures, for technological constraints or con-

trols." As Wilson says in *Contemporary Transformations of Religion* (Oxford, 1976), the new movements essentially "add nothing to any prospective reintegration of society, and contribute nothing towards the culture by which a society might live" (p. 96). In today's cultural milieu, diverse and exotic structures of meaning are able to coexist and be tolerated precisely because of pervasive secularization, which reduces spiritual systems to relatively trivial consumer items. In effect, Wilson sees religion as becoming trivialized to a mere commodity in the secular, materialist culture of advanced capitalism.

Along similar lines, Harvey Cox in *Turning East* (New York, 1977) criticizes spiritual "narcissism" and assimilation of imported Eastern mysticism to capitalist mass consumption culture. This analysis is not dissimilar to that made by Marvin Harris. Yet unlike Harris and Wilson, Cox maintains that the religious trends of the last fifteen years challenge the assumptions of growing secularity and declining supernaturalism—assumptions that were common in the 1960s and that were often linked to general interpretations of religion as a form of "false consciousness" or an outmoded, premodern orientation. From this secularist perspective, any "revival" or reemergence of religions that have supernaturalist orientations and that encourage intense fervor will necessarily be fundamentally regressive. Nevertheless, the liberal, humanistic forms of Christianity that appeared to be the wave of the future in the early sixties did not grow substantially in the late 1960s and 1970s, while conservative and evangelical churches experienced rapid growth (Kelley, 1977) as did assorted "cults," guru movements, and religiotherapy groups. Analyses of these latter phenomena in terms of "narcissism," "brainwashing," and spiritual trivialization and instrumentalization, whatever their empirical and analytical merits, operate to reinforce cultural assumptions about the linkage of secularity and progressive modernity.

Religious Movements, Moral Ambiguity, and Value Confusion. Much scholarly and sophisticated journalistic commentary on new religious movements analyzes the present American spiritual ferment as a reflection of normative breakdown related to the erosion of dominant value complexes such as "civil religion," patriotism, "cold war" anticommunism, traditional morality, "Protestant ethic" values, and "liberal" Christian modernism. The upsurge of small messianic sects may reflect the decay of messianic "Americanism," entailing crusading anticommunism, which operated as a unifying civil religion in mid-twentieth-century America. One writer comments: "The war against communism ceased to be holy in Vietnam. That war, at least temporarily, separated church and state. Messianism and nationalism were sundered and patriotism debunked as a false religion. The obsessive searching for new religions that characterized much of the 70s has been the consequence of our political fall from grace. The cult phenomenon has substituted a myriad of fragmented visions for the central messianism we once called Americanism" (Willa Appel, "Satanism in Politics," *New York Times*, 15 Jan. 1980, p. A15). This analysis is especially applicable to the Unification Church, which Thomas Robbins and others view as "a revitalization movement that attempts to reconstitute and recombine threatened theistic and anti-communistic patriotic values in a context of pervasive politico-moral secularization" (Robbins et al., 1978, p. 67). The ideology of the Moon movement can be seen as "a sectarian version of the disintegrating 'civil religion'" that reconstructs both the traditional American pattern of dualistic moral absolutism and the anticommunist cold-war ideology. The same point might be made concerning the evangelical resurgence and its politicized right-wing element.

Observers frequently stress the relationship between the upsurge of new spiritual movements and discontinuities in "American civil religion." While some emphasize the decline and reconstruction of the theme of Americans as a "chosen people" and other sacred nationalist mystiques, others highlight the consequences of the undermining of civil religion for the weakening of the linkage between private and public value systems. Benton Johnson, in an essay entitled "A Sociological Perspective on the New Religion," argues that the radical differentiation of private and public spheres in contemporary America creates a disjunction between personal expressivity and wider social and civic concerns (Robbins and Anthony, 1980). This has generated a surge of privatized and "narcissistic" religiotherapy groups that stress self-actualization. Along these lines, Dick Anthony and Thomas Robbins have argued that the sundering of public and private realms and the concomitant disintegration of civil religion have produced two contrasting responses: (1) authoritarian "civil religion sects" such as the People's Temple and the Unification Church, whose meaning systems respond to cultural fragmentation by synthesizing political and spiritual elements, and (2) mystical and therapeutic movements such as Arica and est, which are labeled as "narcissistic" because they are self-oriented rather than collectivity-oriented, and because they reject the overt infusion of civic and political values into personal spirituality (Anthony and Robbins, in Barker, 1982).

Robert Bellah and others have discussed American civil religion as a constellation of shared religiopolitical meanings that articulate a sense of national purpose. However, in *The Broken Covenant* (New York, 1975) Bellah has noted that "today the American civil religion is

an empty and broken shell" (p. 145). Bellah sees the present spiritual effervescence and its attempt at a "birth of new American myths" as a response to the undermining of civil religion. In Bellah's view, the new spiritual movements that flourished in the 1970s represented "successor movements" to the late sixties' "crisis of meaning" and revolt against "technical reason" and utilitarian individualism. Bellah's analysis has been extrapolated by Steven Tipton (1981) in his studies of the moral ideologies of est practitioners, American Zen devotees, and Jesus converts. In Tipton's view these movements mediate between dominant and subcultural value orientations: the meaning system of each movement constructs a synthesis between the "countercultural" ethos of spontaneity and either utilitarian individualism or the "revelational-authoritarian" morality of biblical absolutism. Particular attention is devoted to est, whose participants are "saved from the sixties" through internalization of the adaptive moral ideology of "rule-egoism," which accommodates the ethos of spontaneity to conformist careerism.

In his essay "Consciousness among Contemporary Youth," Charles Glock identifies the undermining of traditional notions of personal autonomy and mastery as the essential cultural transformation of the sixties and seventies, which in turn has produced a quest for new structures of meaning (Glock and Bellah, 1976). Glock's view of current value shifts has been reinforced by the survey research of Robert Wuthnow (1976) on popular notions of causation in social and individual experience. Revealing a movement away from traditional individualist-voluntaristic orientations and toward both "mystical" and "scientific" orientations, Wuthnow has also suggested a relationship between these value shifts and emerging patterns of religious "populism." The undermining of the cultural belief in individual responsibility also contributes to disputes over alleged use of brainwashing by cults and lends plausibility to the argument that conversion to deviant religious sects may take place through techniques of "mind control."

Finally, some writers, ourselves included, have pinpointed a climate of moral ambiguity as the context for contemporary spiritual ferment. This climate arises from the erosion of a traditional cultural ethos of dualistic moral absolutism that presumes that individuals have personal responsibility and autonomy. The growing moral confusion has precipitated two comprehensive spiritual resolutions. First, monistic worldviews extend the relativistic and subjectivistic tendencies in cultural modernism. They offer systematic, rational theodicies centered on the premises of metaphysical unity ("oneness") and the illusory quality of the phenomenal world (i.e., the primacy of consciousness). Dualistic worldviews, on the other hand, reaffirm ethical dualism, moral absolutism, and apocalypticism, which are drawn from American evangelical and puritan traditions. Both resolutions, extreme monistic relativism and resurgent dualistic absolutism, provide foundations for constructing meaning in the face of moral chaos.

Dislocations in Communal Patterns. An additional perspective on today's proliferation of esoteric spiritual movements emphasizes the search for community and the problems of community that arise in an urbanized mass society dominated by impersonal bureaucratic megastructures. As traditional "mediating structures" between individuals, families, and the broader society (e.g., ethnically or otherwise homogeneous, "folksy" neighborhoods, extended families, churches, nonbureaucratic work settings) are undermined by various trends, the nuclear family becomes increasingly isolated from other social institutions. The structural isolation of the family may lead to a radical discontinuity between the "loving" quality of familial roles and the impersonal quality of "adult" roles in educational and vocational milieus. Because of this discontinuity, many young persons may seek surrogate families in extrafamilial relationships. Various movements and guru groups appear to promise devotees alternative kinship systems featuring unconditional acceptance, emotional warmth, and moral authority. The language of kinship ("brothers and sisters," "father") is employed by these new movements somewhat more seriously and literally than by traditional, institutionalized churches.

The isolation of the nuclear family renders it difficult for the family to fulfill all the expressive needs of adolescents and young adults, who are increasingly socialized in formal and informal peer-group contexts. Religious movements provide alternative "families" and wean young persons away from exclusive affiliative and valuative dependence upon the nuclear family of origin. However, religious movements can also provide a context for the development and consolidation of new nuclear families, and they can provide services and supports for families—including jobs, day care for children, medical assistance, and welfare. Such supports may be viable, however, only if a family becomes part of the movement. If assimilation is resisted by one or more members of the family, the effect of the movement on the family may be disintegrative, especially if the movement is close-knit, militant, and authoritarian.

In general, "mediating structures" provide the opportunity for close, face-to-face contact with other persons with whom one shares common feelings and a sense of belonging. They also provide a moral foundation in the sense of generating and sustaining communal values, which become socially reinforced personal values. Cults, communes, encounter groups, and various ideal-

istic social movements can be viewed as "social inventions" that meet needs arising from the undermining of traditional mediating structures. These new "quasicollectivities" tend to detach young persons from exclusive reliance upon the nuclear family for interpersonal relationships and value transmission. Settings are produced for extended communal relations that transcend structurally isolated or fragmented kinship ties. In this regard, Irving Horowitz, a severe critic of the Unification Church, has conceded that "the Unification Church as surrogate family . . . does provide an effective therapeutic setting that offers linkage to the larger society without its turmoils" ("The Politics of the New Cults," in Robbins and Anthony, 1980).

Social movements are often effective mediating structures because they emphasize universal values and often integrate these meanings into familylike patterns of interpersonal relationships. Thus the Unification community (of "Moonies") becomes a surrogate family. But it is more than just a family; it is legitimated in terms of universal values. Despite the childlike quality of some aspects of interaction within the community, the role of the Unification family member has an "adult" quality that inheres in its orientation toward broader civic and spiritual values. The theme of "sacrifice" is crucial here. Young converts see themselves as fighting selflessly for universal ideals of love and harmony and world unity in a world permeated by relativism, cynicism, and selfish egoism. In their essay "Kids in Cults," Irwin Doress and Jack N. Porter point out that the "Unification Church constantly emphasizes the breakdown of the American family, corruption and immorality in American life (divorce, pornography, suicide, drugs, and scandal) and, by contrast, the work of the church toward the 'perfect family' in a perfect world" (Robbins and Anthony, 1980, p. 297).

The importance of religious movements as mediating collectivities for young persons arises from their capacity to create universalistic values and symbols that legitimate new patterns of interpersonal relationships and communal interaction. Converts to contemporary religious movements often believe that they enjoy a special communal fellowship in which "loving" relations among spiritual brethren are perceived as deriving from each devotee's inner relationship to Jesus, the Holy Spirit, a spiritual master, or an immanent mystical force. Satisfying relationships among devotees in a group thus constitute a legitimating "plausibility structure" for the meaning system of the movement.

Holistic Self-conceptions. One final analysis, although similar to the foregoing, offers a subtly different emphasis. Social differentiation and the concomitant fragmentation of the lives of individuals into diverse, compartmentalized, and functionally specific social roles has created a diffusion of personal identity. This condition enhances the appeal of symbolic mystiques and social movements that are capable of providing the foundation for holistic conceptions of self. Various new collectivities emphasizing some mode of "consciousness raising" employ intensive group-dynamics processes to transform the identities of devotees through the reinterpretation of personal experience and biography. Personal identity can appear problematic in a highly differentiated society where individuals have multiple limited involvements and interests, some of which must be performed in an emotionally detached manner. The many new therapeutic movements offer participants an integrative sense of "who I am" that stands apart from their diverse roles and limited group and activity commitments. However, therapeutic mystiques may be more compelling if linked to overarching worldviews and theodicies. Hence many of the movements involved in the explosion of new therapies are religiously tinged. Paradoxically, some of the new religiotherapeutic movements such as ISKCON or The Way are so totalistic that participants actually cease to be involved in diversified roles and groups, such that they appear to some observers to have regressed to a subhuman or premodern level and to lack autonomous selves (Beckford, 1979). Such persons are sometimes said to be "under mind control."

Types of Groups

Much of the writing on today's marginal religions tends to imbue them with an illusory homogeneity. "Cults" are popularly typified as authoritarian, centralized, and "totalistic" on the model of the ill-fated People's Temple community which, under the direction of Jim Jones, committed mass suicide at Jonestown, Guyana, in November 1978. However, James Richardson (1980) points to salient organizational differences between the infamous People's Temple and other authoritarian groups such as ISKCON or the Unification Church. Many groups are far less centralized, authoritarian, and close-knit than either of these movements. Indeed, some movements appear to feature a concentric-ring structure of "core" participants surrounded by "householders" and other devotees with "limited-liability" involvement. It is not always easy to delineate the group's boundaries.

"Cults." The term *cult* is frequently employed to refer to deviant or marginal religious or therapeutic groups; however, the term really has no precise consensual meaning. Several writers have tried to distinguish between "cults" and "sects" and thereby to assimilate the concept of cult within traditional "church-sect theory"

in the sociology of religion. Three partly incompatible conceptions of what constitutes a cult seem to have emerged.

1. Authoritarianism and the related notion of "totalism" appear to be defining properties of "cults" in much popular and journalistic literature. Charismatic leadership is a further specification frequently offered by nonsociologists. However, these notions of "cult" converge in some respects with sociological concepts of "sect."

2. Looseness and diffuseness of organization and an absence of clear "boundaries" are identified as defining properties of cults (as opposed to authoritarian and clearly bounded sects) by some scholars. In this conception, cults are viewed as lacking centralized leadership, clear organizational boundaries, and standardized doctrine. Such groups are presumed to be ephemeral, although they may sometimes persist. In *The Road to Total Freedom* (London, 1976), Roy Wallis argues that cults must either evolve into centralized, authoritarian sects or else succumb to "organizational precariousness" and fade back into the more general "cultic milieu" from which viable groups differentiate themselves. Wallis exemplifies this process through the changes undergone by Dianetics, a diffuse cult of the 1950s, which was reorganized by its founder, L. Ron Hubbard, as a centralized, authoritarian sect called Scientology.

3. Deviancy is another criterion that has been employed to identify cults. A related approach identifies a cult as a group that makes a radical break with a dominant religious tradition, while a sect is viewed as a schismatic movement within a larger, dominant tradition. The degree of continuity between a group and a broader tradition is, however, subject to interpretation. (Is the Unification Church, for example, a cult or a Christian sect?)

Critical and Normative Typologies. Some years ago, using the terms *adaptive* and *marginal*, we attempted to distinguish two divergent patterns in new movements with respect to the consequences of involvement for the social integration of participants (Robbins et al., 1975). Adaptive movements, we found, promote the assimilation of converts to conventional vocational, educational, and familial roles, and are often associated with other "integrative" outcomes such as drug rehabilitation. In contrast, converts to marginal movements tend to drop out of conventional structures and become encapsulated in self-sufficient and authoritarian communal institutions. Marginal groups are more likely to evoke hostility from the relatives of converts and from other parties.

Well-known marginal groups include the Unification Church, the Children of God, The Way, the Alamo Foundation, ISKCON, and Love Israel. Clearly adaptive groups include followers of Meher Baba, Transcendental Meditation, and est. There are also a number of intermediate groups in which there is an encapsulated "core" of members plus a larger number of "limited-liability," noncommunal participants. Groups filling this category include Scientology, the Divine Light Mission, the followers of Baba Muktananda, and various Tibetan and Zen Buddhist groups.

Monistic and dualistic systems. More recently, we have been developing a typology of religious movements based on the meaning systems and moral ideologies of different groups. The typology is grounded in the dichotomy of "monistic" and "dualistic" responses to a pervasive climate of moral ambiguity, arising in part from an erosion of the cultural tradition of dualistic moral absolutism (Anthony and Robbins, in Barker, 1982). Monistic meaning systems employ concepts from Eastern mysticism and affirm the essential "oneness" of reality, the ultimately illusory quality of the phenomenal world, the ideas of reincarnation and karma, and the primacy of inner consciousness and its refinement through enlightenment, although not all essentially monistic groups entail every one of these traits. Generally monistic groups include such "Eastern" groups as the Divine Light Mission, ISKCON, Happy-Healthy-Holy (3HO), the followers of Rajneesh, Meher Baba, and Baba Muktananda, and Tibetan and Zen Buddhist groups as well as such implicitly monistic religiotherapeutic movements as est, Scientology, and Arica.

Implicit in monistic perspectives is a qualified moral relativism and a rejection of absolute polarities in human experience. Dualistic systems, on the other hand, revolve around absolute dualities and the immediate, urgent, and inescapable choices that must be made between right and wrong, God and Satan, and so on. Dualistic religion generally affirms the radical transcendence of the godhead and the ever-present tension between the divine creator and the corrupted human creation. Monism, however, affirms a universal order immanent in the depths of consciousness—a latent universal self—in which all priorities are resolved and transcended.

Today's surging evangelical movements are stridently dualistic, as are such well-known "cults" as The Way, Love Israel, the Children of God, the Alamo Foundation, and the Unification Church. The ideology of the Unification Church, for example, can be characterized as "exemplary dualism," in which contemporary sociopolitical forces such as communism are seen as embodying absolute moral-contrast categories.

In our view, the contemporary cultural chaos and the concomitant relativization of particularistic social myths (e.g., American civil religion) provide a fertile

context for the diffusion of monistic perspectives: that is, cultural fragmentation may provide a basis for individuals to glimpse the unity hidden in life. However, extreme dualistic perspectives are also favored by the current climate of moral ambiguity. As Meredith McGuire points out in *Pentecostal Catholics* (Philadelphia, 1982), dualistic perspectives possess a substantial "ordering potential" that enables devotees to "make sense" of the turmoil of their environment and to reinterpret the difficulties of their own lives in terms of a vast cosmic struggle. Dualism is often associated with apocalyptic and millennial visions, which proliferate in the context of the specter of nuclear holocaust, the perceived threat of world communism, and various signs of social disorganization or decay.

In a frequently cited paper (Robbins, Anthony, and Richardson, 1978) two subdimensions of monistic movements have been elaborated. The first subdimension contrasts "charismatic" movements with "technical" movements. Charismatic movements entail conceptions of spiritual apotheosis as embodied in exalted masters (e.g., Meher Baba, Muktananda, and Rajneesh) and in the intense relationships of devotees with them. In contrast, technical movements link spiritual realization to standardized repetitive techniques (e.g., of meditation, chanting, or "auditing"). A second subdimension contrasts "one-level," or literal-univocal, versions of monism with "two-level," or symbolicist-multivocal, monism. This distinction involves the degree to which monistic meanings are viewed as susceptible to literal interpretation and immediate application to the material world. Many of the largest "consciousness" groups, such as est and Scientology, fit the key category of one-level technical groups. Such groups "train" people in techniques for developing an advanced state of consciousness and for implementing advanced consciousness in terms of enhanced efficacy and power in the social and material realms. Groups such as est and Scientology weave mystiques that are grounded in monistic premises (such as the ontological priority of consciousness) but that are extrapolated in a direction consonant with utilitarian individualism and the careerist success ethic (Tipton, 1981).

Univocal vs. multivocal cognitive styles. The distinction between one-level and two-level monism is related to a broader distinction between univocal and multivocal conceptions of reality. The rationalization of culture has as its linguistic dimension the hegemony of "rational discourse" involving terms that are fixed, precise, and context-free in their meaning and that are clear and specific in their empirical referents. Multivocal symbols give way to univocal signs. Ambiguous metaphysical and supernatural (supraempirical) terms are excluded from rational discourse and rationalized culture. To use Max Weber's term, the world is "disenchanted." However, the symbolic impoverishment of the dominant rationalized culture frustrates human needs for multivocal enchantment and thus engenders spiritual ferment and an alternative culture of multivocal mystiques aimed at reenchanting the world.

Weber and other sociologists have generally spoken of "the disenchantment of the world" in terms of the content of a symbolic universe. From this standpoint the contemporary evangelical surge and the rise of "cults" constitute an attempt to reenchant the world. But a different perspective is possible. Consider the evangelical revival, and in particular the pervasive "premillennial" vision of some fundamentalist Christian groups, which see the foundation of the state of Israel as the commencement of the "Last Generation" that will culminate in the dictatorship of Antichrist and ultimately in the millennium. The evangelical revival from which this vision emerges entails a paradox: its supernaturalist content is multivocal and "enchanted," but its literalist, dogmatic, and empiricist interpretative mode (where every symbol has one exclusive meaning with a clear and palpable empirical referent) constitutes a rationalized univocalism in form. The paradox of multivocal supernaturalist content combined with univocal rationalist form may also be applicable to certain human potential and quasi-mystical groups that are "scientistic" in their discourse and that, moreover, resolve spiritual apotheosis into standardized "techniques" or into the cultivation of ecstatic "highs" as an empirical-consequential criterion of truth.

A reduction of symbolic conceptions to univocal rationalism can thus transpire simultaneously with a protest against the rationalized "reduction" of religion: that is, the same movements and mystiques can both protest against and embody the cognitive style of univocal rationality. Assuming that reductionism is objectionable and that the recovery of spiritual enchantment is desirable, the distinctions between univocal and multivocal religious conceptions, between monism and dualism, and between technical and charismatic religiosity may lay the foundation for a critical typology of contemporary religious movements (Anthony, Ecker, and Wilber, 1983).

Hostility to New Religious Movements

The remarkable hostility that today's new religious movements have elicited has a number of sources.

The Secular Premise. An ethos of secular rationality is built into modern culture. Ultimately, controversies

over the new religions involve conflicts between alternative models of human nature. An important foundation for the attacks on "cults" is the common view that certain kinds of religion—ecstatic religion, emotionally intense religion, authoritarian sectarianism, life-consuming religion, and mysticism—are culturally regressive and thus hostile to modern civility. Acceptable religion is expected to be primarily ethical and to be only nominally supernatural. It must not encourage "extreme behavior" such as trances, ecstasies, snake handling, or glossolalia. Religion must also "know its place." It must accept the compartmentalization of life into separate secular and religious realms. Religions departing from these norms appear to many persons to be not religions but rather forms of psychopathology and social disorder. Seemingly antisocial religions are thus stigmatized as "cults" and "pseudoreligions" pertaining more to the sphere of disease and medicine than to the realm of religion. If converts are portrayed as robots who have been "psychologically kidnapped" by sinister gurus, physical coercion may be justified as a way to restore them to personal responsibility.

The Question of Autonomy. A number of contemporary religious movements whose participants work and live entirely under the auspices of the movement, and are subject to stringent discipline, have been described as "totalistic." As James Beckford has noted in his seminal paper, "Politics and the Anti-Cult Movement" (1979), totalistic movements are perceived as threatening the fundamental modern cultural value of personal autonomy. The growth of cults has "precipitated an unusually elaborate and assertive statement of the typically Western model of the person as an individual," according to which individuals are expected to manifest "a dignity in their own right regardless of the social groups or categories to which they belong. The 'real' self is felt to inhere in this abstracted individual and is considered an end-in-itself." The totalistic and authoritarian quality of some movements contravenes the norm of autonomy and the associated ideals of privacy and human dignity. In effect, devotees are perceived as dehumanized in the sense that they lack autonomous "selves."

Ironically, the upholding of this norm is also a basic concern of civil libertarians who defend the rights of authoritarian movements, and who argue that personal autonomy is not merely a goal but is a basic assumption of our legal system. The notion that "mind control" arising from peer pressure without physical coercion is capable of destroying free will arguably violates the assumed factual component of the norm of autonomy. Thus, the coercive "deprogramming" of cultists reinforces a deterministic view of humanity as incapable of any exercise of the will.

Institutional Conflicts. "Cults" such as the Unification Church and Scientology are highly diversified and multifunctional movements. They are involved in numerous enterprises: commercial, financial, healing, educational, and political. The multifunctional and totalistic quality of these movements encourages a strong dependency on the part of devotees, who are involved in an unequal power relationship with gurus or spiritual masters. Valid questions of exploitation may arise. Diversified spiritual movements also enter into competition with a number of other groups and "mediating structures."

Families. The diversified, totalistic, and aggressively evangelical qualities of some movements bring them into conflict with various other institutions and groups. Families who "lose" a member to a totalistic communal movement sometimes feel acutely threatened by what appears to be a larger, wealthier, and more powerful family. Devotees may openly refer to the movement as their "true family," and to its leaders as their "true parents" (as in the Unification Church). Other movements such as ISKCON may be indifferent to the traditional American allegiance to family. Finally, parents are frequently aroused by the jeopardy to the educational and career prospects of progeny who become encapsulated in totalistic groups. For these reasons, as well as the cultural predispositions discussed above, many relatives of devotees have become seriously alarmed by the involvement of their kin in new religions, and have come to view converts as exploited, dehumanized, and bedeviled "cult victims" who must be "rescued" by any available means (Shupe and Bromley, 1980; Kaslow and Sussman, 1982).

Mental health professionals. Psychiatric critics of cults are understandably concerned with the psychological consequences of the participation of young persons in authoritarian communal movements, particularly when intense feelings and "altered states of consciousness" are involved. However, it is also significant that novel spiritual movements tend to be unregulated competitors of certified psychotherapists. The latter are naturally inclined to interpret deviant movements as performing dangerous, unlicensed therapy and inflicting mental harm on participants. The attitudes of mental health professionals should also be understood in light of the potential that "rehabilitation" and counseling of former devotees, as well as counseling of traumatized families, have for enhancing opportunities for mental health professionals by placing a premium on expertise in the esoteric area of mind control. Finally, it is important to realize that mental health professionals in the

United States increasingly identify families as well as individuals as their clients. They are naturally inclined to see conflicts involving families and cults from the standpoint of concerned relatives and to view involvements with cults as somewhat similar to drug abuse and other "deviant behaviors" that seemingly alienate young people and undermine their familial relationships, vocational prospects, and social adjustment.

In general, modern psychiatry has been an important vehicle for advancing secular values in modern society. Religion has frequently been attacked by psychiatry as a force antithetical to the blossoming of modern rationality. The competition between conventional therapy and new gurus is ultimately a competition to gain converts to alternative models of reality. Allegations about brainwashing and mind control may be viewed as rhetorical counterattacks intended to reinforce the priority of traditional psychotherapy and the ideal of the rationally "adjusted" person to which it is bound.

Denominational clergy. Conventional churches and clergymen are threatened by dynamic movements that appear to have great appeal for young persons and that are able to elicit an intense, diffuse commitment that contrasts sharply with the one-day-a-week involvement of conventional churchgoers. A number of clergymen have been heavily involved in activities directed against "cults." On the other hand, some church leaders are active in the defense of the rights of stigmatized groups. Church organizations have often been sensitive to the issues of religious liberty and "church autonomy" that have arisen in instances of governmental intervention against religious groups.

There appear to be some interesting differences among major religious communities with respect to attitudes toward cults. The Jewish community and Jewish organizations seem to be the most hostile toward cults and the least ambivalent toward legal controversies involving unconventional religious movements. A number of Jewish foundations have appropriated funds for "cult awareness" programs. Roman Catholic groups are also highly hostile to cults, and courses warning against cults have been planned for some diocesan schools. Much of the clerical assistance to beleaguered movements has come from liberal Protestant spokesmen. However, conservative Christian and evangelical groups are becoming increasingly ambivalent. Although cults have generally been fervently denounced by evangelicals, some of the secular opponents of cults are now attacking evangelical, fundamentalist, and pentecostal groups. Independent Christian fellowships, which have proliferated in the aftermath of the "Jesus movement" of the early 1970s, have been stigmatized as cults. Many evangelical movements are themselves highly diversified, and thus they are themselves dependent on broad interpretations of religious liberty and church autonomy.

Former devotees. Unpopular religious and political movements have tended throughout American history to produce embittered apostates who have become enthusiastic supporters of persecutory countermovements. Mormons, Freemasons, and Roman Catholics in the early nineteenth century and communists in the mid-twentieth century experienced this apostate syndrome (Robbins and Anthony, 1979). Although many of the accounts of former devotees concerning their manipulation and exploitation in cults may be substantially true, three factors tend to encourage their hostility to the movements they have left. (1) They are substantially influenced by parents, deprogrammers, therapists, and anticult activists who provide them social support and guide them in reinterpretations of their cultist involvement in terms of brainwashing. (2) Such interpretations shield former cultists from the stigma of having been committed to an excoriated group. (3) The brainwashing interpretation may help to reintegrate the family of an ex-convert, which will accept that the deviant "was not really himself" under cultist mind control.

Functions of the Medical Model. Of the various groups comprising the "anticult movement" (Shupe and Bromley, 1980), the role of mental health professionals has been crucial by virtue of their presumed specialized expertise on brainwashing and mental impairment. Legal and legislative victories over cults have often been based on the prestige of this expertise. Deviant religious movements can thus be said to have been "medicalized" (Robbins and Anthony, 1982), and controversies over unorthodox religious movements are viewed by many influential parties as essentially mental health issues. This conception of controversies over cults serves to neutralize religious claims to "free exercise of religion," since psychiatric insights are seen as suggesting that cultist religion is not truly "free." Medicalized conceptions of "destructive cultism" also serve to consolidate a broad anticult coalition by "scientifically" legitimating the concerns and recriminations of parents and apostates, and by highlighting the expertise and remediating role of mental health professionals. Finally, reliance on the medical model produces a situation in which dispute over deviant religious movements tends to center primarily on questions concerning how persons enter and leave movements—that is, on controversies over brainwashing and deprogramming. Other questions arising directly from the diversification of religious movements, such as their tax breaks and employment policies, are overshadowed. "Cults" are thus implicitly designated as a special case, and the possible

linkage of conflicts involving stigmatized movements to a broader crisis of church and state relations is obscured.

Evaluating the Claims of Mind Control. Do conversion and commitment processes within controversial movements constitute a mode of "coercive" and pathogenic brainwashing? Several interpretations have been offered.

Coercive persuasion. A number of models of "coercive persuasion," "brainwashing," or "thought reform" are definitely applicable to relatively authoritarian religious movements. However, some of these relatively broad models are also applicable to other phenomena, including conventional religious orders, college fraternities, and revival meetings. Other models are more restrictive and require a context of forcible physical confinement.

The authors of an important article typologizing "conversion motifs" (Lofland and Skonovd, 1982) typify the indoctrination and conversion processes transpiring at the Unification Church's controversial Booneville Center as approximating a return to nineteenth-century revivalist techniques, which entail manipulated ecstatic arousal in a group context. Although they are manipulative, the processes at Booneville are viewed by Lofland and Skonovd as constituting a conversion motif different from true brainwashing.

It is arguable that some critics of cults have tended to employ a broad and relatively unbounded notion of "coercion," so that items such as "repetitive chanting" or "obsessive prayer" are transvalued as signs of coercion or psychopathology. Finally, it is a dubious proposition that converts lose their free will, particularly in the light of data indicating that relatively authoritarian groups such as the Unification Church exhibit a substantial voluntary drop-out rate (see Anthony et al., 1984). Studies also indicate that new movements manage to recruit only a fraction of those persons with whom initial contact is made (ibid.).

In general, many of the new movements can be said to employ manipulative and heavy-handed methods of indoctrination, intense peer pressure, and, in a few cases, flagrant deception or even physical coercion to attract and maintain recruits. However, it does not appear to be true that the new movements have discovered novel and terrifyingly effective methods of subverting human rationality.

Religious movements and mental health. Initially, the mental health implications of the rise of new religions seemed rather favorable. Observers saw these movements as serving needs arising from contemporary social forces, as well as performing various therapeutic functions (e.g., drug rehabilitation) for converts. More recently a number of clinicians have decried the pathological effects of a syndrome of "destructive cultism." The overall evidence is rather ambiguous, and it appears that the mental health implications of esoteric religions vary tremendously from group to group and from individual to individual within any single group. To complicate matters further, it has also been suggested that unconventional movements tend to attract a disproportionate share of already disoriented persons.

Toward Religious Persecution? At present, the picture with regard to the legal rights of movements and participants, and the legal "remedies" for alleged organizational abuses on the part of religious movements, is unclear. Employment of the medical model and the consequent emphasis on "rescuing" and counterindoctrinating ("deprogramming") alleged "cult victims" has alarmed many civil libertarians who perceive a threat to freedom of belief. Opponents of cults reply that beliefs not freely chosen may not enjoy absolute protection. Arguments and counterarguments are proliferating (see Robbins et al., 1984). The Minnesota Supreme Court appears to have accepted some of the arguments of the supporters of deprogramming and has affirmed in *Petersen* v. *Sorlien* (1980) that parents or their agents may restrict the movements of an adult child without being liable to damages for false imprisonment if the parents have reason to believe that the child's judgment has been impaired and if the child at some point (not necessarily at the outset) consents to his or her deprogramming. Similarly, criminal prosecution of deprogrammers and their employers is frequently unavailing when the defendants successfully plead justification and allege cultist mind control. It appears that courts generally sympathize with concerned relatives and sometimes go out of their way to infer justification for physical coercion. Nevertheless, some federal appeals courts have handed down innovative decisions permitting unsuccessfully deprogrammed converts to sue parents and deprogrammers under the Civil Rights Acts.

The above discussion refers primarily to coercive restraints on converts imposed without the explicit sanction of court custody orders. However, many coercive deprogrammings have transpired under the auspices of conservatorship and guardianship orders granted to parents by lower courts. In a much cited case, *Katz* v. *Superior Court* (1978), a California appellate court overturned conservatorship orders that a lower court had granted to parents of five members of the Unification Church. The implication of the *Katz* decision was that existing conservatorship and guardianship statutes were inadequate for the purpose of reclaiming cultists. However, legislation providing for special custody arrangements for victims of coercive persuasion is pend-

ing in several state legislatures. Other proposed laws aim at punishing deceptive proselytizing, and at regulating the hours of work within religious movements to curtail "slavery" in cults.

The financial solicitation of new movements has also become a legal issue. In *Heffron* v. *The International Society for Krishna Consciousness* (1981) the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota state fair regulation that limits religious solicitation and restricts distribution of religious literature to assigned booths. However, in *Larson* v. *Valente* (1982) the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, overturned a Minnesota law requiring those religious organizations that obtain more than half of their funds from sources other than member contributions (i.e., from the public) to make comprehensive financial disclosure reports. The Unification Church had challenged the statute as unconstitutionally discriminatory against smaller churches.

It is arguable that additional regulations need to be imposed on the far-flung enterprises of diversified spiritual movements. But many observers feel that unpopular minority movements are being selectively targeted in a persecutory manner. Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions affecting new movements will probably emerge in the remainder of the 1980s, and one or more of them will probably confront the issue of alleged psychological coercion in religious proselytizing and indoctrination.

[*For more detailed treatment of specific groups, see* International Society for Krishna Consciousness *and* Unification Church. *For discussions of the legal issues raised by the practices of many new religious movements, see* Law and Religion, *article on* Religion and the United States Constitution. *For a related discussion in a broader context, see* Church and State.]

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THOMAS ROBBINS and DICK ANTHONY

New Religions and Cults in Europe

The new religious movements with which this article is concerned are those which first appeared, or became noticeable, in Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, especially during the late sixties and the seventies. Many, indeed most of them, have their roots in other religions, but they are termed "new" because they arose in a new form, with a new facet to their beliefs, or with a new organization or leadership which renounced more orthodox beliefs and/or ways of life. Some of the movements have been denied, or have themselves rejected the label *religious*. No attempt will be made here to argue what a "real" religion should or should not consist of. The term *new religious movements* is employed merely as a somewhat arbitrary, but usefully general, term by which to refer to a multitude of movements which might be termed cults, sects, spiritual groups, or alternative belief systems by others.

Already it will be apparent that, faced with such a wide classification, the movements will differ greatly from each other, and indeed the first generalization that must be made about new religious movements is that one cannot generalize. One could indeed say that the only attribute which all the movements have in common is that they have been referred to as new religious movements. That said, however, some trends and some characteristics shared by some of the movements may be noted.

Immediate Historical Setting. New religions in the past have frequently been categorized as religions of the oppressed. It is, however, clear that the membership of the current wave of new religions cannot be described as politically or economically oppressed or as suffering from material deprivation. It has been argued that those who join the contemporary movements are suffering either from relative material deprivation or from spiritual deprivation. It is difficult for such explanations not to be tautological or to beg the question, but there can be little doubt that while a disproportionate number of those who join the better known of the new movements come from what, half a century earlier, would have been considered a highly advantaged background, many such people have claimed to experience feelings of emptiness, purposelessness, and frustrated hopelessness in the bureaucratic, materialistic, and secularized "rat race." Most specifically, communications media have focused "public concern" on the fortunes of small groups of middle-class youth who have, in a variety of ways, expressed their dissatisfaction with modern society.

During the late forties and early fifties there was a widespread concern to "pick up the pieces" in the aftermath of World War II, which had itself followed a period of economic depression and high unemployment throughout most of the West. By the late fifties, Europe

had, generally speaking, made a remarkable recovery. Future prospects seemed hopeful. By the middle sixties, however, there had grown up a new generation with a new set of hopes and values. The immediate relief of peace and the relative political and economic stability were forgotten as it became increasingly obvious that the rosy expectations of continuing peace and prosperity were not being entirely fulfilled. A vociferous group of students in universities throughout Europe, but especially in England, Germany, France, Holland, and Italy, joined the protesters in North America in attacking Western imperialism and bourgeois capitalism. By the end of the sixties, however, this section of middle-class youth seemed to be giving up hope of changing the structure of society through mobilizing political pressure and organizing "demos." They turned instead to a fundamental rejection of structures and standards. The "hippie" movement was never so visible in Europe as it was in California, but it certainly existed. It was most obviously established among segments of English, Scandinavian, Dutch, and German culture, but the sunny coasts of Greece, southern France, and Spain drew many seekers who intermingled with those who had discovered their paths to truth or spiritual enlightenment in India or California.

There then followed during the seventies a period in which this first wave of movements was joined by a conservative backlash, and the establishment of more organized and authoritarian movements which imposed strict rules, order, and clear answers in place of the antinomian laxity of the earlier movements. At the same time there was a spread of Neo-Pentecostal revivalism and charismatic renewal. The general shift of emphasis and the search for order and certainty were also apparent in conservative reactions within many traditional churches in opposition to the liberalization of theology and general outlook evidenced, in part, by Vatican II. By the early eighties, there existed several hundreds of groups competing for souls and, frequently, the total commitment and financial resources of the young, and, in some cases, the not so young.

Origins. The vast majority of the new movements were not indigenous to Europe. Most can be traced to the United States (frequently California) or Asia (mainly India, but also Japan, Korea, and other parts of Asia). There are also a few groups that have come from Africa, most of these finding their home among the black populations residing in Europe.

A few of the movements which did not originate in Europe arrived with immigrant groups, but the majority were introduced by professional missionaries, some of whom may have been natives of a European country who had come across their new religion while traveling abroad. Not infrequently movements with roots in the East have been introduced to Europe indirectly, via the United States. It is, however, noteworthy that several of the Eastern religions show the influence of Westerners who had traveled to Asia, carrying with them either the Christian message or, more recently, the language and perspectives of various forms of humanistic psychology and the "human potential" movement—a movement which has itself been traced both to the East and to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pietism in the West. Thus it is that although many of the new movements may appear exotic and seem to present highly alien concepts to Europeans, it is possible to identify a not inconsiderable contribution from Europe which could have "prepared" the way or made the novelties more acceptable to Westerners than might otherwise have been the case. There is, moreover, a further twist to this tale of cultural exchange and syncretism. It is often the accretions of American culture which the new movements bring across the Atlantic that are most strongly objected to by their European critics.

Spread of the Movements. All the countries in Western Europe play host to at least some of the new religions. Even Eastern European countries have a few followers in their midst, but most of these work underground and only very rarely will they publicly confess their faith.

There exist no reliable sources of information about the numbers of movements, let alone the membership of the new movements for Europe as a whole or indeed for any of the individual countries. It does, however, appear that there is a very large number of such movements (several hundreds), but that most of them have a relatively small membership (occasionally fewer than a dozen people). Calculating the exact figures is close to impossible because (1) many movements do not advertise their existence and (2) those movements which do declare themselves are liable to be very secretive about their membership or, alternatively, to produce grossly exaggerated figures, perhaps including any individual to whom they have given or sold a sample of their literature.

The most scholarly attempt that has been made to gauge the relative strength of the movements comes from Rodney Stark of the University of Washington at Seattle. Stark undertook this study in order to test his theory that secularization does not bring about the end of religion, but is a self-limiting process in that it stimulates new religious reactions. His central hypothesis is that while secularization stimulates both revival and religious innovation, sect movements (i.e., schisms) cluster where conventional churches are stronger, while cult movements (i.e., innovations) are stronger in places

where conventional churches are weaker. Having exposed this pattern in North America, Stark tested and found evidence supporting his theory in Europe. Contrary to a widely held belief that new religions have been stronger in the United States, Stark's computations indicate that Europe is more receptive to the movements—indeed, his figures even suggest that many distinctly American cults and sects fare better in Europe than in their homeland. He found 153 cult movements which were operating in England and Wales (which he, correctly, considered to be a serious undercount). This produced a rate of 3.2 cults per million of population, compared with the American rate of 2.3 per million. The areas with the highest rate of Eastern movements per population were Britain, Scandinavia, and Switzerland. France, the Netherlands, Austria, and West Germany, although having lower rates, were still more "cultivated" than the United States. Italy, Spain, and Belgium had lower rates than the United States. This picture was, by and large, reversed when Stark assessed the extent of sectarian success, which he measured with reference to the success of North American evangelical Protestant missions. These had practically no success at all in Scandinavia; very little success in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Netherlands; quite a lot more in Austria, Belgium, and Spain; and a staggering success in Switzerland, Portugal, France, and Italy.

Thus, given the general state of religious belief and practices in the respective countries, and given that the data are, perforce, incomplete and in many ways unsatisfactory, there is at least a *prima facie* case for two of Stark's principal contentions: first, that much of Europe has experienced more secularization than the United States, and is therefore more receptive to new religious movements than has been generally assumed, and, second, that those countries (especially the more northern, Protestant ones) in which traditional churches are weakest are the most receptive to alien religions (cults), while those (especially the more southern, Catholic countries) in which conventional religion is stronger are more likely to be receptive to sectarian (revivalist) activity.

Hostility to the New Religions. By the mid-seventies there also had been established throughout the continent a loose network of groups whose avowed aim was to expose and curtail the activities of the new movements. Anticult movements were particularly prominent in France, Germany, and Britain, but there were also individuals or small groups actively opposing the new religions in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, other countries.

Almost without exception press coverage was hostile to the new religions. Headlines told of bizarre sexual practices, blasphemous beliefs, brainwashing, kidnapping, brokenhearted parents, political intrigue, exploitation, deception, and the vast wealth amassed by leaders of the movements. Some of the groups attracted far more attention than others. One of the earliest groups to be singled out was Scientology; others which had periods of exposure were the Divine Light Mission, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON, or the "Hare Krishna" movement), the Children of God (or Family of Love, as it was later known), and the followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh.

The movement which has undoubtedly received the most attention has, however, been the Unification Church, whose members are popularly referred to as "Moonies." [*See* Unification Church.] Generally speaking, although few Europeans had heard of Sun Myung Moon in the mid-seventies, his name was almost a household word by the beginning of the eighties. The quantity and quality of exposés have varied from country to country; the French have been particularly concerned about the movement's political and financial concerns; the Germans have focused on social security payments and the possibility of a new Hitler Youth movement; the English on the breakup of families and on brainwashing; the Norwegians have denied its Christian status; and the Finns have tended to ignore the Moonies in their midst.

In England, the Unification Church lost a six-month libel action against the *Daily Mail*. Pressure was put on several governments (notably the French, German, and British) to ban or at least to curtail the activities of the Moonies. The Ministry for Youth, Family, and Health of the Federal Republic of Germany financed an international inquiry into the "Causes and Consequences of Social Dissension of Young People," which was, in effect, an inquiry into the new religious movements. A report produced for the French government included the recommendation that judges be allowed to give parents the power to extract their adult children from religious organizations. Continual pressure has been put on the Charity Commission in Britain to remove the Unification Church from its list of tax-exempt charities.

In May 1984, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for "a common approach by the Member States of the European Community towards various infringements of the law by new organizations operating under the protection afforded to religious bodies." The resolution expressed concern about some of the practices of the new religions, and listed a number of "criteria [that should] be applied in investigating, reviewing and assessing the activity of the . . . organizations." The supporters of the resolution were in favor of insti-

tuting a voluntary code of practices to be followed by the movements. Several of the movements responded by saying that not only do they follow most of the code's rules anyway, but that any such code ought to apply to *all* religions, and not just to the "new" ones (which are, furthermore, notoriously difficult to define).

Despite—possibly to some degree because of—the extent of the public outcry, the actual number of fully committed members of the movements has remained remarkably low. There have never been as many as three thousand European Moonies at any one time. Britain, Germany, France, and Austria can boast a few hundred each; other countries have no more than fifty or, in several instances, fewer than twenty members. It is unlikely that many other movements have more full-time members, although the casual, affiliated, or associate membership of various groups can occasionally run into a few thousands. It is, moreover, clear that all the new religious movements experience a very high turnover rate in their membership.

Classifications. In order to try to create some sense of order among the myriad movements, a number of different classificatory systems have been proposed. These systems have both advantages and disadvantages, and are more or less useful according to the particular questions one wishes to explore. One of the simplest divisions is based on the origin of the movement. (It is, however, necessary to bear in mind the earlier discussion concerning the exchange of ideas and the syncretistic nature of many of the groups.)

Those new religions from the mainly Indian tradition of the East include Ananda Marga, Brahma Kumaris, the Divine Light Mission, ISKCON, followers of Meher Baba and of Sathya Sai Baba, the Rajneesh Foundation (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh), and Transcendental Meditation. Those from Japan include Nichiren Shōshū (Sōka Gakkai) and Risshō Kōseikai; and from Korea comes the Unification Church. The movements originating in America tend to be either Christian derivatives (or deviations) such as The Way International, Armstrongism (The World Wide Church of God), Bible Speaks, and The Children of God (The Family of Love), or, alternatively, groups connected with the human potential movement like est (Erhard Seminars Training), Exegesis, Silva Mind Control, P.S.I. (People Searching Inside and the Kundalini Research Institute of Canada), and the Rebirth Society. Occasionally techniques offered primarily for self-improvement are transferred into (and sometimes back from) a movement claiming to be a new religion. Dianetics' transformation into the Church of Scientology (and back into Dianetics) is a case in point. Also from America come innumerable New Age groups and those which deal in the occult, neopaganism, witchcraft, and magic. These are joined by similar, indigenous groups which are most prolific in northern Europe, especially in parts of Scandinavia and Britain. Such groups range from highly secret fellowships practicing ritual "sex magick," to orthodox covens, to the English Gnostic Church (founded in Chicago in 1979), to astrological groups, Druid gatherings, and Aquarian festivals. From Africa come the Aladura churches, and from Jamaica has come the Rastafarian movement, which has gained considerable popularity among the West Indian population in Britain. Among the groups indigenous to Europe there is the Pentecostal Earmark Trust, the Bugbrooke (Christian) Community, Ishvara (an offshoot of the Divine Light Mission), and the Emin, an esoteric group founded by "Leo" (Raymond Armin/Scherlenlieb). Numerous gurus and messiahs have also appeared, bringing tidings of impending doom and/or an imminent second coming. Britons were surprised to read, in a full-page advertisement in *The Times* in the spring of 1982, that "The Christ Is Now Here" and that he would reveal his identity within the next two months. Two years later they were still waiting, but the advertiser, one Benjamin Creme, had gathered around him a small group of expectant believers.

One of the more useful ways in which new religious movements have been classified is by Roy Wallis's threefold distinction between world-rejecting movements, such as the People's Temple, ISKCON, and the Children of God, which see society being in need of and/or about to experience radical change; world-affirming movements, such as Scientology and the human potential groups, which might be called quasi-religious in that, although they pursue transcendental goals by largely metaphysical means, they concentrate on techniques for improvement of their lot within contemporary society, and thus "straddle a vague boundary between religion and psychology"; and, last, world-accommodating movements, such as Neo-Pentecostalism and western branches of Sōka Gakkai, which concentrate on providing religion for their followers' personal, interior lives, and which tend to be unconcerned with their followers' social lives.

Another method for categorizing the movements is based on the degree of commitment offered by members to the group. This is a useful criterion, for much concern about the movements has been over young people giving up conventional ways of life, abandoning university courses and/or promising careers, and more or less severing relationships with friends and relations who are not of their persuasion. It is also a difficult criterion to apply, however, as many of the movements have a

membership of both committed full-time members and of other, more or less casual associates. The Unification Church, ISKCON, and the Children of God, for example, are usually characterized by their full-time members who live in communities and devote all their energies to the furtherance of their movement (typically by fund-raising from door to door or in public places—although this is not permitted in all European countries—and by "witnessing" to potential converts). They also have associate members or sympathizers (whom the Moonies call Home Church members) who accept the general tenets of the theology but who live and have occupations in the wider society. They may even attend another (traditional) church or temple. "Premies" (members of the Divine Light Mission) may live in ashrams, but most of them now live in houses with perhaps a couple of other Premies, and most have "outside" work to support themselves and provide money for attending festivals to see and hear their guru, Maharaj Ji. Scientology, Transcendental Meditation, and the Rajneesh movement have a small core of full-time members who organize courses for a clientele which will range between those who spend all their spare time (and money) following the courses, and those for whom contact with the movement is a minimal pastime.

Another way of differentiating the movements is based on the kind of membership they attract. While the Rastafarians attract blacks of all ages but have a particular appeal to less advantaged black youth, the Unification Church attracts white, middle-class people in their twenties. Those who are attracted to Bhagwan Rajneesh tend to fall within a wider age range, but they too are mainly from the middle classes. Premies and Children of God are younger and sometimes, though by no means always, less well educated than Moonies. Some of the movements whose techniques, such as yoga and meditation, appeal to a very wide range of Europeans offer classes under the auspices of local authorities or teach in official government or business institutions, a practice which causes some concern to anticult movements.

It should also be recognized that, partly because of their very newness and their lack of tradition and institutionalization, the composition of the movements is particularly susceptible to change within relatively short periods of time. Take, for example, ISKCON membership, which in the early seventies was largely composed of dropouts and former drug addicts from the hippie scene. By the early eighties the British movement was having its greatest success in attracting large numbers of highly respectable Hindu immigrants from East Africa as "life members."

In addition to Stark's theory, briefly outlined above, many other, diverse explanations have been offered to account for the current wave of new religions. As these are comprehensively covered in the foregoing articles, they will not be rehearsed here. It may, however, be worth mentioning (as a codicil to Stark) that there is a growing body of evidence which shows that a large number of Britons and Scandinavians (at least) have spiritual and/or religious experiences which they find themselves unable to communicate to others. European countries (especially the northern, Protestant ones) tend to be markedly less "permissive" than much of American (especially Californian) culture concerning the discussion of spiritual, religious, or emotional sentiments. The new religions can be one means of providing both the language and a social context within which people are "given permission" to explore such phenomena in a religious environment which is protected from the apparently hostile or indifferent attitudes of a secular society. Once again, however, it must be stressed that only a tiny proportion of those who have abandoned any strong commitment to traditional religions will avail themselves of the new options on offer.

Long-Term Significance. It is difficult to assess the long-term significance of the new movements with respect to their effect on European culture. It is, indeed, possible that the reaction to the movements is more significant than the movements themselves. Each country should, of course, be considered separately. Greece and Finland, for example, do not seem to be aware of having such a "problem," and in Spain it was not until 1970 that non-Catholic religions could operate legally (but, according to Stark's figures, Spain had "caught up" with Italy by the end of the decade).

It is possible that those countries in which the reaction to new religious movements has been strongest will see some alterations in the policies of their governments and the attitudes of the traditional churches. After initial panic, it has been recognized in several quarters that the new movements could be meeting needs, or at least they could be bringing to the surface desires, hopes, ideals, or resentments not met or assuaged by traditional institutions—although, paradoxically, some of these needs could have been created or at least fostered by those very institutions. There is, for example, a manifest desire among certain sections of the educated youth of Europe to be able to contribute in a recognizable way to their society, but traditional avenues for social service seem blocked. Orthodox churches are seen as hypocritical; and bureaucratic welfare states make voluntary or community services, if not actually redundant, difficult to accomplish. Even people with ex-

cellent degrees are unlikely to rise to the top of their professions for several years, and many who have not quite "made it" have no obvious means of feeling themselves to be of value. The new movements can offer such people hope, either by selling techniques said to help them lead the fulfilling kind of life they espouse within the society (by advancing their career prospects or "realizing their true potential"), or by demanding a hard, sacrificial way of life as part of the path to overcoming the all too apparent ills of contemporary society and building the kingdom of heaven on earth.

It is, however, necessary to end on a note of caution. It is very easy in the mid-eighties to assume that the new movements are far more significant than they probably are. Already there are signs that their peak is passing. Some may accommodate to society, lose their sectarian characteristics, "denominationalize," and join the respectable religions of the future. A few may start to grow, then shatter into schisms; some of these may persist for a generation or so, thereby offering a small group of followers an experience which remains beyond the ken of the rest of the society. Most will probably fade away, or perhaps reappear in some slightly different form when Europeans—or rather some sections of some European societies—turn once more to new forms of religious beliefs and practices.

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EILEEN BARKER

New Religions in Japan

The modern era has been a prolific period for new religious movements in Japan. A new religion will have most or all of the following attributes:

1. Establishment within the last two centuries, usually characterized by features that suggest a religious response to the crises of modernity
2. A definite moment of establishment and, usually, a founder possessing special charisma
3. An important new, distinctive revelation or realization, expressed through some novel doctrine and usually attributed to supernatural sources
4. A separate institutional structure
5. Distinctive rites or practices

Historical Background. Most Japanese new religions fall into one of three overall categories: (1) the "old" new religions, basically Shintō in style of worship but monotheistic, originating before the Meiji restoration of 1868; (2) the Ōmoto group, whose founders were influenced by the syncretistic, eschatological, and spiritualistic movement of that name, dating from the 1890s; and (3) the Nichiren group, a category representing revitalizations of Nichiren Buddhism.

The roots of such movements in Japan lie in the rising popular discontent that marked the Tokugawa shogunate (1600–1868) as it drew to a close. During the entire period, mass pilgrimages to Ise, countryside shamanism, and religious dance manias were aspects of popular religion, as were the more decorous movements associated with moral philosophers such as Ishida Baigan (1685–1744), founder of Shingaku ("heart learning"), and the "peasant sage" Ninomiya Sontoku (1787–1856). The moralists reinforced the Confucian values of work and obligation that made society function, while the wildfire "enthusiasts" gave vent to diverse spiritual impulses within a nominally regimented Confucian order. Both tasks became more urgent as the Tokugawa regime went into decline in the early nineteenth century. In those decades the "old" new religions, synthesizing elements of both popular exuberance and conventional morality, crystallized out of the spiritual ferment.

Fundamentally, each of the new religions offered stability by making pivotal a single example of each type of religious expression in popular religion. Each featured one god out of the many *kami* and Buddhas; one

divine teacher and one revelation out of the numerous shamans and visions of the era; one preeminent rite; one religious center and magnet for pilgrimage; one scripture; one institution. At the same time, they interpreted rapid change by explaining it in familiar eschatological language: God is hastening the coming of a new divine age, or the paradise of Maitreya, the Buddha of the future. They helped ordinary people to adjust to the ways of the new civilization through their own adaptations of its schools, bureaucracies, and mass media. At the same time, by expecting, unlike the traditional community Shintō shrines and Buddhist temples, a definite personal commitment of faith, they aided people in meeting the most profound challenge imposed by modernization, taking responsibility for one's own life in a changing and pluralistic world.

In Japan there were other authorities that claimed control over the modern soul. But despite opposition from a government increasingly seeking to regulate all aspects of national life, including religion, new movements (notably those of the Ōmoto group) appeared and flourished during the period between the Meiji restoration (1868) and Japan's defeat in World War II (1945). In that tumultuous era they played a complex role as vehicles of protest, as ways of helping ordinary people adjust, and—when the religions made their peace with the regime and its ideology—as sectors of a state-controlled religious establishment.

After 1945, with the coming of full religious freedom and the discrediting of prewar Shintō and Buddhism in the eyes of many, the new religions grew mightily for several decades. Most were direct or indirect continuations of prewar movements. But they took advantage of the new liberal atmosphere to purify their teaching and practice and drew on Japan's burgeoning affluence to build great temples and even spiritual cities. In the 1970s and 1980s their rate of growth tended to level off, but the new religions remain important aspects of Japanese society; an authoritative 1980 estimate put their total membership at 22.4 percent of the Japanese population.

General Characteristics. Common characteristics of the Japanese new religions include the following:

1. Founding by a charismatic figure whose career often recalls the shamanistic model: supernatural calling, initiatory ordeal, wandering, oracular deliverances from the spiritual world. As in Japanese shamanism generally, the founder is often female.
2. Tendency toward monotheism or a single, monistic source of spiritual power and value. Against the background of the spiritual pluralism of popular Shintō and Buddhism, the new movements set one deity, one founder, and one revelation as definitive.
3. Syncretism, drawing from several strands of religion and culture. The new religions typically embrace Buddhist doctrine, at least to the extent of inculcating doctrines of *karman* and reincarnation, extol a basically Confucian morality as well as what is really a Neo-Confucian idea of God as supreme principle or unity, and (except for the Nichiren group) incorporate Shintō styles of worship. At the same time, notions may be borrowed from Western spiritualism, New Thought (a nineteenth-century movement stressing the power of thought to heal and bring success), or evolutionism. There is also a strong desire to harmonize the religion with "modern science."
4. A definite, this-worldly eschatology. The new religions usually teach that rapid change is afoot and a divine new age imminent.
5. A sacred center, often an entire sacred city, to which pilgrimage is made, where the faith is headquartered, and which represents a foretaste of the coming paradise.
6. Emphasis on healing. Indeed, most of the new religions began as spiritual healing movements, only gradually developing a full spectrum of doctrine and practice.
7. A tendency toward "mentalism," that is, the belief that through the power of affirmative thinking one can heal mind and body and control one's own destiny. Although mentalism certainly has roots in traditional Buddhism and Confucianism, like the Western schools of New Thought and "positive thinking" it has been directed with fresh emphasis to such worldly benefits as health and prosperity.
8. A single, simple, sure technique for attaining and employing the special spiritual power offered by the religion. One practice, whether the Daimoku of the Nichirenshū or the *jōrei* of World Messianity, is presented as the key to unlock spiritual power.
9. A simple but definite process of entry, suggesting that the religion is open to all but requires a personal decision and act of commitment.

The "Old" New Religions. The "old" new religions, which appeared before the Meiji restoration, have served as prototypes and often training grounds for later new religions. They are characterized by a rural background, making an originally Shintō or folk deity into a monotheistic supreme being, and, compared to later movements, show little real evidence of Western influence.

Kurozumikyō. The saintly Kurozumi Munetada (1780–1850) founded this movement after a revelation in 1814. Kurozumi believed himself possessed by the Shintō sun goddess Amaterasu, whom he identified as the infinite deity. This small but influential movement emphasizes healthy living, healing, the cultivation of joy, and worship of the indwelling divine spirit. [*See also* Kurozumikyō.]

Tenrikyō. Tenrikyō ("religion of heavenly wisdom") originated in 1838, when a farmer's wife, Nakayama Miki (1798–1887), was possessed during a shamanistic rite by a deity who identified himself to her as the true and original God. Subsequently this deity, now known to followers as God the Parent, imparted through Miki healing gifts and revealed scripture. Tenrikyō features an account of the creation and the performance of a dance ritual that recalls it. [*See also* Tenrikyō.]

Konkōkyō. In 1859 a peasant, Kawate Bunjirō (1868–1912), felt himself called by the high god Tenchi Kane no Kami to a ministry of mediation between the divine and humankind. This he did through the Konkōkyō ("religion of golden light"), a faith that teaches that God is benevolent, and that offers a practice called *toritsugi* in which supplicants receive spiritual counsel from a priest. [*See also* Konkōkyō.]

The Ōmoto Group. The prolific Ōmoto new religions, stemming from the late-nineteenth-century Ōmoto faith itself, are characterized by a monotheism combined with a rich vision of a complex spiritual world from which souls descend into matter, a picture somewhat reminiscent of Western Neoplatonism and gnosticism; a strong affirmation of immediate and continuing divine revelation; and an eschatological bent emphasizing an imminent paradisical new age. The influence of Western spiritualism, Swedenborgianism, and New Thought is apparent.

Ōmoto. In 1892 Deguchi Nao (1837–1918), a peasant woman and member of Konkōkyō who had experienced many personal troubles, began to deliver divine oracles. Although the messages were initially from the Konkōkyō deity, Nao left that faith in 1897 and soon thereafter met Ueda Kisaburō (1871–1948), a mystic and spiritualist whom she believed to be the great teacher her revelations had predicted would be sent from God. He became her son-in-law and was adopted into the family as Deguchi Onisaburō. Under him Ōmoto ("great source") became a well-organized and rapidly expanding religion. A colorful figure of considerable religious creativity, Onisaburō offered pointed social criticism and produced voluminous oracular scriptures, the *Ofudesaki* and *Reikai monogatari.* They emphasized the oneness of God, the existence of a formative spiritual world behind the material, the temporary descent of souls from the spirit realm into the world of matter, the expression of the divine through art, and the coming of a new age heralded by a great teacher. Onisaburō also devised rites of healing, as had Nao in the early years of the movement.

By the early 1930s Ōmoto had some two million members. The increasingly totalitarian government forced it to disband in 1935; although it was reorganized in 1946 it has never regained its former strength. Yet Ōmoto has had an immense influence on other, newer religions more successful than itself in the postwar years. The founders of World Messianity and Seichō no Ie served what amounted to apprenticeships as leaders in Ōmoto, and though the connection is less direct, Perfect Liberty (PL Kyōdan) appears also to have been influenced in ideology and practice by the older faith. [*See also* Ōmotokyō.]

Seichō no Ie. Seichō no Ie (lit., "house of growth") represents a cross-fertilization between the Japanese spiritual tradition and American New Thought. Its founder, Taniguchi Masaharu (1893–1985), was an avid reader of Western and Eastern philosophy as a young man, and participated in Ōmoto for four years. In 1928 by chance he discovered a book by the American New Thought teacher Fenwicke Holmes. This book helped him crystallize a system of thought that was officially launched as Seichō no Ie in 1930, when Taniguchi began publishing a magazine of that name. Seichō no Ie affirms the perfection and spiritual nature of all things and denies the reality of matter, suffering, or evil: one may escape from them through the affirmative power of mind. During World War II Taniguchi actively supported government policies, and today Seichō no Ie continues to be identified with right-wing causes. It is less a religious institution in the strict sense than a movement defined by subscription to its literature and attendance at lectures and classes, including fifteen-day intensive courses. However, it does teach a distinctive form of meditation called *shinsōkan* and certain chants. It claims some three million followers in Japan.

World Messianity. Called in Japanese Sekai Kyūseikyō or Sekai Meshiakyō, the World Messianity movement represents a development of the eschatological wing of Ōmoto. Its founder, Okada Mokichi (1882–1955), was an active worker in that faith until 1934, when he felt called to form his own organization. The present name was adopted in 1950. Emphasizing the coming of a paradise on earth through an accelerating inpouring of divine light, World Messianity seeks to prepare the way through a practice called *jōrei*, channeling divine light through a cupped upraised hand to a body

or other object to cleanse it of evil. World Messianity also regards art and beauty, including gardens, as precursors of the earthly paradise.

Perfect Liberty. Perfect Liberty, or PL Kyōdan—the movement uses only the English term—was founded in 1946. Based through its founder, Miki Tokuchika (b. 1900), on a complex heritage of prewar movements, PL is liturgically oriented, enacting beautiful rituals of prayers accompanied by graceful bows and stylized gestures, sermons, testimonials, and offerings in its public worship. Monotheistic, it emphasizes that life's misfortunes should be understood as warnings from God, to be interpreted by a PL teacher; a special procedure for such consultation is provided. A well-known and distinctive PL concept is that life is art, to be lived in a balanced, creative, aesthetically expressive way. This in turn has led to an appreciation of the spiritual worth of sports and crafts; PL churches are noted for their classes and facilities in these areas.

The Nichiren Group. The medieval Buddhist prophet Nichiren (1222–1282) started a movement from which most important sectarian developments in Japanese Buddhism have stemmed. [*See also* Nichirenshū.] Nichiren Buddhism's fundamental conviction is that the *Lotus Sūtra* is the supreme and full doctrine; it is worshiped in the form of a *maṇḍala*, the Gohonzon, by means of a chant called the Daimoku. Nichiren himself is believed to be the teacher, or even the Buddha, of the present age, his doctrine superseding all previous Buddhism. Nichiren Buddhism therefore claims to be the one true Buddhism. It emphasizes the coming of a spiritual new age, and the power of the faith to bring benefits here and now.

Nichiren Shōshū and Sōka Gakkai. The most important Nichiren movement is not strictly a new religion, for Nichiren Shōshū ("Nichiren true teaching") was established by a disciple of Nichiren himself and is one of two main traditional Nichiren denominations. But it was revitalized—indeed, virtually transformed—by the remarkable Sōka Gakkai ("value creation society") in the twentieth century. Although it is technically a lay organization for evangelization within Nichiren Shōshū, many consider Sōka Gakkai for all practical purposes to be a modern new religious movement. Membership in the two groups is now coextensive.

Sōka Gakkai was established in 1937 by Makiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944), an educator and convert to Nichiren Shōshū. He shared the belief of pragmatism that human benefit is of greater importance than truth regarded as an abstract ideal, and saw a compatible view in Nichiren's emphasis on present attainment of the benefits of practice. Sōka Gakkai was reconstructed after the war under the dynamic leadership of Toda Jōsei (1900–1958) and became a highly organized promotional arm of Nichiren Shōshū. While its tactics were often criticized, in this period it was hailed as the "fastest growing religion in the world," claiming by 1960 some 750,000 households. After Toda's death, leadership passed to Ikeda Daisaku (b. 1928). Emphasizing the movement's cultural and social significance, he founded a related political party, the Kōmeitō ("clean government party"), and otherwise sought to advance the coming of the Third Civilization, when true faith would spread over the world, ushering in an era of peace and plenty. [*See also* Sōka Gakkai.]

Reiyūkai. The oldest major modern Nichiren sect, Reiyūkai ("spiritual friends association") was founded in 1925 by Kubo Kakutarō (1892–1944) and his sister-in-law Kotani Kimi (1901–1971), both of humble background. Essentially a lay organization, it depends on informal groups and volunteer teachers. In addition to the usual Nichiren emphases, Reiyūkai stresses the importance of ancestor worship, features quasi-shamanistic faith-healing practices, and has developed an influential kind of group counseling called *hōza* ("*dharma* circle"). Reiyūkai suffered many difficulties after the war, but by the 1970s the movement was again an established part of Japanese spiritual life, inculcating conservative social values. [*See also* Reiyūkai Kyōdan.]

Risshō Kōseikai. Many new Nichiren movements arose out of the decentralized, charismatic matrix of Reiyūkai. By far the most successful was Risshō Kōseikai ("society establishing righteousness and harmony"), founded in 1938 by Niwano Nikkyō (b. 1906) and a housewife, Naganuma Myōkō (1889–1957), both former members of Reiyūkai. Risshō Kōseikai includes healing and divination practices and *hōza* group counseling; it presents an eclectic form of Nichiren Buddhism. After World War II Niwano attained international recognition for his activity in worldwide peace and interreligious organizations. [*See also* Risshō Kōseikai.]

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ROBERT S. ELLWOOD

NEW TESTAMENT. *See under* Biblical Literature.

NEWTON, ISAAC (1642–1727), widely regarded as the greatest scientist of all time. Born prematurely (at Woolsthorpe, Lincolnshire, England), Newton developed into a physically weak, lonely, unhappy child; he was also an indifferent student until an encounter with a school bully roused him to excel. In 1661, he entered Trinity College at Cambridge University, where he showed no distinction until he came under the influence of Isaac Barrow, a professor of mathematics. A man of great insight, Barrow was the first to recognize Newton's genius; in fact, he resigned his professorship so that Newton, at age twenty-six, could be appointed to it.

Shortly after Newton graduated in 1665, the university was closed because of plague, and he had to return to Woolsthorpe. There he spent eighteen months in studies that laid the foundation for much of his later work. He discovered the binomial theorem, differential and integral calculus, the theory of color, several other important theorems in mathematics, and the celebrated law of gravitation—which for nearly 250 years was regarded as the epitome and exemplar of scientific laws of nature.

Newton's interests were both mathematical and experimental. He invented a reflecting telescope to free telescopes from the chromatic aberration of refracting lenses. He presented a small version of his telescope to the Royal Society, which honored him by electing him a fellow when he was only thirty. In 1672, when Newton published his new theory of light and color—including the experiments showing that white light can be separated into its component colors by a prism—the society was bombarded with letters disputing his conclusions. Some of the correspondents were scientists of note, among them Robert Hooke and Christiaan Huygens. The controversy affected Newton greatly and, thereafter, he tended to withdraw from the public eye. Though he had vowed after the controversy not to publish any further discoveries, he did, in fact, continue to publish.

Newton conceived a proprietary interest in every subject he investigated; there was hardly any achievement of his creative scientific life that was unaccompanied by acrimony and quarreling. This was largely owing to a great deal of paranoia and self-doubt in Newton's personality. His ego needed to be continually bolstered by the praise and admiration of others, a trait that may have had its cause in Newton's humble origins—his father was a yeoman, a fact that always made Newton uneasy and that he tried to obscure by inventing grandiose genealogies for himself.

In 1684, Newton received a visit from the astronomer Edmond Halley, who consulted him about some mathematical points concerning gravitational attraction (Halley and Hooke had been working on this problem for some time). To Halley's great surprise, Newton replied that he had already made these calculations many years earlier, but that he could not find the appropriate papers. Halley urged Newton to recalculate, using his original theorems, and to prepare a manuscript for the Royal Society. Halley showed enormous tact and good judgment in not letting Hooke's claim to the inverse-square law of gravitation and the attendant acrimony between Hooke and Newton vitiate the whole project. Financed by moneys from Halley's personal funds, Newton's work was finally published in 1687 under the title *Philosophia naturalis principia mathematica*.

Newton's *Principia*, as it has come to be known, is justifiably regarded as the greatest scientific work ever produced. It integrated into one coherent whole diverse data and mathematical principles concerning the motion of material particles and gravitation. As the publication of Copernicus's *De revolutionibus* in 1543 marked the beginning of the great scientific revolution, the publication of the *Principia* marked its completion and the beginning of the modern scientific age.

Indeed, Newton is often described as the inaugurator of the "age of reason." Alexander Pope hailed him thus:

> Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
> God said, let Newton be! and all was light.

And many were other accolades from philosophers, theologians, and poets, although few of them ever read the *Principia* or had the mathematical ability to comprehend it, as the philosopher John Locke confessed about himself. For his own and the immediately succeeding generation, Newton epitomized reason, sound judgment, and even saintly goodness. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century, poets like Blake, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Keats had vilified Newton, identifying him—and the science that he had helped create—with the forces of mechanization that were despiritualizing the cosmos. Blake, for example, regarded Newton, along with Locke and Francis Bacon, as a member of an "infernal trinity" that had a satanic influence on "Al-

bion," by which Blake meant unspoiled England, or archetypal man.

In 1693, Newton suffered a sort of nervous breakdown. He had represented the university as a member of Parliament since 1689, and he had devotedly attended to his mother during her final illness, and these responsibilities must have weighed on him. After his recovery, he resumed his life in London, where he became warden and later master of the Royal Mint. In 1703 he became president of the Royal Society, a post he used, often unscrupulously, in his various and many feuds, including one with G. W. Leibniz over the question as to which of them had first discovered differential calculus. He published his *Opticks*, written in a very different style from the *Principia*, in 1704; it was actually read not only by his scientific colleagues but also by other intellectuals. He was knighted in 1705. Shortly before his death, he removed to the country air of the village of Kensington. He died there in 1727, without having requested last rites. He was buried alongside kings and princes in Westminster Abbey.

Throughout his life—and by no means only during his nervous breakdown, as some have maintained—Newton was highly interested in theological, chronological, and alchemical studies. It is estimated that he wrote some two million words on these subjects, a total far surpassing that of his writings in mathematics and physics. Much of this material, particularly that on alchemy, consists of the writings of others that Newton copied for his own use, but he also wrote books of his own on these subjects. It may even be true, as Newton himself seems to have hinted, that his real interest lay in a wide and comprehensive knowledge that he hoped to acquire through alchemy and theology, and that he viewed his scientific studies only as amusing diversions. Since he could not, in general, be accused of excessive humility, we may have to understand in another light a well-known remark he made toward the end of his life: "I do not know what I may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy, playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, while the great ocean of Truth lay all undiscovered before me."

Newton certainly believed in the *prisca sapienta*, an ancient wisdom that had existed among priest-scientists such as the Chaldeans in Babylonia, the brahmans in India, and Moses and Pythagoras among the Hebrews and the Greeks. He believed that this wisdom was now largely lost, that he, Newton, was one of an esoteric brotherhood extending back to ancient times, and that he was redisclosing this knowledge in a new form, more mathematical than metaphysical or mythological. "Newton was not the first of the age of reason," the economist John Maynard Keynes concluded after examining Newton's alchemical papers. "He was the last of the magicians, the last of the Babylonians and Sumerians, the last great mind which looked out on the visible and the intellectual world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than 10,000 years ago."

Newton was a staunch monotheist and strongly antitrinitarian. Perhaps owing to this, he never took holy orders and could not become the master of Trinity College. His antitrinitarian sentiment, however, was a dreadful secret that Newton tried desperately all his life to conceal. He himself often maintained the philosophical autonomy of nature and revelation, but for himself he certainly regarded his work in natural philosophy to be a gloria and a study of God's works. Future generations, in denigrating religion and exiling God from natural philosophy, were more influenced by the science and its mechanistic implications, a science of which he was the supreme representative and symbol, than by Newton's own example or beliefs. This trend would have horrified Newton, who felt an emotional, personal relationship with God. In fact, Newton himself would have wished to be regarded as a prophet of God.

[*For further information concerning the influence upon Newton of esoteric wisdom traditions, see* Alchemy, *article on* Renaissance Alchemy, *and* Rosicrucians.]

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NEW YEAR FESTIVALS. The concept of year, which is found in all higher cultures (as solar year or lunar year or some combination of the two), is not

known in all archaic cultures. Some cultures reckon only in periods of approximately six months; this is especially the case in tropical lands where seedtime and harvest come twice in the course of a single year. Even when the year is regarded as a basic division of time, the calculation is often based not (or not exclusively) on the sun and the moon but on the visibility of certain constellations; in tropical and subtropical areas, it is based with special frequency on the heliacal early rising of the Pleiades. The beginning of the year, or the "New Year," is often not a precise and fixed date that is astronomically determined (e.g., by equinoxes or solstices). Rather, it is a period that is determined by the annual vegetation cycle or, more generally, by climatic processes (passage from the dark period of the year to the bright, from the cold to the warm, from the stormy to the calm, from the dry to the rainy). Such periods are often accompanied by festivities, and when the interval between such festivities is approximately as long as a solar year we are justified in speaking of New Year festivals.

Even where the year is known as a unit of time, it does not necessarily follow that the years are counted and that a chronology exists. "It is true indeed of most primitive peoples . . . that they are well acquainted with . . . the concrete phenomenon of the year . . . as a single period of the seasonal variation, but do not reckon in years in this sense. That is to say, the year is by them empirically given but not limited in the abstract: above all it is not a calendarial and numerical quantity" (Nilsson, 1920, p. 90). Thus, in archaic cultures and in early high cultures the importance of New Year festivals is not, or is only in small measure, found in the fact that they are measures of time; the principal function of such ceremonies is to ensure, during a critical transitional period, a renewal of life and the life force. In fact, in many instances they even assume the form of a symbolic new creation out of chaos. [*See* Chaos.]

While New Year ceremonies vary widely from culture to culture, their meaning is essentially concerned with the phenomenon of transition or passage in its two aspects of "elimination" and "inauguration." What is old, exhausted, weakened, inferior, and harmful is to be eliminated, and what is new, fresh, powerful, good, and healthy is to be introduced and ensured. The first aspect finds expression in ceremonies of dissociation, purification, destruction, and so on. These involve washing, fasting, putting off or destroying old clothing, quenching fires, as well as the expulsion of sicknesses and evil powers (demons) through cries, noisemaking, and blows, or through the dispatch of an animal or human being on which are loaded the sins of the previous period of time. The ceremonies may also reintroduce chaos through the dissolution of the social order and the suspension of taboos in force at other times, and, in some cases, through the election of a temporary pseudo-king. The conflict between the old and the new time is also symbolized by ceremonial battles and by masquerades (in which the demons to be expelled or the creative ancestors of the primordial time may be represented). [*See* Masks.] In addition, there is often a temporary suspension of the division between the world of the living and the world of the dead, with a return of the latter to the houses of the living, where they receive sacrifices and food but from which they are ceremoniously dismissed at the end of the festal period. The second and positive aspect of the passage from old to new is to be seen in the donning of new clothes, the lighting of a new fire, and the drawing of fresh water, in green branches and other symbols of life, in initiations (reception of young people into the cult community), and in orgiastic festive joy that leads to many kinds of excesses: immoderate eating, drinking, and dancing and, often, sexual orgies (these are to be regarded not only as reintroduction of chaotic conditions but also as an attempt at the forcible augmentation of the life forces). In agrarian cultures there is often a suspension of taboos at the new harvest and the renewal of food reserves. Only rarely, however, are all these elements found conjoined. In any case, a purely phenomenological approach is inadequate and can even be misleading, since it presumes a fictitious universality. A phenomenological consideration of the traits common to New Year festivals must therefore be supplemented by a detailed examination of the form they have taken in the context of particular cultures. This kind of detailed analysis is extensively provided in works by Vittorio Lanternari (1959, 1976).

Archaic Cultures. In most archaic cultures, New Year ceremonies are a dramatic representation of occurrences in the primordial time and, more specifically, of the "fondazione degli alimenti" or the establishment of the manner of obtaining food, which is recorded in the myths about the primordial time. To this symbolic recreation of the established order is added the concern with the expulsion of the unfavorable period of the year and the inauguration of the favorable period.

Hunting and food-gathering cultures. In most hunting and food-gathering cultures New Year ceremonies take place at a time when food is beginning to be scarce. In Australia this is usually toward the end of the dry period (in many parts of Australia the rainy season begins in October, in other parts in December). The San of the Kalahari Desert in southern Africa also conduct their New Year ceremonies at the beginning of the rainy season. Among the Selk'nam (in the Tierra del Fuego archipelago) and the Andaman islanders the ceremonies focus chiefly on banishing the bad (cold or stormy) sea-

son of the year; elsewhere the emphasis is on inaugurating the good season with its abundant food (as in the ceremonies of the Australian Aborigines, which aim at an increase in certain species of animals). In the arctic climate of the Inuit (Eskimo), hunting (which consists chiefly of the slaying of marine mammals) is impossible during the winter months; these months are instead a time of intense ritual activity that reaches its climax at the winter solstice. Among the Inuit, religious exaltation finds expression in shamanistic activity and especially, as with hunters and food-collectors generally, in dancing. These dances represent in dramatic form the events of the primordial time, that is, the deeds of the ancestors and culture heroes. Unrestrained eating and drinking is not to be found at these feasts of the hunters and gatherers, and sexual orgies are very rare. Such orgies do occur among some Western Inuit tribes, but their New Year festivals clearly show the influence of the fishing cultures of the American Indians of the Northwest Coast. Among Australian Aborigines sexual orgies are connected with initiations, but these are not part of New Year festivals. The belief in collective return of the dead from the sea is usually not found except among some few Inuit tribes, and, in this case, the form of the belief is connected with their manner of life as hunters of marine mammals, a connection found also in the belief systems of the fishing cultures. Finally, among hunting and food-gathering cultures, the sacrifice of firstlings is not part of New Year celebrations (as it is among nomadic herdsmen and cultivators). Where sacrifices of firstlings are customary, they are offered immediately after a successful hunt.

Fishing cultures. The term *fishing cultures* is here used in a broad sense, to include those peoples who hunt chiefly marine mammals or even other sea animals, such as tortoises. Since the peoples in question are sedentary inhabitants of islands and coasts, they are also often agriculturalists, where climatic conditions allow. But where the character of experience is determined primarily by the group's relation to the sea, this relation manifests itself in the New Year festival. Thus even the time for the New Year festival is determined by the condition of the sea; the festival may occur at the solemn inauguration of the fishing period (when, for example, certain fish or other marine animals appear in great numbers) or at the close of this period (when fishing becomes impossible for a long time because of storms or excessive cold). Among the American Indians of the Northwest Coast (the Kwakiutl, Tsimshian, and others), the ceremonies take place when the salmon enter the rivers in great schools and the salmon catch begins; during the ceremonies certain parts of the catch are thrown back into the water (the same is done among some Inuit tribes of the Northwest Coast). Similar ceremonies are conducted by the coastal Koriak and coastal Chukchi, Siberian peoples who live chiefly by hunting whale and seal, but these ceremonies are conducted at the end of the hunting season.

An important element in the New Year festivals of fishing cultures is the belief in a collective return of the dead, especially of those drowned at sea; this idea is especially important among peoples of the Northern Hemisphere and it has left its mark on European folklore. Where sacrifices of the animals caught are offered (these are to be regarded in part as sacrifices of firstlings), they are addressed either to the sea as such or to the dead; in the former case a belief in a return of the animals to life is also of some importance at times.

Nomadic herding cultures. The special characteristics of New Year festivals among cattle-breeding nomads are most clearly to be seen in northern Eurasia, where the distinction between the cold and warm seasons of the year is very pronounced. These peoples, whether breeders of reindeer (Saami, Samoyeds, Tunguz, Koriak, Chukchi) or breeders of horses, sheep, and cattle (Altai Tatars, Abakan Tatars, Yakuts, Mongols), celebrate their New Year festivals in the spring when the vegetation revives, the animals produce their young, and milk and milk products are abundant. At this time sacrifices of firstlings are offered to the higher powers and especially to the supreme heavenly being in gratitude for the increase of the flocks; these offerings consist both of young animals and of bloodless victims (milk and milk products, such as koumiss, an alcoholic drink made of mare's milk); often, too, the rite of bloodless dedication of animals is practiced. Festive joy finds expression also in abundant meals and in sporting competitions that represent in symbolic form the victory of summer over winter.

In tropical regions the shift of seasons often occurs in a less striking way, and animals often produce young throughout the entire year. For this reason New Year festivals of the type found in northern Eurasia are rarely found among the herding peoples of Africa, except for certain festivals that occur before the beginning of the rainy season. But in subtropical regions, for example, in Southwest Asia, springtime festivals are found, or at least traces of them can be seen, as among the Arabs and in the Israelite Pesaḥ.

It can be said of all nomadic herding cultures that they do not have a belief in the regular collective return of the dead and that sexual orgies too are almost unknown among them

Primitive cultivation cultures. According to Lanternari (1976), three types of agrarian cultures are to be distinguished: (1) primitive cultivators (tuber cultivators) without social stratification, (2) advanced cultivators with improved methods of tilling and a social strat-

ification, and (3) grain growers, who already represent a transition to the high cultures. A vivid example of the New Year festivals of primitive tuber cultivators is the Milamala festival of the Trobriand Islanders of Melanesia, which Bronislaw Malinowski, in particular, described in great detail. It has its foundation in mythology and is celebrated for an entire lunar month, that is, in August–September when the harvest of yams, which are the principal food, has been completed and there is thus an abundance of food. During the entire month, work in the produce gardens is strictly forbidden; the time is spent in singing, dancing, eating copious meals, and sexual orgies. During this period the spirits of the dead enter the village and are offered food; at the end of the festive period they are ceremonially expelled.

Festivals of a similar character are widespread among the tribal peoples of Melanesia (Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, New Britain, New Ireland, New Guinea, New Caledonia), where the cultivation of tuberous plants everywhere provides the staple foods. Typical elements in these festivals are reverence for the earth (as agent of fruitfulness and dwelling place of the dead); the collective return of the dead to whom sacrifices of first fruits from the new harvests are offered; and the orgy in its various forms (copious meals, dances, sexual abandon). The collective return of the spirits of the dead and the sacrifice of first fruits from the harvest are also documented outside Melanesia (in Africa, Indonesia, and elsewhere). In some parts of Melanesia, cultic societies (of a more or less secret character) play a role in the New Year festivals. Other Melanesian tribes have special ceremonies not found in the Milamala festival, for example, initiatory celebrations, the appearance of masked dancers in dramatic presentations, and the slaying of large numbers of pigs. Moreover, the "Festival of Pigs" frequently takes a form in which the enhancement of social prestige plays a special role. While this particular festival is celebrated not annually but at longer intervals, there are nonetheless many indications that it was originally connected with the New Year festivals.

Sexual orgies, regarded as a means of intensifying the life force and promoting the fertility of plant life, are also found as part of the New Year celebrations among more highly developed agrarian cultures.

Advanced cultivation cultures. The culture of the Polynesians may be taken as a typical example of advanced cultivation cultures. Polynesian culture is based chiefly on the cultivation of the breadfruit tree; on some islands this is supplemented by taro or sweet potatoes, for which irrigation is used. Because of the climate there is no sharp contrast between the seasons of the years and between periods of abundance and dearth. Surplus agricultural production has made possible the development of a hierarchic social order, often with a sacral or even divinized king at its apex. The upper classes are not directly involved in agricultural production but exercise other functions, particularly ritual ones. For this reason the purpose of the New Year ceremonies (which do not occur at the same time on all the islands) is less to ensure the food needed for life and much more to validate the social order: the first fruits of the harvest are not offered to the returning dead as a whole but to the kings and the chiefs (who then often make a further distribution of them) as well as to the royal ancestors and the gods; the latter are often of an agrarian-solar type. Ceremonial battles take place, and at times a symbolic deposition or slaying of the king, followed by his reenthronement. Unrestrained dancing and sexual orgies are often part of the fertility cult, as they are among primitive cultivators. The New Year festival shows comparable forms with a similar content in various cultures that combine cultivation of the soil and cattle breeding and that also have a hierarchic social structure, for example, among southeastern Bantu peoples, in West Africa, and in Madagascar.

Grain-growing cultures. The New Year festival in grain-growing cultures has much in common with the festival as found in other agrarian cultures; there are, however, distinguishing features that can be seen among rice farmers (ancient Japan, ancient China) and maize growers (North America and Mesoamerica). The contrast between the cold, dark, and unfruitful and the warm, bright, and fertile periods of the year is very marked (this opposition accounts, for example, for the great importance of new fire as a symbol of light in the New Year ceremonies—something also found among nonagrarian peoples of the north such as the Inuit and northern Asiatics). In grain-growing cultures the sun, the influence of which on the growth of cereals is directly visible, is of paramount importance; not so among tuber cultivators, who ascribe fertility directly to the earth and the dead. (The great importance of the solar complex among the Polynesians can be traced back to Asian elements in their culture; a further significant similarity with East Asia is the importance of the sacral ruler for the general prosperity.) A dominant theme in the myths of grain growers is the marriage of heaven (the sun) and earth. In some grain-growing cultures the New Year festivals are connected with the solstices, in others with the revival of the vegetation in the spring or with the conclusion of the harvest.

Cultures of the Ancient Near East and of the Mediterranean World. The influence of the mythical ideas and corresponding rituals of the grain-growing cultures

reaches into the agrarian and urban cultures of the ancient Near East and of the Mediterranean region. In these cultures, however, the ceremonies are enriched with numerous new elements. First, the vegetative cycle and its accompanying round of agricultural labors determine the demarcations of the year; however, there is also a more refined astronomical observation. Thus, the beginning of the year is determined partly by climate and vegetation (therefore the year begins either in the spring or in the autumn), partly by the equinoxes, and, more rarely, by the solstices (as in Phoenicia and Syria). In Ugarit there seems to have been a cultic year that began in the autumn, and a "civic" year that began in the spring. In Mesopotamia the Akitu festival among the Sumerians was originally an autumn festival marking the resumption of field work after the summer drought. [*See* Akitu.] The Babylonian New Year festival (Sumerian, Zagmuk; Akkadian, Zagmukku), also called Akitu, which was celebrated in the spring at the beginning of the month Nisan, represented the fusion of two originally distinct festivals, one in the spring, the other in the fall. The Iranian New Year festival (Nawrūz), celebrated at the time of the spring equinox, also replaced an older custom of starting the year in the fall. [*See* Nawrūz.] In pre-Islamic Arabia, the year began in the fall; in only a few northern frontier areas was there a shift to a year beginning in the spring. We do not know when the year began in the ancient cultures of southern Arabia; in modern times we find there the year beginning sometimes in the spring, sometimes in the fall.

As for the ceremonies of the New Year festivals in the Near Eastern and Mediterranean cultures, members of the "cult history" school (known also as the "myth and ritual" school) delineated a "pattern" for the urban New Year festival that includes the following elements: "The dramatic representation of the dead and resurrection of the god; the recitation or symbolic representation of the myth of the creation; the ritual combat, in which the triumph of the god over his enemies was depicted; the sacred marriage; the triumphal procession, in which the king played the part of the god, followed by a train of lesser gods or visiting deities" (A. M. Johnson in Hooke, 1958, p. 226). Judah B. Segal (1963) brings together what is known about New Year ceremonies in ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Babylonia, among the Hittites, and in Syria, Phoenicia, and Arabia to derive components of a general pattern:

> The New Year is fixed by the calendar. In all communities we find a ritual going-forth from the city to the open country. In all are rites of purification, which include fasting and the wearing of new clothes, processions, the exchange of gifts, sacrifices, and feasting. In some communities there is a solemn recital of a myth of Creation, in several the sacred marriage is enacted. Most include the temporal removal of conventional social restrictions. The New Year appears to be an appropriate time for the dedication of a temple.
>
> (Segal, 1963, pp. 125–126)

The Israelite New Year festival is not to be derived from this urban type, which supposedly split into a spring festival and an autumn festival. We must suppose rather that the Israelite festivals contained independent elements derived from the nomadic period and that, in part, they were remodeled Canaanite festivals (through which Mesopotamian influences were indirectly at work) that were taken over after the settlement. The Canaanite influence is especially apparent in the New Year festival in the autumn; nomadic traditions, on the other hand, are reflected in the spring festival (Pesaḥ) at the beginning of the year. The very details that give the Pesaḥ ritual its specific character are the ones that do not fit into the general pattern that has been presented by Segal. In Arabia, the pre-Islamic (nomadic) spring festival lives on in changed form in the *ʿumrah* of Mecca, while the pre-Islamic (agrarian) autumn festival can be seen in the *ḥajj*.

Spring and autumn festivals that mark the beginning of the year (or at least critical turning points during the year) are also to be regarded, in the folklore of North Africa and the southern European countries, as survivals of a common ancient Mediterranean agrarian culture. Among the common features are sexual rituals as a means of promoting fertility (although today these have for the most part been reduced to symbolic actions or purely verbal manifestations), masks as representations of the returning dead, and the role played by a temporary sacral "agrarian king."

The Christian feast of Easter is connected with the Israelite Pesaḥ and, as the feast of the resurrection of Christ, has its own specific salvation-historical content. In addition, however, it contains (partly in the official rites of the Roman Catholic and Eastern churches, partly in popular customs) numerous details that derive from archaic cultures and the cultures of the ancient Near East; these details symbolize a transition and a new beginning, and to this extent make it possible to regard Easter as the real Christian New Year festival.

[*For separate treatments of themes associated with New Year festivals, see* Dragons; Hieros Gamos; *and* Light and Darkness. *See also* Seasonal Ceremonies.]

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Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

NGAI, whose name is sometimes written *Mogai*, is the high god of the Kikuyu (Gikuyu), Maasai, and Kamba peoples of the Kenya Highlands of East Africa. The creator and giver of all things, Ngai is the one high god. His dwelling place is the sky, but he is understood to visit several places on earth, mountains or sacred groves, where prayers and sacrifices are traditionally offered to him. The Kikuyu address Ngai as Mwene-Nyaga ("possessor of brightness"). Christian missionaries have adopted this same term as the gloss for the word *lord*. Mount Kenya, called Kere-Nyaga ("mountain of brightness"), is Ngai's special dwelling place on earth. In addition to Mount Kenya, there are other mountains on which he is said to dwell; furthermore, certain large, sacred trees are often chosen as places of prayer and sacrifice to Ngai. On significant occasions, prayers are offered facing each of the four sacred mountains at the four cardinal directions.

Natural phenomena are also often taken to be signs of Ngai's presence or action, and he expresses his emotions through them. Thunder and lightning are understood as Ngai's preparation to move from one place or another. Thunder is sometimes referred to as Ngai "cracking his joints" when he is about to chase his enemies or punish evildoers. He cannot be seen, but nature can indicate his presence or movement.

Like many African high gods, Ngai is not concerned with ordinary day-to-day events but rather with moments of communal importance or crisis, such as planting, harvesting, epidemic, or rites of passage. A person does not invoke Ngai on behalf of himself or another unless he is in great need or distress. Chiefs or elders are considered the proper people to approach Ngai, and he is customarily invoked by them on behalf of the whole clan. The hierarchical nature of Kikuyu society and religion can be illustrated not only by the fact that Ngai is often invoked by these elders as "Reverend Elder" but also that Ngai is approached only after other, lesser spiritual powers, such as those of the ancestors, have been tried and found wanting. Hierarchical relations also characterize Kikuyu social or legal practices, which exhaust local courts or elders before moving up the social hierarchy to solve local problems or disputes.

Ngai is approached not only verbally through prayer but often also through an accompanying offering and animal sacrifice. Sacrifice is always offered in cases of communal crisis or disaster, such as drought or epidemic. Home-brewed beer and milk may also be offered to Ngai (as well as to the ancestors). The sacrifice is consumed by those who attend it (elders, prepubescent children, and postmenopausal women), while a portion is burned on the fire for Ngai.

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A splendid introduction to the traditional life of the Kikuyu is *Facing Mount Kenya* (1938; New York, 1962) by Jomo Kenyatta, first prime minister and first president of Kenya.

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NGARINYIN RELIGION. *See* Ungarinyin Religion.

NGUKURR RELIGION. The Aboriginal township of Ngukurr is located on the remote Roper River in southeastern Arnhem Land in Australia's Northern Territory. Its population, which in the 1970s fluctuated between three hundred fifty and five hundred, consists of the descendants of the Aboriginal tribes of the lower and middle Roper River and the adjacent coast, mainly the Alawa, Mara, Ngalagan, Ngandi, Nunggabuyu, and Wandarang. The people of Ngukurr still retain close spiritual and physical ties to their tribal land.

The Setting. The Arnhem Land region has an area of about ninety-five thousand square kilometers. It was set aside in 1931 by the Australian government as a reserve

for the Aborigines and remained as such until 1977. Following the passage of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976, the ownership of Arnhem Land was transferred from the Australian government to various Aboriginal bodies.

Arnhem Land, and in particular southeastern Arnhem Land, is physically remote and economically underdeveloped. The only productive enterprises in the area around Ngukurr are beef-cattle raising and fishing. The country to the south and west of Ngukurr is occupied by large cattle stations (ranches), varying in size from one thousand to seven thousand square kilometers.

Prior to 1969 Ngukurr was known as Roper River Mission and was administered by the Church Missionary Society, an evangelical missionary body within the Anglican Church of Australia. The Aborigines were residents of the mission settlement and lived under the control and direction of the mission staff.

The administrative structure and political control of Ngukurr has undergone sweeping changes beginning late in 1968, when Ngukurr became a government settlement run by the Welfare Division of the Northern Territory Administration. The administration of the town of Ngukurr was transferred to a locally elected council in 1975. Government grants finance the town's budget and the major part of the people's incomes with employment and social service payments. Ngukurr has few productive activities and a very high rate of chronic unemployment.

Religion and the Mission. The Aboriginal community at Ngukurr operates within two religious universes. One derives from the indigenous traditions of the Aboriginal people who make up the present-day community, and the other from the people's subjugation by Europeans, in particular the Christian missionaries.

Christianity and indigenous religion today have an uneasy relationship within the community. Each tolerates the existence of the other, but they are considered as separate. There is no intellectual cross-fertilization, though to an extent they share practitioners and believers.

The structure of Christianity at Ngukurr in the early 1970s reflects its mission origin. From 1908 until 1968, the Church Missionary Society integrated Christianity and social control: Aboriginal residents were able to gain social preference through participation in church activities and nonparticipation provoked negative sanctions. Participation in the church declined dramatically following the transfer of secular control to the Australian government. By 1970 the active Aboriginal congregation was reduced to less than twenty adults, mostly older men and women who had a long history of residence at the mission.

The main point of contact between the local church and the indigenous religion in 1970 was through the composition of the church's lay council. The adult male members were all active participants in the indigenous religious realm. Some, including two of the lay preachers, were leaders in the organization of indigenous cult performances. These men wore their dual positions lightly. As councillors they participated in the church's decision-making process and occasionally attended services at the church, but they fulfilled their main religious role within the indigenous religion. However, their political positions were maintained through participation in both realms.

The Indigenous Realm. The people of Ngukurr, as Aborigines, see themselves and are seen by others as culturally distinct from the mainstream of Australian society, and this distinctiveness is considered a positive value that encapsulates a traditional conception of society.

The conduct of religious cults is the main arena of social life that appears fully contained by this traditional worldview. The social strictures found in the cults, together with the Ngukurr kinship system, provide the framework for social relations in those areas not yet entirely subordinated to the non-Aboriginal world. Today these manifold relations have two main foci: (1) the right to make decisions about and to participate in the religious cults and (2) the distribution of rights and access to the land.

Aboriginal religion is articulated around the relations between groups of people and the land that their forebears occupied and exploited (and that the Aborigines are again seeking to occupy). The foci of the Aboriginal religious systems are supernatural, totemic beings that may or may not be representations of natural species. The more important totemic powers in the Ngukurr pantheon are the *nagaran* (a supernatural spirit usually represented as a male giant), the plain kangaroo, various species of monitor lizard (goannas), rain and lightning, the *gilyiring-gilyiring* (which takes various forms, though it is most commonly glossed as a woman or a mermaid), and various species of snakes and fish.

At their most innovative, they are world-creative forces that transform an unfeatured landscape into its known social forms. They pass through the country creating places, leaving their paths, establishing ceremonies, and meeting and establishing structured relations with other powers. Different parts of the country are associated with different powers or ensembles of powers [*For further discussion of this phenomenon in Australian religion, see* Dreaming, The.]

The totemic powers organize religious life by bonding particular groups of people with particular sites, paths,

or tracts of land. They also articulate the relations between groups that are linked to different sites and tracts of land made by a particular totemic power or constellation of powers. This is made more complex by the fact that people are also related through the interconnections between their different totemic powers. There is in Aboriginal religion, therefore, an intricate interweaving of interests that structures and spreads sociality. Ideally this balances the contradictory tendencies of parochial and universalizing interests.

The Development of Ngukurr Religious Practice. In their traditional habitat and across their own countries, people held ceremonies at the sites being celebrated, but when colonists appropriated the land ceremonies had to be held away from these places.

Mission authorities actively discouraged ceremonies within the mission area, though they continued to be held with difficulty. The mission's attitude prevented ceremonies at Ngukurr until mission policy changed in the mid-1950s. Up to the 1950s Ngukurr was only one of a number of population centers (the others being cattle stations) that shared the cult life of the Roper area. This cult life, richer than that now performed at Ngukurr, included four secret male cults, the Yabuduruwa, Gunabibi (called Kunapipi elsewhere), Balgin, and Maddaiin. An elaborate circumcision ritual and secret women's cults were also part of this religious practice. [*For detailed discussion of Gunabibi (Kunapipi), see* Australian Religions, *overview article.*]

All the ceremonies organized by Ngukurr men after 1957 were held in the vicinity of Ngukurr. This occurred alongside the decline in the attendance of Ngukurr men at ceremonies elsewhere in the region, the dropping of the Maddaiin and the Balgin cults from the men's repertoire, and the abbreviation of the circumcision rites. Performance of the women's cults had ceased before this time. Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s about eight Yabuduruwa ceremonies and six Gunabibi ceremonies were held at Ngukurr. Each was associated with one or two of the nine "estate-group territories" (for an explanation of the term *estate*, see below). I have described elsewhere (Bern, 1979) the changes that brought about the establishment of a specific Ngukurr society. The changes during the 1950s resulted in the appearance of a ritual life specific to Ngukurr and of a distinct set of Ngukurr religious properties.

The Cults. Indigenous religious practice at Ngukurr centers on the conduct of the two cults of the Yabuduruwa and the Gunabibi. These cults celebrate, with great complexity, the relations between people, between people and the totemic powers, between people and the land, and between the land, people, and the totemic powers. Intergroup relations are specified through the identification of particular kinship-based groups with particular territories. Such groups are called *estate groups*. Relations between people are also specified through sociocentric categories. Thus patrilineal moiety and semi-moiety affiliations are ritualized.

Moieties and semimoieties. At the most inclusive level the organization of the Yabuduruwa and Gunabibi cults is based on the division of society into two patrilineal moieties, within which context people's positions and actions are defined. People who are related through their fathers to the totemic powers represented in a cult are called *mingeringgi*, and they have a certain set of rights and obligations. The people of the opposite moiety, who are related to the powers through their mothers and fathers' mothers, are called *junggaiyi*, and they have a set of rights and obligations complementary to those of the *mingeringgi*.

The *mingeringgi* are the celebrants and the human representation of a cult. They bear the responsibility for any errors or damage to the cult's artifacts or integrity. The *junggaiyi* care for and organize the emblems, paraphernalia, and performances of the cults. The Yabuduruwa cult celebrates the estates and totemic powers of the people of the Yiridja moiety and they are its *mingeringgi*. The Gunabibi cult celebrates the estates and totemic powers of the people of the Dua moiety and they are its *mingeringgi*.

The Yabuduruwa and the Gunabibi are also semimoiety cults. At Ngukurr the semimoieties belonging to the Yiridja moiety are called Budal and Guyal. Those belonging to the Dua moiety are called Mambali and Murungun. The semimoiety division is utilized in a number of ways in the two cults.

The totemic powers and the sites represented in the cults are identified with one or another of the semimoieties as well as with a particular moiety. The *nagaran* estate-group territories are celebrated in the Yabuduruwa cult. This power is associated with the Yiridja moiety and the Guyal semimoiety. Another Yabuduruwa-cult estate-group territory is the Plain Kangaroo territory, which is also identified with the Yiridja moiety, but which is further identified with the Budal and not the Guyal semimoiety. Similarly, the *gilyiring-gilyiring*, which is celebrated in the Gunabibi cult, is associated with the Dua moiety and the Mambali semimoiety at Ngukurr, while the king brown snake is identified with the Dua moiety and the Murungun semimoiety.

At the moiety level both semimoieties of Dua are *mingeringgi* for the Gunabibi. However, there are times when the semimoieties are structurally separated and only one qualifies as *mingeringgi*. The other semimoiety of the Dua moiety then occupies a position called *dal-*

nyin (lit., "mother's mother"). The same applies for the Yiridja moiety in the context of the Yabuduruwa. The *dalnyin* have a largely supplementary role and can in certain circumstances act as both *mingeringgi* and *junggaiyi*.

In each of the cults there are important rites in which the two semimoieties of the *mingeringgi* moiety are separated and perform distinct segments. A striking example of this separation occurs in the Yabuduruwa ceremony; in parts of this ceremony, those in the opposite semimoiety (but the same moiety) to that of the ceremony initiators can assume the role of *junggaiyi* in the absence of appropriate senior *junggaiyi*.

The same separation of semimoieties does not occur within the *junggaiyi* category. Two of the most important reasons for this are the composition of the estate group, which includes *junggaiyi* from both semimoieties, and the importance of individual kinship ties. Ego-centered kinship relations are activated in the organization and conduct of the cults. For example, in the preparation of individual male performers particular tasks can be performed only by cross-cousins and others only by a mother's brother. One's cross-cousins and mother's brothers would normally be found in different semimoieties of the opposite moiety.

The estates. The cults also have a narrower perspective in the celebration and reinforcement of social relations. The social features of the landscape are established by the movements of the totemic powers and the sites that they created. Particular groups have special attachment to and responsibility for parts of the landscape associated with a particular power or ensemble of powers. These are the ritual "estates." The groups associated with each estate have a complex structure.

The core of the "estate group" is composed of people who are related to the estate through their fathers. Individual members of the core group have names that are taken from the names of features in the estate, and collectively the core is known by the name of the estate. Other members of the estate group are people who trace their relationship to the estate through their mothers, their fathers' mothers, or their mothers' mothers. In the context of the estate, the ones who trace their relationship through their fathers are the estate's *mingeringgi;* those whose relationship is through their mothers or fathers' mothers are the *junggaiyi;* and those people related through their mothers' mothers are the *dalnyin.*

A major emphasis in both the Yabuduruwa and the Gunabibi cults is the celebration of particular estates and their totemic powers, in ceremonies initiated by the senior men. The occasion is often to commemorate a recently deceased senior core-member (no less than two years and preferably no more than ten years deceased). However, the reason may simply be that this group has not had a ceremony for its own estate for a long time. Their ownership is acknowledged by the initiated core members, who take the lead in most of the performances of the ceremony, and by the organizers of the ceremony, who are the estate's senior *junggaiyi.* The main dance ground and associated structures are built to dimensions that are specific to the estate.

Estates are specifically celebrated in certain rites held in both cults. Within these rites *mingeringgi* perform individual dances, wearing designs that represent a totemic power and site from their estate. The dances, designs, and paraphernalia worn by the performers, as well as songs and myths that particularly concern the estate, are part of the estate's *gulinga,* a Ngukurr term which encompasses all aspects of an estate's religious property. A group without a *gulinga* has no ceremony, though they may still have an estate.

Control and participation. Both the Yabuduruwa and the Gunabibi are cults of initiated men; the most important parts of a Yabuduruwa or Gunabibi ceremony's performance, its paraphernalia, and the knowledge it conveys are kept secret from the women, novices, and children of the community (as well as all other uninitiated people). The men also control the organization and most aspects of the conduct of the ceremonies, and perform most of the cult's rites.

Women, however, play an indispensable, though subordinate, part in both the organization and the conduct of the cults. They prepare food on behalf of the male participants, and they have responsibility for the public part of the ceremonial precinct, which is a cleared area within the total ceremonial precinct and which is located about half a kilometer from the main ceremonial ground. In the Yabuduruwa cult they also have the care of the novices, who remain at the public precinct before they are taken to the main performing ground to observe the men's performance. Women also participate as actors in some of the central rites in both ceremonies.

While the two cults together impart symmetry to Ngukurr's religious practice, there are significant differences between them. Unlike the Yabuduruwa, the Gunabibi includes song cycles in its performance. The training of novices is more thoroughly pursued in the Gunabibi than it is in the Yabuduruwa. In the former, dogma prescribes that novices are withdrawn from the community for the duration of the ceremony and put in the charge of initiated young men. However, at Ngukurr, this is usually modified to the extent that novices remain within the male area of the ceremonial precinct for the duration of a session, which usually covers a weekend of performances. In the Yabuduruwa cult, by

contrast, the novices remain within the community and are only obliged to attend the ceremony for the duration of each performance. Even then they are kept at the women's area during the period of preparation for a performance.

The Gunabibi cult emphasizes social control of the emerging generation of males through the separation of novices from the secular world and their subjection to adult male discipline, while the Yabuduruwa cult lays less emphasis on such a *rite de passage*. The Yabuduruwa's central concern is with the dramatization of exclusion and of the hierarchical order of society. The former has its highlight in the Goanna Tail rite, in which women, the main actors, are led to the men's secret dance ground at night. They keep their heads bowed. They approach a fire on the ground and light rolls of paperbark and then return to the women's precinct. (The rolls of paperbark symbolize the tails of goannas, which are a central motif of the Yabuduruwa. The goanna tails are an important phallic representation and are also the most desired part of the goanna for eating.) If they were to raise their heads during their trip to the men's secret dance ground, the women could see the sacralia of the men. Kenneth Maddock offers a convincing interpretation of this rite as a dramatization of the exclusion of women from the cult's innermost secrets (1982, pp. 133–134).

The issue of hierarchy is encapsulated in the final rite of the Ngukurr Yabuduruwa cult, performed after the ceremony has been officially concluded. The senior men return to the main ceremony ground, taking with them some specially chosen younger initiated men. They give as the reason for their return the need to clean up the ceremony ground. However, a rite is performed there by the two most senior *mingeringgi*, which is witnessed only by this select group. During the preparation for this rite the men discuss any infractions that have occurred during the course of the ceremony and decide what, if anything, they will do about such infractions.

Religion and the Community. The continuity of Ngukurr religion, in the form outlined here, is not certain. The influences at work have contradictory effects. The rapid changes of recent years have not yet been fully worked out and externally imposed changes are still taking place. One hope, that European authority would be replaced by one based on traditional values, has not eventuated. For a while the Gunabibi cult was seen as a possible vehicle of social control, especially of the teenage males. This hope has not been realized and even the rhetoric of this movement had disappeared by the mid-1970s.

People continue to believe in the bond between themselves and their land, and the myth and structures represented in the cults still mediate these beliefs. The legislation on land rights has given this recent material support, and this, at least, can be seen as supportive of the indigenous religion.

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NHIALIC is the name of the high god of the Dinka, a Nilotic people in the southern part of the Republic of the Sudan. The word *nhialic* connote both the notion of

"up" and of "sky," but this being is also referred to as "creator" and "father." Nhialic dwells in the sky but is not identified with it, although the Dinka conceive of approaching Nhialic as a "going up" to him, as in levitation or by climbing to the top of a mound or hillock to pray.

According to Dinka myth, the earth and the sky were originally joined or at least contiguous. The sky was so close to the earth (and thus Nhialic close to men) that a rope connected them, and humans could ascend to Nhialic freely. It was an idyllic time, in which Nhialic gave the first humans (Garang and Abuk) everything to satisfy their wants and, by means of the rope ladder, the means to make their requests known to him. However, Nhialic also specified how much man and woman were to eat, how they could move around (some versions of the myth relate that Nhialic enclosed mankind in a jar or pot), and how they should conduct themselves (formally, as in situations in which they must show respect). One day the woman, because of greed, took a pestle to pound millet. As she raised the pestle she struck Nhialic, who then withdrew and severed the rope between heaven and earth. While this separation brought mankind freedom, it also ended the golden age of Nhialic's direct protection and introduced suffering, work, and death.

As with Kwoth, the high god of the neighboring Nuer, Nhialic is conceived of in different ways—as a supreme being, as an activity, or through a manifestation as a lesser spiritual being—depending on the particular social context. All divinities among the Dinka, including *vath* (clan divinities) and *yeeth* (sky deities), manifest various degrees of *jok* ("spiritual power").

Nhialic now governs the destiny of the world from afar, dispensing punishment to the wicked and looking out for the Dinka (and the world) as a father looks out for the affairs of his children. As in a human social setting, the Dinka, as children of Nhialic, cannot always understand or fathom the ways of their father, Nhialic, but must submit to his will. Although men and women were bound and constrained when heaven and earth were joined and chose freedom, albeit accidentally, from Nhialic's domination, they are still dependent on Nhialic as long as there is suffering, sickness, and death in the world. Their relationship to divinity is ambiguous, and prayers at once implore Nhialic's aid and beg him to leave mankind alone.

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NICAEA, COUNCIL OF. *See* Councils, *article on* Christian Councils.

NICEPHOROS. *See* Nikephoros.

NICEPHORUS CALLISTUS. *See* Nikephoros Kallistos.

NICHIREN (1222–1282), Japanese Buddhist monk of the Kamakura period (1192–1282) and eponymous founder of the Nichirenshū (Nichiren sect). In his radical insistence on the priority of the *Lotus Sutra* (Skt., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra;* Jpn., *Myōhōrengekyō;* also known by its abbreviated title, *Hokekyō*) over all other teachings and forms of Buddhism, Nichiren established himself as one of the major figures in the history of Japanese Buddhism. His influence persists to this day through the various schools and movements that look to Nichiren as their founder.

Life. Nichiren was born in the village of Kominato in Awa Province (Chibaken), the son of a fisherman and minor manorial functionary. His talents as a youth brought him to the attention of the lord of the manor, who had him enter the Tendai monastery Kiyosumidera (Seichōji) in 1233 in order to begin his formal education. In 1237 he became a monk and adopted the religious name Renchō. Later, Nichiren left the Kiyosumidera for Kamakura, the seat of the military government, where he studied Pure Land Buddhism and Zen. The year 1242 found Nichiren on Mount Hiei, the center of the flourishing Tendai sect, and thereafter he studied on Mount Kōya, the center of the Shingon (Esoteric) school, and in the ancient capital of Nara. Convinced of the inadequacy of the Buddhism of his times, Nichiren returned to the Kiyosumidera in 1253 and began his self-appointed mission to bring what he believed to be true Buddhism to the Japanese. On 28 April of that year he publicly denounced all other forms of Buddhism as incomplete and ultimately false, and advocated a wholehearted faith in the teachings of the *Lotus.* It was at this time that he adopted the name Nichiren.

The remainder of Nichiren's life was marked by his conflicts with the government and the leaders of the established Buddhist sects. The year 1253 found Nichiren expelled from Kiyosumidera and disseminating his teachings in Kamakura, where he became deeply concerned about the social and political disorder of the times. In 1260 he presented his treatise *Risshō ankoku-ron* (Establish the Right Law and Save Our Country) to the government. In it he ascribed the increase in floods, pestilence, famines, political strife, and conspiracies to

the government's refusal to accept the Buddha's true teachings as found in the *Lotus* and their tolerance of the false doctrines of "heterodox" schools. He admonished the Hōjō rulers (military regents from 1213 to 1333) to abandon these expedient teachings and warned of the inevitability of rebellions and foreign invasions that would result from failure to embrace the true Buddhism. His criticism of the Hōjō family provoked the eldest member, Hōjō Shigetoki, a fervent Nembutsu (i.e., Pure Land) practitioner and a patron of Ryōkan, the chief priest of the Shingon-Ritsu temple in Kamakura and one of Nichiren's foremost rivals. It is highly probable that Nichiren's hermitage in Kamakura was destroyed in 1260 by outlaws hired by Shigetoki. In 1261 the government exiled Nichiren to the province of Izu (Shizuoka-ken), only to pardon him in 1263. While visiting his home province in 1264, his old enemy Tōjō Kagenobu, a Nembutsu follower, planned an ambush from which Nichiren narrowly escaped.

In 1268 a Korean envoy arrived in Japan demanding the payment of tribute to the Mongolian ruler, Khubilai Khan. Nichiren submitted a proposal to the government reminding the Hōjō rulers that he had foretold such foreign invasions in his *Risshō ankokuron* and claiming that only he and, of course, faith in the *Lotus*, could save the country. Although the government ignored both the request of the envoy and Nichiren's warning, the masses, fearing the threat of invasion by Mongolian troops, turned in greater numbers to Nichiren's school. Concerned over Nichiren's growing popularity, the monks of several established Buddhist sects in Kamakura brought formal charges against Nichiren. These resulted in his arrest and, in 1271, his exile to Sado Island. After more than two years, in 1274, he was pardoned and returned to Kamakura. Soon after, Nichiren retired from public life and secluded himself in a mountain retreat in Minobu (Yamanashi-ken). There he became ill; in 1276 he moved to Ikegami in Musahi Province (Tokyo), where he died in 1282.

Thought and Works. Although Nichiren remained fundamentally within the Tendai tradition, he is known as a reformer, if not a radical, who departed from many of the teachings of Saichō, the founder of that sect. Indeed, he virtually reduced Tendai doctrines to the sole practice of chanting the Daimoku ("sacred title") of the *Lotus Sūtra*, that is, the recitation of the formula "Namu *Myōhōrengekyō*" ("Adoration be to the Lotus of Perfect Law"). The Daimoku, according to Nichiren, contains the entire universe and symbolizes absolute truth or, in other words, Śākyamuni Buddha. In his *Kanjin honzonshō* (The Object of Worship Revealed by the Introspection of our Minds), written while exiled on Sado Island, Nichiren established Śākyamuni as the true object of worship and the Daimoku as the practice for revealing the absolute truth.

An integral aspect of his method of conversion *(shakubuku)* was the condemnation of the popular sects of Buddhism. Nichiren held that by deliberately provoking people and raising their anger he would cause them to evaluate their beliefs. Anger and hatred, in Nichiren's system, were productive and creative emotional states. While at Kiyosumidera Nichiren's denunciations were focused primarily on the proponents of Nembutsu and Zen practices. He criticized Pure Land for engaging in expedient practices that would lead (he claimed) to rebirth in the lowest of hells and for emphasizing the notion of a Western Paradise, a belief, Nichiren held, that discourages people from establishing peace in their present lives. He criticized Zen for stressing a transmission outside scripture and for their belief in the efficacy of "no-words." Nichiren argued that without *sūtra*s and words the teachings of the Buddha could not be transmitted at all. Later, Nichiren added Ritsu (Vinaya), Shingon, and the esoteric subsects of Tendai to his list of heterodox schools.

Nichiren's exile on Sado Island proved to be a period of great creativity. Among the essays and treatises he wrote during this period was the *Kaimokushō* (Liberation from Blindness). Here he departs from traditional Tendai notions of spiritual filiation by claiming that he is the successor to and reincarnation of the Viśiṣṭacāritra Bodhisattva (Jpn., Jōgyō Bosatsu), to whom Śākyamuni is said to have entrusted the *Lotus Sutra* and whose reappearance is prophesied in that text. Another work, the *Daimandara* (Great Maṇḍala) reiterates this theme. The *maṇḍala* itself, inspirationally revealed to Nichiren, represents all living beings in the Buddha world expressed in the *Lotus Sutra*. It depicts the Daimoku surrounded by the names of Śākyamuni, various *bodhisattva*s led by Viśiṣṭacāritra, *śrāvaka*s, Japanese gods *(kami)*, and Tendai masters arranged on levels in descending order. The image of Śākyamuni and the Daimandara became the chief objects of worship in Nichiren's thought. Other of Nichiren's writings include 434 essays and epistles and a commentary on the *Lotus Sutra*. The original of this commentary, which is still extant, is written on the back pages of a copy of the *Triple Lotus Sutra*, a set of three *sūtra*s including the *Myōhōrengekyō (Lotus Sutra);* the *Muryōgikyō*, regarded as an introduction to the *Lotus;* and the *Kan Fugen bosatsu gyōhōkyō*, an epilogue to the *Lotus*. Aside from the *Risshō ankokuron*, the most significant of Nichiren's essays include: *Kaimokushō*, *Kanjin honzonshō*, *Senjishō* (Selection of the Proper Time), and *Hōonshō* (Requitment of Favors).

[*See* Nichirenshū.]

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WATANABE HŌYŌ

NICHIRENSHŪ. One of the Japanese Buddhist sects established during the Kamakura period (1192–1333), the Nichirenshū was founded by Nichiren (1222–1282), a monk of the Tendai sect. Concerned with what he perceived as the decay and corruption of Kamakura Buddhism, Nichiren called for a return to the true teachings of the Buddha Śākyamuni as found only in the *Lotus Sutra* (Skt., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra;* Jpn., *Myōhōrengekyō;* also known by its abbreviated title, *Hokekyō*). Nichiren is considered one of the most prophetic, charismatic, and controversial figures of Japanese religious history. Today, his influence is still evident in the numerous schools and new religions that claim Nichiren as their founder.

Life of Nichiren. Nichiren began his formal Buddhist training at the age of eleven when he entered the Tendai monastery Kiyosumidera. After being ordained as a Tendai monk, Nichiren studied Pure Land and Zen Buddhism in Kamakura, Tendai on Mount Hiei, and Shingon (Esoteric) Buddhism on Mount Kōya. In 1253, convinced that all other forms of Buddhism propagated false doctrines and expedient methods and that absolute faith in the *Lotus* was the only path to salvation, Nichiren returned to Kiyosumidera to begin disseminating his teachings. Throughout his life Nichiren was unrelenting in his condemnation of the teachings of the established Buddhist sects, including Tendai. In his treatise *Risshō ankokuron* (Establish the Right Law and Save Our Country) Nichiren admonished the government for tolerating these "heterodox" schools and thereby causing the recent outbreak of natural disasters and political unrest. He warned that unless the government abandoned these schools in favor of the teachings of the *Lotus*, the nation would inevitably suffer rebellions and foreign invasions. Nichiren's outspoken attacks against other Buddhist schools and his criticism of the ruling Hōjō family caused formal charges of slander to be brought against him by the Buddhist establishment; these resulted in his banishment by the government.

In its insistence on the priority of the *Lotus* over all other Buddhist teachings and its single practice of reciting the Daimoku ("sacred title [of the *Lotus*]"; i.e., "Namu *Myōhōrengekyō*," "Adoration to the *Lotus of the Perfect Law*"), Nichiren's teaching represents a radical reformation of the Tendai teachings expounded by the school's founder, Saichō (767–822). According to Nichiren, absolute truth, or the true teachings of Buddhism, are embodied both by the syllables of the Daimoku and by the eternal, original Śākyamuni revealed in the *sūtra* itself; all other Buddhas, including the manifest, historical Buddha, are mere emanations. The image of Śākyamuni and the Daimandara—a *maṇḍala* depicting the Daimoku surrounded by Śākyamuni, various *bodhisattvas*, Japanese gods *(kami)*, and Tendai masters—were held as the two chief objects of worship in Nichiren's thought.

Early Schisms. Before his death Nichiren charged six main disciples with propagating his teachings and caring for his tomb on Minobusan: Nisshō (1221–1323), Nichirō (1245–1320), Nikkō (1246–1333), Nikō (1253–

1341), Nitchō (1252–1317), and Nichiji (b. 1250). Initially, these six disciples had agreed to manage Nichiren's tomb in rotating one-month shifts. However, the political disorder in the aftermath of the invasions of Mongolian troops in 1274 and 1281 and the restrictions imposed on the Nichiren sect by the war minister, Nagasaki Yoritsuna, made it difficult for the disciples living in Kamakura to travel to Mount Minobu. In 1285 Nikkō agreed to assume permanent responsibility for the tomb. In 1285 he was joined by Nikō, who promptly became the favorite of a local wealthy patron, Nambu Sanenaga. The first serious schism within the Nichiren sect arose when Nikkō, a dogmatic purist, held that Nambu Sanenaga committed two religious improprieties—worshiping the image of Śākyamuni unaccompanied by his lom disciples, thereby rendering the image indistinguishable from that of the historical Buddha, and paying homage to Shintō gods. Nikkō defended his position by claiming that Nichiren had identified the eternal Śākyamuni as the only true object of worship and had forbade the worship of Shintō shrines since they had been abandoned by the *kami* and were, therefore, empty. In 1288 Nikkō formed his own subsect, known as Kōmon-ha, and in 1290 he founded the Taisekiji in Fuji District in the province of Suruga (Shizuoka-ken).

The main actors in a fourteenth-century dispute were Nichijū, a Tendai monk who converted to the Nichirenshū in 1378, and Nisson, the chief priest of the Hommyōji in Shimousa (Chiba-ken). In 1384 Nichijū, unhappy with Nisson's conciliatory approach to other Buddhist schools, seceded from the main Nichiren sect to found a subsect called the Myōmanji-ha in Kyoto.

Although the justification offered for the secession of the Kōmon-ha and Myōmanji-ha was doctrinal, these two subsects did not advocate practices and teachings that differed from those of the main Nichiren sect. Indeed, these early subsects emerged primarily as the result of disputes over leadership. With the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, doctrinal differences became more prominent as rationalizations for establishing new sects. The questions raised by Nikkō and Nichijū—that is, whether to compromise with other Buddhist sects and Shintō shrines and whether the Buddha Śākyamuni or the "manifest" Buddha was the true object of worship—dominated later controversies and factional disputes. Movements emerged offering different practices and teachings based on particular doctrinal positions.

The Honmon-Shakumon controversy. Early exegetical studies divided the *Lotus Sutra* into two parts. The first fourteen chapters, called the *Shakumon* ("section of manifestation"), cover the discourses of the historical, manifest Buddha in which he reveals his methods for teaching. The second fourteen chapters, called the *Honmon* ("section of origin"), deal with the discourses of the eternal Śākyamuni, the *dharmakāya* itself, wherein it is revealed that the historical Buddha was merely one of many manifestations. While traditional Tendai doctrine emphasized the *Shakumon*, Nichiren, insistent on the primacy of the eternal Śākyamuni, considered the *Honmon* more significant. By the fifteenth century the controversy between those who argued the supremacy of the *Honmon* and those who felt the sections were of equal import led to internecine disputes and the eventual establishment of numerous subsects. Those who conceived of the two sections as equal remained within the main Nichiren sect and were referred to as the Itchi-ha (Conformity sect). Those who advocated the supremacy of the *Honmon* included. Nichijin (1339–1419), who founded the Honjōji-ha; Nichiryū (1385–1464), who in 1423 founded the Happon-ha (Eight Chapters sect), so named for Nichiryū's view that chapters fifteen to twenty-two of the *Lotus Sutra* held the essence of Śākyamuni's teachings; and Nisshin (1444–1528), the eponymous founder of the Nisshin-monryū. These three subsects and the two earlier groups—Kōmon-ha and Myōmanji-ha—were collectively referred to as the Shōretsu-ha, a contraction of the phrase *honshō shakuretsu* ("*Honmon* superior; *Shakumon* inferior").

The Jufuse-fujufuse controversy. Another issue that came to divide the Nichiren sect was whether Nichiren monks should receive offerings and gifts from, and contribute to, Shintō priests and shrines and "heterodox" schools of Buddhism. The dispute had repercussions for the Nichiren sect's relation to other Buddhist sects and for their own teaching methods. In general, those who belonged to the Itchi-ha tended toward moderation. They avoided violent denunciations of other sects (known as *shakubuku*, a part of Nichirenshū's conversion practice) and performed rituals on behalf of the government. Those who believed in the supremacy of the *Honmon*—that is, the Shōretsu-ha—tended toward extreme *shakubuku* practices, demanding that the families of Nichiren monks convert and engaging in outspoken attacks against other Buddhist sects. They were adamant in their refusal to perform rituals for, or receive offerings from, those who were not absolute believers in the *Lotus*, and they were strict in their adherence to the single practice of chanting the Daimoku.

The term *jujufuse* ("neither to receive nor give") first appeared in an early fifteenth-century document associated with the Myōkakuji-monryū in Kyoto. Strictly, it refers to a policy of neither receiving nor giving offerings from devotees of non-*Lotus* sects; more broadly, of course, it encompasses a rejection of the ecumenism of

more moderate Nichirenshū opinion. By the late sixteenth century those who advocated *fujufuse* had developed into a movement that threatened to destroy the stability of the established sect. The dispute reached its climax in 1595, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi, ruler of Japan from 1586 to 1598, invited eminent monks from various sects to participate in a memorial service to his ancestors held in the newly built Daibutsuden. With the exception of Nichiō (1565–1630), the abbot of Myōkakuji in Kyoto, all Nichiren monks accepted this invitation, arguing that a policy of *jufuse* ("to receive but not to give") should be followed when dealing with the ruler of Japan. Nichiō, however, held that under no circumstances was it proper to either give to, or receive from, anyone other than an adherent of Nichirenshū. Nichiō's refusal to compromise resulted in the censure of the more moderate Nichiren monks and in his banishment to Tsushima Island by the government. In 1612, after twelve years in exile, Nichiō was pardoned and returned to Kyoto. His undaunted efforts to propagate *fujufuse* doctrine attracted many followers. Among them was Nichikō (1626–1698), who along with other leaders of the *fujufuse* movement was exiled to Kyushu in 1669. The government, threatened by the *fujufuse* adherents' resistance to government orders, officially prohibited the movement in 1669. However, groups continued to propagate *fujufuse* policy in hiding while publicly pretending to have converted to *jufuse*. In 1875, under the leadership of Shaku Nisshō, the underground movement was successful in attaining government recognition. The restored sect was given the name Nichirenshū Fujufuse-ha.

The Modern Era. The Meiji period (1868–1912) was characterized by the government's willingness to tolerate an influx of Western philosophy and science, the establishment of Shintō as the state religion, and the persistence (albeit with diminished vigor) of Neo-Confucian principles as a foundation of the state ideology. While the established Buddhist sects suffered routinization and institutionalization resulting from their loss of imperial patronage, the lay movements of popular Buddhism were relatively vital. This period is marked by the rise of "new religions" *(shinkō shūkyō)* that were, more accurately, reformations, revivals, and restorations of the old traditions. Some of the earliest of these new movements grew out of the Nichiren sect. In general, they were lay movements that stressed the attainment of salvation in this world and the procurement of worldly benefits, and that combined Nichiren faith in the *Lotus* with the art of healing. The Nichiren movements that emerged in the Meiji era gave rise to several other splinter groups in the period between the First and Second World Wars. Many still thrive in the late twentieth century. For the most part, the new movements claiming affiliation with Nichiren's teachings are divided into two main denominations—the Nichirenshū and the Nichiren Shōshū (True Nichiren Teaching). Although it is considered a new religion, Nichiren Shōshū traces its origins to the thirteenth century, when Nikkō seceded from the main sect to form the Kōmon-ha.

Butsuryūkō. One of the oldest of the new religions that emerged in the Meiji, Butsuryūkō (Society Established by the Buddha) was founded in 1857 by Nagamatsu Seifū (1817–1890). As a monk in the Happon-ha, Nagamatsu began to question the quality of the priesthood and monastic organizations of his time. He left the order and began disseminating his teachings, calling for a return to the doctrines expounded by Nichiren. While his movement continued to be affiliated with Nichirenshū, it was essentially a lay organization. His votaries increased in number so rapidly that the leaders of the Happon-ha had no choice but to appoint Nagamatsu as chief priest of the Yūseiji in Kyoto. In 1947 the movement declared its independence from the Happon-ha, calling itself Honmon Butsuryūshū.

Kokuchūkai. In 1879 Tanaka Chigaku (b. 1861), a monk in the Nichiren sect, renounced the priesthood to organize the Kokuchūkai, or Nation's Pillar Society. Tanaka turned to the lay community, for he, like Nagamatsu, recognized the need to reform Nichiren Buddhism from without. The sect's popularity grew, particularly during the period of fervent nationalism in the 1890s. Although Tanaka's charisma attracted many followers, the sect's popularity waned after World War I. Kokuchūkai was, however, responsible for the revival of interest in Nichiren's teachings. In 1922 Tanaka succeeded in his appeal to the government to have the posthumous title Risshō Daishi conferred on Nichiren.

Reiyūkai. A third lay movement to emerge from the Nichiren school in this period was Reiyūkai (Spiritual Friends Society), founded in 1925 by Kotani Kimi, a laywoman with shamanic skills, and her brother-in-law Kubo Kakutarō. This group accepts the Nichiren practice of chanting the Daimoku but claims that the only true object of worship is the Daimandara. Furthermore, with its emphasis on ancestor worship, divination, and healing practices, Reiyūkai is representative of a more spiritualistic tendency within the Nichiren school. The true significance of Reiyūkai, however, is that it gave rise to many successful splinter groups after World War II. [*See* Reiyūkai.]

Risshō Kōseikai. Founded in 1938 by Niwano Nikkyō (b. 1906) and his disciple Naganuma Myōkō (1889–1957), a laywoman and diviner, Risshō Kōseikai is the most successful movement to have emerged from Rei-

yūkai. Niwano Nikkyō's decision to secede from the Reiyukai movement resulted more from personal differences with Kotani Kimi than from doctrinal differences. Niwano, however, claimed that the only true object of worship was Śākyamuni and that the Daimandara was to be revered, not worshiped. Risshō Kōseikai practices are founded on a combination of Nichiren Buddhist and Shintō elements along with such innovations as the group counseling sessions *(hōza)* for the moral edification of its members. In the 1980s Risshō Kōseikai is the second-largest movement in Japan with over one and a half million members. [*See* Risshō Kōseikai.]

Sōka Gakkai. The largest and perhaps most controversial of the modern Nichiren movements, Sōka Gakkai was founded by Makiguchi Tsunesaburō in 1930. Originally an educator, Makiguchi advocated a system of education that stressed subjective values and pragmatism. As a convert to Nichiren Shōshū, he found that many of his notions of education suited Nichiren doctrine. Makiguchi held that the true object of worship is Nichiren, whom he identified as a savior. Sōka Gakkai practices include recitation of the Daimoku, profession of absolute faith in the *Lotus*, and devotion to the Daimandara. Since membership in Sōka Gakkai is dependent on membership in Nichiren Shōshū, both groups boast large numbers of adherents. [*See* Sōka Gakkai.]

Later developments. In the mid-1980s the temples affiliated with Nichirenshū and its subsects numbered approximately seven thousand worldwide. The major temples are located in Japan at sites associated with Nichiren's life—the Tanjōji in Kominato, Nichiren's birthplace; the Seichōji in Kiyosumi, where Nichiren first studied Buddhism; the Kuonji at Minobusan, which is also the site of the sect's monastic training center, the Shingyō Dōjō; and the Hommonji in Ikegami, where Nichiren died. Both Nichirenshū's headquarters and its educational center, the Risshō University, are in Tokyo. Annual festivals celebrated by Nichirenshū adherents include the founder's birthday *(shūso-gōtan'e)* on 16 February; the anniversary of the founding of the sect (kaishū-e) on 28 April; "persecution days" *(gohōnan'e)* on 12 May, 27 August, 12 September, and 11 November; and the anniversary of Nichiren's death *(oeshiki)* on 13 October.

[*See also* Tendai; New Religions, *article on* New Religions in Japan; *and the biographies of Nichiren and Nikkō.*]

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MURANO SENCHU

NICHOLAS OF CUSA (1401–1464), German canonist, Christian theologian, and philosopher. Nicholas was born at Kues (present-day Bernkastel-Kues) on the Moselle, and studied at Heidelberg, Padua, and Cologne. At the Council of Basel, with his treatise *De concordantia catholica* (1434), he defended conciliar authority over the pope and proposed extensive reforms consistent with this position. He later converted to the cause of the papacy. As papal legate he traveled to Constantinople to promote Christian reunification (1437), and as cardinal and bishop of Brixen, he worked throughout Germany and Bohemia on behalf of papal authority and ecclesiastical reform. During his last years in Rome, Nicholas lived simply, having used much of his income

to establish the Saint Nikolas Hospital in Kues, which still contains his large personal library.

Amid this active life Nicholas wrote numerous speculative works, beginning with *De docta ignorantia* (Learned Ignorance; 1440). He accords intellect a central role in the religious life, and emphasizes the desire to know God. All inquiry requires a "proportion" between the known and the as yet unknown, but there is no proportion between the infinity of God and our finite intellect. Knowledge of God therefore becomes "learned ignorance," that is, the knowledge that we cannot know God precisely in the divine nature, but only symbolically through God's self-revelation in the universe and in Christ, who unites finite humanity and divine infinity. Nicholas correlates learned ignorance with "conjecture" (*De coniecturis*, 1442–1443). More than mere guesswork, conjecture approximates truth in limited, indirect ways. Nicholas's conjectures include many metaphors, mathematical symbols, and attempts to name God (e.g., as Absolute Maximum; as *Possest*, or the union of possibility and actual being; and as Not-other). Nicholas uses a distinctive logic, the "coincidence of opposites," which points beyond the contrasts of finite reason toward the infinite unity of God. The ability to formulate this logic indicates that the mind, while finite, nevertheless conceives of divine infinity and approaches it without limit. In *Idiota de mente* (The Layman: About Mind; 1450) Nicholas claims that the mind is a living image of God that "has the power of corresponding more and more without limit to its unreachable original." Participating in God's creative activity, humanity also creates a cultural world. This human world provides examples for Nicholas's art of conjecture, for example in his *De ludo globi* (1463), in which a ball game becomes the focus for theological speculation.

Nicholas's tolerance of religious diversity emerges in two works written in response to the Turkish conquest of Constantinople. *De pace fidei* (The Peace of Faith; 1453) recognizes the conjectural truth of all religions, yet sees their fulfillment in Christianity. *Cribratio Alcoran* (Sifting the Qur'ān; 1461) is perhaps the most tolerant examination of Islam in the late medieval West.

In controversies over conciliarism, theology, and Islam, Nicholas of Cusa is an original, even idiosyncratic, thinker. The roots of his thought run deep in the medieval world, particularly in the Christian Neoplatonic tradition. His works were widely circulated in four early printed editions. He influenced Giordano Bruno, through whom Leibniz and other German thinkers encountered Nicholas's ideas. Commentators like Ernst Cassirer have viewed Nicholas as the first modern philosopher because of his novel epistemology and cosmology. While claims for Nicholas's modernity should be tempered, his learned ignorance, conjectural theology, and religious tolerance do address persistent problems of religious knowledge and practice.

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DONALD F. DUCLOW

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD (1892–1971), American theologian, ethicist, and political philosopher. Niebuhr was born in Wright City, Missouri, on 21 January 1892. His mother was a second-generation German-American; his father, a German immigrant, was a pastor in the Evangelical Synod of North America, the offspring of the Prussian Union Church, which was predominantly Lutheran with a strain of Calvinism. At the age of ten Niebuhr declared that he wanted to become a minister because his father was the most interesting man in town.

After studies at the denominational schools Elmhurst College and Eden Theological Seminary, Niebuhr entered Yale Divinity School, where he earned B.D. (1914) and M.A. (1915) degrees. He later enjoyed recalling that he was admitted to the M.A. program on probation because he had received his earlier education at unaccredited schools. Rather than embark on a program of doctoral studies, he accepted assignment to a pastorate in Detroit, partly for family financial reasons (his father had died in 1913), partly out of obligation to his denomination, and partly because he "desired relevance rather than scholarship."

During the thirteen years that Niebuhr served as pastor of Bethel Church, its membership grew from 65 to 650. The congregation reflected a broad spectrum of the American population, from automobile workers to two millionaires; during his pastorate Niebuhr drew a few black families into some activities of the church. The Detroit ministry plunged the young pastor into the problems of urban, industrial America. Niebuhr vociferously objected to the inhumanity of the automotive

assembly lines, the forced unemployment during retooling, and the abject dependence of workers upon corporations that resisted unions. After a period of racial conflict, he chaired the mayor's Race Committee. Meanwhile he won a reputation as a lecturer and preacher, especially in colleges, and as a contributor to periodicals.

Niebuhr supported World War I with mixed feelings, opposing the mixture of German loyalty and quasi-pacifism common in his denomination. A visit to Germany in 1923 added to his increasing disillusionment with war and confirmed his growing pacifism.

In 1928 Niebuhr joined the faculty of Union Theological Seminary in New York. Although in point of fact there was no faculty opening, President Henry Sloane Coffin was interested in Niebuhr, and Sherwood Eddy, a leader in many Christian causes, located funds to support the appointment initially. The move enabled Niebuhr to expand his scholarly and organizational activities. Later he also joined the graduate faculty of Columbia University. He continued to preach almost every weekend in pulpits within and outside the city. He founded the Fellowship of Socialist Christians (1930) and its quarterly, *Radical Religion* (1935), later renamed *Christianity and Society*. He ran as a Socialist for the New York State Senate (1930) and for Congress (1932), but assured Coffin that he had no chance of winning and would continue his teaching without interruption.

In 1931 Niebuhr married Ursula Keppel-Compton, an English fellow at Union. They were a devoted pair and soon became parents. For many years students and friends, some famous and some unknown, crowded the Niebuhrs' apartment at their frequent "at-homes."

Niebuhr was active in countless organizations involving labor unions, tenant farmers, and liberal or left-wing causes. In a period of great political tensions, he struggled with conflicts between pacifists and those concerned about the menace of Hitlerism, as well as conflicts between conservatives, liberals, and communists. In 1933 he resigned from the executive committee of the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation, of which he had been national chairman for several years. In 1940 he resigned from the Socialist Party, and the next year he founded the biweekly *Christianity and Crisis* as an organ for relating theology to liberal anti-Nazi political policies. In 1941 he was a chief organizer, and then national chairman, of the liberal anticommunist Union for Democratic Action. In 1944 he helped found the Liberal Party in New York and became a state party vice-chairman.

Meanwhile, Niebuhr's eminence as a theologian was increasing. *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York, 1932) was an epoch-making contribution to social ethics. Niebuhr's international reputation flourished with his participation in the Oxford Conference on Life and Work (1937) and his delivery of the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh (1939).

When World War II broke out, Niebuhr advocated American support of Britain and France, short of armed intervention. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he supported the war but criticized mass bombings of German and Japanese cities. After the war, Niebuhr became an adviser to the State Department's Policy and Planning staff, headed by George Kennan. Although a strenuous critic of Soviet power, he emphasized the necessity, in a nuclear age, of international policies that would build "mutual trust and tissues of community." He was a frequent visitor to Europe on religious, scholarly, and governmental missions, and served as a major speaker at the first assembly of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948. In 1949 he cochaired the founding conference of Americans for Democratic Action, an organization of the liberal left. The postwar years saw a stream of major lectureships and books.

In 1952, Niebuhr suffered the first of a series of strokes that sapped his strength for the rest of his life; from this point on, periods of severe illness alternated with periods of active life. In 1955 he became vice president of Union Theological Seminary; in 1958 he was a visiting fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton. After retirement from Union in 1960 he spent one year at Harvard. He made his home in New York, but later moved to Stockbridge, Massachusetts. In 1964 he was awarded the President's Medal for Freedom by Lyndon Johnson. In his final years he suffered great pain and disability, but a steady stream of visitors and correspondents helped him maintain ties with theological scholarship and public affairs. Death came on 1 June 1971.

Development of Niebuhr's Thought. Niebuhr was a man in motion, often (as he liked to say) tilting at windmills he himself had built earlier. His thought was an ongoing dialectical process: usually the new idea was both a criticism and a transformation of the old.

His earliest writings—posthumously published in *Young Reinhold Niebuhr*, edited by William G. Chrystal (Saint Louis, 1977)—reveal a seminarian in the pietistic evangelical tradition, objecting to the politicization of religion and urging that the way to improve the world is "to make more men Christians and all Christians truer" (p. 42). At Yale Divinity School he imbibed liberal theology. The Detroit pastorate moved him to the left wing of the Social Gospel movement while intensifying his pastoral concern in ministry to the sick and the dying. His adoption of socialism was a pragmatic one, and indeed was initially almost innocent of Marxism.

Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York, 1932) es-

tablished Niebuhr's reputation as a major thinker. The title, which Niebuhr admitted was an exaggeration for pedagogic reasons, expressed the book's theme: the gap between the behavior of individuals in their personal relations and in their human collectivities (nations, classes, corporations, and so on). The book was an assault on liberal hopes for the effecting of social improvement through rationality and religion. Rationality and religion, said Niebuhr, are more often instruments of power than correctives of it.

Two years later, Niebuhr described himself as moving to the left politically and to the right theologically. As he sometimes said, he was trying to relate Christian religion (which was politically deficient) to Marxist political realism (which was religiously false). The theological movement was guided above all by Augustine's conceptions of human nature and history. In the Gifford Lectures, published as *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York, 1941 and 1943), he added Kierkegaard's insights to those of Augustine, and he became more critical of Marx.

For his attacks on "liberalism," Niebuhr was often called "neoorthodox," a term that he disliked. He offended the orthodox by treating their fondest beliefs as "myths," and he offended liberals by taking those myths "seriously, but not literally." He provided fresh interpretations of Christian beliefs about the creation of humankind in God's image, the Fall, original sin, justification by faith, and the coming kingdom of God. Whereas he criticized liberalism for its optimism, its inattention to conflicts of power, and its utopianism, he was liberal in his acceptance of critical scholarship and his eagerness to relate Christian faith to the whole range of human knowledge. If university faculties saw Niebuhr as a critic of liberalism, average Americans regarded him as plainly liberal—as he discovered when a flood of "hate mail" poured in after his public criticism of Billy Graham.

Although the Gifford Lectures stand as Niebuhr's greatest intellectual monument, they do not record his final position. In the years following the lectures, his pragmatic tendencies, significant from his Yale days onward, became more conspicuous as he criticized doctrinaire theology and political thought, including his own. The concept of grace, always important to his thought but often subordinated in discussions to the doctrine of sin, now became a major theme. Partly under the influence of his friend Erik Erikson, the psychologist, Niebuhr became more appreciative of self-affirmation. From the works of the eighteenth-century English statesman Edmund Burke he learned to consider the continuities and the organic characteristics of history as well as the historical conflicts and cataclysms that had always impressed him. But to the end the polemical fires still flared, particularly against idolatries of race, wealth, and political power.

Principal Ideas. Niebuhr frequently denied that he was a theologian. He sometimes described himself as a circuit-riding preacher with an interest in ethics. He had little interest in the niceties of doctrine. However, his chief insights have reverberated through the whole of theology.

To find definitive statements of his main positions is difficult. Niebuhr often wrote in polemical situations. If some extravagant statement he had made was quoted back to him later, he was likely to reply with a laugh, "That's one of the many foolish things I've said." He was too impatient to revise his own writings. Yet on many themes he was scholarly, subtle, and persistent. For the truest account of his opinions on a subject, one must look at his extended statements on it, then dig out the scattered self-corrections made over subsequent years.

Echoing Pascal, Niebuhr loved to speak of the grandeur and frailty of the human being. He saw the essence of selfhood as freedom, which included qualities of imagination, rationality, and foresight—all captured in the biblical phrase "the image of God." Freedom brings anxiety: the awareness of insecurity and of the inevitability of death. Faith, in turn, can channel anxiety into creativity; without faith the creature strains for false security (the classical sin of pride) or tries to avoid risk in a less-than-human existence (sloth). Of these two, Niebuhr wrote far more about pride—perhaps, as it is often said, because sloth was no temptation for him. Pride overcomes individuals as well as groups; in the latter it may appear as nationalism, economic domination, racism, or claims of gender superiority. Attempts to subdue pride by moral accomplishments usually reinforce it instead; the only answer is the intervention of divine grace, both the common grace known in many human experiences and the special grace known in Christ.

Niebuhr's doctrine of history began with the Old Testament prophetic faith in history as showing marks of divine judgment and grace. He qualified this with the New Testament belief that history finds its fulfillment only in the kingdom of God that is yet to come. Any effort to find the meaning of history within history—say, in the triumph of a nation or a religion or a social class or even the best of projected societies—is error and idolatry.

Niebuhr affirmed the biblical idea of a linear, rather than cyclical, history. But he rejected the "heresy," nourished in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, that transmutes the directedness of history into faith in progress. There are obvious evidences in history of progress in technique, in some kinds of rationality, and in social organization, but history as a whole is not a

progressive story, and its achievements never eliminate the lurking threat and presence of sin. Thus Niebuhr became a constant critic of utopianism. Despite his excoriation of nationalistic idolatries, he objected to proposals for world government. World government represented to him either a "soft" utopia (relying on reason and goodwill, without attention to the painful realities of power) or a "hard" utopia (imperialistic conquest resulting in one power's hegemony over the world). Instead, he advocated the difficult effort to negotiate limited agreements among nations with attention to both morality and power.

Niebuhr's critics charge that anti-utopianism cuts the nerve of action. In fact, Niebuhr himself said the same in his earlier writings, but later he renounced that position. He affirmed that there are "indeterminate" possibilities for social improvement, but he held that those who neglect the persistent power of sin are most likely to misconstrue its workings in themselves and in history.

For Niebuhr the ultimate ethical possibility is love, which in mutuality enhances life and society, but which sometimes requires sacrifice, as represented in the cross of Christ. However, love is sentimental unless it finds realization in justice. Justice is the attempt to embody something of the responsibility of love in human institutions. Yet justice, with its legal and juridical forms, is at best an incomplete embodiment of love. And because justice requires enforcement, it readily becomes a contradiction to the free and voluntary nature of love. Whereas love gives freely, justice imposes and enforces obligations.

Thus love and justice interact in a continuous dialectic. They need each other: love that does not seek justice is unreal love, and justice without love is a graceless legalism that is not really just. Yet the two live together in tension, and no formula can relate them perfectly.

Faith and political activity meet in a comparable dialectical relation. Serious faith has implications for political life. Pretenses to the contrary, especially in a modern democratic society, are an evasion of responsibility and usually a tacit support of an unjust status quo. But faith (or religious beliefs) can never be embodied fully in politics. And the ultimate loyalties of faith relate only uneasily to the negotiations, the maneuverings, and the exercises of power that characterize politics. Niebuhr criticized those who try to keep faith uncontaminated by politics as well as those who give their political opinions divine sanction. As with love and justice, there is no easy way to combine faith with politics.

Influence. During Niebuhr's lifetime he was a powerful figure, an intimidating force in polemics, yet a friendly person known to many as "Reinie" (except to his wife, who called him Reinhold). The South African novelist Alan Paton in his autobiography, *Towards the Mountain* (New York, 1980), described Niebuhr as "the most enthralling speaker" he had ever heard. Niebuhr's style, despite many awkward sentences, was impetuous, biting, witty, reverent, and serene, often in the course of a single speech or sermon. His writings have been translated into many European and Asian languages. During his lifetime he set so many agendas that his critics, no less than his supporters, often acted on issues he enunciated.

Niebuhr advocated an ethical "realism" that searched out the moral issues in every controversy yet never imposed moral answers without giving due attention to the realities of power. The famous political scientist Hans Morgenthau in 1961 called Niebuhr "the greatest living political philospher of America" (Landon, 1962, p. 109). Through friendships with Eleanor Roosevelt, George Kennan, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hubert Humphrey, as well as with several labor leaders and journalists, he exercised some influence on public policy—although he rebuked Vice President Humphrey for supporting the war in Vietnam.

Who continues Niebuhr's heritage today? The question is a controversial one. In 1981 a bemused Senate committee heard tedious arguments on just this issue. Neoconservatives, pointing to his Burkean strain and his anti-utopianism, sometimes claim him as part of their heritage. On the other hand, he always regarded himself as left of center; and his final writings, produced in the years of pain and illness, were furious attacks against abuses of presidential power.

Niebuhr's influence is least among those who isolate their religious faith from political action and those who maintain any dogmatic religious and political position, whether reactionary or revolutionary. But where people struggle to relate faith to justice in a perplexing world, Niebuhr remains an important figure in the conversation.

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The Irony of American History. New York, 1952. A study of American history, emphasizing the ways in which, for better and worse, the American character worked out an inner logic, often contradictory to its declared intentions.

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Man's Nature and His Communities: Essays on the Dynamics and Enigmas of Man's Personal and Social Existence. New York, 1965. Niebuhr's last revision—although brief and written under great handicaps of illness—of the themes for which he was famous.

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ROGER LINCOLN SHINN

NIEN-FO. The Chinese term *nien-fo* (Jpn., *nembutsu*) is a translation of the Sanskrit word *buddhānusmṛti*. *Anusmṛti* is a feminine noun derived from *smṛ-*, a verbal root, with the prefix *anu-* meaning "following," "toward," or "along." English translations of *anusmṛti* include "holding in one's mind, remembering, thinking of [upon], contemplating," and "reciting." Most of the definitions refer to aspects of meditation, whereas the last definition, "reciting," means the repeated oral recitation (of a particular formulaic utterance), or the mental recitation of this same formula. This usage gave rise to the recitative *nien-fo* that became an important practice in East Asian Buddhism from about the fifth century CE.

Primitive Nien-fo. In its earliest form, *nien-fo* referred to *buddhānusmṛti*, a simple remembrance or thinking about Śākyamuni Buddha, as in reverence to a teacher. First mention of *nien-fo* is found in the initiation ceremony of the Buddhist order held while Śākyamuni Buddha was still alive. This simple profession of faith in the Three Treasures—the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha (the Buddhist order)—encouraged members of the order to put trust in, worship, and adore Śākyamuni Buddha as a teacher. This type of *nien-fo* gradually became practiced by believers even far removed from Śākyamuni in time or place as a means of asking for his protection in times of crisis. From this, the ten titles of Śākyamuni, the ten faculties of the Buddha, and the thirty-two features of the Buddha came to be regarded as the object of remembrance. By the constant and incessant *anusmṛti* the early disciples of Śākyamuni Buddha thus kept alive the memory of their master.

Meditative Nien-fo. The simple practice of remembrance, adoration, and trust in Śākyamuni Buddha gradually developed into an actual visualization of his features and virtues. Such meditation was directed not only toward Śākyamuni but also toward such Buddhas as Amitābha (Jpn., Amida), Bhaiṣajyaguru, and Mahāvairocana, and such *bodhisattvas* as Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya. One of the earliest *sūtras* to advocate such a practice was the *Pratyutpannasamādhi Sūtra* (Chin., *Pan-chou san-mei ching*). In this *sūtra* (as well as in many other scriptures) the subject of *nien-fo* came to be Amitābha and other Buddhas rather than Śākyamuni, and birth in Amitābha's Pure Land rather than in the various Buddhist heavens. The practice of *nien-fo* directed toward Amitābha Buddha is also emphasized in the *Larger Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra* (Chin., *Wu-liang-shou ching;* Sutra on the Buddha of Infinite Life), the *Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra* (Chin., *Kuan wu-liang-shou ching*, or Meditation Sutra on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life), and the *Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra* (Chin., *O-mi-t'o ching;* Sutra on the Buddha Amitābha). These three scriptures are known in Japan as the Triple Sutra of the Pure Land.

The *Pratyutpannasamādhi Sūtra* preaches the practice of *nien-fo* for the laity and the doctrine of "emptiness" *(śūnyatā)* for monks. It teaches that one can see the Buddhas of the ten directions by attaining the meditational consciousness of emptiness. This is accomplished by keeping the precepts and meditating on the Buddha Amitābha for a period of from one to seven days and nights. The *sūtra* also declares that it is possible to be born in the Pure Land of the Buddha Amitābha by

wholeheartedly meditating on his name for a period of from one to seven days.

Within the Pure Land tradition, a number of different types of meditative *nien-fo* were introduced. These included "*nien-fo* with a concentrated mind" for those of advanced capacities, "*nien-fo* with a distracted mind" for people of lower spiritual capacities, "*nien-fo* of formless principle", "*nien-fo* of a Buddha's form," "single-hearted *nien-fo* on Amitābha alone," "*nien-fo* on other Buddhas," "*nien-fo* through self-power," and "*nien-fo* through other-power."

The *Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra* states that a person who single-heartedly bears the name of Amitābha in mind from one to seven days will see Amitābha at his deathbed and obtain birth in his Pure Land. This thought is presumed to derive from the *nien-fo* of the *Pratyutpannasamādhi Sūtra*. The characteristic point of the *Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra* is that birth in the Pure Land takes place at the moment of death, not while visualizing the Buddha in one's daily life. Moreover, what is borne in mind here is the Buddha's name, not his figure or characteristics as was the case in meditative *nien-fo* of the *Pratyutpannasamādhi Sūtra*.

Traditionally, the *Larger Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra* has been considered the basic *text* of Pure Land teachings. The most important section of the *sūtra* is the description of Amitābha's vows, in which Amitābha sets forth the conditions that he shall fulfill before achieving final enlightenment. In the Wei dynasty translation of this *sūtra* (252 CE), the all-important eighteenth of Amitābha's forty-eight vows states: "If, when I shall attain Buddhahood, sentient beings in the ten quarters who have sincere mind, serene faith, and desire to be born in my country should not be born there even after (directing) ten thoughts (to me), may I not attain Perfect Enlightenment." Various interpretations of the precise meaning of the term *ten thoughts* have been given. Basically, the words may be taken to refer to the continuity, for a certain period of time, of sincere mind, serene faith, and desire for birth in the Pure Land.

The *Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra* teaches thirteen methods of meditation on the features of Amitābha and his Pure Land. Through the successful accomplishment of this meditative *nien-fo* the aspirant may be born in the Pure Land and see all the Buddhas of the ten directions. In addition to these thirteen meditations, in the latter portion of the text another way of birth into the Pure Land is expounded for those with distracted minds. This section of the *sūtra* teaches that even the lowliest beings, those who have committed such misdeeds as the Five Grave Sins or slander of the Dharma, can be born in the Pure Land by uttering the Buddha's name ten times at the last moment of life. For Pure Land Buddhists, the importance of this *sūtra* lies in the teaching that birth in the Pure Land by means of ten recitations of the name is assured even to beings of diminished spiritual capacities. This concept is pivotal in the historical development of *nien-fo* thought. Thus, all three Pure Land *sūtras* played a decisive role in the transformation of the concept of *nien-fo* from meditation to simple recitation of the name of Amitābha.

Recitative Nien-fo. Although early *nien-fo* practice was primarily meditative, oral recitation of the Buddha's name was often used concurrently as an aid to concentration. Thus, two types of *nien-fo*, meditative and recitative, began to be used in all schools. It was generally believed that recitative *nien-fo* was easier, though inferior, to meditative *nien-fo:* the former was regarded as a mere accommodation to those not qualified to practice meditation or other forms of mental cultivation. The practice of recitative *nien-fo* as an independent and self-sufficient discipline, however, was developed later, in the thought of several important Buddhist thinkers: Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250) and Vasubandhu (c. 320–400) in India; T'an-luan (476–542?), Tao-ch'o (562–644), and Shan-tao (613–681) in China, and Genshin (942–1017), Hōnen (1133–1212), and Shinran (1173–1262) in Japan.

Nāgārjuna divided the Buddha's teachings into "difficult" and "easy" practices for the attainment of enlightenment. This latter path, better suited to beings born in an age of the "five corruptions," requires only that one hear the name of Amitābha and utter it with sincerity in order for the devotee to achieve a state of spiritual nonretrogression in the Pure Land and thereafter attain enlightenment. Vasubandhu taught that the practice of the *wu-nien men* ("five devotional gates": worship, praise, aspiration, perception, and the transfer of merit) would bring about birth in the Pure Land. The disciplines set forth under the Five Devotional Gates, however, were intended more for the sake of "sages" (i.e., the spiritually advanced) than for the ordinary person, as they were difficult to accomplish in the proper manner.

T'an-luan interpreted Vasubandhu's teachings to mean that even the most sinful person could practice the Five Devotional Gates insofar as the power to perform these practices originates in Amitābha's sacred vow to save all sentient beings, not in the devotee himself. T'an-luan asserted that birth in the Pure Land is ensured by means of ten utterances of the name.

A major concept contributing to the transformation of *nien-fo* practice from that of meditation to recitation was consciousness of the historical degeneration of the Buddha's teachings. Traditionally, Buddhism has postulated three periods of the Buddha's Law. These are

known in Chinese as *ch'eng-fa* ("the era of the righteous law"), *hsiang-fa* ("the era of the counterfeit law"), and *mo-fa* (Jpn., *mappō;* "the latter days of the law"). It was held that the Era of the Righteous Law was a five-hundred-year period following the decease of Śākyamuni during which the Buddha's teaching, the aspirants' religious discipline, and their enlightenment all flourished. The Era of the Counterfeit Law is a period in which the teaching and practice remain, but none actually attains enlightenment. During the third period, the Latter Days of the Law, there is neither practice nor enlightenment. Only the Buddha's teachings remain.

Concerning the duration of the three periods, Tao-ch'o writes in his *An-lo chi* (A Collection of Lines Concerning the Country of Peace and Happiness) that the Righteous Law taught during Śākyamuni's lifetime had lasted for five hundred years, the Counterfeit Law would prevail for one thousand years, and the Latter Days of the Law for ten thousand years. Tao-ch'o lived during a period in which people were highly conscious of how the religious climate of their own age differed from the one in which the influence and the personality of Śākyamuni were directly felt by the *saṃgha*. In particular, the Chinese of the seventh century were vexed by the perceived depravity of the Buddhist world, the episodic oppression of Buddhism by the secular authorities, and the inferior capacity of contemporary members of the Buddhist order with regard to the practice of monastic discipline. [*See also* Mappō.]

Tao-ch'o complemented T'an-luan's teachings by emphasizing that a lifelong sinner could be born in the Pure Land by means of the infinite compassion of Amitābha. This concept took into account the fact that people of the latter two stages of the Law's degeneration were less capable of undertaking strict meditative practice than those living in the Era of the Righteous Law. Shan-tao, the third Chinese Pure Land patriarch, emphasized a further point, that an ordinary person could be born in Amitābha's true Pure Land rather than a "provisional" Pure Land where additional practice would be necessary before supreme enlightenment is attained. He also stressed that the recitation of the name itself is the true cause of entering *nirvāṇa*. But this overall concept of the primacy of the recitative *nien-fo* did not take permanent root in China, as evidenced by the fact that after the middle of the T'ang dynasty the Pure Land tradition gradually embraced a combined regiment of meditation, discipline, and recitation of the name.

In Japan, however, the doctrine of recitative *nembutsu* flowered through the teachings of Genshin and Hōnen. Genshin stressed the belief that of all the teachings of Śākyamuni, the most important for people of the Latter Days of the Law, was recitation of the name. He taught that the ordinary person, eyes blinded by passion, was constantly enveloped by the infinite compassion of Amida Buddha, thereby assuring his or her salvation, Hōnen re-emhpasized the point that for the defiled person the only way to attain enlightenment was to recite the name. At the same time, he insisted that mere recitation of the name would not assure birth in the Pure Land unless supported by sincere faith in Amida. Shinran took Hōnen's teachings a step further by maintaining that more important than recitation of the Buddha's name was the true and real faith underlying the recitation. He taught that true faith could only be an endowment from Amida Buddha.

In the history of the recitative *nien-fo* many special forms of practice emerged. For example, the *wu-hui nien-fo* (Jpn., *goe,* "five-toned," *nembutsu*) was introduced into Japan from China by the T'ien-t'ai monk Ennin (749–864). This form of *nien-fo* later developed in Japan into *fudan nembutsu* ("incessant recitation of the name") and *inzei nembutsu* ("chanting of the name with a prolonged voice"). There also appeared such *nembutsu* forms as *yūzū nembutsu* (*nembutsu* of the interpenetration of all beings"), *kan nembutsu* ("midwinter *nembutsu*"), *uta nembutsu* ("chanting the name in song"), and *odori nembutsu* ("dancing *nembutsu*").

Today, Pure Land devotees comprise the largest single Japanese Buddhist group. Daily worship of Amida Buddha before the family altar, including recitation of his name and the chanting of Pure Land scriptures, is a widespread practice. Recitation of the name is heard during funerals and worship services and on radio and television programs. The same recitation is heard coming from the lips of devout believers when they are walking, working, and resting. Through the recitative *nien-fo,* Amida Buddha is as close to the believer as the movement of the lips.

[*See also* Amitābha; Pure and Impure Lands; Ching-t'u; Jōdoshū; *and* Jōdo Shinshū. *Many of the individual figures mentioned in this article are subjects of independent biographies.*]

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FUJIWARA RYÔSETSU

NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH (1844–1900), German philosopher and social, cultural, and religious critic. Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the most remarkable, controversial, original, and important figures in modern philosophical and intellectual history. In his short productive life (which ended with his collapse in 1889, although he lived on until 1900), he published an astonishing number and variety of works, and wrote a great deal more. His writings attracted relatively little attention prior to his collapse; but the subsequent impact of his thought was and continues to be both great and diverse.

Life and Work. Nietzsche was born on 15 October 1844 in Röcken, Saxony (in Prussia). The son of a Lutheran pastor (who died when he was six), he entered a boarding school in Pforta in 1858, excelling in his studies of religion and classical and German literature. In 1864 he entered the University of Bonn, intending to study theology and classical philosophy; but after only one year he transferred to the University of Leipzig, where he concentrated on philosophy. While there he discovered Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation*, which profoundly influenced him. It was as a classical philologist, however, that he received a call from the University of Basel at the astonishingly early age of twenty-four.

Nietzsche taught at Basel from 1869 until 1879, when he retired owing to the deterioration of his health (which resulted from illnesses he contracted in 1870 as a volunteer medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War). During this period he formed a close association with Richard Wagner, his early fascination with whom is reflected in his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). His later break with Wagner, culminating in his polemic *The Case of Wagner* (1888), was both profound and painful to him. At first regarding Wagner as showing the way to a cultural and spiritual renewal, Nietzsche came to see him as epitomizing and fostering decadent and dangerous tendencies.

These concerns with the direction and health of contemporary cultural and intellectual life were the real focus of most of Nietzsche's early writings. As he developed his own quite distinctive philosophical idiom and method, he drew strongly upon the idea and practice of interpretation associated with his discipline of classical philology. He departed increasingly from the conventional limits and norms of that discipline, however, and the unorthodox character of his published work during his tenure at Basel—beginning with *The Birth of Tragedy* and becoming more pronounced in his *Untimely Meditations* (1873–1876) and *Human, All-Too-Human* (1878)—effectively divorced him from it. This rendered his retirement in 1879 merely the ratification of an accomplished fact.

The following decade, most of which Nietzsche spent alternating between residences in Switzerland and northern Italy, was phenomenally productive. *The Dawn* (1881) and the first four books of *The Gay Science* (1882) were followed by the four-part *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885). The next four years saw the appearance of *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), the fifth book of *The Gay Science* and *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), *The Case of Wagner* (1888), and *Twilight of the Idols* (1889) as well as the completion of several other works that were published some years later: *The Antichrist* (1895) and *Ecce Homo* (1908). During this period he also amassed a great deal of material in notebooks. (A substantial selection of this material, the significance of which is a matter of considerable controversy, was arranged and published posthumously under the title *The Will to Power*.)

Having written the last four of these works in the single year of 1888, Nietzsche suffered a complete mental and physical breakdown in early January of 1889, in Turin. His illness probably was the consequence of his having contracted syphilis many years earlier. He remained a partially paralyzed invalid, never regaining his health and sanity. During the remaining years of his life he was cared for by his sister, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche. She obtained control of his writings, sought to enhance and exploit his reputation, and was partly responsible for the misrepresentation of his thought that culminated in the travesty of his work being presented as the philosophical inspiration of National Socialism. This seriously damaged his reputation and long obstructed a just assessment of his work.

Nietzsche's style and manner of writing have affected his reception as well. Unlike most philosophers, he generally did not set out his views systematically, in clearly discernible lines of argument cast in dry and measured prose. His works, for the most part, consist of series of short paragraphs and sets of aphorisms, often only loosely (if at all) connected. Many deal with philosoph-

ical topics, but in very unconventional ways. His language, moreover, is by turns coolly analytical, heatedly polemical, and highly metaphorical. It is not surprising, therefore, that many philosophers have found it difficult to know what to make of him or whether to take him seriously, and that they have interpreted his work in many different ways.

Thought. The early Nietzsche was greatly concerned with basic problems he discerned in contemporary Western culture and society, for which he considered it imperative to seek new solutions. He was further convinced that Schopenhauer's bleak picture of the world and the human condition was fundamentally sound, and yet he was determined to discover some way of avoiding Schopenhauer's pessimistic conclusions. In *The Birth of Tragedy* he looked to the ancient Greeks for clues and to Wagner for inspiration, believing that their art held the key to human flourishing in a Schopenhauerian world. In his subsequent series of four essays collectively titled *Untimely Meditations*, he expanded upon the need to reorient human thought and endeavor in a manner more conducive to the creativity and vitality of human life.

These essays were followed by a number of aphoristic books in which Nietzsche refined and extended his assessment of various human tendencies and social and cultural phenomena. During this period his thinking became much more sophisticated, and he developed the philosophical style and outlook that found mature expression in his writings of the 1880s. He prophesied the advent of a period of nihilism as traditional modes of interpretation and valuation collapsed in conjunction with the "death of God," the demise of metaphysics, and the discovery of science's inability to yield anything like absolute knowledge. However, the prospect of this forthcoming crisis deeply disturbed him. He took the basic challenge of philosophy to be that of overcoming not only traditional metaphysics and scientific rationalism but also the nihilism resulting from their abandonment. In the early 1880s, when he conceived and wrote *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he arrived at a conception of human life and possibility—and with it, of value and meaning—that he believed could serve to fill the void left by the bankruptcy of traditional philosophy and religion and the poverty of science.

What Nietzsche called the "death of God" was both a cultural event—the waning of the "Christian-moral" interpretation of life and the world—and a philosophical development: the dismissal of the idea of God as a concept deserving serious philosophical attention. As a cultural event it was a phenomenon to be reckoned with, and a source of profound concern. As a philosophical development, on the other hand, it was his point of departure, demanding a radical reconsideration of the nature of life and the world, human existence, knowledge, value, and morality. Thus the "de-deification of nature," the "translation of man back into nature," the development of a "naturalistic" value-theory and its application to a "revaluation of values," and the tracing of the "genealogy of morals" and their critique were among the main tasks he set for himself.

Nietzsche emphatically rejected not only the "God-hypothesis" but also any metaphysical postulation of a "true world of 'being'" transcending the world of life and experience, and likewise deemed the "soul" and "things-in-themselves" to be ontological fictions. He conceived of all existence in terms of an interplay of forces without any inherent structure or final end; these forces ceaselessly refigure themselves as the fundamental disposition he called "will to power" gives rise to successive arrays of power relationships among them. His idea of the "eternal recurrence" underscores this conception of the world, in which things ever happen in this same manner. He thus construed human nature and existence naturalistically: "The soul is only a word for something about the body," he wrote; and the body is fundamentally an arrangement of natural forces and processes manifesting the "will to power." At the same time, however, he stressed the importance of social institutions and interactions in human development. He also insisted upon the possibility of the emergence of exceptional human beings ("higher men") capable of an independence and creativity elevating them above the general human level ("the herd"), and he proclaimed the "overman" *(Übermensch)* to be "the meaning of the earth," representing the overcoming of the "all-too-human" and the attainment of the fullest possible "enhancement of life."

Thus, far from seeking to diminish our humanity by stressing our animality, Nietzsche sought to direct our attention and efforts to the emergence of a "higher humanity" capable of endowing existence with a redemptive human justification. He espoused a "Dionysian value-standard" based upon an affirmation of the "will to power" as the creative transformation of existence; and he accordingly made the "enhancement of life" and creativity the central themes of his "revaluation of values" and value-theory.

Insisting that moralities ought to be understood and assessed "in the perspective of life," Nietzsche argued that most of them were obstructive rather than conducive to the enhancement of life, reflecting all-too-human needs, weaknesses, and fears. Distinguishing between "master" and "slave" moralities, he found the latter to have eclipsed the former, issuing in a dominant "herd-animal morality" well-suited to the mediocre who are

the human rule but stultifying and detrimental to potential exceptions. Therefore he advocated a "higher morality" for the latter, one that would be "beyond good and evil" and better attuned to their attainment of an enhanced, creative form of life. This reflects the linkage of his notions of such a "higher humanity" and the associated "higher morality" to his conception of art. Art, involving the creative transformation, in restricted contexts, of the world as we find it, anticipates the kind of life that might be lived more fully in this manner and constitutes a step toward its emergence.

Influence. In the decades following Nietzsche's collapse, a veritable Nietzsche cult developed in central Europe, as self-styled followers produced a variety of influential but simplistic and distorted interpretations of his thought. Thus he was depicted by turns as a latter-day Romantic, an iconoclastic nihilist, a social Darwinist, and a racist and protofascist. He also attracted a substantial following in artistic and literary circles beyond as well as within central Europe. It was only slowly, however, that he began to be taken seriously by philosophers, and even then he was, and continues to be, interpreted in ways lending themselves to diverse philosophical purposes that often stand in a rather problematical relation to his own.

The common association of Nietzsche with existential philosophy, for example, is owing to his appropriation (in different ways) first by such German existential philosophers as Heidegger and Jaspers and then by French existentialists, notably Sartre and Camus. For others, he was a leading representative of *Lebensphilosophie;* as such he influenced the philosophical-anthropological movement that developed out of this school in central Europe. He was also one of the sources upon which members of the Frankfurt School drew in their attempts to develop a critical theory of society and culture. More recently still, he has been warmly embraced by post-structuralist French philosophers, who derive much of their inspiration from their reading of him. Certain recent Anglo-American analytical philosophers have discovered in him a kindred spirit as well.

Nietzsche and Religion. Unlike most philosophers of importance before him, Nietzsche was openly and profoundly hostile to most forms of religious thought (with the notable exception of that of the early Greeks). He declared "war" upon the major world religions and their theologies, contending not only that they perpetuate superstitions and errors for which there is no longer any excuse but also that they are deeply objectionable owing to their detrimental impact upon human life. It was above all their purported "crimes against life" for which he attacked them, arguing that they have fed upon and fostered weakness, sickliness, life-weariness, and *ressentiment*, and that they have poisoned the wellsprings of human health, strength, and vitality by "de-valuing" all "naturalistic values."

Thus Nietzsche undertook to "revalue" religious values, to expose the "all-too-human" origins and motivations of religious ways of thinking, and to undermine all otherworldly theologies, seeking to deprive them of any appearance of legitimacy they might still retain. He intended both to make their emergence and continuing acceptance understandable as human phenomena and at the same time to render them unacceptable to those capable of doing without them and of thinking clearly and honestly. He had some respect for a religion like Christianity as a form of life answering to a certain (interesting but flawed) configuration of human traits, and associated Jesus with this human possibility, but he contended that historical Christianity represented a perversion of it, fostering life-endangering attitudes and seducing potentially healthier human types into stunted or self-destructive forms of existence.

Although Nietzsche may have done religion in general and Christianity in particular a considerable injustice, he compelled their advocates to consider whether and how various forms of religion could be exonerated of his charges against them. He also gave strong impetus to attempts to develop new theologies that dispensed with traditional conceptions of God and the soul in favor of alternative ways of conceiving of the divine and the spiritual nature of mankind. In other quarters, his attack upon traditional religious ways of thinking prompted their defiant defense, thereby contributing indirectly to the resurgence of neoorthodoxy in opposition to the liberal-theological and naturalistic secular currents of modern thought. Finally, Nietzsche helped to stimulate a reconsideration of the relation between religion and theology. The idea that the most important thing about a religion is the difference it makes in the lives of those who embrace it, rather than the belief system it elaborates, owes much to him, even though most religious thinkers who have followed him in this have tended to assess the effects of religion on the lives of believers very differently than he did.

Nietzsche may not have subverted religion as decisively as he desired and claimed to have done, for his criticisms do not leave all its forms without any means of defense. His critique cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and if it is accorded the serious consideration by religious thinkers it deserves, then the religious issue of this confrontation will be arguably more deserving of respect than most of religion as he knew and conceived it. In any case, anyone well disposed toward religion

would do well to make the experiment of attempting to view it through Nietzsche's eyes. This may not lead one to abandon religion, but it is almost certain to alter one's view of it to good effect.

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NIHILISM. *See* Doubt and Belief *and the biography of Nietzsche.*

NIKEPHOROS (758–828), patriarch of Constantinople. Nikephoros lived during the Iconoclastic Controversy (726–843), a crisis that involved all levels of Byzantine society in a desperate struggle. The reality of Christ became the theological justification for the veneration of icons, which was tested and fought for in the arenas of imperial and ecclesiastical authority. The iconophiles, who supported the use of icons in the church, perceived the challenge of their iconoclast rulers as an attack against the person of Jesus Christ.

Nikephoros's birth in Constantinople coincided with a brewing storm of persecution initiated by Emperor Constantine V (741–775), which was also directed against Nikephoros's father. Attached to the service of the empire as secretary and director of the largest poorhouse in the capital, Nikephoros also served as the imperial spokesman at the Second Council of Nicaea (787). This experience was to serve him well during his tenure as patriarch (806–815), during which he witnessed the political vicissitudes of three imperial masters.

Like his predecessors Germanos and Tarasios, the patriarch was an advocate of a moderate policy through which concessions were made to extremists of both the imperial and ecclesiastical factions. Nikephoros remained resolute when the orthodox faith was at stake, as is proved by his long exile under Leo V from 815 until his death.

Scholars have increasingly recognized that Nikephoros's role in the controversy was more important during this period of exile, when he turned to a literary refutation of the heterodoxy of Constantine V and the iconoclastic Synod of Hagia Sophia (815), than it was during the preceding period, when he was a hierarch actively in office.

Dogmatically sophisticated, Nikephoros displayed extraordinary skill as he worked within the larger context of theological concerns, which he presented in such a way as to support the veneration of icons. Moreover, as a direct descendant of the apostolic tradition and Cappadocian synthesis, he worked out the problems faced by both John of Damascus and Theodore of Studios by elucidating the dogmatic and philosophical relation between an image and its archetype, the difference between art and circumscription, and the continuity of tradition as exemplified in the church's kerygma and witness concerning the icons. His subtle argumentation is a unique addition to the iconophiles' arsenal supporting Christ's iconographic depiction. Nikephoros's singular achievement was to sever the teaching on icons from an iconoclastic theology—traceable back to monophysitism with its Origenistic, Neoplatonic spiritualism—and to identify this teaching as an uninterrupted continuation of Chalcedonian Christology, with its reaffirmation of the historical facts of the New Testament.

As the last well-known iconophile theologian, Nikephoros may have wanted to be remembered primarily as the author whose work could have served as the basis for a future orthodox synod. But his generation overlooked, perhaps not intentionally, his theological efforts and praised the sanctity of his life. The patriarch in exile became the symbol of unity for both clergy in the world and monastics and a reconciler between iconophiles and iconoclasts in the strife that lasted for two more decades. Not until the restoration of the icons (11 March 843) could his followers transfer his holy rel-

ics back to Constantinople and honor their prelate as a saint-confessor of Orthodox Christianity.

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JOHN TRAVIS

NIKEPHOROS KALLISTOS (c. 1256–1335), more fully Nikephoros Kallistos Xanthopoulos; Byzantine theologian and church historian. Most probably Nikephoros was a native of Constantinople and had served as a priest on the staff of the Hagia Sophia cathedral. Of the very little that we know about his life, it seems certain that, during the reign of Emperor Andronikos the Elder (1282–1328), Nikephoros was active in ecclesiastical affairs and sided with those who opposed union with Rome.

Nikephoros wrote several works. His eighteen-book *Ecclesiastical History* covers the period from the birth of Christ to 610 and is important because it provides information on hagiology and on the theological and christological controversies of the early centuries. A summary of five more books at the end of his introduction to the *History* has been accepted as an indication that he intended to continue the narrative to 912. There is no evidence that Nikephoros intended to write a general ecclesiastical history from the church's inception to his own time. Though the earliest books depend heavily on the church historians of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, such as Eusebius of Caesarea, Socrates, Sozomenos, Theodoretos, Evagrios Scholastikos, and Theodore the Lector, Krumbacher (1897) has rightly observed that "in matters and topics dear to him, [Nikephoros] was an original and worthy author."

Of his other writings, Nikephoros's didactic poems became very popular and have survived in many manuscripts. He also wrote several liturgical, exegetical, and hagiographical works, including a synopsis of the holy scripture in iambics, the *Siege of Jerusalem*, the life and miracles of Nicholas of Myra, seven hymns to the *theotokos*, and several short hymns for the Akathistos Hymn. He wrote homilies on and commentaries to *Psalms* and homilies on Gregory of Nazianzus.

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DEMETRIOS J. CONSTANTELOS

NIKKŌ (1246–1333), Japanese Buddhist priest and one of the chief disciples of Nichiren (d. 1282). Although Nichiren did not designate a particular successor, on his deathbed he selected six of his senior disciples, Nisshō (1221–1323), Nichirō (1245–1320), Nikō (1253–1341), Nitchō (1252–1317), Nichiji (1250–?), and Nikkō, to carry on his work. Following the death of Nichiren, these six decided among themselves to assume care on a rotating basis of the temple named Kuonji that had been founded at Mount Minobu by Nichiren in 1281. Under this agreement, the priests, assisted by disciples living in the area, resolved to take up residence at the temple in one-month shifts. Political circumstances, however, intervened to frustrate their plans. Nikkō and Nichiji, who were living near Minobusan, faced little difficulty in fulfilling their obligations, but the other priests came under considerable pressure from Nagasaki Yoritsuna, minister of war and a powerful foe of the Nichiren group, and thus were unable to leave the capital city of Kamakura. In 1285, Nikkō agreed to a request by Nambu Sanenaga, a patron of the temple, and the other five senior disciples that he take up permanent residence on Minobusan. By 1288, Nikō was able to join Nikkō there following the relaxation of Yoritsuna's efforts to suppress the order.

Later, Nambu Sanenaga made an image of Śākyamuni Buddha and worshiped it. Nikkō contended that the image of the Buddha should be accompanied by companion images of the four disciples of the "original" Śākyamuni in order to distinguish it from that of the "historical" Śākyamuni. Nikō, on the other hand, was

inclined to permit worship of the icon unflanked by images of the four disciples. When Nambu Sanenaga sided with Nikō, Nikkō left Minobusan and in 1288 founded the Kōmon-ha subsect. In 1290 he established his own temple, the Taisekiji, at Ōishi-ga-hara in Suruga Province (Shizuoka-ken), and the following year moved to a new hermitage at Kitayama, two miles north of the Taisekiji. In 1298 the hermitage was remodeled into a full-fledged temple and renamed the Honmonji. Nikkō served as abbot of both temples until his death in 1333.

Although Nikkō is not responsible for the formulation of any independent doctrine, he is historically significant for his role in creating the first split in the Nichiren school. Later generations of Kōmon-ha adherents, notably Nichiu (1409–1482), the ninth abbot of the Taisekiji, advocated an identification of Nichiren with the "original" Buddha and prohibited the worship of images, but these doctrines cannot be traced back to the influence of Nikkō.

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MURANO SENCHU

NIKODIMOS OF THE HOLY MOUNTAIN (c. 1749–1809), known also as the Hagiorite, Greek Orthodox spiritual father and writer. Nikodimos was born on the Greek island of Naxos and studied in Smyrna, where he was taught Latin, Italian, and French. His teacher was the famous monk Chrysanthos Aitolos (d. 1785). Nikodimos was influenced by the hesychast tradition, which stressed mental prayer, and by the Kollyvades movement, which emphasized strict adherence to the doctrinal and liturgical traditions of the church. At the age of twenty-six Nikodimos went to Mount Athos. Two years later, in 1777, Makarios of Corinth arrived there, and a fruitful collaboration between him and Nikodimos began. Together, they published the *Philokalia*, a collection of the writings and sayings of the great ascetic Fathers of the church. Nikodimos also published *Concerning Continual Communion*, in which he made the unusual recommendation to the Orthodox that they receive Holy Communion frequently, in accordance with the ancient Christian practice. In his *Handbook of Counsel* Nikodimos developed the practice of mental prayer. In the *Pedalion* (The Rudder) he collected and paraphrased the canons of the church. Finally, in addition to editing hymns and publishing exegetical works and lives of the saints, Nikodimos translated into Greek an Italian work by the Jesuit Giovanni P. Pinamonti (1632–1703) that was probably based on the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius of Loyola. He also translated *Spiritual Combat* by Lorenzo Scupoli (c. 1530–1610) into Greek, calling it *Unseen Warfare*.

In 1955 the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople officially proclaimed Nikodimos a saint of the church, and his memory is commemorated on 14 July. As a prolific writer, splendid theologian, and practitioner of the prayer of the heart, Nikodimos contributed greatly to the awakening of the Greek Orthodox people during the difficult years of the Ottoman conquest.

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GEORGE S. BEBIS

NIKON (1605–1681), patriarch of Moscow, Russian Orthodox church reformer. Nikon briefly dominated the Russian political and ecclesiastical scene in the mid-seventeenth century. Not least of his achievements was that he rose from utter obscurity to do so. He served a Moscow parish for ten years but turned his back on the capital in the early 1630s when his three children all died suddenly. Both he and his wife decided to become monastics. Much of the time Nikon lived as a solitary (1634–1643). He was, however, elected abbot of the Kozheezero hermitage and by 1646 was abbot of an important monastery in Moscow. There he was befriended by the tsar. Hardly three years later he was appointed metropolitan (archbishop) of Novgorod and by 1652 was in line for election to the patriarchal throne itself.

By this time Nikon was clearly aligned with the reformers of the Russian church, the "God-seekers." They had encouraged a notable revival in the moral and liturgical life of the Russian people. At the time of his election Nikon had elicited an unusual promise of obedience from the tsar and boyars of the realm. He was now to implement it in an unprecedented fashion. He proceeded at an accelerated pace—and at his own initiative—with new liturgical reforms. The principle on which he based these reforms was that Orthodoxy was universal rather than merely Muscovite; that Russia

gained its Orthodoxy from the Greeks; and that Greek models should be followed wherever any discrepancy could be detected between Greek and Russian practice. Nikon did not pause to consider that such discrepancies could well be legitimate and that seventeenth-century Greek practice might not be any more "authentic" than Russian.

Popular piety was outraged by some of Nikon's earliest reforms, not least because they involved the use of three fingers instead of two for the frequently used sign of the cross. In any case, Russians had long been used to thinking of Muscovite faith and practice as normative. Within a few years a schism developed, which remains unhealed in the late-twentieth century. Whereas Nikon's own commitment to his reforms seems to have wavered within a few years, Old Ritualists (otherwise known as Old Believers) consistently accepted persecution rather than tolerate the new ways.

Paradoxically, the Russian church councils of 1666 and 1667, which accepted the Nikonian reforms and excommunicated the conservative Old Ritualists, also sat in judgment on Nikon himself. Their hidden agenda was the question of authority. Nikon was seen by the councils as having too readily accepted papal standards of authority. For example, he had published in Russian the spurious *Donation of Constantine* (a ninth-century document fabricated to strengthen the power of the Roman see), and he advocated the medieval formulation of the "two swords," which was held to justify the pope's authority over church and state alike. He insisted that the priesthood possessed primacy vis-à-vis the ruler and resisted any secular challenge to church prerogatives or ownership of land. All this caused resentment among the boyars and eventually also in the tsar. It was Tsar Aleksei himself who saw to it in 1666 that the church council depose his former friend Nikon. He thus paved the way for the 1720 reforms of Peter the Great, which involved the absolute (administrative) subjugation of church to state.

Nikon was subsequently exiled to the north and his status reduced to that of a simple monk. When the new tsar, Fedor, permitted him to return to Moscow (1681) it was already too late: Nikon died on the journey south at Yaroslavl. Nonetheless, his burial was that of a patriarch.

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SERGEI HACKEL

NILSSON, MARTIN P. (1874–1967), Swedish classicist. Martin Persson Nilsson enrolled as a student in classical studies at the University of Lund in 1892, where in 1900 he earned his Ph.D. degree with a dissertation on the Attic festivals of Dionysos. He became instructor of Greek language and literature at the same university, and also taught archaeology; under the university's auspices he participated in the Danish excavations at Lindos, Rhodes, between 1905 and 1907. In 1909 he was appointed to the new chair of classical archaeology and ancient history at Lund, which he occupied until his retirement in 1939. Among the numerous recognitions he received were his appointment as member to the Society of Letters (in Lund), membership in the Royal Academy of Letters, History, and Antiquities (in Stockholm), and membership in the Royal Danish Academy. In 1939–1940 he taught at the University of California at Berkeley and lectured at various places in the United States under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Norton Lectureship of the Archaeological Institute of America.

In his early years, Nilsson was greatly interested in primitive religion and in anthropology, interests that resulted in publications on primitive culture and religion. Although he himself dated the beginnings of his extensive work on Greek religion to the early 1920s, James G. Frazer wrote as early as 1924 that Nilsson had "long been known to scholars as one of the most learned and sagacious exponents of ancient Greek life and thought," in his introduction to Nilsson's *A History of Greek Religion* (1925). Among Nilsson's other studies on Greek and Roman religions in general, the most widely known are "Die Griechen," a chapter in P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye's edition of *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* (1925), and especially his major work, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (1941–1950). He dealt specifically with Greek folk religion and piety in *Greek Popular Religion* (1940) and *Grekisk religiostet* (1946). By his careful analysis of the impact and influence of the Minoan-Mycenaean religion and culture upon ancient Greek religion, Nilsson has undoubtedly made his most widely recognized contribution to the field. In all his major studies on Greek religion Nilsson discussed this subject, and a number of his publications specifically deal with it, especially *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and Its Survival in Greek Religion* (1927).

Among his numerous other publications, several deal with festivals, calendars, and time reckoning, primarily (but not exclusively) using data from the Greek world. Bordering the field of New Testament studies is his *The Historical Hellenistic Background of the New Testament* (1941), while some of his other essays treat the wider fields of religious studies in general and the history and comparative study of religions. At points, his work touches on some methodological issues. In his writings Nilsson often offers valuable surveys and critical assessments of existing literature. For example, he rejects Erwin Rohde's thesis of the Thracian-Dionysian origin of the belief in immortality; he objects strongly to all antievolutionists and to every approach that he brands "ahistorical" (including that of Walter F. Otto); and he speaks sarcastically about Geo Widengren and other "adherents of the High God Belief." For the context of this last criticism, see his article "Letter to Professor Arthur D. Nock on Some Fundamental Concepts in the Science of Religion" (*Harvard Theological Review* 42, 1949, p. 105).

Nilsson's own understanding of primitive religion included a modified notion of *mana*, or sacred power. He opted, with Gerardus van der Leeuw, for the term *dynamism* to describe the religions of primitive peoples, but he stressed that "power appears to consciousness only in separate phenomena or cases" and that "one cannot speak of a concept of power" (ibid., p. 91). This integral aspect of Nilsson's work, along with his self-confessed evolutionism (not in the sense of historical development but as a conceptual, logical series) are some of the points on which Nilsson has been most severely criticized. Specifically, the impact of his idea of *mana* on his interpretation of the Greek concept of the *daimōn* as "impersonal power" has been sharply attacked.

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WILLEM A. BIJLEFELD

NIMBĀRKA (fl. mid-fourteenth century?), a Telugu brahman, also called Nimbāditya or Niyamānanda. It is believed that Nimbārka came from Nimba or Nimbapura in the Bellary district (Mysore state), but tradition associates him mostly with Mathurā, the center of the Vaiṣṇava faith in North India. His date has been a matter of controversy among scholars. Since he refers to Rāmānuja's view in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*, he must have lived shortly after Rāmānuja (R. G. Bhandarkar's conjecture). But Surendranath Dasgupta (1940) dates him roughly around the middle of the fourteenth century CE. Dasgupta's argument seems convincing, for this date fits well with the tentative chronology of the four Vaiṣṇava Vedānta schools—those that opposed the Advaita Vedānta school of Śaṅkara. Nimbārka was the founder of one of the four traditionally recognized Vaiṣṇava sects or *sampradāya*s. These sects are known as Śrī Sampradāya (followers of Rāmānuja), Brahma Sampradāya (followers of Madhva), Rudra Sampradāya (followers of Vallabhācārya), and Sanakādi Sampradāya (followers of Nimbārka).

Of the approximately nine works attributed to Nimbārka, the most notable are his commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtra* and on the *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*, and an independent work, the *Daśaślokī*. Some of the others are neither available in print nor completely preserved, even in their manuscript forms.

Nimbārka's philosophy is usually called *dvaitādvaitavāda*, "the theory of dualism and nondualism." This description is based upon the main question raised by all the Vedāntins: what is the relation between *brahman* and the world, or between *brahman* and man? Is this an absolute nondifference (Śaṅkara) or absolute difference, or both? Unlike Śaṅkara, all the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins argued that the world is real. Rāmānuja was the first to take the lead in attacking Advaita. But while Rāmānuja called his view "qualified nondualism" Nimbārka called it "both dualism and nondualism." Madhva asserted the view of "dualism" while Vallabha leaned toward "nondualism." For Nimbārka, *brahman* was not an impersonal entity, but was identified as a personal, omnipotent God. Unlike Śaṅkara, all of the Vaiṣṇavas talked about a personal god (= *brahman* = Kṛṣṇa = Hari = Viṣṇu) and supported the cultivation of *bhakti* ("devotional attachment") toward such a godhead. Nimbārka's Vedānta is very similar to Rāmānuja's in this regard.

According to Nimbārka, the *brahman* is Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is omniscient, omnipotent, and the ultimate cause. He is all-pervading. He has transformed himself into the material constituents of the world and *jīva*s ("sentient beings"). Two analogies are cited to emphasize that in spite of this essential nondifference (one inter-

pretation of "transformation") between cause and effects, *brahman* maintains his independence or difference. Just as the *prāṇa* ("life force") manifests itself into various activities of the senses and the mind, but still retains its independence and individuality, and just as a spider spins out of its own body the web and yet remains independent, *brahman* creates sentient beings and the material world out of himself but still remains pure and full and undiminished in his glory and power.

Nimbārka used his dialectical skill in refuting the views of Śaṅkara and other rivals. In spite of the fact that his theory was very similar to that of Rāmānuja, his skill in argumentation and his novelty in presentation earned him a permanent and independent place in the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta tradition. His explanation of the *līlā* theory (that creation is only a spontaneous sport of the ever-perfect, ever-blissful Hari) had a freshness that captured the imagination of many *bhakta*s or devotees. His immediate pupil, Śrīnivāsa, wrote a commentary called *Vedānta-kaustubha* on his *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*. Many other scholars followed Śrīnivāsa. Among them were Keśava Kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa, Puruṣottama Prasāda, Mukunda, and Vanamāli Miśra, who kept alive the Nimbārka substream of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta.

[*See also the biographies of Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara, Madhva, and Vallabha.*]

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BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

NIMBUS. The nimbus, or halo, usually pictured as a luminous figure around the head of a god or holy person, is clearly related in some instances to the sun and solar divinities. Among the native civilizations of Central America, agrarian gods are often pictured with golden crowns or nimbuses. The Inca deity Viracocha wears a tiara that is also the sun. Combining the natures of a sun god and a storm god, Viracocha participates in the character of the highest universal beings, such as Yahveh/El, Zeus, and the Buddha, who in some representations both wields a thunderbolt and wears a nimbus. The nimbus can also be traced, however, to the idea of an external expression of an internal supernatural force, and hence partakes of the full range of light symbolism from both Western and Eastern traditions; in particular, its light signifies intellect or mystical knowledge.

The Iranians pictured what the Avesta terms the *khvarenah* as a sort of supernatural fire, a nimbus, or an aureole, which is like the nimbus but encircles the whole person. It belonged primarily to the gods but could be given to royalty by the grace of the chief divinity, Ahura Mazdā. In Vajrayāna Buddhism in Tibet, the Vidyārajas represent the wrathful side of the absolute wisdom of Vairocana as the *bodhisattva*s represent the calm side. Encircling the supreme being, they wear aureoles of blazing flames and direct them against the darkness of *avidyā* (ignorance), which prevents aspirants from gaining emancipation.

More commonly, the nimbus expresses holiness or sacred character rather than action: two early texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism describe the *bodhisattva* as having a halo studded with five hundred Buddhas, each of which is, in turn, attended by numberless gods. As a way of picturing the wholly transcendent nature of the Buddha, some portraits show his head and halo as a wheel.

In Greece and Rome, the nimbus was often shown around the heads of gods and those in special relationships with them. It acquired fine distinctions in Christian art: the rectangular nimbus, for example, belonged to someone still living at the time the picture was made, whereas a nimbus with three rays or groups of rays was one of several forms that could be given only to the members of the Trinity, usually to the Son.

Between the sixth and twelfth centuries CE, the nimbus was depicted as luminous and transparent. Later representations were more stylized. Sometimes it was opaque, and between 1300 and 1500 the name or initials of a saint were often decoratively inscribed on the nimbus itself. During this same period, the nimbus sometimes appeared around animals when they symbolized divinities or holy persons. In depictions of Jesus Christ or the Virgin Mary with the child Jesus, the aureole was sometimes used.

Another, possibly related, version of the aureole occurs in Islamic representations of a person inside a pearl: here the pearl represents Paradise, where those who are blessed go after death.

[*See also* Iconography.]

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The nimbus as a Christian symbol has been described in detail in many books on Christian symbolism in art. Typical of these is George W. Ferguson's *Signs and Symbols in Christian Art* (Oxford, 1954). Most of the time these discussions are general and have little or no explanation of deeper meanings. The Mahāyāna texts in which the nimbus of the *bodhisattva* is de-

scribed are the *Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra* and the *Vajracchedika Sūtra*.

ELAINE MAGALIS

NINHURSAGA ("mistress of the foothills") was the highest-ranking Mesopotamian goddess and, with An and Enlil, a member of the ruling triad of gods. Her Akkadian name, *Belitili*, means "mistress of the gods." With the beginning of the second millennium BCE and the growth of patriarchal attitudes she was replaced in the triad by Enki (Ea). The earliest form of Ninhursaga's name was simply *Hursag*, designating her as the numinous power immanent in the foothills and near ranges of the Zagros Mountains to the east. Other names often found for her are *Ninmah* ("august mistress"), *Dingirmah* ("not just Mah; august deity"), and *Nintur* ("mistress birth-hut"), designating her as the numinous power in the hut where pregnant animals were sheltered during birth giving in fold and pen. Major centers of her cult were Kesh (not yet identified) and Adab (Bismāya). According to one tradition her husband was Enlil, who engendered on her the seasons Summer and Winter, as also the god of thunderstorms and floods, Ningirsu. A different tradition makes her the wife of Shulpae, a god of wildlife in the desert. Ninhursaga's daughter Lisin was a goddess of wild asses, and she herself was closely connected with the characteristic fauna of the foothills, especially the stag.

It seems likely that at least two originally independent major figures were merged in Ninhursaga: a goddess of the foothills and their wildlife, Hursag, and a goddess of birth, Nintur. Since herders pastured their flocks or herds on the lush mountain slopes in the lambing and calving season, such syncretism may have seemed natural. Nintur was not only the power for birth giving but also for the development and formation of the embryo during pregnancy. As such she had the epithets *Ninzizna* ("mistress of the embryo"), *Nindim* ("mistress fashioner"), and *Nagarshaga* ("carpenter of the womb"). She is a very early goddess, with roots in European and Anatolian Neolithic cultures. A plaque dating from Old Babylonian times pictures her nursing an infant and with babies' heads protruding from her shoulders. On either side of her hangs on pegs her omega-shaped symbol, a representation of the uterus of a cow, and on the ground squat two emaciated figures supporting their chin in their hands. They represent embryos, possibly prematurely born fetuses, for which a Sumerian term was *susagaduga* ("[with] the hands put to the head"). Such figures have been found with images of a birth goddess in Romania and Moldavia dating from the fifth millennium BCE.

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THORKILD JACOBSEN

NINURTA was a Mesopotamian god of thunderstorm, war, and hunting. His name in Sumerian means "lord of the earth." Ninurta was the son of the great cosmic god of the earth, Enlil, and his cultic place was, like Enlil's, at Nippur. In the Sumerian period Ninurta is to be equated with Ningirsu, tutelary deity of Girsu, a quarter in the city of Lagash. Each of the major gods of the Mesopotamian pantheon could be designated by a symbolic number ranging from ten to sixty (sixty being the highest, in accordance with the Mesopotamian sexagesimal system). Ninurta/Ningirsu, like his father Enlil, had the second highest number, fifty, hence his temple at Lagash was called Eninnu ("house of fifty"). As a god of thunderstorms, Ninurta is extolled in hymns and prayers as a provider of fertility and vegetation; as a warrior god, he is praised as the champion of his father, Enlil, and the defender of the people against external enemies. In the Angimdimma myth Ninurta is portrayed as a thunderbird warrior returning from battle in his war chariot, and in the Lugale myth he fights and vanquishes a number of stones that have invaded his city, Nippur. In the Akkadian myth of Anzu, Ninurta is selected as the champion of the gods to retrieve the tablets of destiny stolen by the storm bird Anzu from Ninurta's father, Enlil.

As the god of war, Ninurta achieved special prominence in the militaristic Middle Assyrian and Neo-Assyrian periods. Ashurnasirpal II, king of Assyria (ninth century BCE), prefaced one of his inscriptions with a long paean to Ninurta, praising him as "the splendid [and] perfect warrior whose attack in battle is unequaled," "the angry [and] merciless whose attack is a deluge," "the one who overwhelms enemy land [and] fells the wicked," and so forth.

Ninurta was also god of the hunt. Tiglathpileser I (r. c. 1115–1077 BCE) recorded that at Ninurta's command, during a certain hunt he slew numerous "extraordinary wild virile bulls," ten strong bull elephants, hundreds of lions, and every kind of wild beast and winged bird of the heavens.

[*See also* Mesopotamian Religions, *overview article.*]

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DAVID MARCUS

NIRVĀṆA. About twenty-five centuries ago in northern India, Siddhārtha Gautama achieved *nirvāṇa*. That event ultimately changed the spiritual character of much of Asia and, more recently, some of the West. That something indeed happened is an indisputable fact. Exactly what happened has been an object of speculation, analysis, and debate up to the present day.

Nirvāṇa is both a term and an ideal. As a Sanskrit word (*nibbāna* in Pali), it has been used by various religious groups in India, but it primarily refers to the spiritual goal in the Buddhist way of life. In the broadest sense, the word *nirvāṇa* is used in much the same way as the now standard English word *enlightenment*, a generic word literally translating no particular Asian technical term but used to designate any Buddhist notion of the highest spiritual experience. Of course, Buddhism comprehends a diverse set of religious phenomena, a tradition with sacred texts in four principal canonical languages (Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese), and a spiritual following throughout the world. Not surprisingly, then, when referring to the ultimate spiritual ideal many Buddhist groups prefer to emphasize their own distinctive terms instead of *nirvāṇa*.

Nirvāṇa in the Early Buddhist and Abhidharma Traditions. In the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, works first written down or composed two or three centuries after the death of the Buddha, there is little philosophical discussion about the nature of *nirvāṇa*. Indeed, on technical points such as the enlightened person's status after death, the *sūtra*s admonish that such metaphysical speculation is only an obstacle to achieving the ultimate goal. In a famous story found in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, for example, Māluṅkyāputta asked the Buddha several metaphysical questions, including whether the Buddha continues to exist after death. The Buddha responded that such questioning is beside the point; it would be comparable to a man struck by a poison arrow who worried about the origin and nature of the arrow rather than pulling it out.

> Whether there is the view that the Tathāgata both is and is not after dying, or whether, Māluṅkyāputta, there is the view that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, there *is* birth, there is ageing, there is dying, there are grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair, the suppression of which I lay down here and now.
>
> (Horner, 1954–1959, vol. 2, pp. 100–101)

In short, the early Buddhist texts primarily approached *nirvāṇa* as a practical solution to the existential problem of human anguish. Specifically, they maintained that by undertaking a disciplined praxis the Buddhist practitioner can achieve a nondiscursive awakening *(bodhi)* to the interdependent nonsubstantiality of reality, especially of the self. With that insight, it was believed, one could be released from the grips of insatiable craving and its resultant suffering.

In most cases *nirvāṇa* is described in negative terms such as "cessation" *(nirodha)*, "the absence of craving" *(tṛṣṇākṣaya)*, "detachment," "the absence of delusion," and "the unconditioned" *(asaṃskṛta)*. Although in the Nikāyas and subsequent Abhidharma school commentaries there are scattered positive references to, for instance, "happiness" *(sukha)*, "peace," and "bliss," and to such metaphors of transcendence as "the farther shore," the negative images predominate. Indeed, the word *nirvāṇa* itself means "extinction," and other words used synonymously with it, such as *mokṣa* and *mukti*, refer to emancipation. One difficulty with the early texts, however, is that they were not always clear or unequivocal about *what* was extinguished and *from what* one was emancipated. One prominent tendency was to understand *nirvāṇa* as a release from *saṃsāra*, the painful world of birth and death powered by passion, hatred, and ignorance. According to the early texts, the Eightfold Path leading to *nirvāṇa* is the only way to break free of this cycle and to eliminate the insatiable craving at its root. The Path is not merely a set of moral exhortations, but rather, a program of spiritual reconditioning that liberates one from the pain of *saṃsāra*. [*See* Eightfold Path.]

The Buddhist view of *saṃsāra* developed as the notion of rebirth was taking root in ancient India. So enlightenment came to be understood as the extinction *(nirvāṇa)* of what can be reborn, that is, as the dissolution of any continuing personal identity after death. This led to the need to distinguish between (1) the enlightenment of the person who has transcended in this world the suffering caused by craving, and (2) the perfect *nirvāṇa* achieved only when that person dies and is fully released from *saṃsāra*, the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. The Pali texts, therefore, distinguished "*nirvāṇa* with remainder" *(saupādisesa nibbāna)* from "*nirvāṇa* without remainder" *(anupādisesa nibbāna)*, or even more simply, enlightenment *(nibbāna)* from *complete* enlightenment *(parinibbāna;* Skt., *parinirvāṇa)*.

The Abhidharma traditions interpreted the distinction in the following way. After many lifetimes of effort and an overall improvement in the circumstances of rebirth, the person undertaking the Path finally reaches the stage at which craving and its attendant negative effects are no longer generated. This is the state of "*nirvāṇa* with remainder" because the residue of negative karmic effects from previous actions continues. The enlightened person still experiences physical pain, for example, as a consequence of the mere fact of corporeality, itself a karmic "fruit." Once these residues are burned off, as it were, the person will die and achieve the perfect "*nirvāṇa* without remainder."

An ambiguity in the distinction between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* is whether the contrasted terms refer to psychological or ontological states. That is, are *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* states of mind or kinds of existence? If *saṃsāra* refers to the psychological worldview conducive to suffering, then the transition from *saṃsāra* to *nirvāṇa* is simply a profound change in attitude, perspective, and motivation. If, on the other hand, *saṃsāra* refers to this pain-stricken world itself, then *nirvāṇa* must be somewhere else. Here the ancient metaphor of *nirvāṇa* as "the farther shore" could assume a metaphysical status. In effect, *nirvāṇa* could be understood as a permanent state of bliss beyond the world of birth, death, and rebirth. The reaction against such an interpretation influenced the Mahāyāna Buddhist views of enlightenment.

Nirvāṇa in the Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist Traditions. Indian Mahāyāna Buddhists minimized the opposition between *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*, renouncing the suggestion that *nirvāṇa* was an escape from the world of suffering. Instead, they thought of enlightenment as a wise and compassionate way of living in that world. The adherents of the two major Indian branches of Mahāyāna philosophy, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, each developed their own way of rejecting the escapism to which, it was thought, the Abhidharma interpretation led.

The Perfection of Wisdom and Mādhyamika traditions. One Mahāyāna strategy was to undercut the epistemological and logical bases for the sharp distinction between the concepts of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*. Without *nirvāṇa* there is no *saṃsāra*, and vice versa. How then could one be absolute and the other relative? This question was most clearly raised by the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) literature and philosophically analyzed in the Mādhyamika school founded by Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE).

In effect, Mādhyamika thought radicalized the Buddha's original silence on this critical issue by trying to demonstrate that any philosophical attempt to characterize reality is limited by the logical interdependence of words or concepts. Assuming an isomorphic relationship between words and nonlinguistic referents, Nāgārjuna reasoned that the interdependent character of words precludes their referring to any absolute, nondependent realities. To the very extent we can talk or reason about *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*, therefore, they must depend on each other. Neither can be absolute in itself.

For the Mādhyamikas, the real cause of human turmoil is that through naming and analyzing we try to grasp and hold onto what exists only through the distinctions imposed by the conventions of language. From this perspective, Buddhist practice frees one from this attachment to concepts by cultivating *prajñā*, a nondiscursive, direct insight into the way things are. Once one recognizes that the substantialized sense of ego is based on a linguistic distinction having no ultimate basis, an enlightened attitude develops in which one actively shares in the suffering of all other sentient beings. In this way, the wisdom of *prajñā* can also be considered a universal form of compassion, *karuṇā*. This *prajñā-karuṇā* ideal eventually became a major paradigm of enlightenment within the entire Mahāyāna tradition in India, Tibet, and East Asia. [*See* Mādhyamika; Prajñā; Karuṇā; *and the biography of Nāgārjuna.*]

Nirvāṇa in the idealistic and Yogācāra traditions. The typical approach of such idealistic texts as the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and of its related philosophical school, Yogācarā, was to assert that *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* had a common ground, namely, the activity of the mind. The terminology varied from text to text and thinker to thinker, but the thrust of this branch of Mahāyāna Buddhism was that the mind was the basis of both delusion (understood as *saṃsāra*) and enlightenment (understood as *nirvāṇa*). For many in this tradition, this implied that there is in each person an inherent core of Buddhahood covered over with a shell of delusional fixations. Sometimes this core was called the *tathāgata-garbha* ("Buddha womb, Buddha embryo," or "Buddha matrix"); in other cases it was considered to be part of a store-consciousness *(ālaya-vijñāna)* containing seeds *(bīja)* that could sprout either delusional or enlightened experience. In either case, Buddhist practice was seen as a technique for clarifying or making manifest the Buddha mind or Buddha nature within the individual. This notion of mind and its relation to Buddhist practice influenced the later development of Mahāyāna Buddhism, even the schools that first flourished in East Asia, such as T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Ch'an (Zen). [*See* Tathāgatagarbha *and* Ālaya-vijñāna.]

A problem raised by this more psychological approach to enlightenment was the issue of universality.

Is the inherent core of enlightenment in one person the same as in another? Is it equally present in everyone? With such questions, the difficulty of the ontological status of enlightenment once again emerged. That is, if both *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* are dependent on the mind in some sense, the problem for the Yogācāra philosophers was to explain the objective ground for *nirvāṇa*. Otherwise, truth would be merely subjective. Yogācāra thinkers such as Asaṅga (fourth century CE) and his brother, Vasubandhu, approached this problem by asserting a transindividual, mental ground for all experience called *ālaya-vijñāna*. Other Yogācāra thinkers such as Dignāga, however, rejected the existence of such a store-consciousness and tried to establish the necessary ground for objectivity within mental cognition itself, while denying the substantial reality of any object outside cognition. In general, the former approach persevered in the transmission of Yogācāra's philosophy into East Asia, where the idea of the ground of enlightenment or of the Buddha nature would become a major theme. [*See* Yogācāra *and the biographies of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga*.]

Buddhahood in devotional Mahāyāna Buddhism. *Nirvāṇa*'s ontological or metaphysical nature was also a theme in Mahāyāna religious practices quite outside the formal considerations of the philosophers. This development was associated with the rise of the notion that the historical Buddha who had died in the fifth century BCE was actually only an earthly manifestation of an eternal Buddha or of Buddhahood itself. This line of thought developed into the construction of a rich pantheon of Buddhas and *bodhisattva*s living in various heavenly realms and interacting with human beings in supportive ways. These heavenly figures became the objects of meditation, emulation, reverence, and supplication. [*See* Celestial Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.]

The evolution of the Buddhist pantheon was consistent with the general Mahāyāna principle that a necessary component of enlightenment is compassion. The Buddha, it was believed, would not desert those who had not yet achieved *nirvāṇa* and were still in a state of anguish. Whereas the physical person of the Buddha was extinguished, the compassion of his Buddhahood would seem to endure. Following this line of reasoning, the historical Buddha was taken to be only a physical manifestation of enlightened being itself. This interpretation made moot the question of *nirvāṇa* as the release from the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. If Buddhahood continues even after the physical disappearance of the enlightened person, enlightenment must be more *manifested* than achieved. This way of thinking was conducive to Mahāyāna Buddhism's transmission into East Asia.

Nirvāṇa in East Asian Buddhist Traditions. The Mahāyānists were generally more interested in the truth to which enlightenment was an awakening than the pain from which it was a release. This emphasis on the positive aspect of enlightenment also caused to be diminished the importance of *nirvāṇa* as the release from rebirth. This perspective was well suited to Chinese thought. Since the Chinese had no indigenous idea of the cycle of rebirth, release from that cycle was not the existential issue in China it had been in India.

A second Mahāyānist idea readily accepted by the Chinese was that enlightenment is available to anyone in this very lifetime. The Abhidharma traditions generally assumed the path to enlightenment would take eons, and that the last rebirth in this progression of lifetimes would be that of a monk blessed with the circumstances most conducive to concentrating on the final stages of the Path. This view led to a distinction between the spiritual development of monastics and laypersons: laypersons were to support monastics in their religious quest; such support would, in return, give the laypersons meritorious *karman* leading to successively better rebirths until they too were born into circumstances allowing them to reach the final stages of the Path.

The Mahāyāna ideal, on the other hand, was that of the *bodhisattva*, the enlightened (or, more technically, almost enlightened) being who chooses to be actively involved in alleviating the suffering of others by leading them to enlightenment. In other words, the *bodhisattva* subordinates personal enlightenment to that of others. Both Abhidharma and Mahāyāna Buddhism aim for the enlightenment of everyone, but whereas in the Abhidharma view enlightenment is achieved by one person at a time and the group as a whole pushes upward in a pyramid effect, supporting most the spiritual progress of those at the top, in Mahāyāna Buddhism the *bodhisattva*s at the top turn back to pull up those behind them until everyone is ready to achieve enlightenment simultaneously. Ultimately, the Mahāyāna model dominated in East Asia, partly because the collectivist viewpoint was more consistent with indigenous Chinese ideas predating the introduction of Buddhism. [*See* Bodhisattva Path.]

When Buddhism entered China around the beginning of the common era, Confucianism and Taoism were already well established. Confucianism placed its primary emphasis on the cultivation of virtuous human relationships for the harmonious functioning of society. This emphasis on social responsibility and collective virtue blended well with the Mahāyāna vision of enlightenment. [*See* Confucian Thought, *article on* Foundations of the Tradition.]

Compared to Confucianism, Taoism was relatively ascetic, mystical, and otherworldly. Yet its mysticism was strongly naturalistic in that the Taoist sage sought unity with the Tao by being in harmony with nature. In Taoism, as in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the absolute principle was completely immanent in this world, accessible to all who attune themselves to it by undertaking the proper form of meditation and self-discipline. Since one of the root meanings of the term *tao* is "path," the Chinese found parallels between the Buddhist sense of the Path and the Taoist understanding of achieving oneness with the Tao. [*See also* Taoism, *overview article.*]

Nirvāṇa in the T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen schools. Eventually there arose new forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism distinctive to East Asia, schools either unknown or only incipient in India. The term *nirvāṇa*, possibly because it carried connotations of a foreign worldview replete with such ideas as rebirth and the inherent unsatisfactoriness *(duḥkha)* of existence, tended to lose its privileged status in favor of such terms as "awakening" *(chüeh)* and "realization" *(wu)*.

The Chinese T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen traditions formulated their own sophisticated philosophical worldviews out of ideas suggested by Indian *sutra*s. Both schools emphasized the interpenetration of all things. In T'ien-t'ai terminology as developed by such philosophers as Chih-i (538–597), all the "three thousand worlds" are reflected in a single instant of thought. Reality's underlying, unifying factor was understood to be mind. [*See the biography of Chih-i.*] For T'ien-t'ai followers the fundamental mind is itself always pure and does not contain, as most Indian Yogācārins held, both delusional and enlightened seeds.

The T'ien-t'ai assumption of an underlying, inherently pure, mind had two important consequences. First, the goal of its primary contemplative practice, known as "cessation and discernment" *(chih-kuan)*, was explained as immersion into, rather than the purification of, mind. By ceasing to focus on the surface flow of ordinary phenomena, one can discern the underlying single mind at the source of all things. Second, since the underlying mind is pure or enlightened, it follows that all things, even inanimate ones, are endowed with Buddha nature. This corollary was first proposed by the ninth patriarch of the tradition, Chan-jan (711–782), who clearly articulated the view that the entire world, as it is, is already somehow enlightened. The goal, then, is to realize, awaken to, or manifest that enlightenment in one's own life. The relationship between inherent and acquired enlightenment became a central problematic in the T'ien-t'ai tradition and a major theme behind the development of the various schools of Japanese Buddhism in the Kamakura period (1185–1333) as well.

Chinese Hua-yen Buddhism also affirmed the interdependence among, and harmony within, all things. Unlike the adherents of T'ien-t'ai, however, the Hua-yen philosophers did not think of mind as the underlying, unifying entity. Fa-tsang (643–712), for example, preferred to deny any single unifying factor and used the phrase "the nonobstruction between thing and thing" *(shih-shih wu-ai)*. In other words, each phenomenon itself was thought to reflect every other phenomenon. Tsung-mi (780–841), on the other hand, favored the phrase "the nonobstruction between absolute principle and thing" *(li-shih wu-ai)*. Thus, he regarded principle (*li*) as the fundamental unifying substrate, even the creative source, of reality. [*See the biographies of Fa-tsang and Tsung-mi.*]

In all these T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen theories we find a recurrent, distinctively East Asian, interpretation of *nirvāṇa*. Just as the Confucians sought harmony within the social order and the Taoists harmony within the natural order, the T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen Buddhists understood enlightenment in terms of harmony. Rather than emphasizing the painful aspect of the world and the means to emancipation from it, the T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen Buddhists focused on recognizing the intrinsic harmony of the universe and feeling intimately a part of it. [*See* T'ien-t'ai *and* Hua-yen.]

Nirvāṇa in the Ch'an (Zen) school. Ch'an (Kor., Sŏn; Jpn., Zen) is another school with roots in India, but it developed into a full-fledged tradition only in East Asia. It is distinctive in its de-emphasis of the role of formal doctrine and religious texts in favor of a direct "transmission of mind" from master to disciple. Ch'an focused most on the interpersonal aspect of the enlightenment experience. Enlightenment was considered a stamp embodied in a particular lineage of enlightened people going back to the historical Buddha, and the personal encounters of great masters and disciples were recorded in order to serve as the object of meditation for future generations.

One topic of debate about enlightenment in the Ch'an school concerned the issue of whether enlightenment was "sudden" or "gradual." The Northern school emphasized the inherent purity of the mind and, therefore, advocated a practice intended to remove delusional thoughts covering over that intrinsically undefiled core. Then, it was assumed, the inherent enlightenment of the mind could shine forth ever more brilliantly. According to the *Platform Sutra*, a text of the Southern school, this position was expressed in a poem by Shen-hsiu (606–706) as follows:

> The body is the Bodhi tree,
> The mind is like a clear mirror.

> At all times we must strive to polish it,
> And must not let the dust collect.
> (Yampolsky, 1967, p. 130)

The members of the Southern school, on the other hand, accused their Northern school counterparts of reifying enlightenment into an independently existing thing. In the expression of Hui-neng (638–713) also recorded in the *Platform Sūtra*:

> Bodhi originally has no tree,
> The mirror also has no stand.
> Buddha nature is always clear and pure;
> Where is there room for dust?
> (ibid., p. 132)

In other words, enlightenment should be manifest at all times in all one's activities. It is not a separate state or seed to be nurtured or cared for. The goal for the Southern school, therefore, was to make enlightenment manifest while going about one's daily affairs. [*See the biography of Hui-neng.*] This viewpoint eventually led some Southern masters, especially those in the lineage of Ma-tsu (709–788), to de-emphasize simple meditation in favor of the shock tactics of shouting, striking, and using the *kung-an* (Jpn., *kōan*). These special techniques were all ways of making the disciple realize and manifest Buddha nature in a sudden manner.

Another approach to the sudden/gradual issue was originally taken by the previously mentioned Hua-yen (and Ch'an) master Tsung-mi, and later developed extensively by the great Korean Sŏn master, Chinul (1158–1210). Their view was that the Southern school (which eventually dominated for political as much as religious or philosophical reasons) was correct in maintaining that enlightenment, the awakening to one's own Buddha nature, had to be a sudden realization. Yet Tsung-mi and Chinul also maintained that realization had to be gradually integrated into one's life through a continuously deepening practice of spiritual cultivation. Thus, their position is known as "sudden awakening/gradual cultivation," rather than "sudden awakening/sudden cultivation." This distinction exemplifies the importance Ch'an philosophers accorded the need to define as precisely as possible the relationship between practice and enlightenment. [*See the biography of Chinul.*] Dōgen (1200–1253), the founder of the Japanese Sōtō Zen tradition, addressed the problem of how enlightenment could be inherent and yet practice still necessary. That is, if people are already primordially enlightened why should anyone bother to sit in meditation? Dōgen understood practice to be enlightened activity itself: one does not sit in meditation in order to achieve enlightenment, but rather, one's enlightenment is expressed as one's sitting in meditation. [*See the biography of Dōgen.*]

For virtually all the Ch'an (and Sŏn and Zen) traditions, enlightenment is more than an insight or even a sense of harmony. It is also a mode of *behavior* to be continuously enacted and tested in everyday life. Much of the interpersonal dynamics between master and disciple is designed to challenge the person to make *nirvāṇa* manifest in such ordinary activities as talking, working, eating, and washing, as well as meditating. [*See* Ch'an *and* Zen.]

Nirvāṇa in the Pure Land traditions. All forms of Buddhism discussed up to now have assumed that one can only achieve *nirvāṇa* through years (or even lifetimes) of concentrated practice. The Pure Land tradition, especially as developed by Shinran (1173–1262) in Japan, radically reinterpreted the notion of Buddhist practice, however.

Pure Land Buddhism is another Mahāyāna tradition that had its basis in Indian *sūtra*s but that only fully blossomed in East Asia. It began with a rather otherworldly orientation: the present period of history was considered so degenerate that it was thought to be no longer possible for human beings to practice genuine Buddhism and to achieve *nirvāṇa*. A *bodhisattva* named Dharmākara (Hōzō in Japanese), however, vowed not to allow himself to achieve full Buddhahood if people who called on his name with faith were not reborn in a Pure Land, a place ideally suited for Buddhist practice. In that Pure Land, people could attain enlightenment and even come back into the world as *bodhisattva*s to aid in the spiritual progress of others. The Pure Land *sūtra*s go on to explain that Dharmākara became the Buddha Amitābha/Amitāyus (Jpn., Amida). Therefore, he must have fulfilled his vow, and thus if people can call on that Buddha's name with complete faith in his compassion and power to help they will be guaranteed rebirth in the Pure Land.

The major lesson in this account for Pure Land Buddhists like Shinran was that human beings today cannot achieve *nirvāṇa* by their "own power" *(jiriki)*. Rather than help themselves through the practice of calculated, self-conscious actions (*hakarai*), people should simply resign themselves completely to the "power of another" *(tariki)*, that is, the power of Amida's compassionate vow. Even this act of the "entrusting heart and mind" *(shinjin)* must itself be an expression of Amida's vow and not an effort on one's own part. In this way, Shinran maintained that enlightenment could ultimately only be achieved by first releasing oneself to the spontaneousness "naturalness" *(jinen hōni)*, the active grace of Amida's compassion as this world itself. "Amida Buddha is the medium through which we are made to realize *jinen*" (Ueda, 1978, pp. 29–30). By subordinating even Amida and his vow to the principle of spontaneous naturalness in this way, Shinran re-

moved the otherworldly traces in Pure Land teaching, making it more suitable to its East Asian, particularly Japanese, context. [*See* Amitābha *and the biography of Shinran.*]

Nirvāṇa in the Esoteric traditions. The Esoteric, Vajrayāna, or Tantric forms of Buddhism can be generally viewed as extensions of Mahāyāna. In general, however, Esoteric Buddhism was most permanently influential in Tibet (including the Mongolian extensions of Tibetan Buddhism) and in Japan. In both cases, Esotericism merged its practices and doctrines with the indigenous shamanistic, archaic religions of, respectively, Bon and Shintō.

In terms of their understanding of *nirvāṇa* the Esoteric traditions added an important dimension to their otherwise generally Mahāyānistic outlook, namely, that enlightenment should be understood as participation in the enlightenment of the Buddha-as-reality (the *dharmakāya*). From this viewpoint, sacred speech (*mantras*), sacred gestures (*mudras*), and sacred envisioning (*maṇḍalas*) constitute a Buddhist ritualistic practice having an almost sacramental character. That is, in performing the rituals outlined in the Tantras, the Esoteric Buddhist believes that one's own speech, action, and thought become the concrete expression of the cosmic Buddha's own enlightenment.

This notion found a particularly clear formulation in the Japanese Shingon Buddhism established by Kūkai (774–835). According to Kūkai, the fundamental principle of Shingon practice and philosophy is that of *hosshin seppō*, "the Buddha-as-reality [*dharmakāya*] preaches the true teaching [*dharma*]." In making this claim, Kūkai rejected the exoteric Buddhist notion that only a historical Buddha *(nirmāṇakāya)* or a heavenly Buddha *(saṃbhogakāya)* can preach. All of reality in itself, according to Kūkai, is the symbolic expression of the *dharmakāya* Buddha's enlightened activity and, as such, is the direct manifestation of truth. The way to grasp this symbolic expression is not to be an audience to it, but rather to take part in it directly through Esoteric rituals. The individual's own enlightenment was considered an aspect of the cosmic Buddha's enlightened activity. Kūkai identified the Buddha-as-reality or the cosmic Buddha as the Great Sun Buddha, Dainichi Nyorai (Skt., Mahāvairocana). [*See* Mahāvairocana.]

Kūkai's view of enlightenment was, therefore, summarized in the phrase "attaining Buddha in and through this very body" *(sokushin jōbutsu)*. Through the ritualized, physical participation in the world, the person could become a concrete expression of Dainichi Buddha's enlightened action. Kūkai expressed this intimacy between the individual and Dainichi Buddha as "the Buddha enters the self and the self enters the Buddha" *(nyūga ganyū)*. In effect, the Mahāyāna Buddhist's identification of *nirvāṇa* with the world was taken to its most radical conclusion. That is, from the Shingon perspective, this very world *is* the Buddha Dainichi. This means that enlightenment is not inherent in the world, but rather, the world itself is the experience of enlightenment. [*See* Buddhism, Schools of, *article on* Esoteric Buddhism; Chen-yen; Shingonshū; *and the biography of Kūkai.*]

Conclusion. As this article has shown, there is no single Buddhist view of *nirvāṇa*. The Buddhist ideal varies with the culture, the historical period, the language, the school, and even the individual. Still, we do find in the Buddhist notions of *nirvāṇa* what Ludwig Wittgenstein would have called a "family resemblance," that is, a group of characteristics that no single family member entirely possesses but that all members share to such an extent that the members of one family are distinguishable from the members of another. In this case, the Buddhist conceptions of *nirvāṇa* share a set of qualities that can be summarized as follows.

1. *Nirvāṇa* is the release from ignorance about the way the world is. Because we do not understand the nature of human existence and the laws affecting human life, we live in either a state of outright suffering or in a state of disharmony. *Nirvāṇa* is ultimately acknowledging and living by the truths of our world. In that respect, its orientation is this-worldly.

2. The knowledge achieved by *nirvāṇa* is not merely intellectual or spiritual. *Nirvāṇa* is achieved through a process of psychological and physical conditioning aimed at reorienting and reversing ego-centered forms of thinking and behaving. *Nirvāṇa* is achieved through and with the body, not despite the body.

3. One is not alone on the Path. There is support from texts, philosophical teachings, religious practices, the Buddhist community, the examples of masters, and even the rocks and trees. Most of all, there is the power of compassion that one receives from others and that grows stronger the more it is offered to others.

4. *Nirvāṇa* is achieved by penetrating and dissolving the slashes or virgules separating humanity/nature, self/other, subject/object, and even *nirvāṇa/saṃsāra*. The particular pairs of opposition vary from place to place and time to time as Buddhism attacks the special dichotomies most destructive in a given culture during a specific period. *Nirvāṇa* entails a recognition of the inherent harmony and equality of all things.

5. *Nirvāṇa* has an intrinsically moral aspect. By eliminating all egocentric ideas, emotions, and actions, the enlightened person approaches others with either complete equanimity (wherein self and others are treated exactly the same) or with a compassionate involvement in alleviating the suffering of others (wherein self is subordinated to the needs of those less fortunate). Morality

can be considered the alpha and omega of *nirvāṇa*. That is, the Path begins with accepting various rules and precepts of behavior, whereas *nirvāṇa* culminates in the open, moral treatment of other people and things.

6. Although in any given context, one viewpoint is emphasized over the other, generally speaking, *nirvāṇa* can be understood from either a psychological or ontological perspective. Psychologically viewed, *nirvāṇa* is a radical change in attitude such that one no longer experiences the negative influence of egocentric thinking. If this perspective is misunderstood and overemphasized, however, it leads to a psychologism that holds that truth is simply in the mind without any connection to an external reality. The remedy for this distortion is to assert the ontological aspect of *nirvāṇa*.

Ontologically speaking, *nirvāṇa* is the affirmation of the inherent goodness of the world and even of human nature. In this sense, *nirvāṇa* is not merely a kind of experience (as depicted by the psychological view) but is also the content or even *ground* of an experience. If this ontological viewpoint is overemphasized, on the other hand, it can lead to the distorted idea that diligence and practice are arbitrary or even unnecessary. The remedy is, conversely, to neutralize that distortion with more emphasis on the psychological side of *nirvāṇa*.

In short, both the psychological and ontological views contain truths about the nature of *nirvāṇa*, but if either position is developed in such a way as to exclude the other, the result is a distortion of the Buddhist Path. For this reason, the two views coexist throughout Buddhist history, one view always complementing the other and checking any distortions that might arise out of a one-sided perspective.

[*See also* Buddhist Philosophy; Buddhist Ethics; Buddhist Literature, *article on* Exegesis and Hermeneutics; Language, *article on* Buddhist Views of Language; *and* Soteriology, *article on* Buddhist Soteriology.]

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As the fundamental ideal of Buddhism, *nirvāṇa* is discussed in a wide variety of works: *sūtras*, commentaries, and secondary critical works by scholars of various traditions. Any bibliography must be, therefore, incomplete and, at best, highly selective. The following works have been chosen for their particular relevance to the issues discussed in the foregoing article.

Nirvāṇa in the Indian Buddhist Traditions. Of the many references to *nirvāṇa* in the early Indian texts, certain passages have traditionally received the most attention. For example, in the Pali scriptures, the status of the Buddha after death (*parinibbāna*) is handled in various ways. Most prominent, undoubtedly, is the traditional account of the Buddha's passing away described in chapter 6 of the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*. A translation of this text by T. W. Rhys Davids is readily available as *Buddhist Suttas*, volume 11 of "The Sacred Books of the East," edited by F. Max Müller (1881; reprint, New York, 1969). An interesting feature of this account is its clear distinction between the Buddha's *nirvāṇa* and his meditative capacity to cause the complete cessation (*nirodha*) of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. This passage is often quoted, therefore, against any claim that the early Buddhist view was simply nihilistic and world-renouncing. Notably absent in this text, however, is any detailed treatment of the classic distinction between *nirvāṇa* with remainder and *nirvāṇa* without remainder. That distinction is more clearly presented in *Itivuttaka*, edited by Ernst Windisch (London, 1889), esp. pp. 38–39. An English translation by F. L. Woodward is in the second volume of *Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon*, edited by C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London, 1935).

Another commonly analyzed theme is the Buddha's own reticence to describe the status of the enlightened person after death. On this point, there are two particularly provocative textual references. One is the above-mentioned story about Māluṅkyāputta in *Majjhima-Nikāya*, 4 vols., edited by Vilhelm Trenckner, Robert Chalmers, and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London, 1887–1925), *suttas* 63–64; the other is in *The Saṃyutta-nikāya of the Sutta piṭaka*, 6 vols., edited by Léon Freer (London, 1884–1904), vol. 3, p. 118. English translations of these two complete collections are, respectively, *The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings*, 3 vols., translated by I. B. Horner (London, 1954–1959), and *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, 5 vols., translated by C. A. F. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward (London, 1917–1930).

As already mentioned, descriptions of *nirvāṇa* are for the most part posed in negative terms; the interested reader can find a multitude of examples by consulting, for example, the excellent indexes in the collections of early Pali texts cited above. One particularly striking exception to this rule, however, is found in *The Saṃyutta-nikāya*, vol. 4, p. 373. This passage gives a rather lengthy string of mostly positive equivalents to *nirvāṇa*, including terms that mean "truth," "the farther shore," "the stable," "peace," "security," "purity," and so forth. Such positive characterizations of *nirvāṇa* are found elsewhere, but never in quite so concentrated a list.

On the issue of the transcendent, mystical, or metaphysical aspect of *nirvāṇa* in the early Buddhist tradition, a pivotal textual reference is in *Udāna*, edited by Paul Steinthal (London, 1948). An English translation also occurs in volume 2 of Woodward's *Minor Anthologies*, cited above. On pages 80–81 of *Udāna*, we find an indubitable reference to a state of mind or a place beyond birth and death, beyond all discrimination and ordinary perceptions. Controversy still continues over the proper interpretation of the passage. In Rune E. A. Johansson's *Psychology of Nirvana* (London, 1969), for example, there is a sustained discussion of the enlightened state of mind as being a mystical, transempirical, nondifferentiated state of consciousness. The passage from *Udāna* naturally figures prominently in Johansson's argument. On the other hand, this viewpoint is severely criticized in David J. Kalupahana's *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis* (Honolulu, 1976), chap. 7. By interpreting this passage as referring to the state of cessation

(*nirodha*) just prior to the Buddha's death but not to ordinary *nirvāṇa* in this world, Kalupahana argues that early Buddhism consistently maintained that the achievement of *nirvāṇa* does not require, or entail, any transempirical form of perception. In this regard, Kalupahana is expanding on the theory that early Buddhism was primarily empirical in outlook, an interpretation first fully developed in Kulitassa Nanda Jayatilleke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1963).

Another controversial issue among modern scholars is the relationship between early Buddhism and the contemporary form of Hinduism. Whereas Kalupahana's approach sharply distinguishes the early Buddhist view of *nirvāṇa* from the contemporary Hindu ideal of the unity of *ātman* with *brahman*, Johansson tends to see a common mystical element in the two. A generally more balanced and convincing position on this point can be found in the thorough discussion of Kashi Nath Upadhyaya's *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā* (Delhi, 1971).

A good introduction to the modern view of *nirvāṇa* from the standpoint of the only living tradition of Abhidharma, the Theravāda, is Walpola Rahula's *What the Buddha Taught*, rev. ed. (Bedford, England, 1967), chap. 4. This small work is highly regarded for its ability to explain the gist of centuries of Abhidharmic analysis in a straightforward, accurate, and yet nontechnical manner. On the way *nirvāṇa* actually functions today as an ethical ideal in Theravāda daily life, see Winston L. King's *In the Hope of Nibbana: An Essay of Theravada Buddhist Ethics* (La Salle, Ill., 1964). For a more historical and specialized approach to the development of the early Abhidharma views of *nirvāṇa*, see Edward Conze's *Buddhist Thought in India* (1962; reprint, Ann Arbor, 1970), esp. sections 1.5 and 2.3. Although this book is poorly written and organized, it still contains some information not readily available in English elsewhere.

For Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school, the *locus classicus* is Nāgārjuna's discussion in chapter 25 of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. The complete Sanskrit original and English translation of this work with extensive commentary is found in David J. Kalupahana's *Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany, 1985). A good discussion of Nāgārjuna's basic position with respect to *nirvāṇa* also appears in Frederick J. Streng's *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning* (New York, 1967), pp. 69–81.

For studying the Yogācāra and idealist position, the reader may wish to consult *The Laṅkavātāra Sūtra*, translated by D. T. Suzuki (1932; reprint, Boulder, 1978). The identifications of *nirvāṇa* with the pure *ālaya-vijñana* or the *tathāgata-garbha*, as well as with the mind released from delusional discriminations are particularly discussed in sections 18, 38, 63, 74, 77, and 82. For the more systematically philosophical developments of the Yogācāra tradition, the reader may refer to the following works. Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* has been translated and edited by Étienne Lamotte in *La somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*, vol. 2 (Louvain, 1939). Translations of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* by Clarence H. Hamilton and Wing-tsit Chan, respectively, can be found in *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, edited by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore (Princeton, 1957). Sylvain Lévi's *Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra* (Paris, 1932) remains the definitive discussion on Vasubandhu's writings. For an analysis of Dignāga's thought, see Hattori Masaaki's *Dignāga, on Perception* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

For a straightforward and detailed discussion of Indian Buddhist theories of *nirvāṇa*, see Nalinaksha Dutt's *Mahāyāna Buddhism* (rev. ed., Delhi, 1978), chap. 7. Although sometimes biased against the Abhidharma traditions, his account of the differences among the Indian Buddhist schools is very good. For a thorough and fascinating discussion of the attempts of Western scholars to interpret the idea of *nirvāṇa* as found primarily in the Pali texts, see Guy R. Welbon's *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and its Western Interpreters* (Chicago, 1968). Welbon includes a good bibliography of works in Western languages. His book culminates in the famous debate between Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1869–1938) and Theodore Stcherbatsky (Fedor Shcherbatskii, 1866–1942). Both were noted as first-rate commentators on Mahāyāna Buddhism, but their own personalities and temperaments led them to take distinctively different views of Buddhism and its intent. Thus, in examining the same early Buddhist texts, the former emphasized the yogic and religious aspects whereas the latter favored the philosophical. Despite their limitations, however, La Vallée Poussin's *Nirvāṇa* (Paris, 1925) and Stcherbatsky's *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad, 1927) remain classic works on this subject.

East Asian Traditions. For the reasons given in the essay, the idea of *nirvāṇa* is not discussed as explicitly in the East Asian as the South Asian traditions. When *nirvāṇa* is analyzed by East Asian Buddhists, the sharply etched distinctions among the various Indian Mahāyāna schools are softened. A clear example of this is D. T. Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism* (New York, 1963), chap. 13. In this chapter, and indeed throughout the book, Suzuki approaches the ideas of Mahāyāna Buddhists as coming from discrete traditions but involving an underlying common spirit.

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into the Inconceivable (Honolulu, 1983). One noteworthy point about the translation, however, is that it translates *li* as "noumenon" and *shih* as "phenomenon," a rendering popular in earlier English translations, but now usually replaced by terms less speculative and philosophically misleading, such as, respectively, "principle" and "event" (or "principle" and "thing").

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For Kūkai's view on the distinctiveness of Esoteric Buddhism, a key text is *Benkenmitsu nikyō ron* (On Distinguishing the Two Teachings—Exoteric and Esoteric). On the role of ritual in enlightenment, see his *Sokushin jōbutsu gi* (On Achieving Buddhahood with This Very Body) and *Shōji jissō gi* (On Sound-Word-Reality). English translations of these works and others can be conveniently found in Yoshito S. Hakeda's *Kūkai: Major Works* (New York, 1972).

THOMAS P. KASULIS

NISHIDA KITARŌ (1875–1945), Japan's foremost twentieth-century philosopher. Nishida was born in a small village near the city of Kanazawa on the Sea of Japan. In 1894 he completed his philosophical studies as a special student at Tokyo Imperial University, and after a short period as a middle-school teacher was appointed in 1899 to a post at the Fourth Higher School in Kanazawa. His first book, *Zen no kenkyū* (A Study of Good), grew out of lectures delivered during that time. Its publication in 1911 was hailed as an epoch-making event in the introduction of Western philosophy into Japan. In it, Nishida laid the groundwork for his later philosophy through the notion of "pure experience." The book opens with these words:

> To experience means to know things just as they are. It means to know them by casting aside one's own artifices completely and be guided by things themselves. Since people usually include some thought when they speak of experience, "pure" is used here truly to signify the condition of experience just as it is without the addition of the slightest thought or reflection. For example, it refers to the moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound that takes place not only before one has added the judgment that this seeing or hearing is related to something external or that one is feeling some sensation, but even before one has judged what color and sound themselves are. Thus, pure experience is synonymous with direct experience. When one has experienced one's conscious state directly, there is not as yet any subject or object; knowing and its object are completely at one. This is the purest form of experience.

Nishida's words are reminiscent of Bergson and William James, in both of whom he found kindred spirits; but they also show the influence of Zen, to whose practice he devoted himself assiduously during his Kanazawa period.

In 1910 Nishida assumed a professorship at Kyōto Imperial University, where he remained until retiring in 1928. He died in 1945 at the age of seventy-five. During his Kyōto period and throughout his final years, Nishida developed his philosophical method with unflagging industry, continually recasting his former systematizations and seeking newer forms of expression. He likened himself to someone digging for precious stones, more anxious to mine a rich vein of its valuable deposits than to polish his findings and put them on display. This is most apparent in the seven volumes of *Tetsugaku ronbunshū* (Philosophical Essays) he published between 1935 and 1945. Moreover, throughout his writings we find a consistent adherence to the identification of philosophy and religion, a principle he gleaned from Zen.

Around 1910 Nishida's philosophical activity was given a strong stimulus by his study of the works of Bergson and the German Neo-Kantians (in particular, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Hermann Cohen). His strenuous research into the logical epistemology of Neo-Kantian transcendentalism and critique of its fundamental principles brought Nishida to an appreciation of the deeper significance of Kant's philosophy and the transcendental method of German idealism. Traversing the long and dimly lit tunnel into which this inward orientation had led him, he was able to pass from transcendentalism to the transcendent itself, recovering his earlier standpoint of pure experience at a higher level. What opened him to this new dimension more than anything was the notion of the *topos* of nothingness, culminating in his final essay, "The Logic of *Topos* and a Religious Worldview."

In this last work Nishida refers to a sermon of the Zen master Dōgen (1200–1253) to characterize the essence of Buddhism: "To learn of Buddhism, one must learn of the self. To learn of the self one must forget the self. It is wrong to think that one must move toward a thing in order to know that thing as it really is. On the contrary, the thing as it really is moves towards us and enlightens us as to what it is" (*Shōbōgenzō,* "Genjōkōan"). Here Nishida sees an overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy through pure experience and at the same time a leap beyond intentional reflection. In the language of the de-ontological logic of his final period, the absolute as absolute nothingness reflects all individual beings in the world within itself and identifies itself with them; and at the same time, this cosmic mirror of Dharma retreats from all beings as they are reflected within itself in order to retain its independence from them. If this mirror had its own properties, it could not mirror things perfectly. On the one hand, the perfect mirror is itself nothing and therefore reflects everything alike without differentiation or discrimination. On the other hand, the perfect mirror is not a mere nothing since its function as a mirror really exists and presents things exactly as they are. Hence, this cosmic mirror of Dharma exists and acts only as absolute nothingness. Seen from the viewpoint of individual beings, this reflection of the absolute is an "ex-pression" of its cosmic totality into each individual, imprinting the stamp of the absolute whole on relative beings each in its own context.

Nishida characterizes this mutual reflection or expression of the absolute and the relative as the "self-identity of absolute contradictories." Moreover, he considers each such ex-pression of the absolute as an act of creation, enabling each individual then to reflect and express itself vis-à-vis every other in an act of "self-negation *qua* self-affirmation." This gives the historical world a special role as a mediating *topos* for the global self-reflection and self-expression of absolute nothingness. Nishida describes this dialectic as a movement "from the made to the making," setting it off clearly from the Hegelian developmental dialectic. For Nishida, "we are all creative elements in a creative world."

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TAKEUCHI YOSHINORI
Translated from Japanese by James W. Heisig

NIẒĀM AL-DĪN AWLIYĀ' (AH 636–725/1238–1325 CE), an eminent mystic of the Chishtī Ṣūfī order *(silsilah).* Niẓām al-Dīn—popularly accorded the posthumous title *awliyā'* (pl. of *walī,* "saint")—was a native of Badā'ūn, then an important city near Delhi. He was brought up, in very strained circumstances, by his mother, Zulaykhah. After completing his early education at Badā'ūn, Niẓām al-Dīn went to Delhi, where he spent four years studying the conventional theology and sciences with learned teachers. There he was drawn toward Farīd al-Dīn (d. 1265), a noted Chishtī mystic from Pakpattan in the Punjab. Niẓām al-Dīn went to Pakpattan and became his disciple in 1257. After reading some Ṣūfī texts with him, Niẓām al-Dīn returned to Delhi but retained his deep attachment to his master and made two further journeys to visit him. Farīd al-Dīn, on his part, made Niẓām al-Dīn one of his *khalīfah*s, or successors.

Life in Delhi was initially very difficult for Niẓām al-Dīn; he was forced to shift from one place to another while subsisting on unconditional gifts *(futūḥ),* as was the practice of the mystic order. Even as his circle of disciples grew, the gifts received did not suffice for the number who ate or lived with him. Ultimately, he established himself at Ghiyāthpūr, a village at some distance from Delhi. His mausoleum, Dargāh Niẓām al-Dīn, marks the site of his *khāngāh,* or establishment. During the reign of Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Khiljī (1296–1316), Niẓām al-Dīn's repute reached its zenith, and his

circumstances improved. According to the historian Baranī, multitudes went to visit him from the city; his inner circle included the famous poets Amīr Khusraw (whom he affectionately styled "Turk") and Amīr Ḥasan, and noblemen, including even the sultan's son, Khiẓr Khān, vied with each other in sending him gifts. Amīr Ḥasan recorded the mystic's conversations (during the years 1307–1322) in his *Fawā'id al-fu'ād* (Benefits for the Soul).

Niẓām al-Dīn never married. Among his principal *khalīfah*s were Burhān al-Dīn "Gharīb" (d. 1337?), who went to the Deccan, and Naṣīr al-Dīn Chirāgh-i Dihlī ("lamp of Delhi," d. 1356), who remained at Delhi and whose recorded conversations, *Khayr al-majālis* (The Best of Assemblies, 1355–1356), are another important source of information about Niẓām al-Dīn.

Niẓām al-Dīn belonged to that phase of Islamic mysticism for which pantheism was still only an esoteric belief. With the major emphasis on love of God, Niẓām al-Dīn often gave analogies of earthly love and was not even prepared to rule out a concept of God as a beloved in the human sense. By extension, he and his circle looked for *fanā'* ("annihilation") in communion and disdained the conventional Muslim expectation of heavenly reward for good deeds. Like his pir, or preceptor, Niẓām al-Dīn continued to entertain respect for conventional Islamic learning, the preserve of the *dānishmand*s ("scholars"), but he was a critic of rationalism and pure ritualism alike.

Within Sufism, the position of the pir had been elevated by now to the highest level. Niẓām al-Dīn speaks as if going on the *ḥajj* ("pilgrimage") itself displayed some disrespect to one's pir, because one should have rather gone to him instead. Not even an indirect attribution of error or weakness to the pir was permissible; complete obedience was requisite. Niẓām al-Dīn fulfilled all the Islamic rituals, but he was a firm practitioner of *samā'*, the mystic dances that were resented by orthodox theologians in particular. Although he did not believe in asceticism, he advocated a dignified form of poverty, in which one disdained land grants and cash pensions, lived on unpromised gifts, and distributed what was received. Much of Niẓām al-Dīn's reputation rested on his obvious practice of what he preached.

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M. Athar Ali

NIẒĀM AL-MULK (AH 410–485, 1019/20–1092 CE), Persian statesman, political theorist, patron of Islamic learning, and defender of Muslim orthodoxy. Niẓām al-Mulk ("order of the state"—the *laqab*, or Arabic honorific, of Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn Isḥāq al-Ṭūsī) was the celebrated vizier, or chief minister of state, to two sultans of the Turkish Sunnī Muslim dynasty of the Seljuks, Alp Arslan (r. 1063–1072) and his son Malikshāh (r. 1072–1092). In this capacity he served as the virtual ruler of the Seljuk empire, and his biography is thus a virtual guide to the major cultural and political events of the eleventh century in western Asia, the heartland of Islam.

According to the chronicle *Ta'rīkh-i Bayhāq*, the sole source of information on his family, Niẓām al-Mulk was born in the vicinity of the Khorasanian town of Ṭūs, where his father served as a revenue agent for the Ghaznavids, the Turkish Muslim rulers who preceded the Seljuks in eastern Iran. It is obvious that many of Niẓām al-Mulk's ideals of proper courtly and administrative procedure as set forth in his *Siyāsāt-nāmah* (Book of Government) emanate from the positive impressions he received during his own early years of secretarial service to the Ghaznavids.

Niẓām al-Mulk's rise in the Seljuk government bureaucracy was rapid and direct. By the time that Alp Arslan ascended to power he was firmly attached to Niẓām al-Mulk. Together, Alp Arslan and Niẓām al-Mulk sought good relations with the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad and fashioned themselves into champions of orthodoxy against Shī'ī and Ismā'īlī threats. To achieve this latter goal, Niẓām al-Mulk worked to gain the support of the *'ulamā'*, especially those of the Shāfi'ī school to which he strongly adhered. At the same time, he mobilized large numbers of Türkmen tribesmen who had recently migrated into Persia for *ghāzī* raids into Fatimid and Byzantine territory. Niẓām al-Mulk also revised and adapted the traditional tax-farming system of revenue collection that had developed under the Buyids and replaced it with the system of *iqtā'*, or fiefs, whereby military commanders supported themselves and their troops on the yield of lands allotted to them.

In short, Niẓām al-Mulk represents the greatest example of the heights of power, influence, and personal discretion to which a Persian functionary in the service of the Turkish military leaders might aspire. While al-

ways serving the immediate, mundane functions of letter writing, record keeping, and translating, the class of "scribes" to which he belonged played a vital role in the development of the belles-lettres tradition of both Arabic and Persian literature and in the articulation of the ideals of Islamic government and princely behavior for their empire-building but nonliterate masters. Niẓām al-Mulk's *Siyāsāt-namah*, which has been called "one of the most valuable and interesting prose-works which exists in Persian," falls between the categories of purely learned or instructional writing and polite (or *adab*) literature. Written at the end of his thirty-year tenure of office and apparently at the request of his master Malikshāh, the *Siyāsāt-nāmah* is composed of fifty chapters on such diverse topics as taxation policies, land assignments, proper courtly conduct, the need for spies, and the place and influence of women at court—all areas of administration and conduct conducive to an orderly, centralized, and autocratic government.

There has been much misunderstanding of the relationship between Seljuk government policy and private acts of patronage undertaken by Niẓām al-Mulk as a pious Muslim. The confusion centers on the role played in the "Sunnī revival" of the fifth century AH (eleventh century CE) by the network of *madrasah*s (Islamic mosque-colleges) that Niẓām al-Mulk founded and endowed. Since he was an official of the Seljuk government, it was assumed that the *madrasah*s he founded were proof of the official theological position favored by many of the members of his own Shāfiʿī school, namely the Ashʿarīyah, over the rival Muʿtazilī and Ḥanbalī positions. However, Niẓām al-Mulk's prominence as a politician and public figure must not obscure the existence of many other patrons of the religious learned, of other important *madrasah*s in Baghdad and elsewhere, and, most important, of the lively diversity of theological discussion within the ranks of "orthodoxy." Although no theological studies of the rationalist *kalām* type were ever included in the curriculum of any *madrasah*, and courses in these institutions were devoted strictly to the traditional Muslim religious sciences of *fiqh*, *ḥadīth*, Qurʾān recitation, and so forth, no "official" Ashʿarīyah blocked the theological discussion and instruction undertaken in various informal study circles.

While Niẓām al-Mulk had acted in a kind of partnership with Alp Arslan, he managed to dominate Sultan Malikshāh for the greater part of his reign (albeit with the increasing resentment and resistance of the younger man). Niẓām al-Mulk was assassinated in 1092 at the hands of a man disguised as a Ṣūfī. Confusion and folklore have entered the accounts of his death, with some contemporary versions of the story charging Malikshāh (who himself died one month later) with responsibility. The sultan had exerted much energy in his last years to asserting his independence and power against his old atabeg, Niẓām al-Mulk. However, it is generally accepted that the assassin was an agent of Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ, the commander of the Alamūt Ismāʿīlīyah and an old nemesis of Niẓām al-Mulk.

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MONICA E. CASEY

NJǪRÐR (Njord) is described in some Germanic myths as the most outstanding god among the Vanir. This prominent position accounts for his being sent with his son Freyr to the Æsir after peace is concluded between the two groups of gods. The *Gylfaginning* (chap. 23) describes him as extremely wealthy and prosperous: therefore he can grant plenty of landed and movable property to those who call upon him. The protector of seafarers and fishermen, he assured them favorable winds and calm seas. His dwelling in Ásgarðr is called Nóatún ("harbor"; lit., "ship enclosure"), a name that also points to his affinity with sailing and boats.

The mythology of Njǫrðr is dominated by his belonging initially to the Vanic group and later joining the Æsir. Thus, Loki reproaches him in the *Lokasenna* (st. 36) with having begotten his son Freyr (as well as his daughter Freyja) with his own sister. Such incestuous relations, which seem to have been allowed in the Vanic world, were utterly rejected by the ethics of the Æsir. Accordingly, Njǫrðr enters into a new marriage, which serves the moral purposes of the Æsir but turns out to be a disaster of temperamental incompatibility for both spouses. It does, however, legitimize Freyr and Freyja in Æsir terms. According to Snorri Sturluson (*Gylfaginning* 24), he begets them with his wife in Nóatún.

The story of the marriage itself is an intertwining of *Märchenmotive* and fertility rites: through Loki's deceit,

the giant Þjazi was killed by the Æsir; when his daughter Skaði came to Asgarðr to claim compensation, she was offered her choice of a husband from among the Æsir, but under the condition that she look only at their feet. She chose the god with the most beautiful feet, expecting this to be Baldr, but it was Njǫrðr. She had accepted this arrangement only on condition that the gods would make her laugh: Loki was able to do so by tying one end of a string to his scrotum and the other to a goat's beard; when both pulled, there was a lot of shouting and howling until Loki fell on his knees in front of Skaði, who burst out laughing. The cult of Njǫrðr is documented by considerable toponymical evidence in eastern Sweden and western Norway, but he is represented in relatively few place-names in Denmark and Iceland. Literary testimonies indicates that he was invoked together with Freyr in oaths, curses, and blessings. According to chapter 14 of the *Hákonar saga Góða*, a section of the *Heimskringla*, the second toast with the sacrificial beaker during the pagan Yule celebration was dedicated to Njǫrðr and Freyr. Further, according to the *Ynglingasaga* (chap. 4), Óðinn appointed Njǫrðr and Freyr "priests for the sacrificial offerings" after they had been accepted among the Æsir.

The significance of Njǫrðr is also reflected in his role in the mythical history of the early Scandinavian dynasties: he took over the throne of Sweden after Óðinn passed away and brought such peace and plenteous harvests to the land that the Swedes believed he controlled the crops and the well-being of mankind. But he had become so assimilated into the Æsir that, before he died in his bed, he had himself marked for Óðinn (*Ynglingasaga* 9); that is, he asked one of his closest friends to dispatch him with the stroke of a sword or the thrust of a spear. Germanic heroes wanted to die an Odinic death, not a "straw death." When old age or sickness struck them down, they wanted to die not in bed but gloriously on the battlefield.

A major problem in discussing Njǫrðr is his relation to the mother goddess of the Inguaeonic tribes, Nerthus, described by Tacitus (*Germania* 40). *Njǫrðr* reflects the Germanic term **nerþuz*, as does the Latino-Germanic name *Nerthus*. But why is the earlier deity a goddess and the later one a god? This change has tentatively been ascribed to the "masculinization" of agriculture that apparently occurred between Roman times and the Viking age. According to Tacitus, the early Germanic tribes left the cultivation of the land to women, the elderly, and the weaker members of the extended family (*Germania* 14), while the Scandinavian farmer of the Viking period was out in the fields with his plow and horses. Such an explanation is by no means compelling, however (see, e.g., de Vries, 1957, pp. 164–165), especially as it does not account for the shift of the deity's main domain from fertility to the sea and navigation. Modern research tends to emphasize the fact that Njǫrðr has always been a "man of the sea" (see, e.g., Dumezil, 1973, pp. 23–26, 215–229).

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NOAH, or, in Hebrew, Noaḥ; son of Lamech and father of Shem, Ham, and Japheth, according to the Hebrew scriptures (*Gn.* 5:29–30, 6:10); chosen by God to be saved from the universal flood that destroyed the earth. Plausibly, this story has ancient Mesopotamian roots, as do many other features of the biblical flood traditions. But while ancient Sumerian tradition and its reflexes refer to a hero who attained immortality after the flood, biblical tradition speaks of the mortality of Noah.

As one born in the tenth generation after Adam, Noah is clearly linked to Adam. Indeed, his position as an Adam *redivivus* is more expressly indicated in the popular etymology of his name in *Genesis* 5:29, which regards him as the one who "will comfort us from our labor and the travail of our hands, out of the earth which Yahveh has cursed," a thematic and verbal allusion (and, indeed, a hoped-for end) to the divine curses announced in *Genesis* 3:17. Moreover, after the flood Noah and his sons are given the same blessing and earthly stewardship as was Adam, with the singular exception that now flesh is permitted as food, whereas Adam was a vegetarian (*Gn.* 9:1–7, 1:28–30). In the postdiluvian world, Noah also goes beyond his ancestor Adam insofar as he is considered a man of domesticated labor—a vintner (*Gn.* 9:19). Later biblical tradition remembered Noah as the hero of the flood (*Is.* 54:9) and as one of the three most "righteous" men of antiquity (*Ez.* 14:14, 14:20). In this latter attribution, there is an obvious link to the statement in *Genesis* 6:9 that "Noah was a righteous man; perfect in his generation."

In the Midrash and *aggadah*, rabbis developed the

traditions of Noah's righteousness, emphasizing, on the one hand, both his fellow feelings and his concern that his generation repent of their sins (a tradition also found in the church fathers) and, on the other hand, his concern for all animals and species of life. A more jaundiced note is sounded by both the rabbinic view that Noah merely excelled in his own generation, which was very evil, but was not himself of exemplary righteousness (*Gn. Rab.* 30.9) and the later Hasidic comment of Ya'aqov Yosef of Polonnoye that Noah was a self-centered *tsaddiq*, or righteous leader, since he did not seek the spiritual-social transformation of the entire people.

In Christianity, Noah served as one of the most important typological figures insofar as he symbolized the just person who, in a sinful world, submitted in faith to God (cf. *Heb.* 11:7, *Lk.* 17:26, *1 Pt.* 3:20, *2 Pt.* 2:5). The flood, ark, and dove prominent in the biblical story also serve as Christian prefigurations, for just as Noah rises above death by water, so Jesus and the Christians defeat Satan and death by the waters of baptism (*1 Pt.* 3:18–21). In other traditions, Noah prefigures Jesus as one who announces judgment and saves humanity from complete destruction, and his ark symbolizes the church. The dove sent forth by Noah comes to symbolize the Holy Spirit of peace and divine reconciliation moving over the baptismal waters. In Muslim tradition, Noah (Arab., Nuḥ) also plays a strong role: an entire surah of the Qur'ān (17) is devoted to him, and Muḥammed considered Noah's life as prototypical of his own.

There may have been esoteric books of Noah: a passage in *Jubilees* (10:1–15) refers to a medical and antidemonic work transmitted by Noah to his descendants (see also *Jub.* 7:20–30, *1 En.* 6–11, 60, 65–69, 106–107). In medieval literary traditions, Noah figures prominently; and in some English mystery plays, ribald motifs from the life of Noah are found.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE

NOCK, ARTHUR DARBY (1902–1963), Anglo-American historian of religions. Nock, who was born in Portsmouth, England, and died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, showed early promise of becoming what Martin P. Nilsson was to call him: "the world's leading authority on the religion of later antiquity." His *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge, England, 1926), a model edition of an allegorical treatise from late antiquity, is notable for its essay on the treatise in its fourth-century setting.

A fellow of Clare College, Cambridge, Nock shared some of the interests, if not all the beliefs, of a group of learned Anglo-Catholics who were producing a set of essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation. He maintained his independence and objectivity while preparing an enduringly valuable essay entitled "Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background," in which he anticipated much of his later work on both subjects. Quite soon Nock was invited to Harvard University, where he became Frothingham Professor of the History of Religion in 1930. His Lowell Lectures were published as *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford, 1933).

Nock's scholarly range was immense, his depth and intensity remarkable. His shorter papers reflect great energy governed by a strong mind. Legend has it that he had spent his earlier years reading all the Teubner texts before going on to all the secondary literature. For many years he worked with A.-J. Festugière, O.P., on an edition of the theosophical *Corpus Hermeticum* (Paris, 1945), freeing the text from needless emendations and setting the whole in its Middle Platonic environment. To clarify historical context was always his goal. As he wrote in the preface to *Conversion*, "We shall seek to see as a pagan might the Christian Church and the Christian creed. The evidence at our disposal does not admit of complete success in this quest; we can but hope to have a reasonable approximation to the truth and, in the Swedish proverb, 'to put the church in the middle of the village.'"

Publication of Nock's Gifford Lectures, delivered in 1939 and 1946, was delayed by World War II and was finally nullified by his perfectionism. He was too busy to look back. He had already produced a masterly chapter on late Roman religion, "The Development of Paganism in the Roman Empire," making full use of the coins, for the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 12 (Cambridge, 1939), and he was responsible for editing the *Harvard Theological Review*—which he continued to do for thirty-three years—as a journal for ancient religion, chiefly Greek and Roman.

Nock was opposed to the proliferation of hypotheses and to the building of theory upon theory. Reluctant to generalize, he spoke of the sacredness of fact, although he valued facts not for their own sake but as the foun-

dation stones of knowledge. Revered by his students and colleagues for his knowledge and judgment, he helped many to resist speculation, thus pointing the way to a truly collaborative study of religion.

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Particularly notable, along with the works mentioned above, is Nock's *Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background* (New York, 1964), which includes the essay by that title as well as two other papers. Among Nock's many articles, it is difficult to select the most important, although certainly his "Sarcophagi and Symbolism," "Hellenistic Mysteries and Christian Sacraments," and "The Roman Army and the Religious Year" deserve attention. Nock's 415 publications are listed—and 59 of them are reprinted—in his *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, 2 vols., edited by Zeph Stewart (Oxford, 1972).

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NOISE. *See* Percussion and Noise.

NOMINALISM. The philosophical view of nominalists is based on the conviction that in human discourse only names *(nomina)*, nouns, or words are "universal," not things, common natures, or ideas, as claimed by the realists. The problem of universals, first raised in logic, concerned the status of terms that are predicable of many subject-terms. The problem raised other questions that had to be answered in psychology or epistemology, with serious ramifications in theology. The logical problem of universals was heatedly debated in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in response to Abelard; the larger problem was debated even more heatedly in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in response to Ockham and his followers.

In the early Middle Ages logicians encountered the problem of universals in teaching Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge* (Introduction). In the *Categories* Aristotle listed ten classes of terms that are predicable of subject-terms in discourse (substance and the nine accidental characteristics). Porphyry grouped these into five types of univocal predicability called "universals" *(uni-versus-alia)*, namely, genus, species, difference, property, and accident. Concerning their status Porphyry raised three questions: namely, whether they exist substantially or only in the mind; if the former, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal; and, third, whether they exist separately from objects of sense or only in them. Porphyry gave no answer but implied a Platonic solution. Boethius (c. 475–c. 525), in his commentary, further asks whether these universals are "things," as the Platonists hold, or only "names" as Aristotle seems to hold.

Early teachers such as John Scottus Eriugena (fl. 847–877), Anselm (c. 1033–1109), and William of Champeaux (c. 1070–1121), largely influenced by the Platonic realism of the early church fathers, maintained that predicable terms immediately reflect common natures in creatures and mediately reflect ideas in the mind of God. The earliest opponent of such realism was the French teacher Roscelin (fl. 1080–1125), who taught Peter Abelard (1079–1142). Arguing that things as such exist only as individuals and cannot be predicated universally, Roscelin attributed universality solely to vocal utterances. Modifying the extreme view of Roscelin, Abelard held that in predication it is simply names that are predicated of subject-terms, and the main function of names is to signify whatever is agreed upon by men. The meaning of the term *rose* being agreed upon, the name of the rose and its signification remain even when there are no more roses. Signification, for Abelard, exists only in the mind, not in individual things existing outside the mind. Abelard, however, did not raise the more serious questions of psychology or epistemology, since he did not know the rest of Aristotle's philosophy.

Logicians after Abelard distinguished between the meaning *(significatio)* of names and their intended use *(suppositio)* in sentences. Three kinds of supposition were noted: "simple," as in the simple meaning of a name; "material," as in the sounds or letters with which it is composed; and "personal," as in the proper subject possessing the attribute. In the thirteenth century wider issues were also discussed, such as the psychology of knowledge and the epistemological foundations of all knowledge. Moderate realists explained universal concepts in terms of "abstraction" by the human intellect from sense knowledge directly perceiving existing individuals.

Early in the fourteenth century William of Ockham (c. 1285–1349) rejected every shade of universality in things outside the mind, even fundamentally and potentially: "All those whom I have seen agree that there is really in the individual a nature that is in some way universal, at least potentially and incompletely" (*Sentences* 1.2.7). Ockham's unique nominalism rests on three crucial positions. First, in logic he substituted a new meaning for "simple" supposition: namely, when a term used stands for a mental intuition *(intentio animae)*, but without that meaning, that is, without signifying something mental. As a consequence "personal" supposition became the concrete individual indicated by the name (*Sum of Logic* 1.64). Second, in psychology Ockham eliminated all distinctions between the soul and its faculties, among the faculties themselves, and

between intellectual and sense knowledge. For Ockham, the intellect directly perceives the concrete individual by "intuitive" knowledge. Third, as for existing realities, only "absolute things" *(res absolutae)* can exist, namely, individual substances (matter or form) and sensible qualities: "Apart from absolute things, viz. substances and qualities, nothing can be imagined [to exist] either actually or potentially" (ibid., 1.49). Thus the other Aristotelian categories, such as quantity, relation, and the like, were reduced to mental intuitions *(intentiones animae)* that referred to individual "absolute things" variously perceived. [*See the biography of William of Ockham.*]

Ockham's nominalism eliminated much of what was traditionally considered "real" in philosophy and theology. Thus the name "motion" in any variation did not refer to a reality other than the body itself in motion; it signified a body (personal supposition) considered as being in one place after another without interruption (in simple supposition). Since "without interruption" is a negation, it cannot exist outside the mind in order to be distinct from the body in motion. Similarly, "grace" signifies a sinner acceptable to God as pleasing to him, not a reality in man distinct from the sinner. This simplification of names appealed to many philosophers and theologians after Ockham.

Many of the leading theologians in the fifteenth century—Gabriel Biel, Pierre d'Ailly, and Peter of Candia (the antipope Alexander V), for example—were nominalists. Moreover, most universities of Europe in the sixteenth century considered nominalism a mark of Catholic orthodoxy.

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NONVIOLENCE. Virtually every religious tradition contains some sort of injunction against taking human life. The biblical instruction "Thou shalt not kill" (*Ex.* 20:13, *Dt.* 5:17), considered normative for both Jewish and Christian traditions, is echoed in the New Testament (*Mt.* 5:21) and also in the Qur'ān: "Slay not the life that God has made sacred" (6:152). In the Buddhist tradition, the first of the Five Precepts mandated as part of the Eightfold Path of righteous living is the requirement not to kill. A Jain text claims that "if someone kills living things . . . his sin increases" (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.1), a sentiment that is also found in Hinduism: "The killing of living beings is not conducive to heaven" (*Manusmṛti* 5.48).

Despite the general agreement over the immorality of killing, however, there is a great deal of disagreement within and among religious traditions over such crucial matters as (1) how the rule against killing is justified; (2) when the rule may be abrogated; (3) whether it applies to all animate life; (4) whether it includes a prohibition against forms of harm other than physical; and (5) how central it is to each tradition.

A comparative survey of the concept of nonviolence is also complicated by the fact that the terms used for nonviolent acts and attitudes differ widely from culture to culture and from one century to the next. The words *pacifism* and *nonviolence*, for instance, are relatively new inventions in the English language. *Nonviolence*, a translation of the Sanskrit term *ahiṃsā* (lit., "no harm"), came into common English usage only in the twentieth century through its association with Mohandas Gandhi and his approach to conflict. While the term has parallels in religious traditions throughout the world, the idea is central primarily in the religious traditions found in India.

In the following survey of nonviolence in the world religious traditions, the concept can be seen as conceived in three basic ways:

1. *As an inner state or attitude of nondestructiveness and reverence for life.* This idea is expressed primarily in the Jain, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions through the notion of *ahiṃsā*. It is also found in certain African and Native American tribal societies and in some Christian communities, including the Quakers.
2. *As an ideal of social harmony and peaceful living.* This concept, associated with the Hebrew term *shalom* and the Islamic term *salām*, is also found in ancient Greek religion, where gods such as Demeter and Apollo incarnated the virtues of peace. It is linked with visions of a perfect future found in Christianity and in various tribal religions.
3. *As a response to conflict.* A nonviolent approach to confrontation, even in oppressive situations, has been the hallmark of the Christian notion of sacrificial love, the Jewish concept of martyrdom, and the Gandhian strategy of nonviolent conflict.

Ancient India. During the Vedic period (c. 1500–500 BCE), the concept of nonviolence was virtually unknown.

The culture of the time was permeated with the values of a military society, and animals were widely used for food and sacrifice. The mythological accounts of Vedic gods are filled with acts of violence, vengeance, and warfare—activities in which the gods of the great epics also participated.

The first mention of nonviolence as a moral virtue is found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (3.17.4), where the word *ahiṃsā* implies self-sacrifice and restraint. The *Yoga Sūtra* later requires it as a vow for those undertaking yogic practices. The further evolution of the concept, however, is linked with another notion that arises in the Upaniṣads, the belief in *karman*, that is, that one's attitudes and deeds in this life will influence one's status in the next. Acts and attitudes destructive to life are considered to have an especially bad influence. The concept of *ahiṃsā*, thus elevated, came into a central position in the teachings of the heterodox masters of the sixth century BCE, notably Mahāvīra, the prominent figure in the Jain tradition, and Siddhārtha Gautama, the Buddha. [*See* Ahiṃsā.]

Jain Teachings. The importance of nonviolence in Jainism is due to the tradition's stark view of the law of *karman*: any association with killing, even an accidental one, is a serious obstacle on the path of karmic purity. For that reason, pious Jains wear masks over their faces to avoid breathing in (and thereby destroying) tiny insects, and they sweep the ground before them in order to avoid stepping on anything living as they walk. In addition, all Jains adhere to a vegetarian diet. Vegetables are also living things, of course, but certain vegetables are thought to carry a greater karmic weight, and these the Jains try to avoid. Jain monks, whose code is even stricter than that of the laity, hold as an ideal the logical conclusion of an extreme form of *ahiṃsā*: the completion of one's life by starving to death.

Buddhism. The Buddhist ideal of *ahiṃsā*, even as practiced by Buddhist monks, is not as strict as that of the Jains. Buddhists emphasize motivation as well as action, and traditional Buddhist teachings require five conditions, all of which must be present before one can be considered culpable of an act of killing: (1) something must first have been living; (2) the killer must have known that it was alive; (3) he or she must have intended to kill it; (4) there must have been an act of killing; and (5) it must, in fact, have died.

It is the absence of the third of these conditions that typically allows for some mitigation of the rule of total nonviolence in the Buddhist case. For instance, many Buddhists will eat meat as long as they have not themselves intended that the animal be slaughtered or been involved in the act of slaughtering. Armed defense—even warfare—has been justified on the grounds that such violence has been in the nature of response, not intent. To use violence nondefensively, however, for the purpose of political expansion, appears to be prohibited under the Buddhist rule.

Perhaps for this reason, the great Buddhist emperor Aśoka came to accept the principle of nonviolence only after his bloody wars of expansion. From his headquarters in what is now the North Indian state of Bihar, Aśoka conquered a goodly portion of the South Asian subcontinent in the third century BCE. Once in power, however, he instituted the rule of nonviolence as state policy.

Even in modern Buddhist societies such as Thailand, where kingship is a religious as well as a political role, there is a tension between the obligations of political authority and the adherence to the rule of nonviolence. In countries such as China and Japan, where Buddhism is intertwined with other religious traditions, the stringent Buddhist standards are maintained only by monks, while those in political authority rely on other religious traditions, such as Confucianism and Shintō, to justify political force.

Chinese culture has been receptive to Buddhist ideas on nonviolence, however, due to the existence of similar notions in traditional Chinese thought. The Taoist concept of *wu-wei* ("nonstriving") connotes an ideal of peaceful living and the absence of aggression much like that conveyed by the concept of *ahiṃsā*.

Medieval and Modern Hindu Attitudes. Sometime after the rise of Buddhism, and perhaps because of its influence, the idea of nonviolence gained popularity throughout India and became linked with two other notions, vegetarianism and respect for the cow. Some scholars regard cow worship as a vestige of an earlier nature-goddess religion in India, but in its later, Hindu interpretation, veneration of the cow became a symbol of respect for all living beings, and by extension, a symbol of nonviolence. Despite the popularity of the concept, however, the political history of India has been dominated by military rulers, often members of the warrior caste (*kṣatriya*) whose moral obligation (*dharma*) includes leadership in battle.

It was Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948) who brought the concept of nonviolence into the political sphere. By combining the notion of nonviolence with a traditional means of protest—*dharṇā* (a general strike)—Gandhi made movements of nonviolent noncooperation into instruments of significant political power. By employing nonviolence as an essential element of the consensus style of decision making traditionally practiced by India's village councils (*pañchāyat*), Gandhi developed a

novel method of conflict resolution he called *satyāgrāha* ("truth force"). He applied this term both to his campaigns for India's independence and to his way of dealing with differences of opinion in everyday life.

Although Gandhi insisted on nonviolence as a general rule, he allowed for several significant exceptions. He condoned the violence required to stop snipers or rapists as they attacked, and permitted the killing of pests and wild animals that threatened his rural commune. He claimed that he preferred violence over cowardice, and he placed the battle for truth on a higher plane than the strict observance of nonviolence. Yet Gandhi also regarded nonviolence as the litmus test that would reveal where truth was to be found. In Gandhi's view, any form of coercion or intimidation was violent and to be abhorred. [*See the biography of Gandhi.*]

Hindu and Sikh Militants. The persistence of violence in India's public life is ample testimony that Gandhi's approach was not unanimously accepted even in his own land. The movement for national independence that Gandhi led was marred by violence, including that perpetrated by Bengali nationalists inspired by Durgā, a goddess to whom great destructive powers were ascribed. At the time of independence, Hindu militants led violent assaults against their old Muslim foes and, in 1948, one of them led the fatal assault on Gandhi's life as well.

The assassination in 1984 of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India was also motivated by religious concerns. Mrs. Gandhi was killed by a member of the Sikh community in retaliation for her part in ordering a military assault on the Sikh Golden Temple. The fundamental teachings of the Sikhs are not, however, violent: the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century spiritual masters who are regarded as founders of the faith are portrayed as such gentle souls that Gandhi himself claimed to have been inspired by them. But over the years the ranks of the Sikh movement swelled with members of a militant tribal group, the Jats, and Sikhs were involved in violent clashes with the Mughals, the British, and other Indian rulers. The core of the Sikh community is known as "the army of the faithful," and their symbol is a double-edged sword.

Biblical Judaism. Western religious traditions are no less inclined than their Eastern counterparts to combine violent and peaceful images of the divine. And, as in the Hindu tradition, some of the earliest images are the most violent. "The Lord is a warrior," proclaims *Exodus* 15:3. The utter desolation with which God destroyed his enemies indicated just how fierce a warrior he could be.

Later sections of the Hebrew scriptures temper this image with an attitude of compassion, and some even show a disdain of things military (see *Ps.* 20, 30, 33, 147; *Is.* 30). David, for instance, was not allowed to build the Temple because he had shed blood (*I Chr.* 28:2–3), and the prophetic vision that nations will "beat their swords into plowshares" and "never again be trained for war" (*Is.* 2:4, *Mi.* 4:3) is one of the most vivid images of pacifism in any religious scripture.

An even more positive approach is indicated by the growing prominence of the biblical term for "peace," *shalom*, which appears often in the prophetic books of the Hebrew scriptures, especially *Jeremiah* and *Isaiah*. The term signifies not only an absence of warfare, but the presence of a spirit of well-being and harmony. In this respect, *shalom* is the Hebrew equivalent for the positive aspects of *ahiṃsā*, especially the absence of the desire to harm.

Rabbinic and Modern Judaism. Writings in the Babylonian Talmud continue this Jewish emphasis on *shalom* and further elaborate a series of ethical restrictions on using violence. On an interpersonal level, the absence of violence is applauded even in the face of provocation. If one is attacked, a fourth-century rabbi advised, "let him kill you; do you commit no murder" (*Pes.* 25b). At the level of statecraft, the rabbis did sanction warfare, but they distinguished between "religious" war and "optional" war. The former they required as a moral or spiritual obligation—to protect the faith or defeat enemies of the Lord. These contrasted with wars that are waged for reasons of political expansion and power; such optional wars are justified only if they are initiated for virtuous reasons.

During the rabbinic period, the Jewish community was also beginning to develop nonviolent forms of self-defense and resistance, both as individual and as communal actions. The confrontations with the occupying Roman government included not only militant clashes, such as the Maccabean Revolt (166–164 BCE), but also nonviolent encounters, as when the Jewish community resisted Caligula's attempt to establish a statue of himself as Zeus in the Temple at Jerusalem in 40 CE. The revolt at Masada in 73 CE, although violent, involved a show of religious solidarity that culminated in mass suicide, and the rebellion led by Bar Kokhba (c. 132–135 CE) involved a kind of passive resistance that resulted in martyrdom.

The concept of martyrdom, *kiddush ha-Shem* ("sanctification of the divine name"), is central to the Jewish tradition of nonviolent resistance. The term implies that those who revere the divine order must be unflagging in their witness to it, even at the cost of their lives. A rabbinical council in the second century CE narrowed

to three the number of offenses that one should refuse to commit even under the threat of death: idolatry, unchastity, and murder. By extension, however, martyrdom was expected in any situation where one was forced to deny the basic tenets of the faith.

In times of political oppression, the ideal of *kiddush ha-Shem* has served to inspire Jewish resisters to acts of courage and faithfulness even at the risk of their lives. This ideal was tested in the fifteenth century when, during the Spanish Inquisition, many Jews were persecuted for adopting a technique that amounted to passive resistance: they claimed to be Christian converts when in fact they were secretly observing the Jewish faith. In the twentieth century, faced with massive Nazi attempts at genocide, the European Jewish community adopted both violent and nonviolent forms of resistance. One of the most common responses to the Nazis, especially among the Orthodox, was based on the traditional notion of *kiddush ha-Shem*: they faced their opponents with dignity and faithfulness, rather than adopting any aspect of the enemy's behavior, even if it meant risking death.

Early Christianity. Martyrdom was an important feature of early Christianity as well, partly because it seemed an imitation of the sacrifice of Jesus, but there has been disagreement among Christians from that time to the present over whether Jesus' example of selfless love (agape) was meant to be followed to similar extremes by other members of the Christian community. Those who thought so expected that the peaceable kingdom of God that is often depicted in the Gospels would be realized in this world, and they took literally Jesus' advocacy of a nonviolent approach to conflict: "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you" (*Mt.* 5:44).

The early church fathers, including Tertullian and Origen, affirmed that Christians were constrained from taking human life, a principle that prevented them from participating in the Roman army. The fact that soldiers in the army were required to swear allegiance to the emperor's god was also a deterrent, since it would have forced Christians into what they regarded as idolatry.

The adoption of Christianity as the state religion by Constantine in the fourth century CE brought about a major reversal in Christian attitudes toward pacifism and led to the formulation of the doctrine of just war. This idea, based on a concept stated by Cicero and developed by Ambrose and Augustine, has had a significant influence on Christian social thought. The abuse of the concept in justifying military adventures and violent persecutions of heretical and minority groups led Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, to reaffirm that war is always sinful, even if it is occasionally waged for a just cause.

Pacifist Christian Movements. The late medieval period witnessed the rise of a series of movements dedicated to pacifism and the ethic of love that Jesus had advocated in his Sermon on the Mount. One of the first of such groups was the Waldensian community based in France and North Italy; this was founded by Pierre Valdès, who in 1170 had committed himself to a life of poverty and simplicity, and who refused to bear arms. Although Valdès was excommunicated from the church, he is said to have influenced the young Francis of Assisi, whose religious order later adopted many of Valdès's principles. Similar pacifist teachings were advocated by John Wyclif and his Lollard followers in fourteenth-century England, and in the same century the Hussite and Taborite movements in Czechoslovakia rejected all forms of violence, as did their successors, the Moravians.

The Protestant Reformation provided a new stimulus for groups that rejected the church's compromise with what it often regarded as the political necessity of military force. In the first decades of the sixteenth century, the Anabaptists broke away from Ulrich Zwingli's branch of the Swiss Reformation over the issues of voluntary baptism and absolute pacifism—teachings the Anabaptists affirmed and that, later in the same century, were adopted by Menno Simons and his Mennonite followers in Holland. In a tragic and ironic twist of fate, many of these pacifists were persecuted by fellow Protestants as heretics, and were burned at the stake.

Perhaps the best-known Protestant pacifist movement is the Society of Friends, commonly known as the Quakers, which was established by George Fox in England in 1649. The nonviolent ethic of this radical Puritan movement was based on the notion that a spark of the divine exists in every person, making every life sacred. With this in mind, the Quaker colonialist William Penn refused to bear arms in his conflict with the American Indians, with whom he eventually negotiated a peace settlement.

Many pacifist Christian movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, owe a substantial debt to Christian predecessors such as those mentioned above. Others have been influenced by Western humanist and Asian pacifist thought, especially, in the twentieth century, by the ideas of Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi, in turn, was influenced by Christian pacifists, including the Russian novelist and visionary Lev Tolstoi and the American Christian social activists Kirby Page, Clarence Marsh Case, and A. J. Muste. The largest Christian pacifist organization of

modern times, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, was founded in England in 1914; and a number of statements urging nonviolence have been issued from the Vatican and from the World Council of Churches in response to the two world wars of this century. In the United States during the mid-twentieth century, Christian pacifist ideas played a significant role in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s nonviolent movement for racial justice, the movement against the American involvement in the Vietnam War, and in movements against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some Christian "nuclear pacifists," however, restrict their advocacy of nonviolence to nuclear arms, whose massively destructive power, they feel, vitiates the traditional Christian defense of weaponry in a "just war."

Islam. The concept of nonviolence is not so thoroughly developed in Islam as it is in many other religious traditions, but certain parallels do exist. The Islamic concept of peace, for instance—*salām*—is as central to Islam as *shalom* is to Judaism, and plays a similar role in providing a vision of social harmony. To that end, Islamic communities have placed great emphasis on arbitration and mediation so that intracommunal conflicts will not erupt into violent confrontations.

Yet there are times when recourse to violence is permitted in Islamic law: inside Islam, it is justified as a means of punishment, and beyond Islam, as a tool to subdue an enemy of the faith. The latter situation is known as *jihād*, a word that literally means "striving" and is often translated as "holy war." This concept has been used to justify the expansion of territorial control by Muslim leaders into non-Islamic areas. But Muslim law does not allow it to be used to justify forcible conversion to Islam; the only conversions regarded as valid are those that come about nonviolently, through rational persuasion and change of heart. For that reason, non-Islamic groups have traditionally been tolerated in Islamic societies, and the Jews in Moorish Spain are often said to have been treated less harshly under their Muslim rulers than under subsequent Christian ones.

Muslim mystics, known as Ṣūfīs, have on occasion rejected the common notion of *jihād* by redefining it so that it refers primarily to an inner struggle, which they consider "the greater *jihād*": the conflict of truth and evil within every person. In addition, there have been overtly pacifist sects in Islam, such as the Māziyārīyah and Aḥmadīyah movements. The twentieth-century Muslim Pathans in North India, influenced by Gandhi and led by Abdul Ghaffir Khan, conducted an extensive nonviolent campaign for independence from the British. In other cases, Muslims have responded to oppressive regimes by noncooperation and witnessing to the faith even at peril of death—a form of martyrdom much like that found in the Jewish and Christian traditions.

[*See also* Peace.]

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NORITO are religious statements addressed to the deities *(kami)* in Shintō rituals. They usually follow upon a one- to three-day purification rite, at the conclusion of which the *kami* are invited by the Shintō priests to be present at the ceremony. A *norito* generally contains the following elements: (1) words of praise to the *kami*, (2) an explanation of the origin of, or reasons for, this particular ritual or festival, (3) entertainment for the *kami*, (4) expressions of gratitude for protection and favor given, and (5) prayers for the successful completion of the matter at hand. *Norito* are composed in the classical language, and contain expressions of great beauty; they are usually written exclusively in Chinese characters, some of which have merely a phonetic function. The rhythm produced by the peculiar word arrangement, which involves many pairs of expressions and sets of words to modify the same object, is intended to pacify both the *kami* and the participants and instill in them a feeling of unity.

Although there are many etymological theories regarding *norito*, examples drawn from the classics and Shintō history suggest that they were words of blessing spoken to all the *kami* and to the people by the emperor, the descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu and the "great life-giving" *kami* Takamimusubi. *Norito*, therefore, were originally regarded as able to produce a beneficial response from heavenly *kami*. Later, however, two families, the Nakatomi and the Imbe, were given the exclusive right to recite *norito* on prescribed occasions to all enshrined *kami*.

The oldest known *norito* are a collection of twenty-four such documents edited in 820 CE, during the reign of Emperor Saga, as part of detailed legal regulations that were eventually compiled in the *Engishiki* in 927. The most important *norito* are entitled "Grain-Petitioning Festival," "Festival of the Sixth Month," "Festival of the First-Fruits Banquet," and "Great Exorcism of the Last Day of the Sixth Month." All of these begin with the expression "By the command of the sovereign ancestral male *kami* and the female *kami* who remain in the High Celestial Plain." The first three are concerned with ensuring a bountiful rice harvest so that the country may be stable and prosperous. The last is a purification ritual for the land and people, and is especially valuable for its precise description of both heavenly and earthly sin, in the Shintō sense.

A second group of six important *norito* in the *Engishiki* collection is dedicated to the personal safety and repose of the emperor. Among them, the "Ritual for the Tranquillity of the Imperial Spirit" is recited to lay to rest the emperor's spirit in the Office of Rites sanctuary. The next three, "Blessing of the Great Palace," "Festival of the Gates," and "Fire-Pacifying Festival," are dedicated to the protection of the emperor from external danger. Although the remaining two are not regular or seasonal, they too have the same basic function, protecting the emperor from evil spirits. It should also be mentioned that the formula "the heavenly ritual, the solemn ritual words" is used only in *norito* connected with pacification of evil spirits. This unusual phrase is believed to refer to a special magic formula that was transmitted to the Nakatomi family from the deities but that has been lost over time.

Most of the remaining *norito* are for rituals observed at the Grand Shrine at Ise. Of special significance is the *norito* called "Divine Congratulatory Words of the Kuni no Miyatsuko of Izumo," which indicates through its title that in ancient times the chief priest of Izumo Shrine, who was also the ruler of that area, represented other local leaders in the ritual presentation of local land-spirits to the emperor.

With the decline of imperial power in the late twelfth century, a new type of *norito* emerged, a type deeply influenced by Buddhism and concerned especially with ritual purification. After the eighteenth century a movement to revive Shintō arose, but no attempt was made to standardize *norito* until the beginning of the Meiji era (1868–1912). In 1875, and later in 1914, the government ordered that the shrine rites and rituals as well as official *norito* be standardized, but today there is a tendency to use contemporary expressions in order to adjust to the demands of a changing society.

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NORSE RELIGION. *See* Germanic Religion.

NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS. [*This entry surveys the religious systems of indigenous peoples in various regions of North America. It consists of seven articles:*

Indians of the Far North
Indians of the Northeast Woodlands
Indians of the Southeast Woodlands
Indians of the Plains
Indians of the Northwest Coast
Indians of California and the Intermountain Region
Indians of the Southwest

For discussion of Native American religions in a continental context, see North American Religions.]

Indians of the Far North

The North American sub-Arctic extends from Alaska to Labrador, a vast region comprising several vegetation zones. The tundra covers the area along the Arctic coast, a strip of treeless wilderness between one and four hundred miles wide, which protrudes deep into the interior in northern Alaska and in Canada west of Hudson Bay. The uniformity of this lichen-and-moss-covered plain is broken by the occasional shrubs of the bordering zone, which appear with increasing frequency farther south. The third zone, the "cold snow forest," begins, in western Canada, around the region of Great Slave Lake, Lake Athabasca, and Reindeer Lake. Countless fir trees interspersed with spruce, pine, birch, and poplar cover this region, which changes over into the prairie and the deciduous forests of the Atlantic East before reaching the border between Canada and the United States.

Adaptation to Climate. The inhospitable climate of the region, with its long, severe winters and short summers, shaped the culture of the native inhabitants. Since any form of cultivation was impossible, human existence was dependent on hunting and fishing. And here natural factors proved to be of some assistance. Large deer, such as caribou and moose, sought refuge in the forest zone in the autumn, then wandered back into the northern tundra in spring. This movement back and forth set huge herds of migrating caribou into motion, which facilitated big-game hunting and the accumulation of food reserves. In late winter, however, hunting was limited to stalking of small packs or isolated animals. Extensive river networks that abounded in fish, particularly salmon, provided food in the summer. Hunting and fishing, two seasonally varying activities—the one with lance and arrow, the other with hook and net—formed the basis of the sub-Arctic economy so long as the native population was isolated from outside influences. This alternation in economic life led to nomadism, which often involved a short-term relocation of housing. A round, dome-shaped house covered with bark or straw was erected in the winter; a rectangular, gabled lodge was preferred in the summer. Today these structures have given way to the conical tent, which in turn is beginning to be replaced by the log cabin.

The advancing Europeans encountered tribes belonging to three linguistic families: the Inuit (Eskimo) along the Arctic Ocean, the Athapascan in western Canada, and the Algonquian in eastern Canada. Among the Algonquian we also include the Abnaki of New Brunswick and Maine (Micmac, Malecite, Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, Abnaki), who have preserved vestiges of their sub-Arctic way of life up to the present. The non-Indian Inuit will not be treated here, as they are the subject of a separate article. [*See* Inuit Religion.]

The usual division leaves us twenty-four groups or tribes of Athapascan provenance and thirteen of Algonquian provenance. All are unmistakably shaped by the sub-Arctic way of life with its alternation between forest and water, its absence of any cultivation, and its big-game hunting in winter and fishing in summer.

Human existence in the sub-Arctic has always revolved around surviving the winters. January and February witness the worst side of the cold season: the temperature reaches its lowest point, the reserves are exhausted, the short days limit the hunter's range of movement, and the last caribou and moose in the vicinity of the winter camps have already been hunted down. This is a time of extreme hardship. The isolation of families—each has its own hunting grounds—is a hindrance to mutual help and support. The earliest reports tell of famine and starvation and of whole bands fatalistically facing their death.

The tool kit and hunting methods were not always adapted to environmental conditions. There were, for example, no procedures and devices for hunting the masses of waterfowl that appeared on the surfaces of the interior lakes in autumn, as Cornelius Osgood (1932, p. 42) observed. Likewise the Indians in the cordillera had little control over the important hare-hunting, which often failed owing to unexpected fluctuations in the hare population (*Handbook of North American Indi-*

ans, 1981, vol. 6, p. 376; hereafter referred to as *Handbook*).

By way of comparison, the Inuit cultures along the Arctic coast mastered every environmental difficulty: of their inventions one need only think of the igloo, fur clothing, seal hunting at the breathing holes on the ice, and oil lamps—a utilization of natural conditions not to be found among the Athapascan and the Algonquian. It is as though the interior sub-Arctic Indians had migrated from other regions and had somehow been stopped in the middle of the necessary relearning process.

Mythology. The meagerness of the material culture stands in sharp contrast to the abundance of spiritual traditions. Even the common people, who are not counted among the elite shamans, have an immeasurably rich view of the world. The forests and waters teem with a host of beings of half-human, half-animal appearance, similar to the figures of early European popular superstition.

Thus the Athapascan-speakers fear the *nekani*, the "bad" Indians who wander about the wilderness and abduct children; the *nekani* do their mischief only in summer when there is no snow to reveal their tracks. The Algonquians tell of monsters like the cannibal Windigo, sometimes said to be as tall as a man, sometimes as tall as a tree; and of well-meaning dwarfs, water sprites, and shaggy creatures with razor-sharp faces that lead a shadowy existence in the thicket.

This multitude of frightening creatures has led to the erroneous impression that the spiritual world of the sub-Arctic Indians is a confusion of pure fantasy arising from fear and anxiety. In fact, virtually all Canadian mythologies display a careful chronological and figural order. Mythological tradition is structured by a series of epochs, beginning with the events of primordial time (such as the deluge). Likewise the mythical beings are subject to a hierarchical ordering, with great differences separating the important from the unimportant figures.

Ages of the World. The mythical chronology falls into three stages (see Rand, 1894; Osgood, 1932; and Pliny Earle Goddard, "The Beaver Indians," *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History* 10, 1916). In the earliest period there were no divisions between living creatures; each could assume any animal's form and discard it again at will. All moving creatures spoke a single language; no barriers stood in the way of understanding. The second period began with the birth of the culture hero, the great teacher and leader of mankind. Material and spiritual knowledge derived from him. The house, tent, snowshoe, sled, bark canoe, bow, arrow, lance, and knife—in short, all man's appurtenances—stem from him, as does knowledge of the land of the dead, the stars and constellations, the sun, the moon, and the calendar months. It was also he who had the muskrat dive into the waters after the Deluge and who then created a new world from the mud that was brought up, thus becoming a second creator (if there had been a first).

The activities of this hero are directed toward a single goal: providing mankind with a special position and, thus, severing man from the community of the world family. The constant struggle of the hero against malicious monsters also serves this purpose. Consequently, with the appearance of this archetype of the Herakles of antiquity the community of living creatures ceases: man remains man, and the animals remain animals. Man is no longer able to transform himself, nor can he understand the language of animals.

The present era is within the third epoch. Although the hero has disappeared, the special position of mankind remains and begins to expand. Only the shamans are able to cross the boundaries between the human and the extrahuman.

Individual tribes expand this universal chronology. The Koyukon, for example, the northwesternmost Athapascan tribe in Alaska, speak of no less than five world periods: (1) the hazy time before there was light on the earth; (2) the epoch when man could change into animals, and animals into men; (3) the time when the culture hero created the present state; (4) the past time of legends; and (5) the present as far back as memory reaches (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 595).

Unity of life. The sequence of world epochs is more than a faded memory. It lives on today in traditional beliefs and customs that recall the events or conditions of those epochs—especially the earliest period, with its basic idea of the world family and the unity of all living creatures. Thus the Kutchin, a northern Athapascan tribe that inhabits the territory between the Mackenzie River delta and the upper Yukon, possess a special relationship with the caribou; every man, they believe, carries a small piece of caribou heart within himself, and every caribou a portion of human heart. Hence, each of these partners knows what the other feels and thinks (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 526). The Sekani of British Columbia believe that a mystical bond links man and animal (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 439); the Koyukon call the bear "Grandfather" and the wolf "Brother" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 593); and the Chipewyan, who live west of Hudson Bay, identify with the wolf (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 279).

The names of certain Athapascan tribal groups—Beaver, Dogrib, Hare—point to familial ties with certain animals. In all of these examples we hear an echo of the

earliest epoch, when a common language prevailed and all creatures had the ability to transform themselves and thus to overcome every barrier between them.

Also, the game that is killed is treated respectfully. The animal is addressed in familial terms; its death is mourned; its bones are protected from the dogs. Otherwise, the spirit "master" of the particular type of animal will withhold game from the hunter, subjecting him to hunger. The very concept of a master of the game teaches the Indians to show a religious reverence toward the nonhuman creatures of the world. They know that every animal form has a spirit protector and helper to whom the souls of the killed animals return and, if warranted, make complaints about ill treatment. They know that no game returns to earth without the consent of the master. Finally, they know that this consent is dependent on the keeping of certain religious prescriptions. Thus the activity of the hunter is a religious act: he is constantly aware of being watched by extrahuman beings.

The culture hero. The culture hero remains the most powerful figure within this hierarchy. Just as the different animals have their masters, mankind also has its overlord, who is at the same time the master of all masters. Thus we move from the series of mythical epochs to the mythical center of time. To the hunter, this heroic figure is an ideal that cannot be equaled. The Ojibwa on the northern side of Lake Superior liken this master to the captain of a steamboat or to the government in Ottawa; he directs all lesser masters (Diamond Jenness, *The Ojibwa Indians of Parry Island*, 1935, p. 30).

The culture hero is responsible, too, for the abundance and richness of sub-Arctic mythology. Around the camp fire or in the tent, the deeds of the hero, teacher, and friend of mankind provide the most important storytelling material. Other mythical figures are patterned after him, so there is a continuous expansion of the cycles of myths. The Koyukon are said to have "a highly developed and sophisticated repertory of myth and legend" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 595); other groups are said to have a "deep respect for and attachment to their mythology" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 195). The oral tradition is not understood merely as entertainment; the mythical stories confer a sacral dimension on it, which is still recognized by the Indians.

The figure of the hero is most clearly developed among the Algonquians of the Atlantic coast. The Micmac of Cape Breton Island, for example, call the teacher of mankind Kuloscap ("liar" or "deceiver") because he always does the opposite of what he says he will do. The stations of his life can still be read in the natural features of the landscape: Cape Breton Island abounds in references to the hero. Every large rock, every river, every waterfall, testifies to his deeds. All the sub-Arctic Indians have a similar mythical geography.

To the west of the Micmac other names for the culture hero appear. Among the Montagnais-Naskapi of Labrador he is called Little Man or Perfect Man; among the Cree on either side of James Bay, the One Set in Flames or the Burning One; among the Chipewyan, Raised by His Grandmother; among the Beaver Indians, He Goes along the Shore.

This last example brings us to the group of names found in northern Athapascan mythologies, which pay particular attention to the hero's unflagging wanderlust. In the regions around the large Canadian lakes, the Kutchin, Koyukon, and Kolchan speak of the Wanderer, Ferryman, Celestial Traveler, He Paddled the Wrong Way, He Who Went Off Visiting by Canoe, or One Who Is Paddling Around, designations that refer to a particular task of the hero. He is said to labor continuously to combat giants, cannibals, and monsters for the benefit of mankind. The mass of fantasy figures in whose deeds the mythologies abound—such minor heroes as Moon Boy, Moon Dweller, Shrew, Moss Child, Wonder Child, White Horizon, the Hero with the Magic Wand—follow the same path as the tireless figure of the Wanderer. The designation *First Brother* reveals that pairs of brothers also appear among these parallels to the great culture hero.

Robin Ridington's account of the religious culture of the Beaver Indians of Alberta is the most vivid report we have for an Athapascan people (*Swan People: A Study of the Dunne-za Prophet Dance*, 1978, pp. 13ff.). The emergence of a genuinely sub-Arctic world-genesis is remarkable in itself, but of equal importance is the picture of the culture hero Swan that Ridington brings to light. The Indians view this figure as a model, an example; they identify themselves with him almost completely. The young boy who through vision seeking acquires a helper and a "song," that is, his own personal "medicine power," not only follows this model; he is in reality Swan himself, a duplicate of the hero. The mature hunter who locates his game in dreams is an embodiment of an aspect of Swan, called Saya. In the myths, Saya eliminates the hostile monsters and teaches man how to hunt and how to avoid being hunted. Prepared and directed by dreams, daily activities become a repetition of primeval experiences.

The situation changes along the western rim of the Athapascan region in the cordillera and on the Alaskan plateau. Here the heroes appear in animal form. The story cycles are grouped around Raven or Crow, which suggests the probable influence of the Northwest Coast Indians, whose mythologies are dominated by the Raven, Yetl (*Handbook*, vol. 6, pp. 410, 502).

Storytelling and Ritual. The thriving, highly developed oral tradition that centers on the mythical leader of mankind is an original creation of the sub-Arctic. During the endless dark nights of the long winter, no one willingly leaves the camp. Outside, the man-eating giants roam about. The faintest sound is startling. All the inhabitants huddle around the hearth, listening to the storyteller whose tales contain the religious knowledge of generations. The loneliness of the taiga and tundra promoted the development of the art of storytelling. The practice of ritual requires the participation of large groups, as is immediately apparent in the cultic celebrations farther to the south (e.g., the Big House ceremony of the Delaware, or the Sun Dance celebrated by many Plains tribes). But in the sub-Arctic regions the harsh climate and difficult terrain made large groups immensely difficult to muster, especially in winter; this explains the predominance of the word in the religious life of the Indians of the Far North.

The tribes of the sub-Arctic perform only short, meager rituals such as the biannual Feeding the Fire, during which pieces of meat are thrown into the flames and the souls of the dead are asked to nourish the living just as the living themselves are feeding the fire. As Goddard pointed out in "The Beaver Indians," "this seems to have been the one important ceremony of the north" (p. 230). The New Year celebration of the Tanaina of Cook Inlet, British Columbia, begins as soon as the salmon start to swim upstream. The ritual signifies the renewal of nature with the coming of the warm period. Fresh grass is spread out before the house doors to serve as a bed for the first catch of fish, sweat baths are taken to refresh the body, the finest clothing is put on, and clouds of smoke from a lucky herb are made to swirl through the mild air (see Cornelius Osgood, *The Ethnography of the Tanaina*, p. 148).

The national holiday of the Micmac, Saint Anne's Day (26 July), is a blend of Christian and Indian traditions. Celebrated with canoe races, footraces, dancing, wedding ceremonies, baptisms, and feasting, it is certainly derived from an earlier tribal custom. Native rituals are also encountered in the sparse references to the calendar ceremonies, which were determined by the course of the sun. The Koyukon, for example, celebrate the winter solstice, a time at which they also honor their dead. It is, they say, the time "when the long and short days meet" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 593.) Implicit in that phrase is a precise knowledge of the solstices, which were determined by observing when the sunrise positions on the horizon reached a standstill.

A sharper contrast between the dearth of ritual and the abundance and vividness of mythology is hardly imaginable. The distinctive one-sidedness of religions of the sub-Arctic is due to certain religious tendencies that emanate from the figure of a supreme being.

The Supreme Being. In general, research on religions of sub-Arctic Indians tends to assume the absence of a belief in a supreme being. Lane's statement on the Chilcotin of British Columbia—"There was no belief in a supreme being" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 408)—is supposed to be applicable to all Athapascan and Algonquian groups. Any hints of such a belief that do occur are assumed to be due to Christian influence.

This simplistic assumption might never have arisen had its supporters referred to the dictionary compiled by the French priest Émile Petitot (1876). Under the entry "Dieu" Petitot distinguishes between native terms for the deity and those that came into circulation as a result of missionary activity, some time after 1850. Among the first category are found the following: *The One by Whom One Swears, Vault of the Sky, The One through Whom Earth Exists, Eagle, Sitting in the Zenith, The One Who Sees Forward and Backward, Having Made the Earth, The One through Whom We Become Human.* Alongside these early native names appear the Christian terms *Creator, Father of Mankind, The One Who Dwells in Heaven*, but the first two Christian terms are also found among the early native designations, and Petitot includes them in both categories. He evidently wanted to indicate that the designations *Creator* and *Father of Mankind* existed before the missionaries arrived.

The missionary Silas Tertius Rand, who worked among the Micmac along the Atlantic coast of New Brunswick in mid-nineteenth century, also noted word formations that referred to the supreme being as creator—for example, *He Creates Us* and *Our Forebear.* Frank Gouldsmith Speck's work among the Algonquian tribes to the south confirms this interpretation: they, too, speak of *Our Creator* and *Our Owner.* Osgood is correct in assuming that the conception of a supreme divine being is genuine (1932, p. 132). Here the work of missionaries activated and strengthened an archaic belief but by no means created it.

Ridington's research on the Beaver Indians provides conclusive evidence of the correctness of Osgood's assumption. In the beginning, Ridington reports, the tribe resisted christianization. Around 1900 the Beaver finally accepted Roman Catholic baptism, but their conversion remained nominal. "They had," Ridington observes, "assimilated Catholic ideas in enrichment of their own traditions rather than giving them up in favor of the religion of the missionaries" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 358).

This resistance probably explains the Beaver's preservation of their own account of the creation of the world. In the beginning, it is related, Heaven Sitter

drew a cross on the surface of the primeval sea. He then commanded Muskrat to bring up a clump of mud from the bottom of the water. Heaven Sitter then placed this piece of earth at the center of the cross and ordered it to grow. The earth was created as a disk divided into four parts, since four paths lead from the center to the edge of the sky, at the cardinal points. The connection from east to west marks the path of the sun. Up and down, that is, heaven and earth, meet at the intersection in the middle, so that six directions come together in the middle point of the world: four vertical lines and two horizontal lines. This bundle of directions continues to order daily life. The Beaver sleep with their heads pointing toward the sunrise; they see in the path of the sun a reenactment of creation, for that body renews itself every day (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 354).

No parallels of this cosmic myth have ever been discovered among other Athapascans, so here it is important to consider the entire continent, especially since the diving of animals is a prominent motif of creation myths found elsewhere in North America.

The motif appears in two versions. In one version the diver descends into the primeval sea of the beginnings; in the other, which refers to a much later occurrence, the diver descends into the waters of the deluge. The cause in each case is clearly differentiated: the creator is the prime mover over the primeval waters; the culture hero, over the waters of the deluge. It is the culture hero who drifts on his raft across the watery waste and who, in instigating his animal passengers to dive, functions as a second creator.

The frequent occurrences of this myth reveal a surprising geographical distribution. The deluge variant is predominant in the middle of the continent and deep into the Canadian North; the primeval sea variant is found in areas bordering on this region: on the western Prairies, in California, along the lower Mississippi, in the Southeast, and on the Alaskan plateau. It looks as if the deluge myth displaced the primeval sea myth, pushing it into the coastal regions. Both versions are mutually exclusive; where the deluge appears, there is no primeval sea.

The geography of the creation myth lends itself to the following interpretation: deluge and animal diver represent a more recent variant of the ancient myth of creator and water genesis. Its dispersal corresponds exactly to the borders of the Athapascan and Algonquian linguistic families; no other group could have invented and preserved this new version. They are the ones who attributed to the culture hero what once belonged to the sphere of the creator.

A shifting of religious emphasis becomes evident here. The creator withdraws, and the hero moves into the foreground. This explains the faint contours of the supreme being and the intensive development of the heroic cycles. The appearance of the Athapascans and the Algonquians sets in motion a tendency that leads to a dethronement of the supreme god. He loses his most important task, the creation of the world. This explains why the sub-Arctic mythologies almost never speak of a creation; rather, they tell only of a second genesis from the watery wastes of the deluge. The Beaver tradition is the unique example of the retention of both versions by a single group: here we find the primeval sea *and* the deluge, the creator *and* the hero (Ridington, *Swan People*, p. 13; Pliny Earle Goddard, "Beaver Texts," *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History* 10, 1917, p. 344).

This shifting of basic values, that is, the eradication of the supreme being and the ascendancy of the hero, must have begun long before the first contact with Europeans, for the attempt to degrade the creator can be seen even in the names for the deity. Names that recall Janus figures, like *The One Who Looks Forward and Backward*, are totally unsuitable for a supreme being who has relinquished the function of world-orderer to the culture hero. Likewise, the name *Boatsman* is linked to the wandering hero but not to the regent of the universe.

The contrariness of these two key religious figures is quite evident. The hero is closely identified with man and with man's goals and purposes. The supreme god, however, encompasses the world in its entirety; he is the cosmos itself. "He is in the sun, moon, stars, clouds of heaven, mountains, and even the trees of the earth," according to the Penobscot (Speck, "Penobscot Tales," p. 4). The Naskapi likewise declare, "He is a spirit like the sun, moon, and stars, who created everything including them" (Speck, 1935, p. 29).

The reason that ritual in the sub-Arctic never progressed beyond the meager initial phases thus becomes clear. Cultic celebrations for a cosmic, universal god require a cosmic foundation, and to be effective they require the presence of all inhabitants of the "world house"—human beings, animals, and plants—as only the prayers, songs, and drumming of the whole world community reach the ear of the universal god. But this basic idea is contrary to the sub-Arctic way of life. The harsh, hostile environment tends to isolate people; it prevents any kind of community and thus hinders communal celebrations. As soon as the northern wasteland gives way to the southern deciduous forests, there suddenly appears the unique religious poetry of the Big House, Midewiwin, and Sun Dance. With these rituals, which encompass the world in its entirety, the supreme god begins to live as the creator at the crown of the

universe. [*See* North American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Northeast Woodlands, *and* Sun Dance.]

The sub-Arctic and its culture hero are left behind. The myth clearly prophesies the direction the hero is moving toward. One day the timeless Wanderer will return, and it is then that the earth will go up in flames (Speck, "Penobscot Tales," pp. 5f.).

Shamanism. The all-encompassing rituals mentioned above form the bulwark of human life in more southerly latitudes. They incorporate everyone into the cosmic unity of life. These universal celebrations provide an indestructible shelter within the world house and prevent isolation of the individual. In the taiga and tundra, however, the individual is dependent on himself. When he needs help, the sub-Arctic Indian turns to the shaman. It is he who provides the only help when bad weather spoils the hunt, when the game withdraws into inaccessible places, when fewer fish swim upstream, when disease announces the loss of the soul, and when continued misfortune bespeaks the attack of a hostile shaman.

Dreams, songs, and journeys. The shaman has reliable dreams; he foresees future events; he disperses evil spirits; he sings effective songs or incantations. The word *shaman* derives from Tunguz and is thus a foreign term in Indian languages. Indigenous names, equivalents of "clairvoyant," "dream doctor," "singer," and "dreamer" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, pp. 660f.), or "shadow man," "arrogant one," and "head full of songs" (Petitot, 1876, p. 224) are far more descriptive than such nebulous European designations as *medicine man, sorcerer,* and *magician.*

The shaman's important and essential characteristics are attained through dreams. The visions befall selected candidates. The chosen must have a "peculiar aptitude" (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 607), but family inheritance can also play a role. The strength of a shaman depends on spirit helpers that are either acquired through dreams or inherited from his father or his maternal uncle. Every hunter has one such helper, acquired in the years of childhood through dream-fasting, but the shaman has at least half a dozen. The spirits manifest themselves in the form of animals, in natural phenomena such as the sun and the moon, or in the souls of deceased shamans (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 409).

Every spirit helper has its own song, and when a shaman incants a spirit's song, the spirit addressed hurries to help his master. The activity of the shaman alleviates much more than everyday cares. It is believed that his spirit leaves his body every night, travels on lengthy visits to the sky, and learns there everything he desires to know. When his spirit returns from its flight accompanied by the shaman's helpers, the drum on the wall begins to sound without being touched. His song is heard far and wide, and his body dances six inches above the ground (John Alden Mason, *Notes on the Indians of the Great Slave Lake Area*, 1946, p. 40).

These "journeys" establish the reputation of a shaman. While his body lies rigid and motionless on the floor, his soul hastens through far-off spaces and unknown lands, encounters mythical figures, and receives their instruction. The few reports we have indicate that the images in these dream experiences are the same as those found in the tribal mythologies. The visionary sees in his trance only what he knows. His dream journeys revitalize religious knowledge; without the continual confirmation through dreams, the mythical images would be forgotten. The shaman is thus the most important preserver of tribal traditions.

> There once lived among the Hare Indians a powerful sorcerer who was called Nayeweri ("he who was created by thought"). One autumn as he saw the birds flying toward the warm lands, he followed them and soon came to the foot of the sky. There a huge cave opened up, and out of it a river flowed. The cave was the winter abode of the souls of the dead. In the summer they roam the earth, but with the approach of the cold, they fly with the migratory birds southward to this cave.
>
> Nayeweri looked around but could see the souls only up to their knees. Some were casting nets, others paddled around in their canoes, while others were dancing. In front of the cave stood a tall tree; with the help of that tree Nayeweri climbed up to the sky. For two days his body lay lifeless on the earth, but on the third day Nayeweri returned from his journey and rose to his feet.
>
> (adapted from Petitot, 1876, p. xxxi)

What the visionary saw here is based on an idea common to all Canadian Indians: the southwest is the home of the dead. This is a familiar image in the conceptual world of the hunter. The Micmac place their ancestral home in the southwest, and even the Narraganset, an Algonquian people who inhabited a maize-growing region on the coast of Rhode Island, locate their land of the dead in the southwest, which is also said to be the source of their maize and beans (Rand, 1894, p. 110 and n. 2; and Roger Williams, *A Key into the Language of America*, 1643, pp. 7, 70).

The world cross of the Beaver Indians, which the creator drew on the surface of the primeval sea and which formed the basis of the earth disk, also belongs to these dream images. When preserved as a graphical representation on a drumhead, the image is without doubt based on a dream experience. We do not know a great deal about these experiences, but the few pieces of evidence available to us display a fundamental characteristic of shamanistic epiphanies: their pictorial nature. They are

painted on bark or leather with sticks and colors and are also sewn as patterns on articles of clothing. They are thus never meant to express abstractions, as the indiscriminate use of the word *medicine* would suggest.

The shaman's drum. Pictorial representations are mostly to be found on the drum, the most important accessory of the shaman. Physically the drum consists of a skin-covered wooden hoop. The upper side is painted with numerous figures, all illustrations of dream experiences. Animal tendon into which pieces of bone have been twisted is stretched across the drumhead. When the drum is beaten with a wooden stick, the bone fragments begin to vibrate; they "sing."

Speck (1935) reports that the Labrador shamans believe that their drums are living beings capable of speaking and understanding human language (p. 175). The close association of drum and drummer is also indicated by the Penobscot word for "shaman": he is the "drum-sound man."

The drum is used to induce a trance in the drummer; the vibrating and buzzing sound dulls the consciousness and opens the way for the "journey." At the same time the drum beckons the helping spirits, as can be seen in the following drumming song from the Passamaquoddy:

> I sit down and beat the drum, and by the sound of the drum I call the animals from the mountains. Even the great storms hearken to the sound of my drum.
>
> I sit down and beat the drum, and the storm and thunder answer the sound of my drum. The great whirlwind ceases its raging to listen to the sound of my drum.
>
> I sit down and beat the drum, and the spirit-of-the-night-air comes and listens to the sound of my drum. Even the great storm-bird will cease moving his wings to hearken to the sound of my drum.
>
> I sit down and beat the drum, and the spirit-under-the-water comes to the surface and listens to the sound of my drum, and the wood-spirit will cease chopping and hearken to the sound of my drum.
>
> I sit down and beat my drum, and the great man with long red hair will come out of the deep and hearken to the sound of my drum.
>
> The lightning, thunder, storms, gales, forest-spirit, whirlwind, water-spirit and spirit-of-the-night-air are gathered together and are listening to the sound of my drum.
>
> (John D. Prince, "Notes on Passamaquoddy Literature," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 13, pp. 385f.)

This song, with its pictorial richness, also testifies to the worldliness of the shamanistic conceptions. The shaman lives with the realities of the world, not in the unreachable hereafter. Even the spirits are a part of this world; they sit and listen, and participate in the life of the cosmic house.

The shaking tent. In addition to the drum, the eastern Canadian Algonquians use another device to communicate with the spirits: the shaking tent, which is a specially built cylindrical structure with a framework of thick poles. The top of the tent remains open so that the spirits can enter. As soon as the shaman crawls into the tent and begins to sing, the posts, which are dug in deeply, start to shake. The beckoned spirits can be heard rushing by; animal cries arise; the shaman asks questions; and the spirits respond. The whole tent sways as if battered by a storm. Those assembled outside are also allowed to pose questions about lost articles, cures for illnesses, and the threatening designs of hostile persons. The séance ends when all the participants are satisfied (*Handbook*, vol. 6, p. 251).

A certain bewilderment is noticeable in the reports of Europeans who have witnessed the ceremony, all of them sensible and discerning men. They have affirmed again and again that the shaman crawls into the tent alone and, further, that a single person could not have the strength to move the deeply sunken posts as much as a finger's breadth. They assert, too, that the shaman could not possibly produce the confusion of different sounds simultaneously. To them, the whole phenomenon remains incomprehensible and inexplicable. The usual talk of deception and charlatanry misses the point. The search for purely rational or empirical explanations cannot come to grips with the kind of spiritual powers to which sub-Arctic peoples have access.

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Our earliest sources on sub-Arctic Indian religions are two myth anthologies compiled by missionaries. *Legends of the Micmacs* (New York, 1894) is the work of Silas Tertius Rand. Around the middle of the nineteenth century Rand wrote down what the Indians at his mission in New Brunswick related to him. The publication followed several decades later.

Around the same time the monk Émile Petitot was working among the northern Athapascans. His *Traditions Indiennes du Canada Nord-Ouest* (Paris, 1886) is to this day the most comprehensive collection of texts from the region between the upper Yukon and Mackenzie rivers. Equally indispensable is his comprehensive *Dictionnaire de la langue Dènè-Dindjié* (Paris, 1876). The author lists the vocabulary in four parallel columns: French, Montagnais, Hare, Loucheux (Kutchin). Individual entries offer deep insight into the religion of the Indians of the time.

The transcribing of the oral tradition was continued in numerous collections. Volume 10 of the *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History* (1917) contains the "Chipewyan Texts" by Pliny Earle Goddard (pp. 1–66) and "Chipewyan Tales" by Robert H. Lowie (pp. 171–200). The *Journal of American Folk-Lore* 30 (1917) published the "Kaska Tales" by James Teit (pp. 427–473). The "Passamaquoddy

Texts" by J. Dyneley Prince appeared in the *Publications of the American Ethnological Society* 10 (1921): 1–85.

With the rise of modern anthropology a special problem emerged: the widespread inability of the younger generation of researchers to understand and grasp the meaning of the religious heritage of the Indians. A mechanistic worldview reduced religious values to sociological catchwords; fashionable sociological theories blocked the understanding of alien ways of thinking. Frank Gouldsmith Speck's *Naskapi: The Savage Hunters of the Labrador Peninsula* (1935; reprint, Norman, Okla., 1977) is one exception. Speck was one of the few researchers who recognized that the so-called primitive cultures are steeped in religion and are guided by the spiritual side of life, not by the material.

In comparison to this superb work Cornelius Osgood's otherwise laudable study on the Athapascans appears somewhat pedantic. The author fails to grasp that religion is more than knowledge. He nevertheless takes a positive step by treating religious elements not as material for sociology but as values *sui generis*. Among his numerous publications are: "The Ethnography of the Great Bear Lake Indians," *Bulletin of the National Museum of Canada* 70 (1932): 31–97; *Contributions to the Ethnography of the Kutchin* (New Haven, 1936); and *Ingalik Mental Culture* (New Haven, 1959).

The same shortcomings mark the *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 6, *Subarctic*, edited by June Helm (Washington, D.C., 1981). The impression often arises that this collection of short studies is dealing with "religionless" peoples. One exception here is Robin Ridington's article on the Beaver (pp. 350–360).

WERNER MÜLLER

Translated from German by Anne Heritage and Paul Kremmel

Indians of the Northeast Woodlands

The Northeast Woodlands peoples occupy an area within 90° to 70° west longitude and 35° to 47° north latitude. The region can be divided into three smaller geographical areas: (1) the upper Great Lakes and Ohio River Valley region, (2) the lower Great Lakes, and (3) the coastal region. Their settlement patterns varied from the northern nomadic hunting groups of extended families through combined bands in semisedentary villages to relatively permanent agricultural settlements. The organization of lineage descent was matrilineal among the Iroquoian-speaking peoples, matrilineal or bilateral among the coastal Algonquian-speaking peoples, patrilineal or bilateral among the upper Great Lakes and Ohio River Algonquian- and Siouan-speaking peoples. Population density in the Northeast varied. At the time of first contact with Europeans the number of persons per hundred square kilometers was ten to twenty-five in the upper Great Lakes and Ohio River areas; twenty-five to sixty in the lower Great Lakes region; and among the coastal Algonquian from three hundred in the Virginia–North Carolina area and decreasing northerly to fewer than twenty-five in the more northern regions of New England (Driver, 1969).

The most prominent tribes, divided according to language group, are (1) Algonquian-speaking (Southern Ojibwa, Ottawa, Potawatomi, Menomini, Sauk, Fox, Kickapoo, Miami, Illinois, Shawnee, Narraganset, Mohican, Delaware, Nanticoke, and Powhatan), (2) Iroquoian-speaking (Huron, Erie, Neutral, Petun, Seneca, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Mohawk, and Tuscarora), and (3) Siouan-speaking (Winnebago, Tutelo).

The oldest ethnographic material that scholars now rely on deals with these people as they were originally situated. However, significant materials have been gathered subsequently as different tribes either migrated or reorganized on reservations.

These Indian peoples began a period of intense movement in the seventeenth century or earlier, which has continued for many tribes into the present century. Although discussion of these movements will not be undertaken here, no treatment of the religious life of these people can be attempted without acknowledging the intensely disruptive experiences of the past four centuries. The severing of cultural and religious ties to specific geographical locations has been seen by some Native American religious leaders not simply as a loss of natural resources but as a sacrificial event with profound consequences for the survival of individual tribes and their religious practices. In particular, the loss of ancient ancestral sites has disrupted the linkage between the North American Indian peoples and the land through which the power and meaning of their religious culture manifested itself.

Cosmological Beliefs. The cosmological beliefs of the Northeast Woodlands peoples involve the concept of power as manifested in the land, in the dialectic of the sacred and the profane, and in patterns of space and time. According to the mythic thought of these peoples, power is that transformative presence most clearly seen in the cycles of the day and the seasons, in the fecund earth, and in the visions and deeds of spirits, ancestors, and living people. This numinous power is so manifestly present that no verbal explanation of it is adequate; rather it is itself the explanation of all transformations in life. While generally regarded as neutral, power may be used for good or ill by individuals.

Power. This all-pervasive power is expressed among Algonquian-speaking tribes by the word *manitou* or one of its linguistic variants. *Manitou* is a personal revelatory experience usually manifested in dreams or in visions of a spirit who is capable of transformation into a specific human or animal form. The efficacy of power is

symbolized as "medicine," either as a tangible object reverently kept in a bundle or as an intangible "charm" possessed internally. The term *manitou* is used here to indicate both the singular form of power as the binding concept throughout the highly individual Algonquian belief systems and as the plural form of tutelary spirits who embody such binding force. *Manitou*, in its various contexts, has both noun forms that indicate entities that empower and verb forms that indicate a moral responsibility to cultivate power.

The belief in *manitou* can be found among the coastal Algonquians from New England to North Carolina. Similarities may be seen in the name for the Great Manitou: for the Narraganset he was Kautantowwit and for the Penobscot, Ktahandowit. The Delaware worshiped as Great Manitou a spirit called Ḱeetan'towit, who had eleven assistants (*manitowuk*s), each having control over one of eleven hierarchically organized "heavens." The most ancient of the *manitou* was Our Grandfather, the great tortoise who carries the earth on his back. The Virginia Algonquians called those *manitou* who were benevolent *quiyoughcosuck;* this was also the name given to their priests. The evil *manitou* were called *tagkanysough.* Southeast Woodlands influences led to the depiction of *manitou* in carvings and statues, usually found in the sacred architecture of the North Carolina and Virginia Algonquians.

The Huron concept of *oki* referred both to a superabundance of power or ability and to spirit-forces of the cosmos, or guardian spirits. An *oki* could be either benevolent or malevolent. The supreme *oki*, Iouskeha, dwelt in the sky, watched over the seasons and the affairs of humans, witnessed to vows, made crops grow, and owned the animals. He had an evil brother, Tawiskaron.

The Iroquois *orenda*, a magico-religious force, was exercised by spirit-forces called Otkon and Oyaron; it was present in humans, animals, or objects that displayed excessive power, great ability, or large size. The Iroquois had a dualistic system whereby all of the spirit-forces deemed good were associated with the Good Twin and all of those deemed evil with his brother the Evil Twin.

The land. In many of the mythologies of the peoples of the Northeast Woodlands this cosmic power was intimately connected with the land. In their origin myth, the Menomini relate that they came into existence near the mouth of the Menominee River in Wisconsin; here two bears emerged from the earth and became the first man and woman. Near Fond du Lac, where a prominent rock ledge projects into Lake Winnebago, three thunderbirds descended and also became humans. Thus the Menomini use sacred stories associated with the local landscape to mark their origin as well as to relate the division of the tribe into earth and sky clans. The interweaving of tribal myth and sacred geography serves to integrate the community into both personal and cosmic levels of meaning. The intimate relationship of these Algonquian speakers with the land was reflected in their image of the land as Nokomis ("grandmother earth"), who nurtured her grandchildren. This intimacy of kinship with the earth was also part of an elaborate hierarchical perspective that located the earth within a vast schema of layers of power in the cosmos. Both the Algonquian speakers and the Siouan-speaking Winnebago developed cosmologies in which the heavens above and the earth regions below were seen as layered in hierarchies of beneficial and harmful spirits. The highest power was the supreme being called Great Spirit by the Potawatomi, Ottawa, Miami, and Ojibwa; Master of Life by the Menomini, Sauk, and Fox; Finisher by the Shawnee and Kickapoo; and Earthmaker by the Winnebago. This "great mysterious" presence maintained a unique relationship with the last and weakest members of creation, namely, human beings.

Spirit-forces. Power and guidance entered human existence from the cosmic spirit-forces, from the guardian spirits of individuals and medicine societies, and from spirits of charms, bundles, and masks. Dreams, in particular, were a vehicle for contacting power and thus gaining guidance for political and military decisions. New songs, dances, and customs were often received by the dreamer and were used to energize and reorder cultural life; dreams channeled power as consolation and hope during times of crisis, and often initiated contact between visionary power and the shamans. One means of describing the human experience of this cosmic power is through the dialectic of the sacred and the profane.

This dialectic is useful even though the Northeast Woodlands peoples did not draw a sharp distinction between the sacred and profane. The dialectic refers to the inner logic of the manifestation of numinous power through certain symbols. Profane objects, events, or persons might become embodiments of the sacred in moments of hierophany. This manifestation of the sacred in and through the profane frequently became the inspiration for sacred stories and mythologies that narrated the tribal lore. Among the Winnebago and other Northeast Woodlands peoples, narrative stories were distinguished as *worak* ("what is recounted") and *waika* ("what is sacred"). Telling the *worak* stories of heroes, human tragedy, and memorable events was a profane event, whereas narrating the *waika* stories evoked the spirits and was therefore a sacred ritual. Thus the ordinary act of speaking could become the hierophany that

manifests power. Not only narrative but also the interweaving of sacred space and time gave real dimensions to cosmic power.

Sacred space. A place of orientation that provides individuals or groups with a sense of both an integrating center and a cosmic boundary is called "sacred space." This concept is exemplified by the Medicine society's rite, which originated among the Ojibwa and was transmitted throughout the eighteenth century to the other tribes of the upper Great Lakes. For this Medicine rite a special lodge was constructed of arched trees, covering an earthen floor with a rock and an elaborate pole in the center. These items varied slightly throughout the area of the ritual's diffusion, but in every instance they were used to delineate sacred space and to symbolize the cosmos. For the Winnebago, the arched trees of the lodge symbolized the water spirits (snakes who occupied the four cardinal directions). For the Potawatomi the earthen floor was Nokomis ("grandmother earth"). Among the Sauk the central stone in the lodge indicated the abiding presence of power. For the Ojibwa, originators of this ceremony, which they called Midewiwin ("mystic doings"), the pole symbolized the cosmic tree that penetrated the multilayered universe and united all the assembled *manitou*.

Iroquoian and coastal Algonquian peoples lived in rectangular "longhouses" or "big houses," in groups comprised of several matrilineally connected families. That the longhouses and big houses were seen as microcosms is most clearly reflected in the symbolism of the Delaware big house. The floor and ceiling represented the earth and sky, respectively. There was a door where the sun rose and a door where the sun set, and these doors were connected by the ceremonial Good White Path, symbolizing the journey human beings make from birth toward death. The fact that there was a door, an opening toward the west, and the fact that the dances eventually circled back, point to the Delaware hope in an afterlife and, for some, a rebirth. In the center of the big house stood a post with a carved face that was made from a tree and that symbolized the *axis mundi;* from its base the post was believed to run upward through the twelve cosmic levels, the last being the place of the Great Manitou. This post was the staff of the Great Manitou, whose power filled all creation. Power manifested in the spirits was symbolized by the faces carved into low posts situated around the inside of the big house.

Sacred time. The period of contact with sustaining power is "sacred time." Such contact was believed to occur in the movement of the seasons, the fecundity of nature, and the personal life cycle. Among the native peoples of the upper Great Lakes, time was also sacralized in the narratives and rituals that reconstituted the mythic time of *manitou* revelation. During the Menomini Mitawin, or Medicine rite, while the origin myth of the ceremony itself was narrated, the society members imagistically participated in the original assembly of the *manitou* who began the ceremony in mythic time. Such an evocation of relationship with cosmic powers and identification with them in the oral narratives structured an experience of sacred time.

The Delaware Big House ceremony evoked powers that made possible the transition from the old year of chaos to the new year of cosmos. The origin myth narrated during that ceremony set the context for a renewal of the earth and of the tribe's binding relationships with the spirit-forces. The myth related that long ago the very foundation of life itself, the earth, was split open by a devastating quake. The forces of evil and chaos erupted from the underworld in the form of dust, smoke, and a black liquid: all creatures were struck with fear at these events. The humans then met in council and concluded that the disruptions had occurred because they had neglected their proper relationship with the Great Manitou. They prayed for power and guidance. The *manitou* spoke to them in dreams, telling them how to build a house that would re-create the cosmos and how to conduct a ceremony that would evoke the power to sustain it. This ceremony would establish their moral relationship with the *manitou*, and by the carvings of their *mesingw* ("faces") on the posts an identification with each of these cosmic forces would occur as one moved ritually along the Good White Path. Furthermore, the recitation of puberty dream-visions would renew and revivify the individual's relationship with his or her personal *manitou*. The old time was one of impurity, symbolized by dirt and smoke. To make the transition into sacred time everyone and everything had to be purified, including attendants, reciters of dreams, and the big house itself. Purifying fires burned on either side of the center post. Persons or objects in a state of impurity, such as menstruating women, were always excluded from the big house.

Ceremonial Practices. Some understanding of the rich and complex ritual life of the Northeast Woodlands peoples can be obtained by considering selected ceremonies concerned with subsistence, life cycles, and personal, clan, and society visions.

Subsistence. Through subsistence rituals, tribes contacted power to ensure the success of hunting, fishing, or trapping; gathering of herbs, fruits, or root crops; and agricultural endeavors. Among the Sauk and Menomini there were both private and public ceremonials for hunting that focused on sacred objects generically labeled "medicine." The large public medicine-bundles

of three types were believed to have been obtained by the trickster–culture hero Manabus from the Grandfathers, or *manitou* spirits. The first hunting bundle, called Misasakiwis, helped to defeat the malicious medicine people who tried to foil the hunter's success. Both the second bundle, Kitagasa Muskiki (made of a fawn's skin), and the third (a bundle with deer, wolf, and owl skins), fostered hunting success. Each bundle might contain a variety of power objects such as animal skins, miniature hunting implements, wooden figures, herbal preparations, and often an actual scent to lure animals. The bundle's owner obtained the right to assemble or purchase such a bundle from a personal vision. Songs, especially, evoked the powers of the bundle; these songs often recalled the agreement between the visionary and the *manitou* as well as the prohibitions and obligations that impinged upon the owner of a bundle. In this way the bundle owner, and the hunters he aided, thwarted the evil ones and contacted the *manitou* masters of the hunted animals. Thus power objects from the environment, the empowered hunters, and the ritually imaged *manitou*-spirits, functioned together to bring sustenance to the people.

Although the growing season varied within the Northeast, most of these peoples practiced some form of agriculture. With the introduction of agriculture new symbol complexes developed, giving meaning and power to this new subsistence activity and integrating it into the larger cosmic order. The northern Iroquois, for example, linked together woman, earth, moon, and the cycles of birth and death.

According to northern Iroquois mythology, agricultural products first emerged from the dead body of the Creator's mother. Out of her breasts grew two cornstalks, and from her arms and body came beans and squash. Her death had been caused by the Creator's evil-minded brother, who was frequently associated with winter and ice. In giving birth to winter the Earth Mother "dies," but she brings forth life in the spring. The gathering of plants and the planting of crops were also the practical tasks of Iroquois women. Consequently, these women played a key role in scheduling and celebrating the ceremonies marking the yearly cycle of life: the Our-Life-Supporters Dances, the Bush Dance, and the Maple, Seed Planting, Strawberry, Raspberry, Green Bean, Little Corn, Green Corn, and Harvest rituals.

The spirit of the Earth Mother was also made into the Moon by her son, the Creator (or Master) of Life. Grandmother Moon was connected with life, as it was her duty to watch over all living things during the night. The monthly cycle of the moon and the yearly cycle of vegetation were associated with the mystery of life, death, and rebirth; women and the earth were seen as connected because they both have the power to bring forth and nourish life.

The domestic ceremony of apology for taking life is also found among all these Northeast Woodlands people. This simple ceremony illustrates the moral character of the force that was believed to bind the cosmos together. The ceremony consisted of a spoken apology and a gift of sacred tobacco for the disturbance caused to the web of life by cutting trees, gathering plants, or taking minerals. For example, William Jones, in his *Ethnography of the Fox Indians* (1939), quotes a Fox tribesman as saying: "We do not like to harm trees. Whenever we can, we always make an offering of tobacco to the trees before we cut them down. If we did not think of their feelings . . . before cutting them down, all the other trees in the forest would weep, and that would make our hearts sad, too" (p. 21). This ceremony is both a thanksgiving for the blessing of a material boon and an acknowledgment of the environmental morality that binds the human and natural worlds.

Life cycles. Life-cycle rites of passage are illuminating examples of these peoples' recognition that the passage through life's stages required a structured encounter with power. These ceremonies included private actions that invoked power at liminal moments such as menstruation, marriage, and birth. For example, menstruating women withdrew to specially constructed lodges, and the marriage ceremony was generally validated by an extensive exchange of gifts between families. Similarly, conception was ensured by protective fetal spirits, and new birth required a period of seclusion for purification of the mother and cradle-amulets for the child. Although there were taboos surrounding pregnancy and delivery, there were no elaborate birth rituals among the northern Iroquois or coastal Algonquians. Other life-cycle ceremonials, however, were marked by elaborate ritual activities, such as naming, puberty, and death ceremonies.

Birth and early childhood. Naming ceremonies arise both from the belief that humans are born weak and require power for growth and survival as well as a belief that new life should be introduced into the cosmos. Generally, two types of naming ceremonies have been found. Among the Southeast Woodlands tribes a child was given an ancestral clan name. This situated that child in the clan lineage and empowered the child by directly connecting him or her to the ancestral vision embodied in the clan medicine bundles. Another ceremony associated with the Menomini, Potawatomi, Ojibwa, and Ottawa, but occasionally practiced by the other groups, involved naming by virtue of a dream vision. In this ritual a person was chosen by the parents

to undergo a fast or a sweat lodge purification so that they might receive a name for the child from the *manitou*.

Among the Iroquois and Delaware the naming ceremony, which was conducted in the longhouse, was the most significant ritual of early childhood. Delaware parents were attentive to their dreams for a revelation of the name. They would give their child to an elder in the big house who would announce the child's name and offer prayers of blessing for it. A similar ceremony would be conducted for an adult who decided to change his or her name due to a significant deed or because the first name no longer seemed appropriate. The Huron pierced the ears of the child and named it shortly after birth; the child's name then belonged to the clan and could not be used by another member of the tribe. The Iroquois named their children either at the Green Corn ceremony in the summer or before the Midwinter ceremonies. A child who resembled a dead ancestor might be given his or her name since it was believed that the name might have some of the ancestor's personality. The name remained the child's exclusive privilege and the focus of his or her early spiritual formation until the puberty ceremonials.

Puberty. It is uncertain whether the puberty rites of the Algonquians of Virginia and North Carolina involved a vision quest. However, the vision quest was part of the puberty rites of all of the upper Great Lakes peoples with variations according to the tribe. Some southern Ohio River groups such as the Shawnee emphasized less ecstatic experiences such as a boy's first kill. Among the Potawatomi, however, on specially designated mornings the parents or grandparents would offer a youth in his or her early teens a choice of food or charcoal. Encouraged to choose the charcoal and to blacken their faces, the youngsters were taken to an isolated place, often to perch in the limbs of a tree. There, alone, they fasted for dream visions. Although boys and girls might undertake vision quests, many tribes in this area had special ceremonies for girls.

The northern Iroquois, the Delaware, and the coastal Algonquians secluded girls in huts during their first menstruation. Among the Delaware the girls observed strict rules regarding food, drink, and bodily care; while in seclusion they wore blankets over their heads, and they were not permitted to leave the huts until their second menstrual period. This rite signified a girl's eligibility for marriage. There is evidence that some northern Iroquoians did not seclude their women during menstruation, although certain taboos had to be observed.

Among the Kickapoo a young girl was isolated from the village in a small hut during her first menses. Tended by her female kin, the girl followed strict prohibitions. Her dreams, like those of the isolated youth in the forest, were of special importance. Accounts of these momentous visions and dreams speak of encounters with tutelary *manitou* who bestowed blessings. Visions of such entities as wind, trees, fire, or birds, were all considered symbolic indications of the young person's future life. A successful dreamer might narrate part or all of his or her dream to an elderly family member or a shaman empowered to interpret dreams. This dream-vision was a means of acquiring psychic integration and spiritual strength so as to meet the challenges of life and death.

One of the most striking puberty rites was the Huskanawe of the Algonquians of Virginia. This rite was undergone by boys selected to be future chiefs and priests, positions of great importance in a highly stratified society. The ceremony began with the ritual tearing away of the children from their mothers and fathers, who had to accept them thenceforth as "dead." The boys were taken into the forest and were sequestered together in a small hut. For months they were given little to eat and were made to drink intoxicating potions and take emetics. At the end of this period of mental and emotional disorientation, they completely forgot who they were, and they were unable to understand or speak the language they had known. When the initiators were sure that the boys had been deconditioned, they took them back to the village. Under close supervision from their guides, the boys formed a new identity; they relearned how to speak and were taught what to wear and the intricacies of the new roles now assigned to them. As rulers or priests they had to be free from all attachments to family and friends. Their minds had been cleansed and reshaped so that they might see clearly and act wisely. Their claim to authority and their power to lead others rested on their successful ritual transition to a sacred condition.

Death. The form of death rites varied widely among the Northeast Woodlands peoples. In the tribes of the upper Great Lakes area, bodies were usually disposed of according to the individual's wishes or clan prerogatives for scaffold exposure, ground burial, or cremation. Among the Fox, death was a highly ritualized event announced to the village by a crier. The members of the deceased's clan gathered for a night of mourning. The clan leader addressed the corpse, advising it not to look back with envy on those still alive but to persevere in its journey to the ancestors in the west. After burial there were the rituals of building a grave shed and installing a clan post as a marker. A six-month period of

mourning then followed, during which time a tribesperson was ceremoniously adopted to substitute for the deceased person, especially at memorial feasts.

Burial practices differed among the peoples of the lower Great Lakes and coastal region. The Algonquians of Carolina buried common people individually in shallow graves. The Algonquians of Virginia wrapped the bodies of common people in skins and placed them on scaffolds; after the decay of the flesh was complete, the bones were buried. The rulers of both peoples, however, were treated differently. After death their bodies were disemboweled and the flesh was removed, but the sinews were left attached to the bones. The skin was then sewn back on to the skeleton, after being packed with white sand or occasionally ornaments. Oil kept the body's oils from drying. The corpses were placed on a platform at the western end of the temple and attended by priests.

The Nanticoke and other tribes of the southern Maryland and Delaware peninsula area practiced a second ossuary interment, in some cases preceded by an inhumation and in others by scaffold burials. The rulers of most of these tribes were treated like those of the Algonquians of Virginia and North Carolina. Some of the southern Delaware also had a second ossuary burial, but the main tribal group had one inhumation only; no special treatment for chiefs was noted.

The Huron and some Algonquian groups had two inhumations, the second one in an ossuary. Their Feast of the Dead was conducted at periodic intervals of ten to twelve years. At that time all of the bodies buried during the preceding decade were disinterred, their remaining flesh was removed, and after a ten-day ceremony the skeletons were reburied. Village bands solidified alliances in these ceremonies in which the bones were deliberately mixed. This was a symbol of the unity that should exist among the living. The Petun followed the Huron, while the Neutral and Wenro had a scaffold burial followed later by burial in an ossuary. The Wyandot and Iroquois had only one inhumation but had an annual or semiannual feast for the dead. Eastern New York State, including Long Island, may mark the northern coastal border of secondary burials.

These life-cycle ceremonials were an integral part of every tribesperson's passage through life. Indeed, in the Winnebago Medicine rite the image of human aging in four steps is presented as a paradigm of all life. However, such ceremonial rites of passage can be distinguished from certain personal, clan, and group rituals.

Individual, clan, and group. Power objects given by the *manitou*, such as medicine bundles, charms, and face-paintings, became the focus of personal rituals, songs, and dances. An individual evoked his or her spirit and identified with it by means of rhythmic singing, drumming, rattling, or chanting; one would then channel the power brought by the spirit to a specific need such as hunting, the healing of sick people, or, in some cases, toward more selfish ends.

The Huron owned power charms *(aaskouandy)*. Many of these were found in the entrails of game animals, especially those who were difficult to kill. Charms could be small stones, tufts of hair, and so on. One of the abilities of a power charm was to change its own shape, so that a stone, for example, might become a bean or a bird's beak. *Aaskouandy* were of two types: (1) those that brought general good luck and (2) those that were good for one particular task. The particular use of a charm would be revealed to its owner in a dream.

An individual or family might collect a number of charms and keep them in a bundle consisting of, for example, tufts of hair, bones or claws of animals, stones, and miniature masks. The owner was periodically obliged to offer a feast to his charms, during which he and his friends would sing to the charms and show them honor. The owner usually established a relationship to the charm spirit, similar to that between an individual and a guardian spirit, although charm spirits were known to be more unpredictable and dangerous than guardian spirits. An individual or family who wished to get rid of a charm had to conduct a ritual and bury it; even then uneasiness surrounded the event.

Among the Huron and Iroquois, there were masks that had to be cared for in addition to a charm or bundle. A person acquired a mask through dreaming of it or having it prescribed by a shaman. A carver would go into the forest and search for a living tree; basswood, cucumber, and willow were the preferred woods. While burning tobacco, he recited prayers to the tree spirit and the False Face spirits. The mask was carved into the tree and then removed in one piece. The finishing touches, including the eye-holes (which were surrounded with metal) and the mouth hole, were added later. If the tree had been found in the morning, the mask would be painted red; if in the afternoon, black. The hair attached to the mask was horsetail.

Because the mask was considered sacred and full of power the owner had to treat it correctly. He would keep it in a cloth carrier with a turtle rattle placed in the hollow side. If a mask was hung on a wall, it had to face the wall, lest some unsuspecting person be possessed by it. Periodically the mask would be fed mush and anointed with sunflower oil. If a mask fell or if a person dreamed of his mask, he would burn tobacco to it. One or two small bundles of tobacco were also hung

inside the mask. The owner of a mask belonged to the False Face society and engaged in its curing rituals. The mask not only brought the owner power and protection but also the ability to heal the sick.

Personal power could overwhelm individuals, causing them to seek only self-aggrandizement. The Shawnee have myths that relate the origin of witchcraft to that mythic time when a crocodile's heart, which was the embodiment of evil, was cut out and carried home to the village by unwitting tribespeople. While the tribes of the Northeast fostered belief in contact with power, they also condemned the misuse of such power in sorcery. They tried to control their exceptional personalities by threatening the return of all evil machinations to the perpetrator. Nonetheless, witch societies have been prominent in Menomini history. Even though these destructive medicine practices were at times pervasive among the Northeast Woodlands tribes, their many religious societies never completely abandoned the constructive use of power.

These religious societies could be either temporary or permanent. Participants were usually selected according to criteria based on clan membership, on blessing from the same tutelary spirit, or on personal conduct and achievement. Their ceremonial activities, including narrative rituals, feasts, dances, and games, all had sacred meaning because they were performed to honor clan ancestors, guardian spirits, or departed society members. The Miami and Winnebago each had religious societies formed around clan war-bundles. The Kickapoo still have clan societies that hold spring renewals centered on their ancestral bundles. Vision societies also developed among individual Winnebago, Sauk, Fox, Kickapoo, Illinois, Miami, and Shawnee people who had received vision revelations from the same *manitou* spirit. Throughout this region societies also formed around those warriors or braves whose heroic acts in battle were seen as special signs of personal power. So also the Potawatomi Southern Dance temporarily brought together tribespeople who still grieved for deceased relatives. The medicine societies and other groups, such as the Dream Dance (or Drum Dance) and the Native American Church, admitted tribespeople who felt called to these societies and were willing to submit to the societies' ethics.

At present the primary medicine society among the Iroquois is the Society of Medicine Men (also known as Shake the Pumpkin) to which most members of other societies belong. This society is dedicated to the medicine animals who long ago promised to heal humans in exchange for ceremonies and feasts.

The Society of Mystic Animals includes the Bear, Buffalo, Otter, and Eagle societies; members of each group take its tutelary spirit as their own when they are healed by it. The Little Water Medicine society guards and cures with the most potent of Iroquois medicines, which come from parts of animals, birds, and plants. Rituals to renew the power of this medicine are held several times a year. The Little People society (also known as Dark Dance) receives power from its relationship with the "little people" who live in stream banks, forests, and underground.

The False Face society is one of the most popular Iroquois societies. As described above, the wooden faces represent spirits of the forest who appear to people in dreams. The society has its own curing ceremonies, but it also participates in the Midwinter ceremony. The Husk Faces are agricultural correlates of the False Faces; they are dedicated to the spirits of maize, beans, and squash. Besides having private curing ceremonies, members of the Husk Face society are doorkeepers at the longhouse when the False Faces perform and also function as police during Longhouse ceremonies.

Religious Personalities. The shaman is the most important religious figure among the upper Great Lakes and Ohio River native peoples. Primarily a healer and diviner, the shaman contacts power by means of a trance and channels that power to specific needs. Shamans are known by a variety of names derived from the calls to their vocation they have received by way of visions, as well as from their particular healing functions. Generally, four shamanic vocations are found among the northeastern Algonquian peoples. There are also a number of shamanic techniques. Both the shamanic vocations and techniques are documented from the seventeenth century.

The most celebrated shamanic figure among the Algonquian peoples is the shaking-tent diviner and healer, whom the Ojibwa call *tcisaki*, the Menomini *tcisakos* and the Potawatomi *tcisakked*. Among the Ojibwa, this shamanic figure received the vocation after a dream "call" from the *manitou* called Mistabeo had occurred four times. The *tcisaki*'s technique was to enter a special lodge that swayed when the *manitou* arrived. The *tcisaki* then mediated between the spirits and the audience during a question-and-answer session in which the location of a lost object or the cause of an illness was sought. In the case of illness, the diviner might determine the cause of the sickness while inside the shaking tent and then come out to perform a sucking cure.

Another ancient shamanic profession is that of the tube-sucking curer whom the Ojibwa called *nanandawi*. Several *manitou* could give this healing vocation, but the Thunderer was especially favored. The sucking curer often used the bones of raptorial birds to suck the affected area and to remove objects believed to have

been shot into a person by malicious witches. The curer would partially swallow as many as seven bones down his esophagus; he would apply the bones, which projected out of his mouth, to the area of the patient's body that was being treated.

The manipulation of fire for healing purposes is also an ancient shamanic vocation; the Ojibwa call this healer *wabeno*, the Menomini called him *wapanows*, and the Potawatomi, *wapno*. The traditional call to this vocation came from Morning Star, who was imaged as a *manitou* with horns. The *wabeno*, working individually or in a group, healed by using the heat of burning embers to massage and fascinate his patients.

The final shamanic personality I shall consider here is the member of one of the medicine societies. For example, the Ojibwa Mide, or Medicine society, is composed of the tribe's recognized shamans and candidates initiated into the society as well as healed patients. Thus the healing shamans and ritually initiated members perform together with the healed patients during the ritual. There is a basic difference in technique between the members of these shamanic societies and the individual shamanic healers previously discussed. Among individual healers, healing through spontaneous trance is central, whereas within shamanic societies, transmission of sacred knowledge is primary and trance states are more formally structured and are of secondary importance. Thus the role of the religious leader in the medicine societies can be more accurately described as that of a shaman-priest.

Shamanism among the Huron and the Iroquois of the seventeenth century was primarily an individual enterprise, although a few societies did exist. In subsequent centuries the Iroquois channeled shamanistic powers and skills into the growing number of medicine societies, as described above. The central concern of the Huron shamans was the curing of illness. Illness was caused by either (1) natural events, (2) witchcraft, or (3) desires of the soul. The first could be handled by an herbalist or other practitioner. The second and third required the diagnostic and healing abilities of a shaman *(arendiwane)*, including divining, interpreting dreams, sucking, blowing ashes, and juggling hot coals.

The *ocata* was a shaman skilled in diagnosis. In the case of a hidden desire of the soul whose frustration was causing illness he would seek to have a vision of what was desired. To do this he might gaze into a basin of water until the object appeared or enter into a trance-like state to see the object or lie down in a small dark tent to contact his spiritual allies to assist him.

The spirit-ally *(oki)* was won after a long fast and isolation in the forest; it could take the form of a human, an animal, or a bird such as a raven or eagle. Sometimes the power and skill needed to cure would come through a dream. There were shamanic specialists who handled hot coals or plunged their arms into boiling water without injury; frequently a power song, which allowed the person to accomplish this, was sung. Other shamans cured by blowing hot ashes over a person or by rubbing the person's skin with ashes.

Witchcraft was combatted by the *aretsan;* usually the *aretsan* would suck out the evil spell that the witch had magically injected into his victim. Still other shamans could see things at a distance, cause rain, persuade animal guardian spirits to release game, or give advice on military or political matters.

Outside of these established vocations, certain shamanic techniques were available to all lay people among the tribes of the Northeast. These included tattooing, naming, divining, bloodletting, induced vomiting as a cure, weather control, and herbal healing. However, at times individual shamans or shamanic societies were so strong that they absorbed these and other curing practices as their exclusive prerogative.

Other outstanding religious personalities included the war chiefs, who led war bundle ceremonies and war parties, and the peace chiefs, who did not go to fight but who acted as mediators, working for peace within the tribe as well as between separate tribes. The Menomini chose hereditary war chiefs from the Bear clan and peace chiefs from the Thunderer clan. All Northeast Woodlands tribes used a war and peace chief system, but the clan totems from which these leaders were selected often differed from band to band.

Occasionally singular religious figures appear in the ethnohistory of the Northeast Woodlands peoples. The Winnebago have had sacred clowns and "contraries" who performed ritual actions backward or in a humorous manner to accentuate the ambiguity of life. Transvestite men such as the Miami "whitefaces" wore women's clothes and did women's work; occasionally they gained reputations as healers or diviners because of their unusual call and personal abilities. Among other exceptional personalities were the ecstatic visionaries often called "prophets." The Delaware prophet Neolin called for a rejection of white influences and a return to the old ways and inspired many to join Pontiac's uprising in the 1760s. The famous Shawnee prophets Tecumseh and Tenkswatawa initiated a nativistic movement uniting many woodland peoples against American expansion in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Handsome Lake, of the Seneca, inspired a reformed way of life for the Iroquois in the early nineteenth century. During the same period the Kickapoo prophet Kenekuk led a religious movement that fostered his people's accomodation to some Ameri-

can cultural influences. The Winnebago prophet Wabokieshiek began a short-lived revitalization of traditional values during Black Hawk's War in the 1830s. These and other minor prophets received revelations concerning the need to transform specific historical situations. They represented a shift in religious thought among these native peoples from the predominantly individual concern and responsibility for harmony with cosmic powers in nature to a more structured ethics based on an interior religious imperative.

Northeast Woodlands peoples have struggled to maintain their traditions into the present period. Not only have they endured the cultural inroads of a variety of Christian missionaries, but these native traditions have also persisted in the face of tribal fragmentation and degradation. This struggle was reflected in the life of the Seneca leader Handsome Lake; he was able to give focus to his people's plight by drawing on the spiritual power of dreams that came to him during an illness brought on by drunkenness and despair. The traditional sanction of dreams and visions in native Northeast Woodlands religions continues into the present revitalization of the sweat lodge, the vision quest, and medicine-wheel gatherings. The relevance of these traditional ceremonies to contemporary needs is highlighted by the growing participation of non-Indians in these meditative rituals.

[*For detailed treatment of one Northeast Woodlands tradition, see* Iroquois Religion. *See also* Shamanism, *article on* North American Shamanism, *and the biographies of Handsome Lake, Neolin, and Tecumseh.*]

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JOHN A. GRIM and DONALD P. ST. JOHN

Indians of the Southeast Woodlands

The Indians who were the aboriginal inhabitants of the southeastern United States lived in a region whose boundaries were approximately the same as those of the contemporary South, that is, extending from about 95° west longitude eastward to the Atlantic coast and from about 37° north latitude southward to the Gulf of Mexico. The Indians of the Southeast Woodlands were linguistically diverse. Muskogean was the most important language family, but four additional language families were present: Iroquoian, Siouan, Algonquian, and Caddoan. Both prehistoric and historical forces shaped the cultural and social characteristics of the Southeast Indians.

In the late prehistoric, or Mississippian, period (800 to 1540 CE) the Indians of the Southeast developed a form of social organization and a belief system that appear to have been generally uniform throughout the region. The Southeast Indians farmed the rich, easily tilled alluvial soils on the margins of the larger rivers, and their villages and towns lay along these same rivers. They were organized into chiefdoms, societies ruled by chiefly lineages whose members possessed higher status than commoners, although the social distance between chiefs and commoners varied from society to society and from time to time. These chiefdoms were highly militaristic, and their young men vied with each other in winning war honors.

The Southeast Indians shared a common history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because the region of the United States that was best for their hoe agriculture was also ideally suited for plantation agriculture. Hence, they became enmeshed in the wars that Britain, France, and Spain waged for supremacy in the South, and in the early nineteenth century they held title to vast tracts of land that southern planters wished to cultivate, using the labor of black slaves. At that time most of the Southeast Indians were "removed" from their land and forced to migrate to the present state of Oklahoma. Only a few Cherokees, Choctaws, Catawbas, and Seminoles evaded removal. Their descendants still live in the South.

Various estimates of the Indian population of the Southeast Woodlands have been proposed for the period just prior to European exploration in the sixteenth century. They range from a low of 170,000 to a high of perhaps 1.7 million. But whatever the Indians' aboriginal population, beginning in the sixteenth century they began to suffer from a series of European epidemic diseases that caused very heavy loss of life. By 1755, they may have numbered only about 50,000 to 70,000. It is clear that this demographic collapse caused extensive social and cultural change. The Indians' social structure became less stratified, and their religious and ritual life was simplified. The most detailed information on Southeast Indian religious beliefs and practices was collected in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although some good information was collected by eighteenth-century observers, and this is complemented by scattered information from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some threads of continuity can be discerned among beliefs and practices throughout this four-hundred-year period.

The Belief System. The Southeast Indian conception of the cosmos resembled, in its broad outlines, the cos-

mologies of many other New World peoples. The Southeast Indians believed, for example, that this world—the earth on which they lived—was a circular island that rested upon the waters. The sky above was thought to be a vault of stone, in the form of an inverted bowl. At dawn and at dusk, the bowl rose so that the sun and the moon, two principal deities, could pass beneath it at the beginning and end of their transit through the heavens.

In addition to the earth on which they stood and the world in which they lived, the Indians believed that an upperworld existed above the sky vault and that an underworld existed beneath the earth and the waters. The upperworld was peopled by the sun and the moon, and by large, perfect archetypes of all the creatures that lived on the earth. The underworld was peopled by spirits and monsters living in a chaotic world full of novelty and invention.

For the Southeast Indians, the upperworld was a place of structure, regularity, and perfect order. Its opposite was the underworld, a place of chaos and disorder, as well as fecundity. The Indians appear to have attempted to steer a middle course between the compulsive order of the upperworld and the mad chaos of the underworld. They believed, for example, that in the beginning there were only two worlds, the upperworld and the underworld, and that this world had been created when soft mud was brought up from beneath the waters to form the island earth. Moreover, they believed that the island was suspended rather precariously from the sky vault by four cords, one in each of the four cardinal directions. They appear to have believed that man's inability to behave strictly in accordance with moral and religious precepts weakened the cords, and thus they feared that the earth would one day sink beneath the waters.

The Southeast Indians believed that certain kinds of beings were more pure, more sacred, than others. Sacred beings were those that seemed able to resist or to stand above natural, mundane constraints. Sacred plants included cedar, pine, spruce, holly, and laurel, because they remained green in winter while other trees shed their leaves. Sacred animals included the owl and the cougar, because both were able to go about in darkness, and they therefore possessed a terrible advantage over animals that could not see in darkness. Sacred people included priests and medicine men, who lived more completely in accordance with sacred precepts than did ordinary people. Hence, the Indians' priests and medicine men were believed to possess powers that ordinary people did not possess.

The sun, the chief upperworld deity, was represented on earth by sacred fire. The smoke that rose from sacred fire connected this earthly world with the upperworld. The Southeast Indians believed that when they behaved badly in the presence of sacred fire, their behavior was immediately known to the sun. The medium that connected people in this world with the underworld was the water in creeks and rivers, which were thought to be avenues or roads to the underworld. The Cherokee personified rivers and streams, calling them "the long person." Fire and water were considered opposites. As such, fire and water were one of an extensive series of opposed forces and beings in the Southeast Indian belief system.

The Cherokee, and probably other Southeast Indians, classified living beings into large categories, and the relationships among these categories were important structural features of their belief system. The three categories of living beings were people, animals, and plants. People, as hunters, preyed upon animals, and because they sometimes killed animals thoughtlessly or carelessly, the animal world became angry and resentful. As a way of getting revenge upon people, the spirits of the animals sent them diseases. The deer, for example, afflicted careless or thoughtless hunters with crippling rheumatism or arthritis. Plants, the third category of beings, were believed to be friends of people and, as such, were the sources of most medicines. These three categories and the interrelationships among them shaped the Southeast Indians' conception of illness as well as their theory of medicine.

Each of these three categories was further subdivided into smaller categories. People were divided into matrilineal clans. Plants were classified in terms of an elaborate taxonomy. Animals were divided into birds, four-footed animals, and vermin, the latter category including fish, snakes, and other creatures inhabiting the watery realm. Many of these animals were invested with symbolic value. In Southeast Indian thought, each of these three animal categories was epitomized by a particular species. The rattlesnake, the most feared venomous snake in the Southeast, was the epitome of the vermin category, and the Virginia deer, the region's most important game animal, was the epitome of the four-footed animals. Birds may have been epitomized by two creatures—the bald eagle, the supreme bird of peace, and the peregrine falcon, the supreme bird of war. If frequency of occurrence in late prehistoric art is a reliable measure of symbolic importance, then the peregrine falcon was clearly the more important of the two birds.

In addition to the animals that epitomized the normal categories, the Southeast Indian belief system recognized an extensive series of anomalous beings that did not fit neatly into a single category. In each case,

these anomalies were given special symbolic value. For example, the Venus's-flytrap *(Dionaea muscipula)* and the pitcher plant *(Sarracenia purpurea)*, because they "catch" and "digest" insects, were considered to be plants that behave like animals. The Cherokee believed that the roots of both plants possessed extraordinary magical powers.

The bear was considered anomalous because it is a four-footed animal that possesses certain characteristics reminiscent of people: it is capable of bipedal locomotion; the skeletal structure of its foot closely resembles the human foot; it is as omnivorous in its diet as people are; and its feces resemble human feces. In Cherokee mythology the bear is depicted as a buffoon who attempts to act as humans act, but who fails because of his clumsiness and because he is, after all, an animal.

The most anomalous being in the Southeast Indian belief system was a monster formed of the parts of many creatures. There is evidence that the Indians considered this monster to be an actual being, not a creature whose existence was exclusively spiritual. The Cherokee called this monster the *uktena*. Its body was like that of a rattlesnake, only much larger, the size of a tree trunk. It was believed to live on the margins of the known world, in deep pools of water and near high mountain passes. If a person merely saw an *uktena*, it could cause misfortune, and to smell the breath of an *uktena* brought death.

In the art of the late prehistoric Southeast Indians, images of creatures similar to the *uktena* are incised on shell and pottery. They are serpentine in shape, but they also have wings, deer horns, the teeth of herbivores or carnivores, and other non-snakelike features. Moreover, according to Cherokee mythology the first *uktena* was created when a man was transformed.

The *uktena* was not, however, merely an evil creature from which no good could come. The Cherokee believed that the *uktena* had a blazing crest on its forehead, which, if it could be obtained, was the most powerful means of divination. This crest was in the form of a crystal, and one could gaze into it and see the future reflected, just as a tree is reflected in a quiet pool of water.

Both in their form and in the role they played in the larger belief system, the *uktena* and other serpentine monsters resemble both the feathered serpent of the Aztec and the dragon of Eurasia. Why these imaginary monsters should have been structurally similar remains to be explained.

Witchcraft. The Southeast Indians explained many of the events in their lives as reward and punishment meted out by spiritual beings who acted according to known standards of behavior. For example, young men who were too careless or headstrong to observe certain taboos and rules of behavior could endanger their own safety and the safety of their comrades in warfare. And women were required to segregate themselves during their menses; if they failed to do so, their mere presence was thought to be polluting and could spoil any serious enterprise. Thus the Southeast Indians explained some of the misfortunes in their lives as having emanated from a just principle—bad things happened when people behaved badly.

But this principle could not explain why morally virtuous people suffered misfortune, nor why morally corrupt people experienced remarkable success. The Southeast Indians believed that occurrences of this kind were caused by the mysterious agency of witchcraft. That is, they believed that witches were real people living in their communities who were irredeemably evil and who caused certain misfortunes to befall virtuous people.

The witchcraft beliefs of the Southeast Indians are largely known through historical sources. Hence they cannot be known in the same detail as similar beliefs documented in societies that have been studied more recently through firsthand observation. But enough is known to make it clear that in the Southeast, as elsewhere, witchcraft beliefs grew out of the powerful tensions and ambivalences that exist in small-scale societies. In such societies, people do powerfully affect the lives of one another, and because of this they are forever examining one another's behavior with the most exacting scrutiny, searching for motives and intentions. Witchcraft beliefs thrive in such a social climate.

In Cherokee myths witches are depicted as irredeemably evil people who can take on the appearance of any person, four-footed animal, or bird. Witches are thought particularly likely to assume the appearance of a horned owl or a raven. The Cherokee took pains to stay up all night at the bedside of anyone who was seriously ill because they believed that witches were especially likely to attack such weak and defenseless people. They believed that witches stole the remaining days, months, or years of life of the ill person, extending their own lives by adding this time to their own. For this reason, the Cherokee believed that witches were often old people.

The Cherokee believed that witches' activities could sometimes be discovered through divination. This was especially necessary in the case of people who were ill. The medicine man who was taking care of the afflicted person would rake up a cone-shaped mound of coals in the fireplace and then sprinkle some pulverized tobacco *(Nicotiana rustica)* on the cone. Using the mound of coals as a kind of compass, the medicine man would

recognize the direction of a witch's presence by the place on the cone where the sparks flared. If the particles clung together and flared with a loud burst, the witch was just outside the house. The Cherokee believed that a witch could be killed merely by learning his or her identity. Deceit and deception were at the core of witchcraft, and without these a witch could not exist.

Rituals. The Southeast Indians acted out their beliefs about the world in rituals at both small and large junctures in their lives. In their everyday lives they observed taboos and avoidances that devolved from their fundamental categories of thought. Fire and water, for example, symbolized the opposition of the upper world and the underworld; accordingly, the Southeast Indians had a taboo against extinguishing fire with water, except on the occasion of someone's death, when this act perhaps symbolized the dissolution of a human life. Many additional taboos and avoidances were predicated on other categorical oppositions and anomalies. For example, males and females were strictly separated on certain occasions; some Southeast Indians prohibited cooking birds and four-footed animals in the same pot; and children were forbidden to touch moles because of their anomalous life beneath the ground. The Southeast Indians bore their prohibitions and taboos constantly in mind.

Immersion in water was a ritual that all Southeast Indians were supposed to perform each day, although some practiced it more faithfully than others. One was supposed to go to a moving stream at dawn and immerse oneself in the life-renewing water, even if ice was on the water. This ritual appears to have been kept most strictly by males, and particularly by younger males, upon whose vigor the defense of the society depended.

All important transitions of life were underscored by rites of passage. Mothers generally gave birth in the small houses where women sequestered themselves during menstruation. Before the newborn baby was allowed to suckle, it was taken to a creek or a spring and dipped into the water. Then bear oil was rubbed all over the baby's body. The father of a newborn baby was required to fast for four days.

Marriages were sealed by a series of exchanges. The kinsmen of the groom first collected gifts that were then presented to the kinsmen of the bride. In the marriage ceremony itself, the most essential acts were the killing of a deer or a bear by the groom, symbolizing his role as meat producer, and the cooking of a corn dish by the bride to symbolize her role as corn producer.

The principal concern of young men in the aboriginal Southeast was acquiring war honors, which they earned by meritorious deeds of valor. At each juncture in their military careers, a new name was bestowed upon them at a ceremony in their honor. The young men to be honored rubbed bear oil over their bodies and wore special clothing. The beloved old men delivered orations on the valor of the young men, and they admonished others to observe sacred precepts.

In curing illness, Southeast Indian priests and medicine men relied upon rituals as much as upon herbal medicines. As has been seen, they believed that many diseases were caused by vengeful spirits of the animals they had slain. If, for example, a medicine man concluded that his patient's disease had been caused by a vengeful fish spirit, he might invoke a kingfisher spirit or heron spirit to fly down and snatch away the offending fish spirit. Or if the illness happened to be rheumatism caused by an angry deer spirit, the medicine man might require the patient to drink a medicine made of several different ferns, and he would then invoke a terrapin spirit to come and loosen the rheumatism from the patient's bones. Moreover, the medicine man might give his patient a number of taboos and avoidances to observe, such as eating no salt, wood ash lye (a food seasoning), or hot food and avoiding squirrels, cats, bison, or any other animal that humps its back like a person with rheumatoid arthritis.

Funerals were the rites of passage around which the Southeast Indians organized their most elaborate rituals. In the late prehistoric era, and in some places even in the early historical era, the death of an important person could cause several other people to submit to voluntary death so that they could accompany the dead person to the otherworld. The interment of an important person's body was the occasion of a solemn ceremonial with much mourning. Months later the body was dug up and the bones cleaned and placed in a basket or box that was kept in the temple. Less important people received less elaborate treatment, but even they might be buried with some of their possessions, as well as with containers of food for their journey to the otherworld. In some cases, favorite pets were killed and interred with their masters.

In addition to a multitude of everyday taboos and avoidances, life-crisis rituals, and rites of passage, the Southeast Indians organized periodic ceremonials that were performed on behalf of the entire society. There is evidence that the Southeast Indians in the late prehistoric period performed a series of such rituals throughout the year. But by the eighteenth century only one of these was widely performed—the Green Corn ceremony. This ceremony was performed when the kernels of the late corn crop filled out and could be roasted and eaten as green corn. Hence, the precise time when the ceremony was performed varied from late July to early September, and in the extreme south it could even come in June.

The Green Corn ceremony was a first-fruits ceremony and a rite of thanksgiving, but it was also an important vehicle in the Southeast Indians' never-ending quest for purity. In fact, the Green Corn ceremony was a ritual means of purifying an entire society.

When the principal men of a society decided on the date on which the ceremony was to begin, they announced it to all the towns. On the appointed day the people assembled and began by eating a feast of the old year's food, for the eating of the new corn was forbidden until near the end of the ceremony. Next, the men cleaned and refurbished all the public structures, and the women did the same for their households, throwing away old pottery and artifacts and replacing them with new. A strict avoidance was imposed between the sexes, so that a man could not touch even a female infant for the duration of the ceremony.

In the next episode of the ceremony, the men fasted for a day and two nights while repeatedly drinking emetics and vomiting up the last vestiges of the old year's food. During this period of fasting the men discussed all the social conflicts and crimes of the previous year. Many of these were resolved at this time, and all was forgiven except murder. People who for various crimes, such as adultery, had fled from the town or had been expelled could now return to society with their crimes forgiven.

Next came the crucial rite of renewal. All fires were extinguished, and all the people fell into absolute silence, as if time had stopped. Then one of the priests, using a fire drill, kindled a new, pure fire, and from this fire all fires in the households were made anew. This marked the beginning of a new year. Afterward all appeared in their finest clothes, and the Green Corn ceremony ended with feasting and dancing. Then it was as if the entire social order had been cleansed and purified.

Christian Missions and Modern Religious Movements. The christianization of the Southeast Indians began in the late sixteenth century, when the Spanish built a mission system along the Georgia coast and in northern Florida. An early missionizing attempt by the Jesuits failed, but beginning in 1583 the Franciscans laid the groundwork for a mission system that endured until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Spanish friars taught the mission Indians Roman Catholic dogma, and they taught some of them to speak Spanish; a few Indians even became literate in the language. The missionaries also introduced European grains, vegetables, and fruits. The friars were able to maintain their missions only in the coastal regions; they were never able to missionize effectively in the interior, although a few attempts were made.

The Spanish mission system was rapidly destroyed after the British founded the colony of South Carolina in 1670. In their new colony the British quickly set about building plantations to be worked with slave labor. They armed Indian mercenaries to aid in their attacks on the Spanish missions. They enslaved many of the Indians and put them to work alongside the African slaves. By 1705, the Spanish mission system among the Southeast Indians had been completely destroyed.

Throughout the eighteenth century the Southeast Indians were caught up in the competition among the British, French, and Spanish for supremacy in the Southeast. The French sent a few missionaries to the Indians, but they were relatively ineffective. In the British colonies the Anglican Society for the Propagation of the Gospel did some mission work, although never with great enthusiasm. John and Charles Wesley also attempted for a time to missionize the Indians of the Georgia colony, but without success.

The first serious attempt after the Spanish to missionize the Southeast Indians came in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when several Protestant groups began working among the Indians. It was also at this time that a nativistic movement swept through one group of Southeast Indians, the Upper Creek, with disastrous results. Partly stimulated by a visit from the Shawnee leader Tecumseh, who attempted to unite the Indians against the Americans, a number of prophets arose among the Upper Creek who believed that they could expel the Americans through combining religious and military action. This led to the Creek War of 1813–1814, which ended in a decisive defeat of the Indians. [*See the biography of Tecumseh.*]

At the very time when nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries were trying to "civilize" the Southeast Indians by teaching them not only Christianity but also modern agricultural and mechanical arts, pressure was building among southern planters to "remove" the Indians from their land. Ultimately the planters had their way, and beginning in the 1830s almost all the Indians of the Southeast Woodlands were forced to migrate to the Indian Territory, now Oklahoma.

Although fragments of the old Southeast Indian belief system have lingered on, often in an underground way, such beliefs have become curiosities in the twentieth century. In some places descendants of the Southeast Indians attend "stomp dances," but similar dances are performed by many modern American Indians. In a few places the Green Corn ceremony continues to be performed, although it lacks the powerful and pervasive meaning it once had.

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CHARLES HUDSON

Indians of the Plains

Plains Indian religion is as varied and complex as the various peoples who inhabit the Plains region, an area delineated by the Rocky Mountains on the west; the Canadian provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba on the north; the Mississippi River on the east; and the Gulf of Mexico on the south. The Great Plains measure 1,125,000 square miles, an area roughly equal to one-third the land mass of the United States, and serve as the home for more than thirty American Indian ethnic groups, conventionally known as bands, tribes, nations, and confederacies. The Plains present linguistic as well as ethnic complexity; seven distinct language families are found. In historical times, these language groups have been identified in the following way:

1. *Algonquian*, represented by the Northern Arapaho of Wyoming and the Southern Arapaho of Oklahoma; the Atsina, or Gros Ventre of the Prairies; the Blackfeet Confederacy comprising the Siksika, the Kainah (or Blood), and the Piegan; the Northern Cheyenne of Montana and the Southern Cheyenne of Oklahoma; the Plains Cree; and the Plains Ojibwa (also known as Chippewa, or Bungi).
2. *Athapascan*, represented by the Lipan Apache and the Kiowa Apache of Oklahoma, and the Sarsi of Alberta. The Sarsi are counted with the Blackfeet Confederacy despite the difference in languages.
3. *Caddoan*, represented by the Arikara, or Ree; the Caddo; the Kichai; the Pawnee; and the Wichita. These tribes ranged from Texas to North Dakota but now reside in North Dakota (Arikara) and Oklahoma (all others).
4. *Kiowa-Tanoan*, represented on the Plains by only one tribe, the Kiowa, who now live in Oklahoma.
5. *Siouan*, by far the largest on the Plains, represented by the Assiniboin, also known in Canada as the Stoney; the Crow, or Absoroka, of Montana; a subdivision of the Siouan family known as Deghiha, comprising the Kansa (or Kaw), the Omaha, the Osage, the Ponca, and the Quapaw, all of whom live in Oklahoma; the Hidatsa, or Gros Ventre of the River; the Iowa, Oto, and Missouri, who form a linguistic subdivision called Chiwere and who reside in Oklahoma; the Mandan, who share a reservation with the Arikara and Hidatsa in North Dakota; the Dakota, or Santee; the Lakota, or Teton; and the Nakota, or Yankton. The Mandan, the Arikara, and the Hidatsa are currently referred to as the Three Affiliated Tribes. The Dakota, the Lakota, and the Nakota are conventionally designated as the "Sioux," a term that, despite its pejorative origin, continues to be employed by scholars as the only one available under which to group these three closely related tribes and their numerous subdivisions. [*For further discussion, see* Lakota Religion.]
6. *Tonkawan*, represented exclusively by the Tonkawa of Oklahoma.
7. *Uto-Aztecan*, represented by one tribe, the Comanche of Oklahoma.

Although archaeologists conclude that the Plains area has been inhabited by humans continuously for the past twelve thousand years, Plains Indian culture is a historical phenomenon coalescing after the introduction and diffusion of the horse in the seventeenth century, which led to the development of nomadic, equestrian bands whose economy was based on buffalo hunting, though some groups conserved aspects of an older hor-

ticultural way of life. Sedentary villages continued to flourish among the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara on the northern high Plains, and among the Pawnee and Deghiha speakers on the southern Plains. These people lived part of the year in earth lodges and tilled the soil near their homes. The more nomadic tribes lived most of the year in tipis, and transportation was by horse and dog travois over land and by round-shaped bullboats over water.

There was extensive trade among Plains tribes, facilitated by an invention unique to the Plains, sign language, which permitted traders speaking diverse languages to communicate for the purpose of exchange. Although cultural similarities existed between tribes during the historical period, individual ethnic groups displayed an unusual amount of cultural variation. There was, however, a progressive homogenization, partly a response to European contact and resultant disease, warfare, and, ultimately, conquest. Although population figures are difficult to ascertain, there are currently 225,000 Indians on the Plains, and most authorities believe that, following a dangerous population decline at the turn of the twentieth century, the present-day Indian population equals or surpasses precontact figures.

The Plains culture essentially comprises a potpourri of religious ideas from other parts of the United States and Canada, and it is useful to see the Plains as a point of synthesis of various customs, beliefs, and rituals that amalgamate as a result of emigration and, ultimately, diffusion. Nearly all the basic religious ideas found in other parts of native North America are found on the Plains. If the focus is on the historical period, these basic religious ideas can be seen to fall into three major categories.

The first category may be regarded as tribal religion, idiosyncratic beliefs and rituals that are perceived by their adepts to be unique to their own tribe. In practice, idiosyncratic rituals may in fact have diffused, unbeknownst to the adepts, to other tribes, as in the case of the Pawnee Hako and the Lakota Hunka, which are ritual variants that are believed by each tribe to be unique to itself.

The second category is made up of pantribal religion, beliefs and rituals acknowledged to have been diffused usually from a known single source. Frequently there is a conscious effort made to learn a new religion from a foreign ethnic group. Examples of pantribal religion are the hallmark of Plains religion and include the Sun Dance, the Ghost Dance, and the Native American Church (in order of historical occurrence), although not all of these religions are limited to the Plains area.

A third category falls somewhere between the first two and consists mainly of two ubiquitous religious institutions, the vision quest and the Sweat Lodge ceremony, as well as a number of other beliefs and practices that, although present in all Plains tribes, are still considered by their followers to be unique to each.

Vision Quest and Sweat Lodge. The ideas behind the vision quest and the Sweat Lodge ceremony and their associated ritual paraphernalia are essentially the same among all Plains tribes, but there is some variation found even within any single tribe. During the vision quest, a person, usually a male, embarks upon an ordeal in which he will isolate himself from the remainder of the tribe. Under the direction of a medicine man, he is led to a hill or other secluded spot, where he stays for an agreed-upon number of days and fasts until he receives a vision that will later be interpreted for him by the medicine man. The vision usually takes the form of a communication between the supplicant and an animal, bird, or inanimate object such as a stone. The supplicant may also envision a ghost, but in all cases, he will receive instructions that will affect his future. He may also be instructed to obtain the skin of an animal or bird or another object that will serve as a personal fetish or good-luck charm. He may learn a song, acquire a name, or even receive a calling to become a medicine man.

Guardians or tutelary spirits sometimes are acquired in the vision quest, at other times obtained in a ritual from a shaman. Guardian spirits may be represented by animals, birds, inanimate objects, or the ghosts of humans. Frequently, the guardian spirit is manifested in the form of a bundle, fetish, or other object that an individual wears or carries during ordeals or dangerous encounters, such as those met on the warpath. Along with the object, a quester may acquire special prayers or songs learned in the vision and may employ these incantations in times of need.

In the Sweat Lodge ceremony, a small number of (usually) males join together with a medicine man in a small dome-shaped lodge constructed of saplings and covered with hides and blankets to make it airtight and dark. In the center of the lodge a hole is dug and stones heated outside are handed in by means of ladles by the fire tender and placed into the center hole. The hides are secured firmly over the lodge and the medicine man sprinkles water over the heated stones, causing a great rush of hot air to fill the lodge. The participants perspire profusely and slap their bodies with switches made from pine boughs or with buffalo tails in order to increase their blood circulation. At the same time they sing and pray together, asking for special favors from the spirits who come into the lodge, and also praying for the general welfare of the people. During the course

of the ceremony, the lodge is opened occasionally so that the adepts may breathe fresh air, and at that time the ceremonial pipe is smoked.

Frequently, the Sweat Lodge ceremony is conducted as a prefatory ritual before going on the warpath or before undertaking the vision quest or some other religious ceremony. The Sweat Lodge is regarded as a means of purifying individuals both physically and spiritually.

Ritual Practitioners. The most important figure in Plains religion is the ritual leader, who is known by a variety of names depending on his or her specialization. Normally, a shaman cures people of symbolic illness by ritual means, such as singing, dancing, or praying, while a medicine man or woman is a specialist in herbal curing. In most cases both types of ritual leaders employ the knowledge of the other, and frequently the medicine man or woman relies on supernatural aid in the selection of the proper herb, just as the shaman occasionally uses herbal teas and other concoctions in the course of a shamanic ceremony. Although *shaman* is a preferred term among scholars who study ritual behavior that is highly individualistic and informal, most Plains Indians refer, in English, to both ritual curers and herbalists as "medicine men." In the native languages, however, discrete terms are used.

Each ritual practitioner is well known in a tribal community and achieves high status by performing cures for his patients and by conducting the important ceremonies. He is often a conjurer or magician capable of amazing his adepts with his mystical abilities. With a modicum of skill in sleight of hand he can give the appearance of sucking a foreign object out of his patient's body through a bone tube, later spitting out for all to see a bird or rock or other substance that allegedly caused the illness or the pain. The ritual practitioner is usually well paid for his services, previously in horses, buffalo robes, or blankets, now in food and money, although most shamans admit that payment is not required. Part of the popularity of the ritual practitioner is predicated on his success rate with patients and the particular way he conducts the important public ceremonies. Frequently the greatest difference in technique between shamans is stylistic: there are many variants of public and private ceremonies since they are conducted and performed according to instructions received in visions by individual shamans. In many cases, the popular shaman is simply the one who can put on the most interesting performance, but showmanship is not seen as a detraction from the sincerity of the performances.

In former times the shaman was also called upon for consultation in matters of war, hunting, moving camp, finding buffalo, naming children, conducting the great public ceremonies, and analyzing visions. In formal ceremonies such as the Sun Dance, the shaman continues to serve as an intermediary between the common people and the supernaturals who control the universe. Some may serve as directors of the Sun Dance because of their exclusive knowledge of the cosmological mysteries. Often this knowledge is discussed among medicine men in a special argot, a sacred language believed to be understood only by the supernaturals and other medicine men. Because of their supernatural abilities shamans are often feared by the common people and in some instances by other shamans who believe that some ritual practitioners are capable of performing magic and witchcraft.

Although witchcraft and sorcery are not common on the Plains, several tribes have such beliefs. The Plains Cree and Plains Ojibwa brought from their Great Lakes homeland a number of ceremonies, and although they quickly learned the Sun Dance from the Assiniboin, they continued to bury their dead in the ground and conduct an annual Feast of the Dead. They were particularly frightened of witchcraft and sorcery and had one ceremony, probably related to the ceremonies of the Midewiwin, or Great Medicine society, in the Great Lakes, in which a shaman was bound hand and foot and placed in a lone tipi. It was believed that spirits entered the tipi, untied the shaman, and taught him how to cure the sick and find lost articles. Sometimes to the amazement of the devotees, the tent began to shake while the shaman was being untied and frequently he was found in a ridiculous position, sometimes wedged in between the tipi poles. For this reason, this particular ceremony (called a "shamanic cult institution" in the anthropological literature) is referred to as the Shaking Tent rite. Modified forms of this ceremony are still popular on the northern Plains among the Arapaho, Cheyenne, Lakota, and others. The Lakota call the ritual Yuwipi, a term referring to the act of rolling up into a ball the rope with which the shaman is tied.

The Supernatural. The notions of sacredness and taboo are common to Plains religion. Both designate states, desirable or not, that may be changed through the mediation of prayer, song, dance, or general propitiation of the proper spirits. The idea of the holy is most often expressed by native terms such as the Lakota *wakan;* the Algonquian variants of *manitu;* the Ponca *xube;* and Comanche *puha.* All animate and inanimate objects are capable of serving as a receptacle for this sacred state. The rituals employed to transform persons or objects from a profane state to a sacred one have frequently but erroneously been called in English "medicine," or "making medicine." Frequently the source of a

medicine man's personal power is kept in a "medicine bundle." *Medicine* is here a misnomer for *sacred power.*

All Plains people distinguish in their respective languages between power and sacredness. *Great Mystery* and *Great Spirit* are also English terms associated with the Plains belief in a creator god or prime mover, a belief that led to the Christian interpretation that Plains Indians believed in a monotheistic god prior to European contact. There is no empirical evidence for this, however, and today the term *supreme being* usually designates the total of all supernatural beings and powers in the tribal universe. Thus the Lakota word *wakantanka,* most often translated as "Great Mystery" or "Great Spirit," more accurately means "most sacred" and symbolizes sixteen separate entities in the Lakota belief system.

Most often the symbols used to designate the important gods of the tribal pantheons are analogized or personified by references to astral phenomena, and the chief god of many tribal religions is addressed as "the Sun," while the terrestrial counterpart is always "Mother Earth," but there is no evidence to support the idea that these references are anything but metaphorical.

The Plains culture hero or trickster who figures importantly as the mediator between the supernaturals and humankind goes by a number of names—Inktomi ("spider") among the Lakota; Great White Hare among the Algonquian speakers; and Old Man or Coyote among the Crow. In the creation myths this being teaches humans about culture after the establishment of the earth. He also plays another important role in the mythology of the Plains people: he is the principal character in a cycle of morality stories in which positive values of the Indian people are taught through negative examples, that is, the hero always makes mistakes and demonstrates poor judgment. Children are told not to behave as the trickster.

Taboos associated with sexual intercourse, menstruation, and food are as prominent on the Plains as they are elsewhere in American Indian culture, although recent evidence shows that menstrual taboos are positive, in their reinforcement of the female biological role, as well as negative, in their reinforcement of the male fear of "pollution."

The Hereafter. A belief that each person had more than a single "soul"—one that inheres in the living until death, another that corresponds to the common notion of ghost—was common among the Plains tribes.

The hereafter was described as a hazy duplicate of the living world. There people dwelled in tipi camps, hunted buffalo, sang, feasted, danced, and were reunited with their kin. Enemies also abounded, and one had to beware of vengeance from the spirit of a slain enemy. It is alleged that the practice of scalping prevented the enemy spirit from going to the spirit camp after death.

The Milky Way figures prominently as the route over which the souls of the departed travel toward their final destination, the myriad of stars representing the campfires of the deceased. At a fork in the celestial road, judgment is pronounced over the soul, usually by a woman who instructs some of the souls to continue to the hereafter, while others are remanded back to earth to live as ghosts.

The most common forms of burial on the Plains were scaffold and tree burials. The deceased was dressed in fine clothing and wrapped in a buffalo hide. Then the body was placed in the scaffold or tree and secured tightly; it remained there until it decomposed. Most Indians were generally fearful that the spirit of the deceased haunted the place of its burial, so burial grounds were usually avoided. At the time of the burial, however, close relatives of the deceased would come and linger near the corpse. They prepared foods for the spirit's journey to the hereafter and placed new hunting and fighting implements near the scaffold. Frequently a favorite horse was killed and placed at the foot of the scaffold so that the spirit of the deceased could ride that of the horse in the other world.

Mourners might stay near a close relative's body for several days. To show their grief women would often cut their hair short, gash their arms and legs, and blacken their faces. It was also customary for the relatives of the deceased to give away all their belongings to the needy.

The Lakota mourned their dead for one year. They had a special ceremony called Ghost Keeping in which a close relative would keep a lock of hair of the deceased in a special bundle for one year. Each day the ghost was ritually fed by the keeper, and at the end of the year elaborate ceremonies were held on its behalf. At this time all the people in the camp assembled to watch the ghost being fed for the last time, and the soul of the deceased was finally freed.

It was also commonly believed that when a person died, its ghost would attempt to entice a close relative to join it in death. These ghosts heralded their presence in numerous ways and some believed that if they heard a baby crying outside in the night or a wolf howl or a rooster crow, it was some boundless spirit calling someone to die. When this occurred members of the family would fire guns to frighten away the spirit. Shamans would burn incense with an aroma that was displeasing to these angry ghosts. Belief in ghosts was common, and it was accepted that ghosts were capable of advising hu-

mans about the welfare of the tribe. Shamans were believed to commune with ghosts at night. The shamans freely asked the advice of ghosts about how to cure people, and the ghosts predicted certain events in the lives of the living. Ghosts were also capable of finding lost or stolen articles and in some cases were capable of taking another life.

Major Symbols. Perhaps there is no more universal a symbol of Plains Indian religion than the long-stemmed pipe, sometimes called the "peace pipe." The pipe is essentially a medium of prayer, and when people pray with the pipe it is believed that the smoke rising from the pipe will carry the message of the supplicants to the spirits above. Pipe smoking is a necessary prelude to every important religious ceremony. In the past a pipe was also frequently smoked when deliberations had to be made over hunting or warfare. Normally, each man owned his own pipe and carried it in an elaborate bag or bundle.

The prized pipe is one made with a bowl fashioned from catlinite, a red stone that is found in Pipestone, Minnesota, and that is distributed widely throughout the Plains through trade. The bowl is made separately from the pipe stem, which is wood, or in some cases pipestone. It is considered unlucky by some tribes to store the pipe with the bowl attached to the stem, and consequently the two parts are disjoined when not in use. Because the pipe is powerful in communicating with the supernaturals, it is treated with a great deal of respect by everyone. Children are not allowed to touch the pipe or even approach it for fear that they will abuse it. Showing disrespect to the pipe by stepping over it or dropping it might cause a great disaster or even death to someone in the offender's family.

Several types of Indian tobacco are smoked in the pipe, and it too is considered to have certain sacred powers. It is often wrapped in pouches and hung in trees as offerings to the supernaturals. Prior to the Indians' confinement to the reservation, there were various types of commercial tobacco traded between traders and Indians, as well as indigenous types cultivated by tribes such as the Crow.

Among the Crow, tobacco was considered to be so important to the general welfare of the tribe that they instituted a Tobacco society whose members were given the task of overseeing the planting and harvesting of the crops. Both men and women belonged. The society had its own songs, dances, and ceremonies, most of which were of a secret nature. To the Crow, tobacco was synonymous with medicine, and they believed that it was bestowed upon their tribe by supernatural forces. [*See also* Tobacco.]

The eagle was regarded by most tribes as the chief of all birds because of its perceived ability to fly higher than any other bird. It was believed that the bird was the paramount messenger of the Great Spirit, and thus its feathers were highly prized for ceremonial purposes and to indicate prestige, as in the famous Plains headdress, the warbonnet.

The Hidatsa are the best known of the Plains tribes for their ability to trap eagles. Eagle trapping was regarded as both a sacred and a dangerous event. Late in the fall the eagle trappers would build a camp a mile or so from the village. High atop hills each trapper dug a pit about three feet deep that he covered with grass and twigs to form a blind. Using a rabbit or small fox for bait, the man climbed into the pit and waited for an eagle to soar overhead and spot the bait. When the eagle landed on top of the pit, the man thrust his hands upward and grabbed the eagle by its legs, pulling it down into the pit, and strangling it. After the feathers were secured there was sometimes a ceremony in which the eagle's body was buried and offerings made to its spirit.

Creation Myths. The sedentary tribes that lived in permanent villages devoted much time to elaborate rituals and accompanying belief systems. The Pawnee seemed to have been great religious innovators, having established one of the most comprehensive philosophies of all the Plains Indians.

The Pawnee elaborated a series of myths that described the creation of the world, the origin of humans, and the power of the gods. The Pawnee believed that Tirawa, the supreme being, was married to the Vault of Heaven, and both reigned somewhere in the heavens in a place beyond the clouds. Yet they were purely spiritual beings and took no earthly shape. Tirawa sent his commands to humans through a number of lesser gods and messengers who manifested themselves to the Pawnee.

Next in importance to Tirawa and his wife was Tcuperika ("evening star"), who was personified as a young maiden. Evening Star was keeper of a garden in the west that was the source of all food. She had four assistants, Wind, Cloud, Lightning, and Thunder. She married Oprikata ("morning star"), and from them was born the first human being on earth. Morning Star was perceived as a strong warrior who drove the rest of the stars before him. In some Pawnee ceremonies, the sacrifice of a young captive girl was offered to him, suggesting some relationship between Pawnee religion and the religions of central Mexico where human sacrifice was also known.

Of lesser status were the gods of the four directions, the northeast, southeast, southwest, and northwest, and next in rank to the four directions were the three gods

of the north: North Star, chief of all the stars; North Wind, who gave the buffalo to humans; and Hikus ("breath"), who gave life itself to the people. Next in line came Sun and Moon, who were married and produced an offspring, the second person on earth, whose marriage to the offspring of Morning Star and Evening Star gave rise to the first humans.

There were lesser gods who also figured in Pawnee mythology. Star of the South, for example, stood at the southern end of the Milky Way, which comprised the campfires of the departed, and received the spirits of the dead. It is also believed that another star called Skiritiuhuts ("fool wolf") became offended at one of the councils of the star people and in revenge introduced death to mankind.

Major Corporate Rituals. Not only were the philosophy and mythology of the Pawnee rich, but their ceremonies were many and varied. There were ceremonies to Thunder, to Morning Star and Evening Star, for the planting and harvesting of Mother Corn, as well as lesser ceremonies for the general welfare of the people.

The Hako. One of the best documented rituals of the Plains, the Hako was performed so that the tribe might increase and be strong, and so that the people would enjoy long life, happiness, and peace. The ceremony was conducted by a man called the *kurahus* ("man of years") who was venerated for his knowledge and experience. To him was entrusted the supervision of the songs and prayers, which had to be performed precisely in the same order each time. The Hako was usually performed in the spring when birds were nesting, or in the fall when they were flocking because it was believed that when prayers were offered for life, strength, and growth of the people it must be done when all life was stirring.

Those taking part in the ceremony were divided into two groups, the fathers who sponsored the ceremony and the children who received the intentions, prayers, and gifts from the fathers. The head of the fathers' group, called Father, was responsible for employing the *kurahus*. The head of the children's group, called Son, also played an important part in the ceremony, acting on behalf of the other children.

The most important paraphernalia used in the Hako were the sacred feathered wands resembling pipe stems without the bowls attached. The ceremony took three days and three nights during which time twenty-seven rituals were performed, each ritual and song unveiling Pawnee sacred lore. At the end of the ceremony, the wands were waved over the children, thus sealing the bond between fathers and children. At the end of the ceremony most of the ritual paraphernalia was discarded except for the feathered wands, which were given to one of the children for his keeping. At a later date the children might take the part of the fathers and offer the prayers to another group of children, thus perpetuating the ceremony and the continued solidarity of the Pawnee. It was also believed that the children could take the wands to other tribes as an offering of peace. This latter custom undoubtedly led to the diffusion of the Hako to the Lakota, who at one time were at war with the Pawnee.

The Sun Dance. The most characteristic religious ceremony of the Plains was the well-known Sun Dance, usually performed in the early summer in conjunction with the annual communal buffalo hunt. It owes its name to the fact that certain men who had taken vows to participate danced for several days gazing at the sun, or more precisely, in the direction of the sun. It is useful to note that the Sun Dance was held also in cloudy and even rainy weather, and there is some speculation that the progenitor of the dance may actually have been performed at night during the time of a full moon. There is some linguistic evidence to support this idea. For example, in Lakota there is no distinction between sun and moon; both are called *wi*, the only distinction being made by a qualifier: day *wi* and night *wi*. Thus "to gaze at the sun" is not linguistically differentiated from "to gaze at the moon," although conventionally the current translation signifies the sun.

There is some agreement that the oldest form of the Sun Dance originated among the Mandan. Unlike the sun dances of other tribes, the Mandan Sun Dance, called Okipa, was held indoors in the tribe's medicine lodge. The ceremony lasted for four days, during which time the dancers were actually suspended by skewers through their chest from the lodge rafters and the bodies spun around by helpers below. The dance was usually done in advance of warriors going out on a war party.

In other tribes, dancers had skewers of wood placed through the fleshy part of their chest; the skewers were attached to rawhide thong ropes that were tied to a center pole. The dancers pulled backward as they bobbed in time with drum beats until they tore the flesh, thus releasing themselves from the thongs. The Lakota philosophized that the only thing that one could offer to the Great Spirit was one's own body since it was the only thing that a human being really owned. The Sun Dance was one form of making such an offering, the skewering of the dancer also being equated with being in a state of ignorance, and the breaking free as symbolic of attaining knowledge.

The Blackfeet form of the Sun Dance was unlike that of other tribes inasmuch as it centered around a woman known for her industry who vowed to lead the dancers and who bore the title "medicine woman." While she

did not go through tortures like her male counterparts in other tribes, she did participate in a number of elaborate ceremonies that preceded the actual dance. Two important ceremonies over which she presided were the Buffalo Tongues and the Sweat Lodge ceremonies. Before the Sun Dance, people in the camp were asked to bring buffalo tongues to a certain lodge erected for that purpose. In the lodge the tongues were ceremoniously skinned, cleaned, and boiled and then distributed to the remainder of the people in camp. Later a special sweat lodge was constructed from one hundred willow saplings, which were placed in the ground and tied together at the tops like those of an ordinary sweat lodge. The dancers then fasted and joined in the Sweat Lodge ceremony before dancing.

Because of the self-mortification practiced by some of the tribes, and a general belief that native religious practice was primitive, the United States government banned the Sun Dance during the 1880s. It was never renewed on the southern Plains; however, on the northern Plains the Sun Dance went underground, emerging publicly again in 1934. By 1959 the Lakota and Plains Ojibwa had again incorporated self-mortification, which continues today. [*For further discussion, see* Sun Dance.]

Sacred Arrow Renewal. In addition to the Sun Dance there were other public ceremonies that Plains tribes participated in. One of the most important for the Cheyenne was the Sacred Arrow Renewal.

The Cheyenne believe that long ago their supreme being, Maiyun, gave four sacred arrows to the mythological hero Sweet Medicine in a cave in what are now called the Black Hills of South Dakota. Maiyun taught Sweet Medicine that two of the arrows had supernatural powers over the buffalo and the other two over human beings. Maiyun instructed the young man in the proper care of the arrows and the sacred ceremonies associated with them and charged Sweet Medicine with the responsibility of teaching the Cheyenne about their mysterious powers.

Sweet Medicine taught the Cheyenne that if the two arrows associated with hunting were simply pointed at the buffalo herds, they would be easy to kill. He also taught that if the other two arrows were pointed at enemies before battle it would cause them to be blinded, confused, and vulnerable to defeat by the Cheyenne warriors.

The Cheyenne say that from the time Sweet Medicine taught them about the ritual of the sacred arrows, the arrows have been kept in a fox-skin bundle, which has been handed down from one generation to another and guarded by a person known as the sacred-arrow keeper. In alternate years an individual pledges to sponsor a Sacred Arrow Renewal ceremony and the arrows are unwrapped and displayed to all the male members of the tribe. The man making the pledge does so in order to fulfill a vow, such as is the case with the Sun Dance. The vow was originally made when a warrior was threatened during a fight, or someone became sick and was fearful of dying. Although only one person makes the pledge, the ceremony is given on behalf of all Cheyenne, so that they will be ensured of a long and prosperous life.

The Sacred Arrow Renewal ceremony traditionally took four days to perform. A special lodge was prepared on the first day. Warriors held in high esteem were selected to choose the site on which the lodge was to be erected. New poles were cut and the lodge covering borrowed from families of good reputation. Inside the lodge the priests of the tribe sat on beds of sage. As part of the preparation each Cheyenne family gave a special counting stick to the conductor of the ceremony. Symbolically, the sticks represented each member of the tribe.

On the second day the sacred arrows were obtained from the keeper and the bundle was opened and examined. If the flight feathers of the arrows were in any way damaged, a man known for his bravery was chosen to replace the feathers. On the third day the arrows were renewed and each of the counting sticks was passed over incense to bless all the families in the tribe. On the last day the arrows were exhibited to the male members of the tribe. The Cheyenne said that it was difficult to look directly at the arrows because they gave off a blinding light. To conclude the ceremony, the priests made predictions about the future of the Cheyenne people. With the conclusion of a Sweat Lodge ceremony the Sacred Arrow Renewal ceremony was officially over, and the Cheyenne symbolically began life anew.

The Ghost Dance. Although missionaries provided Christianity as a viable option to native Indian religions, Plains Indian traditional religions persist in most parts of the Plains. After missions had been established for only a few years, there was one last attempt to rebel against white domination in a pacifistic movement called the Ghost Dance. It began in the state of Nevada when a Paiute Indian named Wovoka had a vision that the white man would disappear from the face of the earth in a cataclysmic event: the earth would turn over, taking all the white men with it. All the old Indians who had died, as well as the buffalo, now all but extinct, would return to live the old way of life. Wovoka claimed that in his vision he visited with these spirits of the deceased Indians and they taught him a dance that would bring about the destruction of the whites. Wovoka preached to other tribes that it was useless to fight with

the white man anymore, for soon this cataclysm would be upon them and they would disappear.

After the teachings of this Indian messiah, who had been raised by a Bible-reading white family, the Ghost Dance spread rapidly throughout the Plains, spilling over occasionally into bordering culture areas. All but the Comanche, who preferred their own, more individualistic form of religion, participated.

During the dance the dancers performed for long periods of time until they went into trances. When they awoke they sang of great meetings with their dead kin and of how glad they were that the old way of life would soon return.

But the cataclysm did not come. Instead, the federal government, fearing that the Ghost Dance would serve to engender hostilities among the Indians, ordered all dancing stopped. On 29 December 1890 a band of Ghost Dancers under the leadership of Chief Big Foot was halted on Wounded Knee Creek on the present-day location of the Pine Ridge Indian reservation. Shots rang out, and 260 men, women, and children were massacred, thus ending the short-lived movement. [*For further discussion, see* Ghost Dance *and the biography of Wovoka.*]

The Native American Church. A pantribal religion that has become popular since the turn of the twentieth century is the Native American Church, better known in the anthropological literature as the peyote cult. Long before Columbus arrived in the New World the native peoples of Mexico were using a sacred plant of the cactus family in their religious rituals. The Aztecs called it *peyotl,* a term that refers to a number of plants with elements that produce hallucinatory sensations when ingested in a green or dry state or in a tea. Because of its effects, peyote *(Lophophora williamsii LeMaire),* as it is known in the United States and Canada, has been regarded by the Indians as a sacred plant, a gift of the Great Spirit that may be consumed for the welfare of the people during prayer meetings.

Since peyote is classified as a controlled substance, there has been a great deal of controversy over Indians' use of the plant in their religious meetings. But neither the legal issue nor the implied immorality, in the white man's eyes, of peyote's use has prevented peyotism, or, as its members prefer, the Native American Church, from becoming an important religious movement in the United States and Canada.

The majority of peyotists are found among the southern Plains tribes, though members of almost all tribes on the Plains as well as other culture areas belong.

The peyote plant, whose "buttons" contain the hallucinogenic agent mescaline, is found in Mexico and Texas on both banks of the Rio Grande. From the tribes of Mexico, the plant itself and certain ceremonies associated with it diffused northward to the Apache, Tonkawa, Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne, and Arapaho, and ultimately to surrounding tribes.

Peyotism is strongly influenced by Christianity and individual tribal beliefs; thus there are minor differences in the ceremonies from one tribe to the next. There are two major divisions, analogous to denominations: the Half Moon, by far the most popular, and the Cross Fire. The rituals of the two divisions differ somewhat, the greatest ideological difference being that the Cross Fire uses the Bible in its ceremonies. Peyote ceremonies are likely to vary also from one tribe to the next, or even from one practitioner to the next. If all members attending a meeting are from the same tribe, it is likely that the native language will be used. If members from several tribes congregate, English is used as the religious lingua franca. Despite the many variations of peyotism, however, there are some customs, rituals, and paraphernalia that are common to all.

Peyote meetings are held on Saturday nights, usually from sundown to sunup on Sunday. The ceremony takes place in a traditionally shaped tipi made from canvas. It is especially erected for the occasion and dismantled after the meeting is concluded. The doorway of the tipi faces east, and inside an altar is built containing a fireplace in the center of the lodge behind which is a crescent-shaped earthen altar. On top of the altar is placed a large peyote button called Father, or Chief Peyote. Between the fire and the altar is another crescent made from ashes. Between the fireplace and the doorway of the lodge are placed food and water that later will be ceremonially consumed.

The principal leaders of the meeting are assigned special seats inside the tipi. The peyote chief, also known as the "roadman" or "road chief," sits directly opposite the doorway, in what is for most Plains tribes the traditional seat of honor. On his right sits the drum chief, the keeper of the special drum used in the ceremony. To his left sits the cedar chief. Next to the doorway sits the fire boy. The remainder of the congregation are interspersed between the ritual leaders around the perimeter of the tipi. If a Bible is used it is placed between the earth altar and the peyote chief.

Each member has his own ritual paraphernalia that are stored in a "feather box," usually rectangular and made of wood and often decorated with inlaid silver or with painted designs including representations of the crescent moon, the tipi, a stylized version of a water turkey *(Anhinga anhinga),* a star, and utensils used in the ceremony. The box usually contains a "loose fan," so called because the feathers are not set rigidly into the handle; a large Chief Peyote; a staff, constructed from

three sections of a rare wood such as ebony and joined together when in use by means of inserted ferrules (in the Christian-influenced rituals it is called the "staff of life," but in the Indian interpretation it is a bow with no bowstring, hence a symbol of peace); and a gourd rattle and an arrow with a blunt head, also symbols of peace. Most peyotists wear a blanket made of red and blue material, usually an expensive copy of old-time wool cloth received from traders. The red is symbolic of day, the blue of night.

The drum chief is entrusted with keeping a commercially made three-legged brass kettle over which he stretches a hide. The kettle is partially filled with water to regulate the tone, and the hide is tied to the kettle by a rope in such a manner that when the tying is completed the rope forms an outline of a six-pointed star, called the "morning star," on the underside of the drum. Each person has his own drumstick, usually carved out of the same wood as the staff and the gourd handle.

Peyote meetings may be held for special purposes such as curing ceremonies, birthday celebrations, funerals, memorial services, or on occasions when persons leave the Indian community to travel great distances or return from the armed services. Some are simply prayer meetings conducted on a regular schedule similar to Christian services. Persons wishing to participate in the ceremony arrive at the home of the sponsor, who provides all the peyote buttons for consumption during the meeting as well as the food that will be shared by the participants at the conclusion. At dusk the roadman asks all who wish to pray to follow him into the tipi. He leads the line of members around the tipi first before entering the doorway. Once inside all take their seats, and put their paraphernalia in place.

The roadman places the Chief Peyote upon the altar and the cedar chief sprinkles needles on the fire. Instead of using the traditional long-stemmed pipe, cigarettes made from corn husk and tobacco are rolled and passed around the circle of participants. When the ritual smoking has ended, the ashes of the cigarettes are collected and placed near the altar. Sage is passed around and each member rubs some of the sage on his hands, arms, and face, or chews pieces of it. Next the peyote buttons are passed around and each member takes four of them. At this point the singing begins.

The peyote chief takes some sage, the staff, and the gourd rattle and tells the drum chief to begin. As the drum resounds, the peyote chief sings the opening song of the ceremony. This is a rather standardized song at all peyote meetings, no matter what tribe. He sings it four times, the sacred number for most Plains tribes. When he finishes, each member in turn eats some of the peyote buttons and sings four songs. The man on the right of the singer plays the drum while the singer shakes the gourd rattle. In this manner the ritual of eating and singing progresses around the tipi clockwise. The particularly fast drumming on the water drum and the rapid phrasing of the peyote songs may have a great deal to do with creating the hallucinatory effects experienced in peyote meetings.

Concurrent with the visionary experience is the feeling of a closeness with God. Because peyotism is now greatly influenced by Christianity, the members pray to Jesus Christ, equate the consumption of the peyote button with Holy Communion, and espouse the basic tenets of the Christian churches in their prayers and songs.

The praying, eating of peyote, and singing continue until midnight, when there is a special ceremony. The fire boy informs the peyote chief that it is midnight and then leaves the tipi to get a bucket of water. He returns with the water and presents it to the peyote chief, who dips a feather into the bucket and splashes water on the people in the tipi. After smoking and praying, the water is passed around to the members so that each may drink. During this part of the ceremony another standard song is sung. After the water drinking at midnight, the bucket is removed and it is time to resume the peyote eating and singing.

Before each major segment of the ritual, the cedar chief burns incense and the members purify themselves and their paraphernalia in the smoke. The ceremony lasts until dawn, when a woman is called into the lodge bearing another bucket of water. She is called the morning-water woman and is usually a relative of the peyote chief, who now sings the dawn song. After praying and smoking again, the water is passed around the tipi. The peyote chief smokes and prays and may doctor those who are ill or simply pray for the welfare of the people. After the ceremonial water drinking, the woman retrieves the bucket and leaves the tipi. The peyote chief then sings the "quittin' song" while the morning-water woman prepares the traditional breakfast consisting of water, corn, fruit, and meat.

Despite its Christian aspects, peyotism is frowned on by many missionaries. Yet the Native American Church thrives. It has already become increasingly popular among tribes who were once adherents of their native religions or outright Christians. In the early years peyotism was extremely popular with adjacent communities of black Americans, and today many other non-Indians are joining the Native American Church.

[*For discussion of the religious systems of two Plains tribes that have been the subjects of much ethnographic study, see* Blackfeet Religion *and* Lakota Religion.]

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WILLIAM K. POWERS

Indians of the Northwest Coast

The peoples of the Pacific Northwest Coast of North America lived along a narrow strip of land that extends from the mouth of the Columbia River north to Yakutat Bay in Alaska. Cut off, for the most part, from the tribes around them by the rugged, impenetrably forested mountains that rise from the sea, and relatively isolated from one another by the scarcity of habitable beach sites, they developed a variety of distinct but intertwined local traditions.

For the sake of convenience, the Northwest Coast culture area has been divided into three subareas: the northern area was inhabited by the Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian peoples; the central by the Bella Coola, Nootka, and Kwakiutl groups; and the southern by the Coast Salish and Chinookan tribes of the Washington and Oregon coasts. While the cultures within each subarea shared some basic traits that distinguished them from those of other subareas, the bewildering variety of linguistic, social, political, and ideological variations within each area implied numerous migrations, acculturations, and cultural borrowings that make any retrospective synthesis of Northwest Coast culture a formidable task.

Adding complexity are the effects of contact with white culture, which did not begin until the late eighteenth century. The vast wealth introduced into the

area by the sea-otter fur trade altered the balance of wealth and power that had existed in the aboriginal period. During the nineteenth century (usually referred to as the "historical" period, and the time frame for this essay) the peoples of the Northwest Coast underwent dramatic social change, including cultural efflorescence, drastic population decline, wholesale abandonment of ancestral villages, the formation of new composite villages, increased trade, and intermarriage between tribes, all of which contributed to the diffusion of religious traditions at a vastly accelerated rate. The indigenous peoples eventually came under heavy governmental and missionary pressure to abandon all native customs.

Material Culture. The lives of the Northwest Coast Indians were entirely oriented toward the sea, on whose bounty they depended. The staple food of the area was salmon; varieties of salmon were smoked and stockpiled in immense quantities. However, many other types of fish, sea mammals, large land mammals, water birds, shellfish, and varieties of wild plants were also collected. Though food was plentiful, the rugged topography of the land limited access to food-collecting sites. Access to these sites was also controlled by an oligarchy of hereditary nobles (called "chiefs") who maintained their power primarily through ritual performances that legitimized their claims.

Northwest Coast technology was based on a complex of wood and animal products. Wood and tree bark, especially from cedars, were the fundamental materials and were used ubiquitously. Humans lived in houses, traveled in canoes, caught fish with hooks, trapped salmon in weirs, stored their belongings and were themselves interred in boxes, and wore clothing and ceremonial costumes all made from wood products. A system of symbolic correspondences between objects underlay the entire ceremonial system. Skins, flesh, and bones from animals were also used and played a critical symbolic role in religious activities.

Social Organization. The basic principles of Northwest Coast social organization have been the object of much theoretical controversy. Traditional tribal appellations may lump together groups with similar languages but very different customs, and vice versa. Essentially the basic unit of social and political organization was the independent extended local family, defined by some degree of lineal descent and by coresidence in a single communal household in a single winter ceremonial village. (Winter was the season in which virtually all ceremonies were held.) Group membership was defined less by kinship than by concerted economic and ceremonial activity, though in the northern subarea suprafamilial kin groups played a role in setting the boundaries of a group. The head of each household was its political and spiritual leader, the inheritor and custodian of the house's aristocratic titles, and its ambassador to both human and supernatural worlds. All aristocratic titles in each area were ranked hierarchically for all ceremonial activities. Whether or not the hierarchical system created a class structure as well as a rank structure is a controversial theoretical question. While there was some social mobility, social position was primarily ascribed and inherited. However, all succession to rank had to be validated by the giving of a potlatch at which the heir recounted or reenacted in dance drama the family myths that proved the legitimacy of his claim; the potlatch also proved his personal power and spiritual worthiness by the heir's distribution of wealth to other chiefs. The potlatch was a major mechanism for promoting group solidarity, organizing labor, and maintaining the structure of the hierarchical system. [*See* Potlatch.] As one goes north within the area, hierarchical systems seem to increase in importance and are firmly embedded in a religious matrix. The peoples of the southern subarea seemed to put little emphasis on hierarchy and exhibited a social structure and religious ideology with more similarities to peoples of the Plateau and California areas than to the coastal peoples to their north.

Belief and Ritual. There was little synthesis of religious ideas and institutions on the Northwest Coast. Rituals and myths developed into a multiplicity of local traditions that directly integrated local history and geographical features with the more universal elements of creation. Different families and different individuals within families might have conflicting accounts of family history and its mythic events, giving the religion an atomistic quality that permitted a continual restructuring of ceremonies and renegotiating of meanings. However, much of the cognitive conflict that might arise from such discrepancies was mitigated by the fact that although there was an extraordinary amount of public ceremony most rituals were performed in secret and were known only to the rankholder and his heir.

Like the religions of other native North American peoples, the beliefs of the Northwest Coast Indians focused on the critical relationship of hunter to prey and on the set of moral principles that permitted that relationship to continue. Humans were thought to be essentially inferior to the rest of the world's inhabitants and were dependent on other creatures' good will for survival. Humans were important as mediators between different spirit realms because supernatural beings had granted them gifts of knowledge and insight about how the world operates and how they fit into the world. The features unique to Northwest Coast religion centered on

the private possession and inherited control of the religious institutions by titled aristocrats. Access to the supernatural beings (called "spirits" by anthropologists because of their essential rather than corporeal nature) and their power was strictly under the control of chiefs, as was access to food.

Spirits. The origin of all power—both the power to control and, more importantly, the power to become aware—was in the spirit world, and the actions of spirit power, which gave form and purpose to everything, were visible everywhere. All objects, ideas, forces, and beings were believed to have inherent power that could be released and directed into human affairs, if correctly integrated into ritual action. The world was seen as filled with spirit power that could be reified in human rituals. Spirits, the personified categories of power, were less characters than ineffable forces. As a salmon could be brought into the human world when caught in a properly constructed net, so could spirit power be brought into the human world when caught in a net of properly constructed ritual action. Humans could never perceive the true nature of spirits, but they could see that the costumes—created as coverings for the spirits—became animated when the spirits covered themselves with them and danced.

An example may better explicate the idea of spirits as essences: the *sisiutl,* visible to humans in its manifestation as a huge double-headed serpent, was one of the most powerful spirits in Kwakiutl religion. It was the reification of all the inherent qualities and power of that which is wet and fluid—ocean, rain, blood, tears, and so on—and by extension all that is uncontainable and transitory and all that is insignificant in small quantities, life-sustaining in proper amounts, and dangerous in excess. The *sisiutl* thus provides a metaphor for a key ideological tenet of Kwakiutl thought: that the world is in motion and can be stopped (and thus perceived as a material entity) only temporarily; that human life, ritual, understanding, wealth, and power will come to pass but will flow away like water. The *sisiutl* was only one among hundreds of creatures depicted in Northwest Coast myth and ritual—each a vision, a realization, of the processual nature of the universe, and each a metaphorical statement of a fundamental philosophical idea.

The peoples of the Northwest Coast saw their world as one in which myriad personified forces were at work, competing for a limited supply of food and souls. Every human, every group, every species, and every spirit-being had its own needs, its own specialized niche in the food chain. All of their conflicting demands and needs had to be balanced against one another, and this could be achieved only through ritual, which was seen as a method of mediation between the various creatures of the universe. The world was filled with a seemingly endless variety of raptorial creatures who feed on human flesh and souls just as humans feed on salmon flesh. Man-eating birds and other animals, ogres, dwarves, giants, and monsters were believed to prey upon humans as raptorial birds prey upon mice (a frequent image in Northwest Coast myths).

Animals, which were seen as the material representations of spiritual beings, sacrificed themselves for the benefit of human survival because humans had agreed to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the spirits. The metaphors of Northwest Coast ritual continually repeat the image of the responsibility of humans to support the spirit world. Humans and spirits, living off each other's dead, were intertwined in a reincarnational web. By eating the substance of each other's bodies, they freed the souls and permitted their reincarnation. If any link in the ritual chain was lost, the entire system of reincarnation broke down.

Food. Food was thus a sacramental substance, and meals were inherently ceremonial occasions. Northwest Coast religion placed a heavy emphasis on the control of food-related behavior, on the denial of hunger (which was thought to be a polluting desire), and on the ritual distribution of food and other material substances. The rules, taboos, and rituals associated with food are ubiquitous and enormous in number.

Of all the ceremonies directed toward the propitiation of the animals on which humans feed, those known collectively as the first-salmon ceremonies were the most widespread. These were sets of rituals performed every year in each area over the first part of the salmon catch of each species. Similar ceremonies existed for other species as well. The fish were addressed as if they were chiefs of high rank and were killed, prepared, and served in a ceremonious manner. Their released souls returned to the land of their compatriots to inform them of the proper treatment that they had been accorded. Like most other Northwest Coast rituals, these ceremonies were the property of individual chiefs, who performed them for the benefit of all of the people. All hunting was imbued with ceremony, since success in the hunt was strictly a matter of the proper ritual relationship to the hunted animal. The ceremonies associated with hunting were an important part of a family's inheritance.

Guardian spirits. In theory, a person could obtain a guardian spirit by dedication to a regimen of self-mortification, abstinence, fasting, prayer, and ritual bathing. However, the most powerful contracts with the spirits were obtained in mythic times through the group's ancestors, and these contracts formed the basis

of the rank system. Every ranked position was actually an embodiment of a spiritual contract—a covenant between the rankholder and the spirit world. The relationship between the ancestor and the spirit was the primary element of a family's patrimony and was constantly reaffirmed in ritual. As the living representative of the ancestor, the rankholder acted as an intermediary to the spirits on secular occasions and as an impersonator or embodiment of a spirit on sacred occasions.

The relationships between particular aristocrats and particular spirits were manifested in a system of "crests," which were images of spirits that have become allied with individual families. The right to depict the image of a spirit, or in some cases even to pronounce its name in public, was a fiercely guarded possession. All objects of spiritual importance were decorated with images of a person's guardian spirits. This gave the objects a name, an identity, and the ability to act as a conduit through which spirit power could be directed. While crest images acted on one level as emblems of a group's status, they were more than mere coats of arms—they were ritual objects of causal power. Most crest images presented representations of transformation, a key idea in Northwest Coast thought, which expressed the interlocked identities and destinies of humans and spirits. Through the crest, the identity of the aristocrat was connected to that of the spirit being, and through this connection the aristocrat's self expanded to a more cosmic identity. The widespread use of crest objects was graphic proof of the extent to which religious ideas permeated the entire fabric of Northwest Coast culture.

In addition to having shared destinies, humans and spirits were interrelated in that all creatures were considered to be human and to possess human souls. Each lived in its own place in one of the levels of the universe, where it inhabited a house, performed ceremonies, and otherwise acted like a human being. At the proper season, the spirits donned costumes and visited the world of humans, where they appeared in their transformed identity. Similarly, humans who appeared to themselves as humans put on costumes and appeared to the spirits as spirits.

With the exception of Frederica De Laguna's account of Tlingit culture (1972), Northwest Coast Indian ideas of the self, its components, and its relationship to the spirits are not well documented. It is clear that the soul was believed to have several material manifestations as well as several incorporeal components. A person was viewed as a combination of life forces and parts from different planes of existence, and therefore as having spiritual connections in many directions. Whatever their component parts, souls were thought to exist in only limited numbers, to undergo metempsychosis, to be transferred from one species to another, and to be reincarnated alternately in first a human and then either a spirit or animal being. A human death freed a soul for an animal or spirit, and vice versa, linking humans, animals, and spirits in a cycle of mutual dependency. Ideas about the soul and its nature seem to have been better codified among the Northern peoples, though this impression may be an artifact of the high quality of De Laguna's ethnography.

Shamanism. Connections to the spirit world could be made through inheritance or by acquiring, through a vision, the power to cure disease. All illnesses and death were considered a sickness of the spirit that was caused either by the magical intrusion of a foreign substance into the body or by the wandering or the loss of the soul. When methods for reestablishing one's spiritual purity failed to alleviate the symptoms, a curer (or "shaman") was called in. A shaman cured an illness by going into a trance during which his guardian spirits would fight with the soul of the disease or of the witch who had sent the disease. When the shaman came out of his trance, he was able to display a small object that symbolically represented the empty husk of the diseased spirit body. Shamanic paraphernalia, like other ritual objects, were formed and moved so as to direct the spirit power in the proper ways to effect a cure. Shamanic performances were dramatic events, with much stage illusion as well as singing, dancing, and praying.

Shamans acted as intermediaries between humans and the forces of nature and the supernatural, and were thought to be able to foretell the future, control the weather, bring success in war or in hunting, communicate with other shamans at a distance, and, most importantly, cure illnesses and restore souls stolen by witches or maleficent spirits. The shaman was believed both to control and to be inspired by the spirits with whom he was connected. Among the Tlingit, shamanic rituals were usually inherited, but among the central tribes they were obtained through visions. Shamans had to undergo strict regimens if they were to retain their powers; shamanism was a route to prestige but not to title, nor was it a lucrative profession. It was believed that the shaman received his calling involuntarily, but that, having been chosen, it was his responsibility to accept wholeheartedly the burdens of his profession.

Witches. Northwest Coast Indian beliefs about shamans were complemented by their beliefs about witchcraft. Witches were thought to be motivated by envy

and jealousy, either conscious or unconscious, and there was no act, no matter how terrible, of which they were thought incapable. Patterns of witchcraft among the Northwest Coast Indians were parallel to those of other North American groups: it seems likely that few if any people practiced witchcraft, but accusations of witchcraft were an important means of articulating rivalry and competition. Among the central tribes, witches were generally thought to be shamans from enemy tribes; among the northern groups, where fear of witches was more prevalent, witches were thought to belong to the same kin group as their victims. Witches were thought to be under the compulsion of a possessive spirit, from whose influence the witch could be freed by torture. Occasionally witches died under torture or were executed despite their confession. The best protection against witches was to maintain spiritual purity through fasting and the correct performance of ceremonies. As long as the ceremonies were performed, the world existed in the proper balance, and witches could not do harm.

The causal principle underlying the ideas of the Northwest Coast Indians on the effectiveness of ritual lay in the idea that under the proper analogical conditions, the patterned motions or words of human beings have an inherent ability to coerce the spirits into parallel actions. Thus a human action could be magnified and intensified into a power that alters the state of the world. Human beings were conduits for supernatural power: although they possess no powers themselves, humans could become the vehicles of supernatural power if they observed the proper ritual actions. In creating analogies between themselves and the spirits, humans gained the ability to influence the actions of those more powerful than themselves.

Creation. Supporting the social and ritual systems was an extensive and varied body of myths and tales (which, except in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, have been little analyzed). There were few myths about the creation of the world as such, since the world was seen as a place of innumerable eternal forces and essences. Like other North American groups, the Indians of the Northwest Coast were less interested in how the world was created as material substance than in how it was made moral or how the inherent powers of the universe could be controlled for the benefit of its inhabitants. The creation of material phenomena—the sun and moon, human beings, animal species—is always secondary to the moral dilemmas presented in the myths and the resolution (or lack thereof) of those dilemmas. For example, though there are no myths about the sun being created out of nothing, there are many myths about the sun being placed in the sky, in order to fulfill its proper role by enabling people to see—reminding them of the continual motion and flux of the world and of the balance of light and darkness.

Transformers. Although there are few myths about a creator spirit (and those possibly developed after contact with whites), there are cycles of myths about a transformer or trickster figure who through his actions places the forces of the world in balance. The most detailed and integral of these is the Raven cycle found among the Tlingit (though each tribe had some form of trickster or transformer cycle, not always associated with Raven). Raven is a creature of uncontrollable desires and excesses, and in the act of trying to satisfy his desires, he inadvertently creates moral order and constraint. Incidental to each act of moral creation is the creation of some physical attribute of the world—a mountain or other geographical feature, or the color of a mallard's head or an ermine's tail—that serves to remind people of the myth and its moral import. Thus the world is made up of signs and images of mythic significance for those who know the stories behind them.

In general, the trickster cycles of the Northwest Coast parallel those of other areas in their nature and social function, although imagistically the Northwest Coast trickster stories more strongly emphasize the maintenance of the flow of wealth as representation of the correct motion of the universe. This image of flow—the release of wealth from its temporary container, whether it be the material wealth of a chief or the spiritual soul that is released from the body of a dead person when ravens begin to tear it apart—runs throughout the Northwest Coast mythology. However, not all Northwest Coast transformers are trickster figures: the Kwakiutl culture hero is one of a set of rather solemn mythic beings.

Myths of origin. Every feature of the geographic, social, and ceremonial world had an origin myth that encapsulated it into the basic structure of power and ideology, and these myths formed the basic material for Northwest Coast religion and ceremony. No public ceremony occurred without the retelling—either in recital or a dance reenactment—of the origin myths of the people involved, which is to say that no ceremony took place without the reenergizing of the connection between humans and spirits. Clan and family myths were integrated individually into the larger corpus of hero mythology, so that every family and person of title was in some specific way linked to the events and forces of the universe. Myth is a depiction of the interaction of universal forces, and the retelling of the myth reactivates and redirects those forces.

Northwest Coast rituals, like myths, developed into a multiplicity of local traditions, resulting in the direct linking of local history to the more cosmic elements of creation. Ceremonies were always changing as new rituals were acquired through war, marriage, new visions, or the emigration of families. There was a constant renegotiation of the meanings and structure of all rituals and stories, as traditions coalesced, melded, or broke apart; conflicting versions of stories were constantly being reworked.

Winter ceremonials. Spirit power was an essential part of the success of any task; thus there was ceremony in all human endeavor. Even so, there was a clear division of the year into secular (summer) and sacred (winter) seasons. Large-scale ceremonial performances were given in the winter. These were most important among the Kwakiutl and Nootka. Among the southern tribes there was a ceremony of spirit-possession and occasional rituals of world renewal similar to those of the peoples of northern California. Some scholars feel that the spirit-possession ceremony was more widespread until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when cultural change promoted the rapid efflorescence and diffusion of northern and central ceremonial forms, but the evidence for such a historical change is contradictory.

The narrative structure of the Kwakiutl winter ceremonials, like that of the family origin myths, was based on a simple set of images that were endlessly elaborated: a hero cuts himself off from the material world of humans, seeks or is kidnapped by spirits who take him to their home, learns the rituals of the spirits, obtains some of the spirits' power, and then brings the rituals back to the human world. He becomes frenzied as his frail human form attempts to contain the potency of the spirit power. During the ceremony the hero's fellow humans gradually came to control the power that threatened to destroy them, and it was they who "tamed" him. These rituals were performed in the most sensationalistic fashion, with elaborate stage effects and illusions, masked performances, complicated props, and stunning displays of strength and athletic agility.

The winter ceremonials were complex and changing ceremonies. All performances were carefully integrated into a larger dramatic structure with important ritual implications, depending on the number and type of dances being given, the guests' status, the time of the season, and a number of other factors. Each type of dance, of which there were hundreds, was a metaphorical connection to the spiritual universe. Just as the world is made up of people separate but interdependent, so were Northwest Coast rituals structured so as to place individuals in a web of mutual reinforcement. The agenda of dances was ordered so that each individual dance would contribute to their combined effect. One dance would act as contrast or catalyst for the next, giving added power to their combined performance. Feasts were carefully interspersed so as to distribute, in the form of food and wealth, the powers that had been brought into the human world through the preceding dances.

The rituals of the winter ceremonials were under the jurisdiction of groups called "dance societies" or "secret societies." Membership in these groups was inherited and strictly limited. A new member could be invested only upon the retirement of his predecessor, but there were many stages of initiation and many years of preparation before complete initiation. Most of the ceremonies of the dance societies were performed away from public scrutiny, to maintain private ownership of the rituals and to prevent the uninitiated from being harmed by the presence of immense spirit power. A small proportion of the ceremonies were performed only for members of the dance society or for a small group of aristocrats, and a very few were performed for the entire village. Yet even this small proportion of rituals went on for hours every day over a period of four or five months. In essence, then, the entire winter period was given over to ceremony—a fact that belies the usual claim by anthropologists that the peoples of the Northwest Coast were primarily interested in status.

Of all the winter-ceremonial performances, the most famous and widely discussed is the Hamatsa dance, which the Kwakiutl considered to be their most powerful ceremony. The Hamatsa dance seems to best encapsulate the ethos of Northwest Coast religious ideology. The *hamatsa* was a human who had been carried away by those supernatural creatures who preyed on the flesh and substance of human beings; while living with these supernatural creatures in their ceremonial house, the *hamatsa* took on their spiritual qualities (especially their affinity with death and killing); and when he returned to the land of human beings, he was possessed with the wild desire to eat human flesh. In a long series of rites, the members of the tribe gradually tamed his wildness through a series of pledges to sacrifice their wealth and (when they eventually died) their souls, to feed the spirits so that the world would remain in equilibrium. The violence and energy with which the *hamatsa* acted was a potent representation of the intensity of the struggle or task that humans had to accept if the world were to be kept moral. The burden of spiritual power demanded not a quiet acceptance but energetic activity, a ferocity for right action.

Conclusion. Although founded on the same basic philosophical principles as that of other native North

American religions, Northwest Coast religion developed those ideas into a distinct set of social and religious institutions that were adaptable to the changing fortunes and histories of each village and its individual members. It was a system in which atomistic elements could be separated from their original relationships with each other and reformed in new combinations dealing in a powerful, cohesive, creative, and poetic way with the purposes and dilemmas of human existence.

Unfortunately, much of Northwest Coast culture was irrevocably altered or destroyed in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. All Northwest Coast religion was illegal in Canada from 1876 to 1951, though enforcement of applicable laws was uneven, and some ceremonial life persisted. In the last several decades, there has been a new emphasis on the traditional rituals, but how much they retain of their original character and the place they hold in the lives of the people today are questions that remain to be answered. As North American Indians and scholars both reexamine the historical record to determine the significance of the Northwest Coast religion for the present, it can only be hoped that there will be new interpretations and understandings of what is unquestionably one of the most vibrant and fascinating of the world's tribal religions.

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STANLEY WALENS

Indians of California and the Intermountain Region

The Intermountain Region of North America is framed on the east by the Rocky Mountains of Canada and the United States and on the west by the Cascade and the Sierra Nevada ranges. Ethnographers customarily divide this region into two indigenous "culture areas," the Plateau and the Great Basin. The Plateau is bounded on the north by the boreal forests beyond the Fraser Plateau of British Columbia and on the south by the Bitterroot Mountains of Idaho and the arid highlands of southern Oregon and northwestern Montana. It includes the Columbia River's plateau and drainage in Washington, Oregon, and a small portion of northern California. The Great Basin is the area of steppe-desert lying primarily in Nevada and Utah but including parts of southern Idaho, western Wyoming, and western Colorado. It runs south from the Salmon and Snake rivers of Idaho to the Colorado Plateau, is bounded by the Colorado River on the south, and includes the interior deserts of southwestern California. "California," as an indigenous culture area, thus comprises the lands west of the Sierra Nevada crest to the Pacific Ocean, most of southern California and northern Baja California, and most lands north from there to the present Oregon border.

California and the Plateau have supported large and varied native populations. The Great Basin, with its exceedingly restrictive ecology, has always been less heavily populated and more culturally uniform than either California or the Plateau. Nonetheless, even in the Basin, sweeping areal generalizations can serve only as starting points in investigating both intra- and interareal diversity among native peoples, for the three areas are foci of cultural adaptation, expression, and influence, rather than impermeably bounded cultural or historical isolates.

Although the indigenous peoples of the Basin were all speakers of closely related Numic languages, the languages of the Plateau were more varied, and those of California had a truly extraordinary diversity. Broadly speaking, cultural and linguistic diversity were correlated in the three areas. In terms of religious practice, the greatest diversity was in California and the least in the Basin, with the Plateau falling somewhere between.

General Themes

The pervasiveness of religious concerns and behavior in the daily lives of all of these peoples is suggested by the range of religious themes that are common to the three areas, despite the diverse, area-specific expressions given them.

Power. Significant contacts with European influences occurred in the three areas beginning in the eighteenth century and had achieved devastating impact by the mid-nineteenth century. As will be seen, European influence tended to elevate concepts of anthropomorphic creator figures to new eminence. Before contact, however, a widespread perception of a diffuse, generalized, and impersonal cosmic force, often referred to today as

"power," was far more significant. This energic field of all potentials is a neutral, amoral, and generative presence that produces all things.

Mythology. In some cases, power was first manifested by a world creator who, through it, brought the world into its present form. Such creators might be culture heroes and transformers, such as Komokums among the Modoc, a people interstitial between California and the Plateau. Komokums and many others like him acted in conjunction with earth divers to form the earth from a bit of soil raised from the depths of a primordial sea. In other cases, especially in north-central California, world creators are likely to be true creator gods, thinking the world into existence or bringing it forth with a word. In southern California we find creation myths of great metaphysical complexity and subtlety, such as those of the Luiseño, for whom creation arose by steps, out of an absolute void. Even here, however, we find a transformer, Wiyot, shaping the present world from an earth that preceded his existence, and this seems the more typical pattern. Such gods and heroes tend to become otiose after their work is accomplished, rather than lingering on as moral overseers.

Unlike the Californians, neither the peoples of the Basin nor those of the Plateau seem to have been much concerned with world origins. Yet they shared with Californians a profound concern for a variety of prehuman spirits—usually animals, but also celestial beings, monsters, and others—who aided in bringing the world to its present shape and in establishing culture. Thus, throughout the region one finds arrays of such prehuman beings, each exercising power for good or ill according to its innate proclivities. The actions of each are recounted in a broad spectrum of myths and stories. Commonly, one or more of these beings, most often Coyote but others as well, emerge as a trickster, undoing the good works of the heroes and creators through a peculiar blend of innocence, greed, and stupidity. Such tricksters may be creatively helpful as well as negatively influential, and sometimes creators and tricksters are one and the same, which accounts for the multivocality of existence. Often the trickster is the sibling of a culture hero, as Coyote ("little wolf") is of Wolf among the Shoshoni, Short-tailed Weasel is of Long-tailed Weasel among the Washo of the eastern Sierras, and Frog Woman is of Wiyot among the Luiseño.

Spirits and Personal Power. Many animal spirits, including tricksters, remained in the world as sources of specialized powers for human beings. Other unique power potentials might reside in celestial and landscape features and in common, manufactured objects. People might encounter such spirits, usually in their anthropomorphic forms, in visions or in dreams. Through such encounters individuals gained spirit-helpers, enhancing the power innate in themselves and gaining particular powers that, through volitional control, brought success in specific endeavors. Vision quests in many different forms are found throughout the three areas.

Seeking increased, specialized power and protection through intentional encounters with spirit-beings was a primary concern of the religions of the Plateau. In the Basin, visions and personal powers tended to come to individuals spontaneously, at the spirits' will, and were not often sought through formal quests. In California, spirit encounters sometimes resulted from stringent austerities and Plateau-style questing, as among the Achomawi and Atsugewi in the northeast. Often they were sought through participation in initiatory "schools" of pubescent boys seeking power collectively under the tutelage of older initiates. Such schools were central to the visionary religions of the south and the elaborate dance and healing societies of northern California.

In many such California initiation schools, sodalities—secret, mythically chartered societies—were at the forefront. Membership in such sodalities was often restricted; males alone were accepted, and sometimes only those representative of elite kin groups. In parts of the Plateau, especially among the Nez Perce and the Tenino, specific guardian spirits might be transmitted through inheritance. In the notably egalitarian Plateau, however, this did not have the effect of centralizing both spiritual and social ascendency in elites, as did sodality membership in the more stratified of California groups.

More generally, both males and females had access to the spirits and, thus, to personal power. In the Plateau, young boys and girls alike often sought visions, although boys did so more frequently than girls. In the Basin, both males and females could receive spirit powers at any time during their lives, although it appears that men were more often so favored. The situation in California was more complex. In each of three major subareas, women were initiated into some groups but not into others and, among these groups, there were often varying, ranked degrees of male and female spirit acquisition and initiation.

Throughout the three culture areas, the specific spirits that one might encounter and the powers that they enabled were varied. Hunting or fishing skill, the ability to cure and to injure, success in courting and in fighting, finesse in crafts and in song making, gambling luck, wealth, wisdom, and many other potentials might be realized.

Although increased and specialized powers could be

acquired and maximized through contacts with spirits, they could also be lost by offending those spirits through failure to adhere to taboos imposed in vision or dream; through misuse of songs, rituals, or power objects; through more general breach of custom, or simply through baffling happenstance. Every increase in an individual's power had its price.

Shamans. The shamans were the most powerful of people, the most respected for their spirit contacts, and the most feared. It was they who paid the highest price for their acumen. (*Shaman* here means a healer who obtains and exercises his powers through direct contact with spiritual beings.) In the Plateau, special effort was not usually exerted to obtain the guardian spirits that brought shamanic powers. Here, as in the Basin, both men and women could receive shamanic powers, although male shamans predominated. The same was largely true of Californians, although shamans among Shoshoni, Salinan, and some Yokuts groups were exclusively male, whereas in northwestern California female shamans vastly predominated, those who were the daughters and granddaughters of shamans having the greatest proclivity toward acquiring such powers.

Throughout the three areas, initial encounters with spirits capable of bestowing shamanic powers (sometimes volitionally sought in California and, to a lesser extent, in the Basin) were followed by intensive and often long-term training in the control of the spirit-power and an apprenticeship in its use under a recognized shaman. Such training might include initiation in the secrets of legerdemain, fire handling, and ventriloquism, on which shamanic performances often depended for their dramatic impact. Yet although shamans everywhere were expected to display their powers in such feats, and occasionally to best other shamans in public power contests, their primary function was as curative specialists, and the tricks of the trade were subordinate to success in this important function.

Theories of disease were fairly uniform. Illness came through magical objects projected into the sufferer's body by human sorcery or witchcraft. Again, ghosts or spirits whose rules for conduct had been ignored or whose special places had been defiled might make people ill. The spiritual essence of the patient could be called away by unseen beings or injured by a sorcerer or witch. Finally, one could be poisoned by a witch, either psychically or physically. In the Plateau all such power-related disease was distinguished from natural, physical illness; shamans treated only the former, whereas the latter were treated through exoteric remedies, often by lay specialists. Among the Washo of the Basin, however, all death was attributed to sorcerers.

As theories of spiritually induced disease were quite uniform, so were therapeutic measures. Shamans diagnosed the illness and then entered a trance through singing, dancing, and, occasionally, the ingestion of powerful substances. The shaman then sucked out the introjected objects and disposed of them or used his breath to blow off the "shadows" of offended spirits that had lodged in the patient's body. He might also heal through various forms of massage. Many shamans specialized in one or another approach to particular sorts of illnesses. Some, especially in the Plateau, traveled out of their bodies to find and retrieve the lost souls of patients or to regain these in other ways. Illnesses might be caused by the misdeeds of members of the community other than the patient himself, and both public confessions and the identification of sorcerers were common features of performances.

Shamans in most groups acquired other, noncurative powers and specialties as well. In the Great Basin, in southern California, and north through the central California subarea, rattlesnake handling was practiced by shamans specially related to this powerful creature and capable of curing its bites. Weather shamans who both caused and stopped rains were found in these areas as well. In the Basin, shamans served as hunt leaders, dreaming of quarry such as antelope, leading drives, and charming the game into enclosures. Other specialties abounded. Paiute shamans in the Basin and many in central and northern California became "bear doctors," imitating these animals and using their powers for both benign and malign ends. Others might gain the power to find lost objects, to predict the future, or to conjure, as among the Colville and the Kutenai of the Plateau, whose rites were similar to the shaking tent rites more common far to the east. Virtually everywhere, even among the Plateau and Basin groups whose shamans first obtained their powers without special questing, such practitioners often sought to augment their acumen through gaining additional spirit helpers, often seeking these in special places.

Power itself is neutral, its potential for good and ill being manifested at the discretion (or indiscretion) of those spirits, ghosts, or human beings who have more than usual control of it. Thus shamans were universally feared for their potential to use power in malign ways, as sorcerers. In the Basin and in much of California shamans were viewed with great suspicion; they were thought to induce or prolong illness in order to collect higher fees and to kill outright for a fee from an aggrieved party. Among the Mohave and other River Yuman groups in southeastern California, the killing of a shaman, on whatever grounds, was not considered reprehensible. Elsewhere shamans were killed only in the event of their patient's death. In northwestern Cali-

fornia, shamans simply returned their fee should the patient die, greed being more commonly attributed to them than sorcery. The shaman's position was not always enviable, and, particularly in the Great Basin and Plateau, people tended to become shamans only at the behest of a spirit who could not be refused, or they refused to accept shamanic powers when opportunities to acquire them arose.

First-Fruits Rites. First-fruits rites, celebrated for a variety of resources throughout the region, were often conducted by shamans. This was true, for example, of the small, local first-salmon rites that were common along many of the rivers and streams of the Plateau, along the northern California coast south to San Francisco Bay, and among the Pyramid Lake Paviosto, the Lemhi Shoshoni, and some other groups in the northern Great Basin. In some cases, however, first-salmon and other first-fruits rites were incorporated into larger-scale renewal ceremonies, as in northwestern California, and were directed by specialized priests—intermediaries between the human and nonhuman worlds who, as holders of inherited and appointed offices, recited codified liturgies.

Girls' Puberty and Menstrual Seclusion. The ritual initiation of females into adulthood at menarche and, often, the public celebration of this event constitute a second widespread ritual element in the religions of the three culture areas. In general, throughout the region women were isolated at menarche and placed under a variety of restrictions, their conduct during the time being thought to presage their future. Emphasis on girls' puberty tended to be greater among peoples more dependent on hunting than on gathering. Thus, periods of training might be as short as five days, as among the peoples of the western Basin, or extended as long as four years, as among the Carrier Indians of the northern Plateau. In coastal southern California, puberty was a community concern, and all young women reaching menarche during a given year were secluded and instructed together, sometimes being "cooked" in heated pits in a way reminiscent of the training of novice shamans to the north in California. Indeed, it can be argued that puberty rites in many groups represent a female equivalent of male spirit quests and sodality initiations. Such "cooking" of pubescent girls is found elsewhere, as among the Gosiute of the Basin. Communal rites are paralleled in the Plateau, where the Chilcotin, the Southern Okanogen, the Tenino, and the Nez Perce utilized communal seclusion huts for the initiation of young girls.

There were, however, no elaborate public female puberty celebrations in the southern Plateau, where girls' puberty was marked by simple elaborations of more general menstrual customs. Public ceremonies did occur, usually at the discretion of the girl's family, in the Great Basin—as among the Washo and others. Here, girls' puberty might be celebrated in conjunction with a Big Time, an intergroup gathering for shared subsistence enterprises, ritual, feasting, trading, dancing, gambling, and games. In California, girls' puberty dances were held by many northern groups as the year's ritual highlight—again, often in conjunction with Big Times. Occasionally, and especially among the Athapascan-speaking groups of the northwest, such dances were the prerogative of elite Californian families.

The prevalence of concern for female puberty in the three areas is clearly related to a concern for menstruation in general. Menstrual blood was viewed as among the most powerful of substances, highly dangerous if not properly controlled and, although often of positive virture to the woman herself, inimical to the welfare of others, especially males. The isolation and restriction of girls at menarche was thus widely repeated—although with far less elaboration—at each menses. Communal menstrual shelters were found in some Plateau communities and perhaps in parts of California. Elsewhere, a small hut for the individual menstruant was constructed, as in much of the Basin, or her movements were restricted to the family's dwelling, as among the River Yuman groups. Menstrual seclusion and dietary and other restrictions varied in duration from the time of the flow up to ten or twelve days, as in northwestern California.

Sudatories. Male concern for menstrual pollution and for other pollutants that might hinder the exercise or acquisition of power, or "luck," was certainly related to the prevalence of male sweating, carried out in a variety of sudatories in all three areas. Such sudatories might be small and temporary or large and permanent structures. In northwestern California, for example, "sweat houses" were sizeable, semisubterranean houses, men's clubs where all adult males slept, worked, and practiced rituals, as well as sweated. Among the Nomlaki substantial men's sweat houses were the domain of a male sodality, the *huta*. The religious nature of purification through regular sweating is evident in the veneration with which the sudatory was regarded. Among certain Plateau groups, such as the Sanpoil, the sweat house itself was the mundane manifestation of a powerful sweat-house god.

Major Religious Systems

In each area, and often in specifiable subareas, the general themes outlined above were manifested within the context of—and were given particular ideological inflections by—area-specific religious systems.

Among the peoples of the Great Basin, environmental conditions demanded small populations divided into highly mobile bands, reduced at times to the extended nuclear family, and expanding at more abundant times to small bands of such families. There was little need for social or political organization on a wider scale that would ensure the privileges of more complex kin groups or the territorial autonomy of a large political unit. By the same token, dispersed resources could not be collected in sufficient quantities to provide for the needs of frequent, large gatherings. Complex ritual systems depending on cyclic collective action did not develop in the Basin as they did in both California and the Plateau. By contrast, in these latter areas more sedentary peoples, enjoying richer resource bases and enacting more complex and farther-reaching kinship and political organizations, created religious systems through which large numbers of people were regularly assembled for collective ritual experience.

The Great Basin. Basin religion was largely an individual or small-band concern, and shamans provided spiritual leadership sufficient to the needs of most bands. Rituals, such as girls' puberty celebrations, that in other areas served as foci for large gatherings here tended to be small, family affairs. The healing performances of shamans might provide occasions for shared ritual participation, but such gatherings, too, were small, limited to band members, and not held according to a fixed schedule.

Large-scale Big Times did occur with some regularity among the Washo and Paiute of the western Great Basin, several bands gathering together for harvest of the more abundant wild crops (such as piñon nuts) for ritual, and for recreation. The Paiute reciprocated such Big Times with the Mono and Miwok of California. Interband antelope drives, sometimes in conjunction with Big Times, were ritually prepared and imbued with religious significance, as suggested by the many Basin rocks displaying petroglyphs and pictographs that date from the remote past through the nineteenth century.

The Big Times of the western Great Basin and California were supplanted in the eastern portion of the Basin area by other sorts of events. Ute and Shoshoni bands convened several times a year for "round dances." Among the Ute, a more ritually focused Bear Dance, marking the return of bears from hibernation and thus the renewal of the world in spring, was performed annually in late winter.

The Plateau. In the Plateau the common western theme of personal spirit-power was honed to its greatest refinement and served as the basis for an areal religious system keynoted by collective "winter spirit-dances." Although there were a great many variations in the specifics of individual guardian-spirit quests and of winter dances among Plateau tribes, a generalized account may be offered as an introduction.

Among the Sanpoil-Nespelem and most other Salish groups, boys and many young girls began spirit questing at or before puberty, often when they were as young as six or eight. (Sahaptin groups placed less emphasis on spirit quests, and others, such as the Carrier, restricted them to certain males.) The child was sent out to fast, scour himself with rough foliage, bathe in cold pools, and keep vigils in isolated places. In dreams, as among the Carrier, or in visions, the supplicant was visited by an animal spirit or the spirit of an object or place. The spirit instructed the person in a song that often had an associated dance step, and sometimes revealed power objects. In many groups, the supplicant, on returning from a successful quest, "forgot" both encounter and song. (The Kutenai, whose youths sought only a single, immediately effective spirit, present an exception.) Among the Salish, when the individual reached full adulthood, usually about age twenty-five for men, the spirit returned, often causing illness. With the aid of a shaman, the individual "remembered" the song and spirit. Once fully accepted, one's spirit became an intrinsic aspect of one's being, like a soul, a "partner" whose loss was life-threatening. Throughout their lives, people might seek different, additional spirits with associated powers and specialties.

During a two-month period in the winter, anyone who had a guardian spirit—a shaman or a layman—might sponsor a spirit dance. The dances, held in a winter lodge, lasted two or three nights and were scheduled so that people of a given locale might attend several in a winter. Under the supervision of shamans, dancers imitated their own guardian spirits, singing their songs and performing their dance steps. New initiates to whom spirits had recently returned used the occasion to legitimize their relationships with their spirits. Other components of the dances included feasting and the giving of gifts to visitors, the offering of gifts to spirits at a center pole, and shamans' displays and contests. The conduct of the audience was rigidly controlled during the dances, and in some groups their behavior was policed by officiants.

Among the Sanpoil, Colville, Kutenai, Kalispel, Spokan, Coeur d'Alene, and Flathead, a society of men possessing Bluejay as guardian spirit served this policing function. These "Bluejay shamans" identified entirely with Bluejay during the winter dance period, painting their faces black, keeping to themselves, and scavenging food. The Bluejay shamans perched in the rafters of dance houses during performances, swooping down on those who broke the rules of conduct. They also per-

formed services as finders of lost objects and as curers, and were ritually returned to a normal state at the end of the dance period. Although the Bluejay shamans suggest an at least latent sodality structure in the southeastern Plateau, such sodalities were fully developed only in California.

California. There were four major subareal ritual complexes in aboriginal California. Beyond serving as vehicles for religious expression, such complexes served important functions in social, economic, and ecological regulation, in ethnic maintenance, and, through creating unifying networks, in political organization.

Toloache. From the Yuman tribes of the south, north through the Yokuts and, in diminished forms, to the Miwok, the use of *Datura stramonium*—jimsonweed, or *toloache* (from the Nahuatl and Spanish)—was a common and central feature of religious practice. A psychotropic decoction was made from the root of this highly toxic plant and carefully administered to initiates by shamans or by specialized priests. After a period of unconsciousness the initiates awoke to a trancelike state of long duration during which, guided by adepts, they acquired animal or celestial spirit-helpers. Such collective, drug-induced vision questing was often undertaken by males at puberty and in the context of an extended "school," as among the Luiseño-Juaneño, the Cahuilla, the Ipai-Tipai, the Cupeño, and the Gabrielino. Schooling included severe physical ordeals, instruction in mythic cosmology carried out through dry painting, and in some cases the creation of rock art. In such groups as the Chumash and the Serrano, training was restricted to the sons of an elite. In all cases, the group of initiated men, and—among the Monache and the Yokuts—women, formed a sodality that bore defined religious, economic, and political responsibilities. Among the Chumash, such an organization provided the basis for a highly complex, elite socioreligious guild, *ʔantap*, led by priest-astronomers. Throughout the subarea, shamans made use of *toloache* in achieving curing trances.

In the extreme southeast, among the Mohave, the role of *toloache* was secondary to that of dreaming. Men learned clan myths through intentional dreaming and chanted these in long, collective "sings." Kin group solidarity was important to religious practice among other southern California groups as well, many keeping sib medicine bundles that were revealed only to *toloache* adepts.

Mourning anniversaries. With their stress on ritual death and rebirth, the *toloache* religions of southern and central California reflected an overriding concern with personal and cosmic death and renewal. A second feature, the "mourning anniversary," accompanied the *toloache* complex. In broad outline, mourning anniversaries were large public gatherings in which effigies of the year's dead, together with large quantities of property, were burned on poles erected in circular brush shelters, the assembled audience mourning its collective losses. The occasion often served as a vehicle for girls' puberty celebrations, for the giving of new names, for honoring chiefs, and for expressing reciprocity between kin groups. Often an Eagle (or Condor) Dance, in which shamans displayed their power by slowly killing a sacrificial bird, formed an important part of the event.

The mourning anniversary, with many local variations, was practiced by the Basin peoples of the southern portion of contemporary California—the Chemhuevi, the Panamint, the Kawaiisu, and the Tubatulabal—as well as by virtually all groups in the southern California culture area. The practice extended northward through the *toloache*-using groups and beyond, being performed by the Maidu and Nisenan of northern California in conjunction with another religious complex, the Kuksu cult.

Kuksu. In northern California the *toloache* complex gave way to a second great ritual system, the Kuksu cult. The term *Kuksu* derives from the Pomo name for a creator-hero who is impersonated by masked dancers in the periodic performances that are the focus of the religious system. A parallel figure, Hesi, was prominent in the performances of groups in the Sacramento Valley and the Sierra Nevada foothills. The Hill Maidu expression of the complex featured a third such figure, Aki, who is found together with Hesi among the Northwestern Maidu. Kuksu and Hesi are sometimes found together among other groups.

Masked and costumed dancers impersonated these and other spirits and mythic figures in elaborate ceremonials performed in dance houses before large audiences during gatherings that lasted several days. Dances at various ceremonial centers were reciprocally supported. As with *toloache* religions, the various Kuksu religions provided collective "schools" for pubescent initiates who were, through cultic indoctrination and participation, conducted into secret, often ranked sodalities. Such sodalities could exercise great political and economic influence, as well as spiritual power. The Kuksu dances themselves returned the world to its pristine, mythic condition and often included first-fruits and curing elements in their scope. Intergroup trading, gambling, shamans' contests, and recreation were features of the Big Times that usually followed Kuksu performances.

Among groups that had both Kuksu and Hesi sodalities, as well as some others, participation was open to young men and also to some young women, as among the Cahto and the Yuki. More commonly, membership

in such sodalities was restricted to males. In some groups, membership was further restricted to elite cadres who worked their way up through the sodality's ranked levels, as among the Pomo-speaking groups. In such groups a second sodality, the Ghost society, was open to all young men, as among the Patwin, and sometimes to women as well, as among the Eastern Pomo. These less prestigious sodalities presented masked dances that paralleled those of the Kuksu type and emphasized the honoring of the departed, the curing of ghost-disease, and the continuity of generations. Such themes were present in the mourning anniversaries prevalent to the south. Thus, the Ghost society was not found among groups in the Kuksu subarea (such as the Maidu and the Nisenan) that practiced mourning anniversaries.

World renewal. Mythic reenactment, collective mourning, generational continuity, and world renewal are all motives present in the Kuksu religion that found other expressions in northwestern California, where a fourth areal ritual complex, the World Renewal cult, flourished. This complex featured cyclic ten-day ceremonials within more extended periods of ritual activity performed by specialized officiants. The various dances were given reciprocally at two- to three-year intervals at perhaps thirteen ceremonial centers in Yurok, Karok, and Hupa territories. Close equivalents of these World Renewal dances were held by Tolowa-Tututni, Wiyot, Chilula, and Shasta groups as well. The focal occasions were religious festivals, extended periods of public and private ritual, dancing, feasting, and communality that at times attracted several thousand participants. World Renewal festivals thus replaced both Big Times and mourning anniversaries in the northwestern subarea. However, the primary purpose of these large gatherings was the prevention of world disorder and the reaffirmation of interdependency. The world, potentially imbalanced by the weight of human misconduct, was "fixed" or "balanced" through the Jump Dance, the interdependence and abundance of all life reaffirmed and ensured through the Deerskin Dance. In both, teams of dancers displayed finery and power objects emblematic of the spiritual ascendency of their sponsors, and it was in this sense that such costumes and objects were considered "wealth."

The World Renewal religion was given different inflections by the different participating groups: the Yurok incorporated first-salmon rites and collective fishing as well as the rebuilding of a sacred structure; the Karok included "new fire" (new year) elements, as well as a first-salmon rite; and the Hupa celebrated a first-acorn rite, the rebuilding of a cosmographic structure, and so on. All stressed the reenactment, by priests, of the origins of the dances and their attendant rituals. The recitation of long, codified mythic scenarios was a central feature. School-like organizations of "helpers" were instructed by the priests. These organizations were similar to the initiatory sodalities of south and central California and included both men and women. Neither priests and their assistants nor dancers impersonated spirit beings, however, as was done in Kuksu performances or the spirit dances of the Plateau.

The sketches given here do not exhaust the aboriginal ritual inventories in any of the areas and subareas dealt with. There were many less prominent but no less meaningful ritual activities, both private and public. Throughout these areas religious knowledge and practice were fully integrated with social action. The European invasion of the American West, in disrupting ecological, social, and political systems, also disrupted religious systems.

Postcontact Religious Change

The religions of California, the Great Basin, and the Plateau have undergone thousands of years of slow change and development. They were probably changed most suddenly and drastically by the direct and indirect influences of Europeans and Euro-Americans that began in the eighteenth century.

The Roman Catholic missionization of California, beginning in 1769, had largely disastrous effects on the native populations of the area. Voluntary conversions took place, but forced baptism and forced residence in mission communities were more common. Ultimately, the successes of Catholic missionization north to San Francisco Bay were negated by the fearsome toll exacted by the diseases fostered by overcrowded missions and forced labor under the Spanish *encomienda* system. Success measured in lasting conversions was modest, and negative in terms of human welfare, but the missionaries contributed to native religious revitalization. For example, Catholicism seems to have provided the basis for a new high god, Chingichngish, in the *toloache* religions of the south. This moralistic, omniscient creator, which originated among the Gabrielino, also supplemented the mythic pantheons of the Luiseño-Juaneño, the Ipai-Tipai, the Chumash, and the Yokuts.

Other missionaries, primarily Protestant and Mormon, also made extended efforts in the nineteenth century in California, the Basin, and the Plateau. Yet the effects of later missionization were broadly similar: rather than supplanting native religions, Christianity provided symbolic means through which native religions found new forms to cope with the radically changing circumstances of life.

However, the effects of conquest were not limited to

innovations informed by Christian ideology. The introduction of the horse onto the Plains and thence into the Plateau and the northwestern Basin in the early eighteenth century had an important impact on the peoples of these areas. Together with the horse came other Plains influences. Military sodalities were integrated into the religions of the Kutenai and the Flathead, as was the Sun Dance. The Sun Dance also spread to the Great Basin, where it was taken up by the Wind River Shoshoni and the Bannock and was introduced to the Utes by the Kiowa as late as 1890. [*See* Sun Dance.]

The preponderant contact phenomena evidenced in the religious life of all three areas, however, were the millenarian crisis cults inspired by a variety of "prophets" whose visions had been shaped by Christian influences. Typically, such visions occurred in deathlike states in which prophets met God or his emissary and received word of the coming millennium and the practices and moral codes that would ensure Indians' survival of it. Perhaps the best known of such crisis cults are the Paiute Ghost Dances of 1870 and 1890.

The first of these, initiated by the prophet Wodziwob in 1870, moved through the Basin and into central California. It was taken up by a number of California groups and moved north to the Shasta. The Ghost Dance doctrine stressed the destruction of the whites by the Creator, the return of the Indian dead, and the restoration of the earth to its pristine, precontact condition. It inspired a number of variants in the years following 1870. Most of these represented fusions of Kuksu-type and Ghost society dances with the new millenarianism. Such cults included the Earth Lodge religion practiced by many central and northern California peoples. Adherents awaited the millennium in large, semisubterranean dance houses. Other cults inspired by the 1870 Ghost Dance included the Big Head and Bole-Maru cults of the Hill Patwin, the Maidu, and the Pomo-speaking groups, and a succession of other local cults led by various "dreamers."

The 1890 Ghost Dance, initiated in 1889 by the Paiute prophet Wovoka, again spread through the Basin, this time moving east onto the Plains. It directly affected neither California nor the Plateau.

The two Ghost Dances are but the better known of a large number of similar efforts toward religious revitalization that flourished, particularly in the Plateau area, in the nineteenth century. In the 1830s, many prophets, not acting in concert, spread the Prophet Dance through the central and southern Plateau. This round dance, always performed on Sundays and reflecting belief in a high god, showed Christian influence, although some have argued that it had aboriginal precedents as well. The dance took many forms under the guidance of many prophets and dreamers, of whom the best known is perhaps Smohalla, a Sahaptin dreamer who revived the Prophet Dance in the 1870s in a form that spread widely.

In 1881 a Salish Indian from Puget Sound named John Slocum underwent what was by that time the established visionary experience of a prophet. Together with his wife Mary he inaugurated the Indian Shaker church, a Christian church in which the presence of God's power, signified by physical trembling ("the shake"), was used by congregants to cure the sick. This mixture of Christian and native shamanistic elements proved highly appealing, and the Indian Shaker church spread into the Plateau, where it was accepted by Yakima, Umatilla, Wasco-Tenino, Klamath, and, to a lesser extent, Nez Perce Indians. In northwestern California in 1926, churches were built by Yurok, Tolowa, and Hupa congregations. The Shakers' popularity in California began to wane in the 1950s, the result of internal schism, competition with evangelical Christian churches, and increasing stress on "Indianness" and the accompanying return to old ways.

These two apparently conflicting ideologies, based on the salvific powers of Jesus Christ, on the one hand, and on an Indian identity perceived as traditional, on the other, seem to have reached mutual accommodation in peyotism and its institutionalized expression, the Native American Church. The Peyote Way has been accepted by a large number of Basin Indians, spreading among the Ute, Paiute, Gosiute, and Shoshoni in the early twentieth century, its acceptance perhaps facilitated by the collapse of the 1890 Ghost Dance. The Washo received peyote from Ute believers in 1936.

Peyotism spread through the Basin despite the resistance of many traditionalists, becoming itself the basis for a new traditionalism. It was not, however, established in California, although Indians from such cities as San Francisco make frequent trips to take part in peyote meetings sponsored by the Washo and others in Nevada.

Many other postcontact religious systems, including the Sun Dance, continue to be enacted. Chingichngish remains central to religious life on the Rincon and Pauma reservations in southern California; Smohalla's Prophet Dance is still practiced as the basis of the Pom Pom religion of the Yakima and Warm Springs Indians; and Bole-Maru and other postcontact transformations of Kuksu religions are viable among Pomo and other central Californian groups. The Indian Shaker church survives in many communities.

Since the 1960s Indians of all three culture areas have made concerted efforts to reassert religious, as well as political, autonomy; indeed, the two realms continue to

be closely intertwined. Traditional religious specialists and, in many cases, collective ritual activities have survived both conquest and christianization. Younger Indians are increasingly turning to elderly specialists and investing themselves in old ritual practices. Annual mourning ceremonies are still prominent in parts of southern California; northwestern Californians continue to dance in World Renewal rituals; and shamanism survives in the Basin, as does spirit questing on the Plateau. A myriad of other native ritual events and private practices continue throughout the region. Such state agencies as California's Native American Heritage Commission, as well as federal legislation such as the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act, support these efforts to a degree. Withal, one can see the durability of the ancient ways, their persistence, and their ability to continue through modern transformations.

[*For further discussion of postcontact transformations of Native American religious systems, see* North American Religions, *article on* Modern Movements. *For more detailed information on particular movements, see* Ghost Dance; *sections on peyotism in* North American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Plains; *and* Psychedelic Drugs.]

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THOMAS BUCKLEY

Indians of the Southwest

From the southern end of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado, the Southwest culture area extends southward through the mountains, high sandstone mesas, and deep canyons of northern New Mexico and Arizona, and dips over the Mogollon Rim—the southern edge of the Colorado Plateau—into the arid, flat, and sparsely vegetated, low-lying deserts of southern New Mexico and Arizona and northwestern Mexico, to the warm shores of the Gulf of California. It is interspersed throughout with mountain ranges, some bearing dense forests and large game animals. Major rivers are few: the Colorado, its tributaries, and the Rio Grande are the primary sources of water for large sectors of the southwestern ecosystem.

Given the variegation in topography, vegetation, and climate, it is not surprising that the Southwest should contain an equal cultural variety. Four major language families (Uto-Aztecan, Hokan, Athapascan, Tanoan) are represented by a large number of peoples, and two

other languages (Zuni and Keres) comprise language isolates. But it should not be thought that language boundaries are a guide to cultural boundaries. The thirty-one pueblos of New Mexico and Arizona include speakers of six mutually unintelligible languages from four language groups. Yet they share numerous cultural, and specifically religious, features. On the other hand, among the groups speaking Uto-Aztecan languages are found sociocultural forms as disparate as the hunter-gatherer bands of Shoshoneans in the north and the great Aztec state to the south of the Southwest culture area.

Economic Patterns. General typologies of Southwest cultures inevitably simplify such diversity. Despite such shortcomings, they may provide a framework within which to make some systematic generalizations. Edward Spicer (1962) has suggested four major divisions according to distinctive economic types at the time of European contact: rancheria peoples, village peoples, band peoples, and nonagricultural bands. The rancheria peoples all traditionally practiced agriculture based on the North American crop triumvirate of maize, beans, and squash. They lived in scattered settlements with households, or "small ranches," separated by some distance from each other. This general economic pattern was followed by groups as disparate as the Tarahumara and Concho in the Sierra Madre of Chihuahua, the Pima and Papago of southern Arizona, the Yaqui and the Mayo concentrated in the river deltas along the Sonoran coast of the Gulf of California, and the riverine and upland Yuman groups. Considerable differences of settlement pattern, including greater population concentrations among Pimans and seasonal movements from ridges into valleys for the Tarahumara and Concho, obtain from people to people. Still, the designation *rancheria* is helpful as a general characterization of Southwest agricultural economies that do not support densely populated, permanently sedentary communities.

The village peoples of Spicer's classification are, by contrast, sedentary communities with tightly integrated populations in permanent villages of stone and adobe construction. These are the Pueblo peoples, who have come to be regarded as the archetypical indigenous agriculturalists of the Southwest. The Tanoan Pueblos include the Tiwa, Tewa, and Towa, whose villages stretch up and down the upper portion of the Rio Grande in New Mexico. Also living for the most part along the Rio Grande or its tributaries are several Keresan Pueblos, with linguistically close Laguna and Acoma a little farther west, on the San Jose River. Moving west across the Continental Divide lies the pueblo of Zuni on a tributary of the Little Colorado River. At the western edge of Pueblo country, on the fingerlike mesas that extend southwestward from Black Mesa of the Colorado Plateau, are the eleven Hopi villages, whose inhabitants speak Hopi, a Uto-Aztecan language. Also located in this vicinity is one Tewa village, Hano, settled by refugees from the Rio Grande valley after the Great Pueblo Revolt of 1680.

The Pueblos are intensive agriculturalists. Among the Eastern Pueblos (those occupying the Rio Grande area) and in Acoma, Laguna, and Zuni (which with the Hopi constitute the Western Pueblos), agriculture is based on a variety of irrigation techniques. Hopi country has no permanent watercourses, and agriculture there is practiced by dry farming. Their sedentariness is a striking feature of the village peoples: Acoma and the Hopi village of Oraibi vie for the status of oldest continuously inhabited community in North America, with ceramic and tree-ring dates suggesting occupation from at least as far back as the twelfth century CE.

Spicer's third subtype is that of the band peoples, all Athapascan speakers. These consist of the Navajo and the several Apache peoples. These Athapascans migrated into the Southwest, probably via the Plains, from northwestern Canada not long before the arrival of Spanish colonists at the turn of the sixteenth century. They variously modified a traditional hunting and gathering economy with the addition of agriculture from the Pueblos (Navajo and Western Apache) and of sheep (Navajo) and horses (all groups) from the Spanish. The means of acquisition of these economic increments—through raiding of the pueblos and Spanish settlements—points up another important feature of Apache economies.

The fourth economic subtype Spicer refers to as nonagricultural bands. The Seri of the northwestern coastline of the Mexican State of Sonora are the primary representatives of this subtype. Traditionally, they hunted small game, fished and caught sea turtles, and gathered wild plant resources along the desert coast of the Gulf of California.

Variations in economy do not, of course, suggest variations in religious structure and orientation *tout court*. Still, modes of environmental adaptation do, within certain bounds, constrain the possibilities of social complexity. Southwest Indian religious patterns frequently do reflect forms of environmental adaptation because of a prevailing notion of social rootedness within a local environmental setting. Since many of the religious concerns of Southwest peoples pertain to man's relationship with environmental forces, the interplay between economic and religious spheres is fundamental.

Religious Patterns. Among the panoply of indigenous Southwestern cultures, two general patterns of religious

action are evident: that focusing on the curing of sickness and that celebrating, re-affirming, and sanctifying man's relationship with the cyclical forces of nature. Religious actions of the former type are usually shamanic performances whose participants include an individual patient and an individual ritual specialist (or a small group of specialists). The latter type includes communal rituals involving large groups of participants under the direction of cadres of hereditary priests. These two general forms are present in the Southwest in a variety of combinations and permutations. Among the Yumans, the Tarahumara, and the Apache, shamanistic curing is the prevalent religious form, and little emphasis is placed on communal agricultural rituals. (The Havasupai, who until the turn of the century held masked ceremonial performances at stages of the agricultural cycle—a practice probably borrowed from their near neighbors, the Hopi—provide a partial exception.) Historically the Pima and Papago peoples held communal agricultural rituals as well as shamanic performances, but with sociocultural change the former have passed from existence while the latter, by themselves, have come to represent traditional religion. At the other end of the continuum, the Pueblos devote most religious attention to the calendrical cycle and have even communalized their curing ceremonies by creating medicine societies to fill the role played in less communally oriented societies by the individual shaman. (The Hopi are an exception, in that they still recognize individual medicine men and women.)

In general, the religious activities oriented around shamanic curing and the acquisition of personal power through individual control over supernatural resources occur in those societies with less (or no) emphasis on agriculture and without concentrated settlement patterns. Communal ceremonies interwoven with the seasonal cycle predominate in agriculture-dependent societies, which have developed highly elaborate and complex ritual systems; as Åke Hultkranz states, "No other Amerindian societies lay so much stress on ceremonialism" as do the Pueblos.

Several Caveats to Students of Southwest Religions. A key problem facing the student of Southwest Indian religions is sociocultural change. The Spanish conquest and colonization of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries affected all Southwest cultures, though individual peoples were treated differently. Our knowledge of indigenous religious beliefs and practices is in some cases (for example, the Seri) severely limited by the wholesale abandonment of indigenous beliefs and their replacement with Christian concepts. Syncretism of traditional and introduced forms is, as among the Yaqui and Mayo, so historically entrenched that it is impossible to isolate the threads of precontact religious life. The traditional Yaqui and Mayo system of three religious sodalities fused in the seventeenth century with Jesuit beliefs and came to embody largely Christian notions, but these peoples' version of Christian ceremonies, such as the rituals recapitulating the Passion of Christ, incorporate traditional figures with clear similarities to the *kachinas* and clowns of the Pueblos. Since such syncretic processes began long before careful ethnographic records were made of indigenous belief and practice, the "pure forms" are simply irretrievable.

The Pueblos, the Navajo, and the Apache have maintained more of their traditional religious systems intact than other Southwest peoples. Of these groups, the Pueblos have the most complex religious systems, which in many instances preserve indigenous forms intact and distinct from religious elements introduced by Europeans. Hence I shall focus upon the Pueblos in this essay. The persistence of Pueblo religious patterns, despite almost four hundred years of colonial domination, is remarkable. The presence of Puebloan peoples in the Southwest, and of the earlier so-called Basket Makers, with whom there is a clear cultural continuity in the archaeological record, reaches far back into antiquity. The remains found in New Mexico's Chaco Canyon and Colorado's Mesa Verde of the civilization of the Anasazi are simply the better-known evidences of this socially complex and culturally sophisticated people, the direct ancestors of the historical Pueblos. The height of Anasazi culture (twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE) is represented by monumental architecture and elaborately constellated settlement patterns that suggest extensive social networks over large regions. For reasons we can only guess at—perhaps drought, war, disease, population pressure, internal social strife, or all of these in concert—the larger Anasazi pueblos had given way to the smaller pueblos by the time of the earliest historical records (c. 1540).

How much change and persistence have occurred in religion is an unfathomable problem. Nevertheless, the religious conservatism of the modern Pueblos, as well as archaeological indications (such as certain petroglyphs) suggest that more than a few Pueblo religious practices have persisted for a very long time. These two factors—the conservatism and antiquity of Pueblo religious practices—reflect another prominent characteristic: that the more important Pueblo beliefs and ritual practices are deliberately and rigorously preserved by an all-encompassing cloak of secrecy. The Pueblos have been and remain today extremely reluctant to reveal anything beyond the superficial aspects of their religious life. No anthropologists, apart from native Pueblo individuals, have been allowed to conduct extended res-

ident field research by any of the Eastern Pueblos. Questions about religion meet with evasion or a purposive silence. Often information obtained by outsiders has been gathered in unusual ways, such as by interviewing individuals in hotel rooms distant from their pueblos. Only limited aspects of Pueblo religious performances are public; no non-Indian outsider has been permitted to witness a *kachina* performance in any of the Rio Grande pueblos since the seventeenth century.

Secrecy is pervasive not simply to preserve the integrity of traditional religion from the corrupting influences of the outside world, but also to protect the religious practices' integrity within the pueblos themselves. Initiates into religious societies are inculcated with the idea that their disclosure of secret, ritually imparted knowledge will have dire supernatural (their own or their relatives' deaths) and social (their ostracism from the pueblo) consequences. The result is that knowledge of Pueblo religion is fragmentary, flimsy, and in some cases inaccurate. We do know something of the surface contours of Pueblo religion, and these are discussed below. In deference to the Pueblos' rights to maintain their religions as they see fit, perhaps this surface level is as far as we may conscionably prosecute our inquiries.

The Pueblo Cosmos. In Pueblo thought generally, there is no absolute origin of life or of human beings. Although there have been a number of transformations since the earliest times, the earth and the people have always existed. Accordingly, there is less concern with primordial origins than with the process through which human beings were transformed into their present state of being from previous states.

Southwest peoples in general envision a multilayered cosmos whose structure is basically tripartite: "below," "this level," and "above." Each level has subdivisions, but the number and character of the subdivisions vary from culture to culture. All the Pueblos believe themselves to have originated beneath the present earth's surface. The layer below is characterized as a previous world, or as several previous worlds (or "wombs") stacked one atop another. The Zuni and the Keresans conceive of four previous worlds, the Hopi of three, and the Tewa only one. The last world "below" lies under a lake or under the earth's surface. At the beginning of the present age, the people were impelled—by supernatural signs in some versions of the Emergence story, by the need to flee evil in other versions—to seek a new life in the world above. By methods that vary from story to story (in some versions by climbing a tree, in others a giant reed), the people ascended to this level. The earth's condition was soft, and it required hardening. This was accomplished with the supernatural aid of the War Twins, who are found among all the Pueblo groups, or it was done by a human being with special powers—for example by the Winter Chief, who in the Tewa story hardened the ground with cold.

Accounts differ with regard to the creation of the Sun, Moon, and stars and to the origin of cultigens. For the Eastern Pueblos, the Sun was a beckoning force encouraging the people's ascent into this world. In Hopi tradition, by contrast, the ritual leaders had to create the Sun and Moon by flinging disks of buckskin or cotton into the sky. After the Emergence, the Hopi met with a quasi-anthropomorphous supernatural, Maasawu, who introduced them to maize, beans, and squash. The stars were formed, the Hopi recount, by Coyote's negligence. Coyote had been instructed to carry a sealed pot toward the eastern house of the Sun, but before he reached his destination he grew weary and decided, against instructions, to lift the lid off the pot. All the stars flew out and formed the Milky Way. In Zuni tradition, a supernatural slayer of monsters cut up one monster's body parts and threw them into the sky, where they became the stars.

The timing and methods of the creation of natural phenomena vary, but the trajectory of human progress is the same throughout the various Pueblo traditions. After their emergence onto the earth's surface through an opening referred to as an "earth navel," the people migrated over the earth, stopping at locations that are identified by oral tradition with the numerous ruins throughout the Southwest, before reaching their final destination in the present-day villages. Variant migration patterns reflect differing forms of social organization: the matrilineal clans of the Hopi migrated independently and arrived at the present Hopi towns as separate units, whereas the two moieties of the Tewa—Winter and Summer—migrated down opposite banks of the Rio Grande from their Emergence point in the north.

Hence Pueblo origin myths emphasize the process of becoming the Pueblo peoples of the present. Each pueblo is highly independent, and, but for exceptional occasions requiring dire responses (such as in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 or during severe famines), there is no political unity among pueblos whatsoever. Such independence is reflected in Pueblo worldview: each pueblo regards itself as the center of the bounded universe. Forces radiate both centripetally from the outer limits and centrifugally from a shrine at the pueblo's center, which is represented as the heart of the cosmos. Thus the Zuni are "the people of the middle place," the Hopi of Second Mesa live at the universe center, and

each of the various Tewa villages lies about its "earth-mother earth-navel middle place" (Ortiz, 1969, p. 21). The outer limits of the world are marked variously. Among the Eastern Pueblos and the Acoma and Laguna, the world is a rectangular flat surface (although of course broken by topography) bounded by sacred mountains in the cardinal directions. For the Zuni, the surface is circular and is surrounded by oceans that are connected by underworld rivers. The Hopi world is more abstractly bounded, although sacred mountains and rivers act as circumscribing features.

All Pueblo worlds are rigorously aligned by six cardinal directions, four of which correspond to our north, west, south, and east (or, in the Hopi case, sunrise and sunset points on the horizon at the solstices—roughly northwest, southwest, southeast, and northeast) and the zenith and nadir. From the viewpoint of its inhabitants, each pueblo lies at the center formed by the intersection of the axes of opposed directions. The directions are symbolized by numerous devices: colors, mammals, birds, snakes, trees, shells, sacred lakes, deity houses, and so forth.

The Zuni and the Tewa seem to have elaborated the axial schema to the greatest extent. For the Zuni, the six directions serve as a multipurpose organizational model for society—in terms of matrilineal clan groupings, priesthood sodalities, *kiva* (ceremonial chamber) groupings—and for nature, in that the taxonomy of species is directionally framed. The fourfold plan (i.e., excluding the vertical axis) of the earth's surface is represented by the Tewa as a series of concentric tetrads, which are marked by four mountains at their extremities and by four flat-topped hills, four directional shrines, and four village plazas as the center is approached. Neither is this a static abstraction in Tewa belief: ritual dancers in the plazas must face the four directions; songs have four parts; and so forth. Each of the physical features marking the corners of the concentric boundaries (the four mountains, hills, shrines, and plazas) is a place of power. Each contains an "earth navel" that connects the three levels of the cosmos and that is presided over by particular supernaturals.

The Pueblo Pantheon. Associated with the levels and sectors of the Pueblo world is a panoply of supernatural beings. Elsie C. Parsons (1939) divides these beings into collective and individualized categories.

Collective supernaturals. The collective category signally includes clouds, the dead, and the *kachinas*. Clouds and the dead have an explicit association: the specific destiny of the deceased person depends upon the role he played during life, but in general the dead become clouds. The cloud beings are classified according to the directions and, accordingly, associated with colors. *Kachina* is a fluid spiritual concept that refers both to supernatural beings and to their masked impersonators at Pueblo ceremonies. *Kachinas* appear in numerous guises and represent many features of the natural and supernatural worlds. They are dramatized in masked impersonation and in stories, where they appear in the forms of animals, plants, birds, the sun, and stars and as spirits such as the War Twins, sky deities, culture heroes, and so on. Some *kachinas* also represent game animals, and *kachinas* associated with the directions are also linked with hunting. *Kachinas* dwell in locations on the edges of the bounded world: in mountains, for instance, or in lakes or other sites associated with the powers of moisture. The three concepts of the dead, the clouds, and the *kachinas* overlap: the dead may become *kachinas*, and *kachinas* may manifest themselves as clouds. The interrelation among clouds, the dead, and *kachinas* points up a significant concern of Pueblo beliefs and ritual practices: the importance of rainfall in this largely arid environment is paramount, and the *kachinas*, as rain spirits, have the power to bring rain to nourish the crops—the central link in the Pueblo chain of being.

Individualized supernaturals. In some respects, individualized supernaturals reflect the arrangement of the cosmos into levels. Thus among the Hopi, Sootukwnangw ("star–cumulus cloud"), the zenith deity, is associated with lightning and powerful rain; Muyingwu, an earth deity associated with the nadir, is the spirit of maize, germination, and vegetation; and Maasawu is the guardian of this level, the surface of the earth. But each of these figures has multiple aspects and cannot be neatly slotted into an abstract cosmic layer. Through his power to shoot lightning like arrows, Sootukwnangw is also an important war deity, and Maasawu, especially, has a cluster of characteristics. He is associated with fire, war, death, and the night, and he looks and behaves in a more manlike fashion than do the deities of above and below. Supernaturals associated with cosmic features also embody moral principles (Maasawu represents humility, conservatism, lack of avarice, serious commitment to the duties of life, and the terrifying consequences of excessive individualism) and biological principles (Sootukwnangw's lightning arrows are associated with male fertilization). Further, there is a plethora of other supernaturals who are not arranged hierarchically but who crystallize a number of religious concerns. The Pueblo pantheon lacks systematization: supernaturals often overlap in meaning and function, and this is further evident in the pattern of religious organization. Discrete segments of Pueblo society often

focus exclusively upon the sets of supernaturals under their control; individuals not in a particular social segment do not have rights of appeal to its set of deities, and they risk severe social repercussions for unauthorized attempts at intercourse with such deities.

The sun, regarded everywhere as male, is a powerful fertilizing force, the father in relation to the earth, who is the mother. Traditionally, every individual was expected to offer cornmeal and to say a prayer to the sun at dawn, when the sun leaves his house (or *kiva*) at the eastern edge of the world and begins his journey to his western house. Prayers to the sun refer to the desire for a long and untroubled path of life for each individual. After a period of seclusion in darkness, the newborn Pueblo infant is taken out and shown to the sun to request a long and happy life and the sun's beneficent attention. As Father, the sun is equated with the care and spiritual nurturance of his children. Songs are addressed to him to ask for his life-giving powers of light and warmth, kept in balance so as not to burn the crops or dry them out. Sun is also a deity of hunting and war; the Keresans, Tiwa, and Hopi seek his assistance in these endeavors.

Other celestial deities. Less significant by comparison, other celestial deities include, first, the moon, who is variously female (Zuni, where Moonlight-Giving Mother is the sun's wife) and male (Tewa, Towa, Tiwa). Moon is rarely addressed in prayer or song. In association with the sun and some constellations, however, the moon's movements and phases are utilized to plan the calendrical cycle of ceremonies. The antiquity of such practices is suggested by the numerous lunar and solar marking devices found in prehistoric Puebloan sites, such as the well-known Sun-Dagger petroglyphs in Chaco Canyon.

The morning star and the constellations Orion and the Pleiades have associations with war and with the timing of ceremonies. The movement of celestial phenomena is critically linked to the seasonal passage of the year. The ceremonial moiety division of the Tewa into Winter and Summer people, each of which has ritual and political charge of half the year, is an indication of the thoroughgoing nature of seasonal principles. The Hopi and Zuni divide their seasons by the solstices, the Tewa by the equinoxes, but the pattern of opposed dual principles is pervasive.

Dawn is deified in the form of Dawn Youths (Tewa), Dawn Mothers (Zuni), and Dawn Woman (Hopi). At Hopi, Dawn Woman is linked with another female deity, Huruingwuuti ("hard substances woman"), who has a formative role in the cosmogonic process. In the Keresan pueblos, she seems to have a counterpart in Thought Woman, whose every thought became manifest into substance. Thought Woman mythologically precedes Iyatiku, a chthonic being who is the mother of people, *kachinas*, game, and maize and who occupies the most prominent role in the Keresan pantheon. Iyatiku is in some respects parallel to Muyingwu, the Hopi maize and germination deity of the below. The principle of human and animal fertility is represented at Hopi by Tiikuywuuti ("child-water woman"), who is Muyingwu's sister.

Other common supernaturals. This group includes the War Twins, who are war gods, culture heroes, and patrons of gamblers; the maternal spirit animating the earth (whose body parts may be represented by vegetation, hills, and canyons); the Feathered and Horned Serpent, who lives in the water forms of the earth—springs, pools, rivers, the oceans—and who is a dangerous, powerful water deity responsible for floods and earthquakes; Spider Grandmother, a cosmogonic creator whom the Hopi consider grandmother of the War Twins; Salt Woman or Salt Man, deities of salt lakes and other salt sources; Fire Old Woman, Ash Man, and Ash Boy, with obvious associations; a giant eagle, or Knife Wing (Zuni), one of several war deities; Poseyemu, generally father of the curing societies, a miracle worker, and a possible syncretic counterpart of Christ; the master spirits of particular animals, such as Bear, Badger, Mountain Lion, Wolf, and Coyote, who are patrons of specific curing societies; the sun's children, patrons of the clown societies; and many others.

Each of these supernatural entities embodies a different form of power. They are, however, discrete forms and not subsumable under a concept of pervasive supernatural power such as *mana* or *orenda*. [*See* Power.] They may be harnessed by human beings and used to transform events and states in the world. Access to power is, however, strictly limited in these societies and is based upon initiation into a religious sodality and, especially, a priestly office. There is no vision quest whereby power (at least for males) is democratically accessible.

Religious Organization and Ritual Practice. The basic form of religious organization in the pueblos consists of ritual societies, which serve a variety of purposes. Pueblo religion focuses on a number of issues: agricultural fertility and productivity, human fertility, fertility and productivity of game animals, war, and curing. These major issues are further divisible into aspects. Thus agricultural concerns are trained on the attainment of adequate—but not excessive—moisture, adequate heat and light, and the effective prevention of many crop pests and of excessive wind and cold. Rituals concerning game animals and hunting may be divided according to the species pursued. War society rituals

are prophylactic, ensuring strength and success, as well as being celebrations of victory and rituals of purifying and sacralizing scalps taken in battle. Curing societies are organized according to the types of sicknesses they cure. "Bear medicine," "Badger medicine," and so forth are sympathetically and contagiously associated with particular ailments and are used by societies of the same names to produce cures. Typically, societies are composed of small numbers of priests and some lay members, and each society follows an annual cycle of ritual undertakings. In their most spectacular forms, such undertakings climax in dramatic public performances at specified times of the calendrical cycle.

Hopi religious societies. An examination of Hopi religious societies provides insight into the structure of such societies in Pueblo cultures generally. In Hopi thought, the religious societies have different degrees of importance and confer different degrees of power on the initiated. A ranking of the societies into three orders of ascending importance may be constructed as follows (translations are given where Hopi names are translatable): Kachina and Powamuy are third-order societies; Blue Flute, Gray Flute, Snake, Antelope, Lakon, and Owaqöl are second-order societies; and Wuwtsim, One Horn, Two Horn, Singers, Soyalangw, and Maraw are first-order societies.

Each of these societies focuses upon a different set of supernatural beings and a different set of specific concerns. The ranking into three orders parallels the age requirements for initiation into particular societies. All children aged six to ten (male and female) are initiated into either (the choice is their parents') the Kachina or the Powamuy society. After this initiation, they are eligible to join second-order societies, although not all individuals will actually join. (Second-order societies are distinguished by sex: Lakon and Owaqöl are female; the rest male.) At about age sixteen, all males (traditionally) are initiated into one of the four manhood societies (Wuwtsim, One-Horn, Two-Horn, Singers) and females into the Maraw (womanhood) society. Initiation into one of the manhood societies, together with birthright, is prerequisite to participation in the Soyalangw society; since this society carries no formal initiation, it can be regarded as a more exclusive extension of the manhood societies.

The ceremonial cycle. The public dimension of each society's activities is concentrated at particular points in an annual liturgy. The beginning of the year, which is reckoned in lunar months, falls from late October to late November and is marked by the manhood society ceremonies. Following an eight-day retreat in the *kiva*s (semisubterranean ceremonial chambers), which involves private rituals, two of the societies (the Wuwtsim and the Singers) process slowly around the village in two facing columns. (Members of both societies are in each column.) The columns are "guarded" at both ends by some members of the Two-Horn society. The Wuwtsim and Singers sing songs composed for the occasion, some of which poke fun at the sexual proclivities of the Maraw society (the women's counterpart to the Wuwtsim society). The remaining members of the Two-Horn society and all the One-Horns are meanwhile continuing with private rituals in their respective *kiva*s. After the final circuit of the Wuwtsim and Singers, all the Two-Horn and One-Horn members, in two separate processions (which are dramatic although unaccompanied by song) visit a series of shrines around the village and deposit offerings. Each manhood society is regarded as complementary to the other three, and each is associated with a particular religious concern: the Wuwtsim and Singers with fertility, the Two-Horns with hunting and game animals, and the One-Horns with the dead and with supernatural protection of the village.

A month later, at the time of the winter solstice, the Soyalangw ceremony occurs. This is one of the most complex Hopi ceremonies and involves the participation of the most important priests in the village. They ritually plan the events of the coming year and perform a variety of ritual activities concerned with reversing the northward movement of the sun and with the regeneration of human, floral (both wild and cultivated), faunal (wild and domestic), and meteorological harmony. Several key themes of Hopi religious concern are sounded in this winter solstice ceremony, which renews and reorients the world and man's position within it. After Soyalangw, game animal dances are held (nowadays particularly Buffalo Dances). These are regarded as "social" dances, as are a group of dances performed in September, which include, among others, Butterfly Dances and "Navajo Dances." The distinction between social dances and sacred performances is not completely clear; songs sung at social dances frequently express desires for beneficial climatic conditions, and in general the social dances evince continuity with the religious concerns of the sacred performances. Clearly, however, the social dances are regarded with less solemnity, and there are only minor religious proscriptions on the performers.

The Soyalangw ceremony opens the *kachina* "season." *Kachina*s are impersonated in repeated public performances from January to July. As has been noted, the *kachina* concept is multiple. The *kachina* costume worn by impersonator-performers includes a mask (there are more than three hundred kinds) and specific garments and body paints. The Hopi regard the masked represen-

tations of *kachinas* to be fully efficacious manifestations of the *kachina* spirits; when speaking English, they avoid the term *mask* because of the implication that "masking" is somehow less than real. Many *kachinas* have distinct emblematic calls and stylized body movements. *Kachina* performers represent a great variety of spirits, including those of plant and animal species, deities, and mythological figures of both benign (e.g., the "mudheads") and severe (e.g., the cannibal ogres) countenance. Positive and negative social values are sometimes fused in the same *kachina*. Often a *kachina* represents many elements and practices simultaneously and contains a thick condensation of symbolic devices. Some *kachinas* ("chief *kachinas*") are more important than others and are "owned" by particular clans and regarded as significant clan deities. Usually from January through March *kachinas* appear in groups to dance at night in the *kivas*; for the remainder of the *kachina* season, they appear during the day to dance in the village plaza. During daytime performances, the *kachinas* may be accompanied by a group of unmasked sacred clowns, who conduct a ceremony in parallel to the *kachina* performance. Clowns are given broad license and are social commentators *par excellence*. They expose numerous social aberrancies on the part of village members and poke fun at everything from sacred ceremonial actions to current events. [*See also* Clowns.]

The two most important *kachina* ceremonies occur in February (Powamuy, "the bean dance") and in July (Niman, "the home dance"). At Powamuy, children may be initiated into either the Kachina or Powamuy society in an evening ceremony inside a *kiva*. During the day a large and multifarious assemblage of *kachinas* proceeds in ceremonial circuits around the village. This facinating and beautiful pageant features a series of minipageants occurring in different parts of the village simultaneously. Powamuy purifies the earth and also prefigures the planting season. Beans are germinated in soil boxes in the *kivas* by the artificial warmth of constant fires. During the day of the public pageant, the bean plants are distributed by *kachinas* to each household, where they are cooked in a stew. At the same time the *kachinas* distribute painted wooden *kachina* dolls and basketry plaques to girls and painted bows and arrows to boys, ensuring their futures as fertile mothers and brave warrior-hunters.

The Niman ("homegoing") ceremony, marks the last *kachina* performance of the year. At the close of Niman, the *kachinas* are formally "sent" by several priests back to their mountainous homes in the San Francisco Peaks and elsewhere. They are requested to take the prayers of the people back with them and to present them to the community of *kachina* spirits.

The *kachina* season is followed by the season of "unmasked" ceremonies. In August occur the Snake-Antelope ceremonies or the Flute ceremonies, the performance of which alternates from year to year. In either case, the two societies from which the ceremonies take their names come together at this time to perform complex rituals that last nine days. The Snake-Antelope rites include a public performance in which the Snake men slowly dance in pairs around the plaza while the Antelope men form a horseshoe-shaped line around them and intone chants. The Snake-Antelope and the Flute ceremonies are densely expressive. Both include a magical attempt to bring clouds over the fields to give rain to the crops; both mark the sun's passage; and both dramatize the mythological entrance of particular clans into the village.

Following these ceremonies in the annual liturgy come the ceremonies of the women's societies. The Lakon and Owaqöl, both referred to in English as Basket Dances, feature a circular dance in the plaza. Selected society members run in and out of the circle throwing gifts to the men, who throng the edges of the circle and dispute over the gifts. Both Lakon and Owaqöl women hold basketry plaques in front of them while they sing. The Maraw society's ceremony features a similar circle in which women hold long prayersticks. A number of other rites occur during the nine-day Maraw, including burlesques of male ceremonial activities. Maraw rites relate to war and fertility; Lakon and Owaqöl rites stress fertility and the celebration of the harvest.

This bare outline of the Hopi ceremonial cycle reveals some basic concerns of Pueblo religion. The timing of ceremonies is intimately connected with the annual progress of nature. The *kachina* performances are especially related to the life cycle of cultivated plants, and they occur at critical points in this cycle. The first ceremonies of the year prefigure the planting and successful fruition of crops; they are designed to bring snow and rain to saturate the earth with moisture, which will remain there until planting occurs in April. The daytime *kachina* performances likewise seek rainfall to help the crops grow. Niman, the Homegoing, signals the end of the early phases of crop maturation; the *kachinas*' departure suggests that the spirits of the crops are sufficiently mature no longer to require the *kachinas*' nurturance. The Snake-Antelope and Flute ceremonies complete the course of metaphysical encouragement and nourishment of the crops. Coming at the hottest, driest time of the year, they invoke powerful forces to bring one last bout of rain to ensure the full maturing of the crops and to prevent the sun's fierce gaze from withering them. The women's society Basket Dances

celebrate the success of the harvest by the joyful distribution of basketry plaques and household goods.

Private rituals. All ceremonies include private rituals in *kiva*s prior to the public performance. Typically such private rituals include the construction of an altar, which consists of a rectangular sand painting in front of a vertical assemblage of painted and carved wooden pieces that incorporate symbolic designs of birds, animals, and supernaturals. The sand painting also incorporates many symbolic elements. Long songs are incanted over the altar, and tobacco is ceremonially smoked and blown to portray clouds. (Smoking binds together the hearts of the priests as they pass the pipe around a circle and gives them a collective power to express their prayers more forcefully.) The *kiva* itself is a multiplex symbol: it is axially oriented by the directions, and at its center is a hole representing the *sipapu*, the place of emergence from the world below. The *kiva*'s four levels, from the underfloor to the roof, are identified with the worlds through which man has ascended; the passage into this world is portrayed by the *sipapu* and the *kiva* ladder that leads to the roof.

Maize Symbolism and Ritual. Maize is the dominant, pervasive symbol of Hopi religious life. Maize is regarded as the mother of people, since it is the primary sustainer of human life. "Corn *is* life," the Hopi say. Two perfect ears of white maize are given to a newborn child as its "mothers"; when a person dies, ears of blue maize similarly accompany him on his journey beyond life. Maize seeds, ears, tassels, milk, pollen, and meal all serve as sacramental elements in differing contexts. Moreover, other important symbols are related to the maize cycle. Clouds, rains, lightning, feathered serpents, and various species associated with water, such as frogs, ducks, reeds, and so forth, all underline a paramount interest in securing water for maize.

Two devices, above all others, serve as mechanisms for establishing holiness or for communicating with supernatural forces: cornmeal and prayer feathers. Cornmeal is an all-purpose sanctifying substance; it is sprinkled on *kachina* dancers, used to form spiritual paths for *kachina*s and the dead, offered to the sun and to one's own field of growing maize plants, and accompanies all forms of private and public prayer. The act of making a prayer to various supernatural forms with the sprinkled offering of cornmeal may be considered the most fundamental religious act for the Hopi as for all the Pueblos.

Feathers of many different bird species are used in innumerable ways in Hopi ritual; they are worn in the hair and around arms and ankles, and they decorate *kachina* masks, altars, and religious society emblems. Prayer sticks and prayer feathers are the two basic forms of feather offerings. Prayer sticks, carved in human or supernatural forms, are living manifestations of prayer and are simultaneously petitions for aid. Feathers are regarded as particularly effective vehicles for conveying messages to supernaturals: they "carry" the prayers of people with them.

Comparisons. It is evident from the Hopi situation that religious action is multiple. There is no single set of activities we can demarcate as "Hopi religion" as distinct from Hopi agriculture or even Hopi politics, since political activity goes on even within the context of private ceremonial gatherings. Also, the exclusiveness of religious societies above the third order suggests a socially fragmented pattern of religious belief and practice. Religious knowledge is highly valued and tightly guarded, and it serves as the primary means of making status distinctions in Hopi society. Hopi explanations of the diversity of their religious activities point to historical circumstances: each cult is identified with a particular clan that introduced it when the clan negotiated admission to the village in the distant past. Although lay cult members may be from any clan, the chief priests should always be of the clan which "owns" the ceremony. In part, then, ceremonial performances celebrate separate clan identities and mark off particular ritual activities as the exclusive prerogative of particular clans. This pattern of closed ceremonial societies with exclusive rights in certain forms of religious action is a fundamental characteristic of Pueblo religion.

The Zuni cult system. Other Pueblo groups depart significantly from the Hopi scheme yet still exhibit similarities that suggest some common patterns of belief and practice. Ethnologists have identified six major types of cults or societies among the Zuni.

1. *The Sun cult.* Responsibility for the important religiopolitical officer called the *pekwin* (Sun priest) belongs to the Sun cult. Membership is restricted to males, and the sodality conducts its ceremonies at the solstices.

2. *The Uwanami ("rainmakers") cult.* This cult is composed of twelve distinct priesthoods of from two to six members each. Membership is hereditary within certain matrilineal families. Each priesthood holds retreats (but no public ceremonies) during the summer months from July through September.

3. *The Kachina cult.* Unlike the Hopi Kachina society, membership in the Zuni Kachina society is not open to females. The cult has six divisions, which are associated with the six directions and are accordingly headquartered in six *kiva*s. Each *kiva* group dances at least three times per year: in summer, in winter following the solstice, and following the Shalako ceremony in late November or early December.

4. *The cult of the kachina priests.* Whereas the Kachina society is primarily concerned with rain and moisture, the cult of the *kachina* priests focuses on fecundity—of human beings and game animals. The *kachina* priests are responsible for the six Shalako *kachinas*, the ten-foot-tall, birdlike figures whose appearance marks the most spectacular of Zuni religious dramas, and for the *koyemsi* ("mudhead") *kachinas*, who are at once dangerously powerful beings and foolish clowns. Other *kachinas* under the charge of the *kachina* priests appear at solstice ceremonies, at the Shalako ceremonies, and every fourth year at the time when newcomers are initiated into the general Kachina cult.

5. *The War Gods cult.* The Bow priesthood, which is exclusively male, controls the War Gods cult. Traditionally, initiation required the taking of an enemy's scalp. The Bow priests are leaders in war and protectors of the village, and they serve as the executive arm of the religiopolitical hierarchy, in which role they prosecute witches. (The extinct Momtsit society may have been the Hopi counterpart of the Bow priests.)

6. *The Beast Gods cult.* The cult is overseen by twelve curing societies, and membership is open to both men and women. Each society focuses on a particular source of supernatural power, which is embodied in the bear, mountain lion, or another predatory animal. The individual societies practice general medicine, but each also specializes in healing specific afflictions. The collective ceremonies of the societies are held in the fall and winter.

The division of Zuni religious practice into cults is underpinned by an extremely complex ceremonial calendar that coordinates and interrelates ritual activities throughout the year. Each cult has a cycle that includes private and public ritual actions and that begins and ends with the winter solstice. As among the Hopi, the year is divided by the solstices. From winter to summer solstice, the main focuses of ceremonial action are medicine, war, and human and game-animal fertility. Throughout the summer, ceremonial emphasis is upon rain and the maturation of the crops. At the solstices, all major religious interests converge. Thus at Zuni, religious organization shows significant differences of emphasis, formally and functionally, though these appear as nuances rather than radical divergences. Overall, there appears to be greater emphasis on curing and less on agriculture than at Hopi, a difference of emphasis that intensifies as one moves on to Pueblo groups further east.

Keresan Pueblo religious practice. Among the Keresan Pueblos—Acoma and Laguna to the west, Santo Domingo, Cochiti, San Felipe, Santa Ana, and Zia to the east on the Rio Grande and its tributaries—the chief religious organizations are referred to as "medicine societies." With variations from pueblo to pueblo, the basic pattern consists of four major medicine societies—Flint, Cikame (an untranslatable Keresan word), Giant, and Fire—and a number of minor societies, including Ant, Bear, Eagle, and Lizard. The medicine societies conduct a communal curing ceremony in the spring, echoing a theme of the Hopi Bean Dance, and they hold performances throughout the year to effect the cure of individual patients. The societies also have rainmaking functions, which they fulfill at private ritual retreats during the summer months. Reportedly, these societies erect altars and construct sand paintings similar to those described for the Hopi and the Zuni. The same major sacramental elements—prayer sticks and cornmeal—are central vehicles for religious action, and extensive songs and prayers designed to make unseen power manifest in the world are a key part of ceremonial content. The medicine societies also have important roles in solstitial ceremonies aimed at reversing the course of the sun.

Other important Keresan societies include a paired group: the Koshare, which is a clown society parallel in many ways to Hopi clown societies, and the Kwirena, which is primarily associated with weather control. A Hunters society, with a permanently installed "hunt chief," and a Warriors society, composed of scalp-takers, are other important societies that traditionally held ceremonies during the winter. A village-wide Kachina society is divided into two ceremonial moieties, Turquoise and Squash, associated with the two *kivas* in the village. *Kachina* performances by both moieties occur during fall and winter, but especially during the summer immediately following the rainmaking retreats of the medicine societies. These retreats include a supernatural journey to the *sipapu*, from which the *kachinas* are brought back to the village. As among other Pueblo groups, ritual activities among the Keresans are dominated by males; although both sexes may join medicine societies, women serve as secondary assistants, and only men may perform as *kachinas*.

The climatic and ecological situation of the Keresan Pueblos is of much greater reliability than that of the Hopi. The Keresans' religious concern with the agricultural cycle is evident, but, since the Keresans have irrigation and more plentiful precipitation, they put less emphasis on the agricultural and more on the curing functions of religious societies. A primary function of the more important medicine societies is to combat witchcraft by evil-hearted human beings and evil supernaturals, which is believed to be the cause of illness. Witchcraft is, and has been historically, a profound concern of Hopi and Zuni also, although at Hopi the con-

cern receives less concerted attention from the major religious societies.

The theme of dualism, which appears at Hopi and Zuni in the form of the solstitial switching of ritual emphases, is manifested at the Keresan Pueblos with the division of the ceremonial organization into moieties centered in two *kiva*s.

Tewa, Tiwa, and Towa religious systems. The theme of dualism in Southwest religion achieves perhaps its maximum expression in the religious life of the six Tewa pueblos: San Juan, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Tesuque, Nambe, and Pojoaque. The division of people into Winter and Summer ceremonial moieties is part of a thoroughgoing dual scheme phrased in terms of seasonal opposition. The division of significance among the Tewa is by equinoxes; the seasonal transfer ceremony that is held (roughly) at each equinox places one or the other of the ceremonial moieties in charge of the village for the following season. Hence there are two overarching religious leaders, or caciques, each the head of a moiety. The calendar of religious activities is planned in accordance with the division into summer (agricultural activities) and winter (nonagricultural activities).

Typically, each Tewa pueblo has two *kiva*s in which the ceremonial moieties are headquartered. There are eight religious societies in all: the Winter and Summer moiety societies, each headed by a moiety priest; the Bear Medicine society; the Kwirena ("cold clowns") and Kossa ("warm clowns") societies; the Hunt society; the Scalp society; and the Women's society. The most intensive ritual activity occurs between the autumnal and vernal equinoxes. This contrasts with the Hopi model, in which the most active part of the cycle occurs from the winter to the summer solstice (and just thereafter). Parallel elements are otherwise clear: religious-society organization among the Tewa is reminiscent of the nearby Keresans. Religious concerns, too, are similar between the Tewa and Keresan Pueblos, though the Tewa Pueblos place less emphasis on curing. The main sacraments are the same; the *kachina* performance is a fundamental religious practice, though more restricted here than among the Hopi, Zuni, and western Keresans.

The traditional religious practices of the Tiwa pueblos—Taos and Picuris in the north and Sandia and Isleta in the south—are the least well known. Taos, in particular, has been most effective in protecting matters it regards as not appropriate for public consumption. At Taos, each of the six *kiva*s (which are divided into three on the "north side" and three on the "south side" of the pueblo) houses a religious society. *Kiva* society initiation involves a set of rituals prolonged over a number of years and is restricted by inheritance to a select group. The *kiva* organization at Taos seems to serve the same purpose as religious societies at other pueblos. At Taos, there is greater ritual emphasis upon game animals and hunting, in line with the pueblo's close cultural ties with Plains peoples, than there is upon the agricultural cycle. Taos may be the only pueblo in which *kachina*s are not represented in masked performances. Picuris seems traditionally to have done so, and it otherwise exhibits more religious similarity with the Tewa pueblos than it does with Taos, its close linguistic neighbor. *Kachina*s do occur, however, in Taos myths.

The southern Tiwa in Isleta pueblo have a system of ceremonial moieties divided into Winter (Black Eyes) and Summer (Red Eyes), each with its "moiety house" (which is equivalent to a *kiva*). In addition, Isleta Pueblo's five Corn groups, associated with directions and colors, seem to parallel *kiva* organizations at Taos. The moieties conduct seasonal transfer ceremonies similar to those at Tewa pueblos, and likewise each moiety controls the ritual activities for the season over which it presides. The ceremonial cycle is attenuated in comparison with that at other pueblos; there is a Land Turtle Dance in the spring and a Water Turtle Dance in the fall. Although unverified, it has been reported that *kachina* performances are conducted by a colony of Laguna Pueblo people who have lived in Isleta since the late nineteenth century.

Jemez, the only modern representative of the Towa Pueblos, exhibits an extraordinarily complex ceremonial organization, with twenty-three religious societies and two *kiva* moieties. Every Jemez male is initiated into either the Eagle society or the Arrow society; other societies are more exclusive. Societies can be classified according to function: curing, rainmaking and weather control, fertility, war and protection, and hunting. The Jemez ceremonial cycle includes a series of retreats by the different religious societies. In the summer, these celebrate agricultural growth; in the fall the ripening of crops; in the winter war, rain, ice, snow, and game animals; and in the spring the renewal of the forces of life. The two ceremonial *kiva* moieties are Turquoise and Squash, the same as among the eastern Keresans, and although the principle of dualism is in evidence it is not so pronounced as among the Tewa.

Life, Death, and Beyond. The Pueblos hold that an individual's life follows a path, or plan, that is present in his fate from birth. A long, good life and a peaceful death in old age are the main requests contained in prayers delivered at the birth of a new person. Through the course of maturation, the person becomes increasingly incorporated, in a ritual sense, into the world. So the Tewa, for example, perform a series of childhood baptismal rites—"name giving," "water giving," "water

pouring," and "finishing"—that progressively fix and identify the individual in relation to the forces of society and the cosmos. Religious society initiations and marriage mark further passages in the individual's path of life.

Beliefs about and rituals surrounding death reveal some of the most essential features of Pueblo conceptions of the nature of existence. I have noted above the association between the dead, clouds, and *kachina* spirits. In general, Pueblos believe that when a person dies, the spirit, or breath, returns to the place of the Emergence and becomes transformed into cloud. Cloud spirits have myriad conceptual associations, and the dead (or certain of them) may likewise be given special associations. So, although clouds are generally regarded as the spirits of all the ancestral dead, distinctions are also made between different afterlife destinations, which vary according to the status the deceased person held while alive.

All the Pueblos distinguish between two kinds of people: those who hold important religious offices (or who are initiated members of religious societies) and everyone else. The former are regarded as supernaturally and socially powerful, ritually significant people; the latter are commoners. For the Tewa, the distinction is between "made," or "completed," people and "dry food" people; for the Zuni, the distinction is between valuable and ceremonially poor, or unvaluable, people; among the Keresans the term *sishti* ("commoners") denotes those without ceremonial affiliation; and for the Hopi, the distinction is between *pavansinom* ("powerful" or "completed" people) and *sukavungsinom* (common people).

The afterlife fate of these different categories may vary from one Pueblo group to another. Deceased members of the Hopi Two-Horn and One-Horn societies judge the newly dead at the house of the dead. Witches, suffering a different fate from that enjoyed by the righteous, may be transformed into stinkbugs! Zuni rain priests join the *uwanami* spirits who live in the waters, whereas Zuni Bow priests join their spiritual counterparts in the world above as makers of lightning. Other religious society members return to the place of the Emergence, but Zuni commoners go to "*kachina* village," the home of the *kachinas*, which is at a distance of two days' walk to the west of Zuni. In short, the social and religious organization in life is replicated in the organization of the dead.

Syncretism and Change. The Pueblos were first exposed to Christian practices through the Franciscan friars who accompanied Francisco Vasquez de Coronado during his exploration of the Southwest (1540–1542). When the Province of New Mexico was made a colony of Spain in 1598, the Franciscan order was given special jurisdiction over the souls of the Indians. Missions were built in most of the pueblos; tributes were exacted; strenuous discipline was enforced; and extremely brutal punishments were levied for infractions of the total ban on indigenous religious practices. In reaction to this colonial domination, and especially to the religious oppression, all the pueblos united in an uprising in 1680, under the leadership of Popé, a Tewa priest. Many Spanish priests and colonists were killed, and the rest were forced to withdraw from New Mexico. Most of the pueblos immediately dismantled their missions. The Oraibi Hopi record that in the Great Pueblo Revolt the Roman Catholic priests were actually killed by warrior *kachinas*, symbolically demonstrating the spiritual rectitude of the action and the greater power of the indigenous religion.

Removed from the mainstream of Spanish settlements, the Hopi never allowed Spanish missions to be built among them again, and their religious practices remained free of Franciscan influence. The other Pueblos all suffered the reestablishment of missions after the Spanish reconquest of the 1690s. The influence of the missions depended upon the regularity and zeal with which they were staffed. At Zuni, a desultory missionary presence seems to have had little impact on traditional religious forms. The Rio Grande pueblos, on the other hand, came under a great deal of Franciscan influence. These pueblos are all nominally Catholic and observe many ceremonies of the Christian calendar. Each town has a patron saint and holds a large dance—called a Corn Dance or Tablita Dance—to celebrate the saint's day. The dance is thoroughly indigenous in character; however, a Christian shrine honoring the saint stands at one side of the plaza during the dance. At the conclusion of the dance, all the participants enter the church and offer prayers and thanks in a Christian fashion. Thus the two traditions coexist in a "compartmentalized" fashion. In some areas, such as rites of passage, Christian practices have supplanted indigenous Pueblo forms, especially in those pueblos that have become increasingly acculturated during the twentieth century (Pojoaque, Isleta, Picuris, and Laguna are examples). Many Eastern Pueblos have also taken over Spanish and Mexican religious dramas, such as the Matachine performances, which are also practiced among the Yaqui, Mayo, and Tarahumara.

Protestant churches have been attempting to proselytize the Pueblos since the latter nineteenth century, though in general without much success. Despite sustained long-term efforts by the Mennonites, Baptists,

Methodists, Roman Catholics, Mormons, and Jehovah's Witnesses among the Hopi, their rate of conversion to Christianity has remained below 10 percent. On the other hand, major Christian holidays such as Christmas and Easter are popular occasions and may be having some impact on traditional religion. A *kachina* dance is regularly scheduled for Easter weekend nowadays, and among the array of presents they bring the *kachina*s include baskets of colored eggs. Regarding other nontraditional religions, only at Taos has peyotism to some extent been adopted, and even there its practice is evidently kept compartmentalized and apart from both indigenous religious practice and Catholicism.

Conclusion. The religious traditions of other Indians of the Southwest contain their own conceptual and historical complexities. I have chosen to focus upon the Pueblos here because of the richness of their extant religious practices and because of the separate treatment that the Apache and the Navajo receive in this encyclopedia. [*For treatment of the religious practices of some Yuman groups, see* North American Indians, *article on* Indians of California and the Intermountain Region, *above.*] This does not imply that Pueblo religions are somehow representative of the religions of other native Southwest peoples, though certain Pueblo themes are echoed in different ways among non-Pueblo peoples. Sodalities and clown societies exist among the Yaqui and Mayo; sand painting is practiced by the Navajo, Pima, and Papago; and masked impersonators of supernatural beings perform rainmaking dances among the Havasupai, Yavapai, Pima, and Papago: but these common threads occur in cloths of quite different weaves. Let me emphasize at the last that the indigenous Southwest is enormously diverse. The sheer complexity of its religious practices belies any attempt to standardize these into a meaningful common pattern.

[*For discussion of non-Pueblo peoples of the Southwest, see* Apache Religion *and* Navajo Religion.]

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On account of their richness and complexity, Southwest Indian religions have proven irresistible to generations of scholars. As the cradle of American anthropology, the indigenous Southwest has produced perhaps a greater volume of ethnographic studies than any other comparably populated area in the world. W. David Laird's *Hopi Bibliography: Comprehensive and Annotated* (Tucson, 1977), for example, contains listings for about three thousand items on this people alone. The contemporary *sine qua non* of Southwest ethnographic material is the *Handbook of North American Indians*, vols. 9 and 10, *The Southwest*, edited by Alfonso Ortiz (Washington, D.C., 1979, 1983). Encyclopedic in scope, these volumes treat Pueblo (vol. 9) and non-Pueblo (vol. 10) cultures; particularly pertinent synthetic articles include Dennis Tedlock's "Zuni Religion and World-View" (vol. 9, pp. 499–508), Arlette Frigout's "Hopi Ceremonial Organization" (vol. 9, pp. 564–576), Louis A. Hieb's "Hopi World View" (vol. 9, pp. 577–580), and Louise Lamphere's "Southwestern Ceremonialism" (vol. 10, pp. 743–763). Complex and detailed statements on specific religious practices may be found in the numerous writings of Jesse Walter Fewkes, H. R. Voth, and A. M. Stephen for the Hopi (see the Laird bibliography mentioned above); Frank H. Cushing for the Zuni; Matilda Coxe Stevenson for the Zuni and Zia; Leslie White for the individual Keresan pueblos; and Elsie C. Parsons for many Pueblo groups (the bibliography in volume 9 of the *Handbook* should be used for specific references).

I recommend a number of works (presented here in order of publication) that either focus specifically on religious practice or devote significant attention to it. H. K. Haeberlin's *The Idea of Fertilization in the Culture of the Pueblo Indians* (Lancaster, Pa., 1916) is an early synthesis that has yet to be superseded. Ruth L. Bunzel's "Introduction to Zuni Ceremonialism," in the *Forty-seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology* (Washington, D.C., 1932), and her other articles in the same volume are excellent windows not only into Zuni religion but into Pueblo religion more generally. The classic, comprehensive (albeit fragmentary) source is Elsie C. Parsons's *Pueblo Indian Religion*, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1939). Mischa Titiev's *Old Oraibi: A Study of the Hopi Indians of the Third Mesa* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944) is perhaps the best single account of the Hopi, although the second volume of R. Maitland Bradfield's *A Natural History of Associations: A Study in the Meaning of Community*, 2 vols. (London, 1973), brings together an enormous amount of earlier material on Hopi religion for a novel synthesis. Alfonso Ortiz's *The Tewa World* (Chicago, 1969) is the most sophisticated and best-written account of any of the Pueblos, and it stands as the single most essential monograph on one Pueblo people. Edward P. Dozier's *The Pueblo Indians of North America* (New York, 1970) is a complete, concise summary concerning all the Pueblos. *New Perspectives on the Pueblos*, edited by Alfonso Ortiz (Albuquerque, 1972), contains several articles on religious practices and beliefs. Although somewhat difficult of access for readers of English, two exceptionally good interpretations of Pueblo ritual and myth have appeared in French: Jean Cazeneuve's *Les dieux dansent à Cibola* (Paris, 1957) and Lucien Sebag's *L'invention du monde chez les Indiens pueblos* (Paris, 1971).

Beyond the Pueblos, and excluding the Navajo and the Apache, little of comparable depth exists. Ruth M. Underhill's *Papago Indian Religion* (New York, 1946) and *Singing for Power* (Berkeley, 1938) are notable exceptions, and her *Ceremonial Patterns in the Greater Southwest* (New York, 1948) is another historic synthesis. For sources on other Southwestern cultures, volume 10 of the *Handbook* is the best guide. Edward H. Spicer's *Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960* (Tucson, 1962), cited above, is a thorough historical study of all indigenous Southwestern peoples.

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NORTH AMERICAN RELIGIONS. [*This entry consists of four articles:*

An Overview
Mythic Themes
Modern Movements
History of Study

The first article presents a broad overview of the major features of native North American religions and a region-by-region survey of the variety of distinct traditions to be found on the continent. The article on mythic themes explores common strains among the diverse storytelling traditions of North American peoples. The third article discusses the nativistic and pan-Indian movements that have forged Native American religious consciousness since the end of the nineteenth century. The final article treats the scholarly study of Native American religious traditions from the time of contact with Europeans to the present.]

An Overview

Because of the isolation of the New World from the high civilizations of Europe, Asia, and Africa and from the communicative network between them, North America had preserved, until the end of the last century, cultures and religions of archaic types. Local historical traditions, intertribal diffusion, social structure and environmental pressure combined to form among the North American Indian tribes a series of religions that were only secondarily influenced by elements from outside the continent. North American religions have become known as varied, colorful, and spiritual. In the religio-scientific debate among anthropologists and historians of religion, such concepts as power and supreme being, guardian spirits and totems, fasting visions and shamanism, myth telling and ritualism, have drawn on North American ideas and religious experiences.

Soon after the arrival of the white man in the 1500s the first information concerning Indian religious worship reached the Europeans. Through Jesuit documents and other reports the religious development of the Iroquoian and eastern Algonquian groups can be followed continuously from 1613 onward. Spanish sources from the same time illuminate at least some aspects of Southwest Indian religious history. In the eighteenth century travel records and other documents throw light on the Indians of the Southeast Woodlands, of the mid-Atlantic region, and of the Prairies and on their religions. It was, however, only at the end of the eighteenth century and in the course of the nineteenth century that knowledge spread of the Plains, Basin, California, Plateau, Northwest Coast, western Canadian, and Alaskan Indian religions.

Main Religious Features

North America is a continent with many diverse cultures, and it is therefore meaningless to speak about North American religion as a unified aggregate of beliefs, myths, and rituals. Still, there are several religious traits that are basically common to all the Indians but variously formalized and interpreted among different peoples. These traits are also found in the religions of other continents and areas, particularly among the so-called primitive or primal peoples. Two characteristics are, however, typically Amerindian: the dependence on visions and dreams, which can modify old traditional rituals, and an intricate and time-consuming ceremonialism that sometimes almost conceals the cognitive message of rituals.

Spirit World. To these common elements belongs the idea of another dimension of existence that permeates life and yet is different from normal, everyday existence. Concepts such as the Lakota *wakan* and the Algonquian *manitou* refer to this consciousness of another world, the world of spirits, gods, and wonders. This supernatural or supranormal world is sometimes manifest in nature, which then receives a sacred import. Often the campsite or the village is arranged in a pattern that establishes a ritual identity with the supernatural world. In twentieth-century pan-Indian religion the connection between terrestrial phenomena and the other world is extremely important.

Supreme being. The supernatural world is primarily expressed through the spiritual powers residing in a host of gods, spirits, and ghosts. In many American tribes prayers are directed to a collectivity of divine or spiritual beings, as in the pipe ceremony. Foremost among these divinities is, in most tribes, a sky god who represents all other supernatural beings or stands as their superior and the ruler of the universe. The Pawnee Indians in Nebraska, for instance, know a hierarchy of star gods and spirits, all of them subservient to the high god in the sky, Tirawa. It could be argued that their idea of a high god is formed after Mexican conceptual patterns, since the Caddoan-speaking peoples to whom the Pawnee belong were much inspired by the Mexican-derived prehistoric Mississippian culture. However, there are clear examples of a supreme being among many North American peoples, and scholarly attempts to trace these figures to Christian influence have so far failed. In most cases the supreme being is vaguely conceived as the ulterior religious force in situations of need and frustration.

The supreme being is closely associated with the *axis mundi*, or world pillar. The Delaware Indians say that he grasps the pole that holds up the sky and is the cen-



ter of the world. In ceremonial life the world pole, or world tree, is the central cultic symbol in the great annual rites of peoples of the Eastern Woodlands, the Plains, the Basin, and the Plateau. At this annual celebration the Indians thank the supreme being for the year that has been (the ceremony takes place in the spring in most cases) and dance in order to secure the support of the Great Spirit and all the powers for the year to come: the Plains Sun Dance is a good example. In California, a region of frequent earthquakes, similar world renewal rituals have as their main aim the stabilizing of the universe. In the east, the Delaware Big

House ceremony is an adaptation of the hunters' annual ceremony to the cultural world of more settled maize-growing peoples: the sacred pillar is here built into a ceremonial house. In many places throughout North America myths testify that the annual ceremony is a repetition or commemoration of the cosmic creation at the beginning of time. This connection is, however, not present everywhere, and many Sun Dance rituals have origin myths of quite a different character.

The culture hero. The connection of the supreme being with creation is often concealed by the fact that in mythology another supernatural being, the culture hero, is invested with creative powers. His true mission is to deliver cultural institutions, including religious ceremonies, to the first human beings, but he is sometimes an assistant creator as well. In this quality he competes with the Great Spirit and appears as a ludicrous figure, a trickster, or an antagonist of the Great Spirit, an emergent "devil." (It should be observed that all this takes place only on a mythological level, for the culture hero disappears after his work has been completed and in many quarters becomes a star.)

Trickster tales occupy a major part of American Indian mythologies and have attracted all kinds of comic folk-tale motifs. The tales usually portray the culture hero/trickster as a zoomorphic being: a white hare in the Northeast; a coyote on the western Plains, in the Basin, the Plateau, and California; and a raven in the Northwest.

Spirits and ghosts. The other beings of the supernatural world—and they are innumerable, varying from tribe to tribe—may be partly distinguished according to their physical location:

1. *Sky beings,* including star gods, Sun (usually a manifestation of the supreme being), and Moon (who sometimes represents the vegetation goddess). The Milky Way is thought of as the road of the dead in some places, and the northern lights as the dead at play.
2. *Atmospheric spirits,* which usually comprise the Four Winds (they emanate from caves situated in the four cardinal directions), Whirlwind (often thought of as a ghost), the rain spirits, and Thunderbird. This last spirit, of which a parallel conception is also found in Siberia, is a giant eaglelike bird; according to many informants his blinking eyes make the lightning, while his flapping wings cause the thunder.
3. *Spirits of the biosphere,* many of them rulers, or owners, of animal species or plant species (Buffalo Spirit, Caribou Spirit, Maize Spirit), others connected with natural places like mountains, stones, deserts, swamps, waters, and so on. Human beings (medicine men, for example) may also manifest supernatural powers.
4. *Powers of the underworld,* such as Mother Earth, underwater monsters (snakes or panthers), and the ruler of the underground dead, who is usually identical with the first ancestor or is a brother of the culture hero.

However, there are powers that do not fit into this scheme. Such powers are the dead, who operate in different places in different types of cultures. Hunters believe the dead are in the sky or somewhere beyond the horizon—beyond the western mountains, beyond the sea where the sun sets. Horticulturists may believe that the dead are in the ground, returning to Our Mother's bosom, or at the place of emergence of mankind; and in stratified agricultural societies like those of the Mississippian culture there are different abodes for different social categories of dead. At the same time there is everywhere a belief in ghosts on earth, who are often heard whistling in the night. Independent of these beliefs is a ubiquitous idea of reincarnation or transmigration into animals.

Guardian spirits and vision quests. Other spirits are the guardian spirits acquired in fasting visions by youths of the Plateau and the Northeast Woodlands and by both boys and men of the Plains and the Basin. These spirits are mostly zoomorphic. They may be animal spirits or spirits that show themselves in animal disguise. Everywhere except among the pueblo-dwelling peoples of the Southwest it has been the individual hunter's ambition to acquire one or several of these guardian spirits. They usually appear to the person after a vision quest during which he has spent several days and nights in fasting and isolation at some lonely spot in the wilderness. The spirit endows his client with a particular "medicine," that is, supernatural power (to hunt, to run, to make love, to cure), gives him a sacred song, and instructs him to make a pouch or medicine bag in which he is to keep the sacred paraphernalia associated with his vision. The vision quest is basic to most American Indian hunting religions.

In some places special societies were established for young spirit seekers who expected to meet the same spirit. This was, for instance, the case among the Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island and vicinity. The vision itself was no longer central here, the neophyte being abducted by masked men to the woods and told there the secrets of his patron, Cannibal Spirit, whose frenzied behavior he imitates in a ceremony on his return.

There seems to be a direct relationship between the individual's guardian spirit and the complex of totemism. If totemism is defined as the mysterious relation-

ship between a segment of a tribe, usually a clan or other unilineal kinship group, and a particular animal species that is its congener and patron, then totemism exists in many places where unilineal societies exist. Several American cases suggest that the totem is the original guardian spirit of an individual that has then been inherited by this person's descendants as their common supernatural partner.

In some more complex societies the medicine bags, or sacred bundles, have become inherited treasures within the vision seekers' families; in other societies they can even be purchased. Where a powerful object has been handed down in a family it is often made a symbol for a larger community, and its uncovering is surrounded by rituals and recitations of its origin myth. A typical example is the sacred bundle of the Arapaho, which contains a flatpipe.

Medicine men and medicine societies. The medicine man is a visionary who has succeeded in receiving power to cure people. However, visionaries with other extraordinary powers, such as the capacity to find lost things or divine the future, have also been labeled "medicine men." In very many cases a bear spirit is the medicine man's patron, so he dresses in a bearskin and mimics a bear's movements and sounds when doctoring people. Diseases may be ascribed to any of several causes, such as witchcraft or the breaking of a taboo. They manifest themselves mainly in two ways: a spirit or disease object is supposed to have intruded into the body (or even, on the Northwest Coast, to possess the person in a psychological sense); or the sick man's soul—in some cases, his power—has been stolen. In the former case it is the medicine man's task to frighten the spirit away or to remove it from the body by sucking, fanning, or drawing it out; in the latter case he has to catch the lost soul, which can be done in an imitative séance. Alternatively, the medicine man may sink into a trance, release his own soul, and send it out after the runaway or stolen soul. The medicine man who becomes entranced in this way may be characterized as a shaman.

In cultures with more complicated social organizations, medicine men may join together, exchanging experiences and working out a common, secret ideology, or they may form medicine societies into which persons are accepted after passing through a series of ritual events. An example of this is the Midewiwin, or Great Medicine society, of the Ojibwa, which is organized like a secret order society and has four or eight hierarchical grades.

In some cultures in the Southwest where collectivism is part of the cultural pattern—as, for instance, among the agricultural Pueblo—the medicine man is replaced by an organization of professional healers, and rituals are performed to aid individuals. Among the Navajo, the old medicine man lives on as a diagnostician ("hand trembler") whereas the curing itself is performed by a ritually skilled singer. The regaining of the patient's health means that harmony has been restored between man and the world of the gods and spirits.

Ritual Acts. Harmony or spiritual balance is what North American Indians want to achieve in their relations with the supernatural powers. A harmonious balance can be reached through prayers and offerings or through imitative representation of supernatural events.

Prayers and offerings. Prayers range from a few words at meal offerings to detailed ritual prayers, from casual petitions of blessing to deeply emotional cries for help and sustenance. Indeed, Navajo prayer has been characterized by one researcher as "compulsive words," by another as "creative words." There is often beauty in Indian prayers, the usual eloquence of the Indians giving moving expression to their religious experience.

There are many kinds of offerings. A simple form is throwing tobacco or food into the fire or onto the ground at mealtimes. Another example is the placing of tobacco pouches on the ground at the beginning of dangerous passages, such as crossing a lake or walking over a mountain ridge.

Tobacco has been intimately related to American Indian religious practice. Even today no Indian conventions or powwows are undertaken without a preliminary pipe ceremony, an invocation of the powers that grant harmony between men and between gods or spirits and men. [*See* Tobacco.]

When hunters killed game they usually performed rites over the body. For instance, after the animal was eaten, the bones might be given a ritual burial; they were reassembled in anatomical order, and the skull of the animal was elevated on a pole or a tree. These rituals were especially important in the case of the bear. This so-called animal ceremonialism was often intended to appease a particular spirit, the master of the game, but the primary purpose of such burials was to ensure the return of the game by showing proper respect for the animals. True sacrifices were not common, but did occur in the Northeast Woodlands, where white dogs were sacrificed to the powers. In many places the skins of animals (and, later, pieces of cloth as well) served as offerings. There was religious cannibalism in the East, even endocannibalism (the eating of one's family dead) in ancient times. Mutilations of fingers and other cases of self-mutilation as offerings occurred in the Sun Dance of the Lakota and in the closely related Mandan Okipa ceremony.

Ritual representations. Harmonious relations with the supernatural world could be restored by the dramatic imitation of the creation, often in an annual rite, as, for instance, the Sun Dance. The performance of such rituals often had the character of dancing, and most observers have therefore described American Indian ceremonies as dances. In the enactment of mythical drama, performers assumed the roles of supernatural beings, as in the representation of the *kachina*, cloud and rain spirits, and spirits of the dead in the Pueblo Indian Kachina Dances. In the Pawnee sacrifice to Morning Star, a young captive girl was tied to a frame and shot with arrows; she was supposed to represent Evening Star, a personification of the vegetation whose death promotes the growth of plants. Even today a Navajo patient is cured through a process of ritual identification with the universe and its powers: the patient sits in the middle of a sand painting symbolizing the cosmos and its powers while the practitioner pours colored sand over him.

Historical Survey

Most North American religions express the worldview typical of hunters and gatherers. This is natural, since the first immigrants who arrived perhaps forty to sixty thousands years ago were Paleolithic hunters who came by way of the Bering Strait. At that time the sound between Asia and North America was dry, due to the absorption of oceanic waters into the glaciers of the Great Ice Age. A narrow corridor stretched between the ice fields, allowing the migration of North Asiatic proto-Mongoloid groups into Alaska. The migration probably involved small groups who traveled independently, perhaps at a rate of four miles a year. Since ecological conditions were similar on both sides of the Bering Sea, the migration did not entail any break in historical and cultural traditions.

The Arctic Substratum. This origin in northern Asia explains why so much of American Indian religion bears an Arctic or sub-Arctic stamp, and why so many features even in more temperate areas seem to be derived from northern cultures. Of course, particularly in the extreme north, we find native religions that are direct counterparts to the circumpolar religions of northern Eurasia. Both ecological and historical factors account for this uniformity. We may pinpoint such common religious elements as belief in a high god, Thunderbird, and Mother Earth; practices such as the bear ritual, hunting taboos, the sweat bath for ritual cleaning, and shamanic rituals; and a good many myths and tales. All these circumpolar traits represent Arctic or sub-Arctic forms of the ancient Paleolithic hunting culture in Eurasia.

There are some problems in establishing American connections with the Old World circumpolar culture, however. The weaker cultural links in eastern Siberia may be correlated with the influx into this area of Tunguz and Turkic tribes from the south during the last millennia. Perhaps under the influence of Lamaism and other forms of Buddhism, there evolved in Siberia an intense form of shamanism, with emphasis on deep ecstasy and possession by spirits. This specialized form of shamanism, so typical of parts of Siberia, finally spread to North America, where it influenced the Northwest Coast Indians and the Inuit (Eskimo). Other shamanic rituals in North America, such as the so-called Shaking Tent (the tent is shaking when spirits enter at the request of the shaman, who is fettered in the dark), found among Inuit groups, and Algonquian- and Salish-speaking tribes of the Plateau, also have their close counterparts in Siberia. But these other rituals derive from a more general form of shamanism that is also present in South America and Southeast Asia and is certainly a heritage from very ancient times.

The languages of the North American Indians are enormously diverse, and with the exception of the relatively lately arrived Athapascan groups none seem related to known Old World languages. The common factor joining them all is their polysynthetic structure, whereby many sentence elements are included in a single word by compounding and adding prefixes and suffixes. Paul Radin suggested many years ago that there may be a genetic relationship between most of these languages, except those of the Aleut and Inuit, who differ from the mainstream of American aborigines in race, culture, and religion.

Development of Hunting Religions. The early hunters brought with them a legacy of ideas and rituals developed in the Old World. These were adapted to the changing habitats in the New World. We can follow the major trends in cultural differentiation after about 10,000 BCE, and we can draw some conclusions also about probable religious orientations.

Thus, the Paleo-Indians of eastern North America were big-game hunters, concentrating on animals like the mammoth, the giant bison, the three-toed horse, and the camel. In all likelihood the inherited concepts of animal ceremonialism and the master of the animals were applied to these animals. The big game died out, because of climatic changes or human overkilling, during the period from 8000 to 4000 BCE. Only one big animal—the bear—survived and continued to be the focus of special rites. The ritual around the slaying of the bear, distributed from the Saami (Lapps) of Scandinavia to the Ainu of northern Japan, and, in North America, from the Inuit and Athapascans in the north and

west to the Delaware in the east and the Pueblo Indians in the south, seem to be a leftover from these Paleolithic and Mesolithic days.

It is difficult to say whether Asian ideas still streamed into North America at this time, but it seems probable. We know that many myths disseminated from Asia are mostly found south of the sub-Arctic area in North America. To this category belongs the myth of the earth diver, a primeval divine hero who fetches mud from the bottom of the sea, thereby creating the ground on which men live. [*See* Cosmogony.] It is important because it includes not only the flood myth, or the myth of the primeval sea, but also the idea of twin creators, one good and one less good or even bad, or one the main creator and the other his assistant (the culture hero). Another important myth that scholars have traced to Asia is the Orpheus myth, but proofs of its dissemination are inconclusive. Several mythic motifs have, however, definitely spread from the Old World, such as the magical flight and the Symplegades (clashing rocks), or the motif of the celestial vault that moves up and down.

The old hunting culture slowly disintegrated into a series of more specialized regional cultures about 7000–5000 BCE, and there are reasons to presume that the religious structures changed accordingly. In fact, it seems that the native hunting, fishing, and gathering cultures and religions that persisted into the historical period began to take form at this time, the changes stimulated to a major extent by ecological and climatic shifts.

An exceptional development took place in the south. In the increasingly arid regions of the Great Basin, the Southwest, and parts of California a so-called desert tradition was established, with heavy dependence on wild plants, seeds, and nuts. The corresponding religious system survived in late Great Basin religions, and part of it was also preserved in many Californian Indian religions. In the Southwest, the Basket Making culture, while an example of the desert tradition, also served as a link to horticultural development.

There is some evidence that psychotropic or hallucinogenic drugs were used primarily in plant-collecting areas. Within the region covered by the desert tradition jimsonweed, peyote (in northern Mexico), pulque, and, of course, tobacco were all employed.

Growth of Agricultural Religions. It seems fairly certain that the cultivation of tobacco spread from Mexico into North America with maize, for maize and tobacco cultivation share the same general distribution within the eastern regions of North America. In the Southwest, however, while maize was cultivated, tobacco was gathered wild.

The introduction of maize, or Indian corn, had basic consequences for aboriginal religions, for it changed the whole outlook on life, the religious pattern, and the character of supernatural powers. There were many incentives for this change: the concentration of the population in more or less settled villages; the preoccupation with sowing, planting, and harvesting; the enhanced position of women (from that of seed collectors to that of seed producers); and the new forms of social organization (matrilineage, or, among the Iroquois, even some sort of matriarchy). Typical of these agricultural religions were concern for crops and fertility, the rise of priestly organizations, the creation of temples and shrines, and the appearance of deities, often of the female sex (or even androgynes), who impersonate the plants or lend fertility. Rituals, in turn, grew more complex, incorporating greater numbers of discrete actions, and sacrifices of a bloody kind (including human sacrifice) became more widespread. Nowhere, however, did agriculture entirely supplant hunting, particularly not in the east, where the rituals for encouraging the growth of maize, beans, and squash are basically the same as the rituals for slain animals. Of course, the death-and-revival pattern is fundamental to both animal and vegetational ceremonialism.

Appearance of maize religion in the Southwest. The introduction of maize into North America occurred in two places, the Southwest and the Southeast. From all appearances it was known earlier in the Southwest, where it is recorded from 3000 to 2000 BCE in the wooded highland valleys of New Mexico. Village agriculture was firmly established about the time of the birth of Christ, and was effective after 500 CE.

Some of the religious innovations surrounding the maize complex and accompanying it on its diffusion from Mexico have been revealed through archaeology. The best illustrations are provided by the so-called Hohokam culture in southern Arizona. It was deeply influenced by Mesoamerica from about 500 to 1200 CE, when it suddenly declined, probably as a consequence of the fall of its model, the Toltec empire in Mexico. The most important evidence of the cultural influence from the south is the architectural planning of the towns: irrigation canals, oval ball courts for ritual games, and platform mounds of earth or adobe serving as substructures for temples with hearths and altars.

The Mexican influence on religion can also be seen in the neighboring Anasazi or Pueblo cultures down to our own time. Mesoamerican symbols appear in the bird designs that decorate Hopi pottery. Some of the religious fraternities that meet in the semisubterranean ceremonial chambers probably have Mexican prototypes, for instance, the *kachina* societies that are reminiscent of the cult organizations that surrounded the Mexican rain god Tlaloc.

Appearance of maize religion in the Southeast. The maize complex entered the Southeast slightly later than the Southwest, perhaps sometime after 1000 BCE; there is, however, no certain proof of agriculture there until the birth of Christ. It seems that influences from Mesoamerica were responsible for the so-called Burial Mound cultures, 1000 BCE to 700 CE, with their earthworks, including mortuary mounds, and for their ceramic figurines. At least the latest of these cultures, the Hopewell, was acquainted with maize ceremonialism.

A major change took place with the introduction of the so-called Mississippian tradition about 700 CE. Large rectangular and flat-topped mounds of unprecedented size were arranged around rectangular plazas. The mounds served as foundations of temples, whence the name Temple Mound, also used to designate these cultures. Intensive agriculture belonged to this new tradition, which flourished in the lower and middle Mississippi Valley but was particularly anchored in the Southeast. Its last representatives were the historical Natchez Indians of the lower Mississippi, known for their hierarchical class system with a sacred king, called the Great Sun, at its apex, for their sacred center, including temple and burial mounds, and for an elaborate ceremonial complex.

The agricultural religions rarely reached such an advanced stage of development in eastern North America, but they spread from the Southeastern hearth in different directions. Mississippian traits mingled with older Woodland traits in the Iroquois culture in the north and, after 1000 CE, with Plains hunting religions in the river valleys to the west.

A Regional Survey

The religions of the indigenous peoples in North America have developed on the foundations that have just been described. However, factors other than historical have contributed to the differentiation in religious profiles that occurs in every region, and especially in the Pacific Northwest, the Southwest, and the Plains. Such factors include local geographic conditions and the ecological adaptations of individual cultures. Religious differentiation is closely related to cultural diversity, for geographical and ecological factors act first of all on a group's cultural and social structure, and then through these structures on religion.

Roughly speaking, North America can be divided geographically into two main parts, the mountainous regions in the west, or the Rocky Mountains system, and the large plain and woodland country to the east. We find a relatively greater number of tribes and tribelets, often in great isolation from each other, in the mountainous West. The cultural variation there is therefore considerable. The vast eastern country, on the other hand, is populated by widely dispersed, large tribes in close contact with each other. Culturally, it can be seen as one large, relatively uniform area, in which the regional variants are relatively undifferentiated.

As Clark Wissler and others have noted, the geographic regions and the cultural areas correspond closely to each other. Since geographical and ecological factors have influenced religious forms, each region reveals unique features.

Arctic. The barren country around the Arctic coasts is sparsely inhabited by the Inuit and, on the Aleutian Islands, their kinsmen the Aleut. Inuit religion carries all marks of a hunting religion, concentrating on beliefs and rituals related to animals and on shamanism. The hunting rituals are rather intricate, in particular in Alaska where they focus on the whale (whale feasts are also found among the Nootka of the Northwest Coast and the Chukchi and Koriak of Siberia). A great role is played by the mistress of the sea animals, called Sedna among the Central Inuit. She figures in shamanic rites: when taboos have been transgressed her hair gets filthy, and in rage she holds back the animals; it is the shaman's task in a séance to descend to her home at the bottom of the sea and clean her hair so that she will free the animals again. [*See* Inuit Religion *and* Sedna.]

Sub-Arctic. A vast region of the coniferous forests, lakes, and swamps in interior Alaska and Canada, the sub-Arctic is sparsely inhabited by Athapascan-speaking Indians in its western half and Algonquian-speaking Indians in its eastern half. The Athapascans are latecomers from Siberia, arriving perhaps around 9000 BCE; their linguistic affiliations are with the Sino-Tibetan tongues. The Algonquian tribes conserve religious traits that associate them closely with the circumpolar culture.

The region is inhabited by hunting cultures, with inland game, in particular the caribou and the moose, as food resources. People are organized in loose bands or, since the introduction by Europeans of the hunting of fur-bearing animals, in family groups who have hunting grounds reserved for their exclusive use.

Religion is dominated by hunting ceremonialism and, to a certain extent, by shamanism. Bear ceremonialism is widespread, and hunting taboos are very common. Sweat baths grant their practitioners ritual purity before hunting or important ceremonies. The vision and guardian-spirit quest is fairly common. Shamanism is characterized by shaking tent ceremonies, usually performed for divination, and by scapulimancy (foretelling the future by inspecting the shoulder blades of animals). Athapascan and Algonquian groups show separate development: the former hold girls' puberty rites

and fear their dead; the latter are known for a strong high-god belief, a consistent system of masters of the animals (in which each species has its own master), and an intense dread of cannibal monsters, which are called *windigo*.

Northeast Woodlands. Formerly covered by mixed coniferous and deciduous trees, the Northeast Woodlands held a large population of Algonquian-, Iroquoian-, and Siouan-speaking tribes. In historical and protohistorical times both agriculture and hunting were practiced, particularly by the Iroquoian groups; the Algonquian tribes were hunters with only limited horticulture. The social systems of these groups were often complicated, with unilineal kinship groups, clan organization, and chieftaincy.

The double economic heritage is to some extent mirrored in the religious pattern. The hunters concentrate on hunting rituals and vision quests, the planters on rituals and beliefs surrounding the crops. The Iroquois, for instance, have a series of calendar rites celebrating the planting, ripening, and harvesting of the "three sisters": maize, squash, and beans. The Midwinter ceremony, formerly a new year ceremony with the kindling of new fire and the sacrifice of a white dog, is the main ritual event. As in many other rituals of agricultural peoples, great attention is paid to the dead, in whose honor feasts are arranged.

Southeast Woodlands. In the southern deciduous forests, with their savannas and swamps, the tribes of Muskogean stock, interspersed with Siouan groups and the Iroquoian-speaking Cherokee, kept up a peripheral high culture, the last vestiges of the prehistoric Mississippian culture. The Southeastern Indians were, at least at the beginning of the historical era, predominantly engaged in agriculture, and their sociopolitical organization was adjusted to this fact. Thus, the Creek had a maternal clan system, with clans subordinated to both phratries and moieties. The latter had ceremonial functions, often carried out in ball games.

Characteristic of Creek religion is the emphasis laid on ceremonialism and priestly functions. The priests, who were instructed in secrecy in the woods, along lines reminiscent of the vision quest, were divided into several classes: one was in charge of the sacred cult objects, another divined hidden things (such as the causes of diseases), and still another cured people from diseases. Even today, a major part of the curing ceremonies is the recitation of sacred formulas.

The main religious ceremony is the maize harvest ceremony, called the Busk. It is also a New Year ritual, in which old fires are extinguished and a new fire is kindled and people ritually cleanse themselves through washing and the drinking of an emetic.

Prairies and Plains. The tall-grass area (with some parkland and river-bottom woodland) between the woodlands in the east and the high Plains in the west is known as the Prairies. The Plains are the short-grass steppe country, too dry for agriculture, that stretches toward the mountains and semideserts in the far West. (In Canada, the Great Plains are sometimes referred to as the Prairies.)

The historical cultures were formed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the acquisition of horses made the wide-open spaces easily accessible to surrounding tribes and white expansion forced woodland Indians to leave their home country for the dry, treeless areas. Algonquian and Siouan tribes immigrated from the east and northeast, Caddoan tribes from the south. Several groups ceased practicing horticulture (the Crow and Cheyenne) and turned into buffalo hunters, but they kept parts of their old social and political organization. In the west, Shoshonean groups held the ground they had traditionally occupied, and groups of Athapascans—for example, the Apache—forced their way to the southern parts of the region.

Whereas the Prairies could be regarded as a periphery of the Eastern Woodlands, the Plains region offers a late cultural and religious complex of its own. The religion is a mixture of derived agricultural ceremonialism and hunters' belief systems. The major New Year ceremony is the Sun Dance, during which asceticism, dancing, praying, and curing take place. Other forms of ritualism center around tribal and clan bundles, and the sacred ritual known as the Calumet Dance, or Pipe Dance. There is much cosmological speculation and an advanced concept of the godhead. The vision and guardian spirit complex is well developed. The Plains religious pattern has become among modern Indians the model for a pan-Indian religion, transcending old tribal and cultural boundaries.

Northwest Coast. The broken coastline, high mountains, and deep fjords of the Northwest Coast were the home of the Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian, and Wakashan tribes and some Coast Salish and Chinookan groups in the south. With their totem poles, their plank houses and canoes, and their headgear reminiscent of East Asian conic hats, these Indians make an un-American impression, an impression that is strengthened by their social organization with its give-away feasts (potlatches) intended to "shame" invited guests and thus increase the host's prestige. There have apparently been contacts with both northern and eastern Asian cultures, although the nature of this exchange is little understood. The basic substratum seems to be a fishing culture that developed on both sides of the North Pacific and gave rise to both Inuit and Northwest Coast cul-

tures. The abundant animal and fish life along the coast, together with the rich herbal and animal life of the dense woods, provided a living standard that sometimes excelled that of the agriculturists. It is perhaps not surprising that rank differentiation, based partly on wealth, and slavery appeared here.

The religion is characterized partly by its association with the activities of hunters and fishermen, partly by its secret societies adapted to the complicated social structure. The animal ceremonialism is focused on the sea fauna, and there are many sea spirits in animal forms. The dead have their realm, or one of their realms, at the bottom of the sea. The secret societies recruited individuals who had an inherited right to make contact with a certain kind of guardian spirit. Famous societies are the Wolf society of the Nootka and the Cannibal society of the Kwakiutl. Possession by spirits also occurred in shamanism, which here reached a high point of development in America.

Plateau. The Intermountain area, which includes both the Columbia and the Fraser river drainages, is known as the Plateau; it was inhabited by Salish and Shahaptin tribes that lived on fish and, secondarily, on land animals and roots. The area is partly wooded, partly a bunchgrass steppe. The culture area is an offshoot of the sub-Arctic hunting culture, tempered by influences from the Northwest Coast and the Plains. The sociopolitical group consisted of the village, under the formal control of a hereditary chief.

In their religion the Plateau Indians stressed the visionary complex and food ceremonies. The vision quests were undertaken at puberty by both sexes. The relation between the guardian spirit and his client was displayed in the Winter Dance, or Spirit Dance, a ceremony, under the supervision of a medicine man, in which the spirit was impersonated. Important celebrations were firstling rites, first-fruits rites, and the First-Salmon rite. In this last rite, which was guided by a so-called salmon chief (who had the salmon as one of his guardian spirits), the first salmon was greeted and its "leader" hailed with special ceremonies.

Great Basin. A dry region of sands and semideserts, the Great Basin was inhabited by Shoshonean (Numic) groups, some of them, like the Gosiute, the most impoverished of North American groups. Seeds, nuts, and rodents provided the principal food. The social organization was often atomistic. The cultural profile represented a remnant of the old desert tradition.

The religious pattern was closely adapted to a lifestyle based on the bare necessities. Hunters had to be blessed by spirits in visions in order to be successful, but there was little elaboration of guardian-spirit beliefs. Medicine men had specialized powers; for instance, the antelope medicine man attracted the antelopes by singing. Harvest ceremonies were round dances at which thanks were given to the supreme being.

California. Whereas the northern, eastern, and southern parts of California were peripheral to the Northwest Coast, Great Basin, and Southwest cultural areas, respectively, the central valleys and coastland constituted a separate cultural area, known as the California region, densely populated by Penutian, Hokan, and Numic groups. These natives, living in a mild climate, dedicated themselves to collecting, hunting, and fishing. Their staple food consisted of wild plants and their fruits, in particular acorns, all of which were found in abundance. The political unit was usually the village (under the leadership of a headman), but was sometimes a lineage.

In this diversified culture area religious expressions were most varied. North-central California is known for its lofty concept of a supreme being and for its initiation of youths into religious societies, such as the Kuksu, Ghost, and Hesi societies. Guardian spirit quests were rare, and medicine men received unsought visions. In the southern part of the area, initiation ceremonies were accompanied by the drinking of drugs prepared from jimsonweed and by various symbolic acts referring to death and rebirth. In some places there were great commemorative ceremonies for the dead.

The Southwest. A magnificent desert country with some oases, particularly along the Rio Grande, the Southwest was populated by hunting and farming groups of Piman and Yuman descent, by former hunters like the Athapascan Apache and Navajo—who did not arrive here until about 1500 CE—and by the Pueblo peoples, intensive agriculturists mostly belonging to the Tanoan and Keresan linguistic families. I shall here concentrate on the Pueblo groups, the descendants of the prehistoric Anasazi culture. Their culture is famous for its big community houses on the mesas, its intensive horticulture (with irrigation in the Rio Grande region), and its complex and beautiful ceremonialism. Each Pueblo town is an independent unit governed by the heads of the religious societies.

Religion penetrates all aspects of Pueblo life. A rich set of ceremonies that mark the divisions of the year are conducted by different religious societies. Their overall aim is to create harmony with the powers of rain and fertility, symbolized by the ancestors, the rain and cloud spirits, and the Sun. Each society has its priesthood, its attendants, its sacred bundles, and its ceremonial cycle. There are also medicine societies for the curing of diseases—the inspired, visionary medicine man has no place in this collectivistic, priestly culture.

No other American Indian societies lay so much stress on ceremonialism as do the Pueblo. Their supernatural beings are almost unthinkable without the rituals through which they are manifested.

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ÅKE HULTKRANTZ

Mythic Themes

Enormous quantities of stories have been collected from the peoples native to North America, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Still, the record is faulty in that the stories collected have rarely been adequately set in their cultural and historical contexts. Often, while the text of a story exists, little is known of the storyteller, the situation in which the story is told, and sometimes even the culture it comes from. A full description of a storytelling event, including the elements of performance style, motivating circumstances, and the audience composition and responses, is almost nonexistent. Furthermore, there has been remarkably little interest in the interpretive study of this literature.

Myth, Tale, and Legend. No standard exists for the use of the term *myth* to distinguish a segment or type of Native American oral tradition. Anthropologists and folklorists have not often discriminated between myth and the related term *tale*, using both simply to refer to narratives or stories. When a distinction is made several criteria are commonly used. Myths are sacred while tales are not. Myths are true while tales are not. The characters of myths are deities and primordial figures; humans and animals are the usual characters of tales. Myths deal with creation at the dawn of time or with cosmic transformations occurring in a prehuman era. Tales tell of fantastical and nonsensical events. Sometimes a subclass of tale or a wholly separate class of narrative is distinguished as *legend;* legend is closer to history and to human affairs. This threefold classification dates from distinctions made by Jakob Grimm in the early nineteenth century.

This manner of classifying Native American oral tra-

ditions focuses on story content considered in terms of external criteria. Other classificatory criteria include the context and function of a story since these may vary for the same story over time and from culture to culture. As early as 1915, Franz Boas insisted that native classifications be considered; however, a full-scale study of native classifications of oral traditions has never been done.

From the point of view of the academic study of religion, *myth* has come to be widely used to designate narratives that have major religious importance. It is also commonly, and more narrowly, used to refer to creation and cosmic transformation narratives. Such events are set in the primordium, a setting signaling that the narrative and the events of which it tells are fundamental.

In contrast, from the modern Native American point of view, the word *myth* has the meaning the word bears in common usage: it refers to a misconception or a story without base. To many Native Americans, *myth* is a pejorative term that indicates insensitivity and misunderstanding on the part of those who apply it to their stories. Concern for native sensitivity is all but entirely missing from studies and presentations of Native American oral traditions that use the terms *myth* and *mythology*.

Story Types in North America. A great many of the stories in North America have to do with creation or with origins resulting from cosmic transformations; these stories often correlate with story types found throughout the world. Most tribes in North America have stories that tell of the beginning of the world that is presently lived in (not one of long ago); the origin of human beings; the origin of plants and animals; the origin of the sun, moon, and stars; and the origin of aspects of the human condition such as death, disease, laziness, and sexuality. I shall summarize the types of these stories, with a discussion of their variant forms and geographic distributions.

Earth diver. The distinctive feature of the earth-diver story type, as the term designating it indicates, is the attribution of the origin of the earth to the result of some figure diving to the bottom of primordial waters to get a bit of sand or soil from which to create the earth. The diver is most commonly animal, and usually there are a number of these divers who try in succession to dive for soil. Only the last diver succeeds, and this figure is usually gone a very long time, being dead or nearly dead when he or she surfaces. Beside the divers, there is a creator figure as well, and it is the work of the creator to take the bit of sand or soil and, through kneading, stretching, singing creation songs, or some other means, to expand this nascent earth to its present size. The created earth then floats upon the primordial waters. Sometimes it is not well anchored, and it shakes or wobbles. This condition is resolved by the erection of pillars in the cardinal directions or some other security measure usually associated with directional orientations.

Earth-diver stories commonly conclude with a post-creation inspection; the creator sends someone on a journey to inspect the newly made world and to measure its extent. Typically these figures do not attend only to the business assigned, but tarry to satisfy their own interests or desires. In consequence of this forbidden action, the figure is transformed in a way that explains his or her nature. In one story, for example, Buzzard is sent out but stops to eat. He is punished by being condemned to eat corpses; hence buzzards are carrion eaters.

This type of creation story is found throughout North America and is certainly the most common and widespread story type in the area. In some locations it appears only as an incidental theme, while elsewhere it has developed into long elaborate stories containing amazing detail and hundreds of elements. These stories are set in the beginning of time or following an era concluded by the cataclysmic event of a world destruction by deluge. [*For further discussion of earth-diver myths in North America, see* North American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Far North.]

Emergence. In emergence type creation stories, a world exists at the outset without its creation being described or in any way accounted for. There are also peoples living in a world below the present earth surface when the story begins. This story type is concerned with the ascent of these human beings and their search for or travel to a habitable world: it is more about finding the proper place in the world than the cosmic creation. Two major types of stories are commonly a part of emergence mythology: the story of the emergence journey onto the earth surface and the story of migrations from the emergence place to the current village site or homeland. The distinctive segment is the story of the emergence journey. Numerous elements are commonly found in that story. The plight of those in the depths of the earth is usually one of darkness, deprivation, filth, and ignorance. The pre-emergence peoples must await heroic figures, designated by a deity, to come to them and escort them on their emergence journey. The journey may be arduous, the way not well known. Sometimes there is no way out of the lower world; then, in a manner similar to the earth diver's diving for soil, various persons, or more typically animals, attempt to break through the earth's surface from below. Many may fail before one succeeds. The means of ascent may be a vine, a tree, a reed, or a mountain. It grows magi-

cally and bears the people upwards to the new world. The sequence of emergence sometimes establishes the universal social order: peoples of many tribes or clans, sometimes including European-Americans, emerge in a sequence that is correlated with status, material wealth, or character. Occasionally, the emergence channel is closed before all are able to emerge, often because someone defies a taboo; the result is that some people are left eternally in the lower world.

The story of the emergence is not always accompanied by one of migration, but such a pattern is very common. After emergence, the people discover that the place at which they have arrived is not suitable. The people must then migrate to the site of their present village or land. The migration may be a wandering in search of a suitable location, or it may be a prophetically directed journey to a designated place. There are also migration stories that are independent of emergence stories; either segment may be simple or elaborate, in any combination.

Emergence stories are not as common as earth-diver stories, but they are found widely throughout what is now the United States, with a few incidences recorded in southern Canada. [*See also* North American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Southwest.]

Two creators. Another type of creation story that appears widely in North America, especially throughout the United States, is one that features two creators. The creator figures are usually antagonists and the creation of the world the result of their struggles. The two creators are often related, and they interact in a variety of ways. Often they are brothers, sisters, uncle and nephew, father and son, or simply powerful figures who meet in the act of making a world according to their respective styles and plans. The elements of contest, of the duality of good and evil, and of positive opposed to negative forces are usually present. A well-known example is the Iroquoian story in which brothers, one good and one bad, create the world. The good brother creates in a manner ideal for human beings, while the bad brother follows him and reverses some of the good, introducing elements that hamper human life, such as disease, plant blight, pests, and dangerous animals. In the climactic moment the brothers meet at the world's rim and engage in a final determining contest: the one who can move a mountain the farthest will be the winner. The bad brother tries first. After great effort he moves the mountain a little. As he turns toward the good brother the good brother effortlessly moves the mountain up against the back of the bad brother. Turning back to boast of his accomplishment, the bad brother smashes his nose against the mountain and twists it into a permanently deformed shape. The good brother then spares him his life at the cost of his becoming the model for the False Face society by devoting himself to the curing of illness.

Theft. Stories of the theft of light, fire, water, game, fish, and many other things necessary for human life are found widely, but especially in western North America from the Southwest all the way north through the Northwest Coast area. As with the emergence story, theft stories account not so much for creation as for a primordial transformation. The condition that motivates the action in this type of story is the loss or lack of something—such as light or game—that is necessary for human life. Often, it has been secreted by giants, monsters, or deities residing in an inaccessible place. The story centers upon a heroic figure who, through courage, tenacity, or magic, and sometimes aided by clever disguise, enters the place where the missing life-necessity is being kept. By theft, the hero achieves the release of this necessity and, consequently, life becomes possible. A moral twist is sometimes added when the returning hero is humiliated or shunned; the result is that the ideal conditions that would have existed are lost, resulting in turn in discomfort and inconvenience.

World parent. The world-parent type cosmogony has been occasionally identified, particularly in the North American Southwest. Among the most common examples cited are stories of the Luiseño and Diegueño tribes of southern California. There is some suggestion of a sexual creation in these stories, yet a close consideration of the known examples suggests that they are more like the two-creator type of story. The primordial figures are brother and sister, and their struggles for dominance conclude with the brother sexually assaulting the sister (who later gives birth to some aspects of the world, usually including a small piece of earth). Another commonly cited example of world-parent creation is the Zuni story of creation recorded by Frank H. Cushing in the late nineteenth century. However, none of the many subsequently recorded accounts of Zuni creation involves the sexual creation by a sky father and earth mother that Cushing reported. It must be thus concluded that there is little, if any, evidence that world-parent cosmogony exists in North America.

Plant and animal origins. Throughout North America stories of the origin of plants and animals are very common, obviously correlating with the sustenance patterns of the respective tribes. Among the most widespread and complex of this type are the Corn Woman stories found throughout southern maize-growing portions of North America. A notable feature of many of these stories is the plight of Corn Woman during the events that introduce the plant to human cultivation. Particularly in Southeast Woodlands versions, Corn Woman pro-

duces corn by rubbing "dirt" from her flesh, or by defecating the kernels. People in this primordial era need not work for their food, they receive it as a gift from the Corn Woman. Several finally observe Corn Woman as she goes to gather food and they find out how she produces it. Being repulsed and disgusted by what they see, they accuse her of witchcraft and prepare to kill her. Through her prescience, Corn Woman knows her fate and tells her murderers what they are to do with her body; typically, her bleeding body is to be dragged about cultivated fields. Corn plants grow where her blood touches the soil, but now the people must cultivate the plants in order to receive the life-sustaining food.

Among the Pueblo tribes, Corn Women often appear in groups of four identified by the four colors of corn. The personified corn is identified as mother to the people, and so as identical with life itself. As Yellow Woman, Corn Woman is a character in an extensive range of stories about an adventuresome young woman. Yellow Woman may even suggest elements of a trickster figure.

Animal origin stories are widely known throughout North America. The Inuit (Eskimo) tell stories of Sedna, an unwilling bride who eventually marries a deceptive husband. Later, her father comes to visit her only to find her miserable in her husband's home. Attempting to rescue her, her father kills the husband and father and daughter flee by boat, but their flight is threatened by the husband's people. The father tries to sacrifice Sedna in order to save himself. He throws her from the boat, but she clings to the side by her fingers. Still trying to save himself, the father chops off Sedna's fingers, joint by joint. As these severed joints fall from her hands into the water, they are transformed into the game animals of the sea. Finally, as Sedna herself falls into the sea she descends to the bottom, where she takes up residence as the fearsome mistress of the animals. [*See* Sedna.]

A very different sort of figure is White Buffalo Calf Woman of Oglala Lakota oral tradition. As Buffalo she reveals the ritual cycle to the people, thus sustaining both their physical and spiritual needs. [*See* Lakota Religion.]

In the many areas where both agriculture and hunting are important, the origins of animals and plants are often combined or conjoined in a single story. In the Plains area this is commonly a story of the origin of buffalo and maize. In other areas, the Southeast Woodlands for example, it is a story that tells of a primordial transformation resulting in the necessity of human labor in cultivation and hunting—that is, it is a story of the origin of planting and hunting.

Trickster stories. The most widespread and best-known stories in North America center on a complex figure that has come to be known by the term *trickster.* This figure takes various physical forms, including Coyote, Raven, Mink, Blue Jay, and a variety of anthropomorphic figures. Although many collectors and interpreters of North American oral traditions have not considered trickster stories anything other than entertainment, more attention has been given in recent decades to the interpretation of these stories than perhaps to any other story type. It is important that the stories of the trickster are not all of a single type and the roles and characters the trickster plays are many and often complex. The trickster figure may also appear as the protagonist in many of the other story types I have discussed.

Basic human needs–sexuality, food, sense of self, sociability, and knowledge—almost always shape the character of the trickster, but by being exaggerated to their limits. The trickster is often grossly sexual. He has sexual relations with his daughter or mother-in-law, thus breaking the most unspeakable of taboos. He often has greatly exaggerated sexual organs, such as a penis so long that he must roll it up and carry it in a pack on his back. The trickster is often so concerned about satiating his hunger that he will eat anything (and assuredly food that is forbidden to him). Furthermore, he is unsociable, antisocial, or falsely sociable. He plays tricks on people, resulting in their suffering, embarrassment, or death. He is slow to learn, but tenacious to the point of foolishness. The trickster is a lively character; stories about him are without doubt entertaining, if sometimes bawdy. Yet the stories are almost always highly valued by native North Americans. Doubtless this is because trickster stories are rarely simply stories about a prankster or buffoon; they are stories about the nature of the world and the nature of being human. In some stories the trickster is actually the cosmic creator, but more often he is a transformer or fixer. Because of the mythic actions of the character, such things as death, suffering, lust, and many of the seemingly negative aspects of being human are accounted for and their meanings are explored. Even physical features of the cosmos such as the Milky Way are attributed to acts of the trickster. In some ways the trickster is comparable to the culture hero type of figure, who steals fire, light, water, or game; in fact, the trickster is often portrayed in this very role. Trickster stories seem also to be related to the stories of creation that feature two antagonistic creator figures, for the trickster often plays opposite a spiritual creator-deity. The antagonism is clear in many cases, for the trickster is not a deity or even a spiritual being, yet through his actions he reverses and

thereby reorders creation. [*For further discussion, see* Tricksters, *overview article and article on* North American Tricksters.]

"Orpheus." Another story type widely known among the peoples native to North America is one which depicts the death of one member of a close male-female relationship. Usually it is the woman who dies. The grief-stricken survivor ignores the interdiction that the dead are unreachable by the living and he (or she) departs on a journey seeking the dead loved one. This journey is often long and arduous, yet the tenacity of the seeker finally pays off and the place of the dead is reached. Contact with the departed lover is often contingent upon tests the seeker must pass; success leads to contact and renewed joy and happiness. An agreement is usually made establishing the conditions under which the lover may be taken back to the world of the living. Often this is an agreement not to touch the dead person or to look back until the pair is once again among the living. Sometimes the seeker must agree to treat the lover kindly after they return and to never strike or offend her. Invariably, the conditions are for some reason—eagerness, carelessness, or curiosity—not kept, and the loved one immediately disappears to return to the dead, closing forever the possibility of the dead returning to life. This story type, widely known throughout the world, is commonly identified by a reference to Orpheus, the male character of the version of this story in Greek mythology. It is a story about the finality of death, but also more broadly about the human condition.

Speech. The idea that speech is a creative force is commonly found in the stories of peoples native to North America. These peoples commonly hold the view that the appropriate tellings of stories are creative acts, that is, acts that perpetuate the creative ordering powers of which the stories tell. In some cases the power of thought and speech is identified with the power of creation, as in the Achomawi and Acoma stories of creation. For the Navajo, thought and speech are personified as important figures in the stories of creation; more significantly, as a pair their conjoined names signify the most profound and central element of Navajo religious thought.

Performance of Myth. Native American languages, with some significant exceptions in the historical period, do not have a written counterpart to utterance. Therefore, to write and read myths is alien to Native American cultures. The stories are kept alive in the minds and hearts of the living members of the cultures, who bear the constant responsibility of preventing their loss. The telling of many of these stories is restricted to particular seasons, to appropriate occasions, and to those who are qualified and deserve to tell them; in some cases stories are said to be owned by certain members of a community. Stories may serve as authority for, as interpretation of, or as directions for the performance of ritual, or they may have little if any relationship to ritual practices. Many Native Americans are reluctant to permit stories to be recorded either in written or taped form. More than anything, this reluctance is based on the extent to which such recording processes truncate and thereby violate the living dimensions of a story tradition, in which the telling of stories is a creative and nourishing act. In comparison, a written text extracted from a culture is a lifeless shadow of a story "event," and is inherently prone to misunderstanding and misuse.

Interpretive Approaches. What do we or can we learn of the religion and culture of a tribe from its stories? What can be learned from these texts about the story process and its formation, development, history, and function? One view holds that such stories are a culture's means for expressing fundamental social, cultural, and religious values. Another view maintains that they express feelings and structures common to all human beings. Clearly, the same story types and motifs are found over extensive geographic areas and on several continents, among disparate culture types, value systems, worldviews, ecological conditions, and sustenance modes, thus limiting the possibilities for culture-specific analyses of stories at the level of type, motif, or theme. The study of mythology in North America faces many challenges and obstacles.

A number of strategies have been adopted to meet the difficulties facing the task of interpreting the mythologies of North America. The most widely practiced approach, to use mythology as a measuring device for the diffusion of culture, largely avoids the matter of interpretation. Diffusionist studies are concerned primarily with the incidence of tale types and motifs identified according to a system devised by Antii Aarne and Stith Thompson. These studies are premised on the proposition that when a given tale type and motif appears in contiguous geographic areas, it is more likely accounted for by diffusion from one area to the other than by independent origins. The great majority of the collections and comparative studies of the stories of North America have been made with a concern for using them as a scale by which to measure the diffusion of culture over space and through time. Franz Boas and his many students provided the chief impetus behind this kind of study throughout the early part of the twentieth century.

Most strategies for interpreting Native American mythology are based on propositions about the nature of

mythology that are meant to apply universally. Various sociological and psychological functions of myth have been articulated by Malinowski, Durkheim, Jung, and others. While some notable studies of North American mythology have been based on these models, these approaches have had surprisingly little general impact on the study of North American mythology. While often valid and illuminating, such approaches limit interpretation to the functional perspective assumed.

While studies based on a proposed function of myth interpret the content of a text in the light of this function, a deeper level of analysis is sought in structural analyses of myth. Certainly the most widely known, but not the only form of structural study, is that articulated by Claude Lévi-Strauss. He demonstrates his analytical approach in several studies of North American mythology (including work on the Zuni, Tsimshian, Pawnee, and Winnebago tribes), although the bulk of his study of myth, published in the multivolume *Mythologiques* (4 vols., 1964–1971; translated into English as *Introduction to a Science of Mythology*, 4 vols., 1970–1981) centers on South America.

Lévi-Strauss holds that the substance of a myth is in the story that it tells, not in the identification of its motifs and themes. The meaning of a story is revealed by discerning the interrelationships among the story elements, that is, by analyzing the structure of the story. This analysis is based on his proposition that mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of fundamental oppositions toward their resolution. For Lévi-Strauss the structural study of myths is focused on the discovery of the values shared among the elements of a story—elements that align in a pattern reflecting the fundamental binary opposition that the story serves to mediate. [*For further discussion of Lévi-Strauss's work, see* Ge Mythology *and* Structuralism.]

Another form of structural analysis directed toward the study of North American mythology is presented by Alan Dundes in his *The Morphology of North American Indian Folktales* (1964). Developing upon V. I. Propp's classic work, *Morphology of the Folktale* (1928), Dundes identifies the motifs of stories in terms of their intent or value (such as lack, lack liquidated, interdiction, and violation). One can describe and typologize the structures of stories in terms of these constituents, thus permitting study, comparison, and analysis of mythology in terms not restricted to simple content identity.

In the last quarter century there have been developments in the study of mythology that are directed toward a deeper interpretation of the texts of stories, enhanced where possible by consideration of the details of particular storytelling events including the native languages in which the stories are told. This approach attempts to demonstrate that Native American mythology is equivalent to literature and that its texts should be studied with as much effort and theoretical concern as any literature. But this approach also goes further by recognizing that a key difference between literature and mythology is that mythology, by its nature, is told; it is exclusively oral, and therefore it must be studied as a social and cultural event as well as a text.

Dell Hymes has made a range of important contributions to this development of the study of North American mythology, working primarily with materials from Northwest Coast tribes. Hymes has effectively demonstrated that the free translations of stories, the "texts" that we often use, are frequently radically different from the stories as originally told. Subsequently directing his analysis to the native language texts, he shows that we cannot comprehend the deeper levels of their meaning if we are not aware of the untranslatable linguistic markers, repetitious language, tense, and other features, which are often observable only when considering the story in the language in which it is told and as it is actually told. He has also called attention to the different ways in which a story may be performed, from an outline demonstration of a story for an outside inquirer to a full performance including many elements of style, such as gesture, facial expression, timing, articulation, and voicing. Consideration of the elements of performance should include such features as the motivation for the storytelling, the relationship between a raconteur and the audience, the audience's reaction, and the expected and actual effects of the telling. Hymes describes his approach as listening to the text in all its details while looking for covariation in its form and meaning.

Based on almost any criteria, mythology is important to the study of religion, and the study of Native American religions is no exception. The study of the religious aspects of Native American mythology has scarcely begun within the academic study of religion. The potential for and importance of such a study is significant.

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Modern Movements

Throughout the initial 270 years following the establishment of the Jamestown colony in what is now Virginia, North American Indians engaged in wars and rebellions against colonial and United States governments. Often these same Indian societies, as well as other groups that had not engaged in warfare, fled from the settlers and the military. Religious movements frequently preceded, accompanied, or followed these direct physical attempts to preserve native lands and ways of life. During the twentieth century such religious movements have come to dominate native responses to oppression and deprivation, sometimes through the pursuit of litigation, involvement in public demonstrations, and even in occasional rebellions. Participants in these movements have attempted to rectify Indian grievances and to maintain Indian culture in the face of overwhelming obstacles.

Early Rebellions. Early events in the eastern and western portions of the North American continent provided harbingers for the sweep of European-Indian relations and the religious movements that have emerged in the wake of those relations. The initial Indian responses to European expropriation and exploitation were to accommodate and, less frequently, to fight. Yet protracted contact with Europeans often provoked the Indians to fight—and not necessarily as a result of special religious messages.

In the East, for example, the Pamunkey Algonquians, under Powhatan (1550?–1618), welcomed the Virginia Company's Jamestown settlers in 1607, supplying them with food. But by 1622 the Pamunkey rebelled against land expropriations, taxes, and pressures to convert to Christianity. As a consequence the Pamunkey were defeated in war and subjected to a policy of harassment and extermination; neither flight nor reservation confinement was useful in protecting them (Tyler, 1959).

In the West, Pueblo Indians residing in what are now Arizona and New Mexico came under the domination of the Spanish in 1598. The Puebloans suffered nearly a century of precipitous population decline and oppression in the forms of forced labor, land expropriation, and forced attendance at Catholic church services. On 10 August 1680, the Great Pueblo Revolt, headed by a San Juan Tewa religious leader, Popé, was successful in

driving the Spanish from all of the Pueblo villages. However, the Spanish reconquered the Pueblos twenty years later. Following a subsequent abortive revolt and with no place to retreat to, the Puebloans were forced to take their traditional Indian religious practices underground, enabling them to put a spiritual distance between themselves and their oppressors (Dozier, 1970; Sando, 1979).

Messiahs and Warriors. In the eighteenth century, as colonial populations grew, Indian struggles were often prompted by prophets—visionaries who received spiritual messages prescribing acts, beliefs, and observances that would effect imminent transformations. The Delaware of the Atlantic seaboard were defeated in numerous contests with colonists over land; the Indians gradually moved west. Prophets began emerging among them and closely related tribes, such as the Shawnee, in the 1750s and continued to appear for the next sixty years. The visionaries of the early period preached that total transformation of the world was nigh and that Indians would be restored to their former state. Later prophets preached redemptive messages that prescribed the total transformation of persons. Both groups, however, taught that white ways must be eschewed and that the oppressors could be defeated in war through spiritual forces that would accompany Indian warriors.

The most prominent of the early visionaries was Neolin, known as the Delaware Prophet. [*See the biography of Neolin.*] His message was acted upon by Pontiac, an Ottawa leader. Pontiac's unified forces experienced early successes in battle against the British, but gradually his supporters began to divide, and finally they withdrew in the face of stiff resistance at Detroit and Fort Pitt (Newcomb, 1956; Wallace, 1956).

During this same period visionaries with messages similar to that delivered by Neolin arose among the Iroquois in the area that is now western Pennsylvania and New York. The Iroquois prophets are not known to have influenced Iroquois war leaders. Nevertheless, Iroquois leaders conspired with Pontiac, who was himself acting on Neolin's message, and carried out relatively successful warfare against the British in 1763.

In 1799 Handsome Lake, a debauched erstwhile war leader among the Seneca, received the first of several visions that were eventually shaped into the *gaiwiio* ("good word"), a social and moral code traditionally recited over a four-day period. Handsome Lake's visions proposed religious and secular, moral and material solutions to Seneca poverty and humiliation. [*See the biography of Handsome Lake.*]

In 1811 Tenskwatawa, a Shawnee prophet, preached that redemption would come through strict avoidance of white practices, drunkenness, racial intermarriage, the release of Indian land to whites, and witchcraft. This redemptive message was soon joined with the belief that spiritual assistance would help the Shawnee and Delaware overcome the United States in battle. The prophet's brother Tecumseh and their followers joined forces with the British in the War of 1812, only to lose and eventually to be removed to Kansas and Oklahoma (Newcomb, 1956; Wallace, 1956). [*See the biography of Tecumseh.*]

Prophet Dance and Ghost Dances. Between 1847 and 1858, war and violence raged throughout the Columbia River drainage area and along the Pacific Coast of contemporary Washington and Oregon as whites extended their dominance over Indian communities and continued to expropriate Indian land. Around 1855 a Wanapum from the Columbia Plateau known as Smohalla claimed to have returned from the dead and began to preach from visions he had experienced. Smohalla preached that agriculture and mining defiled Mother Earth, that land should not be conveyed to whites, and that all of nature should be held in common by those who lived within it. Smohalla's religion, which came to be known as the Prophet Dance, consisted of a formal set of rituals and symbols (some derived from Christianity) integrated with these beliefs. Adherence to his code and performance of the ritual would result in the elimination of all white men, the resurrection of all deceased Indians, and the restoration of the Indians' former way of life (Spier, 1935). The Prophet Dance spread throughout the Columbia Plateau. The famous Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce and his band were also followers. In 1877 they refused to be pushed from their land. At first they fought off the Army, but were finally forced to flee on a one-thousand-mile retreat toward Canada. Eventually they were removed to Oklahoma, then moved again to Washington, but were not allowed to return to their homeland. The Prophet Dance, although stripped of its transformative message (which has been replaced by promises of personal redemption and the acquisition of curative powers), persists in the 1980s as the Pom Pom religion on the Warm Springs reservation in Oregon and the Yakima Reservation in Washington State.

In the late 1860s a Northern Paiute known as Wodziwob or Fish Lake Joe received visions instructing him to create and proselytize the Ghost Dance religion. Visions obtained by participants in the Ghost Dance hastened the day, perceived to be imminent, when the resources from which Indians once culled their livelihoods would be restored, when deceased Indians would be resurrected, when whites would be removed,

and when a new and happy existence would be created for all Ghost Dance adherents (Mooney, 1896; Gayton, 1930; DuBois, 1939; and Hittman 1972, 1973). The Ghost Dance of 1869 swept southwest and northwest through California; the northwestern movement carried to the northern Oregon coast.

The Earth Lodge cult, which grew out of the Ghost Dance, emphasized the catastrophic end of the world from which adherents would be spared by sequestering themselves in huge subterranean earth lodges. Several years later a redemptive movement, the Bole-Maru, evolved from the Earth Lodge cult. The Bole-Maru cult focused on coping with obstacles in the here and now to achieve a happy afterlife.

In 1889, well after the Ghost Dance religion as a transformative movement had died among most California, Oregon, and Great Basin societies, a second Ghost Dance movement was started. Wovoka ("the cutter"; also known as Jack Wilson), a Northern Paiute from Mason Valley, Nevada, received a series of visions instructing him to revive the Ghost Dance religion. Redemption rather than transformation was Wovoka's message, but interpretation of his message varied outside the Northern Paiute area.

The Ghost Dance religion spread throughout the Plains from Canada to Oklahoma. After a year-long period of intense participation in the dance by Indians at Pine Ridge, South Dakota, the infamous "Sioux Outbreak of 1890," the Wounded Knee massacre, occurred in which 370 Indians, 250 of which were women and children, were killed by government troops and state militiamen. These Ghost Dance adherents had believed that their "ghost shirts" were immune to bullets (Mooney, 1896). Partially because of the overwhelming influence of the Ghost Dance, the federal government enacted legislation prohibiting all native Indian religions. [*See also* Ghost Dance *and the biography of Wovoka.*]

Indian Shakers and the Sun Dance. Many of the Salish and Quileute Indian communities of the Puget Sound region (in present-day Washington State) engaged in the Prophet Dance in the 1860s and 1870s. In 1881 three severe epidemics hit the area; the Indians suffered from confinement on the reservations as well as domination by federal officials, settlers, and Christian missionaries. Also in 1881, a new prophet from among the Puget Sound Salish, John Slocum (1840?–1898?), claiming to have returned from the dead, was resurrected in a fit of shaking and incomprehensible speech before the eyes of many of his Salish relations and friends. Slocum, a logger who worked irregularly, had assumed many of the white man's vices, such as drinking and betting on horses. He was instructed by one of God's angels to follow Christ's guidelines for salvation.

After some initial interest in his vision's message, which instructed him to return to earth, to bear witness to his personal transformation, and to lead other sinners into the Christian way of life, Slocum stumbled over some of the obstacles in his worldly path, fell ill, and was expected to die. Yet after his wife—praying, sobbing, and trembling uncontrollably—approached his prostrate form, Slocum began to improve; his recovery was attributed to divine power manifested by his wife's shaking (Barnett, 1957).

As had also been the case for the Ghost Dance, missionaries spread the Shaker message, and investigators journeyed to Slocum's residence on Puget Sound to learn how to receive the gift of redemption, the new state of grace. The cult spread in all directions, spilling into British Columbia and northern California. In the latter area it was syncretized with the Bole-Maru and eventually with Pentecostal-charismatic practices. The religion continues to flourish throughout this wide area (Barnett, 1957; DuBois, 1939; Schultz, 1968; and Amoss, 1979).

The Indian Shaker participants repudiated their Christian heritage, refusing to accept the status of an affiliate of the established religions. The Shaker religion encourages individual variation and provides for it through "gifts" received in individual religious experiences. Some participants become cured, some become curers, some do both.

In the late 1880s several shamans among the Wind River Shoshoni in Wyoming had become disillusioned with the Ghost Dance. The tribe had already participated in a prereservation form of the Plains Sun Dance, and in the late 1880s they began making significant modifications to its ideology and purpose, dropping warfare and hunting themes and emphasizing concern for illness and community misery (Shimkin, 1953). By 1890 a new Sun Dance religion emerged among the Wind River Shoshoni; the new religion sought solutions to illness, death, oppression, and the factionalism that had become pervasive on the reservations during the preceding twenty years.

By about 1904, the Sun Dance had become the principal religion practiced among the Shoshoni of Idaho and Wyoming and the Ute of Utah and Colorado. It continues to be the dominant religion of these peoples in the 1980s, much as misery and oppression continue on all of the reservations. At Sun Dances a communitarian ethic is preached that eschews narrow, individualistic behavior of all kinds. Each participant—dancer, singer, chief, committeeman, and spectator-adherent—sacri-

fices pleasures and endures hardships so that living and dead Indians might have happier conditions (Jorgensen, 1972). [*See also* Sun Dance.]

Pan-Indian Redemptive Movements. The peyote religion is a pan-Indian redemptive movement; its ritual adherents eat the peyote cactus *(Lophophora williamsii).* Although some Indian societies in Mexico employed peyote in their religious practices for centuries, as did some Indian societies of the southern Plains, the peyote religion that spread like wildfire throughout the Plains in the 1890s and throughout much of North America during the next few decades was then, and remains now, distinct from eighteenth-century practices. Known as the Native American Church, the peyote religion has syncretized some Christian content—such as God, Mary, the heavenly angels, and Jesus—with Indian symbolism, the latter dominating and also varying among different tribes. In the course of its first century, the Native American Church has had to struggle against federal opposition, state opposition, Christian opposition, and the strong opposition of tribesmen on many, if not all, reservations. It has nevertheless endured and grown throughout North America (Aberle, 1982; Stewart, 1980; and Slotkin, 1956). [*See* North American Indians, *article on* Indians of the Plains; *see also* Psychedelic Drugs.]

Charismatic Christianity, in the form of Pentecostal sects, has spread widely and rapidly on North American Indian reservations since the early 1960s, as has Mormonism (the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints). These religions emphasize the accessibility and power of the Holy Ghost, and make believers aware of the evil spirit. These various sects provide explanations of the world and ethical codes that are meant to change the relations of the believers to one another and to nonbelievers, and they demand that believers seek a state of grace invested with the power of the Holy Ghost. Such movements are not fertile sources of rebellion. Rather, they allow believers to challenge evil, explain calamities, and to heal themselves and the sick. They do so by explaining why Indians have experienced grief and dissatisfaction in the past, and they provide a new ideology and the spiritual power that enable adherents to recognize and to cope with evil in this world while preparing for the next world (Jorgensen, 1984; Aberle, 1982).

On the other hand, at certain times and places in the past two decades North American Indians have shown their willingness to resist tribal governments as well as the federal government, to learn more fully their cultural traditions, and to fight, even to take up arms against superior forces. Many rebellious acts occurred in the 1970s, including the ransacking of the Bureau of Indian Affairs offices in Washington, D.C., in 1972, and the occupation of a store and a church in Wounded Knee in 1973. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, acts such as those perpetrated by the American Indian Movement (AIM) were reduced dramatically as activist Indian leaders were taken to court, some being indicted, convicted, and imprisoned.

Because of the acts of protest and the resulting litigation of the 1970s, a new understanding of Indian problems emerged among many Indian activists across the continent, as they joined with elder traditional religious leaders to learn the ideology and rituals that comprise the Dream Drum, peyote, Sun Dance, sweat lodge, and Ghost Dance religions. Younger leaders have joined with older religious leaders to participate in these religions, and to spread the practice of them to all Indian people so as to better explain the evil in the system and persons that dominate them, while creating social distance from that system. In 1981 the Dakota ("Sioux") American Indian Movement established a religious settlement known as the Yellow Thunder Camp in the Black Hills of South Dakota. The United States Forest Service controls the land, but the AIM participants in this action, claiming self-determination and freedom to worship under the Indian Freedom of Religion Act of 1978, seek title to the land so that all traditional Indian peoples can unify in spiritual pursuits. As the movement evolves, spreading principally from the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Sioux reservations in South Dakota, it focuses on an analysis of evil in the world, and on the benefits of good health, community well-being, and spiritual power that can be gained from a combination of Indian religious practices—all of which are treated as "traditional."

A combination of ritual practices, performed serially, has occurred. Some of these practices are of precontact origin, others are of postcontact origin. Some were once part of transformative movements, others of redemptive movements, and still others were traditional. All have been modified. The combination includes ritual sweating (a precontact practice) in small sweat lodges created specifically for the ritual; the Sun Dance (of precontact origin but modified to accommodate contemporary pledges for health, well-being, and the acquisition of spiritual power); peyotism (a postcontact redemptive movement); and the Ghost Dance (a latter-day redemptive version of the transformative dance that promotes good health by driving away evil). This new amalgam of nativistic practices is seen as unifying and traditional by its adherents. They are seekers of spiritual power who have recognized the enormous material, economic, and political power possessed by the opposition.

This Traditional Unity complex has spread through the American Indian Movement network to help guide sweating rituals and Sun Dance performances on the Navajo Reservation and the McDermitt Northern Paiute Reservation (both possess peyote traditions), and even to the D-Q University campus in Davis, California. D-Q University, supported by federal funds, is operated by and for American Indians and Mexican-Americans. Practitioners of the Dream Drum, peyote, and Longhouse religions of the Eastern Woodlands are also compatible partners in this loose religious confederacy (Jorgensen, 1984).

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JOSEPH G. JORGENSEN

History of Study

The religions of North American Indians manifest considerable complexity and diversity. In 1492 several hundred cultural groups practiced distinctive forms of religion. While we customarily begin the documentary record at the time of initial European contact, discoveries in archaeology have extended religious perspectives far back into prehistory. Burial mounds in the Midwest, Southeastern ceremonial sites, abandoned *kivas* in the Southwest, stone medicine wheels on the Plains, California petroglyphs, and other remains all evoke the antiquity of North American religions.

Despite its intrinsic value for comparative religion, the field of indigenous North American religions has been undercultivated by religious scholars. Too often dismissed as "primitive," these religions have been generally relegated to an undifferentiated residual category shared with other religions of primal peoples around the world. Interest in these religions has been limited to their supposed evolutionary position as stages logically antecedent to what are commonly called the "great religions," which command the allegiance of the majority of the world's population. Rarely, until recently, have North American Indian religions been studied as valid subjects in their own right. Nevertheless, research has revealed intricately structured rituals and ceremonies, myths densely packed with symbolic meanings, cosmologies that embrace subtle relations with nature, and highly elaborated varieties of individual religious experience.

One difficulty in studying native North American religions is that their institutions tend to be much less obviously compartmentalized than those of the so-called great religions. Their religious beliefs and practices pervade many spheres of practical activity; for example, among the Nootka constructing a canoe is

considered a religious act, as is Hopi horticulture, the rabbit drive of the Rappahanock, the Paiute piñon gathering, and so on.

A second problem confronting students of North American Indian religions is the absence of literacy in traditional native societies. Lacking bodies of orthodox written doctrine, they have depended on oral and visual transmission of religious tradition. Such modes place a premium on mnemonic devices, rhetorical skills, and tacit understandings gained through participation. The absence of written texts has in the past allowed considerable flexibility in adapting to change and permitted considerable latitude for idiosyncratic interpretation.

A third difficulty is that the religions of North American Indians are typically dynamic. Efforts to depict or reconstruct these religions as timeless, fully integrated systems of belief and action are usually doomed to failure. Religious movements are recurrent features in North American history and prehistory. These movements, usually inspired by prophecy, originated within particular tribes but often spread beyond tribal boundaries. Deeply embedded in many of these religions are many reintegrated traits that ultimately derive from early contacts with Christianity.

Early Observers. The study of North American religions begins with the early European explorers. Many explorers carried with them strong Christian theocentric biases that denied the existence of religion in aboriginal societies. People who went naked and lived communally, who practiced polygamy, anthropophagy, and human sacrifice were sometimes judged as less than human. What served as religion to the Indian was disdainfully dismissed by the European newcomer as devil worship, idolatry, or irrational superstition. However, since part of the European mission to explore and settle the New World was religiously motivated, earnest efforts were made to convert the heathens to the "true faith" through both coercion and persuasion.

Later explorers of the interior regions were scarcely more perspicacious than their predecessors concerning native religions. Older stereotypes persisted: Indians were said to be haunted by demons, their religious practitioners were derided as conjurors, jugglers, and imposters, and their rites were regarded as ridiculous and absurd. On matters of religion, the accounts of the explorers replay their presuppositions with monotonous regularity.

Nevertheless, in the performance of their evangelical tasks, missionaries sometimes mastered native languages and were able to penetrate the belief structures of their potential converts. The Recollet and Jesuit fathers bequeathed an unprecedented record of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century religious customs among Algonquian- and Iroquoian-speaking groups in the Northeast. Not only does the seventy-three-volume *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents* (compiled 1610–1791; first published in 1896–1901; reprint in 39 vols., New York, 1959) contain accurate firsthand observations, but the scholarly training of these priests enabled them to engage in speculative comparative ethnology. The high point of Jesuit anthropology was reached by the priest Joseph François Lafitau in his two-volume *Moeurs des sauvages ameriquains comparées aux moeurs des premiers* (1724; translated by William N. Fenton and Elizabeth L. Moore as *Customs of the American Savages, compared with the Customs of Primitive Times*, Toronto, 1977). Lafitau offered a detailed overview of religious customs based on the works of his Jesuit predecessors and supplemented by his own inquiries. He systematically compared Indian religious practices with those of classical antiquity. Convinced that the Indians had emigrated from Asia, Lafitau argued for the unity of the human race, all of whom had in the remote past, he believed, shared a common God-given religion. Lafitau maintained that through migrations, local adaptations, and forgetfulness, primal beliefs and practices degenerated; yet vestiges of this original condition could still be discerned in the customs of contemporary savages, which presented clues for unraveling unwritten history. Lafitau's ideas were not unique, but the reliability of his documentation and his attempts at systematic comparison place him in advance of his times.

Spanish and English missionaries, with rare exceptions, fell far short of the high standards set by the French. The rigid religious orthodoxy of the Spanish and the notorious ethnocentrism of the English seemed to conspire in precluding sympathetic tolerance for native beliefs. Only in the late eighteenth century do missionary accounts of native religions begin to possess substantive worth.

Along with the records of enlightened missionaries, the reports of early travelers and traders offer valuable material on North American Indians. Travelers, by virtue of their experiences with a series of different groups, frequently were sensitive to religious variations. Lack of sustained observation tended to diminish the reliability of these reports, but this deficiency was overcome by exceptional traders and administrators who resided for long periods in Indian communities, learned Indian languages, and often married Indian women. For example, the trader John Long in his account of the Ojibwa (*Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader*, 1791) is the first to refer to the concept of totem, which he describes as an association established with a guard-

ian spirit during a vision quest. Later scholars misappropriated and universalized the term to denote names for descent groups and elementary forms of religion.

Much knowledge about traditional religion among Indians of the Southeast Woodlands derives from James Adair's *The History of the American Indian* (1775). Adair, who lived for forty years among the Cherokee and Chickasaw, believed that the Indians were descended from the lost tribes of Israel. To sustain his argument, he established twenty-three points of specific convergence between Indian and Israelite customs. Despite his erroneous thesis, Adair's mode of analysis forced him to ask questions and record important religious information that might otherwise have been ignored.

Emergence of a Field of Study. Early theories about the indigenous people of North America revolved around questions of origin. Who were they? Whence did they come? Few theorists subscribed to an autochthonous origin; some, influenced by the foreshortened biblical chronology, attempted to link them with historically known Old World peoples. Such speculations encouraged the collection and analysis of ethnological materials, among which religious information was considered critical. Simple connections proved untenable, and the origins of North American Indians were pushed farther into the past. Many European and colonial philosophers and universal historians equated indigenous peoples with early stages of human development, as epitomized in Locke's famous phrase, "in the beginning all the World was America." Themes of native degeneracy and inherent inferiority were countered by the philosophical and literary image of the "Noble Savage," a convention that attained popularity in the mid-eighteenth century more as a critique of Western morality than as a serious effort accurately to portray Native Americans.

The post-Revolutionary consolidation of a national identity on the part of Americans provided another stimulus to the study of North American Indians. Intellectuals of the new republic sought to advance evidence proving that their continent was not inferior to the Old World and could support civilization. Under the influence of such leaders as Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Barton, Peter DuPonceau, Lewis Cass, and Albert Gallatin, coordinated efforts were undertaken not only to "civilize" the Indians but also to preserve for posterity a record of their traditional cultures.

The career of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft (1793–1864) exemplifies the transition from amateur observer to professional ethnologist. Schoolcraft's younger years were spent on the frontier as a geological explorer and Indian trader. After taking up residence among the Chippewa of Sault Sainte Marie, he married an Indian woman, learned Chippewa, and became a governmental agent. In 1839 he published his influential *Algic Researches*, (New York, 1839) in which he sought to reveal the deeper levels of Indian mentality through the collection of myths and folklore and the analysis of subtleties in Algonquian linguistics. His scholarly reputation thus established, Schoolcraft deserted the frontier to promote the fledgling science of ethnology. He secured federal support and was responsible for compiling the mammoth, six-volume *Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1851–1860). This work is laced with important data from missionaries and Indian agents, but its cumbersome and disorganized format limits its utility.

Advances under the Bureau of Ethnology. The founding of the Bureau of Ethnology in 1879 auspiciously launched formal government anthropology in the United States. The bureau's mission was primarily salvage ethnology and scientific systematization of knowledge about America's original inhabitants. Under the inspired directorship of John Wesley Powell, a dedicated group of scholars was assembled who left enduring contributions to the understanding of Indian religions.

The Southwest became an important area of investigation, since Apachean-speaking and Pueblo groups retained viable neoaboriginal religious systems. Such bureau-sponsored researchers as James Stevenson and Matilda Stevenson, J. W. Fewkes, Washington Matthews, J. G. Bourke, and Frank Hamilton Cushing produced papers and monographs on Southwestern ceremonialism that attracted international attention.

Other areas as well were attended to by the bureau. Clay MacCauley, James Mooney, and, later, John R. Swanton studied Southeast Woodlands religions. Research on Iroquois religion persisted through the works of Lewis Henry Morgan and Horatio Hale, whose *The Iroquois Book of Rites* (Philadelphia, 1883) represents the first modern monographic treatment of North American Indian ceremonialism. Such bureau scholars as Erminnie Smith and J. N. B. Hewitt contributed significant studies on Iroquoian myths and cosmology. Other aspects of Eastern Woodlands religion were documented by W. J. Hoffman's works on the Ojibwa and Menomini and later by Truman Michaelson's impressive corpus on the Fox.

The heyday of Plains culture still survived within living memory when bureau ethnologists entered the field. J. Owen Dorsey collected valuable information on Siouan religions; James Mooney reported on the Kiowa

and Cheyenne; Alice Fletcher, in collaboration with native intellectuals Francis La Flesche and James Murie, produced classic monographs on Omaha and Pawnee religion. Mooney's brilliant description and analysis of the contemporary Ghost Dance remains a recognized masterpiece of religious ethnology. Very little bureau work was undertaken among tribes west of the Rocky Mountains until the twentieth century.

Rise of University Specializations. By 1900 the center of American anthropology began to shift from museums and government agencies to universities. As gifted and resourceful as the early researchers of the Bureau of Ethnology were, none had received formal academic training in anthropology. The central figure in the movement toward professionalization was Franz Boas, a European-trained scholar, who exerted a dominant influence on American anthropology for the next half century. Boas developed the modern concept of culture, set new standards for fieldwork, and trained several generations of students destined to make decisive contributions to the study of Indian religions. Boas's own works on the Northwest Coast demonstrated a meticulous concern for ethnographic particularism aimed toward problems of cultural-historical reconstruction. Later he moved from an emphasis on trait analysis and diffusion toward interpretation of the dynamics of cultural integration. Reluctant to generalize and distrustful of grand theory, Boas assiduously collected native-language texts, many of which involve religious topics. Some have argued that Boas's strong positivistic empiricism inhibited theoretical development in North American anthropology; however, his insistence on obtaining the native viewpoint through texts provides a tangible legacy for modern anthropology.

Regardless of how one evaluates Boas's direct contributions to religious ethnology, his students and collaborators succeeded in filling out in fine descriptive detail the major lineaments of indigenous North American religions. Substantive works by such field-workers as Ruth Benedict, Ruth L. Bunzel, Roland B. Dixon, Alexander A. Goldenweiser, Esther Goldfrank, Erna Gunther, Herman Haeberlin, George L. Hunt, Melville Jacobs, A. L. Kroeber, Robert H. Lowie, Elsie Clews Parsons, Paul Radin, Gladys A. Reichard, Edward Sapir, Frank G. Speck, Leslie Spier, John R. Swanton, James A. Teit, Ruth M. Underhill, and Clark Wissler cannot be reviewed here. However, some brief comments on emergent trends can be mentioned. Increasingly, one finds concern with the nature of religious experience and religious meaning for the individual. Stylistic and literary features of myths and tales are given serious attention. Interest in culturally constituted worldviews becomes more apparent. Finally, there emerges an implicitly functional approach that relates religion to other aspects of culture, society, and the individual. Many of these scholars reached beyond ethnographic particularities to address problems of general theory and to impart the facts of native North American religions to a wider audience.

From the beginning, religious materials from North American Indian sources served as ammunition for the heavy artillery of European "armchair" theorists. These materials were employed in hit-or-miss fashion to support the global theories of such commanding figures as E. B. Tylor, James G. Frazer, Andrew Lang, R. R. Marett, W. J. Perry, Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Wilhelm Schmidt, and Adolf E. Jensen. American reaction to these theories has typically been defensive and critical. It must be admitted that, with few exceptions, these theorists and subsequent European ethnologists, comparativists, and religious historians lacked direct American field experience. Yet they have contributed significantly by viewing the American data from the broader perspective of world religions, by constructing typologies with which the American evidence can be analyzed and compared, and by probing deeply into the philosophical implications of these materials. Recent European scholars whose work deserves greater recognition by their American colleagues include Kaj Birket-Smith, Josef Haekel, Rolf Krusche, Werner Müller, Raffaele Pettazzoni, and Anna Burgitta Rooth. The prolific and more accessible works of Åke Hultkrantz, a Swedish scholar, deserve special comment. Hultkrantz conducted field research among the Shoshoni and Arapaho, but his principal eminence derives from his unparalleled grasp of the published literature on native North American religions, displayed in several comprehensive comparative monographs and in numerous topical essays.

Recent Topics of Study. The post-Boasian period from World War II to the present has witnessed an accelerating interest in the indigenous religions of North America, and many profitable approaches have been taken. Psychological anthropology, for example, has brought new insights into the nature of religious experience through the study of alternate states of consciousness induced through ritual use of hallucinogens and other means. Weston La Barre's *The Ghost Dance* (Garden City, N.Y., 1970) is particularly notable for its profound psychological interpretation of Native American religions.

Another approach is through environmental issues, which have stimulated considerations of the effects of religious ideology on ecological adaptation. Calvin Martin's *Keepers of the Game* (Berkeley, 1978), a historical account of Indian participation in the fur trade, has

evoked a wide variety of responses on the role of religious motivation in hunting activities. Probably the most solidly crafted study to address this problem is Adrian Tanner's monograph on the Cree, *Bringing Home Animals* (New York, 1979).

The study of religious movements, too, commands much attention. Anthony F. C. Wallace's *The Death and Rebirth of Seneca* (New York, 1969), an eloquent account of the Handsome Lake religion, is a modern classic. Considerable study has been devoted to variations of the peyote religion. La Barre's enlarged edition of *The Peyote Cult* (New York, 1969) offers the best general overview of the subject, while David F. Aberle's *The Peyote Religion among the Navaho* (Chicago, 1982) and J. S. Slotkin's several publications on Menomini peyotism provide excellent accounts of specific manifestations. Homer Barnett's monograph *Indian Shakers* (Carbondale, Ill., 1957) stands as a definitive treatment of its subject.

The structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss has opened new vistas for the reinterpretation of North American totemism, art, myths, rituals, and the witchcraft-sorcery complex. Lévi-Strauss himself has utilized North American materials extensively in his provocative publications. Structuralism has inspired a whole generation of primarily younger scholars to think about previously collected data in interesting new ways.

Several noteworthy reworkings of important manuscript collections have recently appeared. Irving Goldman, synthesizing Boas's notes and scattered publications, has accomplished what Boas was never able to do—produce a coherent, theoretically informed account of Kwakiutl religion. Goldman's *The Mouth of Heaven* (New York, 1975) is complemented by Stanley Walens's symbolic analysis of Kwakiutl art and ritual, *Feasting with Cannibals* (Princeton, 1981). Raymond J. DeMallie and Elaine A. Jahner have made available the rich previously unpublished Lakota materials that were collected early in the century by James R. Walker (*Lakota Belief and Ritual*, Lincoln, Nebr., 1980; *Lakota Society*, Lincoln, Nebr., 1982; and *Lakota Myths*, Lincoln, Nebr., 1983). DeMallie has also assembled primary materials relating to the renowned Lakota medicine man Black Elk (*The Sixth Grandfather: Black Elk's Teachings Given to John G. Neihardt*, Lincoln, Nebr., 1984). William Powers's *Oglala Religion* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1977) and his excellent descriptions of an Oglala curing ritual in *Yuwipi* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1982) amplify our understanding of Lakota religion. James R. Murie's account of Pawnee ceremonialism has been edited by Douglas Parks and published as *Ceremonies of the Pawnee* (Washington, D.C., 1981). Another important contribution to Plains research is Peter J. Powell's masterful, two-volume opus on Cheyenne religion, *Sweet Medicine* (Norman, Okla., 1969). Elisabeth Tooker has combed *The Jesuit Relations* to reconstruct Huron religion in her *An Ethnography of the Huron Indians, 1615–1649* (Washington, D.C., 1964), and she has also published a useful study entitled *The Iroquois Ceremonial of Midwinter* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1970). William N. Fenton has contributed mightily to Iroquois studies with his superb monograph on the Eagle Dance (*The Iroquois Eagle Dance*, Washington, D.C., 1953) and a continuing stream of research on Longhouse rituals. Information on several extinct Californian religions have been resurrected from the field notes of the remarkable J. P. Harrington and published in various books and articles.

The Ojibwa and the Winnebago remain two of the best-documented American religious traditions. The works of Alanson Skinner, John Cooper, A. Irving Hallowell, and Paul Radin have provided sturdy scaffolding for subsequent research. Ruth Landes's *Ojibwa Religion and the Midewiwin* (Madison, Wis., 1968) and recent historically oriented works on the Ojibwa by Christopher Vecsey (*Traditional Ojibwa Religion and its Historical Changes*, Philadelphia, 1983) and John A. Grim (*The Shaman: Patterns of Siberian and Ojibwa Healing*, Norman, Okla., 1983) illustrate this continuity. Landes's monograph on *The Prairie Potawatomi* (Madison, Wis., 1970) and James H. Howard's summary of Shawnee ceremonialism (*Shawnee: The Ceremonialism of a Native Indian Tribe and Its Cultural Background*, Athens, Ohio, 1981) enlarge our picture of Algonquian religions.

The Southwest continues as a focus of important research on religion. The complexities of Navajo religion, in particular, have been elucidated in the ethnographic and textual works of David F. Aberle, Leland C. Wyman, Berard Haile, David P. McAllester, Charlotte J. Frisbie, Louise Lamphere, and Gary Witherspoon, as well as in useful work by Sam D. Gill and Karl W. Luckert, both skilled historians of religion. Elsewhere in the Southwest, Alfonso Ortiz, a leading Tewa anthropologist, has written a sensitively informed account of Pueblo religion (*The Tewa World: Space, Time, Being and Becoming in a Pueblo Society*, Chicago, 1969), and Carobeth Laird, an affinal Chemehuevi, has recorded religious materials based on a lifetime of observation in her richly textured *The Chemehuevis* (Banning, Calif., 1976).

Knowledge of Southeast Woodlands Indian religion has been enriched by studies of religious continuities in modern Oklahoma (to which many Southeast Woodlands tribes were forcibly removed in the mid-nineteenth century); William L. Ballard's elegant analysis, entitled *The Yuchi Green Corn Ceremonial* (Los Angeles, 1978), and James G. Howard's *Oklahoma Seminoles: Medicine, Magic, and Religion* (Norman, Okla., 1984)

are notable in this regard. Howard also provocatively analyzed the ceremonial complex of the prehistoric Southeast Woodlands Indians in *The Southeastern Ceremonial Complex* (Columbia, Mo., 1968), in which he gains insights from surviving beliefs and practices. A collection of papers edited by Charles M. Hudson, *The Black Drink* (Athens, Ga., 1979), represents another effort to link prehistoric and ethnographic horizons.

The present surge in attention to native religions of North America derives from many sources. Most important is the growing recognition by Indians and non-Indians alike that religion constitutes a viable aspect of past, present, and future North American Indian societies, a point made in Vine Deloria's vigorous manifesto *God is Red* (New York, 1973). Not only have areas such as the Southwest enjoyed unbroken religious continuity, but elsewhere, once-moribund ceremonies—such as the potlatch in the Northwest, the Spirit Dance among the Salish, and the Sun Dance in the Plains—have been revivified. Syncretic and ecumenical native religions are achieving legitimacy, and in many areas Christianity has assumed a distinctively native flavor. These trends reflect changes in the political atmosphere toward native self-determination. Among other developments, passage of the Religious Freedom Act in 1978 has had far-reaching consequences in preserving sacred sites.

Academic concern with indigenous North American religions has grown dramatically in recent years. The establishment of special programs of study in many universities, the increased number of religion scholars of Native American descent, and the seriousness with which indigenous religions are now treated in many theological centers all testify to a new enlightenment. Yet despite the enhanced academic and popular visibility of Native American religions and the proliferation of publications in the field, much groundbreaking work remains. Only the surface has been scratched.

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Åke Hultkrantz's *The Study of American Indian Religions* (New York, 1983) has proved indispensable in preparing this entry. The same author's *The Religions of the American Indian* (Berkeley, 1979) and *Belief and Worship in Native North America* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1981) are valuable sources on native North American religions. A slightly older synthesis, Ruth M. Underhill's *Red Man's Religion* (Chicago, 1965), remains a useful introductory survey. A pair of works by Sam D. Gill, *Native American Religions: An Introduction* (Belmont, Calif., 1981) and *Native American Traditions: Sources and Interpretations* (Belmont, Calif., 1983), offer a lively introduction to the subject. Three anthologies with diverse contents are *Teachings from the American Earth*, edited by Dennis Tedlock and Barbara Tedlock (New York, 1975); *Seeing with a Native Eye*, edited by Walter H. Capps (New York, 1976); and *Native Religious Traditions*, edited by Earle H. Waugh and K. Dad Prithipaul (Waterloo, Ont., 1979). A carefully annotated areal selection of native texts is presented in Elisabeth Tooker's *Native North American Spirituality of the Eastern Woodlands* (New York, 1979). Other areal guides can be found in the available volumes of the new Smithsonian *Handbook of North American Indians* (Washington, D.C., 1978–). *Systems of North American Witchcraft and Sorcery*, edited by Deward E. Walker (Moscow, Idaho, 1970), and Virgil Vogel's *American Indian Medicine* (Norman, Okla., 1970) are useful sources. Harold W. Turner's *Bibliography of New Religious Movements in Primal Societies*, vol. 2, *North America* (Boston, 1978), is a major resource.

RAYMOND D. FOGELSON

NOYES, JOHN HUMPHREY (1811–1886), American religious reformer and founder of the Oneida Community. Born to a prominent family in Brattleboro, Vermont, John Humphrey Noyes graduated from Dartmouth College and attended Andover and Yale theological seminaries, studying under Nathaniel W. Taylor. Because of his unorthodox "perfectionist" beliefs, Noyes soon lost his ministerial license and became the focus of opprobrium and ridicule. He argued that Christ's second coming and the end of the Jewish dispensation had occurred in 70 AD, when the Temple was destroyed in Jerusalem. Henceforth, "perfect holiness," a right attitude that would lead to right works, was literally possible on earth as part of the establishment of the kingdom of God.

These beliefs, which Noyes attempted to propagate throughout New York State and New England, attracted little support. In 1836 Noyes returned to his family estate in Putney, Vermont, and started a Bible school, which became the Putney Community. By 1845 the group had moved toward full communal ownership of property, inspired by the Christian communism of *Acts* 2:44–45. An effort in 1846 to introduce a form of group marriage led to expulsion from Putney in 1847 and the establishment of the Oneida Community in central New York State in 1848.

At Oneida, and at the smaller related community established in 1851 at Wallingford, Connecticut, the practices that had originated at Putney became fully institutionalized. Central to these was "complex marriage." Oneida Community members, who eventually numbered more than two hundred adults, all considered themselves married to each other in an "enlarged family." Men and women exchanged sexual partners frequently, and exclusive romantic attachments were broken up as threats to group stability. Members lived, ate, and worked together, had a system of communal child rearing, and held all but the most basic property in

common. Government was achieved through a daily religious and business meeting, a method of group feedback and control called "mutual criticism," and an informal hierarchy known as "ascending and descending fellowship." A system of birth control called "male continence," technically *coitus reservatus*, was used exclusively until the final decade of the community's existence, when a "stirpiculture," or eugenics, experiment was inaugurated among some members. At Oneida there was far less sex-role stereotyping than in comparable American groups. Men and women worked alongside each other, and women served in positions of authority over men in certain jobs.

Complex marriage existed at Oneida from 1848 until 1879, when it was renounced because of internal dissatisfactions and external pressure. Noyes, with a few of his followers, had meanwhile fled to Canada, where he lived until his death, in 1886. In 1881 the group also gave up its communistic system of economic organization, reorganized as a joint-stock corporation, and went on to become a successful business, best known for its silverware. Throughout his career, Noyes was primarily concerned with disseminating his religious ideas through the newspapers that he and his associates published. Subsequent scholars and popular writers, however, have been most fascinated by his unorthodox sexual ideas and practices, which frequently have been held up as a prototype for the future.

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The only comprehensive biography that captures the spirit of John Humphrey Noyes and his communal efforts is Robert Allerton Parker's *A Yankee Saint: John Humphrey Noyes and the Oneida Community* (New York, 1935). The most accessible primary materials are found in two rich collections of documents, edited with commentary by George Wallingford Noyes: *The Religious Experience of John Humphrey Noyes, Founder of the Oneida Community* (New York, 1923) and *John Humphrey Noyes: The Putney Community* (Oneida, N.Y., 1931). Two classic and complementary nineteenth-century studies that analyze the Oneida Community within the context of the communitarian movement of which it was a part are John Humphrey Noyes's *History of American Socialisms* (Philadelphia, 1870) and Charles Nordhoff's *The Communistic Societies of the United States* (New York, 1875). For the most important primary source material on Noyes and his various communal ventures, serious scholars must consult the periodicals that he and his associates published between 1834 and 1879. These went by many different titles, including *The Circular* (Brooklyn and Oneida, N.Y., and Wallingford, Conn., 1851–1864), and are available through University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, or the Syracuse University Library, the official repository of Oneida materials.

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NUADHA. The ancient Irish hero King Nuadha appears principally in three mythological texts: the *First Battle of Magh Tuiredh*, the *Second Battle of Magh Tuiredh*, and the *Death of the Children of Tuireann*. The *First Battle of Magh Tuiredh* tells of the gods of Ireland, the Tuatha Dé Danann ("people of the goddess Danu"), in their struggle against the previous occupants of the island, the Fir Bholg (possibly, "thundermen"). [*See* Tuatha Dé Danann.] In this struggle, King Nuadha has his right arm severed and thereby loses his royal title.

The *Second Battle of Magh Tuiredh*, the most important and oldest of these texts (fifteenth century), recounts the struggle of the Tuatha Dé Danann against the Fomhoire, demons who oppressed and impoverished Ireland, draining it of wheat, livestock, and milk. Provided with a prosthetic silver arm by the physician god Dian Cécht, Nuadha recovers his royal title, earning the surname *Airgedlámh* ("of the silver arm"). The restitution of the severed arm is a difficult operation, successfully performed by the son of Dian Cécht, Miach ("bushel"). This surgical audacity will be punished by his father with death.

Nuadha is king, both provider and guardian of social order. Originally a member of the warrior class, he is raised to the same rank of dignity as a druid. He is indispensable not only for military victory but also and above all for the healthy functioning and prosperity of society. During his demotion from royalty, he is temporarily replaced by Bres, a Fomhoire. Greedy and stingy, Bres hinders the material well-being of his subjects, draining them of their goods and interrupting the normal flow of economic obligations. Only after Nuadha's reinstatement is the wicked Bres expelled, and only then can the supreme god Lugh organize the definitive battle that will result in the expulsion and massacre of the Fomhoire.

The *Death of the Children of Tuireann (Didhe Chloinne Tuireann)* is a much later narrative—the manuscripts date from the eighteenth century—but it embodies a very archaic tradition. It takes up the theme of the healing of Nuadha and the expulsion of the Fomhoire by the Tuatha Dé Danann. But the beginning of the narrative represents the most explicit Celtic version of the Indo-European theme of "the one-eyed and the one-armed." Here, the one-armed is King Nuadha, and the mutilation of his right arm is related to the symbolism of the king who brings prosperity and wields a sword of light and justice. The one-eyed is the doorkeeper-druid. Through his clairvoyant faculties, intensified by the blindness of his right eye, he is better able to forewarn the king.

Correspondences to the Irish name *Nuadha* occur in Welsh as *Nudd*, modified to *Lludd* in Welsh tales; in the

Breton anthroponym *Nuz;* and in the Brithonic theonym *Nodons*, attested in the fourth century CE in several Romano-British inscriptions at a temple of Mars in Lydney Park, near the estuary of the Severn.

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